Case Digests: Wills & Succession by Ants

ATUN v. NUEZ
GR No.L-8018, October 26, 1955
87 PHIL 762

FACTS: Estefania Atun died without any issue leaving in the

possession of the plaintiffs, her neices and nephews, a parcel of
land. Such land was delivered by plaintiff Gil Atun to Silvestra
Nuez (sister of defendant-appellee Eusebio Nuez) for cultivation,
for which Silvestra paid the Atuns a part of the harvest as rental. In
1940, Silvestra turned over the land to defendant Eusebio Nuez,
who thereafter refused to recognize plaintiffs' ownership or to
deliver their share of the produce. The defendant turn sold the land
to his co-defendant Diego Belga, who took the property with the
knowledge that it belonged, not to Nuez, but to plaintiffs. There
was no prior judicial declaration, however, that the plaintiffs were
the legal heirs of the decedent.

LEDESMA v. MCLACHLIN
GR No.L-44837, November 23, 1938
66 PHIL 547

FACTS: Lorenzo Quitco, died in 1930, leaving defendant Mclachlin

and her children as heirs. Plaintiff Ana Ledesma,
spurious/illegitimate child of Lorenzo Quitco, and her mother, sued
to declare her as compulsory heir which the court however denied.
Two years later, Lorenzo's father Eusebio died, and because he left
some personal and real properties without a will, an intestate
proceeding was instituted and a court order declaring his
compulsory heirs did not of course include Ana as one. Following
such court action, the plaintiff proceeded to collect the sum
payable on a promissory note then issued in favor of her by
Lorenzo by filing a claim in the intestate proceedings of Eusebio's
Estate claiming that the sum be paid out of the properties inherited
by the defendants represents that of the successional rights of
Lorenzo as a compulsory heir of his father Eusebio.

ISSUE: Has plaintiffs the right to recover the property as a

successor of the decedent?
ISSUE: Has plaintiff the right collect the sum promised by her
father from her grandfather's estate?
HELD: Yes. In the instant case, as the land in question still stands
registered in the name of Estefania Atun, now deceased, the
present owners thereof would be her legal heirs. It is of record that
Estefania Atun died without any issue or ascendants and left as her
only surviving heirs the children of her brother Nicolas, plaintiffs
herein; and the rule is settled that the legal heirs of a deceased
may file an action arising out of a right belonging to their ancestor,
without a separate judicial declaration of their status as such,
provided there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement
of the decedent's estate.

HELD: No. The properties inherited by the defendants from their

deceased grandfather by representation are not subject to the
payment of debts and obligations of their deceased father, who
died without leaving any property. While it is true that under the
provisions of Articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a child presents
his father or mother who died before him in the properties of his
grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation does not
make the said child answerable for the obligations contracted by
his deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the

provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of

inheritances, the inheritance is received with the benefit of
inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the properties
received from their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of
Eusebio Quitco, in representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco,
are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their father from whom
they did not inherit anything.

LIMJOCO v. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGRANTE

GR No.L-770, April 27, 1948
80 PHIL 776

FACTS: Petitioner opposed the issuance by the Public Service

Commission of a certificate of public convenience to install,
maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan to the respondent
despite his demise, contending that the Commission erred in
allowing the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of
Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then
pending before the commission, and in subsequently granting to
said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in
contravention of law.

ISSUE: Is the decision of the Commission correct and with basis?

HELD: Yes. If the respondent had not died, there can be no

question that he would have had the right to prosecute his
application before the commission to its final conclusion. No one
would have denied him that right... The aforesaid right of
respondent to prosecute said application to its conclusion was one
which by its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it
constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for which right was a

property despite the possibility that in the end the commission

might have denied his application, although under the facts of the
case, the commission granted the application in view of the
financial ability of the estate to maintain and operate the ice plant.

USON v. DEL ROSARIO

GR No.L-4963, January 29, 1953
92 PHIL 530

FACTS: Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 leaving as an only heir his

estranged wife Maria Uson, the petitioner. The latter sued to
recover the ownership and possession of five parcels of land
occupied by defendant Maria del Rosario, decedent's common-lawspouse and her children. As a defense, defendant presented a deed
of separation agreed upon and signed Faustino and Uson
containing among others an statement giving a parcel of land to
Uson as an alimony and the latter renouncing her rights to any
inheritance from Faustino.
The defendant also contends that while it is true that the four
minor defendants are illegitimate children of the decedent and
under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights,
however, under the new Civil Code they are given the status and
rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights
which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287,
new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were
declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given
retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them
may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new
Civil Code).

ISSUE: Are the contentions of the defendants correct?

HELD: No. It is evident that when the decedent died in 1945 the
five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the
moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article
657, old Civil Code). As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs
to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as
completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them
a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa,
17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of
inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became
vested.
The claim of the defendants that Uson had relinquished her right
over the lands in question in view of her expressed renunciation to
inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and
leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered
into cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future
inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be
renounced.
Nor does the contention that the provisions of the New Civil Code
shall apply and be given retroactive effect. Article 2253 above
referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the
first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which
gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation,
but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested
or acquired right of the same origin... As already stated in the early
part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the
lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her
late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of
the law which commands that the rights to succession are
transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code).
The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the
illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted
to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands
in dispute.

LITONJUA v. MONTILLA
GR No.L-4170, January 31, 1952, 90PHIL757
90 PHIL 757

FACTS: Pedro Litonjua obtained a judgment against Claudio Montilla

for the payment of a sum of P4,039. Failing to find or identify a
property of Claudio to be levied, petitioner then proceeded to file a
claim in the intestate proceeding of the estate of Agustin Montilla
Sr, father of the deceased. The estate has not yet been properly
probated.

ISSUE: Could the petitioner succeed in collecting the debt as

against the estate of the debtor's deceased parent?

HELD: No. In the case of Ortiga Brothers and Co. vs. Enage and
Yap Tico, 18 Phil. 345, it was held that the creditor of the heirs of a
deceased person is entitled to collect his claim out of the property
which pertains by inheritance to said heirs, only after the debts of
the testate or intestate have been paid and when the net assets
that are divisible among the heirs are known, because the debts of
the deceased must first be paid before his heirs can inherit. It was
therein also held that a person who is not a creditor of a deceased,
testate or intestate, has no right to intervene either in the
proceedings brought in connection with the estate or in the
settlement of the succession. The foregoing pronouncements are
perfectly applicable to the case at bar, because the appellant is not
a creditor of the deceased Agustin Montilla, Sr. and he seeks to
collect his claim out of the inheritance of Claudio Montilla, an heir,
before the net assets of the intestate estate have been
determined.

DE GUZMAN vda. DE CARRILLO v. DE PAZ

GR No.L-4133, May 13, 1952
91 PHIL 265

FACTS: A lot had been mortgaged by spouses Severino Salak and

Petra Garcia to Pedro Magat; the latter then assigned the mortgage
to Honoria Salak. After the death Petra, Severino transferred 1/2 of
his rights to the property to Honoria for the sum representing 1/2
of the consideratioin paid by her to the mortgagees Magat.
Severino later died leaving the defendants as heirs. Honoria also
died, with the plaintiff as heir. Intestate proceedings were instituted
for the settlement and distribution of the estate of the deceased
Severino and Petra, including the lot in question which was
adjudicated, after proper proceedings in favor of the defendants.
Plaintiff sued for reconveyance of the 1/2 of the portion of the lot in
her favor as heir of Honoria.

IBARLE v. PO
GR No.L-5064, February 27, 1953
92 PHIL 721

FACTS: Leonardo Winstanley died leaving a parcel of land to his

surviving spouse Catalina Navarro and some minor children.
Catalina sold the entire parcel of land to Maria Canoy who later
sold the same land to the plaintiff Bienvenido Ibarle. After some
time, after her appointment as guardian of her minor children,
Catalina again sold 1/2 of the land in question, which portion now
belonged to the children as heirs, to herein defendant Esperanza
Po.

ISSUE: Which sale was valid, and who has the rightful claim to the
property?
ISSUE: May the petition prosper?

HELD: No. The property now sought to be recovered from the

defendants was adjudicated in their favor after all claims,
indebtedness and obligations chargeable against the intestate
estate of the deceased Severino Salak and Petra Garcia had been
all paid and accounted for out of the estate of the deceased; so
that, in the eyes of the law, the properties now in the hands of the
defendants are presumed to be free from all claims whatsoever.
The claim of the plaintiff set up in the complaint should have been
interposed during the pendency and progress of Special Proceeding
No. 3; but plaintiff not having done so, she cannot now bring this
action against the defendants, for it is clear that there exists no
privity of contract between plaintiff and defendants upon which
plaintiff can predicate her action against the present defendants.

HELD: The sale to defendant is valid. Article 657 of the old Civil
Code provides: "The rights to the succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of his death." in a slightly different
language, this article is incorporated in the new Civil Code as
article 777.
The above provision and comment make it clear that when
Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the
Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the seller's
children. No formal or judicial declaration being needed to confirm
the children's title, it follows that the first sale was null and void in
so far as it included the children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made
by authority of the competent court was undeniably legal and
effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no
consequence. If registration were necessary, still the non-

registration would not avail the plaintiff because it was due to no

other cause than his own opposition.

OSORIO v. OSORIO
GR No.L-10474, March 29, 1916
41 PHIL 531

FACTS: Francisco Osorio y Garcia filed a written complaint alleging

that he is a natural son of one Francisco Osorio y Reyes who died in
1896; and that he had been in continuous possession of the status
of natural son of said Osorio y Reyes, as proven by direct acts of
the latter and of his family; that the defendant Soledad Osorio,
lawful daughter and lawful heir of said Osorio y Reyes, be ordered
to recognize the plaintiff as a natural son of said Osorio y Reyes,
and is entitled to share in his father's estate; and, furthermore,
that said defendant be ordered to furnish subsistence to plaintiff in
such amount as the court might deem proper to fix. The evidence
offered relating to the fact of filiation of Osorio y Garcia to Osorio
Reyes is strong and unimpeachable, so that the court found the
legitimacy of claim of Osorio y Garcia to be properly established.

ISSUE: Has plaintiff the right to be recognized as co-heir and be

entitled to the rights appertaining to his deceased father's estate?

HELD: Yes. Recognition of the child as a natural child must be made

if he has been in continuous possession of his filiation, proven by
the attendance of his father at his baptism, in the certificate in
which his name and that of his mother appear, though the
document contains errors, and by his father's statement to various
friends that the boy was his natural son, and by his father's always
having attended to the care, education and support of his son.

So that the plaintiff, Francisco Osorio y Garcia, according to the

facts proven in this case and the law on the subject, is entitled to
have his half sister Soledad Osorio, a legitimate daughter of the
father of both of them, recognize him as being the natural,
recognized son of Francisco Osorio y Reyes and as entitled to the
rights granted him by law in respect to his deceased father's
estate, all of which is in possession of the defendant spouses.

RAMIREZ v. BALTAZAR
GR No.L-25049, August 30, 1968
22 SCRA 918

FACTS: Victoriana Eguaras, single, mortgaged a real estate to

spouses Baltazar, defendants in this case. Upon demise of
Victoriana, the mortgagees, as creditors of the deceased, filed a
petition for the intestate proceedings of Victoriana's estate,
alleging further that plaintiffs Felimon and Monica Ramirez are
heirs of the deceased. Felimon was later appointed as adminstrator
but did not qualify so that Artemio Diawan was appointed as
judicial administrator of the estate. The mortgagees then filed a
foreclosure of the property in question and succeeded, after
Diawan failed to file an answer against the petition. The foreclosure
sale ensued, the property was bought by the mortgagees
themselves and the sale was confirmed by the court. Felimon sued
for the annulment of the entire foreclosure proceedings, alleging
among others the failure of the judicial administrator to protect
their interests. Defendants contended that plaintiffs have no legal
capacity to sue and hava no cause of action.

ISSUE: Have plaintiffs the cause of action against the defendant?

HELD: Yes. There is no question that the rights to succession are

automatically transmitted to the heirs from the moment of the
death of the decedent. While, as a rule, the formal declaration or
recognition to such successional rights needs judicial confirmation,
this Court has, under special circumstances, protected these rights
from encroachments made or attempted before the judicial
declaration. In Pascual vs. Pascual, it was ruled that although heirs
have no legal standing in court upon the commencement of testate
or intestate proceedings, this rule admits of an exception as "when
the administrator fails or refuses to act in which event the heirs
may act in his place."

DE BORJA v. MENCIAS
GR No.L-20609, September 29, 1966
21 SCRA 1133

FACTS: Petitioners Juan De Borja et al. petitioned for the reversal of

the order of Judge Mencias, denying their petition cause the sale of
the properties levied upon to satisfy the money judgment in a civil
case rendered in favor of petitioners against respondent Crisanto
de Borja. Petitioners levied aganst the rights, interest and
participation which Crisanto de Borja had in certain real properties,
as an heir of the decedents Josefa Tangco and Francisco de Borja,
whose estates were then pending settlement in Special
Proceedings Nos. F-7866 and 1955 of the aforementioned court,
respectively.
this Court hereby holds that whatever interest, claim or right which
Crisanto de Borja may have in the testate estate of Josefa Tangco
and in the intestate estate of Francisco de Borja are subject to
attachment and execution for the purpose of satisfying the money
judgment rendered against the said heir
ISSUE: May the sale of the property levied for execution proceed?

HELD: The above question must be answered in the affirmative,

provided it is understood that the sale shall be only of whatever
rights, interest and participation may be adjudicated to said heir as
a result of the final settlement of the estates, and that delivery
thereof to the judgment creditor or to the purchaser at the public
sale thereof shall be made only after the final settlement of the
estates and in the manner provided by the legal provision
mentioned above.

RODRIGUEZ v. DE BORJA
GR No.L-21993, June 21, 1966
17 SCRA 418

FACTS: Private respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida

Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last
will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez, meanwhile the petitioners filed
a petition before the court to examine the purported will but which
was later withdrawn, and a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez was subsequently field in a
another court in Rizal. The petitioners now sought the dismissal of
the special proceeding on the settlement of the decedent's estate
based on the purported will, questioning therefore the jurisdiction
of CFI Bulacan.

ISSUE: Does CFI Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with the

testate proceedings?

HELD: Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan

became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late
Father Rodriguez, even if no petition for its allowance was filed
until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could,
motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for
proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably
to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of
Court. Moreover, aside from the rule that the Court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, intestate
succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since
intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will.

CHAVEZ v. IAC
GR No. L-68282, November 8, 1990

FACTS: Manuela Buenavista assigned her paraphernal property in

equal pro-diviso among her 6 children, while possession of such
property still remains with her. Three of her children sold each their
share to private respondent Concepcion, consolidating 4/6 portion
thereof. Deeds of sale were therefor executed with the conformity
of Manuela. Despite such transfers, the latter sold the entire
property to one of the siblings, herein petitioner Raquel Chavez.
Respondent sued for the annulment of the later sale to Raquel
which was denied by the trail court but which later decision
overturned by the Court of Appeals. On appeal, petitioner also
contends that their mother has left a last will and this will
supercedes the earlier transfers.

ISSUE: Is partition inter-vivos, and sale based on such partition

valid? Does a last will supercede that of the partition inter-vivos?

HELD: Yes. When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative

that such partition must be executed in accordance with the
provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person makes the
partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may
even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a will,
provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of
compulsory heirs. xxx The Deeds of Sale are not contracts entered
into with respect to future inheritance but a contract perfected and
consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista who
signed the same and gave her consent thereto. Such partition inter
vivos, executed by the property owner herself, is valid.
It would be unjust and inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista
Vda. de Chavez to revoke the sales she herself authorized as well
as the sale she herself executed in favor of her son only to execute
a simulated sale in favor of her daughter Raquel who had already
profited from the sale she made of the property she had received
in the partition inter vivos.

NERI v. AKUTIN
GR No.L-47799, May 21, 1943
74 PHIL 185

FACTS: This is a case where the testator Agripino Neri in his will left
all his property by universal title to the children by his second
marriage, the herein respondents, with omission of the children by
his first marriage, the herein petitioner. The omission of the heirs in
the will was contemplated by the testator with the belief that he
had already given each of the children portion of the inheritance,
particularly a land he had abandoned was occupied by the
respondents over which registration was denied for it turned out to

be a public land, and an aggregate amount of money which the

respondents were indebted to their father.

ISSUE: Should there be cancellation of the will, in view of the

omission of heirs? Is there disinheritance in this case?

HELD: Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared
a total intestacy on the ground that testator left all his property by
universal title to the children by his second marriage, without
expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage but upon
the erroneous belief that he had given them already more shares in
his property than those given to the children by his second
marriage. Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause,
if contested, shall annul the institution of heirs in so far as it is
prejudicial to the disinherited person. This is but a case of
preterition which annuls the institution of heirs.

ISSUE: Can the petitioners impugn the validity of the sales?

HELD: This Court has repeatedly held that "the legal heirs of a
decedent are the parties in interest to commence ordinary actions
arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased, without
separate judicial declaration as to their being heirs of said
decedent, provided that there is no pending special proceeding for
the settlement of the decedent's estate.
There being no pending special proceeding for the settlement of
Paulina Baranda's estate, the petitioners, as her intestate heirs,
had the right to sue for the reconveyance of the disputed
properties, not to them, but to the estate itself of the decedent, for
distribution later in accordance with law. Otherwise, no one else
could question the simulated sales and the subjects thereof would
remain in the name of the alleged vendees, who would thus have
been permitted to benefit from their deception, In fact, even if it
were assumed that those suing through attorneys-in-fact were not
properly represented, the remaining petitioners would still have
sufficed to impugn the validity of the deeds of sale.

BARANDA v. BARANDA
GR No.73275 May 20, 1987

FACTS: Paulina Baranda died without issue, but before her demise,
two of her supposed heirs, the herein respondents Evangelina and
Elisa Baranda, have already taken possession of 6 parcels of land
and caused the transfer of such by virtue of questionable sales
which the late widow had also sought the reconveyance which did
not however materialized. The petitioners, siblings of the decedent,
now sought the annulment of the supposed sale or transfers.
Respondents question the petitioners legal standing, them being
not a party-in-interest in the deed of sale.

BALAIS v. BALAIS
GR No.L-33924, March 18, 1988
159 SCRA 47

FACTS: On an action for recovery of real property filed by the

respondents, spurious children of the late Escolastico Balais who
died in 1948, against the petitioners, legitimate children of the
deceased, the trial court decreed reconveyance of the portion of
the property belonging to the legitime and further declaring

partition that sent 1/4 portion of the legitime to the respondents.

Petitioners come now questioning the partition and seeking the
reconveyance of the 1/4 share that went to the spurious children,
relying on the provisions of the old civil code, and thereby
questioning the competence and jurisdiction of the trial court,

ISSUE: Is the court competent to decree the partition, without it

being asked in the complaint? Could the provisions of the new civil
code be applied over a case which occurs prior to its effectivity?

HELD: 1. Yes. The court acquired jurisdiction by estoppel. It must

be noted that, in spite of the broad challenge the appellants
present against the jurisdiction of the trial court to order the
distribution of the property, they, in reality, question only that part
of the decision awarding a one-fourth part of the property to the
illegitimate children of the deceased, upon the ground that under
the old Civil Code illegitimate children other than natural enjoyed
no successionary rights. They do not contest the delivery of the
estate to the deceased's widow or to themselves in the proportions
decreed by the court.
2. No. The court erred in applying the provisions of the new code.
But as stated, the error of the court notwithstanding, the case is a
closed chapter, the decision having been rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction, have become final and executory. A
decision, no matter how erroneous, becomes the law of the case
between the parties upon attaining finality.

CONDE v. ABAYA
GR No.L-4275, March 23, 1909
13 PHIL 249

FACTS: Casiano Abaya died unmarried however leaving two

unaknowledged children by herein plaintiff-appellee Paula Conde.
The latter, as a ascendant heir of her children, sued for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Casiano along with the
acknowledgment of the two as natural children of the deceased.
The trial court, with the opposition of the defendant-appellant
Roman Abaya, brother of the deceased, rendered judgment
bestowing the estate of Casiano to Conde as legitimate heir of the
decedent's natural children.

ISSUE: May the mother of a natural child now deceased, bring an

action for the acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor of
such child in order to appear in his behalf to receive the
inheritance from the deceased natural father.

HELD: The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his
legitimacy lasts during his whole life, while the right to claim the
acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during the life of his
presumed parents. An action for the acknowledgment of a natural
child may, as an exception, be exercised against the heirs of the
presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event of the death of
the latter during the minority of the child, and second, upon the
discovery of some instrument of express acknowledgment of the
child, executed by the father or mother, the existence of which was
unknown during the life of the latter.
But such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only
be exercised by him. It cannot be transmitted to his descendants,
or his ascendants.

REIRA v. PALMAROLI
GR No.14851, September 13, 1919
40 PHIL 105

FACTS: Antonia Reira, widow of Juan Pons who was at the time of
the latter's death residing at Palma de Mallorca, sought the
annulment of the order of the trial court admitting the probate of a
purported will of her husband. The purported will was submitted to
be admitted to probate by respondent Consul General Palmaroli.
The petitioner contends that the probate of the will, in view of her
absence, deprived her of her right to contest the original
application.

FACTS: Montinola filed an action against the heirs of Dr. Jose Rizal
for recovery of possession of personal property (the RIZAL RELICS)
allegedly sold to him by Doa Trinidad Rizal. The trial court held
that neither party is entitled to the possession of such property,
relying principally on the fact that in Rizal's Mi Ultimo Adios, there
is a line where Rizal bequeathed all his property to the Filipino
people. The court argued that the handwritten work of Rizal
constitutes a holographic will giving the State all his property.

ISSUE: Does Mi Ultimo Adios constitute a last will?

ISSUE: Should the probated will yield to the rights of the
decedent's heir?

HELD: Yes. A will is nothing more than a species of conveyance

whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by
law, to control in a certain degree the disposition of his property
after his death. Out of consideration for the important interests
involved the execution and proof of wills has been surrounded by
numerous safeguards, among which is the provision that after
death of the testator his will may be judicially established in court.
xxx The probate of a will, while conclusive as to its due execution,
in no wise involves the intrinsic validity of its provisions. If,
therefore, upon the distribution of the estate of the decedent, it
should appear that any provision of his will is contrary to the law
applicable to his case, the will must necessarily yield upon that
point and the disposition made by law must prevail.

MONTINOLA v. HERBOSA

HELD: No. An instrument which merely expresses a last wish as a

thought or advice but does not contain a disposition of property,
and executed without Animus Standi cannot be legally considered
a will. Rizal's Mi Ultimo Adios is but a literary piece of work, and
was so intended. It may be considered a will in a grammatical
sense but not in a legal or juridical sense. Moreover, it also lacks
the requirements of a holographic will such as a statement of the
year month and day of its execution and his signature.

MERZA v. PORRAS
GR No.L-4888, May 25, 1953
93 PHIL 142

FACTS: Pilar Montealegre died leaving a will (Exhibit A) and a socalled codicil (Exhibit B), disinheriting her husband Pedro Porras
and some of her relatives. The two documents were submitted to
probate but were denied by the trial court, upon the grounds such
as the defect of the attestation clause on Exh. A and that Exh.
cannot be considered a codicil for it was executed by the testator a

day before Exhibit A, thus it cannot be included in the probate

proceedings.

ISSUE: Should a document, expressly disinheriting certain heirs,

executed by the testator prior to a supposed last will, be probated?

HELD: Yes. The trial court and the CA is correct that Exhibit B
having been executed one day before Exhibit A could not be
considered as a codicil "because a codicil, as the word implies, is
only an addition to, or modification of, the will." The Court of
Appeals added that "the contents of Exhibit B are couched in the
language ordinarily used in a simple affidavit and as such, may not
have the legal effect and force to a testamentary disposition."
However, Exhibit B does partake of the nature of a will. A will is
defined in article 667 of the Civil code of Spain as "the act by which
a person dispose of all his property or a portion of it," and in article
783 of the new Civil Code as "an act whereby a person is
permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a
certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his
death. Exhibit B comes within this definition.

CASTAEDA v. ALEMANY
GR No.1439, March 19, 1904
3 PHIL 426

FACTS: Appellant constested the validity of the will of Doa Juana

Moreno upon the ground that although the attestation clause in the
will states that the testator signed the will in the presence of three
witnesses who also each signed in each presence, the will was not
actually written by the testator.

ISSUE: Is it necessary that a will be written by the testator herself?

HELD: No. Section 618 of the Civil Code requires (1) that the will be
in writing and (2) either that the testator sign it himself or, if he
does not sign it, that it be signed by some one in his presence and
by his express direction. Who does the mechanical work of writing
the will is a matter of indifference. The fact, therefore, that in this
case the will was typewritten in the office of the lawyer for the
testratrix is of no consequence.

MICIANO v. BRIMO
GR No.L-22595, November 1, 1927
50 PHIL 867

FACTS: Joseph Brimo, a Turkish national, died leaving a will which

one of the clauses states that the law of the Philippines shall
govern the partition and not the law of his nationality, and that
legatees have to respect the will, otherwise the dispositions
accruing to them shall be annulled. By virtue of such condition, his
brother, Andre Brimo, an instituted heir was thus excluded
because, by his action of having opposed the partition scheme, he
did not respect the will. Andre sued contending that the conditions
are void being contrary to law which provides that the will shall be
probated according to the laws of the nationality of the decedent.

ISSUE: Is the condition as set by the testator valid?

HELD: No. A foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be
distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his
national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be
ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 of the Civil Code
states said national law should govern. Said condition then, in the

light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten,

and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and
consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor