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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 175368

April 11, 2013

LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,


vs.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES and HON. ANGELO T.
REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of DENR, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,1 praying that this Court order the
following: ( 1) declare as unconstitutional Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160,
otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7076, otherwise known as the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991; (2) prohibit and bar
respondents from exercising control over provinces; and (3) declare as illegal the respondent
Secretary of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources' (DENR) nullification, voiding and
cancellation of the Small-Scale Mining permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan.
The Facts are as follows:
On March 28, 1996, Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration Corporation (Golden Falcon) filed with
the DENR Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office No. III (MGB R-III) an Application for
Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) covering an area of 61,136 hectares
situated in the Municipalities of San Miguel, San Ildefonso, Norzagaray and San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan.2
On April 29, 1998, the MGB R-III issued an Order denying Golden Falcon's Application for
Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement for failure to secure area clearances from the
Forest Management Sector and Lands Management Sector of the DENR Regional Office No.
III.3
On November 11, 1998, Golden Falcon filed an appeal with the DENR Mines and Geosciences
Bureau Central Office (MGB-Central Office), and sought reconsideration of the Order dated April
29, 1998.4
On February 10, 2004, while Golden Falcon's appeal was pending, Eduardo D. Mercado,
Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Liberato Sembrano filed with the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of Bulacan their respective Applications
for Quarry Permit (AQP), which covered the same area subject of Golden Falcon's Application
for Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement.5
On July 16, 2004, the MGB-Central Office issued an Order denying Golden Falcon's appeal and
affirming the MGB R-III's Order dated April 29, 1998.
On September 13, 2004, Atlantic Mines and Trading Corporation (AMTC) filed with the PENRO
of Bulacan an Application for Exploration Permit (AEP) covering 5,281 hectares of the area
covered by Golden Falcon's Application for Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement.6

On October 19, 2004, DENR-MGB Director Horacio C. Ramos, in response to MGB R-III
Director Arnulfo V. Cabantog's memorandum query dated September 8, 2004, categorically
stated that the MGB-Central Office's Order dated July 16, 2004 became final on August 11,
2004, fifteen (15) days after Golden Falcon received the said Order, per the Certification dated
October 8, 2004 issued by the Postmaster II of the Philippine Postal Corporation of Cainta,
Rizal.7
Through letters dated May 5 and May 10, 2005, AMTC notified the PENRO of Bulacan and the
MGB R-III Director, respectively, that the subject Applications for Quarry Permit fell within its
(AMTC's) existing valid and prior Application for Exploration Permit, and the the former area of
Golden Falcon was open to mining location only on August 11, 2004 per the Memorandum
dated October 19, 2004 of the MGB Director, Central Office.8
On June 24, 2005, Ricardo Medina, Jr., PENRO of Bulacan, indorsed AMTC's letter to the
Provincial Legal Officer, Atty. Eugenio F. Resurreccion, for his legal opinion on which date of
denial of Golden Falcon's application/appeal April 29, 1998 or July 16, 2004 is to be
considered in the deliberation of the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) for the
purpose of determining when the land subject of the Applications for Quarry Permit could be
considered open for application.
On June 28, 2005, Provincial Legal Officer Eugenio Resurreccion issued a legal opinion stating
that the Order dated July 16, 2004 of the MGB-Central Office was a mere reaffirmation of the
Order dated April 29, 1998 of the MGB R-III; hence, the Order dated April 29, 1998 should be
the reckoning period of the denial of the application of Golden Falcon.
On July 22, 2005, AMTC filed with the PMRB of Bulacan a formal protest against the aforesaid
Applications for Quarry Permit on the ground that the subject area was already covered by its
Application for Exploration Permit.9
On August 8, 2005, MGB R-III Director Cabantog, who was the concurrent Chairman of the
PMRB, endorsed to the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, Governor Josefina M. dela Cruz, the
aforesaid Applications for Quarry Permit that had apparently been converted to Applications for
Small-Scale Mining Permit of Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and
Lucila S. Valdez (formerly Liberato Sembrano).10
On August 9, 2005, the PENRO of Bulacan issued four memoranda recommending to Governor
Dela Cruz the approval of the aforesaid Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit.11
On August 10, 2005, Governor Dela Cruz issued the corresponding Small-Scale Mining Permits
in favor of Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Lucila S. Valdez.12
Subsequently, AMTC appealed to respondent DENR Secretary the grant of the aforesaid SmallScale Mining Permits, arguing that: (1) The PMRB of Bulacan erred in giving due course to the
Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit without first resolving its formal protest; (2) The
areas covered by the Small-Scale Mining Permits fall within the area covered by AMTC's valid
prior Application for Exploration Permit; (3) The Applications for Quarry Permit were illegally
converted to Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit; (4) DENR-MGB Director Horacio C.
Ramos' ruling that the subject areas became open for mining location only on August 11, 2004
was controlling; (5) The Small-Scale Mining Permits were null and void because they covered
areas that were never declared People's Small-Scale Mining Program sites as mandated by
Section 4 of the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991; and (6) Iron ore is not considered as
one of the quarry resources, as defined by Section 43 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995,
which could be subjects of an Application for Quarry Permit.13

On August 8, 2006, respondent DENR Secretary rendered a Decision14 in favor of AMTC. The
DENR Secretary agreed with MGB Director Horacio C. Ramos that the area was open to mining
location only on August 11, 2004, fifteen (15) days after the receipt by Golden Falcon on July
27, 2004 of a copy of the MGB-Central Office's Order dated July 16, 2004, which Order denied
Golden Falcon's appeal. According to the DENR Secretary, the filing by Golden Falcon of the
letter-appeal suspended the finality of the Order of denial issued on April 29, 1998 by the
Regional Director until the resolution of the appeal on July 16, 2004 by the MGB-Central Office.
He stated that the Applications for Quarry Permit were filed on February 10, 2004 when the area
was still closed to mining location; hence, the Small-Scale Mining Permits granted by the PMRB
and the Governor were null and void. On the other hand, the DENR Secretary declared that
AMTC filed its Application for Exploration Permit when the area was already open to other
mining applicants; thus, AMTCs Application for Exploration Permit was valid. Moreover, the
DENR Secretary held that the questioned Small-Scale Mining Permits were issued in violation
of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7076 and beyond the authority of the Provincial Governor pursuant to
Section 43 of R.A. No. 7942, because the area was never proclaimed to be under the People's
Small-Scale Mining Program. Further, the DENR Secretary stated that iron ore mineral is not
considered among the quarry resources.
The dispositive portion of the DENR Secretarys Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Application for Exploration Permit, AEP-III-02-04 of Atlantic Mines and
Trading Corp. is declared valid and may now be given due course. The Small-Scale Mining
Permits, SSMP-B-002-05 of Gerardo Cruz, SSMP-B-003-05 of Eduardo D. Mercado, SSMP-B004-05 of Benedicto S. Cruz and SSMP-B-005-05 of Lucila S. Valdez are declared NULL AND
VOID. Consequently, the said permits are hereby CANCELLED.15
Hence, petitioner League of Provinces filed this petition.
Petitioner is a duly organized league of local governments incorporated under R.A. No. 7160.
Petitioner declares that it is composed of 81 provincial governments, including the Province of
Bulacan. It states that this is not an action of one province alone, but the collective action of all
provinces through the League, as a favorable ruling will not only benefit one province, but all
provinces and all local governments.
Petitioner raises these issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 17(B)(3)(III) OF THE, 1991 LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE AND
SECTION 24 OF THE PEOPLE'S SMALL-SCALE MINING ACT OF 1991 ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR PROVIDING FOR EXECUTIVE CONTROL AND INFRINGING
UPON THE LOCAL AUTONOMY OF PROVINCES.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACT OF RESPONDENT [DENR] IN NULLIFYING, VOIDING AND
CANCELLING THE SMALL-SCALE MINING PERMITS AMOUNTS TO EXECUTIVE
CONTROL, NOT MERELY SUPERVISION AND USURPS THE DEVOLVED POWERS OF ALL
PROVINCES.16
To start, the Court finds that petitioner has legal standing to file this petition because it is tasked
under Section 504 of the Local Government Code of 1991 to promote local autonomy at the
provincial level;17 adopt measures for the promotion of the welfare of all provinces and its
officials and employees;18 and exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as the league may prescribe for the welfare of the provinces.19

Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the
Government, it bears emphasis that ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time-honored principle
that a statute is presumed to be valid.20 This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation
of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming
courtesy for each other's acts.21 This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof,
unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution,22 leaving no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the Court.23
In this case, petitioner admits that respondent DENR Secretary had the authority to nullify the
Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the DENR
Secretary has control over the PMRB, and the implementation of the Small-Scale Mining
Program is subject to control by respondent DENR.
Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale mining in the provinces is granted by
three statutes: (1) R.A. No. 7061 or The Local Government Code of 1991; (2) R.A. No. 7076 or
the People's Small Scale Mining Act of 1991; and (3) R.A. No. 7942, otherwise known as the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995.24 The pertinent provisions of law sought to be declared as
unconstitutional by petitioner are as follows:
R.A. No. 7061 (The Local Government Code of 1991)
SEC. 17. Basic Services and Facilities. - (a) Local government units shall endeavor to be selfreliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions
currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of
national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units
shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of
the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following:
xxxx
(3) For a Province:c
xxxx
(iii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR,
enforcement of forestry laws limited to community-based forestry projects, pollution control law,
small-scale mining law, and other laws on the protection of the environment; and mini-hydro
electric projects for local purposes; x x x25
R.A. No. 7076 (People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991)
Sec. 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. - There is hereby created under the direct
supervision and control of the Secretary a provincial/city mining regulatory board, herein called
the Board, which shall be the implementing agency of the Department, and shall exercise the
following powers and functions, subject to review by the Secretary:
(a) Declare and segregate existing gold-rush areas for small-scale mining;
(b) Reserve future gold and other mining areas for small-scale mining;
(c) Award contracts to small-scale miners;

(d) Formulate and implement rules and regulations related to small-scale mining;
(e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within a peoples smallscale mining area, an area that is declared a small-mining; and
(f) Perform such other functions as may be necessary to achieve the goals and
objectives of this Act.26
Petitioner contends that the aforecited laws and DENR Administrative Order No. 9640 (the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995) did not explicitly
confer upon respondents DENR and the DENR Secretary the power to reverse, abrogate,
nullify, void, or cancel the permits issued by the Provincial Governor or small-scale mining
contracts entered into by the PMRB. The statutes are also silent as to the power of respondent
DENR Secretary to substitute his own judgment over that of the Provincial Governor and the
PMRB.
Moreover, petitioner contends that Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991
and Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076, which confer upon respondents DENR and the DENR
Secretary the power of control are unconstitutional, as the Constitution states that the President
(and Executive Departments and her alter-egos) has the power of supervision only, not control,
over acts of the local government units, and grants the local government units autonomy, thus:
The 1987 Constitution:
Article X, Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over
local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.27
Petitioner contends that the policy in the above-cited constitutional provision is mirrored in the
Local Government Code, which states:
SEC. 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units. - (a) Consistent with the basic
policy on local autonomy, the President shall exercise general supervision over local
government units to ensure that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions.
The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces, highly urbanized
cities, and independent component cities; through the province with respect to component cities
and municipalities; and through the city and municipality with respect to barangays.28
Petitioner contends that the foregoing provisions of the Constitution and the Local Government
Code of 1991 show that the relationship between the President and the Provinces or
respondent DENR, as the alter ego of the President, and the Province of Bulacan is one of
executive supervision, not one of executive control. The term "control" has been defined as the
power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his/her duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter, while
the term "supervision" is the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform
their function in accordance with law.29
Petitioner argues that respondent DENR Secretary went beyond mere executive supervision
and exercised control when he nullified the small-scale mining permits granted by the Provincial
Governor of Bulacan, as the former substituted the judgment of the latter.
Petitioner asserts that what is involved here is a devolved power.

Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the power to regulate small-scale mining has been
devolved to all provinces. In the exercise of devolved powers, departmental approval is not
necessary.30
Petitioner contends that if the provisions in Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076 and Section 17 (b)(3)(iii)
of the Local Government Code of 1991 granting the power of control to the DENR/DENR
Secretary are not nullified, nothing would stop the DENR Secretary from nullifying, voiding and
canceling the small-scale mining permits that have been issued by a Provincial Governor.
Petitioner submits that the statutory grant of power of control to respondents is unconstitutional,
as the Constitution only allows supervision over local governments and proscribes control by the
executive departments.
In its Comment, respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, stated that
contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the power to implement the small-scale mining law is
expressly limited in Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code, which provides that it
must be carried out "pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review
of the DENR." Moreover, the fact that the power to implement the small-scale mining law has
not been fully devolved to provinces is further amplified by Section 4 of the People's SmallScale Mining Act of 1991, which provides, among others, that the People's Small-Scale Mining
Program shall be implemented by the DENR Secretary.
The petition lacks merit.
Paragraph 1 of Section 2, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the
Constitution31 provides that "the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State."
Moreover, paragraph 3 of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides that "the Congress
may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens x x x."
Pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, R.A. No. 7076 or the People's Small-Scale
Mining Act of 1991, was enacted, establishing under Section 4 thereof a People's Small-Scale
Mining Program to be implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other
concerned government agencies.
The People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 defines "small-scale mining" as "refer[ring] to
mining activities, which rely heavily on manual labor using simple implement and methods and
do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment."32
It should be pointed out that the Administrative Code of 198733 provides that the DENR is,
subject to law and higher authority, in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate,
under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization and conservation of the country's natural resources. Hence, the
enforcement of small-scale mining law in the provinces is made subject to the supervision,
control and review of the DENR under the Local Government Code of 1991, while the Peoples
Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 provides that the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program is to be
implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned local government
agencies.
Indeed, Section 4, Article X (Local Government) of the Constitution states that "[t]he President
of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments," and Section 25 of
the Local Government Code reiterates the same. General supervision by the President means
no more than seeing to it that laws are faithfully executed or that subordinate officers act within
the law.34

The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution
Art. X, Sec. 2 refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more
technical language, the decentralization of government authority.35 It does not make local
governments sovereign within the State.36 Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of
powers, but subject to limitations like following national policies or standards,37 and those
provided by the Local Government Code, as the structuring of local governments and the
allocation of powers, responsibilities, and resources among the different local government units
and local officials have been placed by the Constitution in the hands of Congress38 under
Section 3, Article X of the Constitution.
Section 3, Article X of the Constitution mandated Congress to "enact a local government code
which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities,
and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term,
salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units."
In connection with the enforcement of the small-scale mining law in the province, Section 17 of
the Local Government Code provides:
SEC. 17. Basic Services and Facilities. - (a) Local government units shall endeavor to be selfreliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions
currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of
national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units
shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of
the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following:
xxxx
(3) For a Province:c
xxxx
(iii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR,
enforcement of forestry laws limited to community-based forestry projects, pollution control law,
small-scale mining law, and other laws on the protection of the environment; and mini-hydro
electric projects for local purposes;39
Clearly, the Local Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale
mining law to the provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control
and review of the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out
the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization of the country's natural resources.40
Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 is in harmony with R.A. No. 7076 or
the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991,41 which established a People's Small-Scale Mining
Program to be implemented by the Secretary of the DENR, thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared of the State to promote, develop, protect
and rationalize viable small-scale mining activities in order to generate more employment

opportunities and provide an equitable sharing of the nation's wealth and natural resources,
giving due regard to existing rights as herein provided.
xxxx
Sec. 4. People's Small-Scale Mining Program. - For the purpose of carrying out the declared
policy provided in Section 2 hereof, there is hereby established a People's Small-Scale Mining
Program to be implemented by the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, hereinafter called the Department, in coordination with other concerned government
agencies, designed to achieve an orderly, systematic and rational scheme for the small-scale
development and utilization of mineral resources in certain mineral areas in order to address the
social, economic, technical, and environmental problems connected with small-scale mining
activities.
xxxx
Sec. 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. There is hereby created under the direct
supervision and control of the Secretary a provincial/city mining regulatory board, herein called
the Board, which shall be the implementing agency of the Department, and shall exercise the
following powers and functions, subject to review by the Secretary:
(a) Declare and segregate existing gold-rush areas for small-scale mining;
(b) Reserve future gold and other mining areas for small-scale mining;
(c) Award contracts to small-scale miners;
(d) Formulate and implement rules and regulations related to small-scale mining;
(e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within a peoples smallscale mining area, an area that is declared a small-mining; and
(f) Perform such other functions as may be necessary to achieve the goals and
objectives of this Act.42
DENR Administrative Order No. 34, series of 1992, containing the Rules and Regulations to
implement R.A. No. 7076, provides:
SEC. 21. Administrative Supervision over the People's Small-Scale Mining Program. The
following DENR officials shall exercise the following supervisory functions in the implementation
of the Program:
21.1 DENR Secretrary direct supervision and control over the program and activities of
the small-scale miners within the people's small-scale mining area;
21.2 Director the Director shall:
a. Recommend the depth or length of the tunnel or adit taking into account the:
(1) size of membership and capitalization of the cooperative; (2) size of
mineralized areas; (3) quantity of mineral deposits; (4) safety of miners; and (5)
environmental impact and other considerations;
b. Determine the right of small-scale miners to existing facilities in consultation
with the operator, claimowner, landowner or lessor of an affected area upon
declaration of a small-scale mining area;

c. Recommend to the Secretary the withdrawal of the status of the people's


small-scale mining area when it can no longer be feasibly operated on a smallscale basis; and
d. See to it that the small-scale mining contractors abide by small-scale mines
safety rules and regulations.
xxxx
SEC. 22. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. The Provincial/City Mining Regulatory
Board created under R.A. 7076 shall exercise the following powers and functions, subject to
review by the Secretary:
22.1 Declares and segregates existing gold rush area for small-scale mining;
22.2 Reserves for the future, mineralized areas/mineral lands for people's small-scale
mining;
22.3 Awards contracts to small-scale miners cooperative;
22.4 Formulates and implements rules and regulations related to R.A. 7076;
22.5 Settles disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within ninety (90)
days upon filing of protests or complaints; Provided, That any aggrieved party may
appeal within five (5) days from the Board's decision to the Secretary for final resolution
otherwise the same is considered final and executory; and
22.6 Performs such other functions as may be necessary to achieve the goals and
objectives of R.A. 7076.
SEC. 6. Declaration of People's Small-Scale Mining Areas. The Board created under R.A.
7076 shall have the authority to declare and set aside People's Small-Scale Mining Areas in
sites onshore suitable for small-scale mining operations subject to review by the DENR
Secretary thru the Director.43
DENR Administrative Order No. 23, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 7942, otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, adopted
on August 15, 1995, provides under Section 12344thereof that small-scale mining applications
should be filed with the PMRB45 and the corresponding permits shall be issued by the Provincial
Governor, except small-scale mining applications within the mineral reservations.
Thereafter, DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40, otherwise known as the Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942, otherwise known as the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995, adopted on December 19, 1996, provides that applications for Small-Scale
Mining Permits shall be filed with the Provincial Governor/City Mayor through the concerned
Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board for areas outside the Mineral Reservations and with the
Director though the Bureau for areas within the Mineral Reservations.46 Moreover, it provides
that Local Government Units shall, in coordination with the Bureau/ Regional Offices and
subject to valid and existing mining rights, "approve applications for small-scale mining, sand
and gravel, quarry x x x and gravel permits not exceeding five (5) hectares."47
Petitioner contends that the Local Government Code of 1991, R.A. No. 7076, DENR
Administrative Orders Nos. 95-23 and 96-40 granted the DENR Secretary the broad statutory
power of control, but did not confer upon the respondents DENR and DENR Secretary the

power to reverse, abrogate, nullify, void, cancel the permits issued by the Provincial Governor or
small-scale mining contracts entered into by the Board.
The contention does not persuade.
The settlement of disputes over conflicting claims in small-scale mining is provided for in
Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076, thus:
Sec. 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. There is hereby created under the direct
supervision and control of the Secretary a provincial/city mining regulatory board, herein called
the Board, which shall be the implementing agency of the Department, and shall exercise the
following powers and functions, subject to review by the Secretary:
xxxx
(e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within a people's small-scale
mining area, an area that is declared a small mining area; x x x
Section 24, paragraph (e) of R.A. No. 7076 cited above is reflected in Section 22, paragraph
22.5 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7076, to wit:
SEC. 22. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. The Provincial/City Mining Regulatory
Board created under R.A. No. 7076 shall exercise the following powers and functions, subject to
review by the Secretary:
xxxx
22.5 Settles disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within ninety (90) days upon
filing of protests or complaints; Provided, That any aggrieved party may appeal within five (5)
days from the Board's decision to the Secretary for final resolution otherwise the same is
considered final and executory; x x x
In this case, in accordance with Section 22, paragraph 22.5 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 7076, the AMTC filed on July 22, 2005 with the PMRB of Bulacan a
formal protest against the Applications for Quarry Permits of Eduardo Mercado, Benedicto Cruz,
Liberato Sembrano (replaced by Lucila Valdez) and Gerardo Cruz on the ground that the
subject area was already covered by its Application for Exploration Permit.48However, on August
8, 2005, the PMRB issued Resolution Nos. 05-8, 05-9, 05-10 and 05-11, resolving to submit to
the Provincial Governor of Bulacan the Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permits of Eduardo
Mercado, Benedicto Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz for the granting/issuance of the said
permits.49 On August 10, 2005, the Provincial Governor of Bulacan issued the Small-Scale
Mining Permits to Eduardo Mercado, Benedicto Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz based on
the legal opinion of the Provincial Legal Officer and the Resolutions of the PMRB of Bulacan.
Hence, AMTC filed an appeal with respondent DENR Secretary, appealing from LetterResolution No. 05-1317 and Resolution Nos. 05-08, 05-09, 05-10 and 05-11, all dated August 8,
2005, of the PMRB of Bulacan, which resolutions gave due course and granted, on August 10,
2005, Small-Scale Mining Permits to Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Lucila Valdez
and Gerardo Cruz involving parcels of mineral land situated at Camachin, Doa Remedios
Trinidad, Bulacan.
The PMRB of Bulacan filed its Answer, stating that it is an administrative body, created under
R.A. No. 7076, which cannot be equated with the court wherein a full-blown hearing could be
conducted, but it is enough that the parties were given the opportunity to present evidence. It
asserted that the questioned resolutions it issued were in accordance with the mining laws and

that the Small-Scale Mining Permits granted were registered ahead of AMTC's Application for
Exploration Permit. Further, the Board stated that the Governor of Bulacan had the power to
approve the Small-Scale Mining Permits under R.A. No. 7160.
The DENR Secretary found the appeal meritorious, and resolved these pivotal issues: (1) when
is the subject mining area open for mining location by other applicants; and (2) who among the
applicants have valid applications.1wphi1 The pertinent portion of the decision of the DENR
Secretary reads:
We agree with the ruling of the MGB Director that the area is open only to mining location on
August 11, 2004, fifteen (15) days after the receipt by Golden Falcon on July 27, 2004 of a copy
of the subject Order of July 16, 2004.1wphi1 The filing by Golden Falcon of the letter-appeal
suspended the finality of the Order of Denial issued on April 29, 1998 by the Regional Director
until the Resolution thereof on July 16, 2004.
Although the subject AQPs/SSMPs were processed in accordance with the procedures of the
PMRB, however, the AQPs were filed on February 10, 2004 when the area is still closed to
mining location. Consequently, the SSMPs granted by the PMRB and the Governor are null and
void making thereby AEP No. III-02-04 of the AMTC valid, it having been filed when the area is
already open to other mining applicants.
Records also show that the AQPs were converted into SSMPs. These are two (2) different
applications. The questioned SSMPs were issued in violation of Section 4 of RA 7076 and
beyond the authority of the Provincial Governor pursuant to Section 43 of RA 7942 because the
area was never proclaimed as "People's Small-Scale Mining Program." Moreover, iron ore
mineral is not considered among the quarry resources.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Application for Exploration Permit, AEP-III-02-04 of Atlantic Mines and
Trading Corp. is declared valid and may now be given due course. The Small-Scale Mining
Permits, SSMP-B-002-05 of Gerardo Cruz, SSMP-B-003-05 of Eduardo D. Mercado, SSMP-B004-05 of Benedicto S. Cruz and SSMP-B-005-05 of Lucila S. Valdez are declared NULL AND
VOID. Consequently, the said permits are hereby CANCELLED.50
The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary was rendered in accordance with the
power of review granted to the DENR Secretary in the resolution of disputes, which is provided
for in Section 24 of R.A. No. 707651 and Section 22 of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.52 It is noted that although AMTC filed a protest with the PMRB regarding its
superior and prior Application for Exploration Permit over the Applications for Quarry Permit,
which were converted to Small-Scale Mining Permits, the PMRB did not resolve the same, but
issued Resolution Nos. 05-08 to 05-11 on August 8, 2005, resolving to submit to the Provincial
Governor of Bulacan the Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permits of Eduardo Mercado,
Benedicto Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz for the granting of the said permits. After the
Provincial Governor of Bulacan issued the Small-Scale Mining Permits on August 10, 2005,
AMTC appealed the Resolutions of the PMRB giving due course to the granting of the SmallScale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor.
Hence, the decision of the DENR Secretary, declaring that the Application for Exploration Permit
of AMTC was valid and may be given due course, and canceling the Small-Scale Mining
Permits issued by the Provincial Governor, emanated from the power of review granted to the
DENR Secretary under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The DENR
Secretary's power to review and, therefore, decide, in this case, the issue on the validity of the
issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor as recommended by the
PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function, which involves the determination of what the law is, and what

the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on
the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights.53 The DENR
Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations to the extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting
claims. This quasi-judicial function of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated with
"substitution of judgment" of the Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor
"control" over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the rights of
AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.
In determining whether Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section
24 of R.A. No. 7076 are unconstitutional, the Court has been guided by Beltran v. The Secretary
of Health, 54 which held:
The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a
law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those who
petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the
basis therefor. Otherwise, the petition must fail. 55
In this case, the Court finds that the grounds raised by petitioner to challenge the
constitutionality of Section 17 (b )(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24
'of R.A. No.7076 failed to overcome the constitutionality of the said provisions of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 196231

September 4, 2012

EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner,


vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting through and represented by
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO, Officer in Charge, Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA
TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, and ATTY. CARLITOD. CATAYONG,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 196232
WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, ATTY. DENNIS F. ORTIZ, ATTY. CARLO D.SULAY and ATTY. FROILAN
MONTALBAN, .JR., in their capacities as CHAIRMAN and MEMBERS of the OFFICE OF
MALACAANG LEGAL AFFAIRS, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Case
These two petitions have been consolidated not because they stem from the same factual
milieu but because they raise a common thread of issues relating to the President's exercise of
the power to remove from office herein petitioners who claim the protective cloak of
independence of the constitutionally-created office to which they belong - the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The first case, docketed as G.R. No. 196231, is a Petition for Certiorari (with application for
issuance of temporary restraining order or status quo order) which assails on jurisdictional
grounds the Decision1 dated March 31, 2011 rendered by the Office of the President in OP Case
No. 10-J-460 dismissing petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military
and Other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO), upon a finding of guilt on the administrative
charges of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust.
The petition primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the
power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The second case, docketed as G.R. No. 196232, is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with
application for issuance of a temporary restraining order or status quo order) seeking to annul,
reverse and set aside (1) the undated Order2 requiring petitioner Wendell Barreras-Sulit to
submit a written explanation with respect to alleged acts or omissions constituting serious/grave
offenses in relation to the Plea Bargaining Agreement (PLEBARA) entered into with Major
General Carlos F. Garcia; and (2) the April 7, 2011 Notice of Preliminary Investigation,3both

issued by the Office of the President in OP-DC-Case No. 11-B-003, the administrative case
initiated against petitioner as a Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman. The petition
likewise seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 giving the President
the power to dismiss a Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The facts from which these two cases separately took root are neither complicated nor
unfamiliar.
In the morning of August 23, 2010, news media scampered for a minute-by-minute coverage of
a hostage drama that had slowly unfolded right at the very heart of the City of Manila. While
initial news accounts were fragmented it was not difficult to piece together the story on the
hostage-taker, Police Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza. He was a disgruntled former police
officer attempting to secure his reinstatement in the police force and to restore the benefits of a
life-long, and erstwhile bemedaled, service. The following day, broadsheets and tabloids were
replete with stories not just of the deceased hostage-taker but also of the hostage victims, eight
of whom died during the bungled police operation to rescue the hapless innocents. Their tragic
deaths triggered word wars of foreign relation proportions. One newspaper headline ran the
story in detail, as follows:
MANILA, Philippines - A dismissed policeman armed with an assault rifle hijacked a bus packed
with tourists, and killed most of its passengers in a 10 hour-hostage drama shown live on
national television until last night.
Former police senior inspector Rolando Mendoza was shot dead by a sniper at past 9 p.m.
Mendoza hijacked the bus and took 21 Chinese tourists hostage, demanding his reinstatement
to the police force.
The hostage drama dragged on even after the driver of the bus managed to escape and told
police that all the remaining passengers had been killed.
Late into the night assault forces surrounded the bus and tried to gain entry, but a pair of dead
hostages hand-cuffed to the door made it difficult for them. Police said they fired at the wheels
of the bus to immobilize it.
Police used hammers to smash windows, door and wind-shield but were met with intermittent
fire from the hos-tage taker.
Police also used tear gas in an effort to confirm if the remaining hostages were all dead or alive.
When the standoff ended at nearly 9 p.m., some four hostages were rescued alive while
Mendoza was killed by a sniper.
Initial reports said some 30 policemen stormed the bus. Shots also rang out, sending
bystanders scampering for safety.
It took the policemen almost two hours to assault the bus because gunfire reportedly rang out
from inside the bus.
Mendoza hijacked the tourist bus in the morning and took the tourists hostage.
Mendoza, who claimed he was illegally dismissed from the police service, initially released nine
of the hostages during the drama that began at 10 a.m. and played out live on national
television.

Live television footage showed Mendoza asking for food for those remaining in the bus, which
was delivered, and fuel to keep the air-conditioning going. The disgruntled former police officer
was reportedly armed with an M-16 rifle, a 9 mm pistol and two hand grenades.
Mendoza posted a handwritten note on the windows of the bus, saying "big deal will start after 3
p.m. today." Another sign stuck to another window said "3 p.m. today deadlock."
Stressing his demand, Mendoza stuck a piece of paper with a handwritten message: "Big
mistake to correct a big wrong decision." A larger piece of paper on the front windshield was
headed, "Release final decision," apparently referring to the case that led to his dismissal from
the police force.
Negotiations dragged on even after Mendoza's self-imposed deadline.
Senior Police Officer 2 Gregorio Mendoza said his brother was upset over his dismissal from the
police force. "His problem was he was unjustly removed from service. There was no due
process, no hearing, no com-plaint," Gregorio said.
Last night, Gregorio was arrested by his colleagues on suspicions of being an accessory to his
brother's action. Tensions rose as relatives tried to prevent lawmen from arresting Gregorio in
front of national television. This triggered the crisis that eventually forced Mendoza to carry out
his threat and kill the remaining hostages.
Negotiators led by Superintendent Orlando Yebra and Chief Inspector Romeo Salvador tried to
talk Mendoza into surrendering and releasing the 21 hostages, mostly children and three
Filipinos, including the driver, the tourist guide and a photographer. Yebra reportedly lent a
cellphone to allow communications with Mendoza in-side the bus, which was parked in front
ofthe Quirino Grandstand.
Children could be seen peeking from the drawn curtains of the bus while police negotiators
hovered near the scene.
Manila Police District (MPD) director Chief Superinten-dent Rodolfo Magtibay ordered the
deployment of crack police teams and snipers near the scene. A crisis man-agement committee
had been activated with Manila Vice Mayor Isko Moreno coordinating the actions with the MPD.
Earlier last night, Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez had a meeting with Moreno to discuss
Mendoza's case that led to his dismissal from the service. Ombudsman spokesman Jose de
Jesus said Gutierrez gave a "sealed letter" to Moreno to be delivered to Mendoza. De Jesus did
not elaborate on the contents of the letter but said Moreno was tasked to personally deliver the
letter to Mendoza.
MPD spokesman Chief Inspector Edwin Margarejo said Mendoza was apparently distraught by
the slow process of the Ombudsman in deciding his motion for reconside-ration. He said the
PNP-Internal Affairs Service and the Manila Regional Trial Court had already dismissed criminal cases against him.
The hostage drama began when Mendoza flagged down the Hong Thai Travel Tourist bus
(TVU-799), pretend-ing to hitch a ride. Margarejo said the bus had just left Fort Santiago in
Intramuros when Mendoza asked the driver to let him get on and ride to Quirino Grandstand.
Upon reaching the Quirino Grandstand, Mendoza an-nounced to the passengers that they
would be taken hostage. "Having worn his (police) uniform, of course there is no doubt that he
already planned the hostage taking," Margarejo said. - Sandy Araneta, Nestor Etolle, Delon
Porcalla, Amanda Fisher, Cecille Suerte Felipe, Christi-na Mendez, AP Grandstand Carnage,
The Philippine Star, Updated August 24, 2010 12:00 AM, Val Rodri-guez.4

In a completely separate incident much earlier in time, more particularly in December of 2003,
28-year-old Juan Paolo Garcia and 23-year-old Ian Carl Garcia were caught in the United
States smuggling $100,000 from Manila by concealing the cash in their luggage and making
false statements to US Customs Officers. The Garcia brothers pleaded guilty to bulk cash
smuggling and agreed to forfeit the amount in favor of the US Government in exchange for the
dismissal of the rest of the charges against them and for being sentenced to time served.
Inevitably, however, an investigation into the source of the smuggled currency conducted by US
Federal Agents and the Philippine Government unraveled a scandal of military corruption and
amassed wealth -- the boys' father, Retired Major General Carlos F. Garcia, former Chief
Procurement Officer of the Armed Forces, had accumulated more than P 300 Million during his
active military service. Plunder and Anti-Money Laundering cases were eventually filed against
Major General Garcia, his wife and their two sons before the Sandiganbayan.
G.R. No. 196231
Sometime in 2008, a formal charge5 for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery
extortion and physical injuries) was filed before the Philippine National Police-National Capital
Region (PNP-NCR) against Manila Police District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando
Mendoza, and four others, namely, Police Inspector Nelson Lagasca, Senior Police Inspector I
Nestor David, Police Officer III Wilson Gavino, and Police Officer II Roderick Lopena. A similar
charge was filed by the private complainant, Christian M. Kalaw, before the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Manila, docketed as I.S. No. 08E-09512.
On July 24, 2008, while said cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional Director of the
National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of petitioner Emilio A.
Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication.6 Subsequently, Case No. OMBP-A-08-0670-H for Grave Misconduct was lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his
fellow police officers, who filed their respective verified position papers as directed.
Meanwhile, on August 26, 2008, I.S. No. 08E-09512 was dismissed7 upon a finding that the
material allegations made by the complainant had not been substantiated "by any evidence at
all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the offenses charged." Similarly, the Internal
Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution8 dated October 17, 2008 recommending the
dismissal without prejudice of the administrative case against the same police officers, for failure
of the complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings despite due notice.
However, on February 16, 2009, upon the recommendation of petitioner Emilio Gonzales III, a
Decision9 in Case No. OMB-P-A-08-0670-H finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow
police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman. The dispositive
portion of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondents P/S Insp. ROLANDO DEL
ROSARIO MENDOZA and PO3 WILSON MATIC GAVINO of PRO-ARMM, Camp Brig. Gen.
Salipada K. Pendatun, Parang, Shariff Kabunsuan; P/INSP. NELSON URBANO LAGASCA,
SPO1 NESTOR REYES DAVID and PO2 RODERICK SALVA LOPEA of Manila Police
District, Headquarters, United Nations Avenue, Manila, be meted the penalty
of DISMISSAL from the Service, pursuant to Section 52 (A), Rule IV, Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement
benefits and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service pursuant
to Section 58, Rule IV of the same Uniform Rules of Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
for having committed GRAVE MISCONDUCT.

On November 5, 2009, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 of the foregoing Decision,
followed by a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration11 on November 19, 2009. On
December 14, 2009, the pleadings mentioned and the records of the case were assigned for
review and recommendation to Graft Investigation and Prosecutor Officer Dennis L. Garcia, who
released a draft Order12 on April 5, 2010 for appropriate action by his immediate superior,
Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, who, in turn, signed and forwarded said Order to petitioner
Gonzalez's office on April 27, 2010. Not more than ten (10) days after, more particularly on May
6, 2010, petitioner endorsed the Order, together with the case records, for final approval by
Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez, in whose office it remained pending for final review and
action when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of
August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service.
In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eight
HongKong Chinese nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando
Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of government officials prompted the creation
of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC),13 chaired by Justice Secretary Leila
de Lima and vice-chaired by Interior and Local Government Secretary Jesus Robredo. It was
tasked to determine accountability for the incident through the conduct of public hearings and
executive sessions. However, petitioner, as well as the Ombudsman herself, refused to
participate in the IIRC proceedings on the assertion that the Office of the Ombudsman is an
independent constitutional body.
Sifting through testimonial and documentary evidence, the IIRC eventually identified petitioner
Gonzales to be among those in whom culpability must lie. In its Report,14 the IIRC made the
following findings:
Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross
violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to
languish for more than nine (9) months without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman
prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within
five (5) days from submission. The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto.
The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking.
More so, Mendoza's demand for immediate resolution of his motion for reconsideration is not
without legal and compelling bases considering the following:
(a) PSI Mendoza and four policemen were investigated by the Ombudsman involving a
case for alleged robbery (extortion), grave threats and physical injuries amounting to
grave misconduct allegedly committed against a certain Christian Kalaw. The same
case, however, was previously dismissed by the Manila City Prosecutors Office for lack
of probable cause and by the PNP-NCR Internal Affairs Service for failure of the
complainant (Christian Kalaw) to submit evidence and prosecute the case. On the other
hand, the case which was filed much ahead by Mendoza et al. against Christian Kalaw
involving the same incident, was given due course by the City Prosecutors Office.
(b) The Ombudsman exercised jurisdiction over the case based on a letter issued motu
proprio for Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzalez III, directing the PNP-NCR - without
citing any reason - to endorse the case against Mendoza and the arresting policemen to
his office for administrative adjudication, thereby showing undue interest on the case. He
also caused the docketing of the case and named Atty. Clarence V. Guinto of the PNPCIDG-NCR, who indorsed the case records, as the nominal complainant, in lieu of
Christian Kalaw. During the proceedings, Christian Kalaw did not also affirm his
complaint-affidavit with the Ombudsman or submit any position paper as required.

(c) Subsequently, Mendoza, after serving preventive suspension, was adjudged liable for
grave misconduct by Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales (duly approved on May 21, 2009)
based on the sole and uncorroborated complaint-affidavit of Christian Kalaw, which was
not previously sustained by the City Prosecutor's Office and the PNP Internal Affairs
Service. From the said Resolution, Mendoza interposed a timely motion for
reconsideration (dated and filed November 5, 2009) as well as a supplement thereto. No
opposition or comment was filed thereto.
(d) Despite the pending and unresolved motion for reconsideration, the judgment of
dismissal was enforced, thereby abruptly ending Mendoza's 30 years of service in the
PNP with forfeiture of all his benefits. As a result, Mendoza sought urgent relief by
sending several hand-written letter-requests to the Ombudsman for immediate resolution
of his motion for reconsideration. But his requests fell on deaf ears.
xxxx
By allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for nine long (9) months without
any justification, Ombudsman Gutierrez and Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed
complete and wanton violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rule to resolve motions for
reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission (Sec. 8,
Ombudsman Rules of Procedure). The inaction is gross, there being no opposition to the motion
for reconsideration.
Besides, the Ombudsman, without first resolving the motion for reconsideration, arbitrarily
enforced the judgment of dismissal and ignored the intervening requests for immediate
resolution, thereby rendering the inaction even more inexcusable and unjust as to amount to
gross negligence and grave misconduct.
SECOND, Ombudsman Gutierrez and Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious
disregard of due process, manifest injustice and oppression in failing to provisionally suspend
the further implementation of the judgment of dismissal against Mendoza pending disposition of
his unresolved motion for reconsideration.
By enforcing the judgment of dismissal without resolving the motion for reconsideration for over
nine months, the two Ombudsman officials acted with arbitrariness and without regard to due
process and the constitutional right of an accused to the speedy disposition of his case. As long
as his motion for reconsideration remained pending and unresolved, Mendoza was also
effectively deprived of the right to avail of the ordinary course of appeal or review to challenge
the judgment of dismissal before the higher courts and seek a temporary restraining order to
prevent the further execution thereof.
As such, if the Ombudsman cannot resolve with dispatch the motion for reconsideration, it
should have provisionally suspended the further enforcement of the judgment of dismissal
without prejudice to its re-implementation if the reconsideration is eventually denied. Otherwise,
the Ombudsman will benefit from its own inaction. Besides, the litigant is entitled to a stay of the
execution pending resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Until the motion for
reconsideration is denied, the adjudication process before the Ombudsman cannot be
considered as completely finished and, hence, the judgment is not yet ripe for execution.
xxxx
When the two Ombudsman officials received Mendoza's demand for the release of the final
order resolving his motion for reconsideration, they should have performed their duty by
resolving the reconsideration that same day since it was already pending for nine months and
the prescribed period for its resolution is only five days. Or if they cannot resolve it that same

day, then they should have acted decisively by issuing an order provisionally suspending the
further enforcement of the judgment of dismissal subject to revocation once the reconsideration
is denied and without prejudice to the arrest and prosecution of Mendoza for the hostage-taking.
Had they done so, the crisis may have ended peacefully, without necessarily compromising the
integrity of the institution. After all, as relayed to the negotiators, Mendoza did express
willingness to take full responsibility for the hostage-taking if his demand for release of the final
decision or reinstatement was met.
But instead of acting decisively, the two Ombudsman officials merely offered to review a
pending motion for review of the case, thereby prolonging their inaction and aggravating the
situation. As expected, Mendoza - who previously berated Deputy Gonzales for allegedly
demanding Php150,000 in exchange for favorably resolving the motion for reconsideration rejected and branded as trash ("basura") the Ombudsman [sic] letter promising review,
triggering the collapse of the negotiations. To prevent the situation from getting out of hand, the
negotiators sought the alternative option of securing before the PNP-NCRPO an order for
Mendoza's provisional reinstatement pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration.
Unfortunately, it was already too late. But had the Ombudsman officials performed their duty
under the law and acted decisively, the entire crisis may have ended differently.
The IIRC recommended that its findings with respect to petitioner Gonzales be referred to the
Office of the President (OP) for further determination of possible administrative offenses and for
the initiation of the proper administrative proceedings.
On October 15, 2010, the OP instituted a Formal Charge15 against petitioner Gonzales for Gross
Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty under Rule XIV, Section
22 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 and other pertinent Civil
Service Laws, rules and regulations, and for Misconduct in Office under Section 3 of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act.16 Petitioner filed his Answer17 thereto in due time.
Shortly after the filing by the OP of the administrative case against petitioner, a complaint dated
October 29, 2010 was filed by Acting Assistant Ombudsman Joselito P. Fangon before the
Internal Affairs Board of the Office of the Ombudsman charging petitioner with "directly or
indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or
for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government
and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the
law" under Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and also, with solicitation or
acceptance of gifts under Section 7(d) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards.18 In a
Joint Resolution19 dated February 17, 2011, which was approved by Ombudsman Ma.
Merceditas N. Gutierrez, the complaint was dismissed, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding no probable cause to indict respondent Emilio A.
Gonzales III for violations of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 and Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713,
the complaint is hereby be [sic] DISMISSED.
Further, finding no sufficient evidence to hold respondent administratively liable for Misconduct,
the same is likewise DISMISSED.
Meanwhile, the OP notified20 petitioner that a Preliminary Clarificatory Conference relative to the
administrative charge against him was to be conducted at the Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA) on February 8, 2011. Petitioner Gonzales
alleged,21 however, that on February 4, 2011, he heard the news that the OP had announced his
suspension for one year due to his delay in the disposition of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for
reconsideration. Hence, believing that the OP had already prejudged his case and that any
proceeding before it would simply be a charade, petitioner no longer attended the scheduled

clarificatory conference. Instead, he filed an Objection to Proceedings22 on February 7, 2011.


Despite petitioner's absence, however, the OP pushed through with the proceedings and, on
March 31, 2011, rendered the assailed Decision,23the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Office finds Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A.
Gonzales III guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of
public trust, and hereby meted out the penalty of DISMISSAL from service.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the petition.
G.R. No. 196232
In April of 2005, the Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman charged
Major General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan
Paulo Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia and several unknown persons with Plunder (Criminal
Case No. 28107) and Money Laundering (Criminal Case No. SB09CRM0194) before the
Sandiganbayan.
On January 7, 2010, the Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's urgent petition for bail
holding that strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant of bail. On March 16, 2010,
however, the government, represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit
("Barreras-Sulit") and her prosecutorial staff sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea
Bargaining Agreement (hereinafter referred to as "PLEBARA") entered into with the accused.
On May 4, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the change of plea warranted
and the PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential guidelines.
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off the hook with
nothing but a slap on the hand notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently strong evidence of
his culpability for serious public offenses, the House of Representatives' Committee on Justice
conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA. At the conclusion of these public hearings, the
Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee Resolution No. 3,24recommending to the
President the dismissal of petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of appropriate
charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate government office for
having committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution
and betrayal of public trust, which are violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
and grounds for removal from office under the Ombudsman Act.
The Office of the President initiated OP-DC-Case No. 11-B-003 against petitioner Barreras-Sulit.
In her written explanation, petitioner raised the defenses of prematurity and the lack of
jurisdiction of the OP with respect to the administrative disciplinary proceeding against her. The
OP, however, still proceeded with the case, setting it for preliminary investigation on April 15,
2011.
Hence, the petition.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 196231, petitioner Gonzales raises the following grounds, to wit:
(A)
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE OTHER INDIVIDUAL
RESPONDENTS, HAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL OR VALID STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO

SUBJECT PETITIONER TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION AND TO THEREAFTER


ORDER HIS REMOVAL AS DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN.
(B)
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE OTHER INDIVIDUAL
RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT CONDUCTED ITS INVESTIGATION AND RENDERED ITS
DECISION IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
(C)
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL
RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER COMMITTED DELAY IN THE
DISPOSITION OF MENDOZA'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
(D)
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL
RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER TOOK UNDUE INTEREST IN
MENDOZA'S CASE.
(E)
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL
RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN FAULTING PETITIONER FOR NOT RELEASING THE RESOLUTION
ON MENDOZA'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR FOR NOT SUSPENDING
MENDOZA'S DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE DURING THE HOSTAGE CRISIS.
(F)
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL
RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SHOW
THAT PETITIONER DEMANDED A BRIBE FROM MENDOZA.25
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 196232, petitioner Barreras-Sulit poses for the Court the
question AS OF THIS POINT IN TIME, WOULD TAKING AND CONTINUING TO TAKE
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING AGAINST PETITIONER BE LAWFUL AND
JUSTIFIABLE?26
Re-stated, the primordial question in these two petitions is whether the Office of the President
has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.
The Court's Ruling
Short of claiming themselves immune from the ordinary means of removal, petitioners
asseverate that the President has no disciplinary jurisdiction over them considering that the
Office of the Ombudsman to which they belong is clothed with constitutional independence and

that they, as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor therein, necessarily bear the
constitutional attributes of said office.
The Court is not convinced.
The Ombudsman's administrative
disciplinary power over a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prose-cutor is not exclusive.
It is true that the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative
investigations proceeds from its constitutional mandate to be an effective protector of the people
against inept and corrupt government officers and employees,27 and is subsumed under the
broad powers "explicitly conferred" upon it by the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770.28
The ombudsman traces its origins to the primitive legal order of Germanic tribes. The Swedish
term, which literally means "agent" or "representative," communicates the concept that has
been carried on into the creation of the modern-day ombudsman, that is, someone who acts as
a neutral representative of ordinary citizens against government abuses.29 This idea of a
people's protector was first institutionalized in the Philippines under the 1973 Constitution with
the creation of the Tanodbayan, which wielded the twin powers of investigation and prosecution.
Section 6, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution provided thus:
Sec. 6. The Batasang Pambansa shall create an office of the Ombudsman, to be known as
Tanodbayan, which shall receive and investigate complaints relative to public office, including
those in government-owned or controlled corporations, make appropriate recommendations,
and in case of failure of justice as defined by law, file and prosecute the corresponding criminal,
civil, or administrative case before the proper court or body.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution later envisioned a more effective ombudsman vested with
authority to "act in a quick, inexpensive and effective manner on complaints against
administrative officials", and to function purely with the "prestige and persuasive powers of his
office" in correcting improprieties, inefficiencies and corruption in government freed from the
hampering effects of prosecutorial duties.30 Accordingly, Section 13, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution enumerates the following powers, functions, and duties of the Office of the
Ombudsman, viz:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any
government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any
act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the
performance of duties.
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee
at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and
ensure compliance therewith.
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or
transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or
properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.

(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the
discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due
prudence.
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in
the Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high
standards of ethics and efficiency.
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such
functions or duties as may be provided by law.31
Congress thereafter passed, on November 17, 1989, Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman
Act of 1989, to shore up the Ombudsman's institutional strength by granting it "full administrative
disciplinary power over public officials and employees,"32 as follows:
Sec. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and
its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local
government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over
officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary.(Emphasis supplied)
In the exercise of such full administrative disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman
was explicitly conferred the statutory power to conduct administrative investigations under
Section 19 of the same law, thus:
Sec. 19. Administrative complaints. - The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but
not limited, to acts or omissions which:
1. Are contrary to law or regulation;
2. Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
3. Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in accordance with
law;
4. Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
5. Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
6. Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all
government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials
removable by impeachment, the members of congress and the judiciary, such authority is by no
means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 declares the Ombudsman's
disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the
President express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.
Thus:
Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy.-

xxxx
(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any of
the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken
that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated
measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. A construction that would render a
provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be
reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.33 Otherwise
stated, the law must not be read in truncated parts. Every part thereof must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.34
A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads
to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to
exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, respectively. This sharing of authority goes into the wisdom of the legislature, which
prerogative falls beyond the pale of judicial inquiry. The Congressional deliberations on this
matter are quite insightful, viz:
x x x Senator Angara explained that the phrase was added to highlight the fact that the Deputy
Tanodbayan may only be removed for cause and after due process. He added that the
President alone has the power to remove the Deputy Tanodbayan.
Reacting thereto, Senator Guingona observed that this might impair the independence of the
Tanodbayan and suggested that the procedural removal of the Deputy Tanodbayan...; and that
he can be removed not by the President but by the Ombudsman.
However, the Chair expressed apprehension that the Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsman
may try to protect one another. The Chair suggested the substitution of the phrase "after due
process" with the words after due notice and hearing with the President as the ultimate
authority.
Senator Guingona contended, however, that the Constitution provides for an independent Office
of the Tanodbayan, and to allow the Executive to have disciplinary powers over the Tanodbayan
Deputies would be an encroachment on the independence of the Tanodbayan.
Replying thereto, Senator Angara stated that originally, he was not averse to the proposal,
however, considering the Chair's observation that vesting such authority upon the Tanodbayan
itself could result in mutual protection, it is necessary that an outside official should be vested
with such authority to effect a check and balance.35
Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and
Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the
person of the President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional
and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and employees. Such
legislative design is simply a measure of "check and balance" intended to address the
lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one
another from administrative liabilities.
This would not be the first instance that the Office of the President has locked horns with the
Ombudsman on the matter of disciplinary jurisdiction. An earlier conflict had been settled in

favor of shared authority in Hagad v. Gozo Dadole.36 In said case, the Mayor and Vice-Mayor of
Mandaue City, and a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, were charged before the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 6713, and
the Revised Penal Code. The pivotal issue raised therein was whether the Ombudsman had
been divested of his authority to conduct administrative investigations over said local elective
officials by virtue of the subsequent enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No.
7160), the pertinent provision of which states:
Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints.- A verified complaint against any erring
local elective official shall be prepared as follows:
(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an
independent component city or component city shall be filed before the Office of the President.
The Court resolved said issue in the negative, upholding the ratiocination of the Solicitor
General that R.A. No. 7160 should be viewed as having conferred on the Office of the
President, but not on an exclusive basis, disciplinary authority over local elective officials.
Despite the fact that R.A. No. 7160 was the more recent expression of legislative will, no repeal
of pertinent provisions in the Ombudsman Act was inferred therefrom. Thus said the Court:
Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether
expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the
specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to
only uphold one and strike down the other. Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by
implication are not favored, and that courts must generally assume their congruent application.
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before
the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare
et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and
brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The
fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the
subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against
any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all
laws on the subject.37
While Hagad v. Gozo Dadole38 upheld the plenary power of the Office of the Ombudsman to
discipline elective officials over the same disciplinary authority of the President under R.A. No.
7160, the more recent case of the Office of the Ombudsman v. Delijero39 tempered the exercise
by the Ombudsman of such plenary power invoking Section 23(2)40 of R.A. No. 6770, which
gives the Ombudsman the option to "refer certain complaints to the proper disciplinary authority
for the institution of appropriate administrative proceedings against erring public officers or
employees." The Court underscored therein the clear legislative intent of imposing "a standard
and a separate set of procedural requirements in connection with administrative proceedings
involving public school teachers"41 with the enactment of R.A. No. 4670, otherwise known as
"The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers." It thus declared that, while the Ombudsman's
administrative disciplinary authority over a public school teacher is concurrent with the proper
investigating committee of the Department of Education, it would have been more prudent under
the circumstances for the Ombudsman to have referred to the DECS the complaint against the
public school teacher.
Unquestionably, the Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to discipline his own people and
mete out administrative sanctions upon them, including the extreme penalty of dismissal from
the service. However, it is equally without question that the President has concurrent authority
with respect to removal from office of the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, albeit
under specified conditions. Considering the principles attending concurrence of jurisdiction

where the Office of the President was the first to initiate a case against petitioner Gonzales,
prudence should have prompted the Ombudsman to desist from proceeding separately against
petitioner through its Internal Affairs Board, and to defer instead to the President's assumption of
authority, especially when the administrative charge involved "demanding and soliciting a sum of
money" which constitutes either graft and corruption or bribery, both of which are grounds
reserved for the President's exercise of his authority to remove a Deputy Ombudsman.
In any case, assuming that the Ombudsman's Internal Affairs Board properly conducted a
subsequent and parallel administrative action against petitioner, its earlier dismissal of the
charge of graft and corruption against petitioner could not have the effect of preventing the
Office of the President from proceeding against petitioner upon the same ground of graft and
corruption. After all, the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers.42 In Montemayor v. Bundalian,43 the
Court sustained the President's dismissal from service of a Regional Director of the Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) who was found liable for unexplained wealth upon
investigation by the now defunct Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC).
The Court categorically ruled therein that the prior dismissal by the Ombudsman of similar
charges against said official did not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case.
By granting express statutory
power to the President to remove
a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor, Congress
merely filled an obvious gap in
the law.
Section 9, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution confers upon the President the power to appoint
the Ombudsman and his Deputies, viz:
Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of
at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three
nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All
vacancies shall be filled within three months after they occur.
While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution,
which is by impeachment under Section 244 of the same Article, there is, however, no
constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman,
or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply
filled a gap in the law without running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing
statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the
removal of all other public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor,
who are not subject to impeachment.
That the Deputies of the Ombudsman were intentionally excluded from the enumeration of
impeachable officials is clear from the following deliberations45 of the Constitutional
Commission, thus:
MR. REGALADO. Yes, thank you. On Section 10, regarding the Ombudsman, there has been
concern aired by Commissioner Rodrigo about who will see to it that the Ombudsman will
perform his duties because he is something like a guardian of the government. This recalls the
statement of Juvenal that while the Ombudsman is the guardian of the people, "Quis custodiet
ipsos custodies", who will guard the guardians? I understand here that the Ombudsman who
has the rank of a chairman of a constitutional commission is also removable only by
impeachment.

MR. ROMULO. That is the intention, Madam President.


MR. REGALADO. Only the Ombudsman?
MR. MONSOD. Only the Ombudsman.
MR. REGALADO. So not his deputies, because I am concerned with the phrase "have the rank
of". We know, for instance, that the City Fiscal of Manila has the rank of a justice of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, and yet he is not a part of the judiciary. So I think we should clarify
that also and read our discussions into the Record for purposes of the Commission and the
Committee.46
xxx
THE PRESIDENT. The purpose of the amendment of Commissioner Davide is not just to
include the Ombudsman among those officials who have to be removed from office only
onimpeachment. Is that right?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote on the amendment, may I ask a question?
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. The Ombudsman, is this only one man?
MR. DAVIDE. Only one man.
MR. RODRIGO. Not including his deputies.
MR. MONSOD. No.47 (Emphasis supplied)
The Power of the President to
Remove a Deputy Ombudsman
and a Special Prosecutor is
Implied from his Power to
Appoint.
Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove.48 As
a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also removable by
him.49 The exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise - that is, when the
power to remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other than the appointing power. In
some cases, the Constitution expressly separates the power to remove from the President's
power to appoint. Under Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Members of the
Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President. However,
Members of the Supreme Court may be removed after impeachment proceedings initiated by
Congress (Section 2, Article XI), while judges of lower courts may be removed only by the
Supreme Court by virtue of its administrative supervision over all its personnel (Sections 6 and
11, Article VIII). The Chairpersons and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission Section
1(2), Article IX(B), the Commission on Elections Section 1(2), Article IX(C), and the Commission
on Audit Section 1(2), Article IX(D) shall likewise be appointed by the President, but they may be
removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman himself
shall be appointed by the President (Section 9, Article XI) but may also be removed only by
impeachment (Section 2, Article XI).

In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor,
Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the
President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The Office of the Ombudsman is charged with monumental tasks that have been generally
categorized into investigatory power, prosecutorial power, public assistance, authority to inquire
and obtain information and the function to adopt, institute and implement preventive
measures.50 In order to ensure the effectiveness of his constitutional role, the Ombudsman was
provided with an over-all deputy as well as a deputy each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.
However, well into the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, a provision for the
appointment of a separate deputy for the military establishment was necessitated by
Commissioner Ople's lament against the rise within the armed forces of "fraternal associations
outside the chain of command" which have become the common soldiers' "informal grievance
machinery" against injustice, corruption and neglect in the uniformed service,51 thus:
In our own Philippine Armed Forces, there has arisen in recent years a type of fraternal
association outside the chain of command proposing reformist objectives. They constitute, in
fact, an informal grievance machinery against injustices to the rank and file soldiery and
perceive graft in higher rank and neglect of the needs of troops in combat zones. The Reform
the Armed Forces Movement of RAM has kept precincts for pushing logistics to the field, the
implied accusation being that most of the resources are used up in Manila instead of sent to
soldiers in the field. The Guardians, the El Diablo and other organizations dominated by enlisted
men function, more or less, as grievance collectors and as mutual aid societies.
This proposed amendment merely seeks to extend the office of the Ombudsman to the military
establishment, just as it champions the common people against bureaucratic indifference. The
Ombudsman can designate a deputy to help the ordinary foot soldier get through with his
grievance to higher authorities. This deputy will, of course work in close cooperation with the
Minister of National Defense because of the necessity to maintain the integrity of the chain of
command. Ordinary soldiers, when they know they can turn to a military Ombudsman for their
complaints, may not have to fall back on their own informal devices to obtain redress for their
grievances. The Ombudsman will help raise troop morale in accordance with a major professed
goal of the President and the military authorities themselves. x x x
The add-on now forms part of Section 5, Article XI which reads as follows:
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the
Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one over-all Deputy and at least one Deputy each for
Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. A separate deputy for the military establishment shall likewise
be appointed. (Emphasis supplied)
The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military
watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities that affect the general morale and
professionalism in the military is certainly of primordial importance in relation to the President's
own role asCommander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for
Congress, therefore, to grant the President concurrent disciplinary authority over the Deputy
Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement offices.
Granting the President the Power
to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman
does not Diminish the
Independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman.

The claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power to remove a
Deputy Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates the independence of
the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence which the Office of the
Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from political considerations in pursuing its
constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What the Constitution secures for the
Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political independence. This means nothing more than
that "the terms of office, the salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the
office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians."52 And so it was that Section 5,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution had declared the creation of the independent Office of the
Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman and his Deputies, who are described as
"protectors of the people" and constitutionally mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in
any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government Section 12, Article
XI. Pertinent provisions under Article XI prescribes a term of office of seven years without
reappointment Section 11, prohibits a decrease in salaries during the term of office Section 10,
provides strict qualifications for the office Section 8, grants fiscal autonomy Section 14 and
ensures the exercise of constitutional functions Section 12 and 13. The cloak of independence
is meant to build up the Office of the Ombudsman's institutional strength to effectively function
as official critic, mobilizer of government, constitutional watchdog53 and protector of the people.
It certainly cannot be made to extend to wrongdoings and permit the unbridled acts of its
officials to escape administrative discipline.
Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the Ombudsman from
political influences and the discretionary acts of the executive, Congress laid down two
restrictions on the President's exercise of such power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman,
namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds
provided for the removal of the Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due
process. Reiterating the grounds for impeachment laid down in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770 states that the Deputy Ombudsman
may be removed from office for the same grounds that the Ombudsman may be removed
through impeachment, namely, "culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust." Thus, it cannot be rightly said that
giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor for
that matter, would diminish or compromise the constitutional independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman. It is, precisely, a measure of protection of the independence of the Ombudsman's
Deputies and Special Prosecutor in the discharge of their duties that their removal can only be
had on grounds provided by law.
In Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman,54 the Court elucidated on the nature of the
Ombudsman's independence in this wise The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of the
Ombudsman. To insulate the Office from outside pressure and improper influence, the
Constitution as well as RA 6770 has endowed it with a wide latitude of investigatory and
prosecutory powers virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. This Court
consistently refrains from interfering with the exercise of its powers, and respects the initiative
and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who, 'beholden to no one, acts as the champion
of the people and the preserver of the integrity of public service.
Petitioner Gonzales may not be
removed from office where the
questioned acts, falling short of
constitutional standards, do not
constitute betrayal of public trust.

Having now settled the question concerning the validity of the President's power to remove the
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, we now go to the substance of the administrative
findings in OP Case No. 10-J-460 which led to the dismissal of herein petitioner, Deputy
Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzales, III.
At the outset, the Court finds no cause for petitioner Gonzales to complain simply because the
OP proceeded with the administrative case against him despite his non-attendance thereat.
Petitioner was admittedly able to file an Answer in which he had interposed his defenses to the
formal charge against him. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge
against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative
proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged
to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due
process.55 Due process is simply having the opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.56
The essence of due process is that a party is afforded reasonable opportunity to be heard and
to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense.57 Mere opportunity to be heard is
sufficient. As long as petitioner was given the opportunity to explain his side and present
evidence, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with because what the
law abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.58 Besides, petitioner only has himself
to blame for limiting his defense through the filing of an Answer. He had squandered a
subsequent opportunity to elucidate upon his pleaded defenses by adamantly refusing to attend
the scheduled Clarificatory Conference despite notice. The OP recounted as follows It bears noting that respondent Deputy Ombudsman Gonzalez was given two separate
opportunities to explain his side and answer the Formal Charge against him.
In the first instance, respondent was given the opportunity to submit his answer together with his
documentary evidence, which opportunity respondent actually availed of. In the second
instance, this Office called a Clarificatory Conference on 8 February 2011 pursuant to
respondent's express election of a formal investigation. Despite due notice, however,
respondent Deputy Ombudsman refused to appear for said conference, interposing an objection
based on the unfounded notion that this Office has prejudged the instant case. Respondent
having been given actual and reasonable opportunity to explain or defend himself in due course,
the requirement of due process has been satisfied.59
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial
evidence,60which is more than a mere scintilla and means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.61 The fact, therefore, that
petitioner later refused to participate in the hearings before the OP is not a hindrance to a
finding of his culpability based on substantial evidence, which only requires that a decision must
"have something upon which it is based."62
Factual findings of administrative bodies are controlling when supported by substantial
evidence.63 The OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and the
imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of removal from office was based on the
finding of gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct in office amounting to a betrayal of public
trust, which is a constitutional ground for the removal by impeachment of the Ombudsman
(Section 2, Article XI, 1987 Constitution), and a statutory ground for the President to remove
from office a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman
Act.
The OP held that petitioner's want of care and wrongful conduct consisted of his unexplained
action in directing the PNP-NCR to elevate P/S Insp. Mendoza's case records to his office; his

failure to verify the basis for requesting the Ombudsman to take over the case; his
pronouncement of administrative liability and imposition of the extreme penalty of dismissal on
P/S Insp. Mendoza based upon an unverified complaint-affidavit; his inordinate haste in
implementing P/S Insp. Mendoza's dismissal notwithstanding the latter's non-receipt of his copy
of the Decision and the subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration; and his apparent
unconcern that the pendency of the motion for reconsideration for more than five months had
deprived P/S Insp. Mendoza of available remedies against the immediate implementation of the
Decision dismissing him from the service.
Thus, taking into consideration the factual determinations of the IIRC, the allegations and
evidence of petitioner in his Answer as well as other documentary evidence, the OP concluded
that: (1) petitioner failed to supervise his subordinates to act with dispatch on the draft resolution
of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for reconsideration and thereby caused undue prejudice to P/S
Insp. Mendoza by effectively depriving the latter of the right to challenge the dismissal before
the courts and prevent its immediate execution, and (2) petitioner showed undue interest by
having P/S Insp. Mendoza's case endorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman and resolving the
same against P/S Insp. Mendoza on the basis of the unverified complaint-affidavit of the alleged
victim Christian Kalaw.
The invariable rule is that administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction
can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.64 In the instant
case, while the evidence may show some amount of wrongdoing on the part of petitioner, the
Court seriously doubts the correctness of the OP's conclusion that the imputed acts amount to
gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct constitutive of betrayal of public trust. To say that
petitioner's offenses, as they factually appear, weigh heavily enough to constitute betrayal of
public trust would be to ignore the significance of the legislature's intent in prescribing the
removal of the Deputy Ombudsman or the Special Prosecutor for causes that, theretofore, had
been reserved only for the most serious violations that justify the removal by impeachment of
the highest officials of the land.
Would every negligent act or misconduct in the performance of a Deputy Ombudsman's duties
constitute betrayal of public trust warranting immediate removal from office? The question calls
for a deeper, circumspective look at the nature of the grounds for the removal of a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor vis-a-vis common administrative offenses.
Betrayal of public trust is a new ground for impeachment under the 1987 Constitution added to
the existing grounds of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption and other high crimes. While it was deemed broad enough to cover any violation of
the oath of office,65 the impreciseness of its definition also created apprehension that "such an
overarching standard may be too broad and may be subject to abuse and arbitrary exercise by
the legislature."66 Indeed, the catch-all phrase betrayal of public trust that referred to "all acts not
punishable by statutes as penal offenses but, nonetheless, render the officer unfit to continue in
office"67could be easily utilized for every conceivable misconduct or negligence in office.
However, deliberating on some workable standard by which the ground could be reasonably
interpreted, the Constitutional Commission recognized that human error and good faith
precluded an adverse conclusion.
MR. VILLACORTA: x x x One last matter with respect to the use of the words "betrayal of public
trust" as embodying a ground for impeachment that has been raised by the Honorable
Regalado. I am not a lawyer so I can anticipate the difficulties that a layman may encounter in
understanding this provision and also the possible abuses that the legislature can commit in
interpreting this phrase. It is to be noted that this ground was also suggested in the 1971
Constitutional Convention. A review of the Journals of that Convention will show that it was not
included; it was construed as encompassing acts which are just short of being criminal but

constitute gross faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusable
negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary powers. I understand from the
earlier discussions that these constitute violations of the oath of office, and also I heard the
Honorable Davide say that even the criminal acts that were enumerated in the earlier 1973
provision on this matter constitute betrayal of public trust as well. In order to avoid confusion,
would it not be clearer to stick to the wording of Section 2 which reads: "may be removed from
office on impeachment for and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, and other high crimes, graft and corruption or VIOLATION OF HIS OATH OF OFFICE",
because if betrayal of public trust encompasses the earlier acts that were enumerated, then it
would behoove us to be equally clear about this last provision or phrase.
MR. NOLLEDO: x x x I think we will miss a golden opportunity if we fail to adopt the words
"betrayal of public trust" in the 1986 Constitution. But I would like him to know that we are
amenable to any possible amendment. Besides, I think plain error of judgment, where
circumstances may indicate that there is good faith, to my mind, will not constitute betrayal of
public trust if that statement will allay the fears of difficulty in interpreting the term."68 (Emphasis
supplied)
The Constitutional Commission eventually found it reasonably acceptable for the phrase
betrayal of public trust to refer to "acts which are just short of being criminal but constitute gross
faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusable negligence of duty,
favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary powers."69 In other words, acts that should
constitute betrayal of public trust as to warrant removal from office may be less than criminal but
must be attended by bad faith and of such gravity and seriousness as the other grounds for
impeachment.
A Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor are not impeachable officers. However, by
providing for their removal from office on the same grounds as removal by impeachment, the
legislature could not have intended to redefine constitutional standards of culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, as well as betrayal of
public trust, and apply them less stringently. Hence, where betrayal of public trust, for purposes
of impeachment, was not intended to cover all kinds of official wrongdoing and plain errors of
judgment, this should remain true even for purposes of removing a Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor from office. Hence, the fact that the grounds for impeachment have been
made statutory grounds for the removal by the President of a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor cannot diminish the seriousness of their nature nor the acuity of their scope.
Betrayal of public trust could not suddenly "overreach" to cover acts that are not vicious or
malevolent on the same level as the other grounds for impeachment.
The tragic hostage-taking incident was the result of a confluence of several unfortunate events
including system failure of government response. It cannot be solely attributed then to what
petitioner Gonzales may have negligently failed to do for the quick, fair and complete resolution
of the case, or to his error of judgment in the disposition thereof. Neither should petitioner's
official acts in the resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's case be judged based upon the resulting
deaths at the Quirino Grandstand. The failure to immediately act upon a party's requests for an
early resolution of his case is not, by itself, gross neglect of duty amounting to betrayal of public
trust. Records show that petitioner took considerably less time to act upon the draft resolution
after the same was submitted for his appropriate action compared to the length of time that said
draft remained pending and unacted upon in the Office of Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez.
He reviewed and denied P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for reconsideration within nine (9)
calendar days reckoned from the time the draft resolution was submitted to him on April 27,
2010 until he forwarded his recommendation to the Office of Ombudsman Gutierrez on May 6,
2010 for the latter's final action. Clearly, the release of any final order on the case was no longer
in his hands.

Even if there was inordinate delay in the resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion and an
unexplained failure on petitioner's part to supervise his subordinates in its prompt disposition,
the same cannot be considered a vicious and malevolent act warranting his removal for betrayal
of public trust. More so because the neglect imputed upon petitioner appears to be an isolated
case.
Similarly, petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the
Ombudsman without citing any reason therefor cannot, by itself, be considered a manifestation
of his undue interest in the case that would amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all,
taking cognizance of cases upon the request of concerned agencies or private parties is part
and parcel of the constitutional mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman to be the "champion of
the people." The factual circumstances that the case was turned over to the Office of the
Ombudsman upon petitioner's request; that administrative liability was pronounced against P/S
Insp. Mendoza even without the private complainant verifying the truth of his statements; that
the decision was immediately implemented; or that the motion for reconsideration thereof
remained pending for more than nine months cannot be simply taken as evidence of petitioner's
undue interest in the case considering the lack of evidence of any personal grudge, social ties
or business affiliation with any of the parties to the case that could have impelled him to act as
he did. There was likewise no evidence at all of any bribery that took place, or of any corrupt
intention or questionable motivation.
Accordingly, the OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and the
imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside,
as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal of public
trust. Hence, the President, while he may be vested with authority, cannot order the removal of
petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and
serious kind amounting to a betrayal of public trust.
This is not to say, however, that petitioner is relieved of all liability for his acts showing less than
diligent performance of official duties. Although the administrative acts imputed to petitioner fall
short of the constitutional standard of betrayal of public trust, considering the OP's factual
findings of negligence and misconduct against petitioner, the Court deems it appropriate to refer
the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for further investigation of the charges in OP Case No.
10-J-460 and the imposition of the corresponding administrative sanctions, if any.
Inasmuch as there is as yet no existing ground justifying his removal from office, petitioner is
entitled to reinstatement to his former position as Deputy Ombudsman and to the payment of
backwages and benefits corresponding to the period of his suspension.
The Office of the President is vested
with statutory authority to proceed
administratively against petitioner
Barreras-Sulit to determine the
existence of any of the grounds for
her removal from office as provided
for under the Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act.
Petitioner Barreras-Sulit, on the other hand, has been resisting the President's authority to
remove her from office upon the averment that without the Sandiganbayan's final approval and
judgment on the basis of the PLEBARA, it would be premature to charge her with acts and/or
omissions "tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,"
which are grounds for removal from office under Section 8, paragraph (2) of the Ombudsman
Act of 1989; and which also constitute a violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No.

3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) - causing undue injury to the Government or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. With reference to the doctrine of prejudicial
procedural antecedent, petitioner Barreras-Sulit asserts that the propriety of taking and
continuing to take administrative disciplinary proceeding against her must depend on the final
disposition by the Sandiganbayan of the PLEBARA, explaining that if the Sandiganbayan would
uphold the PLEBARA, there would no longer be any cause of complaint against her; if not, then
the situation becomes ripe for the determination of her failings.
The argument will not hold water. The incidents that have taken place subsequent to the
submission in court of the PLEBARA shows that the PLEBARA has been practically approved,
and that the only thing which remains to be done by the Sandiganbayan is to promulgate a
judgment imposing the proper sentence on the accused Major General Garcia based on his new
pleas to lesser offenses. On May 4, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution declaring that
the change of plea under the PLEBARA was warranted and that it complied with jurisprudential
guidelines. The Sandiganbayan, thereafter, directed the accused Major General Garcia to
immediately convey in favor of the State all the properties, both real and personal, enumerated
therein. On August 11, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, which, in order to put into
effect the reversion of Major General Garcia's ill-gotten properties, ordered the corresponding
government agencies to cause the transfer of ownership of said properties to the Republic of
the Philippines. In the meantime, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) informed the
Sandiganbayan that an Order70 had been issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
21 on November 5, 2010 allowing the transfer of the accused's frozen accounts to the Republic
of the Philippines pursuant to the terms of the PLEBARA as approved by the Sandiganbayan.
Immediately after the OSP informed the Sandiganbayan that its May 4, 2010 Resolution had
been substantially complied with, Major General Garcia manifested71 to the Sandiganbayan on
November 19, 2010 his readiness for sentencing and for the withdrawal of the criminal
information against his wife and two sons. Major General Garcia's Motion to Dismiss,72 dated
December 16, 2010 and filed with the Sandiganbayan, reads:
1.0 The Co-Accused were impleaded under the theory of conspiracy with the Principal Accused
MGen. Carlos F. Garcia (AFP Ret.), (Principal Accused) with the allegation that the act of one is
the act of the others. Therefore, with the approval by the Honorable Court of the Plea
Bargaining Agreement executed by the Principal Accused, the charges against the Co-Accused
should likewise be dismissed since the charges against them are anchored on the same
charges against the Principal Accused.
On December 16, 2010, the Sandiganbayan allowed accused Major General Garcia to plead
guilty to the lesser offenses of direct bribery and violation of Section 4(b), R.A. No. 9160, as
amended. Upon Major General Garcia's motion, and with the express conformity of the OSP, the
Sandiganbayan allowed him to post bail in both cases, each at a measly amount
of P 30,000.00.
The approval or disapproval of the PLEBARA by the Sandiganbayan is of no consequence to an
administrative finding of liability against petitioner Barreras-Sulit. While the court's determination
of the propriety of a plea bargain is on the basis of the existing prosecution evidence on record,
the disciplinary authority's determination of the prosecutor's administrative liability is based on
whether the plea bargain is consistent with the conscientious consideration of the government's
best interest and the diligent and efficient performance by the prosecution of its public duty to
prosecute crimes against the State. Consequently, the disciplining authority's finding of
ineptitude, neglect or willfulness on the part of the prosecution, more particularly petitioner
Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit, in failing to pursue or build a strong case for the government
or, in this case, entering into an agreement which the government finds "grossly

disadvantageous," could result in administrative liability, notwithstanding court approval of the


plea bargaining agreement entered into.
Plea bargaining is a process in criminal cases whereby the accused and the prosecution work
out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval.73 The essence of a
plea bargaining agreement is the allowance of an accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense
than that charged against him. Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides the procedure therefor, to wit:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. -- At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial,
the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea
of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)
Plea bargaining is allowable when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to
establish the guilt of the accused of the crime charged.74 However, if the basis for the allowance
of a plea bargain in this case is the evidence on record, then it is significant to state that in its
earlier Resolution75 promulgated on January 7, 2010, the Sandiganbayan had evaluated the
testimonies of twenty (20) prosecution witnesses and declared that "the conglomeration of
evidence presented by the prosecution is viewed by the Court to be of strong character that
militates against the grant of bail."
Notwithstanding this earlier ruling by the Sandiganbayan, the OSP, unexplainably, chose to plea
bargain with the accused Major General Garcia as if its evidence were suddenly insufficient to
secure a conviction. At this juncture, it is not amiss to emphasize that the "standard of strong
evidence of guilt which is sufficient to deny bail to an accused is markedly higher than the
standard of judicial probable cause which is sufficient to initiate a criminal case."76 Hence, in
light of the apparently strong case against accused Major General Garcia, the disciplining
authority would be hard-pressed not to look into the whys and wherefores of the prosecution's
turnabout in the case.
The Court need not touch further upon the substantial matters that are the subject of the
pending administrative proceeding against petitioner Barreras-Sulit and are, thus, better left to
the complete and effective resolution of the administrative case before the Office of the
President.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act has, nonetheless,
failed to obtain the necessary votes to invalidate the law, thus, keeping said provision part of the
law of the land. To recall, these cases involve two distinct issues: (a) the constitutionality of
Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act; and (b) the validity of the administrative action of removal
taken against petitioner Gonzales. While the Court voted unanimously to reverse the decision of
the OP removing petitioner Gonzales from office, it was equally divided in its opinion on the
constitutionality of the assailed statutory provision in its two deliberations held on April 17, 2012
and September 4, 2012. There being no majority vote to invalidate the law, the Court, therefore,
dismisses the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act in
accordance with Section 2(d), Rule 12 of the Internal Rules of the Court.
Indeed, Section 4(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires the vote of the majority of the
Members of the Court actually taking part in the deliberation to sustain any challenge to the
constitutionality or validity of a statute or any of its provisions.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No.
10-J-460 isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is
ordered REINSTATED with payment of backwages corresponding to the period of suspension

effective immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the
investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232,
WeAFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell
Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution
and a betrayal of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 138200. February 27, 2002]
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
(DOTC), petitioner, vs. ROBERTO MABALOT,respondent.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
At the core of controversy in the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is the validity of
Memorandum Order No. 96-735, dated 19 February 1996, and Department Order No. 97-1025,
dated 29 January 1997, both issued by the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC).
The facts are uncontested.
On 19 February 1996, then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr., issued Memorandum
Order No. 96-735 addressed to Land Transportation Franchising Regulatory Board (LTFRB)
Chairman Dante Lantin, viz:
In the interest of the service, you are hereby directed to effect the transfer of regional functions of that
office to the DOTCCAR Regional Office, pending the creation of a regular Regional Franchising and
Regulatory Office thereat, pursuant to Section 7 of Executive Order No. 202.
Organic personnel of DOTC-CAR shall perform the LTFRB functions on a concurrent capacity subject
to the direct supervision and control of LTFRB Central Office.
On 13 March 1996, herein respondent Roberto Mabalot filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order,[1] against petitioner and

LTFRB Chairman Lantin, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81,
[2]
praying among others that Memorandum Order No. 96-735 be declared illegal and without
effect.
On 20 March 1996, the lower court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner
from implementing Memorandum Order No. 96-735. On 08 April 1996, the lower court, upon
filing of a bond by respondent, issued a writ of preliminary injunction. On 25 April 1996, then
DOTC Secretary Amado Lagdameo, Jr. filed his answer to the petition.
Thereafter, on 29 January 1997, Secretary Lagdameo issued the assailed Department
Order No. 97-1025, to wit:
Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 36, dated September 23, 1987, and for purposes of economy and
more effective coordination of the DOTC functions in the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), the
DOTC-CAR Regional Office, created by virtue of Executive Order No. 220 dated July 15, 1987, is
hereby established as the Regional Office of the LTFRB and shall exercise the regional functions of the
LTFRB in the CAR subject to the direct supervision and control of LTFRB Central Office.
The budgetary requirement for this purpose shall come from the Department until such time that its
appropriate budget is included in the General Appropriations Act.
After trial, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved to reopen the hearing in the
lower court for the purpose of enabling petitioner to present Department Order No. 97-1025. In
an Order dated 18 February 1997, the lower court granted the motion.
On 03 April 1997, respondent filed a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Petition
assailing the validity of Department Order No. 97-1025. On 14 May 1997, the OSG presented
Department Order No. 97-1025 after which petitioner filed a formal offer of exhibits.
In an Order dated 09 June 1997, the lower court admitted petitioners documentary exhibits
over the objection of respondent. Likewise, the lower court admitted the supplemental petition
filed by respondent to which petitioner filed an answer thereto.
On 31 March 1999, the lower court rendered a decision the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Memorandum Order Nos. 96-733 [3] dated
February 19, 1996 and 97-1025 dated January 27, 1997 of the respondent DOTC Secretary null and void
and without any legal effect as being violative of the provision of the Constitution against encroachment
on the powers of the legislative department and also of the provision enjoining appointive officials from
holding any other office or employment in the Government.
The preliminary injunction issued on May 13, 1996 is hereby made permanent.
No pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Hence, the instant petition where this Court is tasked in the main to resolve the issue of
validity of the subject administrative issuances by the DOTC Secretary.
In his Memorandum[4], respondent Mabalot principally argues that a transfer of the powers
and functions of the LTFRB Regional Office to a DOTC Regional Office or the establishment of
the latter as an LTFRB Regional Office is unconstitutional for being an undue exercise of
legislative power. To this end, respondent quoted heavily the lower courts rationale on this
matter, to wit:

With the restoration of Congress as the legislative body, the transfer of powers and functions, specially
those quasi-judicial (in) nature, could only be effected through legislative fiat. Not even the President of
the Philippines can do so. And much less by the DOTC Secretary who is only a mere extension of
the Presidency. Among the powers of the LTFRB are to issue injunctions, whether prohibitory (or)
mandatory, punish for contempt and to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum. These powers devolve
by extension on the LTFRB regional offices in the performance of their functions. They cannot be
transferred to another agency of government without congressional approval embodied in a duty
enacted law. (Emphasis ours)
We do not agree. Accordingly, in the absence of any patent or latent constitutional or
statutory infirmity attending the issuance of the challenged orders, this Court upholds
Memorandum Order No. 96-735 and Department Order No. 97-1025 as legal and valid
administrative issuances by the DOTC Secretary. Contrary to the opinion of the lower court,the
President - through his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary in the
present case - may legally and validly decree the reorganization of the Department, particularly
the establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB Regional Office at the Cordillera Administrative
Region, with the concomitant transfer and performance of public functions and responsibilities
appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.
At this point, it is apropos to reiterate the elementary rule in administrative law and the law
on public officers that a public office may be created through any of the following modes, to wit,
either (1) by the Constitution (fundamental law), (2) by law (statute duly enacted by
Congress), or (3) by authority of law.[5]
Verily, Congress can delegate the power to create positions. This has been settled by
decisions of the Court upholding the validity of reorganization statutes authorizing the President
to create, abolish or merge offices in the executive department. [6] Thus, at various times,
Congress has vested power in the President to reorganize executive agencies and redistribute
functions, and particular transfers under such statutes have been held to be within the authority
of the President.[7]
In the instant case, the creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office was
made pursuant to the third mode - by authority of law, which could be decreed for instance,
through an Executive Order (E.O.) issued by the President or an order of an administrative
agency such as the Civil Service Commission[8] pursuant to Section 17, Book V of E.O. 292,
otherwise known as The Administrative Code of 1987. In the case before us, the DOTC
Secretary issued the assailed Memorandum and Department Orders pursuant to Administrative
Order No. 36 of the President, [9] dated 23 September 1987, Section 1 of which explicitly
provides:
Section 1. Establishment of Regional Offices in the CAR- The various departments and other
agencies of the National Government that are currently authorized to maintain regional offices are
herebydirected to establish forthwith their respective regional offices In the Cordillera
Administrative Region with territorial coverage as defined under Section 2 of Executive Order No. 220
dated July 15, 1987, with regional headquarters at Baguio City.
Emphatically the President, through Administrative Order No. 36, did not merely authorize
but directed, in no uncertain terms, the various departments and agencies of government to
immediately undertake the creation and establishment of their regional offices in the CAR. To
us, Administrative Order No. 36 is a clear and unequivocal directive and mandate - no less than
from the Chief Executive - ordering the heads of government departments and bureaus to effect
the establishment of their respective regional offices in the CAR.

By the Chief Executives unequivocal act of issuing Administrative Order No. 36 ordering
his alter ego - the DOTC Secretary in the present case - to effectuate the creation of Regional
Offices in the CAR, the President, in effect, deemed it fit and proper under the circumstances to
act and exercise his authority, albeit through the various Department Secretaries, so as to put
into place the organizational structure and set-up in the CAR and so as not to compromise in
any significant way the performance of public functions and delivery of basic government
services in the Cordillera Administrative Region.
Simply stated, it is as if the President himself carried out the creation and establishment of
LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, when in fact, the DOTC Secretary, as alter ego of the President,
directly and merely sought to implement the Chief Executives Administrative Order.
To this end, Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution mandates:
The President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed.
By definition, control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what
a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the former for that of the latter.[10] It includes the authority to order the doing of an act by a
subordinate or to undo such act or to assume a power directly vested in him by law.[11]
From the purely legal standpoint, the members of the Cabinet are subject at all times to the
disposition of the President since they are merely his alter ego.[12] As this Court enunciated
in Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior,[13] without minimizing the importance of the heads of
various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President.
Thus, their acts, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.
Applying the foregoing, it is then clear that the lower courts pronouncement - that the
transfer of powers and functions and in effect, the creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR
Regional Office, may not be validly made by the Chief Executive, much less by his mere alter
ago and could only be properly effected through a law enacted by Congress -is to say the least,
erroneous.
In Larin vs.
Executive Secretary,[14] this Court through the ponencia of Mr.
Justice Justo Torres, inked an extensive disquisition on the continuing authority of the President
to reorganize the National Government, which power includes the creation, alteration or
abolition of public offices. Thus in Larin, we held that Section 62 of Republic Act 7645 (General
Appropriations Act [G.A.A.] for FY 1993) evidently shows that the President is authorized
to effect organizational changes including the creation of offices in the department or
agency concerned:
Section 62. Unauthorized organizational changes.- Unless otherwise created by law or directed by the
President of the Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key positions in any department or
agency shall be authorized in their respective organization structures and be funded from appropriations
by this act.
Petitioners contention in Larin that Sections 48 and 62 of R.A. 7645 were riders, deserved
scant consideration from the Court, Well settled is the rule that every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality. Unless and until a specific provision of the law is declared
invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid and binding for all intents and purposes.[15]

Worthy to note is that R.A. 8174 (G.A.A for FY 1996) contains similar provisions as
embodied in Section 72 (General Provisions) of said law entitled Organizational Changes and
Section 73 (General Provisions) thereof entitled Implementation of Reorganization.
Likewise, R.A. 8250 (G.A.A. for FY 1997) has Section 76 (General Provisions) entitled
Organizational Changes and Section 77 (General Provisions) entitled Implementation of
Reorganization.
In the same vein, Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, provides a strong legal basis for the Chief Executives authority to
reorganize the National Government, viz:
Section 20. Residual Powers. - Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such
other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the lawsand which
are not specifically enumerated above or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with
law. (Emphasis ours)
This Court, in Larin, had occasion to rule that:
This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the law. What law then gives
him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree
No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to
reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and
agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities
and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees are unquestionable. The
1987 Constitution clearly provides that all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative
until amended, repealed or revoked.[16] So far, there is yet no law amending or repealing said
decrees.
The pertinent provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1772, reads:
1. The President of the Philippines shall have continuing authority to reorganize the National
Government. In exercising this authority, the President shall be guided by generally acceptable
principles of good government and responsive national development, including but not limited to the
following guidelines for a more efficient, effective, economical and development-oriented governmental
framework:
xxx
b) Abolish departments, offices, agencies or functions which may not be necessary, or create those
which are necessary, for the efficient conduct of government functions, services and activities;
c) Transfer functions, appropriations, equipment, properties, records and personnel from one
department, bureau, office, agency or instrumentality to another;
d) Create, classify, combine, split, and abolish positions;
e) Standardize salaries, materials, and equipment;
f) Create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge or integrate entities, agencies, instrumentalities, and
units of the National Government, as well as expand, amend, change, or otherwise modify their
powers, functions, and authorities, including, with respect to government-owned or controlled
corporations, their corporate life, capitalization, and other relevant aspects of their charters. (As
added by P.D. 1772)

g) Take such other related actions as may be necessary to carry out the purposes and objectives of this
decree. (As added by P.D. 1772) (Emphasis supplied.)
In fine, the designation[17] and subsequent establishment[18] of DOTC-CAR as the Regional
Office of LTFRB in the Cordillera Administrative Region and the concomitant exercise and
performance of functions by the former as the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, fall within the scope
of the continuing authority of the President to effectively reorganize the Department of
Transportation and Communications.
Beyond this, it must be emphasized that the reorganization in the instant case was
decreed in the interest of the service[19] and for purposes of economy and more effective
coordination of the DOTC functions in the Cordillera Administrative Region. [20] In this
jurisdiction, reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. As a general
rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient.[21] To our mind, the reorganization pursued in the case at bar bears
the earmark of good faith. As petitioner points out, [22] tapping the DOTC-CAR pending the
eventual creation of the LTFRB Regional Office is economical in terms of manpower and
resource requirements, thus, reducing expenses from the limited resources of the government.
Furthermore, under Section 18, Chapter 5, Title XV, Book IV of E.O. 292 [23] and Section 4 of
E.O. 202,[24] the Secretary of Transportation and Communications, through his duly designated
Undersecretary, shall exercise administrative supervision and control[25] over the Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (Board).
Worthy of mention too is that by express provision of Department Order No. 97-1025, the
LTFRB-CAR Regional Office is subject to the direct supervision and control of LTFRB Central
Office. Under the law,[26] the decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Franchising and
Regulatory Offices shall be appealable to the Board within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
decision; the decision, order or resolution of the Board shall be appealable to the DOTC
Secretary. With this appellate set-up and mode of appeal clearly established and in place, no
conflict or absurd circumstance would arise in such manner that a decision of the LTFRB-CAR
Regional Office is subject to review by the DOTC-CAR Regional Office.
As to the issue regarding Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution, we hold that the
assailed Orders of the DOTC Secretary do not violate the aforementioned constitutional
provisions considering that in the case of Memorandum Order No. 96-735, the organic
personnel of the DOTC-CAR were, in effect, merely designated to perform the additional duties
and functions of an LTFRB Regional Office subject to the direct supervision and control of
LTFRB Central Office, pending the creation of a regular LTFRB Regional Office.
As held in Triste vs. Leyte State College Board of Trustees:[27]
To designate a public officer to another position may mean to vest him with additional duties while he
performs the functions of his permanent office. Or in some cases, a public officer may be designated to a
position in an acting capacity as when an undersecretary is designated to discharge the functions of a
Secretary pending the appointment of a permanent Secretary.
Assuming arguendo that the appointive officials and employees of DOTC-CAR shall be
holding more than one office or employment at the same time as a result of the establishment of
such agency as the LTFRB-CAR pursuant to Department Order No. 97-1025, this Court is of the
firm view that such fact still does not constitute a breach or violation of Section 7, Article IX-B of
the Constitution. On this matter, it must be stressed that under the aforementioned constitutional
provision, an office or employment held in the exercise of the primary functions of ones principal
office is an exception to, or not within the contemplation, of the prohibition embodied in Section
7, Article IX-B.

Equally significant is that no evidence was adduced and presented to clearly establish that
the appointive officials and employees of DOTC-CAR shall receive any additional, double or
indirect compensation, in violation of Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution. In the absence
of any clear and convincing evidence to show any breach or violation of said constitutional
prohibitions, this Court finds no cogent reason to declare the invalidity of the challenged orders.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision dated 31 March 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon CityBranch 81 in Special Civil Action Case No. Q-96-26868 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
Jr.,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., in the result.

C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan,


De
Leon,
Jr.,
Sandoval-

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 112745. October 16, 1997]
AQUILINO T. LARIN, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND THE
COMMITTEE CREATED TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT
AGAINST AQUILINO T. LARIN, COMPOSED OF FRUMENCIO A. LAGUSTAN, JOSE
B. ALEJANDRINO and JAIME M. MAZA, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
Challenge in this petition is the validity of petitioners removal from service as Assistant
Commissioner of the Excise Tax Service of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Incidentally, he
questions Memorandum order no. 164 issued by the Office of the President, which provides for
the creation of A Committee to Investigate the Administrative Complaint Against Aquilino T.
Larin, Assistant Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue as well as the investigation made in
pursuance thereto and Administrative Order No. 101 dated December 2, 1993 which found him

guilty of grave misconduct in the administrative charge and imposed upon him the penalty of
dismissal from office.
Likewise, petitioner seeks to assail the legality of Executive Order No. 132, issued by
President Ramos on October 26, 1993, which provides for the Streamlining of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, and of its implementing rules issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
namely: a) Administrative Order No. 4-93, which provides for the Organizational Structure and
Statement of General Functions of Offices in the National Office and b) Administrative Order
No. 5-93, which provides for Redefining the Areas of Jurisdiction and Renumbering of Regional
And District Offices.
The antecedent facts of the instant case as succinctly related by the Solicitor General are
as follows:
On September 18, 1992, [1] a decision was rendered by the Sandiganbayan convicting herein petitioner
Aquilino T. Larin, Revenue Specific Tax Officer, then Assistant Commisioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and his co-accused (except Justino E. Galban, Jr.) of the crimes of violation of Section 268 (4) of
the National Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 in Criminal Cases Nos. 14208-14209,
entitled People of the Philippines, Plaintiff vs. Aquilino T. Larin, Teodoro T. Pareno, Justino E. Galban,
Jr. and Potenciana N. Evangelista, Accused, the dispositive portion of the judgment reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is now rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. 14208 and 14209
convicting accused Assistant Commissioner for Specific Tax Aquilino T. Larin, Chief
of the Alcohol tax Division TEODORO P. PARENO, and Chief of the Revenue
accounting Division POTENCIANA M. EVANGELISTA:
xxx
SO ORDERED.
The fact of petitioners conviction was reported to the President of the Philippines by the
then Acting Finance Secretary Leong through a memorandum dated June 4, 1993. The
memorandum states, inter alia:
This is a report in the case of Assistant Commissioner AQUILINO T. LARIN of the Excise tax
Service, Bureau of Internal Revenue, a presidential appointee, one of those convicted in the
Criminal Case Nos. 14208-14209, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Aquilino T. Larin, et.
al. Referred to the Department of Finace by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
The cases against Pareno and Evangelista are being acted upon by the Bureau of Internal
revenue as they non-presidential appointees.
xxx
It is clear from the foregoing that Mr. Larin has found beyond reasonable doubt to have
committed acts constituting grave misconduct. Under the Civil Service Laws and Rules which
require only preponderance of evidence, grave misconduct is punishable by dismissal.
Acting by authority of the President, Sr. Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A.
Quisumbing issued Memorandum Order No. 164 dated August 25, 1993 which provides for the
creation of an Executive Committee to investigate the administrative charge against herein
petitioner Aquilino T. Larin. It states thus:

A Committee is hereby created to investigate the administrative complaint filed against


Aquilino T. Larin, Assistant Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue, to be composed of:
Atty. Frumencio A. Lagustan Chairman
Assistant Executive Secretary for Legislation
Mr. Jose B. Alejandro Member
Presidential Assistant
Atty. Jaime M. Maza Member
Assistant commissioner of Inspector services
Bureau of Internal Revenue
The Committee shall have the powers and prerogatives of (an) investigating committee under the
administrative Code of 1987 including the power to summon witnesses, administer oath or take
testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation by subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena
duces tecum:
xxx
The Committee shall convene immediately, conduct the investigation in the most expeditious
manner, and terminate the same as soon as practicable from its first scheduled date of hearing.
xxx
Consequently, the Committee directed the petitioner to respond to the administrative
charge leveled against him through a letter dated September 17, 1993, thus:
Presidential Memorandum Order No. 164 dated August 25, 1993, a xerox copy of which is
hereto attached for your ready reference, created an Investigation Committee to look into the
charges against you which are also the subject of the Criminal Cases No. 14208 and 14209
entitled People of the Philippines vs. Aquilino T. Larin, et. al.
The committee has its possession a certified true copy of the Decision of the Sandiganbayan in
the above-mentioned cases.
Pursuant to Presidential Memorandum Order No. 164, you are hereby directed to file your
position paper on the aforementioned charges within seven (7) days from receipt hereof xxx.
Failure to file the required position paper shall be considered as a waiver on your part to submit
such paper or to be heard, in which case, the Committee shall deem the case submitted on the
basis of the documents and records at hand.
In compliance, petitioner submitted a letter dated September 30, 1993 which was
addressed to Atty. Frumencio A. Lagustan , the Chairman of the Investigating Committee. In
said latter, he asserts that,
The case being sub-judice, I may not , therefore, comment on the merits of issues involved for
fear of being cited in contempt of Court. This position paper is thus limited to furnishing the
Committee pertinent documents submitted with the Supreme Court and other tribunal which took
cognizance of the case in the past, as follows:

xxx
The foregoing documents readily show that I am not administratively liable or criminally
culpable of the charges leveled against me, and that the aforesaid cases are mere prosecutions
caused to be filed and are being orchestrated by taxpayers who were prejudiced by multi-million
peso assessments I caused to be issued against them in my official capacity as Assistant
Commissioner, Excise Tax office of Bureau of Internal Revenue.
In the same letter, petitioner claims that the administrative complaint against him is already
barred: a) on jurisdictional ground as the Office of the Ombudsman had already taken
cognizance of the case and had caused the filing only of the criminal charges against him, b) by
res judicata, c) double jeopardy, and d) because to proceed with the case would be redundant,
oppressive and a plain persecution against him.
Meanwhile, the President issued the challenged Executive order No. 132 dated October 26,
1993 which mandates for the streamlining of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Under said order,
some positions and functions are either abolished, renamed, decentralized or transferred to
other offices, while other offices are also created. The Excise Tax Service or the Specific Tax
Service, of which petitioner was the Assistant Commissioner, was one of those offices that was
abolished by said executive order.
The corresponding implementing rules of Executive Order No. 132, namely, revenue
Administrative Orders Nos. 4-93 and 5-93, were subsequently issued .by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.
On October 27, 1993, or one day after the promulgation of Executive Order No.132, the
President appointed the following as BIR Assistant Commissioners:
1. Bernardo A. Frianeza
2. Dominador L. Galura
3. Jaime D. Gonzales
4. Lilia C. Guillermo
5. Rizalina S. Magalona
6. Victorino C. Mamalateo
7. Jaime M. Masa
8. Antonio N. Pangilinan
9. Melchor S. Ramos
10. Joel L. Tan-Torres
Consequently, the president, in the assailed Administrative Order No. 101 dated December
2, 1993, found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct in the administrative charge and imposed
upon him the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of his leave credits and retirement benefits
including disqualification for reappointment in the government service.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed directly with this Court the instant petition on December 13, 1993
to question basically his alleged unlawful removal from office.

On April 17, 1996 and while the instant petition is pending, this Court set aside the
conviction of the petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. 14208 and 14209.
In his petition, petitioner challenged the authority of the President to dismiss him from office.
He argued that in so far as presidential appointees who are Career Executive Service Officers
are concerned, the President exercises only the power of control not the power to remove. He
also averred that the administrative investigation conducted under Memorandum Order No. 164
is void as it violated his right to due process. According to him, the letter of the Committee dated
September 17, 1993 and his position paper dated September 30, 1993 are not sufficient for
purposes of complying with the requirements of due process. He alleged that he was not
informed of the administrative charges leveled against him nor was he given official notice of his
dismissal.
Petitioner likewise claimed that he was removed as a result of the reorganization made by
the Executive Department in the BIR pursuant to Executive Order No. 132. Thus, he assailed
said Executive Order No. 132 and its implementing rules, namely, Revenue Administrative
Orders 4-93 and 5-93 for being ultra vires. He claimed that there is yet no law enacted by
Congress which authorizes the reorganization by the Executive Department of executive
agencies, particularly the Bureau of Internal revenue. He said that the reorganization sought to
be effected by the Executive Department on the basis of E.O. No. 132 is tainted with bad faith in
apparent violation of Section 2 of R.A. 6656, otherwise known as the Act Protecting the Security
of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government
Reorganization.
On the other hand, respondents contended that since petitioner is the presidential
appointee, he falls under the disciplining authority of the President. They also contended that
E.O. No. 132 and its implementing rules were validly issued pursuant to Sections 48 and 62 of
Republic Act No. 7645. Apart from this, the other legal bases of E.O. No. 132 as stated in its
preamble are Section 63 of E.O No.127 (Reorganizing the Ministry of Finance), and Section 20,
Book III of E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987. In addition, it is
clear that in Section 11 of R.A No.6656 future reorganization is expressly contemplated and
nothing in said law that prohibits subsequent reorganization through an executive order.
Significantly, respondents clarified that petitioner was not dismissed by virtue of EO 132.
Respondents claimed that he was removed from office because he was found guilty of grave
misconduct in the administrative cases filed against him.
The ultimate issue to be resolved in the instant case falls on the determination of the validity
of petitioners dismissal from office. Incidentally, in order to resolve this matter, it is imperative
that We consider these questions : a) Who has the power to discipline the petitioner?, b) Were
the proceedings taken pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 164 in accord with due process?, c)
What is the effect of petitioners acquittal in the criminal case to his administrative charge? d)
Does the President have the power to reorganize the BIR or to issue the questioned E.O. NO.
132?, e) Is the reorganization of BIR pursuant to E.O. No. 132 tainted with bad faith?
At the outset, it is worthy to note that the position of the Assistant Commissioner of the BIR
is part of the Career Executive Service. [2] Under the law,[3] Career Executive Service officers,
namely Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau director, Assistant Bureau Director,
Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of
equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, are all appointed
by the President. Concededly, petitioner was appointed as Assistant Commissioner in January,
1987 by then President Aquino. Thus, petitioner is a presidential appointee who belongs to
career service of the Civil Service. Being a presidential appointee, he comes under the direct
diciplining authority of the President. This is in line with the well settled principle that the power
to remove is inherent in the power to appoint conferred to the President by Section 16, Article

VII of the Constitution. Thus, it is ineluctably clear that Memorandum Order No. 164, which
created a committee to investigate the administrative charge against petitioner, was issued
pursuant to the power of removal of the President. This power of removal, however, is not an
absolute one which accepts no reservation. It must be pointed out that petitioner is a career
service officer. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, career service is characterized by the
existence of security of tenure, as contra-distinguished from non-career service whose tenure is
co-terminus with that of the appointing or subject to his pleasure, or limited to a period specified
by law or to the duration of a particular project for which purpose the employment was made. As
a career service officer, petitioner enjoys the right to security of tenure. No less than the 1987
Constitution guarantees the right of security of tenure of the employees of the civil service.
Specifically, Section 36 of P.D. No. 807, as amended, otherwise known as Civil Service Decree
of the Philippines, is emphatic that career service officers and employees who enjoy security of
tenure may be removed only for any of the causes enumerated in said law. In other words, the
fact that the petitioner is a presidential appointee does not give the appointing authority the
license to remove him at will or at his pleasure for it is an admitted fact that he is likewise a
career service officer who under the law is the recipient of tenurial protection, thus, may only be
removed for a cause and in accordance with procedural due process.
Was petitioner then removed from office for a legal cause under a valid proceeding?
Although the proceedings taken complied with the requirements of procedural due process,
this Court, however, considers that petitioner was not dismissed for a valid cause.
It should be noted that what precipitated the creation of the investigative committee to look
into the administrative charge against petitioner is his conviction by the Sandiganbayan in
criminal Case Nos. 14208 and 14209. As admitted by the respondents, the administrative case
against petitioner is based on the Sandiganbayan Decision of September 18, 1992. Thus, in the
Administrative Order No. 101 issued by Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Quisumbing which
found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct, it clearly states that:
"This pertains to the administrative charge against Assistant Commissioner Aquilino T. Larin of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for grave misconduct by virtue of a Memorandum signed by
Acting Secretary Leong of the Department of Finance, on the basis of decision handed down by
the Hon. Sandiganbayan convicting Larin, et. al. in Criminal Cases No. 14208 and 14209." [4]
In a nutshell, the criminal cases against petitioner refer to his alleged violation of Section
268 (4) of the National Internal Revenue Code and of section 3(e) of R.A. No.3019 as a
consequence of his act of favorably recommending the grant of tax credit to Tanduay Distillery,
Inc.. The pertinent portion of the judgment of the Sandiganbayan reads:
"As above pointed out, the accused had conspired in knowingly preparing false memoranda and
certification in order to effect a fraud upon taxes due to the government. By their separate acts
which had resulted in an appropriate tax credit of P180,701,682.00 in favor of Tanduay. The
government had been defrauded of a tax revenue - for the full amount, if one is to look at the
availments or utilization thereof (Exhibits 'AA' to 'AA-31-a'), or for a substantial portion thereof
(P73,000,000.00) if we are to rely on the letter of Deputy Commissioner Eufracio D. Santos
(Exhibits '21' for all the accused).
As pointed out above, the confluence of acts and omissions committed by accused Larin, Pareno
and Evangelista adequately prove conspiracy among them for no other purpose than to bring
about a tax credit which Tanduay did not deserve. These misrepresentations as to how much
Tanduay had paid in ad valorem taxes obviously constituted a fraud of tax revenue of the
government xxx.'[5]

However, it must be stressed at this juncture that the conviction of petitioner by the
Sandiganbayan was set aside by this court in our decision promulgated on April 17, 1996 in
G.R. Nos. 108037-38 and 107119-20. We specifically ruled in no uncertain terms that : a)
petitioner cannot be held negligent in relying on the certification of a co-equal unit in the BIR, b)
it is not incumbent upon Larin to go beyond the certification made by the Revenue Accounting
Division that Tanduay Distillery, Inc. had paid the ad valorem taxes, c) there is nothing irregular
or anything false in Larin's marginal note on the memorandum addressed to Pareno, the Chief
of Alcohol Tax Division who was also one of the accused, but eventually acquitted, in the said
criminal cases, and d) there is no proof of actual agreement between the accused, including
petitioner, to commit the illegal acts charged. We are emphatic in our resolution in said cases
that there is nothing "illegal with the acts committed by the petitioner(s)." We also declare that
"there is no showing that petitioner(s) had acted irregularly, or performed acts outside of his
(their) official functions." Significantly, these acts which We categorically declare to be not
unlawful and improper in G.R. Nos. 108037-38 and G.R. Nos. 107119-20 are the very same
acts for which petitioner is held to be administratively responsible. Any charge of malfeasance or
misfeasance on the part of the petitioner is clearly belied by our conclusion in said cases. In the
light of this decisive pronouncement, We see no reason for the administrative charge to
continue - it must, thus, be dismissed.
We are not unaware of the rule that since administrative cases are independent from
criminal actions for the same act or omission, the dismissal or acquittal of the criminal charge
does not foreclose the institution of administrative action nor carry with it the relief from
administrative liability.[6] However, the circumstantial setting of the instant case sets it miles
apart from the foregoing rule and placed it well within the exception. Corollarily, where the very
basis of the administrative case against petitioner is his conviction in the criminal action which
was later on set aside by this court upon a categorical and clear findings that the acts for which
he was administratively held liable are not unlawful and irregular, the acquittal of the petitioner in
the criminal case necessarily entails the dismissal of the administrative action against him,
because in such a case, there is no basis nor justifiable reason to maintain the administrative
suit.
On the aspect of procedural due process, suffice it to say that petitioner was given every
chance to present his side. The rule is well settled that the essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and
to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense.[7] The records clearly show that
on October 1, 1993 petitioner submitted his letter-response dated September 30, 1993 to the
administrative charged filed against him. Aside from his letter, he also submitted various
documents attached as annexes to his letter, all of which are evidences supporting his defense.
Prior to this, he received a letter dated September 17, 1993 from the Investigation Committee
requiring him to explain his side concerning the charge. It cannot therefore be argued that
petitioner was denied of due process.
Let us now examine Executive Order No. 132.
As stated earlier, with the issuance of Executive Order No. 132, some of the positions and
offices, including the office of Excise Tax Services of which petitioner was the Assistant
Commissioner, were abolished or otherwise decentralized. Consequently, the President
released the list of appointed Assistant Commissioners of the BIR. Apparently, petitioner was
not included.
Initially, it is argued that there is no law yet which empowers the President to issue E.O. No.
132 or to reorganize the BIR.
We do not agree.

Under its Preamble, E.O. No. 132 lays down the legal basis of its issuance, namely: a)
Section 48 and 62 of R.A. No. 7645, b) Section 63 of E.O. No. 127, and c) Section 20, Book III
of E.O. No. 292.
Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:
"Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies Within the Executive Branch. -The heads of departments, bureaus and offices and agencies are hereby directed to identify their
respective activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which
may be scaled down, phased out or abolished, subject to civil rules and regulations. xxx. Actual
scaling down, phasing out or abolition of the activities shall be effective pursuant to Circulars or
Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President." (italics ours)
Said provision clearly mentions the acts of "scaling down, phasing out and abolition" of
offices only and does not cover the creation of offices or transfer of functions. Nevertheless, the
act of creating and decentralizing is included in the subsequent provision of Section 62, which
provides that:
"Sec. 62, Unauthorized Organizational Charges. -- Unless otherwise created by law or directed by
the President of the Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key positions in any
department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organization structures and be funded
from appropriations by this Act." (italics ours)
The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is authorized to effect
organizational changes including the creation of offices in the department or agency concerned.
The contention of petitioner that the two provisions are riders deserves scant consideration.
Well settled is the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality.
[8]
Unless and until a specific provision of the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the
same is valid and binding for all intents and purposes.
Another legal basis of E.O. No. 132 is Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which states:
"Sec.20. Residual Powers. -- Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President
shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are
provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above or which
are not delegated by the President in accordance with law." (italics ours)
This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the law. What law
then which gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 [9]which
amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the
Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the
power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to
create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials.
The validity of these two decrees are unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides
that "all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
repealed or revoked."[10] So far, there is yet no law amending or repealing said decrees.
Significantly, the Constitution itself recognizes future reorganizations in the government as what
is revealed in Section 16 of Article XVIII, thus:
"Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from service not for cause but as a result of
the xxx reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to
appropriate separation pay xxx."

However, We can not consider E.O. No. 127 signed on January 30, 1987 as a legal basis
for the reorganization of the BIR. E.O. No. 127 should be related to the second paragraph of
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6656.
Section 11 provides inter alia:
"xxx
In the case of the 1987 reorganization of the executive branch, all departments and agencies
which are authorized by executive orders promulgated by the President to reorganize shall
have ninety days from the approval of this act within which to implement their respective
reorganization plans in accordance with the provisions of this Act." (italics ours)
Executive Order No. 127 was part of the 1987 reorganization contemplated under said
provision. Obviously, it had become stale by virtue of the expiration of the ninety day deadline
period. It can not thus be used as a proper basis for the reorganization of the BIR. Nevertheless,
as shown earlier, there are other legal bases to sustain the authority of the President to issue
the questioned E.O. No. 132.
While the President's power to reorganize can not be denied, this does not mean however
that the reorganization itself is properly made in accordance with law. Well-settled is the rule
that reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. Thus, in
Dario vs. Mison, this court has had the occasion to clarify that:
"As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event no dismissal or separation actually
occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case the security of tenure would not
be a Chinese Wall. Be that as it may, if the abolition which is nothing else but a separation or
removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in
good faith, no valid abolition takes place and whatever abolition is done is void ab initio. There is
an invalid abolition as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions or where
claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds." [11]
In this regard, it is worth mentioning that Section 2 of R.A. No. 6656 lists down the
circumstances evidencing bad faith in the removal of employees as a result of the
reorganization, thus:
Sec. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and
after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exist when, pursuant to a bona fide
reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to merge,
divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful
causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following
circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of the
reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:
a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the
department or agency concerned;
b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created;
c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance
and merit;
d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified
offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices;

e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof."
A reading of some of the provisions of the questioned E.O. No. 132 clearly leads us to an
inescapable conclusion that there are circumstances considered as evidences of bad faith in the
reorganization of the BIR.
Section 1.1.2 of said executive order provides that:
"1.1.2 The Intelligence and Investigation Office and the Inspection Service are abolished. An
Intelligence and Investigation Service is hereby created to absorb the same functions of the
abolished office and service. xxx" (italics ours)
This provision is a clear illustration of the circumstance mentioned in Section 2 (b) of R.A.
No. 6656 that an office is abolished and another one performing substantially the same function
is created.
Another circumstance is the creation of services and divisions in the BIR resulting to a
significant increase in the number of positions in the said bureau as contemplated in paragraph
(a) of section 2 of R.A. No. 6656. Under Section 1.3 of E.O. No. 132, the Information Systems
Group has two newly created Systems Services. Aside from this, six new divisions are also
created. Under Section 1.2.1, three more divisions of the Assessment Service are formed. With
this newly created offices, there is no doubt that a significant increase of positions will
correspondingly follow.
Furthermore, it is perceivable that the non-reappointment of the petitioner as Assistant
Commissioner violates Section 4 of R.A. No. 6656. Under said provision, officers holding
permanent appointments are given preference for appointment to the new positions in the
approved staffing pattern comparable to their former position or in case there are not enough
comparable positions to positions next lower in rank. It is undeniable that petitioner is a career
executive officer who is holding a permanent position. Hence, he should have given preference
for appointment in the position of Assistant Commissioner. As claimed by petitioner, Antonio
Pangilinan who was one of those appointed as Assistant Commissioner, "is an outsider of sorts
to the bureau, not having been an incumbent officer of the bureau at the time of the
reorganization." We should not lose sight of the second paragraph of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6656
which explicitly states that no new employees shall be taken in until all permanent officers shall
have been appointed for permanent position.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted, and petitioner is hereby reinstated
to his position as Assistant Commissioner without loss of seniority rights and shall be entitled to
full backwages from the time of his separation from service until actual reinstatement unless, in
the meanwhile, he would have reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five years in
which case, he shall be deemed to have retired at such age and entitled thereafter to the
corresponding retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., on leave.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 115863 March 31, 1995


AIDA D. EUGENIO, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. & HON. SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ, JR.,respondents.

PUNO, J.:
The power of the Civil Service Commission to abolish the Career Executive Service Board is
challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
First the facts. Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She
applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank on August 2, 1993,
she was given a CES eligibility. On September 15, 1993, she was recommended to the
President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board. 1
All was not to turn well for petitioner. On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil Service
Commission 2 passed Resolution No. 93-4359, viz:
RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359

WHEREAS, Section 1(1) of Article IX-B provides that Civil Service shall be
administered by the Civil Service Commission, . . .;
WHEREAS, Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides
that "The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the
government, is mandated to establish a career service and adopt measures to
promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progresiveness and
courtesy in the civil service, . . .";
WHEREAS, Section 12 (1), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code
of 1987 grants the Commission the power, among others, to administer and
enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system for all
levels and ranks in the Civil Service;
WHEREAS, Section 7, Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 Provides, among others, that The Career Service shall be characterized by
(1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by
competitive examination, or based highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity
for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure;
WHEREAS, Section 8 (c), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the administrative Code of
1987 provides that "The third level shall cover Positions in the Career Executive
Service";
WHEREAS, the Commission recognizes the imperative need to consolidate,
integrate and unify the administration of all levels of positions in the career
service.
WHEREAS, the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 confers on the Commission the power and authority
to effect changes in its organization as the need arises.
WHEREAS, Section 5, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that the Civil
Service Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and the necessary implications
thereof;
NOW THEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Civil Service
Commission hereby resolves to streamline reorganize and effect changes in its
organizational structure. Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board,
shall now be known as the Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil
Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties and
equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of the
Office for Career Executive Service.
The above resolution became an impediment. to the appointment of petitioner as Civil Service
Officer, Rank IV. In a letter to petitioner, dated June 7, 1994, the Honorable Antonio T. Carpio,
Chief Presidential legal Counsel, stated:
xxx xxx xxx
On 1 October 1993 the Civil Service Commission issued CSC Resolution No. 934359 which abolished the Career Executive Service Board.
Several legal issues have arisen as a result of the issuance of CSC Resolution
No. 93-4359, including whether the Civil Service Commission has authority to

abolish the Career Executive Service Board. Because these issues remain
unresolved, the Office of the President has refrained from considering
appointments of career service eligibles to career executive ranks.
xxx xxx xxx
You may, however, bring a case before the appropriate court to settle the legal
issues arising from issuance by the Civil Service Commission of CSC Resolution
No. 93-4359, for guidance of all concerned.
Thank You.
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board
which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at
bench to annul, among others, resolution No. 93-4359. The petition is anchored on the following
arguments:
A.
IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT COMMISSION
USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT
ABOLISHED THE CESB, AN OFFICE CREATED BY LAW, THROUGH THE
ISSUANCE OF CSC: RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359;
B.
ALSO IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT CSC
USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT
ILLEGALLY AUTHORIZED THE TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEY, THROUGH
THE ISSUANCE OF CSC RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359.
Required to file its Comment, the Solicitor General agreed with the contentions of petitioner.
Respondent Commission, however, chose to defend its ground. It posited the following position:
ARGUMENTS FOR PUBLIC RESPONDENT-CSC
I. THE INSTANT PETITION STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE
PUBLIC RESPONDENT-CSC.
II. THE RECOMMENDATION SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
APPOINTMENT TO A CESO RANK OF PETITIONER EUGENIO WAS A VALID
ACT OF THE CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD OF THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION AND IT DOES NOT HAVE ANY DEFECT.
III. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING
THE VALIDITY OF THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE CESB IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER EUGENIO SINCE THE PRESIDENT HAS PREVIOUSLY
APPOINTED TO CESO RANK FOUR (4) OFFICIALS SIMILARLY SITUATED AS
SAID PETITIONER. FURTHERMORE, LACK OF MEMBERS TO CONSTITUTE
A QUORUM. ASSUMING THERE WAS NO QUORUM, IS NOT THE FAULT OF
PUBLIC RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION BUT OF THE
PRESIDENT WHO HAS THE POWER TO APPOINT THE OTHER MEMBERS
OF THE CESB.

IV. THE INTEGRATION OF THE CESB INTO THE COMMISSION IS


AUTHORIZED BY LAW (Sec. 12 (1), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the
Administrative Code of the 1987). THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE HAD ALREADY
BEEN SETTLED WHEN THE HONORABLE COURT DISMISSED THE
PETITION FILED BY THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, NAMELY: SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, FELICIANO R.
BELMONTE, JR., RENATO V. DIAZ, AND MANUEL M. GARCIA IN G.R. NO.
114380. THE AFOREMENTIONED PETITIONERS ALSO QUESTIONED THE
INTEGRATION OF THE CESB WITH THE COMMISSION.
We find merit in the petition. 3
The controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was created in the
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 1974 4 which adopted the Integrated Plan.
Article IV, Chapter I, Part of the III of the said Plan provides:
Article IV Career Executive Service
1. A Career Executive Service is created to form a continuing pool of wellselected and development oriented career administrators who shall provide
competent and faithful service.
2. A Career Executive Service hereinafter referred to in this Chapter as the
Board, is created to serve as the governing body of the Career Executive
Service. The Board shall consist of the Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission as presiding officer, the Executive Secretary and the Commissioner
of the Budget as ex-officio members and two other members from the private
sector and/or the academic community who are familiar with the principles and
methods of personnel administration.
xxx xxx xxx
5. The Board shall promulgate rules, standards and procedures on the selection,
classification, compensation and career development of members of the Career
Executive Service. The Board shall set up the organization and operation of the
service. (Emphasis supplied)
It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished
by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of
public offices is primarily a legislative function. As aptly summed up in AM JUR 2d on Public
Officers and
Employees, 5 viz:
Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of public
offices is primarily a legislative function. In so far as the legislative power in this
respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it supreme, and the
legislature may decide for itself what offices are suitable, necessary, or
convenient. When in the exigencies of government it is necessary to create and
define duties, the legislative department has the discretion to determine whether
additional offices shall be created, or whether these duties shall be attached to
and become ex-officio duties of existing offices. An office created by the
legislature is wholly within the power of that body, and it may prescribe the mode
of filling the office and the powers and duties of the incumbent, and if it sees fit,
abolish the office.

In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the
CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature
has set aside funds for the operation of CESB. Respondent Commission, however, invokes
Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the
source of its power to abolish the CESB. Section 17 provides:
Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. Each office of the Commission shall be
headed by a Director with at least one Assistant Director, and may have such
divisions as are necessary independent constitutional body, the Commission may
effect changes in the organization as the need arises.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together
with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent
Commission, viz:
Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. The Commission shall have the following
offices:
(1) The Office of the Executive Director headed by an Executive Director, with a
Deputy Executive Director shall implement policies, standards, rules and
regulations promulgated by the Commission; coordinate the programs of the
offices of the Commission and render periodic reports on their operations, and
perform such other functions as may be assigned by the Commission.
(2) The Merit System Protection Board composed of a Chairman and two (2)
members shall have the following functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The Office of Legal Affairs shall provide the Chairman with legal advice and
assistance; render counselling services; undertake legal studies and researches;
prepare opinions and ruling in the interpretation and application of the Civil
Service law, rules and regulations; prosecute violations of such law, rules and
regulations; and represent the Commission before any court or tribunal.
(4) The Office of Planning and Management shall formulate development plans,
programs and projects; undertake research and studies on the different aspects
of public personnel management; administer management improvement
programs; and provide fiscal and budgetary services.
(5) The Central Administrative Office shall provide the Commission with
personnel, financial, logistics and other basic support services.
(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records shall formulate and implement
policies, standards, rules and regulations pertaining to personnel records
maintenance, security, control and disposal; provide storage and extension
services; and provide and maintain library services.
(7) The Office of Position Classification and Compensation shall formulate and
implement policies, standards, rules and regulations relative to the administration
of position classification and compensation.
(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement shall provide
leadership and assistance in developing and implementing the overall
Commission programs relating to recruitment, execution and placement, and

formulate policies, standards, rules and regulations for the proper implementation
of the Commission's examination and placement programs.
(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards shall provide leadership and
assistance in the formulation and evaluation of personnel systems and standards
relative to performance appraisal, merit promotion, and employee incentive
benefit and awards.
(10) The Office of Human Resource Development shall provide leadership and
assistance in the development and retention of qualified and efficient work force
in the Civil Service; formulate standards for training and staff development;
administer service-wide scholarship programs; develop training literature and
materials; coordinate and integrate all training activities and evaluate training
programs.
(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit shall develop policies,
standards, rules and regulations for the effective conduct or inspection and audit
personnel and personnel management programs and the exercise of delegated
authority; provide technical and advisory services to Civil Service Regional
Offices and government agencies in the implementation of their personnel
programs and evaluation systems.
(12) The Office of Personnel Relations shall provide leadership and assistance in
the development and implementation of policies, standards, rules and regulations
in the accreditation of employee associations or organizations and in the
adjustment and settlement of employee grievances and management of
employee disputes.
(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs shall formulate and implement policies,
standards, rules and regulations governing corporate officials and employees in
the areas of recruitment, examination, placement, career development, merit and
awards systems, position classification and compensation, performing appraisal,
employee welfare and benefit, discipline and other aspects of personnel
management on the basis of comparable industry practices.
(14) The Office of Retirement Administration shall be responsible for the
enforcement of the constitutional and statutory provisions, relative to retirement
and the regulation for the effective implementation of the retirement of
government officials and employees.
(15) The Regional and Field Offices. The Commission shall have not less than
thirteen (13) Regional offices each to be headed by a Director, and such field
offices as may be needed, each to be headed by an official with at least the rank
of an Assistant Director.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission's power to
reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16, supra.
From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit
administratively attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the
Reorganization Committee "the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the
problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive
outlook." 6 The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its
attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall
within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987,
the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is

to attain "policy and program coordination." This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3),
Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:
(3) Attachment. (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the
department or its equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of
policy and program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by
having the department represented in the governing board of the attached
agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting
rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or
agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the
progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent
provide general policies through its representative in the board, which shall serve
as the framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency.
Respondent Commission also relies on the case of Datumanong, et al., vs. Civil Service
Commission, G. R. No. 114380 where the petition assailing the abolition of the CESB was
dismissed for lack of cause of action. Suffice to state that the reliance is misplaced considering
that the cited case was dismissed for lack of standing of the petitioner, hence, the lack of cause
of action.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Resolution No. 93-4359 of the respondent
Commission is hereby annulled and set aside. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 101251

ELISEO A. SINON, PETITIONER, VS. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT


OF AGRICULTURE-REORGANIZATION APPEALS BOARD AND JUANA BANAN,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to annul the following Resolutions of the public respondents
Civil Service Commission (the CSC)* and Department of Agriculture Reorganization Appeals
Board (the DARAB),** to wit:
1. Resolution No. 97 dated August 23, 1989, issued by respondent DARAB which revoked
petitioners permanent appointment as Municipal Agriculture Officer (MAO) and appointed, in his
stead, private respondent Juana Banan (Rollo 17);
2.
Resolution dated February 8, 1991 issued by the respondent CSC affirming the
aforementioned Resolution of respondent DARAB (Rollo 22);
3. Resolution dated July 11, 1991 issued by the respondent CSC which denied petitioners
motion for the reconsideration of the respondent Commissions Resolution dated February 8,
1991.[1]
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Prior to the reorganization of the then Ministry of Agriculture and Food (the MAF), the private
respondent Juana Banan was the incumbent Municipal Agricultural Officer (MAO) of the
aforesaid Ministry in Region II, Cagayan, while the petitioner Eliseo Sinon occupied the position
of Fisheries Extension Specialist (FES) II in the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
(BFAR) in the same region.
However, the reorganization of the MAF into the Department of Agriculture (the DA) with the
issuance of Executive Order No. 116 dated 30 January 1987, called for the evaluation of the
following employees for the twenty nine positions of MAO in Region II, Cagayan. The list as
prepared by the Placement Committee included the herein petitioner Sinon but excluded the
respondent Banan:
1.

Binoya, Vicente

76.20%

2.

Cabana, Isidro S.

75.01%

3.

Sebastian, Alice

74.18%

4.

Zingapan, Benjamin

70.73%

5.

Guzman, Wilhelmina de la P.

70.50%

6.

Gervacio, Agnes

69.86%

7.

Somera, Hilario S.

68.13%

8.

Tolentino, Julian R.

67.64%

9.

Guillermo, Pedro

67.22%

10.

Tambio, Rodolfo

67.00%

11.

Aquino, Martina

66.94%

12.

Bassig, Pio P.

66.84%

13.

Rumpon, Danilo P.

65.61%

14.

Zareno, Bernardo

65.57%

15.

Madrid, Angel S.

65.57%

16.

Callangan, Napoleon

65.45%

17.

Fiesta, Felicisimo

65.29%

18.

Alvarez, Benefranco

64.99%

19.

Baggayan, Samuel

64.42%

20.

Umbay, Pedro T.

64.01%

21.

De la Cruz, Florencio M.

62.07%

22.

Leonador, Ernesto T.

61.88%

23.

Miguel, Jose

61.86%

24.

Berlan, Herminia C.

61.76%

25.

Soliman, Clemente

61.52%

26.

Llopis, Lino

61.47%

27.

Baliuag, Felicidad C.

61.39%

28.

Aresta, Leticia

60.67%

29.

Sinon, Eliseo A.

60.66%[2]

(Underscoring supplied).
Thus, respondent Banan filed an appeal with the DARAB for re-evaluation of the qualifications of
all those included in the aforementioned list made by the Placement Committee.
On August 23, 1989, the DARAB released Resolution No. 97 in which the ranking for 29 MAO
prepared by the Placement Committee was re-evaluated as follows:
1.

Binoya, Vicente

76.20%

2.

Cabana, Isidro

75.01%

3.

Sebastian, Alice

72.18%

4.

Zingapan, Benjamin

70.73%

5.

Guzman, Wilhemina de la P.

70.50%

6.

Gervacio, Agnes

70.04%

7.

Somera, Hilario S.

68.13%

8.

Tolentino, Julian Jr.

67.64%

9.

Guillermo, Pedro

67.22%

10.

Tambio, Rodolfo

67.00%

11.

Aquino, Martina D.

12.

Bassig, Pio P.

66.84%

13.

Rumpon, Danilo P.

65.61%

14.

Madrid, Angel

66.94%

65.57%

15.

Callangan, Napoleon

65.45%

16.

Fiesta, Felicisimo

65.29%

17.

Alvarez, Benefranco

64.99%

18.

Baggayan, Samuel O.

64.42%

19.

Umbay, Pedro T.

64.01%

20.

De la Cruz, Florencio M.

62.07%

21.

Leonador, Ernesto T.

61.88%

22.

Miguel, Jose L.

61.86%

23.

Berlan, Herminia C.

61.76%

24.

Soliman, Clemente

61.52%

25.

Zareno, Bernardo

61.50%

26.

Llopis, Lino

61.47%

27.

Baliuag, Felicidad

61.39%

28.

Rosario, Jaime C.

60.18%

29.

Banan, Juana

59.32%[3]

(Underscoring supplied).
In this re-evaluation, petitioner Sinon was displaced by the respondent Banan and this same
resolution was duly approved by the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, Carlos G.
Dominguez, who also affixed his signature on the same date.
However, on August 30, 1988, Sinon received an appointment as MAO for Region II in Cagayan
as approved by Regional Director Gumersindo D. Lasam on the basis of the first evaluation
made by the Placement Committee.
Thus, Sinon filed an appeal docketed as Civil Service Case No. 573 on November 22, 1989 to
the CSC. This appeal was granted mainly for two reasons: first, the respondent DARAB failed to
file its Comment within the period required; and second, the evaluation of the qualification of the
employees is a question of fact which the appointing authority or the Placement Committee
assisting him is in a better position to determine. Hence, the Resolution dated 28 February 1989
of the DARAB was set aside.[4]
On March 19, 1990, Banan filed a Motion for Reconsideration in which she pitted her
qualifications against Sinon for the last slot in the 29 available MAO positions. At the same time,
she pointed out that to allow the findings of the Placement Committee to supercede the DARAB
resolution which the Secretary of Agriculture had approved would be tantamount to giving
precedence to the Placement Committee over the head of the agency.
Finally, on February 8, 1991, CSC, after reviewing the Comment filed by the DARAB which had
not been considered earlier in the Civil Service Case No. 573, the CSC granted respondent
Banans Motion for Reconsideration and gave due course to her appointment by the DARAB.
On March 21, 1991, Sinon filed Motion for Reconsideration of the February 8, 1991 Resolution
which however was denied by the CSC in its assailed Resolution dated July 11, 1991.
According to the respondent CSC:

Mr. Sinon strongly argued that the findings of the Placement Committee on the qualifications of
the parties should be accorded deference and greater weight over that of the RAB. Under the
Placement Committees evaluation, Mr. Sinon garnered 60.66 while Ms.Juana Banan earned
57.32 after assessing the contending parties qualification in education, relevant experience,
eligibility and other factors. Following the request of several parties for reevaluation, the RAB in
their decision gave Mr. Sinon 57.66 while Ms. Banan obtained 59.32. Seemingly the findings of
the two bodies are in conflict. Mr. Sinon argues that the findings of the Placement Committee
should prevail since it is specially mandated by RA 6656.
We disagree. The Placement Committees function is recommendatory in nature. The agencys
Reorganization Appeals Board was specially created by the Circular of the Office of the
President dated October 2, 1987 and conferred with authority to review appeals and complaints
of officials and employees affected by the reorganization. The decision of the agency RAB
has the imprimatur of the Secretary of that agency and is therefore controlling in matters of
appointment. Under this principle, the decision of the DARAB in this case enjoys precedence
over the Placement Committee.[5]
Hence, this petition was filed with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, and/or restraining
order to enjoin the execution of the assailed resolutions.
Without giving due course to the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction, the Court required
the parties to file their respective Comments.[6]
On 12 November 1992, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective Memoranda.[7]
The main issue for Our consideration is this: whether or not the CSC committed grave abuse of
discretion in reviewing and re-evaluating the rating or qualification of the petitioner Sinon.
The arguments of the petitioner can be summed up as follows:
1). In issuing the Resolution of 8 February 1991, the CSC in effect revoked the appointment that
the petitioner received as early as 30 August 1989 and which was deemed permanent by virtue
of the approval of the Regional Director of the Department of Agriculture;
2). In giving petitioner a rating of only 57.66%, [8] from his previous rating of 60.66% and at the
same time according a rating of 59.32% to private respondent from a rating of only 57.32%, the
CSC departed from its power which is limited only to that of review, and hence encroached
upon the power of appointment exclusively lodged in the appointing authority;
3). In giving due course to the appointment of respondent Banan in its Resolution of 8 February
1991, CSC was directing the appointment of a substitute of their own choice when the power to
appoint was exclusively lodged in the appointing authority.
We rule as follows.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion or hostility.[9]

Contrary to the allegations of the petitioner, We do not find any evidence of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CSC when it issued Resolution dated 8 February 1991 which in
effect approved the appointment of respondent Banan over petitioner Sinon.
With the reorganization of the MAF into the DA with Executive Order No. 116, it became
imperative to protect the security of tenure of Civil Service Officers and employees in the
implementation of government reorganization. Thus, Congress passed Republic Act No. 6656.
[10]

It was under the same law of R.A. 6656 that the Placement Committee was created:
Section 6. In order that the best qualified and most deserving persons shall be appointed in
any reorganization, there shall be created a Placement Committee in each department or
agency to assist the appointing authority in the judicious selection and placement ofpersonnel.
The Committee Shall consist of two (2) members appointed by the head of the department or
agency, a representative of the appointing authority, and two (2) members duly elected by the
employees holding positions in the first and second levels of the career service: Provided, that if
there is a registered employee association with a majority of the employees as members, that
employee association shall also have a representative in the Committee: Provided, further, that
immediately upon the approval of the staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned,
such staffing pattern shall be made known to all officers and employees of the agency who shall
be invited to apply for any of the positions authorized therein. Such application shall be
considered by the committee in the placement and selection of personnel. (Underscoring ours).
To assist means to lend an aid to, [11] or to contribute effort in the complete accomplishment of
an ultimate purpose intended to be effected by those engaged.[12]
In contrast, to recommend[13] is to present ones advice or choice as having ones approval or
to represent or urge as advisable or expedient. It involves the idea that another has the final
decision.
Clearly, the Placement Committee was charged with the duty of exercising
the samediscretionary functions as the appointing authority in the judicious selection and
placement of personnel when the law empowered it to assist the appointing authority.
The same law also allows any officer or employee aggrieved by the appointments to file an
appeal with the appointing authority who shall make a decision within thirty (30) days from the
filing thereof. If the same employee is still not satisfied with the decision of the appointing
authority, he may further appeal within ten (10) days from the receipt thereof to the CSC.[14]
In the case at bar, the Circular dated October 2, 1987 of the Office of the President created the
agency Reorganization Appeals Board to address the problem of employees affected by the
reorganizations.
The foregoing legal measures spell out the remedies of aggrieved parties which make it
impossible to give the status of finality to any appointment until all protests or oppositions are
duly heard.
Thus, while it is true that the appointment paper received by petitioner Sinon on 30 August 1989
for the position of MAO had not conferred any permanent status and was still subject to the
following conditions attached to any appointment in the civil service:

Provided that there is no pending administrative case against the appointee, no pending protest
against the appointment, nor any decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the
approval of the appointment.[15]
Hence, for as long as the re-evaluation of the qualifications filed by Banan was pending, the
petitioner cannot claim that he had been issued with a complete appointment. Neither is there
any point in asserting that his appointment had cured whatever change was subsequently
recommended by the DARAB.[16]
The fact that the DARAB is capable of re-evaluating the findings of the Placement Committee
only to find that Sinon is not qualified should not be taken as a grave abuse of discretion.
We cannot subscribe to petitioner Sinons insistence that the public respondent CSC had
disregarded the findings of the Placement Committee. The truth is, these findings were reevaluated and the report after such re-evaluation was submitted to and approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture. The CSC affirmed the findings of the DARAB.
Because of all the foregoing circumstances, the Jurisprudence cited by the petitioner Sinon
appears to be incorrect.[17]
Neither do we find in the Resolution of 8 February 1991, any statement by the CSC directing the
appointment of the respondent Banan. Hence, there was no directive from the CSC that may be
misinterpreted as a usurpation of any appointing power.[18]
Besides, in affirming the appointment of Banan as recommended by the DARAB and approved
by the Secretary of Agriculture, the CSC is only being consistent with the law. Section 4 of R.A.
6656 mandates that officers and employees holding permanent appointments shall be given
preference for appointment to the new positions in the approved staffing pattern comparable to
their former positions. Also, the term incumbent officer and the privileges generally accorded to
them would more aptly refer to Banan and not to petitioner Sinon whose appointment was never
confirmed completely.[19] There is no dispute that the position of MAO in the old staffing pattern is
most comparable to the MAO in the new staffing pattern.
Finally, the Solicitor General in behalf of the CSC correctly noted that the petitioner Sinon had
conveniently omitted the then Secretary of Agriculture who had affixed his approval on the
findings of the DARAB. Petitioner Sinon knew fully well that as head of the agency, the
Secretary of Agriculture was the appointing authority.
It must be recalled that the whole purpose of reorganization is that it is a process of
restructuring the bureaucracys organizational and functional set-up, to make it more viable in
terms of the economy, efficiency, effectiveness and make it more responsive to the needs of its
public clientele, as authorized by law. [20] For as long as the CSC confines itself within the limits
set out by law and does not encroach upon the prerogatives endowed to other authorities, this
Court must sustain the Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo,
ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C.
ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO
AGUILLON AGUILA, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman, Commission on
Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister of Justice, Respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:
This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon the validity of any executive or
legislative act in an appropriate cases, has to resolve the crucial issue of the constitutionality of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for Other Purposes." The task of judicial review, aptly characterized as exacting
and delicate, is never more so than when a conceded legislative power, that of judicial
reorganization, 1 may possibly collide with the time-honored principle of the independence of the
judiciary 2as protected and safeguarded by this constitutional provision: "The Members of the
Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior until they
reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office.
The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of
at least eight Members, order their dismissal." 3 For the assailed legislation mandates that
Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts,
except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to
the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It
is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being
alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and
disregarded,
That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding, erroneously entitled Petition for
Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition 4 considered by this Court as an action for prohibited
petition, seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, and respondent Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Petitioners 5 sought to bolster their claim by imputing lack of good
faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue delegation of legislative power to the
President his authority to fix the compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges
thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the reorganization shall be deemed
completed. In the very comprehensive and scholarly Answer of Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza, 6 it was pointed out that there is no valid justification for the attack on the
constitutionality of this statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang
Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of absence of good faith as well as the
attack on the independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of any support in law.
A Supplemental Answer was likewise filed on October 8, 1981, followed by a Reply of
petitioners on October 13. After the hearing in the morning and afternoon of October 15, in
which not only petitioners and respondents were heard through counsel but also the amici

curiae, 7 and thereafter submission of the minutes of the proceeding on the debate on Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, this petition was deemed submitted for decision.
The importance of the crucial question raised called for intensive and rigorous study of all the
legal aspects of the case. After such exhaustive deliberation in several sessions, the exchange
of views being supplemented by memoranda from the members of the Court, it is our opinion
and so hold that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional.
1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as Judge de la
Llana is concerned, he certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice Laurel's opinion
in People v. Vera. 8 Thus: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of
a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." 9 The other petitioners as members of
the bar and officers of the court cannot be considered as devoid of "any personal and
substantial interest" on the matter. There is relevance to this excerpt from a separate opinion
in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections: 10 "Then there is the attack on the standing of
petitioners, as vindicating at most what they consider a public right and not protecting their
rights as individuals. This is to conjure the specter of the public right dogma as an inhibition to
parties intent on keeping public officials staying on the path of constitutionalism. As was so well
put by Jaffe: 'The protection of private rights is an essential constituent of public interest and,
conversely, without a well-ordered state there could be no enforcement of private rights. Private
and public interests are, both in substantive and procedural sense, aspects of the totality of the
legal order.' Moreover, petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers,
their standing to sue has been amply demonstrated. There would be a retreat from the liberal
approach followed in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works,foreshadowed by the very decision
of People v. Vera where the doctrine was first fully discussed, if we act differently now. I do not
think we are prepared to take that step. Respondents, however, would hark back to the
American Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon v. Frothingham with their claim that what petitioners
possess 'is an interest which is shared in common by other people and is comparatively so
minute and indeterminate as to afford any basis and assurance that the judicial process can act
on it.' That is to speak in the language of a bygone era even in the United States. For as Chief
Justice Warren clearly pointed out in the later case of Flast v. Cohen, the barrier thus set up if
not breached has definitely been lowered." 11
2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 to demonstrate lack of good faith does manifest violence to the facts. Petitioners
should have exercised greater care in informing themselves as to its antecedents. They had laid
themselves open to the accusation of reckless disregard for the truth, On August 7, 1980, a
Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization was organized. 12This Executive Order was
later amended by Executive Order No. 619-A., dated September 5 of that year. It clearly
specified the task assigned to it: "1. The Committee shall formulate plans on the reorganization
of the Judiciary which shall be submitted within seventy (70) days from August 7, 1980 to
provide the President sufficient options for the reorganization of the entire Judiciary which shall
embrace all lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the City
and Municipal Courts, and all Special Courts, but excluding the Sandigan Bayan." 13 On October
17, 1980, a Report was submitted by such Committee on Judicial Reorganization. It began with
this paragraph: "The Committee on Judicial Reorganization has the honor to submit the
following Report. It expresses at the outset its appreciation for the opportunity accorded it to
study ways and means for what today is a basic and urgent need, nothing less than the
restructuring of the judicial system. There are problems, both grave and pressing, that call for
remedial measures. The felt necessities of the time, to borrow a phrase from Holmes, admit of
no delay, for if no step be taken and at the earliest opportunity, it is not too much to say that the
people's faith in the administration of justice could be shaken. It is imperative that there be a
greater efficiency in the disposition of cases and that litigants, especially those of modest means

much more so, the poorest and the humblest can vindicate their rights in an expeditious
and inexpensive manner. The rectitude and the fairness in the way the courts operate must be
manifest to all members of the community and particularly to those whose interests are affected
by the exercise of their functions. It is to that task that the Committee addresses itself and hopes
that the plans submitted could be a starting point for an institutional reform in the Philippine
judiciary. The experience of the Supreme Court, which since 1973 has been empowered to
supervise inferior courts, from the Court of Appeals to the municipal courts, has proven that
reliance on improved court management as well as training of judges for more efficient
administration does not suffice. I hence, to repeat, there is need for a major reform in the judicial
so stem it is worth noting that it will be the first of its kind since the Judiciary Act became
effective on June 16, 1901." 14 I t went to say: "I t does not admit of doubt that the last two
decades of this century are likely to be attended with problems of even greater complexity and
delicacy. New social interests are pressing for recognition in the courts. Groups long inarticulate,
primarily those economically underprivileged, have found legal spokesmen and are asserting
grievances previously ignored. Fortunately, the judicially has not proved inattentive. Its task has
thus become even more formidable. For so much grist is added to the mills of justice. Moreover,
they are likewise to be quite novel. The need for an innovative approach is thus apparent. The
national leadership, as is well-known, has been constantly on the search for solutions that will
prove to be both acceptable and satisfactory. Only thus may there be continued national
progress." 15 After which comes: "To be less abstract, the thrust is on development. That has
been repeatedly stressed and rightly so. All efforts are geared to its realization. Nor, unlike in
the past, was it to b "considered as simply the movement towards economic progress and
growth measured in terms of sustained increases in per capita income and Gross National
Product (GNP). 16 For the New Society, its implication goes further than economic advance,
extending to "the sharing, or more appropriately, the democratization of social and economic
opportunities, the substantiation of the true meaning of social justice." 17 This process of
modernization and change compels the government to extend its field of activity and its scope of
operations. The efforts towards reducing the gap between the wealthy and the poor elements in
the nation call for more regulatory legislation. That way the social justice and protection to labor
mandates of the Constitution could be effectively implemented." 18 There is likelihood then "that
some measures deemed inimical by interests adversely affected would be challenged in court
on grounds of validity. Even if the question does not go that far, suits may be filed concerning
their interpretation and application. ... There could be pleas for injunction or restraining orders.
Lack of success of such moves would not, even so, result in their prompt final disposition. Thus
delay in the execution of the policies embodied in law could thus be reasonably expected. That
is not conducive to progress in development." 19 For, as mentioned in such Report, equally of
vital concern is the problem of clogged dockets, which "as is well known, is one of the utmost
gravity. Notwithstanding the most determined efforts exerted by the Supreme Court, through the
leadership of both retired Chief Justice Querube Makalintal and the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro, from the time supervision of the courts was vested in it under the 1973 Constitution, the
trend towards more and more cases has continued." 20 It is understandable why. With the
accelerated economic development, the growth of population, the increasing urbanization, and
other similar factors, the judiciary is called upon much oftener to resolve controversies. Thus
confronted with what appears to be a crisis situation that calls for a remedy, the Batasang
Pambansa had no choice. It had to act, before the ailment became even worse. Time was of the
essence, and yet it did not hesitate to be duly mindful, as it ought to be, of the extent of its
coverage before enacting Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms," characterized in the
Report as "both pressing and urgent." 21 It is worth noting, likewise, as therein pointed out, that a
major reorganization of such scope, if it were to take place, would be the most thorough after
four generations. 22 The reference was to the basic Judiciary Act generations . enacted in June
of 1901, 23 amended in a significant way, only twice previous to the Commonwealth. There was,
of course, the creation of the Court of Appeals in 1935, originally composed "of a Presiding

Judge and ten appellate Judges, who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines,
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, 24 It could "sit en
banc, but it may sit in two divisions, one of six and another of five Judges, to transact business,
and the two divisions may sit at the same time." 25 Two years after the establishment of
independence of the Republic of the Philippines, the Judiciary Act of 1948 26 was passed. It
continued the existing system of regular inferior courts, namely, the Court of Appeals, Courts of
First Instance, 27 the Municipal Courts, at present the City Courts, and the Justice of the Peace
Courts, now the Municipal Circuit Courts and Municipal Courts. The membership of the Court of
Appeals has been continuously increased. 28 Under a 1978 Presidential Decree, there would be
forty-five members, a Presiding Justice and forty-four Associate Justices, with fifteen
divisions. 29 Special courts were likewise created. The first was the Court of Tax Appeals in
1954, 30 next came the Court of Agrarian Relations in 1955, 31 and then in the same year a Court
of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations for Manila in 1955, 32 subsequently followed by the
creation of two other such courts for Iloilo and Quezon City in 1966. 33 In 1967, Circuit Criminal
Courts were established, with the Judges having the same qualifications, rank, compensation,
and privileges as judges of Courts of First Instance. 34
4. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced. After setting forth the background as above
narrated, its Explanatory Note continues: "Pursuant to the President's instructions, this
proposed legislation has been drafted in accordance with the guidelines of that report with
particular attention to certain objectives of the reorganization, to wit, the attainment of more
efficiency in disposal of cases, a reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which
do not tend to the proper meeting out of justice. In consultation with, and upon a consensus of,
the governmental and parliamentary leadership, however, it was felt that some options set forth
in the Report be not availed of. Instead of the proposal to confine the jurisdiction of the
intermediate appellate court merely to appellate adjudication, the preference has been opted to
increase rather than diminish its jurisdiction in order to enable it to effectively assist the
Supreme Court. This preference has been translated into one of the innovations in the proposed
Bill." 35 In accordance with the parliamentary procedure, the Bill was sponsored by the Chairman
of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to which it was referred.
Thereafter, Committee Report No. 225 was submitted by such Committee to the Batasang
Pambansa recommending the approval with some amendments. In the sponsorship speech of
Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there was reference to the Presidential Committee on Judicial
Reorganization. Thus: "On October 17, 1980, the Presidential Committee on Judicial
Reorganization submitted its report to the President which contained the 'Proposed Guidelines
for Judicial Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was drafted substantially in accordance with the
options presented by these guidelines. Some options set forth in the aforesaid report were not
availed of upon consultation with and upon consensus of the government and parliamentary
leadership. Moreover, some amendments to the bill were adopted by the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government, to which The bill was referred, following the public
hearings on the bill held in December of 1980. The hearings consisted of dialogues with the
distinguished members of the bench and the bar who had submitted written proposals,
suggestions, and position papers on the bill upon the invitation of the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government." 36 Stress was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of
such Cabinet Bill would, firstly, result in the attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of
cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality of justice dispensed by the courts is expected
as a necessary consequence of the easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes
introduced in the bill, together with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of
procedure, are designated to suit the court system to the exigencies of the present day
Philippine society, and hopefully, of the foreseeable future." 37 it may be observed that the
volume containing the minutes of the proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590
pages were devoted to its discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable time and effort
as well as exhaustive study before the act was signed by the President on August 14, 1981.

With such a background, it becomes quite manifest how lacking in factual basis is the allegation
that its enactment is tainted by the vice of arbitrariness. What appears undoubted and
undeniable is the good faith that characterized its enactment from its inception to the affixing of
the Presidential signature.
5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of
a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L.
Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. 38reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point urged by
respondents, to be without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is
here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for the
Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor
separation of the incumbents. ... And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed
never to have ceased to hold office. The preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the merits
of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an
illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be
made in good faith." 39 The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Bendanillo, Sr. v.
Provincial Governor, 40 two earlier cases enunciating a similar doctrine having preceded it. 41 As
with the offices in the other branches of the government, so it is with the judiciary. The test
remains whether the abolition is in good faith. As that element is conspicuously present in the
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even
more apparent. The concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta v. De la Costa 42 cannot be
any clearer. This is a quo warranto proceeding filed by petitioner, claiming that he, and not
respondent, was entitled to he office of judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. There was a Judicial Reorganization Act in 1936, 43 a year after the inauguration of the
Commonwealth, amending the Administrative Code to organize courts of original jurisdiction
known as the Courts of First Instance Prior to such statute, petitioner was the incumbent of such
branch. Thereafter, he received an ad interim appointment, this time to the Fourth Judicial
District, under the new legislation. Unfortunately for him, the Commission on Appointments of
then National Assembly disapproved the same, with respondent being appointed in his place.
He contested the validity of the Act insofar as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his
position This Court did not rule squarely on the matter. His petition was dismissed on the ground
of estoppel. Nonetheless, the separate concurrence of Justice Laurel in the result reached, to
repeat, reaffirms in no uncertain terms the standard of good faith to preclude any doubt as to the
abolition of an inferior court, with due recognition of the security of tenure guarantee. Thus: " I
am of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it reorganizes, among other
judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and establishes an entirely new district comprising
Manila and the provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is valid and constitutional. This conclusion flows
from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme
Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new
appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National
Assembly the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts,
subject to certain limitations in the case of the Supreme Court. It is admitted that section 9 of the
same article of the Constitution provides for the security of tenure of all the judges. The
principles embodied in these two sections of the same article of the Constitution must be
coordinated and harmonized. A mere enunciation of a principle will not decide actual cases and
controversies of every sort. (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York, 198 U.S., 45; 49 Law. ed;
937)" 44 justice Laurel continued: "I am not insensible to the argument that the National
Assembly may abuse its power and move deliberately to defeat the constitutional provision
guaranteeing security of tenure to all judges, But, is this the case? One need not share the view
of Story, Miller and Tucker on the one hand, or the opinion of Cooley, Watson and Baldwin on
the other, to realize that the application of a legal or constitutional principle is necessarily factual
and circumstantial and that fixity of principle is the rigidity of the dead and the unprogressive. I
do say, and emphatically, however, that cases may arise where the violation of the constitutional
provision regarding security of tenure is palpable and plain, and that legislative power of

reorganization may be sought to cloak an unconstitutional and evil purpose. When a case of
that kind arises, it will be the time to make the hammer fall and heavily. But not until then. I am
satisfied that, as to the particular point here discussed, the purpose was the fulfillment of what
was considered a great public need by the legislative department and that Commonwealth Act
No. 145 was not enacted purposely to affect adversely the tenure of judges or of any particular
judge. Under these circumstances, I am for sustaining the power of the legislative department
under the Constitution. To be sure, there was greater necessity for reorganization consequent
upon the establishment of the new government than at the time Acts Nos. 2347 and 4007 were
approved by the defunct Philippine Legislature, and although in the case of these two Acts there
was an express provision providing for the vacation by the judges of their offices whereas in the
case of Commonwealth Act No. 145 doubt is engendered by its silence, this doubt should be
resolved in favor of the valid exercise of the legislative power." 45
6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the above-cited opinion of Justice Laurel in
Zandueta, reference was made to Act No. 2347 46 on the reorganization of the Courts of First
Instance and to Act No. 4007 47 on the reorganization of all branches of the government,
including the courts of first instance. In both of them, the then Courts of First Instance were
replaced by new courts with the same appellation. As Justice Laurel pointed out, there was no
question as to the fact of abolition. He was equally categorical as to Commonwealth Act No.
145, where also the system of the courts of first instance was provided for expressly. It was
pointed out by Justice Laurel that the mere creation of an entirely new district of the same court
is valid and constitutional. such conclusion flowing "from the fundamental proposition that the
legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them
territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions." 48 The
challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate court, 49 regional trial
courts, 50 metropolitan trial courts of the national capital region, 51 and other metropolitan trial
courts,52 municipal trial courts in cities, 53 as well as in municipalities, 54 and municipal circuit trial
courts. 55 There is even less reason then to doubt the fact that existing inferior courts were
abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the establishment of such new inferior courts was the
appropriate response to the grave and urgent problems that pressed for solution. Certainly,
there could be differences of opinion as to the appropriate remedy. The choice, however, was
for the Batasan to make, not for this Court, which deals only with the question of power. It bears
mentioning that in Brillo v. Eage 56 this Court, in an unanimous opinion penned by the late
Justice Diokno, citing Zandueta v. De la Costa, ruled: "La segunda question que el recurrrido
plantea es que la Carta de Tacloban ha abolido el puesto. Si efectivamente ha sido abolido el
cargo, entonces ha quedado extinguido el derecho de recurente a ocuparlo y a cobrar el salario
correspodiente. Mc Culley vs. State, 46 LRA, 567. El derecho de un juez de desempenarlo
hasta los 70 aos de edad o se incapacite no priva al Congreso de su facultad de abolir,
fusionar o reorganizar juzgados no constitucionales." 57 Nonetheless, such well-established
principle was not held applicable to the situation there obtaining, the Charter of Tacloban City
creating a city court in place of the former justice of the peace court. Thus: "Pero en el caso de
autos el Juzgado de Tacloban no ha sido abolido. Solo se le ha cambiado el nombre con el
cambio de forma del gobierno local." 58 The present case is anything but that. Petitioners did not
and could not prove that the challenged statute was not within the bounds of legislative
authority.
7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The implementation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, concededly a task incumbent on the Executive, may give rise, however, to questions
affecting a judiciary that should be kept independent. The all-embracing scope of the assailed
legislation as far as all inferior courts from the Courts of Appeals to municipal courts are
concerned, with the exception solely of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals 59 gave
rise, and understandably so, to misgivings as to its effect on such cherished Ideal. The first
paragraph of the section on the transitory provision reads: "The provisions of this Act shall be
immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President.

The Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal
Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to function as presently constituted and
organized, until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the
President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and
the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold the office." 60 There is all the more reason then why
this Court has no choice but to inquire further into the allegation by petitioners that the security
of tenure provision, an assurance of a judiciary free from extraneous influences, is thereby
reduced to a barren form of words. The amended Constitution adheres even more clearly to the
long-established tradition of a strong executive that antedated the 1935 Charter. As noted in the
work of former Vice-Governor Hayden, a noted political scientist, President Claro M. Recto of
the 1934 Convention, in his closing address, in stressing such a concept, categorically spoke of
providing "an executive power which, subject to the fiscalization of the Assembly, and of public
opinion, will not only know how to govern, but will actually govern, with a firm and steady hand,
unembarrassed by vexatious interferences by other departments, or by unholy alliances with
this and that social group." 61 The above excerpt was cited with approval by Justice Laurel
in Planas v. Gil. 62Moreover, under the 1981 Amendments, it may be affirmed that once again
the principle of separation of powers, to quote from the same jurist as ponente in Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 63 "obtains not through express provision but by actual division." 64 The
president, under Article VII, shall be the head of state and chief executive of the Republic of the
Philippines." 65 Moreover, it is equally therein expressly provided that all the powers he
possessed under the 1935 Constitution are once again vested in him unless the Batasang
Pambansa provides otherwise." 66 Article VII of the 1935 Constitution speaks categorically: "The
Executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." 67 As originally framed, the
1973 Constitution created the position of President as the "symbolic head of state." 68 In
addition, there was a provision for a Prime Minister as the head of government exercising the
executive power with the assistance of the Cabinet69 Clearly, a modified parliamentary system
was established. In the light of the 1981 amendments though, this Court in Free Telephone
Workers Union v. Minister of Labor 70 could state: "The adoption of certain aspects of a
parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential
character." 71 The retention, however, of the position of the Prime Minister with the Cabinet, a
majority of the members of which shall come from the regional representatives of the Batasang
Pambansa and the creation of an Executive Committee composed of the Prime Minister as
Chairman and not more than fourteen other members at least half of whom shall be members of
the Batasang Pambansa, clearly indicate the evolving nature of the system of government that
is now operative. 72 What is equally apparent is that the strongest ties bind the executive and
legislative departments. It is likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full
authority to enact whatever legislation may be necessary to carry out national policy as usually
formulated in a caucus of the majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun v.
Labang 73 it was stressed that with the provision transferring to the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is a greater need "to preserve unimpaired
the independence of the judiciary, especially so at present, where to all intents and purposes,
there is a fusion between the executive and the legislative branches." 74
8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts
collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X,
Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision in the 1935 Constitution. It did not,
however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise administratively inferior
courts. 75 Moreover, this Court is em powered "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a
vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal." 76 Thus it possesses the competence to
remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such
power. 77 Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of
the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no
occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his

position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment
of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished,
the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the
abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the
judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance
with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and
judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest
consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic
principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If
such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either
of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the
matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the
vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to
whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of
judicial power, Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude
any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing tulle
inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored
or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one
not readily discernidble except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a
construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives
between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be
preferred. 78 There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into and
forms part of every act to avoid any constitutional taint must be applied Nuez v.
Sandiganbayan, 79 promulgated last January, has this relevant excerpt: "It is true that other
Sections of the Decree could have been so worded as to avoid any constitutional objection. As
of now, however, no ruling is called for. The view is given expression in the concurring and
dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from the direct
fate of invalidity, they must be construed in such a way as to preclude any possible erosion on
the powers vested in this Court by the Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be
committed. It commends itself for approval." 80 Nor would such a step be unprecedented. The
Presidential Decree constituting Municipal Courts into Municipal Circuit Courts, specifically
provides: "The Supreme Court shall carry out the provisions of this Decree through
implementing orders, on a province-to-province basis." 81 It is true there is no such provision in
this Act, but the spirit that informs it should not be ignored in the Executive Order contemplated
under its Section 44. 82 Thus Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the most rigorous test of
constitutionality. 83
9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to reconcile or
harmonize constitutional provisions. To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested
with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process to abolish existing ones. As
noted in the preceding paragraph, the termination of office of their occupants, as a necessary
consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from the practical standpoint from
removal, a power that is now vested in this Tribunal. It is of the essence of constitutionalism to
assure that neither agency is precluded from acting within the boundaries of its conceded
competence. That is why it has long been well-settled under the constitutional system we have
adopted that this Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation. As
Justice Laurel put it so well in the previously cited Angara decision, while in the main, "the
Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government, the overlapping and
interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes
makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins." 84 It is well to recall
another classic utterance from the same jurist, even more emphatic in its affirmation of such a
view, moreover buttressed by one of those insights for which Holmes was so famous "The
classical separation of government powers, whether viewed in the light of the political

philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Motesquieu or of the postulations of Mabini, Madison, or


Jefferson, is a relative theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in
interdependence than in independence and separation of powers, for as observed by Justice
Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down 'with mathematical precision and
divide the branches into water-tight compartments' not only because 'the great ordinances of the
Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white but also because 'even the
more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme
to the other.'" 85 This too from Justice Tuazon, likewise expressing with force and clarity why the
need for reconciliation or balancing is well-nigh unavodiable under the fundamental principle of
separation of powers: "The constitutional structure is a complicated system, and overlappings of
governmental functions are recognized, unavoidable, and inherent necessities of governmental
coordination." 86 In the same way that the academe has noted the existence in constitutional
litigation of right versus right, there are instances, and this is one of them, where, without this
attempt at harmonizing the provisions in question, there could be a case of power against
power. That we should avoid.
10. There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners would characterize
as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of authority to fix the
compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more
careful reading of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned them
against raising such an issue. The language of the statute is quite clear. The questioned
provisions reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges,
Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall
receive such receive such compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the President
along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." 87 The existence of a standard is thus
clear. The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is that it is the legislative
body which is entrusted with the competence to make laws and to alter and repeal them, the
test being the completeness of the statue in all its terms and provisions when enacted. As
pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: 88 "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a
standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle
and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to
repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out.
Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above
guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express
or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does
not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act
considered as a whole." 89 The undeniably strong links that bind the executive and legislative
departments under the amended Constitution assure that the framing of policies as well as their
implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude, and efficiency. There is accuracy,
therefore, to this observation in the Free Telephone Workers Union decision: "There is
accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and executive agencies the
adoption of such means as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative purpose. It is
worth noting that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe, as early as 1947, could
speak of delegation as the 'dynamo of modern government.'" 90 He warned against a "restrictive
approach" which could be "a deterrent factor to much-needed legislation."91 Further on this point
from the same opinion" "The spectre of the non-delegation concept need not haunt, therefore,
party caucuses, cabinet sessions or legislative chambers." 92 Another objection based on the
absence in the statue of what petitioners refer to as a "definite time frame limitation" is equally
bereft of merit. They ignore the categorical language of this provision: "The Supreme Court shall
submit to the President, within thirty (30) days from the date of the effectivity of this act, a
staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to this Act which shall be the basis of the

implementing order to be issued by the President in accordance with the immediately


succeeding section." 93 The first sentence of the next section is even more categorical: "The
provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to
be issued by the President." 94 Certainly petitioners cannot be heard to argue that the President
is insensible to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 95 In the
meanwhile, the existing inferior courts affected continue functioning as before, "until the
completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such
declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents
thereof shall cease to hold office." 96 There is no ambiguity. The incumbents of the courts thus
automatically abolished "shall cease to hold office." No fear need be entertained by incumbents
whose length of service, quality of performance, and clean record justify their being named
anew, 97 in legal contemplation without any interruption in the continuity of their service. 98 It is
equally reasonable to assume that from the ranks of lawyers, either in the government service,
private practice, or law professors will come the new appointees. In the event that in certain
cases a little more time is necessary in the appraisal of whether or not certain incumbents
deserve reappointment, it is not from their standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a
reaffirmation of the good faith that will characterize its implementation by the Executive. There is
pertinence to this observation of Justice Holmes that even acceptance of the generalization that
courts ordinarily should not supply omissions in a law, a generalization qualified as earlier
shown by the principle that to save a statute that could be done, "there is no canon against
using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." 99 Where then is
the unconstitutional flaw
11. On the morning of the hearing of this petition on September 8, 1981, petitioners sought to
have the writer of this opinion and Justices Ramon C. Aquino and Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera
disqualified because the first-named was the chairman and the other two, members of the
Committee on Judicial Reorganization. At the hearing, the motion was denied. It was made clear
then and there that not one of the three members of the Court had any hand in the framing or in
the discussion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They were not consulted. They did not testify. The
challenged legislation is entirely the product of the efforts of the legislative body. 100 Their work
was limited, as set forth in the Executive Order, to submitting alternative plan for reorganization.
That is more in the nature of scholarly studies. That the undertook. There could be no possible
objection to such activity. Ever since 1973, this Tribunal has had administrative supervision over
interior courts. It has had the opportunity to inform itself as to the way judicial business is
conducted and how it may be improved. Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, it is the recollection
of the writer of this opinion that either the then Chairman or members of the Committee on
Justice of the then Senate of the Philippines 101 consulted members of the Court in drafting
proposed legislation affecting the judiciary. It is not inappropriate to cite this excerpt from an
article in the 1975 Supreme Court Review: "In the twentieth century the Chief Justice of the
United States has played a leading part in judicial reform. A variety of conditions have been
responsible for the development of this role, and foremost among them has been the creation of
explicit institutional structures designed to facilitate reform." 102 Also: "Thus the Chief Justice
cannot avoid exposure to and direct involvement in judicial reform at the federal level and, to the
extent issues of judicial federalism arise, at the state level as well." 103
12. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are
endowed with rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does through public
officials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they exercise
not for their own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in the language
of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." 104 That is more than a moral adjuration It is a
legal imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to enable them to
perform his functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that
the security of tenure provision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed. It is an added
guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or

untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely to be inspired solely by their
knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of
base or unworthy motives. The independence of which they are assured is impressed with a
significance transcending that of a purely personal right. As thus viewed, it is not solely for their
welfare. The challenged legislation Thus subject d to the most rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal,
lest by lack of due care and circumspection, it allow the erosion of that Ideal so firmly embedded
in the national consciousness There is this farther thought to consider. independence in thought
and action necessarily is rooted in one's mind and heart. As emphasized by former Chief Justice
Paras in Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, 105 there is no surer guarantee of judicial
independence than the God-given character and fitness of those appointed to the Bench. The
judges may be guaranteed a fixed tenure of office during good behavior, but if they are of such
stuff as allows them to be subservient to one administration after another, or to cater to the
wishes of one litigant after another, the independence of the judiciary will be nothing more than
a myth or an empty Ideal. Our judges, we are confident, can be of the type of Lord Coke,
regardless or in spite of the power of Congress we do not say unlimited but as herein
exercised to reorganize inferior courts." 106 That is to recall one of the greatest Common Law
jurists, who at the cost of his office made clear that he would not just blindly obey the King's
order but "will do what becomes [him] as a judge." So it was pointed out in the first leading case
stressing the independence of the judiciary, Borromeo v. Mariano, 107 The ponencia of Justice
Malcolm Identified good judges with "men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who
discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the
office undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human
units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to the other two departments of
government." 108 There is no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 would be attended with deleterious consequences to the administration of
justice. It does not follow that the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a
judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn duty or one recreant to
the trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less than good faith will attend the
exercise be of the appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an
independent and efficient judiciary is something to the credit of any administration. Well and
truly has it been said that the fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and
justifiably so, that the three departments are as one in their determination to pursue the Ideals
and aspirations and to fulfilling the hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in the
Constitution. There is wisdom as well as validity to this pronouncement of Justice Malcolm
in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company, 109 a decision promulgated almost half
a century ago: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not
sanction usurpations by any other department or the government, so should it as strictly confine
its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the
Organic Act." 110 To that basic postulate underlying our constitutional system, this Court remains
committed.
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown, this
petition is dismissed. No costs.
Makasiar and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., concur in the result.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 109406. September 11, 1998]

REMEDIOS T. BLAQUERA, ROMEO T. ACOSTA, DINAH A. AGATI, RODRIGO AGIR, JR.,


REY M. T. AGUINALDO, ELEAZAR S. ALAIRA, MARCIAL C. AMARO, JR., LEONOR
M. ARZADON, MARLENE C. ARZAGA, MIGUEL G. BADION, NORMITA S. BALLON,
SOCORRO B. DEL MONTE, TEODORA B. CABRERA, ERLINDA CANTIL, ARIEL P.
CATINDIG, MA. HAYLEY N. CONCEPCION, MARY ANN C. CRUZ, MA VICTORIA
ASUMPTU P. DACANAY, FEBES M. DE LEON, LIBERTY M. DELIMA, MARITESS I.
ESCUBIO, RITA D. FLORELIZ, CARIDAD C. FRANCISCO, LEVI F. GABALFIN, FE
GARRIDO, JULIE GOROSPE, NELSON V. GOROSPE, IMELDA GUINTANGUIJO,
NENITA GUTIERREZ, SALLY B. IMPERIAL, NERISSA B. JARABE, FE G. LOO, MA.
IRENE E. LORENZO, LORIDA D. MACARAAN, DANILO P. MANOLOTO,
ADORACION M. MENDOZA, CECILIA MENDOZA, EMMANUEL MIRAFLORES,
LLARINA S. MOJICA, ZENAIDA B. MUNOZ, ALICIA S. NERY, NOEL O. PADILLA,
ERVY C. PASCUAL, MA. MADELINE R. PATAWARAN, CRISTINA B. PAULINO,
IRENEO T. PEREZ, MA. EVELINA RASCO, AUDREY T. ROSETE, LUMINADA C.
ROTOL, FRANCISCO SANTOS, JR., JULIET U. TEXON, HELEN A. TOBIAS, LARRY
R. VILLAFLOR, RAYMOND R. VIRGINO, LILY YBAO, VICKY U. YLAGAN, NENITA R.
ZABALA, CHARLIE U. AGATI, NOEL C. AQUINO, ERLINDA P. AYAP, CONRADO A.
BRAVANTE, JR., EMMA F. CABRERA, MAY R. CANLAS, SUSAN CASTILLA,
CORAZON B. CHECA, BLESILDA T. CORRO, EMMA DIEZ, MA. LOURDES G.
FERRER, LILIHUA B. GARCIA, JESLINA B. GOROSPE, MYRNA GUMANGAN,
LERMA D. HONRADO, ISRAEL S. INOCENCIO, JONAS P. LEONES, AVEL A.
MORADO, JUANITA NACINO, GENEVIEVE AUSTRIA PADILLA, ALMA O.
PELOBELLO, NELIA J. QUESADA, CRISTINA M. REGUNAY, DEMILOUR B. REYES,
MOLINA REYNALDO, GLENN ADONIS M. RICO, BELEN E. SOTALBO, ANDREA B.
TALOSIG, FLORDELIZA TENAZAS, MERLY B. TOMILLUSO, MA. ROSALINA
VELASCO, NATIVIDAD YAVES, PAULO F. ABESAMIS, FELICITAS AREVALO,
FORCIA B. ATOS, BELINDA I. DEANG, CONSUELO T. DUANO, ERNESTINA JOSE,
GERARDO O. MENDOZA, LUZVIMINDA P. MENDOZA, AMANTE S. PERALTA,
YOLANDA M. TATANG, DOLORES M. ANGCO, MA. VENUS BERONGOY, LYDIA M.
BONA, MA. LOURDES CASAL, MABEL COLOMA, MARY JUNE D. DANDAN,
ERLINDA O. DOMINGO JOSEPHINE P. EBORA, ELENA B. FERNANDEZ,

EVANGELINE FERRER-LIMYOLO, AMPARO V. GEREZ, ZENAIDA V. GUTIERREZ,


MILAGROS C. IMBAO, JULIE JALAAN, LETICIA A. LLAMERA, CAROLINA A.
LOPEZ, MARIUS NORMAN MACALALAD, ALICIA L. MALLILLIN, REMEDIOS L.
MERCADO, DINA B. MONTEALEGRE, SUSAN MORTOS, JUANITO F. MUNSAYAC,
PAULA ONG, DALISAY PASCUAL, MA. ALMA M. PILIPINA, NICETA A. ROXAS,
AMADOR ATENDIDO, LUZCELY H. VEDAN, NELLY VILLARAMA, ESTALA S.
AGUILES, JEAN F. ALLADO, YVONNE B. BALDADO, EUPREFIA BALDEMOR,
NICETAS B. BAUTISTA, ANTONIO BENITEZ, JANETTE BERNARDO, MARIA B.
BONGCO,
GREGORIO ALEXIS
M.
CAAYAO,
FREDESVINDA
G.
CASUNCAD, ROSA G. COPON, AMILYN DANTES,
HERMINIA ECLEO,
FILIPINA V. EDRALIN, ROSALINA O. ENRIQUEZ, MARY FERNANDEZ, VICTORIA B.
GIMENO, LEONARDO C. HERNANDEZ, ERLINDA MENDOZA, AURORA V. PIDO,
FORTUNATA C. RAYOSO, MARIA V. RICAFORT, DORINA S. ROJAS, LEONITA R.
SIBUNGA, ERNA D. SY, ALMEIDA J. TAGALA, EDGARDO TUBANG, SOFIA
VELACRUZ, EUGENE N. ANTOLIN, MA. ELVIRA P. JAVIER, LISETTE G. MONENO,
CLEOFE P. PATANAO, MARY JEAN V. REYES, SHIRLEY G. AQUINO, CHRISTY
GEMPES, JOSE FEDERICO M. GEMDRANO, JOSEPHINE G. RANCAP, JOSETTE B.
SAN LUIS, MARINA A. BORRETA, CHERRY B. CID, OLIVIA P. JOVE, MA. TERESA
M. MARING, BETTY P. MOJICA, EDITHA T. MUNIELA, EMMANUEL T. PILAR,
JOVITA C. ROBOSA, MA. NENA M. VILLANUEVA, MARK A. ANTONIO, PRISCILLA
G. BACENA, SUSAN C. BENOZA, RHODORA A. CALUNGCAGIN, ANA MARIA M.
CRISOSTOMO, ELENITO E. CUNANAN, ROMANA A. DE LEON, EDMUNDO B.
FLORENDO, DANIEL GARCIA, AMELIN F. MAGAT, PATRIA A. NULLAS, MYRNA S.
TADENA, THELMA TOTANES, ALFONSO A. VERGARA, BELEN M. ANTIPORDA,
ROSALINA B. CARANDO, ESTELLA P. DE LEON, CRESENCIA I. OLIVAR, LOURIE
A. OLIVERIO, TERESITA A. RAMOS, ELISEO T. REYES, PUREZA T. SAYON,
JOSEFINA B. TEJANA, VILLAROSA C. ABEN, JONATHAN ACABAL, POLICARPIO
ALCARAZ, TERESITA C. AMOG, GLORIA AROGANTE, EVENLYN BANDOLIN,
GERRY BANDOLIN, ADOR BARROS, CELSO L. BAUTISTA, FELICITAS S.
BAUTISTA, CRISTNINA DE GUZMAN, ESTELA C. FACELO, RAMON FLORES,
ANGELITO V. FONTANILLA, GERMAN GALAOS, REMEDIOS S. GARCIA,
MANNY G. GINGCO, VIRGILIO HALILI, ZENAIDA IBAY, ERNESTO B. JARABE,
OSCAR LEANO, TEODORA O. LEONCIO, CARMEN R. LUARCA, EMER REX
MATIBAG, MARLYN R. MENDOZA, BIBIANO C. MIRANDA, ROMERICO MA. T.
MOLINA, ERLINDA C. POYATOS, GIANINA H. PUNZALAN, CRISTINA H. REYES,
PETER RAMIL REYES, RUTH JEAN B. SOLANO, WILFREDO C. TORREDONDO,
NARCISO VILLAMOR, ERLINDA S. VILLANUEVA, OSCAR H. VILLAS, GUILLERMA
B. ALCONIS, AGNES CAMPO, JOCELYN CLEMENTE, AMADO B. ESPANOL,
LEONILO G. GONZALES, FE A. MENDIZABAL, TERESITA MORANARTE, ERLINDA
P. ROMULO, FLORA TANGCO, HONARIO T. TORRENUEVA, WILMA YNGENTE,
SUSANA N. ANTOLIN, JOEL U. BAUN, RHODORA C. BRUCAL, CARMELITA G.
CAYABAN, CARIDAD CLARIN, LIDINILA N. CONCEPCION, FARIDA F. FLAVIANO,
TEODORA B. MACARAYAN, HILARIA G. MAGCULANG, HERNAN MARILLA,
MONINA R. MENDRES, HERMINA A. MOLINA, YOLANDA GIGI H. MOLINA,
RHODORA C. PADILLA, SANTIAGO PALACPAC, JR., ROMMEL PANGILINAN,
DIANA JEAN N. PINAROC, MELANIE C. REY, MERCY L. REYES, HELEN RUTH
BRIONES TABION, MARIA AMELITA DJ ORTIZ TAMAYO, LEONIDES VALERO,
NELIA F. VILLANUEVA, MA. CRISTINA F. ABAYA, MACARIO A. BASCON, NANCY
ROSE CAUGMA, ELIGIO T. ILDEFONSO, MA. DELIA P. MEIMBAN, ROMEO G.
MENDIZABAL, MICHAEL LL. TADEO, JOSE HENRY M. TALABIS, MELCHOR R.
TARUC, PONCIANO M. ARANEZ, REMEDIOS A. ASUNCION, EDILBERTA BUENO,
ELIZABETH F. CRUZ, ARACELI V. ESPINO, RICARDO A. FIAN, LOURDES JM.
FLORES, MA. ELIZABETH GALANG, JOSE C. MORALES, JR., JOSELITO R.
OCHING, JANET REYES, BENITO C. SORIANO, MARCELO B. VALDERAMA,
LINDBERG M.S. VALEROS, SARITA RENDON VALEROS, STEPHEN E. ABELLA,
MARIA FRANCIA ALFEREZ, FELY BALABBO, FE BOJOCAN, CARMELO Z.
CAUSAPIN, NIDA R. DEDEL, JOSEFINA S. DIMALANTA, MARIA TERESITA
ESPINOL, BELEN FERNANDEZ, GERUNDIO C. FERNANDEZ, HELEN LEE D.
JIMENEZ, JAKE MAKI, ROSITA M. PINIANO, CHITO REYES, EFREN F. REYES,
EVELYN REYES, ENRICO A.O. SANTOS, NELIE VALLANGCA, VALENTE
VILLANUEVA, MANUEL D. ROJAS, PAULINA G. CASTRO, FANCY M. LEONES,
ZENAIDA R. OPENA, FRANCISCO B.A. SAAVEDRA, ARNOLD L. SINZACA,

MANUEL P.S. SOLIS, DEMETRIA STA ANA, LALLYJEAN S. AGUILAR, ELENA D.


APOLONIO, RODOLFO A. DE AUSEN, MARITES O. DELFIN, EMMANUEL M.
ESGUERRA, NELSON ITLIONG, ALBINO A. BELEN, ROBERTO E. BELEN, FELIPE
H. CALLORINA, JR., ANTONIO CENTENO, ERNESTO R. FRUTAS, JOSEFINA C.
IGNACIO, PEDRITO N. KALALANG, BELLA P. MILLO, TIRSO P. PARIAN, JR.,
CERLINO ALMENDAREZ, WILLIE V. AMBROCIO, MA. TERESA G. AQUINO,
JUANITA BAUTISTA, CELODONIO C. BERNABE, REMEDIOS T. BLAQUERA,
ALICIA CASTILLO, ANITA D. ESPARES, JOEL FLORES, CITA G. GERADA,
ROBERTO O. IGSOC, ANNALISA V. JAVIER, VICTORIA B. MALACAD, ANTONIO C.
MANILA, EVELYN MENDEZ, LERMA M. MENDOZA, EUFEMIA NUCUM, LEONVINA
A. OLIVO, AMIE T. RABANG, LILIA J. RADA, DELAGIA D. ROBEL, DEGNISITA
G. SERRANO, PETRONIO TADIOSA, RODERICO A. TAN, CHARLITO VALDEZ,
ALMA M. VAZQUEZ, PEDRO E. VICTORIA, SERGIO ABUAN, RODOLFO ANGELES,
MARTINIANO ROTOL, MERLIE T. CASIGAY, THELMA F. CHUSON, ENCARNACION
CONCEPCION, IMELDA CORTEZ, OBDULIA B. DORADO, EVELYN S. ESTRADA,
MARIO S. FERNANDEZ, RUPERTO E. GABUTAN, SONIA R. IGAYA, RAYMUNDA O.
LABUGUEN, AUREA LACHICA, LINA M. MANALAYSAY, SALVADOR MANIOSO
BERLINA B. MANOSO, FLORANGEL MEDRANO, TERESITA S. MESTA, JOCELYN
MONTILLANO, LUZ C. PERALTA, SOFIO B. QUINTANA, YOLANDA B. QUINTANA,
SANTOS RABARA, ROSALINO R. ROMUALDO, MARIFE RUBA, CRISTETA
RULLODA, RHORODA SANTOS, VICTOR SEE, ELNORA G. TALEON, VIRGINIA V.
TALEON, MELCHOR U. TAMAYO, MILAGROS VALDEZ, MARITA WELGAS-BRIZ,
VISITACION A. ZANO, ELVIRA D. AGPOON, VIRGINIA ANGELES, ISABELITA V.
AUSTRIA, ADELAIDA S. BALANZA, ORPHA B. BALILLA, FE T. CARPIO, LOIDA E.
HUNAT, ROSEMARIE LABIS, LUZ MARIA S. LANSIGAN, BONIFACIO RABANG,
ANGELITA RECELI, BERTRAM SIGAION, SARAH F. TUBIG, MYRNA M. VILORIA,
LOURDES C. WAGAN, SILVERIA M. ANTOLIN, BONIFACIO ARCE, MARINA ASIAO,
PERIGRINO S. BAGUNU, ARISCALITA A. BAKER, MARIETTA L. BAL, NELY M.
BUTIC, MOISES H. BUTIC, GLORIA S. CABATIC, GERARDO T. CABREROS,
BENJAMIN C. CARINO, ERASMO M. CORTADO, EVANGELINE J. DE LEON,
EVARISTO C. EUSEBIO, EDEN M. GAZAL, EVA M. JACA, VELERIANO V. LADIA,
JR., NORMA CASUCOG, FELIX L. LECHONCITO, MA. DOLORES M. LEGARDA,
RODOLFO P. LIPAOPAO, JR., LETY A. LORENZO, MARLON C. MELCHOR, ELPIDIO
M. MOLINYAWE, JUAN S. ODANGA, SUEMELITO V. PAA, VENIA T. RAYALA,
FLORDELINO M. REY, CARME T. ROSETE, CORAZON C. SALAMAT, ANASTACIO
B. SISON, VICENTA F. GAERLAN, JULIET G. TOLENTINO, GLORIA E.
URBIZTONDO, ANDRA C. ABARQUEZ, THELMA S. ALCARAZ, SALVE A.
ASUNCION, ALLAN V. BARCENA, NERA S. BAYANI, NEMESIO BERONILLA, PIO P.
BOTE, DOLORES R. CATINDIG, CORWIN B. CECILLANO, ALEX A. CHENG,
GERTRUDEZ C. CORTEZ, ARNULFO A. ESCOBIDO, EUGENE V. ESTRADA,
GENESIS J. FRANCISCO, VIVIEN O. GALEON, FLORDELIZA D. GARCIA,
MITCHELLE A. LACHICA, THELMA I. LAGMAN, MA. CAROLINA G. MELICOR, MA.
MAGDALENA E. MORENO, FRANCIONIE G. NONO, BERNARDO A.
RESURRECCION, VILMA A. SABADO, ELVIRA G. SABANDO, ALEJANDRO R.
SIBUCAO, JR., WILFREDO H. ZAPANTA, HERMENIGILDO S. ALLASCO, REBECCA
BURGOS, MARIEL D. GARCIA, BELINDA M. LEAL, AGAPITA MAGBOJOS, MA.
LOURDES
VICTUELLES,
CARMELITA ALMENDAREZ,
PERLA
ABELLA,
ESMERALDA R. DE CLARO, LOURDES DECAMORA, ROMUALDO DELA CRUZ,
RUFINO DIAROG, HAYDEE LATTO, CARMEN MELCHOR, MERCEDES U. ULIBAS,
EMY R. ZAPANTA, NELDA C. ABLAN, VENERANDO R. ATUD, NESTOR A.
BAMBALAN, PROCESO V. BAUTISTA, EMMA C. CONCEPCION, JUAN G. DAYAG,
ELISA Q. FARRO, EMILIE M. LICO, TEODORA B. PAJARILLAGA, CONCESA P.
QUINONES, VERONICA G. REY, TERESITA O. SERRANO, AVELINA VALDEZ,
ELVIRA L. ADVINCULA, RENATO P. AGUILAR, ROSALINA ALFORJA, LORENSO
ALMENDAREZ, SATA H. ALTAP, JAIME AQUINO, DOMINICO ARROBAN, JR.,
OCTAVIUS L. ASPACIO, MYRNA V. BERNABE, CRECENSIO R. CALDERON, JR.,
RUPITO C. CARACAS, PILAR F. CHUA, ENGRACIA M. CRUZ, MANUEL CRUZ,
AGUSTIN DELASAN, NATIVIDAD C. ESPIRITU, ROLANDO I. ETEROSA, EDEN
FABIAN, LILIA A. FILAMOR, MIGUEL O. GAPAS, ODENCIO GARCIA, PIEDAD R.
GARCIA, BIEN GUICO, PRESENTASION O. HAZAL, MARILYN B. LAGADAY,
LORENZO LAMENDAREZ, ALEJANDRINO MANAS, ROMEO L. MANOSO, MELINDA
MARTINEZ, JOYBERT MIJARES, WENCESLADA A. MIRAN, TEOFILO V. OBLENA,

AMELIA C. OLIVERIA, SOCORRO C. PALENCIA, NELSON PANGILINAN, FAUSTINO


PASON, ELIAS PATAL, ANDRES PELA, AURORA V. PIOL, NOLI PRADO, ANITA C.
RAMBAYON, EVANGELINE E. RODRIGUES , ROSE R. SUNICO, JULIETA F.
TABERNILLA, SALVACION B. VAZQUEZ, EMILY VERANO, EDWIN VILLANUEVA,
JOEL V. VILLAR, SATURNINA VITE, DON ABARRIENTOS, JOSENDEL O.
AGRA, MARISTELA ARIEL, JOHN B. ARROBANG, ALBERTO A. BANATAO,
FEDERICO M. BARREDA, PAULO BERINA, RENATO M. BORJA, GENARO
BORQUIN, FLOR A. CABUNOG, ELIZABETH S. CALDERON, FRESCILLA N.
CALIMAG, CRISTETA A. CASTRO, MA. ELENA CONSTANTINO, MILA CORRE,
RENATO D. CRUZ, JOSEFINA L. DE LEON, RHODORA R. DE VEYRA,
CONSOLADORA A. DIMARANAN, ERNESTO R. DIONISIO, ERNESTO S. DIONISIO,
JR., LIGAYA B. DIONISIO, OSCAR EMBERGA, PEDO FALLARIA, MA. LOURDES V.
FELICITAS, GRISELDA V. GALEON, CRESENCIO MAXIMO GARCIA, MARY ANN
GENEROSO, WHYLEEN SM. GONZALES, ANGELINA C. GREGORIO, SALVADOR
B. JANA, JR., LYNETTE T. LAROYA, OFELIA G. LIPORADA, GRACIANO MANUEL,
BIBIANO H. MEJINO, THEODORE MORAL, ANTONIO P. MORENO, JR., ANICETO D.
ORDEN, IMELDA C. PANGGA, CONSOLACION PANGILINAN, ROSITA P. PARINA,
ELPIDIO N. QUITERO, MYRNA RAMOS, GLENDA B. REFIL, MA. TERESA
REFORSADO, HEIDI D. REGALA, RUFINA R. REYES, SUSAN H. ROQUERO, AJIT
RYE II, LEO J. SAGUGUIT, MARINO K. SANTOS, LINA D. SEGUNIAL, ALBA
SORIANO, JESSICA SORIANO, ROMEO B. TRONO, ANGELITA T. VILORIA, TIRSO
ABAD, FEDERICO ABILO, LOLITA L. ANOVA, OPRIASA ANTONIO, JERRY B.
AQUINO, RODERICK ARAO, RENATO ARROYO, RUBEN ASENSI, ERNESTO
BALINGIT, ALBERTO A. BANATA, JOSEPHINE BARRIENTOS, MARCELINO
BERINA, WILFREDO BONILCA, ED C. BONILLA, FRANCISO BRAZA, ANONINA S.
BRILLANTES, ROGELIO O. CADADAN, RENE CALICA, TERESITA CALUMA,
EDGARDO CAPARAS, ALEX M. CARANDANG, MIGNON C. CARLOS, CRISTETA
CASTRO, MA. ERLINDA B. CAUSAY, REYNALDO M. CENTENO, DANILO
CERVANTES, ELEJIA R. CHARIE, CARMEN G. CLUTARIO, MANUEL F. CRUZ,
DOMINGO DE GUZMAN, ABAS DE JESUS, ROMULO DEL MUNDO, JUAN B.
DESPABELADERO, GAVINO ESMERO, FIDEL C. ESTANISLAO, ROWEN A.
EUSTAQUIO, CORAZON FERNANDEZ, ALBERTINE FLORES, RIOLITA H.
GALLEGO, MARCELINO GATCHALEAN, JIMMY GIDRAMA, RUFINO GUTIERREZ,
MERCEDITA S. HARING, MAY HARINGA, ROMEO P. IBARRIENTOS, BERLINO
INFANTE, JOSELYN V. VILLA, CATALINO LIMBO, ORIOSA LISING, BOYET F. LITA,
ENRICO LIWANAG, ALTHEA O. LOTA, VINA P. MACATANGAY, NORBERTO
MADADO, FLORINIA NADADO, JAIME NADADO, CONNIE NAGAMOS, TESSIE
NAGAMOS, AMALIA U. NELL, EDILBERTO OROCAY, RESTITUTO P. PARDINAS,
ROSITA P. PARINA, EUGENIO PATAG, FERMIN PAVIA, BERNARDO PENA,
JOSEMARIA P. PEREZ, ARMIDA D. PULLO, LAURO S. PUNZALAN, JUSTINA
QUINORES, NANOY C. REANO, EDDIE REYES, FRANCISCO ROMERO, SUSAN
ROQUERO, WILFREDO RUZGAL, CONRADO SALAZAR, ODENCIA C. SALVADOR,
TEODORA B. SANDOVAL, RODANTE SANTIAGO, GLORIA SANTOS, JOSE C.
SANTOS, FLORANTE P. SOMERA, MELISSA B. STA CRUZ, JOSE TABIGAN,
ANTONIO TALASTAS, DOMINGO G. TARNATE, Jr., IGMEDIO TIONGSON, STEPHEN
U. TOLEDO, ROMEO UMAYAN, BENJAMIN URBANO, MALOU B. VERA, JERRY
VISTO, AUGUSTO YUSON, JOSE S. AGUSTIN, LEIS ALEJANDRO, EDWIN E.
ALLADA, ROLANDO ANDRADE, LHITA CABUNGAN, LOUIE CATUDIO, REYNALDO
M. CENTENO, DIOSMEDADO T. COCAL, EVANGELINE I. CORCUERA, REMY D.
CORTEZ, JONATHAN C. DANGA, FRED DE CLARO, MAURO DE JESUS, EFREN
DE JUCOS, GEORGE DE LEON, SHIRLEY DEPASUCAT, MARIA REYNA DONDAY,
AURA ALELI P. DUIROS, DIONICIA DURANTE, MARCELO ENRIQUE, FERDINAND
ESPIRITU,
MIRASOL
ESPIRITU,
RUBY
T.
FAMORCAN,
JOSE
C.
FORTUNO, BEVERLY FRANCISCO, JOSE Z. GALLARDO, REYNALDO GANTONG,
NILO GARCIA, LONESTO GENOVEZA, FELIPE HERRERA, FELIPE G. ISIP, JR.,
RANDY C. MABANA, CESAR MACAALAY, ROGELIO MANGILIT, EMILIO MANUEL
JOSE MARINAS, JAIME MATA, DANILO MIANO, JOVITO NAROG, FELISA A.
NUESCA, REYNALDO OLAHAY, ANSELMO PARANAS, JR., RESTITUTO P.
PARDINAS, MARIAN G. PASCUAL, MARCELLANO P. PEREZ, NEIL PIAMONTE,
REYNALDO QUIROS, EFREN RAMOS, CARLOS RAMOS, MAMERTO
RESURRECCION, QUINONES
RONILO,
ARTURO
C.
SANTOS,
M.C.
SANVICTORES, ROMEO G. SUMULONG, AURELIO G. TAN, JUNIFER TAN,

TERESITA B. TOMAS, APOLLO URBANO, VITORIA B. VALDEZ, CONCESA L.


ALDAY, ELMER Y. CORPUS, ANNIE L. CORPUZ, ZENAIDA M. DE GUZMAN,
MERLINDA V. DE JESUS, ISAURO R. DOROSAN, MA. ELENA D. EBONA, LETICIA
C. EUSEBIO, ALEJANDRO V. FERNANDEZ, EVITA B. GARABILES, NELSON
GARCIA, ROWENA M. HUISCA, JESSE LADISLA, JUVY P. LADISLA, RANDY
LAGUNILLA, LANIE A. MABANA, SAMSON MACOB, ANTONIO MAMMAY,
RICARDO PALAGANAS, LUNINGNING C. PANGILINAN, VILMA PORCADELA,
ROGELIO RONQUILLO, MA. VICTORIA P. SOMERA, MIRASOL R. TUGADE,
DOMINADOR ABAD, BRICCIO P. ABAN, KELVIN C. ABARRA, NESTOR ABENIS,
SYLVIA C. ABUNGAN, (ATTY.) ANSELMO ABUNGAN, ELENITA A. ACUNA, DANILO
C. ADINA, PETRONIO C. AGUILA, SYLVIA S. ALCANTARA, MARCELO ALILIO,
ROMEO L. ALMEDA, NORBERTO ALMERINO, LUISITO M. ALMOGELA, DAHLIA R.
ALMOSARA, JOEL P. ALMOSARA, CATER AMBROSIO, EDITHA A. AMISCARAY,
MA. VICTORIA I. AMORES, LEONARDO APIL, ANTONIO N. APOSTOL, JR., NENA T.
AQUINO, PATRICIO M. ARAGON, JR. SYLVIA ARBOLEDA, JOSE P. ARZADON,
MARIO ASIS, ADELAIDA AUAYANG, MARIO A. AURELIO, ROBERTO M.
AVELLANA, TERESITA J. AVENTURADO, EMOLYN E. AZURIN, EDITHA BACHAR,
GLORIA M. BACONG, GERONIMO BADULIS, JR., GLADIOLA M. BAGADIONG,
AMELIA G. BALAIS, FEDERICO A. BALANON, RODRIGO BALILLA, JOFFER L.
BALLESTEROS, TERESITA P. BALMES, ANITA B. BAURA, CRISANTO A. BAURA,
JR., SERVIN BAUTISTA, GABINO BELLEZA, FLORENCIA P. BENOSA, DANNY
BERCHES, HERNANI BERNAL, ELVIRA V. BERSABE, ISMAEL C. BOCO, MARCIAL
BENJAMIN BUNGOLAN, FELY A. BOSTON, ANGEL A. BRAVO, RAUL BRITANICO,
LILITA G. BROCES, EDUARDO S. BUTIERREZ, JOSEFA C. CAABAY, MICHAEL B.
CABALDA, SIROLAN B. CABE, CESAR B. CABRERA, BENJAMIN S. CADAWAN,
JR., VERONA J. CALAMANAN, ADELAIDA B. CALOOY, ROBERT F. CALUGAY,
JUANITO CALVEZ, NECITA M. CAMANGONAN, SATURNINO Y. CAMANGONAN,
JUAN G. CANLAS, FRANCISCA D. CANUEL, ARTURO D. CANUELA, EVELYN
CANUELA, JESUS CANUELA, NELIA D. CANUELA, AVELINO C. CAPARAS,
RICARDO R. CARINGAL, MA. LOURDES CASIMIRO, ARCADIO I. CASIS, DANIEL C.
CASIS, ELENA C. CASIS, ROBERTO S. CASTILLO, FEIPE P. CASUNCAD, JUANITO
A. CATOR, RENATO CATOR, JONAS R. CHECA, RENE A. CILINDRO, ELWIN B.
CINCO, ROSALINDA CIPRIANO, JOSE MARIE CLOMA, MARJORIE COLLADO,
ELVETA C. COMSTI, ALLAN ANTONIO C. CONDA, APOLONIO V. CRUZ, FE C.
CRUZ, FLORDELIZA CRUZ, LEODEGARIO CUEVAS, OLIVER CUEVAS, REMEDIOS
CUEVAS, GLORIA T. DACANAY, MARIBEL DAMIAN, MARY ANNE C. DE CASTRO,
CESAR S. DE CHAVEZ, ANICET F. DE GUZMAN, AURELIO DE GUZMAN, JOSE C.
DE GUZMAN, RUBY B. DE GUZMAN, BERNARD DE LARA, ALFONSO S. DE LEON,
DANILO DE LEON, RETITUTO C. DE LEON, EDWIN L. DEVERA, HAROLD T. DE
VERA, CESAR M. DE VEYRA, ANACLETO C. DEL MUNDO, ALFONSO P. DELA
CRUZ, JR., EMERITA M. DELA CRUZ, HELEN T. DELA CRUZ, RIZALYN C. DELA
CRUZ, SERVILLANO R. DELA CRUZ, JOSE DELA FUENTE, WILFREDO C. DELA
FUENTE, ARNOLD DELGADO, JAIME DELOS REYES, MANUEL T. DEPANES,
ANTONIO DEQUINA, ROLANDO D. DESTACAMENTO, MARIETA L. DETERA,
PRESENTACION C. DIEZ, RAUL S. DIMALANTA, WENCESLAO DIZON, EDWIN G.
DOMINGO, MELANIO O. DONES, JR., ESTELITO DOROSAN, ISAURO DOROSAN,
JR., CHARLIE M. DULAY, ESTEBAN DULAY, JR., SATURNINO DULAY, MA. AIDA C.
DUROY, RIZAL P. ECHECHE, GASPAR G. ESCOBAR, GASPAR T. ESCOBAR,
ALICIA S. ESGUERRA, JACKSON I. ESPERO, LILIA ESTOPAGE, DIGNA G.
EVANGELISTA, REYNALDO FALLESGON, ROQUE M. FAMILARA, JERRY
FARINAS, NIEVA FARINAS, NARCELYN FELIPE, ERNESTO H. FELIX, MARIANNE V.
FERNANDEZ, ALVIN LUCIO M. FERNANDO, ALFREDO V. FERRER, NOEL V.
FERRER, ELENA G. FETIZA, AUGUSTUS C. FLORES, SANTIAGO R. FRAGANTE,
MA. LUISA FRANCISCO, EDWARD FRANCO, HELENITA EVELYN FRANCO, NOE
FREOLO, EDUARDO VICTORIO FREYRA, EDITHA P. FRIGILLANA, TEOFILO D.
FRONDA, ESTER M. FRONTERAS, HELENA GADDI, ROBERTO D. GADDI, FELISA
C. GALARAGA, ELLENGRACE R. GALISTE, RESTITUTO G. GALO, MAXIMO V.
GARCIA, JAIME M. GATAN, MARIO GUERRERO, ANTONIO GUINSING, JR.,
ANGELINA P. GUTIERREZ, AURELIO P. GUTIERREZ, HERMINIO O. GUTIERREZ,
NELIA C. HALCON, LOURDES V. HERNANDEZ, DIONISIO S. INCIONG, MARIO Z.
JANDUMON, RICARTE JAVELOSA, ADONIS S. JAVIER, ANGELO JAVIER,
LOUELLA G. JIMENEZ, LYNDA JIMENEZ, NONITA JORDAN, ROLANDO

LACANDASO, ELIZABETH C. LACSAMANA, BERNARD LANUZA, PATRICIO B.


LANUZA, SALVIO B. LASERNA, FLORINIO B. LAZO, RODOLFO M. LEE, BEATRIZ
D. LEGASPI, AMOR M. LIM, JAIME D. LOMABAO, REGINA LOPEZ, REBE M.
LOZANO, DANILO N. LUCAS, EDEL LUPOS, CESAR LUCERO, SL MIRA, PATERNO
M. MABASA, RAMON V. MACABUHAY, EDITA M. MACALALAD, DIGNA V.
MACAPAGAL, LOUIE MADRID, ROSALITO MAESTRO, ENRIQUE S. MAGLANQUE,
WENCESLAO MAGO, ERNESTO A. MALICAD, MA. SOCORRO A. MALLARE,
CLARO JOSE C. MANIPON, ELEAZAR C. MANDARING, ELVIRA MARANAN,
GERARDO MARCIANO, SALVADOR MARTIN, ELENITA MARTINEZ, CRISOSTOMO
V. MASANGKAY, MAXIMO MATURAN, CONCHITA J. MEDINA, LAMBERTO R.
MELAD, EDUARDO MELEGRITO, (ATTY.) ADORACIO MENDOZA, ARLENE
MENDOZA, BERNARDO N. MENDOZA, LUIS C. MENDOZA, TITA M. MENDOZA,
GINA MAY P. MERCADO, TERESITA L. MIDEL JULIET M. MIGUEL, VIRGINIA B.
MILANO, CONRADO MIRANDA, LIDA R. MIRANDA, LEOCADIO MOLINA,
ALEJANDRO M. MONTERO, JR., BENJAMIN J. MONZON, ELSA Y. MULA,
PERFECTO NACAR, JOEL A. NATIVIDAD, RUBEN C. NATIVIDAD, GLENN
MARCELO C. NOBLE, NICASIO NOGUERAS, LIWAYWAY A. NUNEZ, ESTELA V.
OSORIO, ELIZA PABELICO, ERNANI BERNAL PADILLA, JESUS M. PADILLA,
GERARD A. PANGILINAN, OMLYMPIA V. PARFILES, ELMER PASCUA, ISABEL
PASCUAL, MA. ISABEL M. PASCUAL, MELODIE PASCUAL, SALVADOR L. PATA,
PETRONILA PAZ, JOSEFA B. PELIAS, NESTOR PENA, NESTOR PENA, ROLANDO
PENA, RENE PERALTA, JOSUE L. PEREZ, SIMEON T. PERMEJO, ALFREDO
PERUCHO, REY V. PERUCHO, RENALDO J. POBLETE, RAMON D. QUEBRAL ,
ROLENDO C. QUEMADO, EDNA V. RAGILES, ALVIN C. RAMOS, EMERITO RAMOS,
MAMERTO RESUBAL, ANGELA P. REVILLA, ALICE REYES, DAISY M. RICAFORT,
WILFREDO RICAFORT, RAMONCITO L. RIVERA, REYNALDO RODELAS, FLORO
RODRIGUEZ, LILIAN A. ROLLAN, ROMUALDO AGUILOS, ANGELO A. ROMULO,
JOSE N. RONAN, TIMOSHENKO RONQUILO, NENITA A. ROQUE, BENJAMIN R.
ROSALDO, FIDEL ROVIRA, LIBERTY RUBIN, LIBERTY L. RUBIN, MA. SALLY P.
SAGRAGAO, REINHOLD PERFECTO M. SALAS, VIRGILIO SALAS, ALEJANDRO B.
SALONGA, EDWIN B. SANTELICES, EMMANUEL A. SANTOS, FELIPE B. SANTOS,
LETICIA C. SANTOS, ADRIANO R. SARIAN, MA. CORAZON E. SERVANDO,
RODOLFO SESPENE, FERNANDO G. SOJANA, EXPEDITO SORIA, NORMA G.
SORIANO, RONALD G. STO. TOMAS, LUCIO R. SUYAT, JOYCELYN F. TAAL,
BARBARA BABSI I. TABACO, DELIA S. TALITE, ANUNSACION E. TAN, MARIETTA
N. TAN, HERMINIO G. TAQUIQUI, EDGARDO L. TOLENTINO, MARCELINA M.
TONDO, ANIANO D. TORRES, SALVADOR D. TORRES, BEATRIZ L. TRINIDAD,
RICARDO P. UGALE, ALICIA S. UMEREZ, VIRGILIO B. URBANO, JOSEPHINE R.
UYACO, RIZALINO N. UYACO, LOYOLA M. VALDEZ, JEFFREY VAZQUEZ,
RODOLFO L. VELASCO, JR., JOSELITO G. VELASQUEZ, EVELYN A. VIDAD,
VICTORINO M. VILLAGRACIA, ARIEL VILLANUEVA, CLARISSA G. VILLANUEVA,
JOCELYN C. VILLANUEVA, WILFREDO VILLANUEVA, RICARDO VILLARBA, TITO
S. VILLARIN, CARMELITA B. YALONG, ROBERTO A. YAZON, LUCILLE V. ABAD,
SILVESTRE L. ABAYA, ELIGIO L. ABRIGANA, ANGELINA O. ABRIL, LORENA
AFRICA, INOCENCIO A. AGRON, CRISTINA P. AGUILAR, ARLEAN L. ALAMARES,
ADORACION L. ALEJANDRINO, RUTH B. ALICER, ROSALINA V. ALMONEDA,
ALFREDO ALVAREZ, ISABEL M. AMISCARAY, OSROXSON L. AMPARO, ANGEL B.
ANDEN, CAROLINA M. ANORES, THELMA P. ARTIFICIO, ANTONIO A. ASADA, JR.,
MA. LUZ M. ASCANO, APOLINAR B. ASENCION, EDWIN AZANON, ERLINDA M.
BAGUE, ANGELINA R. BALAGTAS, RENATO T. BANAGA, VALENTIN BARCENAL,
ADELAIDA C. BARRIDA, BENJAMIN P. BATOLINA, MARCELO BAUTISTA,
SIMPLICIO BAYRON, CORAZON C. BERNIDO, GLENDA P. BILOG, ALAN M.
BORRAS, TERESA L. BORRAS, EVANGELISTA BORROMEO, BEVERLY R.
BRIONES, NESTOR J. BUGADISAN, ADELINA DM. BULOS, SYLVIA S. BUSINE,
EVANGELINE M. CABATUANDO, EDUARDO T. CABILDO, ELIZABETH P. CABILDO,
EMMANUEL P. CAJIPE, JOSE N. CALAYCAY, VIRGINIA S. CALIX, LOPITO
CALUAG, EMMA L. CANCINO, ESPERANZA I. CANCIO, BUENAVENTURA E.
CANSINO, PERCIDITA T. CANSINO, GRACE M. CARLOS, PATRICIA ANDREA V.
CARRILLO, SOLEDAD S. CASTANEDA, MARILYN K. CASTILLO, JEAN M. CASYAO,
JUSTINA S. CERBOLLES, MARIA LUCIA C. COBAR, AVELINO COLOMA, ANA
ELENA L. CONJARES, ALVARO CORDERO, ESTRELLA B. CORTEZ, DANILO A.
CUYCO, RUBEN DACOCO, ROSITA R. DAROY, DENIA A. DATO-ON, PABLO DE

CASTRO, MARIO M. DE GUZMAN, ROLANDO DE GUZMAN, AZUCENA C. DE


VERA, CECILIA M. DE VERA, LOUIE A. DE VERA, NATHANIEL B. DE VERA,
SALVACION O. DEAN, SOLIDAD Z. DEL CASTILLO, ADELAIDA Q. DEL ROSARIO,
ARMANDO DELA CRUZ, FE M. DELA CRUZ, IMELDA S. DELFIN, DANILO D. DIAZ,
FE R. DISCAYA, EMERANCIANA B. DURAN, JAVIER M. EDUARDO, ELIXA
ENRIQUEZ, SOFRONIO ENRIQUEZ, LUZ V. ESGUERRA, JAIME B. ESTEBAN,
MERIAM F. FABRIGAS, LOURDES G. FERNANDEZ, LOURDES R. FONTANILLA,
ROBERTO FONTANILLA, REY M. GABRIEL, RICARDO L. GALLARDO, CORAZON
M. GARCIA, NARDO Q. GARCIA, TEOFILO Y. GARCIA, TEOFILO Y. GARCIA,
IRENEO GERILLA, NOEL B. GERILLA, ALFONSO GRAFIA, JUANA S. GREGORIO,
LEONARDO G. GUMASING, LUZVIMINDA M. IGNACIO, RESTITUTO B. ILAGAN,
ABELARDO A. INOVERO, DOMINGO P. JACINTO, REYNALDO P. JACINTO,
GLENDA S. JAVIER, GLORIA JIMENEZ, REYNALDO S. JIMENEZ, JESULITO B.
JUNIO, JULIETA JUSON, JOCELYN S. LAGARDE, ALICIA F. LAGUNZAD,
LUNINGNING M. LANSANGAN, LUVIMINA G. LANUZA, AVELINA G. LAPADE,
DOLORES M. LAZO, RHODORA LEONIN, TEOFILO V. LEONIN, JR., LEONARDO S.
LEOPANDO, LAURA F. LEYVA, CRISANTO LIMEN, ROEL LOTERINA, PABLITO
MAAT, RUBY LIZA J. MAGLALANG, WILFEREDO MAGSAMBOL, HILARION E.
MAMARIL, MILA A. MANALO, BENJAMIN F. MANDINGUIADO, AURELIO
MANINGAS, ANGELES MARCELO, EDITHA A. MARCELO, VERONICA J.
MARCELO, RONNIE MARCOS, REYNALDO R. MARIANO, JOHNNY R. MARIN,
BENEDICTO E. MARISFOSQUE, JOHN M. MARQUEZ, ALEJANDRO J. MATEO,
JOHNYLEN V. MELENDEZ, JORGE MENDOZA, JULIETA C. MENDOZA, LUCY
MENDOZA, QUIRINO M. MENDOZA, MYLENE M. MOLO, NELIA M. MONTILLA,
DEMETRIO A. MOOG, ERLINDA NATERA, JOSEFINA G. NATERA, NICANOR P.
NICOLAS, CARL M. NOHAY, VIDAL T. OLANDA, JOSEFINA J. OMANDAM, CELIA M.
OPRENARIO, NORMA L. PABLO, SAMUEL D. PABLO, LAMBERTO E. PALAD,
FRANCISCO A. PANCHO, ROMEO PARADERO, VANGELINE K. PARAMI, RENATO
H. PECHO, REYNALDO V. PEDREGOSA, CECILIA T. PEREZ, MARY AGNES PEREZ,
CHRISTINA A. PETRACHE, FEDERICO L. PINEDA JR., LAURA R. PINEDA, MYRNA
E. PIQUERO, EDGARDO E. POBLETE, DIOSDADO A. QUIAMBAO, BERNARDINO
H. QUIZON, BOGAR G. RACHO, MANNY G. RAMA, ANGELITO F. RAMOS, AURORA
D. RAPADAS, ANTONIO E. REFRE, ROSALINO B. REJAS, ESTRELLA D. RELUNIA,
EDILBERTO A. REMENTILLA, SOTERO RESILVA, ROLANDO Y. REYES, GERARDO
M. ROBLES, MARISSA ROBLES, CRISPINA M. ROSALES, BERNADETTE C.
SABLAN, CESAR M. SALABIT, MA. TERESITA A. SALABIT, ARTURO F. SALIH,
VIRGILIO R. SANTIAGO, FLORA L. SANTOS, GABRIEL SANTOS JR., IBARRA S.
SANTOS, JULIETA E. SEGUIS, ROSALIE SEMANA, ELVIRA SOMBRION, RODRIGO
TABIOS, ESTELLITA U. TABORA, ANGILEO P. TAGUIBAO, CARLITO G. TAMBOOM,
MERRIAN DC. TANGONAN, RICARDO TEMPLONUEVO, ANTONIO E. TIONG,
MITOS M. TOLENTINO, LUZ G. USMAN, FLORANTE M. VALDERAMA,
BALDOMERO VALENZUELA, ANA MARIA S. VELUZ, ERNESTO S. VENTURA,
CRISOL P. VILLANUEVA, PORTIA T. VILLEGAS, ARMINDA F. VINAS, MAGNO B.
YOSHISAKI, MA. TERESA YULO-NAZAREA, BRAHIM T. ABAS, RAUL G. ABIQUE,
LEZA A. ACORDA, ADELIA F. AGUILAR, REYNALDO P. ALLANCES,
BERNADETTE M. ANGCO, CLARISSA C. ARIDA, LEONITA D. BAETIONG, EDNA R.
BARLIS, SONIA R. BARLIS, BERNA A. BONDOC, NANETTE BORJA, CORAZON S.
BUSTAMANTE, VICTORIA ORMIN R. CABRAL, WILLIE A. CANDELARIO, ARLINA
G.A. CANTADA, ARACELI CANTRE, JERRY CAPULONG, JEANNIE C. CASAURAN,
REBERTO CO, EMERLINDA N. DACARA, TERESITA T. DAVID, ELENIDA DEL
ROSARIO, MANUEL DELA CRUZ, VICENTE DIAZ, LERMA DIMAYUGA,
BERNARDITA M. DUNGO, ANTONIO P. FAJARDO, CHARLES C. FORONDA,
AURORA V. GALVEZ, DAVINA CLEOFE GONZALES, NICK D. GUILLERMO,
REBECCA P. GUITERREZ, JOSEFINA P. HIPOLITO, EVELYN R. INCIONG,
IMMACULADA F. LA ROSA, ANABELLA C. LABORTE, NAPOLEON R. LAPUZ, AMY
LECCIONES, SAMUEL LIBOON, DEAN R. LOPEZ, MYLEEN Z. LUZ, MERLINA G.
MABUTOL, ALBERT A. MAGALANG, ROMANA B. MAGAT, VICTORIA MALIHAN,
JAIME MALLARE, REMY MAMON, ELVIRA T. MANALO, ANDRES G. MANUELE,
EVALINDA MERCADO, MA. GERARDA MERILO, FATIMA MOLINA, JOSEPHINE L.
MONILLA, EDWIN ROMEL N. NAVALUNA, PERSEVERANDA-FE OTICO, FELIX A.
PASCUA, JR., MARINELA T. PASCUA, ALBERTO C. PECHO, TERESITA PERALTA,
ELVIRA D. PIMENTEL, CRISTINA S. PIZARRO, ISAGANI R. POTES, HARRY R.

QUIAOIT, LINDA A. QUIOCSON, SOLON C. RATIVO, MARCELINO R. RIVERA, JANE


G. RODRIGO, DAMIAN P. RUBIO, ESPERANZA A. SAJUL, ELVIRA L. SALVANI,
MARICHU SANTIBANEZ, VIRGILIO G. SANTOS, GERI GERONIMO, R. SANEZ,
REBECCA E. SARACHO, MA. CECILIA B. STA. INES, PEDE SUMILDE, JESSIE
TANOLA, ROMEO T. TARRAY, DOLORES F. TOLENTINO, GRACIOLO DS. TORRE,
EDGARDO TORRES, ENRICA I. TUMBAGAHAN, MA. LOURDES P. VARGAS,
RENATO VENGCO, GRACE L. ALMERO, JUANITA P. ARSOLON, LETECIA M.
CENDANA, ELIZABETH A. CHUA, MABEL C. CRISPARIL, MANUEL T. ESCASURA,
JUANITA G. FERNANDEZ, VIRGILIO O. FERRER, DELIA P. GEDALA, LAURO M.
HERMOSURA, NATIVIDAD V. IGAYA, ROSABEL T. JOSUE, EVELYN V. LLAMAS,
ANNIE LOMIBAO, ARLINE LUNA, BRILLA P. MALAMUG, ADELINDA L. MANALILI,
ROMUALDO S. MERCENE, JANET MIRANDA, LYDIA NUQUE, FRUCTUOSA R.
OBAY, CATALINA G. PRESTOZA, ROLANDO P. RANES, JULIETA RIVERA,
LOURDES T. SELLEZA, JESUSA A. VELASCO, YOLANDA A. VERDIJO, JOSE
VIDAL, FLORA ABADIN, ROMMEL D. ABAN, ALLEN M. ABLANG, NORMA N. AGIR,
RODRIGO AGIR III, MARDONIO M. ALCANTARA, ROSALINDA ANGER, DANILO T.
ANONUEVA, REMEDIOS M. ANONUEVO, BONIFACIO APOLONIO, MARIO G.
AQUINO, MA. CHONA ARISTOTELES, DICK G. BACUNO, NILDA C. BALAMONG,
ARTHUR M. BALATBAT, FLORANTE G. BONGALON, CEPRIANA S. BORJA,
CRISANTO BRUSAS, RUFINO M. BUSTAMANTE, MELICITA CAPULONG, AMADEO
G. CARDINO, BONIFACIO CARLING, LULU C. CORALES, JIMMY J. CRISOLOGO,
CELIA J. CRUZ, NOEL C. CRUZ, NORBERTO G. CRUZ, AMBROSIO DAGUPAN, MA.
THERESA M. DATU, JAIAME C. DE GUZMAN, ROLAND A. DE JESUS, MONA LISA
F. DE OCAMPO, SONIA C. DIMACULANGAN, LAUREANA C. ESTOROQUE,
PABLITO ESTOROQUE, JR., MARIO M. ESTRELLA, ANGEL FERNANDEZ,
ZENAIDA P. FERNANDEZ, EVELYN C. FLORES, VERONICA T. GARCIA, JOSE M.
GATONGAY, ARIEL A. HIMOC, BONNIE P. LISING, LOTA S. LIZARDA, RUFINA
LOPEZ, EDGARDO K. MAGNO, RODELIO M. MALICAD, ZENAIDA MALLETE,
MARILYN V. MANGEURRA, CONSTANCIO MARIROSQUI, HIDELISA P. MARQUEZ,
ROSARIO J. MENDOZA, ELISA N. MOLA, NILO A. NERA, JUSTO NEYRA, JR.,
ANACLETA P. NILLO, RIBOMAJAL A. OBA, RODOLFO N. ORTIZ, MARITES O.
PADOR, MA. VICTORIA P. PAELMO, MA. JANET PASCUA, ROMEO C.
PASCUBILLO, ESTELITO PENA, JOSIE S. PEREZ, ZENAIDA T. RABAYA, JOSEFINA
D. RAMOS, JENNIE P. SALVADOR, RODOLFO S. SANTOS, LORETA C. TABAS,
RAMONITO TALABUCON, PATRICIA N. TALAMISAN, JULIE N. TANGUILIG,
NUNILON R. TANGUILIG, DOMINGA D. TOLENTINO, CLYDIE TORRES, ABRAHAM
R. VILLANUEVA, AGNES VINUMA, LUZ ANACTA, EDUARDO BALLESTEROS,
RUBY BAUTISTA, ELIZALDE BERANIA, CHARLITA BONGALON, ESTER CADANO,
ALMA CRISTINA COLLADO, EVELINDA CORONEL, BRIGIDA CORPUS, HILARIA
DEZA, LUCIA DIAGCO, CRISTINA ESGUERRA, EDNA ESQUILLO, RHODORA
ESTRELLA, CECILIA FRANCISCO, EMELLINA GAMBA, MARCELA GARCIA,
DIVINA GATMAITAN, ASUNCION GERVACIO, MA. ASUNCION LAQUINDANUM,
LYLEEN LIBAN, ZAIDA LIBAN, BERNANDINO MANOSO, MARITESS PABLO, ANITA
PANER, EDERLINA RABE, JOSE RABE, ROSALIA REBULLANTE, ROBERTO
SABELLA, JUDITH SADALIA, CIELITA SARMIENTO, LUTHER VILLAMIN, ANITA A.
AALA, MARILOU L. ABARRO, PORFIRIO L. ALCACHUPAS, ISABEL V. ARANZAZU,
ROSIE L. ARENAS, CLARO S. ASTOVEZA, SUSAN C. BONDOC, DOMINGO
BRAVO, MARIANITO Z. CAJUCOM, SOFIA T. CAMPOS, SONI G. CASTILLO,
CRISTINA D. COMIE, ADELINA G. CORTIGUERRA, VIRGINIA DE SAGUN, DANIEL
DELOS SANTOS, NIDA C. DILAN, SELFA C. FERNANDEZ, LIGAYA G. GARCIA,
MARLYN A. GARCIA, SONIA B. IBANEZ, BONIFACIO S. LABANGCO, SR., JEAN
LADIA, PERLA G. LORENZO, VIRGINIA B. LUNA, EDNA C. MABULAY, MARILI T.
MALASAGA, MELE T. MALASAGA, MA. TERESA E. MAPILI, DAVID P. MARIANO,
FRISCA P. MAYAMAYA, MARLENE S. MELARPIS, ROLAND P. MENDOZA, VENER
C. MERANA, LAMBERTA N. MERENA, FELISA G. NARCIDA, NORMA M. NORIEL,
FRANCISCO PANGAN, APOLONIO C. SALANGA, JR., CARLOS E. SANCHEZ,
SOFREMEO F. SANTIAGO, JR., LUISA L. SANTOS, SOFIA S. SOLACITO,
GENOFREDO S. SOLMARIN, VIOLETA G. SORIANO, JUAN STA. ANA, SANNY B.
SULIBA, CARMELITA P. TAMARGO, ANTONIO P. TULLAS, JR., VIOLETA A. VELA,
CHONA C. ZAMORA, MA. THERESA P. EMPAYNADO, MABEL GRASPARIL,
EDMUND RAUL KAABAY, JR., MAGIN LABANGUIS, REY B. SELLEZA, PERCIVAL
VALDEZ, NORMA C. VASQUEZ, JUDY ABLAN, MARIBEL M. ALCANTARA,

ANGELITA C. AUKAY, MARLENE M. BADILLA, DOMINADOR L. BIGSOT, ABRAHAM


D. CABALSE, EUFRECINA T. EUSEBIO, MARLON Q. GA, JOCELYN P. ILUSTRE,
PERCIDA G. NORTON, GODOFREDO RAMONES, ELISEO A. VILLASTIQUI, ELY R.
YRA, VIRGINIA D. CADAVIS, CONSOLACION CAYABYAB, PATROCINIA A.
DIMAGUILA, JOLIZA O. ENCISA, LUCILA M. FELIX, SALVACION T. GALLEGO,
ELVIRA GEALON, WILMA T. LAGRIMAS, REMEDIOS B. LIBERATO, JAIME
MADAMBA, BERNICE R. MANALATA, VILMA S. PALMES, EMPERATRIZ R.
PIOQUID, LIGAYA R. SAMSON, ROSALIE M. SANCHEZ, MARCEBENI D.
TALABUCON, LILIA C. TAMAYO, MERCELINA A. TUBALLA, ELDA Y. ZURBITO,
ROWENA ANDAYA, JACINTA B. ANONUEVO, BEATRIZ N. BELEN, TERENCIO
CADUYAC, RAMON C. DELA FUENTA, MIGUEL C. FERNANDEZ, DOLOR MORADA,
CLEMENCIO C. PAJARILLO, ELENILA PASCUAL, TERESITA ADA, MARIO AQUINO,
ROLANO BAGUNU, MARGIE I. BALLESTEROS, ROMULOS BELTRAN, ANTONIO
CORIA, EDWIN DELA CRUZ, YOLANDA DELA CRUZ, ERLINDA ESTRELLA,
AURELIO GUERRERO, MANUEL H. HIZOLA, RUBEN A. MAGTIBAY, NICOLAS
MASANGKAY, FRACTUOSA R. OBAY, LIGAYA PASCUAL, NECETE PASTORFIDE,
TRANQUILINO PUNZALAN, MYRNA P. SUNIO, ARMANDO VILLAFLOR, MARIANO
VILLANUEVA, REMEDIOS ANONUEVO, RIBOMAPIL CLOA, MARINA COLLANTES,
ERLINDA DIMAPAWI, HEDELISA MARQUEZ, MA. VICTORIA PAELMO, ILUMINADA
SABORRIDO, DOMINGA D. TOLENTINO, MA. VICTORIA ABRERA, ALFREDO
AGACETA, JR., WILFREDO ANONUEVO , VERGILIO BAGTAS, ROBERTO BERNAL,
LORETO BOQUIREN, RAMIR BUIZA, CELSO BULADO, NOEL CASTELO, WILIAM
DELA CRUZ, GRACIA DIAZ, ROBERT ENCISO, ANTONIO FAJARDO, ROMEO
GIANAN, JOYCELYN GOCO, JOSE GONZALES, TEMOTEO IDEA, EMMIE IGNACIO,
MA. VICTORIA LANDICHO, MARCIANO MANIEGO, CECILIA MERCADO, REGULO
QUEJADA, ARNEL ROMERO, MANUEL SABATER, NELIA SANTOS, AMELIA
DULCE SUPETRAN, ERNESTO J. ANDRES, LIBRADO S. GESALTA, LORNA JEAN
H. PALAD, PABLO SALIGAN, ZENY DE GUZMAN, LORETO GALLER, EMMALYN C.
TRIA, SEVILIO D. DAVID, PASENCIA A. VOTACION, LEONIDO J. AMANTE, ALMA M.
SACOPLA, MARIETA CABREROS, EUGENIO O. DIAZ, JR., GUENDOLYN C.
BAMBALAN, GUYETO CABADING, MA. THERESA ENRIQUEZ, MA. VICTORIA V. DE
CASTRO, BENJAMIN DEVERA, JAIME OBAR, RAUL VARELA, STEPHEN C.
ACEBEDO, ELEUTERIO AGBAY, ALMA G. ALMONEDA, ANTONIO S. ARELLANO,
FILIPINAS G. ATACADOR, MARIA M. ATIENZA, MAGAMPON Q. BABISTA,
HERMINILDA S. BALDEMOR, ANGELITA I. BALIGAD, EDUARDO J. BANAWA,
CARLOS P. BASILIO, ALEJANDRO T. BATUHAN, ROLANDO BELANO, MARIVIC
BERNARDO, ADALIA A. BISCOCHO, NATIVIDAD B. BITOON, VICTORIA P. BORAC,
M. BURCE JR., YOLANDA M. BUSTAMANTE, PACITA C. CABANSAG, GEMMA P.
CAGUA, EDITHA T. CAPISTRANO, LOPE O. CARIO JR., EDUARDO M. CARPIO,
EDUARDO CAVIZO, ROSALINA C. CERNADILLA, ERNESTO C. CORPUZ
JR., RENAN M. CRUZADO, CRISTINA T. DE MESA, DANIEL C. DIAZ, DIOSDADO
DOCTOR, ADELAIDA C. DUAD, INOCENCIA A. DUMLAO, JAIME D. DYSUANGCO,
BENJAMIN A. EMANUEL, MARIO EPAN JR., VIRGINIA G. ESCOBAR, JOSEFINA P.
ESPERAS, ERLYN C. EZPELETA, ARNEL F. FERAREZA, AMELIA A. FINO,
DOMINGO FRANCISCO, TIMOTEO GAMIT, CRISTETA GARCIA, MILAGROS
GERONIMO, GINALYN GONZALES, QUINCHITA J. GRICALDA, RAFAEL JARILLA
JR., VALE JOSE EXEQUIEL JR., LUZ P. LAGUNERA, ROGELIO M. LAPUS,
RODOLFO A. LOPEZ, PATRICIA MALIHAN, GLORIA MANALANSAN, EVANGELINE
MARCELINO, JOYCE J. MARCIANO, ELIZABETH Y. MATIBAG, CESAR D.
MEMORACION, SALVACION R. NOVINO, MARTINO B. OSITE, ELIZABETH
PACUBAS, SATURNINO S. PACUBAS JR., SERAPIO S. PAHIGDANA, LEMELIE
PASCUA, ALMA A. PASCUAL, ARNOLD T. PASIA, JAIME PEDROCHE, MARILOU L.
PERALTA, HOMOBNUS PIDO II, ALFREDO G. PUNO, MARIVIC S. QUIDES, MYRNA
QUIPIT, PAULINO R. RECONDO, NELLIE REGINIO, JOSE V. REYES, CHERRY B.
RIVERA, SUSANA T. ROBOSA, YOLANDA RODRIGUEZ, DIANA A. ROMERO, REY
S. ROSALES, LUCIO G. SANTIAGO, JOBINO S. SEVALLA, ULYSSES J. SIGATON,
SUSAN T. SOLOMON, LUZVIMINDA B. TABLATE, ROWENA R. TESTON, ERLINDA
TOLENTINO, JOSEFINA G. URRUTIA, LILIBETH L. VELOSO, OSCAR VENTURA,
JOSE VICTORIA JR., ARNOLD N. VILLADOS, NOE L. ZETA, EUGENIO ESGUERRA,
ERNESTO ESPIRITU, DANIEL GARAS, MA. LEONORA PADILLA, MAXIMIANO
RAMOS,
VILLELA
REYNALDO,
ANGELICA
SAJONA,
ROSARIO
SANTOS, ANGELITA L. CRUZ, EDWIN A. LLAGAS, LUCILA SEVILLA, MERCEDES

D. AGALOOS, VICENTA V. AONUEVO, DALISAY S. AVELLANA, GERARDO


BERNAL, LILIBETH L. CANDONITA, FLORNIDO P. CASTRO, WILFREDO CINCO,
LINO N. DIMAPILIS, TITA P. DUEAS, WILFREDO C. ECAMINO, MYRNA D.
HABAGA, MARY JUNE F. MAYCA, NENITA G. MONTOYA, EDITHA N. RECTRA,
RICHARD G. SANDI, ROBERTO D. SHEAN, JUSTINA Q. UMALI, VIOLETA B.
VALERIO, TELESFORO R. VILLAMAR, DANILO N. VILLANUEVA, EUGENIO U.
VILLANUEVA, EFREN R. WAKA, MARIO W. ALBAN, EFREN AONUEVO, VICENTA
V. AONUEVO, ROSALINDA C. ANGEL, VIOLETA A. BUAGAN, ELENITA D.
CABUEOS, FLORIAN S. CANTOS, LOPE M. CARIO SR., ROLANDO G.
CLEMENTE, AREJOLA P. CORAZON, ANTONIO D. CORIA, VIRGINIA I. DELOS
SANTOS, LILY S. DEROCA, ERLINDA A. DIMAPAWI, RANDOLPH DISCIPULO, TITA
P. DUEAS, ERMIE B. DAGDAGAN, CORAZON Y. FERNANDEZ, NIDA G.
GUARINO, GLENN HERALDO, ESTELA B. HERMOSURA, ADORACION U.
HERNANDEZ, GONZALO IMPERIAL, DOLORES S. LA GUARDIA, PERCIVAL
LADUB, AGNES H. LAGON, TERESA M. MAALAC, ISAGANI V. MANALILI,
CONSTANCIO F. MARISFOSQUI, VIRGINIA A. MELCHOR, RONALDO J. MIRANDA,
FRANCIS M. MIRTO, EDWIN M. MOJARES, ELISA D. MOLA, BENJAMIN MORTOS,
CLEMENCIO A. PAJARILLO, LAURO J. PANERIO, ELENITA G. PASCUAL, EXZER
R. RABANG, EMILIO RAMOS, VICENTE A. REGODON, ANDREA H. REYES, MA.
CORAZON V. STA ANA, ZENAIDA P. STO. DOMINGO, ILUMINADA S. TALABUCON,
ANNIE E. TANTOY, MARLOU D. VAQUILAR, NOEL B. VELASQUEZ, NANCY V.
VILLAPANDO, ELISA B. VILLAR, BELOISIE M. ALMAZAN, GLADYS B. BOQUIREN,
ELIZABETH CARIO, LIZ CARPIO, LORMELYN E. CLAUDIO, JOSE CORTEZ,
ROLANDO DE GUZMAN, NORBERTO A. DEL ROSARIO, VILMA C. ELPA, OTTO E.
ESPILOY, ALLAN L. LEUTERIO, EMMANUELITA D. MENDOZA, NICANOR E.
MENDOZA, CONCEPCION C. OCAMPO, CARMELITA M. PASSE, JOSE SALVADOR
PASSE JR., MORENO M. PENALBA, ELVIRA P. PIMENTEL, VIRGINIA V. QUIMO,
NAP ROQUE, CESAR S. SIADOR JR., ILUMINADA SORIA, JULITO G. TANGALIN,
GREGORIO A. TOMILLOSO, FELICISIMO I. VICENCIO, RICARDO D. VICENTINO,
RODOLFO ARELLANO, MYRNA R. CORTEZ, EMMA N. CRUZ, CONCEPCION C.
CUNANAN, NELSON ITLIONG, RESTITUTO S. MAGPANTAY, CATHERINE F.
MANALANSAN, HENRY B. MANDOCDOC, ISIDORO MONTOYA JR., ANDREA A.
RAMOS, ARSENIA E. SAN DIEGO, VILMA SANTIANO, PETRA T. TABUCOL,
BRIGIDA T. TACUBOY, MARILOU A. TIBOR, CORAZON R. VALDEZ, NESTOR U.
VENTURILLO, MARILYN ACOB, EMMA AGOT, DENCIO R. DADIS, MA. AVA DATA,
NORLIE N. DAVID, IRENE S. DELA CRUZ, NESTOR T. GUERREN, GUILLERMA
LAGUMBAY, ANNA LEAH MELEGRITO, EDITO MISTA, BELEN C. NUNEZ, ESTELA
B. SARMIENTO, FRANCISCO TY, CYNTHIA L. AUSTRIA, CORITA M. BARTOLO,
AMELIA L. FLORES, PRISCILA M. MOLINA, CORAZON P. PEREZ, MANOLITA L.
VELASCO, ANTONIO E. VELOIRA, OFELIA B. VELOIRA, MEMORY FABIAN,
ROSARIO MENESES, JULIANA M. ABEN, REMEDIOS F. BONIFACIO, MA.
THERESA M. ENRIQUEZ, OFELIA B. MENDOZA, LILY T. REYES, NARCISA B.
SESE, MA. THERESA M. VILLARUEL, JOHN R. ALMAZAN, DOLORES C.
VELASQUEZ, ALFREDO FERRER, ADGARDO CORPUZ, ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ,
CONSOLACION B. CACULITAN, NORA Y. CALIJA, YVONNE V. CARABEO, AIDA C.
CORPUZ, ROSA P. DORADO, MINDA C. DUAD, CECILIA B. HIWATIG, RITA
CRISTINA V. LAPUS, CASILDA C. MAROHOM, CLEMENCIA A. MARQUEZ, MAXIMA
MATIBAG, EMELITA R, MENDOZA, CRISNATA S. MONTRESCLAROS, TERESITA L.
OBIAS, CHONA R. PASTORFIDE, MERLY H. PATUNGAN, ALNA U. PINEDA,
ANGELITO T. PINEDA, VILMA G. QUIAMBAO, ESTELITA T. RAGASA, LUZVIMINDA
L. RAMOS, NERISSA B. RAPANUT, CARMENCITA S. SANCHEZ, ELSA M. SIGUE,
ROWENA L. TEJADA, MYRNA M. TORREGOZA, LERMA AQUINO, CORNELIA M.
ARANETA, FERDINAND BANGCUA, REYNALDO BARBADILLO, ALFREDO A.
CLAVERIA, DAN JORGE CRUZ, ERLINDA O. DAQUIGAN, REBECCA C. DE VERA,
ERLINDA B. DIZON, MARILYN P. ESTADILLA, CATALINA G. GARINGARAO, MYRNA
MALINAO, SILVESTRE C. MANGAWANG, FLORENCIO C. NAVALED, NOEL D.
OBRA, NELIO T. PAGLINAWAN, ANA MARIE PASCUAL, ARTURO R. PRENDOL,
OTELLA O. SANCHEZ, REYNALDO TEJADA, CRISANTO BADENHOP, JEAN C.
BORROMEO, ANA MARIA C. BUESING, MARIA TERESA CHAVEZ, GIL F.
FERAREZA, MARITES L. GALVEZ, MIGUEL B. JIMENEZ JR., RODANTE JOCSON,
MICHAEL A. JOSE, ARNEL H. LUZ, ARNEL C. MATREO, EDUARDA P. MERCADO,
BENEDICTO P. MURILLO, MINDA A. OSORIO, GLEN Q. PASTORFIDE, ISMAEL S.

RUIZ, FE B. SENDIN, HENRY P. SORIANO, JOYCE SORIANO, FLORENCE V.


VELASQUEZ, PRUDENCIO M. VENTURA, ROY ALAN D. VIANZON, LORETO H.
VILLAS JR. CELESARIA C. ZACARIAS, GEORGE P. ABAYA, ELIZABETH E. AMOR,
LORNA ASIS, IMELDA J. BALLON, LILIA M. BALTAZAR, AURORA I. BELEN, ELSA
B. BURGOS, CORAZON D. CALAMNO, FLORENCIO L. CARANDANG, CYNTHIA V.
CARPIO, ADAMELIA DE ONON, AMPARO L. DE RAMA, LUVIMIN L. DELA CRUZ,
VIOLETA R. GARCIA, PERLA P. MUOZ, PAULINA D. PAGUINTO, JOEL
PAJARILLO, ENCARMILA PANGANIBAN, ERLINDA M. PARRENO, MA. SALVACION
M. PEREZ, ALBINA L. PINEDA, RAYMOND SANTIAGO, BRIGIDO G. SISON,
REMEGIO SULLEZA, TRAZON E. TUSCANO, MYRA B. VILLANUEVA, HENRY
ABONETALLA, MARILYN BABAAN, ELISA A. BERE, JUANITO J. BOLISAY, NORMA
S. CABALLA, ELMER CALLOPE, ELPIDIO T. DE LARA, AGNES G. DE LEON,
GERARDO R. ESPIRITU, ONOFRE P. LAXAMANA, ANSELMO LEGASPI,
CONSUELO MAGAYANES, DELEON L. MAROHOM, MARIO MELGAR, CHOLITA R.
ORTEGA, MODESTA S. PADUADA, PATRIA C. PATRICIO, LORETA N. RAMIREZ,
TERESITA C. SAN JUAN, FELICISIMA SUMAGUE, SOLAIMAN TAWA, VICTOR
TOLENTINO, ANGELITO M. VALENZUELA, DIOSDADO VELARDE, ROBERTO M.
BASCO, JESUS B. CRUZ JR., JOSEPHINE ESTRADA, LUCIA L. ESTRADA, LIGAYA
C. EULOGIO, LEONARD FALLER, DANILO J. GALAGNARA, MA. LOURDES P.
GOROBIA, JUAN ILARDE, ISMAEL R. JOSE, RICARDO P. MACALINO JR.,
ROPERTO MANALO, VIOLETA A. MARIANO, NOBLEZA C. MERINO, PILAR C.
MIGALANG. ALEJANDRO S. MINGOY, DANILO D. PONZALAN, SERGIO TAMAYO,
VIRGILIO V. URGEL, GLORIA VILLAMAR, JULIETA ACHICO, FREDDIE P. AGAZETA,
PEDRO AGONIAS, ALBERTO G. ALBERTO, CRISTINA ALTOAR, SALVADOR
BACANI, LEONIDA BALINGAW, IMELDA BAUZON, VIRGILIO BELGIRA,
GAUDENCIA CABACUNGAN, LEONORA DAVID, VIRGILIO D. ESTRADA, CORSINO
GLORY, PRECIOSO A. LABUGUEN, BENJAMIN LACESTE, ROSITA MACARANAS,
FELIX MAURILLO, JOVENCIO PERALTA, RUBEN R. PRENDOL, CORNELIO
RETUTA, JERRY RETUTA, BENEDICTO P. RIVERA, CORNELIO TABLANTE,
LEONILA VERGARA, LAMBERTO VILLAFUERTE, OFELIA B. AYSON, EDITA M.
BALANZA, ROLANDO M. BAUTISTA, OFELIA L. BUENO, CARMELITA G. CAJIPO,
TERESITA C. CANLAS, ROMEO C. ESTEBAL, IBANA FALLAR, ANASTACIO M.
FLORES JR., DEMOSTHENES GOTHIS, MENCHELITA M. GUCILA, EDMUNDO C.
LAGRIMA, ALLAN C. LEONCIO, MARVIN M. MORALES, DIGNA Z. OBSTACULO,
CORNELIO O. PERALTA, CARLITO B. POMBO, MARIETA R. RED, TRINIDAD A.
TALARO, ADELA T. TONGCO, REGINA B. VILLADOS, JESSICA R. ALMAZAN,
PERFECTO U. ALMAZAN, BERARDO BADERE, GENOVEVA A. BIGORNIA,
NATIVIDAD J. BOCAL, LORNA CABADING, EFREN E. CAWALING, AVELINA T.
DURAN, ROMEO A. FELIPE, CORAZON GARAPAN, ANITA B. IBARDOLASA,
MARCIAL M. JACOBIA, JOSE V. JARTEL, PIDO LOUISA, BASILIO H. MORENO,
CARONIA L. MURCIA, NONILA T. OMANA, AIDA P. PANGANIBAN, SUSAN CULANE
PAZ, ANITA Q. PEREYRA, MAMERTO C. PESTON JR., ROLANDO S. RABE, VILMA
SANSORONA, VICTOR TOLENTINO, LUZVIMINDA O. YAGAYA, JULIET S. AYENTO,
DIGNO D. AYSON, NORENA R. CIASICO, JOVENCIA L. FERNANDEZ, EMILIANO P.
KEMPIS, EUFROCINA B. QUIJANO, SIXTO E. TOLENTINO JR., AMPARO P. ABAYA,
CRISTINA M. ARINGO, LEONILO WILLOU M. BERANO, JOEY B. CASTILLO,
BERNARDO CLARION, MATIAS V. CRUZ, ERLINDA O. DELGACO, ERLINDA B.
DIZON, SENECIO D. FESTIN, FLORENTINA C. VALENCIA, SARAH ABUNGAN,
JUPITER C. ALMAZAN, OFELIA BIRON, MAMERTO C. BOLIVAR, BIENVENIDO R.
CINCO, METEDIO ESTRADA JR., GINALYN GONZALES, ANTONIO M. LACHICA,
NEMESIO RABAJANTE, NELZON TENIOSO, HERMENEGILDO URRUTIA JR.,
VIOLETA C. VALDEZ, CRISANTO VAQUILAR, JOFRE B. ALTAREJOS, EDGARDO L.
BALDEDARA, RAUL SAUDE G. BECARES, RAMON R. BOADO, MELCHOR R.
BORLON, GEMMA CARINO, GEORGE M. CARPIO, CARMELITA S. CUNANAN,
ONESIMO A. DE CASTRO, PURIFICACION R. DE GUZMAN, LEOPOLDO S. J. DE
JESUS, JOCELYN R. DELA CRUZ, DOMINGO U. ESGUERRA, VIRGINIA R.
ESTRELLA, OFELIA A. HERNANDEZ, TRINIDAD JAVIER, EUGENIA L. LAGMAY,
ANGELITA B. LIBIRAN, ARSENIO R. LIBIRAN, CARLOS M. LOPE, RODOLFO A.
LOPEZ, CELSO MAALIW, ROMUALDO E. MENDOZA, CRISPULO A. OCAMPO,
ANGELITA OLOG, EVANGELINE O. OPO, MAXIMO L. PEREZ, JOSE PONPONILLA,
SIXTO P. RIVAS, LYDIA C. ROMERO, CATALINA F. SIGATON, JESUS S. VIJIGA,
MYRA K. VILLAPANDO, GALICANO I. NER, OSCAR R. LAVIN, ESTEBAN S.

CARAG, GRACE M. VILLACRUSIS, JULIETA C. BONDAD, NILDA S. LINING, LUCY


GRACE C. BURGOS, MARIFE CHARO N. DOMINGO, MA. VICTORIA P. DA ROZA,
NILDA CATALAN, RAUL T. ORTEGA, EWARDO R. JOSON, PRUDENCIO M. DELA
CRUZ, FRANCISCO L. CONDE, ARNEL M. ZURITA, EDISON A. CALAOUR, VICTOR
C. CANTOR, CARMELITA M. QUIRINO, AMBROSIO ESTABILLO, ESPERANZA B.
DALUSON, ALBERTO M. MADRILEJOS, ROLANDO C. MANALO, RODOLFO R.
RANCES, PHILIP A. PICHAY, REYNALDO C. ALAMPAY, RENE E. FAJARDO, CELSO
A. AGUILAR, REMEDIOS E. ABING, JOSEFINA M. GAWARAN, FRANCISCO S.
PANGANIBAN, petitioners, vs. HON. ANGEL C. ALCALA, in his capacity as the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and HON.
CARLITO R. ALETA, in his capacity as the Director of the Philippine Nuclear
Research Institute, respondents.

[G.R. No. 110642. September 11, 1998]

BERNARDO BALGOS, NICOMEDES C. AGBADA, EUFRONIO R. ALANO, JR., ERNIE S.


ALINO, CORNELIO A. ARTIENDA, CARY L. ASANA, TRANQUILINO ATIENZA, JR.,
JONATHAN A. AZUCENA, ROY M. BARCERO, CLARITA S. BELONIO, WILFREDO E.
CABEZON, CANDIDO A. CABRIDO, JR., AMELITA B. CALER, DAREF MARCELINO
M. CANET, RONALD CANTONG, ALEJANDRO J. CATIPAY, JR., HERMINIA COLAR,
ELIZABETH A. DAYTO, SALOME G. DE JESUS, JOSEFINA ESTRADA, AURORA M.
FIGUEROA, MA. ANGELITA A. GADDI, RIO L. GULAPO, MA. THERESA M.
GUMABON, ANTONIO A. GUNAY, GERARD HURTADO, ARIEL ILAGAN, WILMAR L.
INFANTE, FLORECER M. LEACHON, ANNA MA. VICTORIA LELINA, LIZA NONETTE
A. MAIBO, EUGENIO P. MANUEL, EDUARDO A. MENGUITO, ERIC AGAPITO
NATIVIDAD, LEONIDES N. NAVEA, MA. PERPETUA OCAMPO, REDENTOR B.
PACANO, ALMOND C. PALABRICA, ELMER T. PASCUA, CRISTY CRISTETA A.
RAMOS, HENRY B. RELLOSA, ROWENA M. RODANILLA, JOSEPH SALVADOR,
CARMELLE GEORGINA SIENA, CRECENCIANO I. SUAN, CESAR TAN, CECILIA T.
VARGAS, GIL NOEL VILLANUEVA, ANALYN S. VISTA, BENITO YU, JR., EDUARDO
AKIATE, EARTHA G. ALINO, TERESITA ANASTACIO, JOSELITO O. AVERION,
ELINO BAGOSO, FERDINAND B. BARBERO, ELSA J. BAUTISTA, ELMER
CALDERON, FRANCIS CAMELLO, RENE CANARES, RODELIO B. CARATING,
JULIETA S. CONSTANTINO, EASTER LIZA CUETO, NANCY V. CUETO, MARIFE
DELOS REYES, JERWYN L. DEMETRIO, EDUARDO DIOKNO, MARGARET T.
ESTANISLAO, MA. ARLENE M. EVANGELISTA, SALVADOR A. FABULA, IRENE P.
GERPACIO, ALMA GONZALES, RICHMOND GONZALES, BENIE E. ILAGAN,
OSCAR JALALON, JOSEFINA JONAS, ELEANOR M. LIGANOR, FLORDELIZA
MALLARI, ROSARIO MAACAP, JOSE A. MANANGHAYA, JULIET R.
MANGUERRA, GLENN A. MANILA, ANGELITA C. MARCIA, CECILIA MARQUESES,
GINA MARZAN, RICHARD M. MOJICA, JOSEFINA MORALES, SANTIAGO
MOSQUEDA, MELCHITO B. NOCEDA, SEGUNDO PACARDO, SONNY PACUNLA,
ALEXANDER PANO, MA. ENQUITA PANOTES, ROMMEL M. PARCASIO, IAN A.
PEDALIZO, ROSANA PERMALINO, EVELYN PITOGO, LOLITA POLIQUIT, LOURDES
REGALA, MARIBEL REYES, JOVETTE TENORIO, HIDALGO TOLENTINO, LUISITO
TRINIDAD, MA. BLANCA A. VALDEAVILLA, EDGARDO YBURAN, ROWENA
ABELLANA, ARTURO ACOBA, PALMAREN AGACIA, FLORENTINO AGUSTIN,
JAIME ALAN, EDUARDO ALBERTO, MACARIO ANACAN, HENRY APOLINARES,
EVELYN AUSAN, REBECCA BACUS, MARYLOU BARATANG, LORENZO
BERMILLO, LIGAYA BOBIS, MA. TERESA BOLOFER, ERNESTO BRAMPIO, FLORA
CABLIN, HENRY CACAYAN, LILIA CALICA, MA. ANA CASUPANG, CHARITO
CAUTON, ARMELYN Y. CLEMENTE, ROOSBELT CREENCIA, FRANCISCO CRUZ,
MARCELO DAYO, MARITES DE LEON, JANE DELA CRUZ, EDGARDO DELOS
SANTOS, IMELDA DELOS SANTOS, RODEL DELOS SANTOS, ELISA DIZON,
SUSAN DUMOT, JOVEN ESPINELI, LEANDRO EVANGELISTA, EVANGELINE
FERRER,
NESTOR
FRANCISCO,
CESARIO
GEMINO,
LAURO
G.
HERNANDEZ, RACHEL HILARIO, MIGUEL IRACTA, OBEN LABONETE, JAIME
LADANGA, ISIDRO LEGAN, ELMIE MADRIAGA, DIOSDADO MANALUS, OSCAR

MANOIS, CRISTINA MEDRANO, LILIAN MILLAN, GLICERIO MONTALLA,


MADELEINE NAVARCE, MA. ANA ORQUIZA, PINKY PADILLA, LUZ BRENDA
PAGLINAWAN, PURISIMA PAJARO, JOSEPHINE PASION, JOCELYN RAMOS,
DOMINGO RODULFO, DELIA SADIASA, VIRGINIA SALILI, GETULIO SAN JUAN,
FLORFINA SANCHEZ, LEOLITA SIASI, GLORIA TEJADA, FRANCIS TORRES,
ERNESTO VALMEO, WILFREDO VELASCO, EPIFANIA VILLA JUAN, RAFAEL
ACENA, ELMER ADRAQUE, EDITHA AIZON, RIZALDY ALBERTO, RAMON
ALOBBA, ALAN ANIDA, BERTOLIO ARELLANO, VERONICA AVILA, MAY
BABARAN, JOAQUIN BANZALI, MARILYN CAACO, ROSE NELIE CABATLAO,
JUANITA CALONGE, NILDA CAPANPANGAN CECILIA CAPUNO, TRINIDAD
CARLOS, SALVACION CAS, AMADO CREUS, PEDRO DAILEG, VIRGINIA DAILEG,
NELITA DE GUZMAN, ROWENA DE GUZMAN, ALMA ARRO DEL ROSARIO,
AMELYN ANG, BERNADETTE ESPINOSA, ESTRELITA FIDER, REYNALDO
GABALLO, NOEMI GABATO, ELMER GABAYA, MARIBELLE GAON, LILIA
GONZALES, CARISA GOSO, ROMEO HERNANDEZ, MYRNA JOVELLANA,
RONALDO
LIM,
GREGORIO
LLANES,
ROBERTO
MABUTI,
DANILO
MACANSANTOS, CRISOSTOMO MAMORBOR, MA. CONCEPCION MANZO,
ROBERT MARGES, ANDRE JOHN MARTINEZ, EUFRONIO MOJICA, HENRY
MOJICA, LILIAN MONJE, MA. RAYSOLYN NATIVIDAD, LAMBERTO NERI,
NICANDRO OBEDENCIO, LISETTE ORENSE, LEA PARDE, JEFFREY PAYNOR, EVA
PUGAY, GODOFREDO RAMOS, CRISPINA RAYO, CECILIA RITO, SALVACION
RITUAL, CRISTINA SANGALANG, ELVIRA SEGOVIA, RENE STA. MARIA,
GENOVEVA TULLAO, GLORIA URRIZA, RESTITUTO VEJERANO, RAUL
VILLACORTE, ZENYBEL VILLEGAS, ZARAH YAP, PHILIP YASAY, TRINIDAD
ACERON, FLORENTINO C. AGUSTIN, CRISOSTOMO ANGUE, CESAR ATIENZA,
CARLOTA AUSTRIA, JOVITA AUSTRIA, VICTORIA BAHALLA, ALLAN
BATUSBATUSAN, ALTAIR BAUTISTA, SONNY BILBAO, GINA BRUGADA, AMELIA
CABRERA, FRANCIA CAMUA, RENATO CARRASCAL, RUSELL CASTRO,
EDUARDO CAUSAREN, NELSON CONCEPCION, MYRNA CORILLA, ROSALIA
FLORA COSTALES, NELSON CUSTODIO, DENNIS DE GUZMAN, EUFRACIO DE
LUNA, LUCIANA DELA CRUZ, JR., VENER DILIG, YOLANDA DINO, REMEGIO
DIWA, EDWIN DOGOMEO, MANUEL ELLANO, MITHI ENCIO, REYNALDO ESPINO,
DAVID ESPIRITU, EMILIANA GAMIT, ENRICO HERNANDEZ, DORIS JAVATE, ALICIA
JIMENEZ, ELEAZAR LOPEZ, MA. SUSANA MARIANO, RONALDO MARAVILLA,
PETER MAURICIO, ANITA OBRERO, ARLENE OLEA, ROEL PARDE, MELCHOR
PEREZ, ROGER PRINCIPE, PRIMA PUJANTE, LILIA RAFAEL, AMELIA RALA
ANTONIO
RIVERA,
LIWAYWAY
RONSARIO,
ERLINDA
SALCEDO,
OFELIA SANGALANG LUZVIMINDA SANTOS, EDESIA SEVILLEJA, NANETTE
SUSA, NEIL VALENTON, FILIPINA VENTIGAN, MA. IDA VILLARALVO, ADELINE
ABANCE, RAUL ACOSTA, MA. CECILIA ADAOAG, GLEN BABANTUGAN, REMIGIO
BACUS, PANTALEON BADION, JIMMY BAJADO, ARTHUR BARAOIDAN, JULIE
CABALLERO, FRANCISCO CADAJAS, EDITHA CASIBANG, NORMAN CONDE,
MENA CREUS, MARY CRUZ, MACARIO DE GUZMAN, LUPO DE LUNA, RODOLFO
DOMINGO, EMILIA EVANGELISTA, REYNALDO FAUSTINO, ALICIA DELA CRUZ
FERNANDEZ, IAN FEROLINO, GIL GALAN, ANALIZA GARIBAY, JESUS GARRIDO,
FLORENCIO GATCHALIAN, CONSORIO GERONES, VERONICA GULAFO, ALMA
HERMINIA, PAUL RODERICK HOFELINA, IDA JACA, ENRIQUE JACSON,
NENEVEH LAPUZ, ROLANDO LEAL, MILLER MANILA, DESALE MANZANO,
ROLANDO MARAON, MARIANO MARIANO, RODELIO MENORIA, ROMEO MERIDA,
JOSEFINA MONJARDIN, NILO PARDE, EMMANUEL PASCO, NONITA QUITO, GLEN
RANCE, BONIFACIO RENOBLAS, JESUS REYES, JOSE REYES, RIZAL REYLES,
JUAN ROQUE, NENITA SALGADO, GAUDENCIO SALONGA, GALLARDO
TOLENTINO, ALBERTO TRINIDAD, MA. FELISA VARGAS, ROGELIO VAZQUEZ,
WILLIAM VEJERANO, ELIZABETH VILLANUEVA, VIRGINIA VILLARUEL, SERGIO
YEBAN, EVELYN M. ALONSO, MIE ARCA, ARTHUR BARAOIDAN, CATHERINE
BATUSBATUSAN, IRENEA CARANDANG, LOURDES CARLENGGA, MA. ANNA F.
CASUPANG, ROSALIA FLORA O. COSTALES, ELSA DIZON, HENRY ESPINELI,
JOVEN ESPINELI, RICHARD FELIX, MA. CRISTINA M. FERNANDEZ, RENATO C.
FERNANDO, LYDIA A. FULGOSINO, RENATO GONZALES, BONIFACIO JOGNO,
OSCAR MANAOIS, JULITA MOJICA, ANGELINA MOYA, LUISITO NACO, MA. ANA
ORQUIZA, SUSAN PRIANES, EDMOND PRINCIPE, TERESA A. RAMOS, ROBERTO
REYES, MARTINET ROBLE, GRETA SALVIEJO, PEPITO SAMSON, SALVADOR

SOLIVEN, JOSE F. SUMINISTRADO, ADELINA TRINIDAD, LUCITO AMISCARAY,


FRANK JAIME AQUINO, MARIO BAISA, ALTAIR BAUTISTA, TEODORO R.
BERSABE, MODESTO L. BORJA (DR.), EUGENIA A. BRIONES, CONRADO S.
COMIA, BLESILDA C. CONCEPCION, NELSON CUSTODIO, DENNIS A. DE
GUZMAN, EUFRACIO V. DE LUNA, LUCIANO DELA CRUZ, JR., REYNALDO
ESPINO, DAVID F. ESPIRITU, EDUARDO FERUELO, JORGE Y. LILLO, RONALDO I.
MARAVILLA, CONRADO A. MERCADO, LEILANI G. NAGA, NOE NAMBATAC,
LARRY P. PINERA, BENEDICTO M. QUITAIN, ERIBERTO L. RODRIGUEZ,
FEDERICO SABADO, JR., OSCAR C. SALONGA, OSCAR C. SANGANBAYAN,
FERIOLA M. SERRANO, ANDRES P. SEVILLEJA, FELICIDAD T. ZAMORA, ARIEL
ARENAS, LOUIE CRISMO, ALBERTO DE GUZMAN, GIDEON DE LUNA, JUNIBERT
DE SAGUN, ANGELICA ECITO, CLARON ESPESO, PORFERIO ESPINA, LEVIN
GABUTAN, NORMAN GALLEMIT, DIOSDADO JOSE, ANSELMA JUNIO, MILA
LAGRIMAS, NOEMI LASPINAS, SINFROSA PASCUA, RENATO POLIDO, ROMY
RAGMA, ROEL REYES, MARIBEL SANTOS, EVELYN SERISOLA, RAIDA V.
ALEGRE, MINDA A. AMON, GREGORIO P. ANTOLIN, JR., LUZ B. ARVIZO, ANDRES
F. BAES, JR., ALEJANDRO R. BALOLOY, BERNARDO B. BAYANGOS, NORA S.
BOQUIREN, ELMER B. BORRE, EDUARDO A. BRION, JAIME C. CABANDE, DELIA
A. CALIXTO, REYNALDO CAMACHO, ROSALINA M. CARRION, ROGELIO N.
CONCEPCION, FARLEY O. CONDE, BIENVENIDO L. DE GUZMAN, CONRADO C.
DE JESUS, CORAZON T. DE JESUS, JOSEFINA G. DILOY, ASUNCION A.
DIMAGUILA, ONOFRE DOLAR, JR., SERGIO S. ENRIQUEZ, CORAZON P. ESPINO,
SILVINO M. FELLO, COLITA J. FRANCISCO, FEDERICO G. GOLDING, RENATO G.
GONZALES, ELIZABETH M. HERNANDO, LILIAN T. HURTADO, GLORIA C.
MACASAET, ERIC N. MARASIGAN, MARINA P. MARGES, NORMA M. MAURICIO,
GINA P. NILO, JANET G. OPERARIO, JULIANA J. ORDOA, BERNARDO B.
PASCUA, ELIODORA D. RAMOS, EVELYN C. RAMOS, PERFECTO O. REYES,
VICENTE V. ROBLES, FLORENCIO A. ROJALES, CORAZON B. ROSALES,
TEOTIMO L. ROTERSOS, ELIZABETH C. SADORRA, FE D. SALIWAN, MOISES T.
SANCHEZ, ESTER S. SANTOS, RUFINO L. SANTOS, EMILIANO M. SIBOLBORO,
BAYANI V. VILLANUEVA, ERNESTO G. ALMENDRAL, TERESITA AVISO, CLARITA
BACATIO, ALFONSO G. BAUTISTA, NARDA A. BLASCO, LUNINGNING J.
BONDOC, JOSE B. BURA, ODON CAPANGPANGAN, VIRGILIO A. CASTAEDA,
MARIO B. COLLADO, ARSENIO L. CALONGE, LUISITO F. COSTELO, OSCAR F.
COSTELO, NILO A. CRUCENA, ARTURO A. DAYOT, SUNNY A. DE GUZMAN,
WILFREDO B. DELA CRUZ, JULIETA G. ESPENELI, CECILIA C. ESTRADA,
PERFECTO P. EVANGELISTA, MAGDALENA Q. FAVIS, CRISTINA M. FERNANDEZ,
RENE D. FERNANDEZ, LOURDES S. GALANTA, RAYMUNDO G. GALANTA,
REDENTOR S. GATUS, JOSE G. GERPACIO, ARNULFO B. GESITE, CLEOFE C.
GONZALES, BELLA V. HERNANDO, CARMELITA B. INCILLO, LIGAYA H. ISON,
AIDA T. LATOZA, DEOGRACIAS R. MAGTALAS, FLORENCIO G. MANANGHAYA,
MAMERTO F. MARTINEZ, NESTOR T. MERJILLA, ALEJANDRO G. MICOSA, PABLO
M. MONTALLA, EDGAR P. NATIVIDAD, QUERUBIN A. NAVERO, HENRY E.
NOCEDA, NOEMI M. PASCUAL, BERNA G. PASTOR, MADONNA H. PEALBA,
CRISTY C. PERLADO, DOMINCIANO D. RAMOS, JR., LEO RETAMAR, TERESITA V.
RETAMAR, ANDRES ARIEL B. REYES, JOSE D. RONDAL, MILAGROS F.
ROSALES, OSCAR C. SALONGA, EDNA L. SAMAR, ANTONIO SAN ANDRES,
MANUEL S. SANDOVAL, SHIRLEY A. SANTOS, MANUEL S. STA. ANA, NESTOR M.
TICSON, LORENZO M. TOMAS, REYNALDO R. VILLANUEVA, MARIO E. VINLUAN,
LOLITA C. AGUSTIN, CRISOSTOMO B. ALCALDE, DIGNA R. ALLAG, MERLYNA F.
ATIL, ELISA AYO, JULITA M. AYUYAO, VICTORCITO V. BABIERRA, AMELIA A.
BANGALAN, ELVIRA M. BAUTISTA, ERLINDA D. BAUTISTA, CELSO R. BERSABE,
APOLINARIO P. CARANDANG, VIOLETA E. CASTAEDA, JOSEFINA L. CREENCIA,
ROGELIO CREENCIA, ESPERANZA V. DACANAY, LEONARDO M. DE LEON,
LEONORA P. DE LEON, LUCIANO C. DELA CRUZ, AURORA B. DELOS SANTOS,
ROMEO P. DELOS SANTOS, DAISY T. ELICANO, MARCIANA B. ENRIQUEZ,
NATIVIDAD P. ESCOBAR, VIRGINCITO G. ESTOCONING, REDEMCION B. GRIFAL,
CELIA C. GROSPE, LORNA L. GULAFO, VIRGINIA S. HILARIO, ARNIE C. ILAN,
ELISA N. LADANGA, IGMIDIO B. LAPIS, ULYSIS M. LATOZA, BEATRIZ C. MAGNO,
JOSE D. MANGUERRA, MA. TERESA T. MANUEL, SERAFIN B. MATAWARAN,
CONRADO A. MERCADO, RAFAEL A. MONTE, VENERANDO F. NABOA,
CLEOTILDE M. NICOLAS, ELSIE V. OBRERO, MAXIMINA OMANITO, EMILIO M.

OSALVO, JOEY V. PADILLA, MARCELINA J. PALIS, REYNALDO G. PALIS, PERLA


PANGANIBAN, WILLIE C. PERLATA, IRENEO B. RAMAT, PERLITA M. RAMOS,
EDGARDO R. REYES, JOSEPH B. ROJALES, LEOGARDA T. RUBITE, JACQUELINE
A. SABINO, ANITA M. SALANDANAN, MEDARDO P. SALVADOR, WILFREDO B.
SANIDAD, IMELDA E. SANTOS, LEONARDO A. SEMANA, CARLOS P. SERRANO,
FLORENCIO C. STA. MARIA, RAMON P. ULIBAS, GAVINO ISAGANI P. URRIZA,
PETRONILLA T. VALENZUELA, SALVADOR F. VILLAREY, AMY O. YAMBOT, FELIX
N. ALBANO, RICARDO C. ALEGRID, ARIEL G. ALMEDA, JULITA V. AONUEVO,
ULDARICO A. ANDAL, JAIME S. ANTONIO, REYNALDO P. BAJAR, BERNARDO D.
BALGOS, JOSELITO N. BANGAWAN, LEOVIGILIO R. BANTIQUE, ELVIRA M.
BAUTISTA, ERNESTO BELO, LUZ C. CABAMONGAN, ANDRES B. CALIMUTAN,
MARCELO S. CRISOSTOMO, AGNEZ CRUZ, BERNARDINA I. DAGUIO, ROLANDO
DE GUZMAN, MARCELINO P. DE LEON, CARMEN P. DEL ROSARIO, EDIZA A.
DIAZ, TEODORICO C. ERNI, JULIANA M. FAJARDO, TEORODICO M. FAJARDO,
LEOVENILDA A. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN M. GALLARITA, CONSTANCIA R.
GANTIOQUI, EUGENIA G. GARCIA, JOSE G. HAPAN, NORA B. INCIONG, LALAINE
JAVINEZ, GERMAN M. JONAS, BELTHA B. LANDICHO, ERLINDA LOVERIZA,
CLARITA J. MAESTRADO, JOSELITO MAGNO, EDUARDO B. MALAPITAN,
EDUARDO A. MANZANO, NAPTHALI Q. MAYUGA, REMEDIOS B. MILLER, AMELIA
R. MORENO, PONCIANO L. MURILLO, JOSEPHINE L. NANA, ISABEL D. NASIS,
MERCEDES V. OCAMPO, GODOFREDO R. ODEJAR, TERESITA OLMELLA,
GERMAN L. OMAA, CECILIA B. ORLANES, BELINA P. PAJARITO, LUCINDA S.
PANGCO, JAIME PASCUAL, TERESITA S. PERLADO, VILMA M. QUIMSON, CESAR
H. RAMOS, ROMEO L. SACDALAN, CRISTINA M. SANDOVAL, TERESITA S.
SANDOVAL, FELICIANA A. SANTIAGO, LORNA F. SANTOS, LUZDIVINA R. SISON,
CRESENCIO O. SOLANO, NELSON B. STA. CLARA, ANSELMA B. STA. CLARA,
ANSELMA B. TAJON, FE P. VADIL, ARTHUR O. ACHA, DANILO E. ADRIATICO,
MERLYN ALDABA, ARNALDO B. ALVAREZ, REYNALDA T. AMADA, NELSON
ANGELES, FRANCISCO A. BAYALAS, TEODORO R. BERSABE, ELSA C. BORJA,
MODESTO L. BORJA, EDUARDO O. BREGANZA, EUGENIA A. BRIONES,
EDMUNDO P. BUSTILLO, RENATO S. CABRERA, MARINA N. CAMACHO, OSCAR
O. CARPIO, BLESILDA C. CONCEPCION, SAMUEL M. CONTRERAS, CORAZON J.
CORPUZ, YOLANDA S. COSTELO, RAMON S. ENRIQUEZ, MERCEDES S.
FERNANDO, JOSE ANTONIO GUATLO, MARUJA JARABEJO, RAUL M. LAURENA,
TERESITA D. LIZARDO, RODOLFO L. LUCAS, CESAR M. MAGADIA, RICARTE A.
MELCHOR,
JOSIE
P.
MERCADO,
LEILANI
G.
NAGA,
AURORA N. NOROMBABA, WILMA G. NOTA, REYNALDO O. PEREGRINO,
SALVACION L. PLANAS, ROGELIO L. PUMARAS, NARCISA D. RAMIS,
ROSEMELINDA R. REFORMA, ROBERTO R. REYES, LOLITA M. RONDON, SONIA
M. SALGUERO, NORBERTO SALILI, NATIVIDAD M. SALONGA, ROSEMARIE C.
SISON, VICTOR J. VILLANUEVA, ARMANDO ARCAMO, BELINDA CABALLA,
TERESITA DIVAD, PEPITO ESPENILLI, BERCELIZA FAJARDO, NELIA GULAPO,
CHRISTINE MANAGBANAG, REYNALDO MANAGBANAG, LUIS MENDOZA,
OSCAR OSTING, EDGARDO REYES, DINO VELASQUEZ, MA. CECILIA O. DELA
PEA, ILUMINADA POJAS, NORA ABAYA, MARIETTA S. ABCEJO, VICTORIA E.
ABELLA, FILOMENA L. ABEN, MA. VICTORIA D. ABESAMIS, NITA D.
ABID, VERONICA ABIERO, RONELLO ABILA, DANILO ABON, EVA ABON, EVA FE
J. ABRAHAM, EDGAR A. ABRIOL, RUBY I. ABRIOL, REMEDIOS ACASIO, ROMEO
L. ACEDO, RIZALINA M. ACORDA, SUSAN B. AGAPITO, RODOLFO T. AGONCILLO,
MARGARITA N. AGOOT, MARIA H. AGOOT, ELIZABETH AGPAOA, AVELINO
AGUINALDO, JOSE R. AJON, LOURDES ALAG, LUZVIMINDA ALBAO, LUCITA
ALEGRE, EXPEDITA S. ALEJON, MELENIDA ALMAZAN, MANUEL T.
ALMOGUERRA, CAROLINA J. ALVIAR, ELVIRA D. AMA, JOHN AMARRA,
BENEDICTO ARABIT, AURORA M. ANCHETA, RAYMUNDO ANDAY, ERIC J.
ANONAS, ROSEMARIE N. ANTEGRO, CARMENCITA APELO (DR.), ESTER
AQUINO, ALEX AQUITAA, EDUARDO ARCA, NANCY I. ARCANGEL, CRISPINO
ARIAS, GAUDENCIO ARIAS, ESTHERLINA D. ARIFALO, ALICIA C. ARJONALAYSON, RODRIGO L. ARMENIO, ABELARDO E. ARNAO, ROSALINDA M.
ARVESU, JOSEPHINE B. ASAS, MA. WYNNE A. ASTUDILLO, VICTOR C. ATIENZA,
DAVID AVANTE, LUISITO AVANTE, ANITA C. AVILLA, HERNANDO F. AVILLA,
EUSTAQUIO AWITAN, ERNESTO BACOLOR, EFREN BACONAWA, MYRNA D.
BALDECAAS, JUANA BALOTRO, LORY C. BANGALISAN, GERMELINA T. BAOY,

ELVIRA BARREDA, DOLORES BAUTISTA, NIEVES V. BAUTISTA, RENATO


BAUTISTA, MELINDA A. BAYOT, EDNA T. BEGINO, BELLA C. BELOY, CAROLYN C.
BENIGNO, CALIXTA C. BERBA, JOSE C. BERNAL, LILIA B. BERNAL, CALIXTO
BERNARDO, DANTE C. BERNARDO, ERNESTO BERNARDO, RENATO
BERNARDO, MELENCIO BERNARDO, ONOFRE S. BONIGFACIO, JOCELYN B.
BOREJON, EDWARD S. BRIONES, ROSALINDA R. BUADO, ERNESTO
BUENAFLOR, FELIX BUTUHAN, CECILLO CABUANG, GILDA CABUANG,
WILFREDO CABUANG, ROLANDO A. CAMBA, RONNIE CAPILI, AURORA
CAPIRAL, MARILOU CAPUNO, LEONCIO CARAAN, ESTELITA R. CARANDANG,
REMIA B. CARPIO, EDUARDO CASTELLANO, LOLITA A. CASTILLO, BELLA U.
CATACUTAN, CARINA P. CATIMBANG, MAURO CAYETA, CRISANTO P. CEREZO,
FELICIANO CONCEPCION, VIVIAN D. CONCEPCION, RODANTE CONSTANTE,
ADELA B. CONTRERAS, JOSEFINA A. CONTRERAS, ANAMARIE P. CORONEL,
CRISOSTOMO A. CORTEZ, , ERLINDA CORTEZ JOSEPH ALAN D. COSTALES,
ROSARIO M. COSTALES, RUBINA O. CRESENCIO, ANTONIO CRISTOBAL,
BALGAMEL C. CROOC, VIRGINIA CRUZ, LEONILO A. DABBAY, ROGELIO V.
DACULLA, AZUCENA DAMANG, LINO I. DANTE, ERLINDA N. DAUZ, KAREN ROSE
C. DAZO, DOLORES T. DE GUZMAN, MARISSA DE GUZMAN, MYRILOU DE
GUZMAN, NATALIA C. DE GUZMAN, REDEDIOS DE JESUS, EMELINA C. DE LEON,
ANGELES DE MAYO, VICTORIA B. DEL PRADO, CESAR M. DELA CRUZ,
ESTENELY M. DELA CRUZ, JOSE K. S. DELA CRUZ, NICANOR S. DELA CRUZ,
EDUARDO DELA TORNE, REYNALDO DELOS SANTOS, VERONICA DELOS
SANTOS, EVELYN DELOS TRINOS, GLICERIA DERROTA, GERMAN DIAZ,
AUGUSTO DIMAMENT, MEDIATRIX DIRECTO, ROMULO S., DIRECTO, JR., STELLA
DOCENA, RODOLFO DOMDOM, JACQUELINE DONESA, ALFREDO DUCUSIN,
PETRONILO B. DUMANGAS, LORNA D. EBIO, GILBERT R. EGAA, ROBERT
EGAA, ROMULO ELAMPARO, MARLENE ENRIQUEZ, NICERATA ERMITA,
LOURDES R. ERSANDO, HERMINIO ESCALONA, NESTOR B. ESCANDOR, PEDRO
ESCREZA, MARILOU B. ESCUREL, TERESITA G. ESPOCIA, MARINA M. ESTACIO,
NANETHA ESTANTE, ELSIE ESTOPACE, MALANIE M. ESTOLE, RODOLFO C.
ESTRELLA, RICA EVASCO, LIWANAG C. FELICIANO, EDNA A. FELIPE, EVA
FEMENTIRA, BERNARDINO FERIDO, JR., PURIFICACION C. FERRER,
FRANCISCO FETALBERO, LUCIA FLORES, MA. GRACIA D. FLORES, NILO
FRANCISCO (DR.), ZENAIDA F. FRANCISCO, MANOLITA Z. GAERLAN, EDITHA S.
GOLLA, ANTONIO A. GANNABAN, CARLOS GARCIA, CORAZON A. GARCIA,
JULIE G. GARCIA, LIZA S. GAYAS, EVAN R. GERONIMO, BONIFACIO GODOY,
ARLENE GONZALES, HILDENCE B. GONZALES, ILUMINADA B. GONZALES,
GRACE L. GUILLERMO, BENJAMIN C. GUTIERREZ, RODOLFO GUTIERREZ,
ALEJANDRINO HADUCA, MARILYN P. HERNANDEZ, NILDA HERNANDEZ,
FREDERICO HIFE, ERQUITA HORCA, LORETO HUMARANG, REBECCA M.
IBAROLA, MELINDA O. IGNACIO, FRANCIA ILAO, AURORA C. INDICO, DIANA
INOCENCIO, ALICIA M. IRANGA, DEOGRACIAS JAVIER, NELLY A. JIAO, CHARITO
GIMENO, DIDETTE M. JOCO, LOLITA JUNIO, LEWELLIE R. KAMPITAN,
ESTRELLITA KARGANILLA, GREGORIO LACSA, JR., ANTONIO LANDRITO,
LETICIA R. LANDRITO, ANDRES LANGIT, MAXIMA R. LAPUZ, ANICIA LAUREL,
FLORENCIA B. LAURENCIANO, MARCELINO E. LEGASPI, MARIO T. LEGASPI,
FIDEL LIBAO, IMELDA LIBERATO, ANITA LIBRADO, LILIA G. LIWANAG, EDEN P.
LLANES, ANTONIO C. LOPEZ, CERELINO LOPEZ, EMELINA A. LOPEZ, VIRGILIO
LORENZO, FLORO MAGO, JR., ZENAIDA MADERA, MELCHOR MAGNAYE,
ARLENE B. MAGPANTAY, FERMINA MAGPANTAY, MAGNO MALABANAN, PABLO
B. MALABANAN, LUISA MALALOAN, MERCIA MALLARI, RICARDO MALLARI,
RONALDO MALLARI, RUSTICO MALLARI, ANGELI MALONZO, PEDRO M.
MANAIG, FLORITA S. MANGABAT, NEMESIA C. MANGABAT, MANOLITO M.
AVANTE, BERNARDO S. MANUEL, CECILIA MANUEL, ROBERTO MANUEL,
CLARIBEL MANZANO, PABLO MARASIGAN, PEAFRANCIA H. MARASIGAN,
RHODORA MARASIGAN, ANNABELLE F. MARBELLA, FLORENCIO MARCIAL,
HERMINIO D. MARCIAL, RICARDO F. MARERO, JUANITO R. MARTIN, JR.,
BALTAZAR MATEO, ROSALINDA P. MATEO, ESTELA MAYO, SOCORRO G.
MERCADO, AVELINO G. MILLORA, APOLINAR MIMIS, NORMA MIMIS, AL MINAO,
CONSUELO MIRANDA, LEONARDO MIRANDA, REBECCA R. MIRANDA, LILIA B.
MOSLARES, MARLYN MULATO, MA. VICTORIA L. MUNN SHA KHATAK, LEONCIA
N. NABONG, AMELIA A. NACIONAL, FLORENCIO R. NAGAO, JOEY N. NAPIZA,

MARION NAPIZA, ZENAIDA NATIVIDAD, ABELO NAVARRO, NICETAS S. NICOLAS,


VICENTE M. NIM, JUAN NIOLAR, LYDIA E. NONES, MARILOU W. NUESTRO,
CLEOTILDE D. OLAYRES, SUSAN R. OLID, AMELITA A. OLIVAS, BIENVENIDO L.
OPEA, FRANCISCA S. ORELLANO, CONSTANCIA ORLANDA, GUELLERMO
ORTICIO, BONIFACIO ORTILLANO, ANGEL PABLO, EDUARDO PABLO,
GENEROSO PACLITA, RAYMUNDO PADILLA, NANIE L. PALABAY, ANGELINA N.
PALOS, ALAN B. PANCHO, MELITA PANCHO, ESTRELLA C. PANGANIBAN, GINA
C. PANGANIBAN, LERMA V. PANGANIBAN, PEDRO A. PANGANIBAN, RITO
PARTOSA, CYNTHIA PASADILLA, PRISCILLA E. PASCUA, JOCELYN C. PASCUAL,
REBECCA PASCUAL, FLORENCIO PASTULERO, GERMAN PATNONGON,
VENANCIO PATRICIO, CARLEEN R. PERALTA, MARITON T. PEREZ, IMELDA D.
PILLAS, RICARDO B. PINAY-AN, JUDITH A. PLATERO, EMILY J. POLON,
BILLYADONA B. PONCE, RAUL R. PONSECA, RAMY PRADO, BERNADEL M.
PRIVADO, FERNANDO S. PRONUEVO, CARMELITA C. PUTOLINO, NORA
QUINTOS, EDNA D. RAGUINDIN, JULIAN D. RAGUINDIN, ANACLETA G. RAMILO,
FRUTO RAMOS, JULIETA RAMOS, ROMEO R. RAMOS, SABINA RAYMUNDO, FE
BIEN R. REALON, ALFREDO RECTRA, IRENEO REGIDOR, RACHEL C. REGIDOR,
ALICE REYES, ELIZABETH L. REYES, FLORDELIZA REYES, DOLORES E.
RICAFRANCA, MANUEL RICARDO, ROBERTA L. RIGUER, GRETEL F. RIVERA,
EFREN ROBLES, PROCESO RODRIGUEZ, REMEDIOS F. RONATO, EDEN ROSON,
LEOPOLDO U. ROXAS, MOISES SADURAL, SR., MOISES A. SADURAL, JR.,
VALENTIN SADURAL, JOSEFINA A. SAGUN, RUBY F. SAHAGUN, MAURA M.
SALIBA, GERLIE SALVA, LEONCIO SALUDARES, AVELINA M. SAMIANO,
REYNALDO A. SAMIANO, JAIME G. SAN PABLO, VERONIDIA G. SAN PABLO,
BARTOLOME SANCHEZ, JOSEPHINE L. SANDOVAL, EDA SANOPO, ELIZA C.
SANTIAGO, JOEL G. SANTIAGO, TIMOTEO SANTIAGO, CONCEPCION W.
SANTOS, FELIXBERTO SANTOS, JR., JOSEFINA C. SANTOS, MARCELINO
SANTOS, RODOLFO SANTOS, CESARIO SANTOSAN, JUMELLE G. SARABIA,
JOSEPHINE SARMIENTO, OFELIA SARMIENTO, AURORA C. SAVELLANO, SALLY
SERRANO, RODOLFO R. SIBALUCA, MARINA SILVESTRE, BASILISA C. SISON,
EDUARDO N. SISON, SYLVANA R. SISON, ESTER SOBREMONTE, JAIME
SOBREMONTE, ALFREDO SORIANO, JR., JULIA PAULA M. SORIANO, CARMEN
STA. AGATA, DOMINGA SUBA, TETERIO SUER, JEROME SUPLIDO, LINA A.
TABUAR, FERMIN TACAZON, LORENZO TALATALA, ADORA V. TAN, NELCY L.
TAEDO, MILAGROSA T. TANALGO, ALBERTO C. TANCHANCO, MELECIO
TARIFE, ROSARIO K. TATLONGHARI, RUFINA B. TAYAG, HERMINIA A. TECSON,
PAPA TENGCO, LOURDES L. TEVES, CRESENCIANA R. TIMBOL, NOLI N. TIONG,
VIRGINIA B. TIONG, LILIA TIONGSON, MA. ASUNCION N. TIONGSON, JOSEPHINE
TOLENTINO, BENJAMIN TORRENTE, OSCAR TORRES, SONIA M. TRINIDAD,
RIZALINA TROPA, CRISTINA TUAZON, HOMER E. TUAZON, RICARDO
TUBUNGBAMA, HYDEE N. TUYAY, MERCY URRUTIA, LARNE VALCARCEL,
EMILIANO B. VALDEZ, JR., REMEDIOS S. VALDEZ, JOSIE VARGAS, FELINO
VELASQUEZ, (DR.), PEDRO A. VELASQUEZ, RAFAEL A. VELEZ, SYLVIA I.
VERGARA, BLESILDA VERIN, ADRIANO VICTORIO, JR., DOMINADOR VICTORIO,
EMILY E. VICTORIO, GLORIA VIDA, LOURDES M. VILLAFLOR, ALBERTO A.
VILLAFLORES, LEONIDO Z. VILLAFLORES, ALICE VILLALOBOS, CATHERINE P.
VILLANUEVA, EDWIN G. VILLANUEVA, TERESITA S. VILLARIAZA, FREDERICO G.
VILLARTA, EDGAR VINCULADO, ZENAIDA C. VINCULADO, EDITHA VITALICIA,
AVELINO C. VIVO, ARLENE V. VYTIACO, MILAGROS WABE, RODOLFO
WENCESLAO, A. WONGSUWAN, HERMINIA V. YALUNG, LAARNI ZAMORA, MARY
ANN R. ZEPEDA, FERNANDO SQ. LATI, M. SIRIOS, JOEL BOREJON, CONCHITA
PUBLICO, AGRIPINA BRIONES, MILTON SACRO, LOLITA RAZON, CONSOLACION
GUERRA, ANDRES ARAO, MARCELINO JUSTO, ROSALES REGINIO, PEDRO
RUBALA,
BENJO
BONIFACIO,
ANGEL
MATEO,
EDUARDO
QUE,
MODESTA M. ANDAYA, ANTONIETTA M. APALISOK, VIENNA E. BELTRAN,
LORENZO N. BRIANA, CRISELDA L. CASTILLO, JUANITO B. CHAN, JR.,
ORLANDO S. CUYUGAN, ZORAIDA F. DE GUZMAN, VITO F. DEL FIERRO, JR.,
RELITA A. ROSA, HERMINIA S. DELOS REYES, BEATRIZ C. DIZON, SUSAN A.
FORONDA, MARY ANN P. FRANCO, ROMULO M. GARCIA, JOVITA M. GONZALES,
REBECCA O. JOSE, MARCIA B. LANUZA, ALBERTO G. LEGASPI, ANGELINA A.
MABUNGA, CONSUELO B. MANGUBAT, ILUMINADA G. MAPAYE, AMELIA V.
MARCELO, GLENDA S. MARQUEZ, LOURDES IRENE N. MIOZA, EULOGIO M.

MONTEALTO, MARIO P. MUECO, LUCILDA L. PADAUAN, EDGARDO V. SAN JUAN,


MA. FATIMA S. SENGCO, CAROLYN O. TABANGCURA, MARIETA U. TIBAYAN,
MARIETA E. TUGADE, petitioners, vs. HON. GODOFREDO N. ALCASID, JR., in his
official capacity as the Director of the Bureau of Soils and Water Management,
HON. ROMEO N. ALCASID, in his official capacity as the Director of the Bureau of
Animal Industry, and HON. PEDRO O. OCAMPO, in his official capacity as the
Executive Director of the Livestock Development Council, respondents.

[G.R. No. 111494. September 11, 1998]

DIONELO D. IBABAO, ELVIRA F. SIMON, AURORA M. CRISTOBAL, ONOFRE T. SUBA,


NELITA DIAZ, ERNESTO NUVAL, ENRIQUE LACSA, SABINA DIAZ, MAGTANGGOL
SANTIAGO, VALENTIN TANZUACO, ANGELITO TABORA, LOIDA CAINGLIT,
ALBERTO SANTIAGO III, HOSPICIO C. MAHILUM, FRANCISCO SANTOS, JR.,
PABLO RABINO, LORETO GANIR, MODESTO DAYON, GLICERIA TUAZON,
HONOLITA ALMONTE, RAQUEL RAMOS, ADORACION C. JASTILLANA, RICARDO
ESGUERRA, JONATHAN DICKSON, ROBERTO TIONGSON, BIENVENIDO
RICAFRENTE, ALFREDO TAYAG, ROLANDO CAJANDING, AMELITO GOLLOSO,
REYNALDO RONQUILLO, LEONCIO LEGASPI, REYNALDO DELA CRUZ, NICANOR
LLAMAS, MARIANO ODHOY, LORETO GANIR, TERESITA MALLA, ORBETA
GUERRERO, HILARION LAGUA, PABLO ABAD, ALBERTO LAPERAL, JR.,
CLARITA ULANDAY, TERESITA LOPEZ, CRESENCIA MALONZO, NATIVIDAD
LAGUA, JERICARDO MONDRAGON, FILOMENA GANTE, JESUSA WAJI,
LEONORA SIGNE, MARILOU ROSANA, JOSEFINA FRANCISCO, MARIA AFRICA
MENDIORO, SEVERO BALANE, JR., TEODORO JOCSON, MARISSA
ALBALADEJO, FLORA CASEM, MILAGROS FLORADA, TOMASA CARANDANG,
MERLY REPANI, SUSAN GARCIA, BENJAMIN NUNEZ, ANA MARIE ARENAS,
ROMUALDO POL, JULITA LAVARO, HERMINIO MAHILUM, AMIANA ABELLA,
ADELAIDA ALCISTO, RIZALINA M. LEGASTO, MILAGROS LEDESMA, LORNA P.
ANACLETO, AUGUSTO T. REGIO, CYNTHIA P. ISAAC, FELIPE ALBANO,
ROSALINA Q. DE LA CRUZ, MITZI C. FERNANDEZ, RUSSEL DIAZ, VALENTINO
MACASAET, SALVADOR DELFINO, MAXIMO ESGUERRA, JR., JUNELITA PACIO,
ERNESTO TUZON, VIOLA MARIANO, LUTGARDA SEBASTIAN, MARCO PEREZ,
ISABELO MACABUGAO, FRANCISCO FABRO, ERLINDA CLAVO, DOMINGO
JOCSON, ENECITAS TABORADA, LUISA TUASON, ROSALIO BAZ, JR.,
LUZVIMINDA SALDUA, TEODORA OAMINAL, LEONOR BRINGAS, DAISY LADRA,
MERCEDES SANGREO, ZENAIDA MUNON, ANTONIO AMURAO, PERCIVAL ECITO,
SYLVIA MON, LOURDES MANGASI, BENIGNO MAGNO, ZOILO AQUINO, ROSARIE
ARREZA, PILAR FONTELAR, FLOR ABELLA, MERCEDITA BANTAYA, PACIENCIA
FIGUEROA, HILDA BALLO, MAURICIO BALLO, RODOLFO C. PINTO, CESAR
GUERRERO, VIRGINIA DE LOS SANTOS, ALICE CORDERO, MYRNA ABILAR,
ROSA BASSIG, ADORACION OBINQUE, AMELITA MAGBAGO, MACARIA
ANDRADE, CONSUELO BALTAZAR, ELIZABETH VIANA, ROSARIO RAGAZA,
JOSEFINO MONDRAGON, CONRADO GANIR, FILIPINA GOJAR, EMILIA
BARRAMEDA, CIRILA LEYVA, FREDA ROXAS, CORAZON DE LA CRUZ, ROSITA
CALVELO, ROSARIO LIZARDO, CRISTINA NUQUI, FELICISIMA MAXINO, JACINTO
ARUCAN, JR., LORETA DE GUZMAN, LEONORA DE LEON, LYDIA AGUILING,
DALISAY MONEDA, LOURDES LIZA, PAZ LADERAS, EFREN LUNA, EVELYN
CABUS, ESTER CONCEPCION, ARIEL BAUTISTA, FRANCIA AMAQUI, FRANCISCA
BIANES, PAZ LUCERO, ERLINDA ESPINOSA, TERESITA CATACUTAN, REGINO
OGSIMER, ESTRELLA ORENSE, MARYLOU VILLAREAL, ALMA DICKSON,
NATIVIDAD RAZO, ALICIA SUALOG, ERLINDA ARALAR, REDENTOR GATUS,
FORTUNATO CABEZAS, CECILIA REYES, AURORA REYES, BARTOLOME
SANTIAGO, JESUS DELA TORRE, CONSOLACION SEVILLA, HENRY LUGAYAN,
ANGELES GALERA, REUBEN A. GANADEN, JULITA ABULON, LINA SANTOS,
GLORIA C. BERGADO, ANSELMA S. LEGASPI, LEONORA RIVERA, EDITHA
MALOLOS, JESUS SANCHEZ, ALBERTO MOLERO, DOMINGO TUAZON, JR.,
SOFIA S. BASA, SUSANA EDIC, FELIPE ELEDA, ARMANDO LANDAYAN, RICARDO

MAR, JR., AUGUSTO SANTOS, ARSENIA AREVALO, ERLINDA ABUEVA, VIRGILIO


SANTOS, GAUDENCIO BADIOLA, JR., MODESTA ANGELES, RENATO
GUTIERREZ, LUCERNA ICAPIN, MARLENE CALANGIAN, NEMENCIO AREVALO,
NENITA DE GUZMAN, LOURDES PALO, MANUEL CABRERA, BENJAMIN MAGAT,
ERNESTO REYES, EUGENE SANGALANG, ARMANDO ALCAZAR, JOSELITO
MAGHIRANG, ROMEO DIETA, ROFER ESQUIRRES, DONATO ALMARINEZ, MELITA
CONSULTA, RENATO VILLAFRANCA, LEONCIO ALVAREZ, MANUEL SOTOMAYOR,
LEOVELITO CATALLA, APOLINARIO GICOS, FLORIDA ARBOLEDA, ROMEO
PORNOBI, CANDIDO SOTOMAYOR, GREGORIO BARRION, CARMELA EUBION,
DANILO NAGPALA, ANGELITO VALDEZ, LEONARDO SAN JUAN, CLAUDIO
RESMA, CESAR GALERA, DANTE AMURAO, FLORDELIZA DE JESUS, EULENIA
FERNANDO, BENEVERT FERNANDO, AQUILINO RONQUILLO, MONA NARVAZ,
VIVIAN NEBRES, ALBERTO NUNEZ, MARINA DUMOL, ARCADIO ISON, NORMA
BORJA, REYMUNDO NEBRES, ALEX MOLE, NALDA TANADA, ARMANDO
VILLANUEVA, NIDA BALANE, ROSALIND SANTOS, NILA MITRA MEDRANO,
ELIZABETH BAUN, ALFREDO VILLATUYA, ROY GARCIA, AVELINA BIERNES,
RODOLFO ASIS, ARTEMIO GINES, AURITA CASTILLO, HOMERTO RIOMALOS,
ALICIA DELOS SANTOS, GRACE DE VEYRA, SALUD R. GANADEN, LOLITA SUIZO,
ERLINDA PICHAY, NELIA TIEL, DORIS FRIAS, JOSIE SAN PEDRO, JOHNNY
ICONAR, AURORA ROCABO, ALICIA BORROMEO, RAMIR MASAYDA, JUANITA
AMURAO, BELINDA SAN DIEGO, SIMEONA REGIDOR, JOSEFINA GENESERA,
PATRICIA AQUINO, EDWYN ALESNA, HECTOR BAUN, DANILO LUCERO, PURITA
DELA PENA, FELIONOR ELESERIO, AUGUSTO HERNANDEZ, LINA ZULUETA,
PHOEBE LAQUINDANUM, ELMER ALBA, MYRNA RAMOS, EFIPANIO ABAYA,
LUZVIMINDA MATIGNAS, GUILLERMO AQUINO, JR., RICARDO VERSOZA,
NELSON FRANCISCO, EDUARDO BUTAC, ADORADO CAINGLIT, ROLANDO SIKAT,
THELMO MAGSUMBOL, ELOISA UZON, JUSTONATO PENIANO, PEDRO
NATIVIDAD, DOMINGO ASUNCION, NARCISO GARCIA, RESTITUTO SANCHEZ,
HELEN IBARRA, ALFREDO DUCANTE, ARMANDO MARTINEZ, GLORIA PASCO,
EMMA MARFORI, RICARDO MENDOZA, ANTONIO MORALES, EDUARDO
TOLENTINO, TITO DELA CRUZ, REGINALD GONZALES, JOSE PACLIBARE,
JOSELITO SONGA, VIRGILIO LEOPANDO, LEVITA ZAPANTA, FELIPA LOPEZ,
ELPIDIO MENDOZA, EDMUNDO EDROSO, DOMINGO CATALLA, VERGEL BIADO,
DIEGO BUTAC, PROSPERO PASTORAL, CESAR AMINES, REGINO OPORTO, JR.,
ARMANDO LAGUIDAO, REYGALDINE RAMIREZ, SEVERINO ESCOBAR, JR.,
BERNABE GONZALES, MAXIMO GATDULA, ALEMAR SABATIN, BONIFACIO
GANDULLAS, MARCELINO TACADAO, SEVERINO BARICANOSA, PACIFICO
FRANCISCO, EDUARDO SALCEDO, RODOLFO SINGH, FLORENCIO SERANILLO,
ELPIDIO MACABALOS, FEDERICO TRINIDAD, JOSE LACTAO, JULITA
FADRIGUELA, PERFECTO GUERRERO, JR. EDITHO DEMDAM, ROMEO B. DE
SAGUN, VIOLETA RAMOS, VIRGINIA LOPEZ, CARMENCITA TOCINO, SALVADOR
NIERRAS, MARILYN BERNALDO, CELIA BUSQUE, JOSE CALDERON, AMADO
ANONUEVO, LEODEGARIO CAWALING, CELSO IGANCIO, MARCIAL CAGUICLA,
CRISPIN DELA CRUZ, GIL FERRER, FARIDA BATOLOS, MARGIE KILAKIL, EMMA
BOROMEO, HERMINIO LEYVA, ROGELIO BERNABE, OSCAR BANDIOLA,
MELCHOR TAYAMEN, RUBEN REYES, ANGELITA SALGUET, JOEDOCIEL
DANTING, ALMA MENDOZA, RENATO MENDOZA, FRANK QUIMSON, EVELYN
ZAFRA, MELITONA PENADA, BENICIO SINGQUENCO, NICANOR CRISOSTOMO,
ROSEBELLA JUMARAN, ABNER BUENAVENTURA, ADELAIDA PALMA, MARCELO
VALDEZ, LILIBETH AFAN, JOSE NAVIDAD, JUANITO BACANI, ROGELIO
LONGALONG, GLICERIO SANTOS, AMOR SANTOS, FE DE JESUS, JAIME DE
JESUS, JOSE VICTORIO, ENRIQUE MARQUEZ, EDMUNDO GADUANG, WESLEY
ROSARIO, ROLANDO MIRANDA, WILHELMINA NATIVIDAD, JOSE NATIVIDAD,
GUILLERMO OQUENDO, CLETO RAFER, JR., LEDA G. HANDOG, CORAZON
MANUBAY, ELADIO GONZALES, JOY DELA CRUZ, ADAN DIAMANTE, ELADIO
VILLAMATER, GLORIA MATIAS, VIRGINIA S. LUYUN, FIDELITO CALUPIG,
RODOLFO JEREMIAS, JOSEPH BANDALA, CONCEPCION JUICO, PRISCILLA
ANGELES, ALFREDO SANTOS, JR., PROCOPIO MACOLOR, AURELIA RABARA,
DANILO SINGQUENCO, HARRIETO CAMARINES, NAMNAMA JAVELLOSA,
AMELIA S. MAALA, RAFAEL RAMISCAL, FRANCISCO TABORDA, CATALINO
REYES, NELSON CALVELO, JOHN TABAY, BENJAMIN PINEDA, petitioners,
vs. HON. ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, In His Capacity As Secretary Of The Department

Of Agriculture, and HON. GUILLERMO R. MORALES, in his capacity as Director,


Bureau of Fisheries, and Aquatic Resources, respondents.

[G.R. No. 112056. September 11, 1998]

JUVY CLAVEL P. GACULA, ANDY R. RIVERA, LORENZO T. SUBARIA, LEO J. BERNAL,


CYNTHIA L. DE VEAS, AVELINA L. DIOCES, FE Y. FELICIANO, THELMA A.
GECOLEA, RODOLFO R. PANGAN, MAURA JASMIN A. REYES, PENNY MARIE G.
TAN, TERESITA V. CHAN, NENA A. INOCENCIO, PELAGIA G. ABAYA, FELIX P.
BERNARDINO, MA. LUISA M. CALDITO, EDGARDO F. DE JESUS, PARALUMAN T.
DELA PAZ, RENATO F. GILERA, LEOVIGILDO G. MALZAN, CLARITA O. OLANO,
HERNAN Z. PEREZ, MILAGROS S. PILAPIL, GAUDENCIO L. RAMOS, JR.,
ADORACION J. SANTIAGO, ANDREA O. TAMINA, TRINIDAD N. TOLENTINO,
CARMELITA F. ZAFRA, CARMELO P. ABADILLA, EMMA L. LOGRONIO,
CARMELITA B. AGPOON, ANTONIO G. ARIZALA, DOHME C. ARPON, RENATO A.
BACLAGAN, MANOLITO A. CUETO, REYNALDO G. CUSTODIO, ROBLETO M.
GULOY, OLIMPIO P. MARIBAO, JR., MANUEL V. MIRANDA, JOSE RANADA, JR.,
JESUS R. REVIDAD, REX P. SEVILLA, FEDERICO D. SORIANO, BENEDICTO L.
STA. ANA, DANIEL S. TOLENTINO, WILFREDO G. VILLANUEVA, GUILLERMO O.
BALURAN, JOSE G. BATTUNG, MANOLITO J. BERNAL, DELFIN R. BRAVO,
PATRICK V. CALDITO, DANILO L. CATIPUNAN, ANTONIO G. COSTOSA, ROLANDO
S. EBERO, BENITO W. GONZAGA, DIVINA S. LEANO, FREDDIE D. LESTINO, RAUL
A. LLAANZANA, JUANITO M. MANSANADEZ, IMELDA M. MIRANDA, ROGELIO J.
ORDONEZ, ESTEBAN M. PAREDES, ROMEO S. CARDOSO, ROBERTO E.
CASAYURAN, RAQUEL V. CATIPUNAN, MARCIANO F. CRUZ, JULIEN C. DE
TORRES, RAYMUNDO N. GABAY, CRISANTA B. MALICDEM, GLENARDO A.
MIJARES, EDA R. NOCON, ERNESTO Q. OBRIQUE, ROMEO D. SISNERO,
ANGELITO C. TALAGON, SOLEDAD S. CRUZ, JOSELITA G. ENCISO, JOSE
CARMELO N. LEANO, ROMEO S. SILORIO, EDGARDO L. VIBAR, LOURDES F.
ELARDE, ANGELINA E. RACHO, ROMILDA DE ASIS, GLYCIDAS P. INIGO,
CONCHITA M. LACEDA, AUREA M. LUCAS, JOSE ROLANDO J. MANLULU,
SERGIO R. MANRIQUE, ELVIRA G. NAZARET, JOSELINE P. NIWANE, LYDIA J.
RUIZ, ALFREDO M. TORRES, CESAR A. AQUINO, MANUEL P. BALATINSAYO,
MONETTE B. CADIANG, RODRIGO O. ESTAMO, ADELAIDA Y. FERRER, EDNA L.
LOGRONIO, LEONARDO B. PONFERRADA, SUSANA M. SANTOS, CONCHITINA Y.
SEVILLA, LIBERTY Z. VALLESTERO, LERMA G. VILLANUEVA, ESPERANZA J.
MERCADO, MA. BESSIE P. DIAMANTE, ROSARIO G. MAYRINA, MAXIMINA C.
SABINORIO, YOLANDA G. ZALDUA, MA. VICTORIA B. ANGELES, NOLASCO K.
BALIBALOS, EDNA C. BAYUGA, MANUELITO C. BONGABONG, GINA B.
CRISOSTOMO, TERESITA N. CUNANAN, FILIPINA G. DE MESA, LOIDA M. GARCIA,
GODREY T. GOLLAYAN, CYNTHIA B. LAGASCA, DIEMMA C. MUNDO, LEONOR S.
PALMA, DELFIN V. PILLE, PATRICIO G. REYES, JR., LOIDA M. VILLANUEVA, EVA
G. ZOSA, FELY C. ARANO, RUEL E. BADINAS, IMELDA F. BARRACA, HELEN
GRACE N. CRUZ, ERNESTO P. GIMAS, ALEX D. GUARDIAN, BEHILDA L. HEZETA,
JOCELYN D. NAGUIT, EDMUNDO A. NUEVO, SOLOMON F. PAZ, LOURDES C.
BALING, EMPERATRIZ N. NEPOMUCENO, ROSAL C. GUARDIAN, REMEDIOS A.
ANCHETA, ROSEMARIE L. BOBIER, MA. ALICIA BONOAN, GEMMA V. BORJA,
ANELY BURGO, FINARDO G. CABILAO, ROSALIE F. DOBLES, EDNA E.
FRANCISCO, ANGELINA V. OPLEDA, MARITES K. RANESES, LIBERTY D.
RESTAN, ANNABEL ARRIETA, OSCAR B. BALAYAN, THELMA BALAYAN, JESUSA
A. CABILAO, ELISEO C. COPIAN, FERNANDO C. DELA CRUZ, JESUS S. FAR,
JOSE G. FUERTES, HANNIBAL A. GALANG, RICARDO M. GALING II, ARNEL B.
GARCIA, IRISH B. MANJARES, MARITESS M. MARISTELA, SYLVIA S. RED,
ARLENE M. REYES, DELILAH H. SAMSON, FARAH D. SELGA, ERNESTINA Z.
SOLLOSO, HELEN URBANO, MARIVIC L. UY, OLIVIA A. UY, ROMEO S. ZAFRA,
CECILIA G. ALEMAN, JULIETA A. ALFEREZ, PERPETUA BALIBALOS, MARILOU C.
BANCUD, ARABECQUE T. BATILONG, PORFIRIO R. BATUYONG, TONI BINALLA,
AIDA E. BORINES, ELISIA D. CLAVANO, ESTER R. EGAMINO, RAMIL R. EGAMINO,

MARIAN L. LOFRANCO, FLORESA T. MARANAN, CYMBELINE S. MARTINEZ,


LORELIE A. SUELO, MARLYN B. AMIGO, LINA A. ARANETA, JOSEPHINE G.
BANAAG, ROWENA CABANERO, IRENE O. DE OCAMPO, LEAH C. EDADES,
FILOMENA LA CORTE, MILAGROS P. ORTICIO, MERLINDA C. SABIO, ADANIA
SAKALURAN, PRISCILA M. YBERA, DELIA G. CORPUZ, PILAR B. MUSCAT,
LIGAYA M. ORGANO, BARBARA LUZ R. PEREZ, NIMFA MARIA C. VIDAR,
CRISTINO G. BABIDA, NENITA G. CRUZ, MERLITA B. CRUZADO, AMELITA O.
DABBAN, EMMA C. DERICO, EMMANUEL M. LASAC, ARACELI V. MALABANAN,
MA. TERESA T. MONTALBO, LOLITA R. NOBIO, GUILLERMO A. PINGOL, JR.
JUDITH R. VILLEGAS, CONSOLACION O. DELA CRUZ, ROSALINA J. DITAN,
CARMEN I. MONARES, DOMINGO O. JAVIER, JESUS B. REMEGIO, MARILOU S.
REMEGIO, ELSA L. MAGAT, RICARDO P. MASINSIN, SANDRA B. PANAHON,
MARIETTA T. FLOTILDES,petitioners, vs. HON. CORAZON ALMA G. DE LEON, in her
capacity as the Secretary of the Dept. of Social Welfare and
Development, respondent.

[G.R. No. 119597. September 11, 1998]

ASSOCIATION OF DEDICATED EMPLOYEES OF THE PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY


(ADEPT), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), respondent.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
These are cases for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality and validity
of Administrative Order Nos. 29 and 268 on various grounds.
The facts in G.R. Nos. 109406, 110642, 111494, and 112056 are undisputed, to wit:
Petitioners are officials and employees of several government departments and agencies
who were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992, pursuant to Executive Order No. 292[1] (EO
292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V[2]of EO 292. On January 19, 1993, then President Fidel V.
Ramos (President Ramos) issued Administrative Order No. 29 (AO 29) authorizing the grant
of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00[3] and
reiterating the prohibition[4] under Section 7[5]of Administrative Order No. 268 (AO
268), enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior approval of the
President. Section 4 of AO 29 directed [a]ll departments, offices and agencies which
authorized payment of CY 1992 Productivity Incentive Bonus in excess of the amount
authorized under Section 1 hereof [are hereby directed] to immediately cause the
return/refund of the excess within a period of six months to commence fifteen (15) days after
the issuance of this Order. In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies
of the government concerned, who are the herein respondents, caused the deduction from
petitioners salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged
overpayments. To prevent the respondents from making further deductions from their salaries
or allowances, the petitioners have come before this Court to seek relief.
In G.R. No. 119597, the facts are different but the petition poses a common issue with the
other consolidated cases. The petitioner, Association of Dedicated Employees of the Philippine
Tourism Authority (ADEPT), is an association of employees of the Philippine Tourism
Authority (PTA) who were granted productivity incentive bonus for calendar year 1992
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6971 (RA 6971), otherwise known as the Productivity
Incentives Act of 1990. Subject bonus was, however, disallowed by the Corporate Auditor on
the ground that it was prohibited under Administrative Order No. 29 dated January 19,
1993.[6] The disallowance of the bonus in question was finally brought on appeal to the
Commission on Audit (COA) which denied the appeal in its Decision [7]of March 6, 1995,
ratiocinating, thus:

xxx Firstly, the provisions of RA #6971 insofar as the coverage is concerned, refer to business
enterprises including government owned and/or controlled corporations performing proprietary
functions.
Section 1a of the Supplemental Rules Implementing RA #6971 classified such coverage as:
All business enterprises, with or without existing duly certified labor organizations, including
government owned and/or controlled corporations performing proprietary functions which are
established solely for business or profit and accordingly excluding those created, maintained or
acquired in pursuance of a policy of the State enunciated in the Constitution, or by law and
those whose officers and employees are covered by the Civil Service. (underscoring supplied)
The PTrA is a GOCC created in pursuance of a policy of the State. Section 9 of Presidential
Decree
No. 189 states that To implement the policies and program of the Department
(Dept. of Tourism), there is hereby created a Philippine Tourism Authority, xxx. Likewise,
Section 21 of the same decree provides that All officials and employees of the Authority, xxx,
shall be subject to Civil Service Law, rules and regulations, and the coverage of the Wage and
Position Classification Office.
Furthermore, although Supplemental Rules and Regulations implementing R.A. #6971 was
issued only on December 27, 1991, the law itself is clear that it pertains to private business
enterprises whose employees are covered by the Labor Code of the Philippines, as mentioned
in the following provisions:
Section 5. Labor Management Committee. xxx that at the request of any party to the
negotiation, the National Wages and Productivity Commission of the Department of Labor and
Employment shall provide the necessary studies, xxx.
Section 8. Notification. - A business enterprise which adopts a productivity incentive program
shall submit copies of the same to the National Wages and Productivity Commission and to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue for their information and record.
Section 9. Disputes and Grievances. - Whenever disputes, grievances, or other matters arise
from the interpretation or implementation of the productivity incentive program, xxx may seek
the assistance of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the Department of Labor and
Employment for such purpose. xxx
Therefore, considering the foregoing, the PTrA is within the exclusion provision of the
Implementing Rules of RA #6971 and so, it (PTrA) does not fall within its coverage as being
entitled to the productivity incentive bonus under RA #6971.
Secondly, Administrative Order No. 29 which is the basis for the grant of the productivity
incentive bonus/benefits for CY 1992 also expressly provides prohibiting payments of similar
benefits in future years unless duly authorized by the President.
Thirdly, the disallowance of the Auditor, PTrA has already been resolved when this Commission
circularized thru COA Memorandum #92-758 dated April 3, 1992 the Supplemental to Rules
Implementing RA 6971 otherwise known as the Productivity Incentives Act of 1990. xxx
Lastly, considering the title of RA #6971, i.e. An Act to encourage productivity and maintain
industrial peace by providing incentives to both labor and capital, and its implementing rules
and regulations prepared by the Department of Labor and Employment and the Department of
Finance, this Office concludes that said law/regulation pertains to agencies in the private sector
whose employees are covered by the Labor Code.
With the denial of its appeal, petitioner found its way here via the petition in G.R. No. 119597, to
seek relief from the aforesaid decision of COA.
We will first resolve the issue on the applicability of RA 6971 to petitioner ADEPT in G.R.
No. 119597 before passing upon the constitutionality or validity of Administrative Orders 29 and
268.

Section 3 of RA 6971, reads:


SECTION 3. Coverage. This Act shall apply to all business enterprises with or without existing
and duly recognized or certified labor organizations, including government-owned and
controlled corporations performing proprietary functions. It shall cover all employees and
workers including casual, regular, supervisory and managerial employees. (underscoring ours)
Pursuant to Section 10[8] of RA 6971, the Secretary of Labor and Secretary of Finance issued
Supplemental Rules to Implement the said law, as follows:
Section 1. - Paragraph (a) Section 1, Rule II of the Rules Implementing RA 6971, shall be
amended to read as follows:
Coverage. These Rules shall apply to:
(a) All business enterprises with or without existing duly certified labor organizations, including
government-owned and controlled corporations performing proprietary functions which are
established solely for business or profit or gain and accordingly excluding those created,
maintained or acquired in pursuance of a policy of the state, enunciated in the Constitution or by
law, and those whose officers and employees are covered by the Civil Service. (underscoring
ours)
x x x
Petitioner contends that the PTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation
performing proprietary function, and therefore the Secretary of Labor and Employment and
Secretary of Finance exceeded their authority in issuing the aforestated Supplemental Rules
Implementing RA 6971.
Government-owned and controlled corporations may perform governmental or proprietary
functions or both, depending on the purpose for which they have been created. If the purpose is
to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit, the function is proprietary. If it is in
the interest of health, safety and for the advancement of public good and welfare, affecting the
public in general, the function is governmental.[9] Powers classified as proprietary are those
intended for private advantage and benefit.[10]
The PTA was established by Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 564 (PD 564).
Its general purposes [11] are:
1. To implement the policies and programs of the Department of Tourism
(Department);
2.

To develop tourist zones;

3. To assist private enterprises in undertaking tourism projects;


4. To operate and maintain tourist facilities;
5. To assure land availability for private investors in hotels and other tourist facilities;
6. To coordinate all tourism project plans and operations.
Its specific functions and powers[12] are:
1. Planning and development of tourism projects
a.
To assist the Department make a comprehensive survey of the physical and
natural tourism resources of the Philippines; to establish the order of priority for
development of said areas; to recommend to the President the proclamation of a
tourist zone; and to define and fix the boundaries of the zone;
b.

To formulate a development plan for each zone;

c.
To submit to the President through the National Economic and Development
Authority for review and approval all development plans before the same are
enforced or implemented;

d.

To submit to the President an Annual Progress Report;

e.
To assist the Department to determine the additional capacity requirements
for various tourist facilities and services; to prepare a ten-year Tourism Priorities
Plan; to update annually the ten year Tourism Priorities Plan.
f.
To gather, collate and analyze statistical data and other pertinent information
for the effective implementation of PD 564.
2. Acquisition and disposition of lands and other assets for tourist zone purposes
a.
To acquire possession and ownership of all lands transferred to it from other
government corporations and institutions and any land having tourism potential and
earmarked in the Tourism Priorities Plans for intensive development into a tourist
zone or as a part thereof, subject to the approval of the President.
b.
To acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any
private land within and without the tourist zones for any of the following reasons: (a)
consolidation of lands for tourist zone development purposes, (b) prevention of land
speculation in areas declared as tourist zones, (c) acquisition of right of way to the
zones, (d) protection of water shed areas and natural assets with tourism value, and
(e) for any other purpose expressly authorized under PD 564.
c.
For the purpose of providing land acquisition assistance to registered
tourism enterprises, to sell, subdivide, resell, lease, sublease, rent out, or otherwise,
to said registered tourism enterprises under sufficiently soft terms for use
specifically in the development of hotels, recreational facilities, and other tourist
services.
d.
To develop and/or subdivide any land in its name or undertake condominium
projects thereon, and sell subdivision lots or condominium units to private persons
for investment purposes.
e.
To take over or transfer to a registered tourism enterprise in accordance with
law any lease on foreshore areas within a tourist zone or adjacent thereto, in cases
said areas are not being utilized in accordance with the PTAs approved zone
development plan and wherein the lessee concerned does not agree to conform
accordingly.
f.
To arrange for the reclamation of any land adjacent to or adjoining a tourist
zone in coordination with appropriate government agencies.
3. Infrastructure development for tourist zone purposes
a.
To contract, supervise and pay for infrastructure works and civil works within
a tourist zone owned and operated by the PTA.
b.
To coordinate with appropriate government agencies the development of
infrastructure requirements supporting a tourist zone.
c.
To take water from any public stream, river, creek, lake, spring, or waterfall
and to alter, straighten, obstruct or increase the flow of water in streams.
4. Zone administration and control
a.

To formulate and implement zoning regulations.

b.
To determine and regulate the enterprises to be established within a tourist
zone.
c.
To ensure, through the proper authorities concerned, the ecological
preservation, maintenance and/or rehabilitation of the common and the public areas
within a tourist zone and the environment thereof.
d.
To identify and recommend to the President the preservation and/or
restoration of national monuments or preserves; to arrange for the preservation
and/or restoration of the same with appropriate government agencies or with the
private sector or with the owners themselves of said tourist attractions; and to
identify and recommend to the appropriate authorities concerned the declaration of
tourist areas and attractions as national monuments and preserves.

5. Project and investment promotions


a.
To identify, develop, invest in, own, manage and operate such projects as it
may deem to be vital for recreation and rest but not sufficiently attractive
economically for private investment.
b.
To construct hotel buildings and other tourist facilities within a tourist zone
and in turn lease such facilities to registered tourism enterprises for operation,
management and maintenance.
c.
To organize, finance, invest in, manage and operate wholly-owned
subsidiary corporations.
6. Direct assistance to registered enterprises
a.

To administer the tax and other incentives granted to registered enterprises.

b.
To evaluate, approve and register or reject any and all tourism projects or
enterprises established within the tourist zones.
c.
To grant medium and long-term loans and/or re-lend any funds borrowed for
the purpose to duly qualified registered tourism enterprises.
d.

To guarantee local and foreign borrowings of registered enterprises.

e.

To provide equity investments in the form of cash and/or land.

f.
To extend technical, management and financial assistance to tourism
projects.
g. To identify, contact and assist in negotiations of suitable partners for both local
and foreign investors interested in investment or participation in the tourism industry.
h.
To assist registered enterprises and prospective investors to have their
papers processed with dispatch by government offices.
7. Other powers and functions
a.
To engage or retain the services of financial, management, legal, technical,
and/or project consultants from the private or government sector.
b.

To have the power to succeed by its corporate name.

c.

To adopt, alter, and use a corporate seal.

d.

To sue and be sued under its corporate name.

e.

To enter into any contracts of any kind and description.

f.

To own or possess personal and/or real property.

g.
To make, adopt and enforce rules and regulations to execute its powers,
duties and functions.
h.

To purchase, hold, and alienate shares of stock or bonds of any corporation.

I.

To collect fees or charges as may be imposed under PD 564.

j.

To contract indebtedness and issue bonds.

k. To fix and collect rentals for the lease, use or occupancy of lands, buildings, or
other property owned or administered by PTA.
l.
To do any and all acts and things necessary to carry out the purposes for
which the PTA is created.
Categorized in light of the foregoing provisions of law in point, PTAs governmental
functions include the first, third, fourth, and sixth of the aforesaid general purposes. The
second[13] and fifth general purposes fall under its proprietary functions.
With respect to PTAs specific functions and powers, the first and fourth are governmental in
nature while the fifth specific functions and powers are proprietary in character. The
second, third, sixth, and seventh specific functions and powers can be considered partlygovernmental and partly-proprietary, considering that 2(a), 2(b), 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 3(a), 6(c), 6(d),

6(e), 7(h), 7(j), and 7(k) are proprietary functions while 2(f), 3(b), 3(c), 6(a), 6(b), 6(f), 6(g), 6(h),
7(a), 7(b), 7(c), 7(d), 7(f), 7(g), and 7(l) are governmental functions. The specific functions and
powers treated in 7(e) and 7(i) may be classifiedeither as proprietary or governmental,
depending on the circumstances under which they are exercised or performed.
The aforecited powers and functions of PTA are predominantly governmental, principally
geared towards the development and promotion of tourism in the scenic Philippine
archipelago. But it is irrefutable that PTA also performs proprietary functions, as envisaged by
its charter.
Reliance on the above analysis of the functions and powers of PTA does not suffice for the
determination of whether or not it is within the coverage of RA 6971. For us to resolve the
issues raised here solely on the basis of the classification of PTAs powers and functions may
lead to the rendition of judgment repugnant to the legislative intent and to established doctrines,
as well, such as on the prohibition against government workers to strike. [14] Under RA 6971, the
workers have the right to strike.
To ascertain whether PTA is within the ambit of RA 6971, there is need to find out the
legislative intent, and to refer to other provisions of RA 6971 and other pertinent laws, that may
aid the Court in ruling on the right of officials and employees of PTA to receive bonuses under
RA 6971.
Petitioner cites an entry in the journal of the House of Representatives to buttress its
submission that PTA is within the coverage of RA 6971, to wit:
Chairman Veloso: The intent of including government-owned and controlled corporations within
the coverage of the Act is the recognition of the principle that when government goes into
business, it (divests) itself of its immunity from suit and goes down to the level of ordinary
private enterprises and subjects itself to the ordinary laws of the land just like ordinary private
enterprises. Now, when people work therefore in government-owned or controlled corporations,
it is as if they are also, just like in the private sector, entitled to all the benefits of all laws that
apply to workers in the private sector. In my view, even including the right to organize,
bargain.... VELOSO (Bicameral Conference Committee on Labor and Employment, pp. 15-16)
After a careful study, the Court is of the view, and so holds, that contrary to petitioners
interpretation, the government-owned and controlled corporations Mr. Chairman Veloso had in
mind were government-owned and controlled corporations incorporated under the general
corporation law. This is so because only workers in private corporations and governmentowned and controlled corporations, incorporated under the general corporation law, have the
right to bargain (collectively). Those in government corporations with special charter, which are
subject to Civil Service Laws, have no right to bargain (collectively), except where the terms
and conditions of employment are not fixed by law.[15] Their rights and duties are not comparable
with those in the private sector.
Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government
workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure
concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is
that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private
employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum
requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of
employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective
bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given
delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of
employment. And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and
regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements. (Alliance of Government Workers v.
Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1) (italics ours)
Government corporations may be created by special charters or by incorporation under the
general corporation law. Those created by special charters are governed by the Civil Service
Law while those incorporated under the general corporation law are governed by the Labor
Code.[16]
The legislative intent to place only government-owned and controlled corporations
performing proprietary functions under the coverage of RA 6971 is gleanable from the other

provisions of the law. For instance, section 2[17] of said law envisions industrial peace and
harmony and to provide corresponding incentives to both labor and capital; section 4 [18] refers
to representatives of labor and management; section 5 [19] mentions of collective bargaining
agent(s) of the bargaining unit(s); section 6[20] relates to existing collective bargaining
agreements, and labor and management; section 7[21]speaks of strike or lockout; and section
9[22] purports to seek the assistance of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the
Department of Labor and Employment and include the name(s) of the voluntary arbitrators or
panel of voluntary arbitrator. All the aforecited provisions of law apply only to private
corporations and government-owned and controlled corporations organized under the general
corporation law. Only they have collective bargaining agents, collective bargaining units,
collective bargaining agreements, and the right to strike or lockout.
To repeat, employees of government corporations created by special charters have neither
the right to strike nor the right to bargain collectively, as defined in the Labor Code. The case
of Social Security System Employees Association indicates the following remedy of government
workers not allowed to strike or bargain collectively, to wit:
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either
petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment
which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government
agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be any
unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector LaborManagement Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not
resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the
private sector, to pressure the Government to accede to their demands. (supra,
footnote 14, p. 698; italics ours)
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. [23] The provisions
of RA 6971, taken together, reveal the legislative intent to include only government-owned and
controlled corporations performing proprietary functions within its coverage.
Every statute must be construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence.[24] We note Section 1, Rule X of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of EO 292, which reads:
SECTION 1. - Each department or agency of government, whether national or
local, including bureaus and agencies, state colleges and universities,
and government owned and controlled corporations with original charters, shall
establish its own Department or Agency Employee Suggestions and Incentives
Award System in accordance with these Rules and shall submit the same to the
Commission for approval. (underscoring ours)
It is thus evident that PTA, being a government-owned and controlled corporation with original
charter subject to Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations, [25] is already within the scope of an
incentives award system under Section 1, Rule X of the Omnibus Rules Implementing EO 292
issued by the Civil Service Commission (Commission). Since government-owned and
controlled corporations with original charters do have an incentive award system, Congress
enacted a law that would address the same concern of officials and employees of governmentowned and controlled corporations incorporated under the general corporation law.
All things studiedly considered in proper perspective, the Court finds no reversible error in
the finding by respondent Commission that PTA is not within the purview of RA 6971. As
regards the promulgation of implementing rules and regulations, it bears stressing that the
power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of the statute is
necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment.[26] In the case under
scrutiny, the Supplementary Rules Implementing RA 6971 issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment and the Secretary of Finance accord with the intendment and provisions of RA
6971. Consequently, not being covered by RA 6971, AO 29 applies to the petitioner.
We now tackle the common issue posited by the consolidated petitions on the
constitutionality of AO 29 and AO 268.
Petitioners contend and argue, that:

I.

AO 29 AND AO 268 ARE VIOLATIVE OF THE PROVISIONS OF EO 292 AND,


HENCE, NULL AND VOID.

II. AO 29 AND AO 268 UNLAWFULLY USURP THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY


GRANTED SOLELY TO THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.
III. THE FORCED REFUND OF INCENTIVE PAY IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
IMPAIRMENT OF A CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION.
IV. ASSUMING, FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT ONLY, THAT THE GRANT OF
PRODUCTIVITY INCENTIVE BENEFITS WAS INVALID, THE SAME SHOULD BE
THE PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFICIALS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE
THEREFOR IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 9 OF AO 268.
Issued by the then President Corazon Aquino (President Aquino) on July 25, 1987 in the
exercise of her legislative powers under the 1987 Constitution, [27] EO 292, or the Administrative
Code of 1987, provided for the following incentive award system:
Sec. 31. Career and Personnel Development Plans. - Each department or agency
shall prepare a career and personnel development plan which shall be integrated into a
national plan by the Commission. Such career and personnel development plans
which shall include provisions on merit promotions, performance evaluation, in-service
training, including overseas and local scholarships and training grants, job rotation,
suggestions and incentive award systems, and such other provisions for employees
health, welfare, counseling, recreation and similar services.
Sec. 35. Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System. - There shall be
established a government-wide employee suggestions and incentive awards system
which shall be administered under such rules, regulations, and standards as maybe
promulgated by the Commission.
In accordance with rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the Commission,
the President or the head of each department or agency is authorized to incur
whatever necessary expenses involved in the honorary recognition of subordinate
officers and employees of the government who by their suggestions, inventions,
superior accomplishment, and other personal efforts contribute to the efficiency,
economy, or other improvement of government operations, or who perform such other
extraordinary acts or services in the public interest in connection with, or in relation to,
their official employment.
Sec. 36. Personnel Relations. - (1) It shall be the concern of the Commission to
provide leadership and assistance in developing employee relations programs in the
department or agencies.
(2) Every Secretary or head of agency shall take all proper steps toward the creation
of an atmosphere conducive to good supervisor-employee relations and the
improvement of employee morale.
Pursuant to the provision of Section 12(2), [28] Chapter 3, Book V of EO 292, the Commission
adopted and prescribed the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292 which, among
others, provide:
Sec. 1. - Each department or agency of government, whether national or local,
including bureaus and agencies, state colleges and universities, and government
owned and controlled corporations with original charters, shall establish its own
Department or Agency Employee Suggestions and Incentives Award System in
accordance with these Rules and shall submit the same to the Commission for
approval.
Sec. 2. - The System is designed to encourage creativity, innovativeness, efficiency,
integrity and productivity in the public service by recognizing and rewarding officials
and employees, individually or in groups, for their suggestions, inventions, superior
accomplishments, and other personal efforts which contribute to the efficiency,
economy, or other improvement in government operations, or for other extraordinary
acts of services in the public interest.
x x x

Sec. 7. - The incentive awards shall consist of, though not limited to, the following:
x x x
(c) Productivity Incentive which shall be given to an employee or group of employees
who has exceeded their targets or has incurred incremental improvement over existing
targets.
On February 21, 1992, President Aquino issued AO 268 which granted each official and
employee of the government the productivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount
equivalent to thirty percent (30%) of his one (1) month basic salary but in no case shall such
amount be less than two thousand pesos (P2,000.00),[29] for those who have rendered at least
one year of service as of December 31, 1991. [30] Said AO carried the prohibition, provided in
Section 7 thereof, which reads:
SECTION 7. The productivity incentive benefits herein authorized shall be granted
only for Calendar Year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including the
governing boards of government-owned or -controlled corporations and financial
institutions, are hereby strictly prohibited from authorizing/granting productivity
incentive benefits or other allowances of similar nature for Calendar Year 1992 and
future years pending the result of a comprehensive study being undertaken by the
Office of the President in coordination with the Civil Service Commission and the
Department of Budget and Management on the matter.
The formulation of the necessary implementing guidelines for Executive Order No. 486
dated 8 November 1991 establishing a performance-based incentive system for
government-owned or -controlled corporations shall likewise be included in the
comprehensive study referred to in the preceding paragraph.
On January 19, 1993, President Ramos issued AO 29 which granted productivity incentive
benefits to government employees in the maximum amount of P1,000.00[31] for the calendar
year 1992 but reiterated the proscription under Section 7 of AO 268, thus:
SECTION 2. The prohibition prescribed under Section 7 of Administrative Order No.
268 is hereby reiterated. Accordingly, all heads of government offices/agencies,
including government-owned and/or controlled corporations, as well as their respective
governing boards are hereby enjoined and prohibited from authorizing/granting
Productivity Incentive Benefits or any and all similar forms of allowances/benefits
without prior approval and authorization via Administrative Order by the Office of the
President. Henceforth, anyone found violating any of the mandates in this Order,
including all officials/employees and the COA Auditor-in-Charge of such government
office/agency found to have taken part thereof, shall be accordingly and severely dealt
with in accordance with the applicable provisions of existing penal laws.
Consequently, all administrative authorizations to grant any form of
allowances/benefits and all forms of additional compensation usually paid outside of
the prescribed basic salary under R.A. No. 6758, the Salary Standardization Law, that
are inconsistent with the legislated policy on the matter or are not covered by any
legislative action are hereby revoked.
The implementation of Executive Order No. 486 dated November 8, 1991, as
amended by Executive Order No. 518 dated May 29, 1992, is hereby deferred until a
more comprehensive and equitable scheme for the grant of the benefits that can be
applied government-wide is formulated by the Department of Budget and
Management.
Petitioners theorize that AO 29 and AO 268 violate EO 292 and since the latter is a law, it
prevails over executive issuances. Petitioners likewise assert that AO 29 and AO 268 encroach
upon the constitutional authority of the Civil Service Commission to adopt measures to
strengthen the merit and rewards system and to promulgate rules, regulations and standards
governing the incentive awards system of the civil service.
The Court is not impressed with petitioners submission. AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in
the valid exercise of presidential control over the executive departments.
In establishing a Civil Service Commission, the 1987 Constitution delineated its function, as
follows:

The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government,
shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency,
integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall
strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development
programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate
conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress
an annual report on its personnel programs.(Section 3, Article IX, B, 1987
Constitution)
The Commission handles personnel matters of the government. As the central personnel
agency of the Government, it is tasked to formulate and establish a system of incentives and
rewards for officials and employees in the public sector, alike.
The functions of the Commission have been decentralized to the different departments,
offices, and agencies of the government -SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall insure and promote the Constitutional
mandate that appointments in the Civil Service shall be made only according to merit
and fitness; that the Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the
Government shall establish a career service, adopt measures to promote morale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, and courtesy in the civil service, strengthen the
merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for
all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public
accountability; that public office is a public trust and public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people; and that personnel functions shall be
decentralized, delegating the corresponding authority to the departments, offices and
agencies where such functions can be effectively performed. (Section 1, Chapter I,
Subtitle A, Title I, EO 292) (underscoring ours)
Specifically, implementation of the Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System has
been decentralized to the President or to the head of each department or agency -Sec. 35. Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System. - There shall be
established a government-wide employee suggestions and incentive awards system
which shall be administered under such rules, regulations, and standards as maybe
promulgated by the Commission.
In accordance with rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the
Commission, the President or the head of each department or agency is authorized to
incur whatever necessary expenses involved in the honorary recognition of
subordinate officers and employees of the government who by their suggestions,
inventions, superior accomplishment, and other personal efforts contribute to the
efficiency, economy, or other improvement of government operations, or who perform
such other extraordinary acts or services in the public interest in connection with, or in
relation to, their official employment. (EO 292) (underscoring ours)
The President is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are
exercised and implemented through him. His power includes the control over executive
departments -The president shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Section 17, Article VII, 1987 Constitution)
Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter.[32] It has been held that [t]he President can, by virtue of his power of control,
review, modify, alter or nullify any action, or decision, of his subordinate in the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices under him. He can exercise this power motu proprio without
need of any appeal from any party.[33]
When the President issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits, enjoining heads
of government agencies from granting incentive benefits without prior approval from him, and
directing the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the President was just exercising
his power of control over executive departments. This is decisively clear from the WHEREAS
CLAUSES of AO 268 and AO 29, to wit:

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 268


x x x
WHEREAS, the productivity incentive benefits granted by the different agencies are of varying
amounts, causing dissension/demoralization on the part of those who had received less and
those who have not yet received any such benefit, thereby defeating the purpose for which the
same should be granted; and
WHEREAS, there exists the need to regulate the grant of the productivity incentive benefits or
other similar allowances in conformity with the policy on standardization of compensation
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6758;
x

x.

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 29


x x x
WHEREAS, the faithful implementation of statutes, including the Administrative Code of
1987 and all laws governing all forms of additional compensation and personnel benefits
is a Constitutional prerogative vested in the President of the Philippines under Section
17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, the Constitutional prerogative includes the determination of the rates, the
timing and schedule of payment, and final authority to commit limited resources of
government for the payment of personnel incentives, cash awards, productivity bonus,
and other forms of additional compensation and fringe benefits;
WHEREAS, some government agencies have overlooked said Constitutional prerogative
and have unilaterally granted to their respective officials and employees incentive
awards;
WHEREAS, the Office of the President issued Administrative Order No. 268, dated February
21, 1992, strictly prohibiting the grant of Productivity Incentive Bonus or other allowances of
similar nature for Calendar Year 1992 and future years pending the issuance of the requisite
authorization by the President;
WHEREAS, notwithstanding said prohibition some government offices/agencies and
government-owned and/or controlled corporations and financial institutions have granted
productivity incentive benefits in varying nomenclature and amounts without the proper
authorization/coordination with the Office of the President;
WHEREAS, the unilateral and uncoordinated grant of productivity incentive benefits gave rise to
discontentment, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel who have
received less or have not received at all such benefits;
x x x.
The President issued subject Administrative Orders to regulate the grant of productivity
incentive benefits and to prevent discontentment, dissatisfaction and demoralization among
government personnel by committing limited resources of government for the equal payment of
incentives and awards. The President was only exercising his power of control by modifying
the acts of the respondents who granted incentive benefits to their employees without
appropriate clearance from the Office of the President, thereby resulting in the uneven
distribution of government resources. In the view of the President, respondents did a mistake
which had to be corrected. In so acting, the President exercised a constitutionally-protected
prerogative -The Presidents duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all
executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the

power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he
controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or
reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that
the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary. (LacsonMagallanes Co., Inc. v. Pao, 21 SCRA 898)
Neither can it be said that the President encroached upon the authority of the Commission
on Civil Service to grant benefits to government personnel. AO 29 and AO 268 did not revoke
the privilege of employees to receive incentive benefits. The same merely regulated the grant
and amount thereof.
Sound management and effective utilization of financial resources of government are
basically executive functions,[34] not the Commissions. Implicit is this recognition in EO
292, which states:
Sec. 35. Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System. - There shall be established a
government-wide employee suggestions and incentive awards system which shall be
administered under such rules, regulations, and standards as maybe promulgated by the
Commission.
In accordance with rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the Commission, the
President or the head of each department or agency is authorized to incur whatever necessary
expenses involved in the honorary recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the
government who by their suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishment, and other personal
efforts contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement of government operations, or
who perform such other extraordinary acts or services in the public interest in connection with,
or in relation to, their official employment. (Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Book V) (underscoring ours)
Conformably, it is the President or the head of each department or agency who is
authorized to incur the necessary expenses involved in the honorary recognition of subordinate
officers and employees of the government. It is not the duty of the Commission to fix the
amount of the incentives. Such function belongs to the President or his duly empowered alter
ego.
Anent petitioners contention that the forcible refund of incentive benefits is an
unconstitutional impairment of a contractual obligation, suffice it to state that [n]ot all contracts
entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be
made between its sovereign and proprietary acts (United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA
487).[35] The acts involved in this case are governmental. Besides, the Court is in agreement
with the Solicitor General that the incentive pay or benefit is in the nature of a bonus which is
not a demandable or enforceable obligation.
It is understood that the Judiciary, Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit,
Commission on Elections, and Office of the Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy, are not
covered by the amount fixed by the President. As explained in Bengzon vs. Drilon (208 SCRA
133):
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of
the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources
with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to
levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates
authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse
such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of
their functions.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100
typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to
Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty
and illusory platitude.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The

imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices
allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy
and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the
Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of
our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme
Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to
constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should
cease to be a meaningless provision.
Untenable is petitioners contention that the herein respondents be held personally liable for
the refund in question. Absent a showing of bad faith or malice, public officers are not
personally liable for damages resulting from the performance of official duties.[36]
Every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in the discharge of official
duties.[37] Absent any showing of bad faith or malice, there is likewise a presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties.[38]
In upholding the constitutionality of AO 268 and AO 29, the Court reiterates the wellentrenched doctrine that in interpreting statutes, that which will avoid a finding of
unconstitutionality is to be preferred.[39]
Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, we cannot countenance
the refund of subject incentive benefits for the year 1992, which amounts the petitioners have
already received. Indeed, no indicia of bad faith can be detected under the attendant facts and
circumstances. The officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such incentive benefits
in the honest belief that the amounts given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted
the same with gratitude, confident that they richly deserve such benefits.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 109406, 110642, 111494, and 112056
are hereby DISMISSED, and as above ratiocinated, further deductions from the salaries and
allowances of petitioners are hereby ENJOINED.
In G.R. No. 119597, the assailed Decision of respondent Commission on Audit is
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Martinez and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., on official leave.