Introduction To German Idealism - 5 (26) Texts

Introduction to German Idealism 5/26 - Robbert Veen at www.wiziq.
com
Introduction to German
Idealism (5/26)
"Self-consciousness as Principle of
Cognition"
Reading material for the lecture on

Monday February 15th,
7 PM GMT (8 PM, CET)
The text of Hegel will be read in detail

on
Friday, February 19th, at the same
time.
1
Introduction to German Idealism 5/26 - Robbert Veen at www.wiziq.com
www.wiziq.com
Robbert Veen -
http://www.robbertveen.com
2
1. Hegel on Kant (History of Philosophy)
2. Phenomenology of Spirit: Selfconsciousness
3. Jill Vance Buroker: Kant's Critique of Pure

Reason. An introduction
NB the passages marked in red will be used for Monday's

meeting
3
Hegel on Kant (History of Philosophy)
1. Critique of Pure Reason
4
1. In the first place, as to the theoretic philosophy, Kant
in the Critique of Pure Reason sets to work in a
psychological manner, i.e. historically, inasmuch as he
describes the main stages in theoretic consciousness.
The first faculty is sensuousness generally, the second
understanding, the third reason. All this he simply
narrates; quite empirically, without developing it from
proceeding by necessity.
a. The a priori fact of sensuous existence, the forms of

sensuous existence, constitute the beginning of this
transcendentalism. […
b. The second faculty, the understanding, is something

very different from sensuousness; the latter is
Receptivity, while Kant calls thought in general
Spontaneity — an expression which belongs to the
philosophy of Leibnitz. The understanding is active
thought, I myself; it “is the faculty of thinking the object
of sensuous perception.” Yet it has thoughts merely
without real content: “Thoughts without content are void
and empty, sensuous perceptions without Notions are
5
blind.”
The understanding thus obtains from the sensuous its

matter, both empirical and a priori, time and space; and
it thinks this matter, but its thoughts are very different
from this matter. Or it is a faculty of a particular kind,
and it is only when both occur, when the sensuous
faculty has supplied material and the understanding has
united to this its thoughts, that knowledge results. The
thoughts of the understanding as such are thus limited
thoughts, thoughts of the finite only.
Now logic, as transcendental logic, likewise sets forth the
conceptions which the understanding has a priori in itself
and “whereby it thinks objects completely a priori.”
Thoughts have a form which signifies their being the
synthetic function which brings the manifold into a unity.
I am this unity, the transcendental apperception, the
pure apperception of self-consciousness. I=I; I must
‘accompany’ all our conceptions. This is a barbarous
exposition of the matter.
As self-consciousness I am the completely void, general

6
I, completely indeterminate and abstract; apperception is
determination generally, the activity whereby I
transplant an empirical content into my simple
consciousness, while perception rather signifies feeling
or conceiving. In order that a content may enter this
One, it must be infected by its simplicity; it is thus that
the content first becomes my content. The
comprehending medium is ‘I’; whatever I have to do with
must allow itself to be forced into these forms of unity.
7
This is a great fact, an important item of knowledge;
what thought produces is unity; thus it produces itself,
for it is the One. Yet the fact that I am the one and, as
thinking, the simplifier, is not by Kant satisfactorily set
forth. The unity may likewise be called relation; for in so
far as manifold is pre-supposed, and as this on the one
side remains a manifold while on the other side it is set
forth as one, so far may it be said to be related.
Now as ‘I’ is the universal transcendental unity of self-

consciousness which binds together the empirical matter
of conception generally, there are various modes in this
relationship, and here we have the transcendental
nature of the categories or universal thought-
determinations.
[…]
8
Thinking understanding is thus indeed the source of the
individual categories, but because on their own account
they are void and empty, they only have significance
through their union with the given, manifold material of
perception, feeling, &c. Such connection of sensuous
material with categories now constitutes the facts of
experience, i.e. the matter of sensation after it is brought
under the categories; and this is knowledge generally.
(13)
9
Kant however connects with this the statement that
experience grasps phenomena only, and that by means
of the knowledge which we obtain through experience
we do not know things as they are in themselves, but
only as they are in the form of laws of perception and
sensuousness. For the first component part of
experience, sensation, is doubtless subjective, since it is
connected with our organs. The matter of perception is
only what it is in my sensation.
I know of this sensation only and not of the thing. But, in

the second place, the objective, which ought to
constitute the opposite to this subjective side, is itself
subjective likewise: it does not indeed pertain to my
feeling, but it remains shut up in the region of my self-
consciousness; the categories are only determinations of
our thinking understanding. Neither the one nor the
other is consequently anything in itself, nor are both
together, knowledge, anything in itself, for it only knows
phenomena — a strange contradiction.
10
Hegel on Kant
2. Self-consciousness in the
Phenomenology of Spirit
11
THE TRUTH WHICH CONSCIOUS CERTAINTY
OF SELF REALIZES
IN the kinds of certainty hitherto considered, the truth for

consciousness is something other than consciousness
itself. The conception, however, of this truth vanishes in
the course of our experience of it. What the object
immediately was in itself--whether mere being in sense-
certainty, a concrete thing in perception, or force in the
case of understanding--it turns out, in truth, not to be
this really; but instead, this inherent nature (Ansich)
proves to be a way in which it is for an other. The
abstract conception of the object gives way before the
actual concrete object, or the first immediate idea is
cancelled in the course of experience. Mere certainty
vanished in favour of the truth.
There has now arisen, however, what was not

established in the case of these previous relationships,
viz. a certainty which is on a par with its truth, for the
certainty is to itself its own object, and consciousness is
to itself the truth. Otherness, no doubt, is also found
12
there; consciousness, that is, makes a distinction; but
what is distinguished is of such a kind that
consciousness, at the same time, holds there is no
distinction made. If we call the movement of knowledge
conception, and knowledge, qua simple unity or Ego, the
object, we see that not only for us [tracing the process],
but likewise for knowledge itself, the object corresponds
to the conception; or, if we put it in the other form and
call conception what the object is in itself, while applying
the term object to what the object is qua object or for an
other, it is clear that being "in-itself" and being "for an
other" are here the same. For the inherent being (Ansich)
is consciousness; yet it is still just as much that for which
an other (viz. what is "in-itself") is. And it is for
consciousness that the inherent nature (Ansich) of the
object, and its "being for an other" are [219] one and the
same. Ego is the content of the relation, and itself the
process of relating. It is Ego itself which is opposed to an
other and, at the same time, reaches out beyond this
other, which other is all the same taken to be only itself.
[…]
What seems to have been lost, then, is only the principal
13
moment, viz. the simple fact of having independent
subsistence for consciousness. But, in reality, self-
consciousness is reflexion out of the bare being that
belongs to the world of sense and perception, and is
essentially the return out of otherness. As self
-consciousness, it is movement. But when it
distinguishes only its self as such from itself, distinction
is straightway taken to be superseded in the sense of
involving otherness. The distinction is not, and self-
consciousness is only motionless tautology, Ego is Ego, I
am I. When for self-consciousness the distinction does
not also have the shape of being, it is not self-
consciousness. For [220] self-consciousness, then,
otherness is a fact, it does exist as a distinct moment;
but the unity of itself with this difference is also a fact for
self-consciousness, and is a second distinct moment.
With that first moment, self-consciousness occupies the
position of consciousness, and the whole expanse of the
world of sense is conserved as its object, but at the same
time only as related to the second moment, the unity of
self-consciousness with itself. And, consequently, the
sensible world is regarded by self-consciousness as
14
having a subsistence which is, however, only
appearance, or forms a distinction from self-
consciousness that per se has no being. This opposition
of its appearance and its truth finds its real essence,
however, only in the truth--in the unity of self-
consciousness with itself. This unity must become
essential to self-consciousness, i.e. self-consciousness is
the state of Desire in general. Consciousness has, qua
self-consciousness, henceforth a twofold object--the one
immediate, the object of sense-certainty and of
perception, which, however, is here found to be marked
by the character of negation; the second, viz. itself,
which is the true essence, and is found in the first
instance only in the opposition of the first object to it.
Self-consciousness presents itself here as the process in
which this opposition is removed, and oneness or identity
with itself established.
For us or implicitly, the object, which is the negative
element for self-consciousness, has on its side returned
into itself, just as on the other side-consciousness has
done. Through this reflexion into self, the object has
become Life. What self-consciousness distinguishes as
15
having a being distinct from itself, has in it too, so far as
it is affirmed to be, not merely the aspect of sense-
certainty and perception; it is a being reflected into itself,
and the object of immediate desire is something living.
For the inherent reality (Ansich), the general result of the
relation of the understanding to [221] the inner nature of
things, is the distinguishing of what cannot be
distinguished, or is the unity of what is distinguished.
This unity, however, is, as we saw, just as much its recoil
from itself; and this conception breaks asunder into the
opposition of self-consciousness and life: the former is
the unity for which the absolute unity of differences
exists, the latter, however, is only this unity itself, so that
the unity is not at the same time for itself. Thus,
according to the independence possessed by
consciousness, is the independence which its object in
itself possesses. Self-consciousness, which is absolutely
for itself, and characterizes its object directly as
negative, or is primarily desire, will really, therefore, find
through experience this object's independence.
The determination of the principle of life(2) as obtained
from the conception or general result with which we
16
enter this new sphere, is sufficient to characterize it,
without its nature being evolved further out of that
notion. Its circuit is completed in the following moments.
The essential element (Wesen) is infinitude as the
supersession of all distinctions, the pure rotation on its
own axis, itself at rest while being absolutely restless
infinitude, the very self-dependence in which the
differences brought out in the process are all dissolved,
the simple reality of time, which in this self-identity has
the solid form and shape of space. The differences,
however, all the same hold as differences in this simple
universal medium; for this universal flux exercises its
negative activity merely in that it is the sublation of
them; but it could not transcend them unless they had a
subsistence of their own. Precisely this flux is itself, as
self-identical independence, their subsistence or their
substance, in which they accordingly are distinct
members, parts which have being in their own right.
Being no longer has the significance of mere [222]
abstract being, nor has their naked essence the meaning
of abstract universality: their being now is just that
simple fluent substance of the pure movement within
17
itself. The difference, however, of these members inter
se consists, in general, in no other characteristic than
that of the moments of infinitude, or of the mere
movement itself.
The independent members exist for themselves. To be
thus for themselves, however, is really as much their
reflexion directly into the unity, as this unity is the
breaking asunder into independent forms. The unity is
sundered because it is absolutely negative or infinite
unity; and because it is subsistence, difference likewise
has independence only in it. This independence of the
form appears as a determinate entity, as what is for
another, for the form is something disunited; and the
cancelling of diremption takes effect to that extent
through another. But this sublation lies just as much in
the actual form itself. For just that flux is the substance
of the independent forms. This substance, however, is
infinite, and hence the form itself in its very subsistence
involves diremption, or sublation of its existence for
itself.
If we distinguish more exactly the moments contained
here, we see that we have as first moment the
18
subsistence of the independent forms, or the suppression
of what distinction inherently involves, viz. that the forms
have no being per se, and no subsistence. The second
moment, however, is the subjection of that subsistence
to the infinitude of distinction. In the first moment there
is the subsisting, persisting mode or form; by its being in
its own right, or by its being in its determinate shape an
infinite substance, it comes forward in opposition to the
universal substance, disowns this fluent continuity with
that substance, and insists that it is not dissolved in this
universal element, but rather on the contrary preserves
itself [223] by and through its separation from this its
inorganic nature, and by the fact that it consumes this
inorganic nature. Life in the universal fluid medium,
quietly, silently shaping and moulding and distributing
the forms in all their manifold detail, becomes by that
very activity the movement of those forms, or passes
into life qua Process. The mere universal flux is here the
inherent being; the outer being, the "other", is the
distinction of the forms assumed. But this flux, this fluent
condition, becomes itself the other in virtue of this very
distinction; because now it exists "for" or m relation to
19
that distinction, which is self-conditioned and self-
contained (an und für sich), and consequently is the
endless, infinite movement by which that stable medium
is consumed--is life as living.
This inversion of character, however, is on that account
again invertedness in itself as such. What is consumed is
the essential reality: the Individuality, which preserves
itself at the expense of the universal and gives itself the
feeling of its unity with itself, precisely thereby cancels
its contrast with the other, by means of which it exists
for itself. The unity with self, which it gives itself, is just
the fluent continuity of differences, or universal
dissolution. But, conversely, the cancelling of individual
subsistence at the same time produces the subsistence.
For since the essence of the individual form-universal
life-and the self-existent entity per se are simple
substance, the essence, by putting the other within itself,
cancels this its own simplicity or its essence, i.e. it
sunders that simplicity; and this disruption of fluent
undifferentiated continuity is just the setting up, the
affirmation, of individuality. The simple substance of life,
therefore, is the diremption of itself into shapes and
20
forms, and at the same time the dissolution of these
substantial differences; and the resolution of this
diremption is just as much a process of diremption, of
articulating. Thus both the [224] sides of the entire
movement which were before distinguished, viz., the
setting up of individual forms lying apart and undisturbed
in the universal medium of independent existence, and
the process of life - collapse into one another. The latter
is just as much a formation of independent individual
shapes, as it is a way of cancelling a shape assumed;
and the former, the setting up of individual forms, is as
much a cancelling as an articulation of them. The fluent,
continuous element is itself only the abstraction of the
essential reality, or it is actual only as a definite shape or
form; and that it articulates itself is once more a
breaking up of the articulated form, or a dissolution of it.
The entire circuit of this activity constitutes Life. It is
neither what is expressed to begin with, the immediate
continuity and concrete solidity of its essential nature;
nor the stable, subsisting form, the discrete individual
which exists on its own account; nor the bare process of
this form; nor again is it the simple combination of all
21
these moments. It is none of these; it is the whole which
develops itself, resolves its own development, and in this
movement simply preserves itself.
Since we started from the first immediate unity, and
returned through the moments of form-determination,
and of process, to the unity of both these moments, and
thus again back to the first simple substance, we see
that this reflected unity is other than the first. As
opposed to that immediate unity, the unity expressed as
a mode of being, this second is the universal unity, which
holds all these moments sublated within itself. It is the
simple genus, which in the movement of life itself does
not exist in this simplicity for itself; but in this result
points life towards what is other than itself, namely,
towards Consciousness for which life exists as this unity
or as genus.
This other life, however, for which the genus as such
exists and which is genus for itself, namely, self-con-
[[225] sciousness, exists in the first instance only in the
form of this simple, essential reality, and has for object
itself qua pure Ego. In the course of its experience, which
we are now to consider, this abstract object will grow in
22
richness, and will be unfolded in the way we have seen in
the case of life.
The simple ego is this genus, or the bare universal, for
which the differences are insubstantial, only by its being
the negative essence of the moments which have
assumed a definite and independent form. And self-
consciousness is thus only assured of itself through
sublating this other, which is presented to self-
consciousness as an independent life; self-consciousness
is Desire. Convinced of the nothingness of this other, it
definitely affirms this nothingness to be for itself the
truth of this other, negates the independent object, and
thereby acquires the certainty of its own self, as true
certainty, a certainty which it has become aware of in
objective form.
In this state of satisfaction, however, it has experience of
the independence of its object. Desire and the certainty
of its self obtained in the gratification of desire, are
conditioned by the object; for the certainty exists
through cancelling this other; in order that this cancelling
may be effected, there must be this other. Self-
consciousness is thus unable by its negative relation to
23
the object to abolish it; because of that relation it rather
produces it again, as well as the desire. The object
desired is, in fact, something other than self-
consciousness, the essence of desire; and through this
experience this truth has become realized. At the same
time, however, self-consciousness is likewise absolutely
for itself, exists on its own account; and it is so only by
sublation of the object; and it must come to feel its
satisfaction, for it is the truth. On account of the
independence of the object, therefore, it can only attain
satisfaction when this object itself [226] effectually
brings about negation within itself The object must per
se effect this negation of itself, for it is inherently (an
sich) something negative, and must be for the other
what it is. Since the object is in its very self negation,
and in being so is at the same time independent, it is
Consciousness. In the case of life, which is the object of
desire, the negation either lies in an other, namely, in
desire, or takes the form of determinateness standing in
opposition to an other external individuum indifferent to
it, or appears as its inorganic general nature. The above
general independent nature, however, in the case of
24
which negation takes the form of absolute negation, is
the genus as such or as self-consciousness. Self-
consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-
consciousness.
It is in these three moments that the notion of self-
consciousness first gets completed: (a) pure
undifferentiated ego is its first immediate object. (b) This
immediacy is itself, however, thoroughgoing mediation;
it has its being only by cancelling the independent
object, in other words it is Desire. The satisfaction of
desire is indeed the reflexion of self-consciousness into
itself, is the certainty which has passed into objective
truth. But (c) the truth of this certainty is really twofold
reflexion, the reduplication of self-consciousness.
Consciousness has an object which implicates its own
otherness or affirms distinction as a void distinction, and
therein is independent. The individual form
distinguished, which is only a living form, certainly
cancels its independence also in the process of life itself;
but it ceases along with its distinctive difference to be
what it is. The object of self-consciousness, however, is
still independent in this negativity of itself; and thus it is
25
for itself genus, universal flux or continuity in the very
distinctiveness of its own separate existence; it is a living
self-consciousness.
A self-consciousness has before it a self-consciousness.
[227] Only so and only then is it self-consciousness in
actual fact; for here first of all it comes to have the unity
of itself in its otherness. Ego which is the object of its
notion, is in point of fact not "object". The object of
desire, however, is only independent, for it is the
universal, ineradicable substance, the fluent self-
identical essential reality. When a self-consciousness is
the object, the object is just as much ego as object.
With this we already have before us the notion of Mind or
Spirit. What consciousness has further to become aware
of, is the experience of what mind is--this absolute
substance, which is the unity of the different self-related
and self-existent self-consciousnesses in the perfect
freedom and independence of their opposition as
component elements of that substance: Ego that is "we",
a plurality of Egos, and "we" that is a single Ego.
Consciousness first finds in self-consciousness - the
notion of mind - its turning-point, where it leaves the
26
parti-coloured show of the sensuous immediate, passes
from the dark void of the transcendent and remote
super-sensuous, and steps into the spiritual daylight of
the present.
27
3. Jill Vance Buroker:
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. An

introduction
28
The Metaphysical Deduction is the first stage in Kant’s

argument for
the categories, in which he identifies the pure concepts
of the under-
standing. The argument has two parts. First Kant
establishes that the
understanding has one function, which is to judge. He
then identifies
the pure concepts based on the forms of judgment, all
the possible
ways in which one can judge. The concepts of these
judgment forms
represent logical or syntactic features of judgment, such
as subject
and predicate. Thus a list of the forms of judgment yields
a complete
system of pure concepts in their logical use. In the
second part Kant
argues that these pure logical concepts also have a real
use, as first-
order or semantic concepts of the objects about which
29
one judges.
This follows from his analysis of judgment as synthesis,
and the claim
that the same synthetic operations that produce
judgments also pro-
duce unified representations of space and time from the
manifold of
pure intuition. Thus Kant concludes that the pure
concepts express-
ing logical features of judgment can represent categorial
features of
the objects being judged. This is the first step in arguing
for synthetic
a priori knowledge of the understanding.
[…]
30
1. Consciousness of conceptual unity presupposes a

unitary con-
sciousness. (A103–4)
2. The notion of an object of representation includes the
idea of a
necessary unity. (A104–6;A108–9)
3. Consciousness of objective unity requires a
transcendental self-
consciousness (as opposed to an empirical self-
consciousness).
Awareness of this identical self makes possible the
notion of a
transcendental object. (A106–7;A108)
4. A transcendental self-consciousness is consciousness
of unity of
synthesis by means of pure concepts. (A107–8)
5. Thus the pure concepts are presupposed in all
objective awareness.
(A109–11)
[…]
31
Section 16: the original synthetic unity of
apperception
The deduction officially begins here, where the first
sentence states
the first premise:
“The I think must be able to accompany all my

representations; for otherwise something would be
represented in me
that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to
say that the
representation would either be impossible or else at least
would be
nothing forme” (B131–2).
This sentence includes several claims. First, it is

necessarily true of me, as a discursive intellect, that I
can attach the “I think” to any state that represents
something to me. Kant is not saying that in fact I always
do this, only that it must be possible for me. If I could
not, he says, the representation would be “nothing for
me.”
32
This means that states that represent something to me
have
two features:
first, I can recognize them as my own states;
and second, they have an intentional object of which I
can be conscious.
In other words, states that are representations for me
have both subjective and objective aspects, which I can
distinguish.
Now the act of attaching the “I think” is the act of

apperception
or self-consciousness. Insofar as I recognize a
representation as mine, I
ascribe it to myself, and thus must be conscious of
myself as the sub-
ject of the state. As in the A edition, Kant calls this self-
consciousness
the transcendental unity of apperception (t.u.a.), and he
distinguishes
it from empirical self-consciousness. The t.u.a. is original
because it
33
is not derived from any other representation, but is a
primitive fact of
consciousness. It is pure rather than empirical because it
has no dis-
tinguishing content of its own. Kant says it is in all
consciousness “one
and the same, [and] cannot be accompanied by any
further represen-
tation” (B132). Recall that empirical self-consciousness is
awareness of
oneself as a particular subject. In addition to the “I think”
it includes
the specific content of inner sense. By contrast, “through
the I, as a
simple representation, nothing manifold is given” (B135).
In a later
section in the Dialectic, Kant calls the I of apperception
“a single
thing that cannot be resolved into a plurality of subjects,
and hence a
logically simple subject” (B407). Thus the t.u.a. is the
bare thought
34
of the numerical identity of the self as the thinking
subject.
In several passages Kant says this first premise is
analytic: “this
principle of the necessary unity of apperception is, to be
sure, itself
identical, thus an analytic proposition” (B135; also B138
and B407).
Now it is important to understand exactly what claim is
analytic,
since from this premise Kant wants to derive the
synthetic conclu-
sion that the categories apply necessarily to any object
of thought.
The key is the scope of the statement, “The I think must
be able to
accompany all my representations.” Kant is claiming not
that this
statement is analytically true of all conscious beings, but
rather that
it is analytically true for any consciousness that can
recognize its own
35
representations.
There are two relevant contrasts here. At B138–9 Kant
distinguishes human consciousness from an intuitive
intellect which
generates its own manifold through its thinking. For such
an intel-
lect, there is no distinction between subjective and
objective states,
and so such an intellect would not be capable of this
original self-
consciousness. The second contrast is with animal
perceivers, which
lack intellectual capacities altogether and thus cannot
recognize their
representations as such. They might have a unified
consciousness,
but they would lack a unified self-consciousness. In other
words, it is
a brute fact (and therefore a synthetic truth) that human
perceivers
are discursive intellects who can recognize their own
representations.
36
But it is an analytic truth that any consciousness that can
recognize
its own representations can attach the “I think” to any of
them.
The second premise occurs at B133: “this thoroughgoing
identity of
the apperception of amanifold given in intuition contains
a synthesis
of the representations, and is possible only through the
conscious-
ness of this synthesis.” To say that the t.u.a. “contains” a
synthesis
means that in order to think the identity of the “I” one
must con-
nect a manifold of representations in thought. To
recognize that it
is the same “I” in “I think a” and in “I think b” one must
connect
the thoughts so that one thinks “I think a + b.” Kant’s
strong claim
here is that performing such a synthesis is a necessary
condition for
37
recognizing the identity of self-consciousness. In thinking
one’s self-
identity by ascribing representations to oneself, one both
connects
the representations and (at least implicitly) recognizes
this connec-
tion. At B133–4 Kant repeats his A edition claim that
consciousness
of one’s numerical identity cannot be derived from
empirical self-
consciousness. Instead, to recognize the empirical self
requires one to
unite the empiricalmanifold in a numerically identical
consciousness.
Thus empirical self-consciousness presupposes the t.u.a.
The final point in section 16 concerns Kant’s claim at
B133–4 that
the apperception, like concepts, has both an analytical
and a syn-
thetic unity. This is easier to grasp if we begin with his
discussion
of concepts in the footnote. Here Kant argues that
38
although both
kinds of unity are essential to general representations,
the synthetic
unity provided by concepts is more fundamental than
their analytical
unity. The analytical unity of a concept is the unity it
provides as a
common characteristic of things. In thinking the concept
“solidity,”
we recognize it as a feature that belongs to potentially
many things. In
representing a feature common to its instances, the
concept provides
analytic unity. But these instances are complex things,
which have
many different properties. For example, they must also
be spatially
extended and have other physical properties. Kant says
the objects
analytically united under the concept “also have
something different
in themselves” (B134). And he concludes: “therefore
39
only by means
of an antecedently conceived possible synthetic unity
can I represent
to myself the analytical unity.” That is, to represent the
objects that
possess common characteristics, one must first
represent the unity
of the complex object. In its synthetic function, a concept
unifies
diverse features of the object. For example, the concept
“chair” uni-
fies the diverse properties such as shape, size, weight,
and location
that belong to a chair. Kant’s point is that although
concepts contain
both kinds of unity, synthetic unity is more fundamental
because it
is presupposed by analytical unity.
At B133–4 he makes the same claim about the t.u.a.:
“the analyt-
ical unity of apperception is only possible under the
presupposition
40
of some synthetic one.” In other words, the “I think” as
attached to
each representation functions on one hand as a common
character-
istic. Abstracted from all content of representation, it has
an analytic
unity. But since this identical self-consciousness requires
a synthesis
of representations, the “I think” also produces a
synthetic unity. In
this respect it functions as the form of any thought in
which one uni-
fies different representations. For this reason Kant calls it
“the highest
point to which one must affix all use of the
understanding . . . indeed
this faculty is the understanding itself” (B134n). In short,
the t.u.a. is
the very basis, and thus the form, of all thinking.
Section 17: the relation between the t.u.a. and the notion
of an object
In section 17 Kant establishes what Allison calls the
41
“reciprocity the-
sis,” namely that the t.u.a. is both necessary and
sufficient for repre-
senting objects.
This is equivalent to showing both that whenever one
performs the “I think” one thereby represents an object
(or objective state of affairs), and that whenever one
represents an object one thereby connects
representations in the synthetic unity of apperception. It
does not become clear until section 19 that this act is
judgment.
Once we put these points together we can get a better

idea of what
Kant means by the objective validity of representation.
Kant’s entire argument in section 17 is contained in the
second
paragraph:
• Understanding is, generally speaking, the faculty of
cognitions. These consist in the determinate
relation of given representations to an object.
• An object, however, is that in the concept of which
42
the manifold of a given intuition is united.
• Now, however, all unification of representations
requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of
them. Consequently the unity of consciousness is
that which alone constitutes the relation of
representations to an object, thus their objective
validity, and consequently is that which makes
them into cognitions and on which even the
possibility of the understanding rests. (B137)
Let us take this argument point by point.
First Kant describes the understanding as the faculty of

cogni-
tion, which implies that the mere data given in intuition
are not in
themselves cognitions. Next he defines a cognition as a
“determinate
relation of given representation to an object,” which
simply means a
representation of a determinate object. His point is that
the function
43
of the understanding is to know objects. Implicit is the
idea that at
the first order, the representations are those given in the
manifold
of intuition. Next comes the key to this section, Kant’s
definition of
an object as “that in the concept of which the manifold of
a given
intuition is united.” This tortured sentence in effect
defines an object
as whatever is thought as a unified manifold by means of
a concept.
The object here is the object of thought; the definition
establishes
that it must be a complex whose parts (the manifold) are
unified
by a concept. Drawing on section 15, the next sentence
states that
all unified representations contain consciousness of
unity. From sec-
tion 16 we know that consciousness of unity is based on
the t.u.a.
44
Thus, Kant concludes, it is the t.u.a. that confers
objective valid-
ity on representations. That is, the act of bringing
representations
to the “I think” is necessary and sufficient for making
them into
representations of an object. Put less technically, Kant
has argued
that when one unifies some manifold by means of a
concept, one
thereby renders themanifold thinkable as an object or
gives it objective validity.
At B137–8 Kant emphasizes that the mere manifold

given in intu-
ition does not by itself represent an object, but provides
only the data
for cognition: “the mere form of outer sensible intuition,
space, is not
yet cognition at all; it only gives the manifold of intuition
a priori for
a possible cognition.” To cognize some spatial region
45
requires con-
necting the spatial manifold in some determinate way by
means of a
concept. Thus to represent a line in space one must
delineate the part
of space making up the line by means of the concept of a
line. Kant
concludes that this consciousness of synthetic unity is
required of all
cognitions, and thus applies to any manifold given in
intuition “in
order to become an object for me.” It is important to
notice the subtle
shift in this last sentence, which claims that the object is
the (mani-
fold of ) intuition itself. In other words, this analysis has
taken place
on the second-order level, where the objects (of thought)
are one’s
representations (the manifold given to one in intuition).
At the end
of this chapter we shall see the significance of this
46
aspect for Kant’s
response to skepticism.
47
For now, let us summarize the steps of the argument in
sections 16
and 17:
1. It is necessarily true of humans as discursive intellects

that they can
attach the “I think” to any of their representations, and,
by doing
so, express the numerical identity of self-consciousness.
2. Attaching the “I think” is possible only insofar as one
connects
one’s self-ascribed representations by means of
synthetic acts.
3. Any synthetic unity of representations requires
unification under
a concept.
4. Any manifold unified under a concept counts as a
thought of an
object.
5. Therefore, thinking of an object is necessary for the
t.u.a.
6. Therefore, the t.u.a. is a sufficient condition for
48
representing an
object.
49
Section 18: objective vs. subjective unity
Here Kant distinguishes an objectively valid unity of
representations
from a unity that has only subjective validity, as a way to
introduce
the notion of judgment in section 19. The first kind is the
unity con-
tained in the thought of an object; the second kind is
characteristic
of a mere association of representations. Unfortunately
Kant con-
fuses two different notions of subjective validity. He
begins section
18 by contrasting the objective unity of the t.u.a. with
“the subjec-
tive unity of consciousness, which is a determination of
inner sense”
(B139). By the latter hemeans amere association of
representations in
consciousness: “One person combines the representation
of a certain
word with one thing, another with something else; and
50
the unity of
consciousness in that which is empirical is not, with
regard to that
which is given, necessarily and universally valid” (B140).
The point is that although a mere association of
representations has a kind of unity in consciousness, it is
not a thought unity. Association occurs when one
representation immediately triggers another in time. It
depends on memory and psychological processes arising
from what
Hume called the “customary conjunction” of
representations. For
this reason Kant assigns it to the reproductive
imagination at B141.
To say that an association is only subjectively valid
means that it does
not produce a representation of an object. (It is also
subjective in
the secondary sense that the association of
representations depends
on contingent facts about the subject.) When Kant calls
this type of
51
connection “a determination of inner sense” he means
that it represents
a temporal ordering of the actual contents of
consciousness. But the
connection is not conceptual; a mere association does
not represent
an object, and hence lacks objective validity. Associated
perceptions
are united temporally in consciousness, but do not
produce a unity
of self-consciousness. Now one can of course take an
association as
an object of thought by reflecting on it. In recognizing
the sequence
as one in which one representation triggers another, one
thereby con-
fers objective unity on it. This is equivalent to taking a
unity in
consciousness as a unity for consciousness. Clearly,
however, the abil-
ity to associate representations does not entail the
ability to represent
52
the association as such. Kant thinks that animals possess
the former
ability but lack the intellectual capacities for the latter.
Unfortunately, in this passage Kant confuses the
subjectivity of an
association of perceptions with that of the empirical unity
of apper-
ception. The latter, as we have seen, is awareness of
oneself as a
particular subject. Empirical self-consciousness includes
the content
of inner sense, but is not a mere association of
perceptions, since
it represents the self as an object. Although empirical
apperception
varies in content by subject, and thus is subjective in the
secondary
sense, it nevertheless contains an objective unity of
representations.
Thus Kant is mistaken to use empirical apperception to
exemplify a
non-objective unity, which is the kind of subjectivity
53
relevant to the
deduction here.
Section 19: objective unity and judgment

In section 19 Kant argues that representing an object is
equivalent
to judging. He begins by complaining that the standard
definition
of a judgment as a relation between two concepts fails to
specify the
nature of the relation. At B141–2 he says that in
judgment one brings
a manifold to the objective unity of consciousness. In the
simplest
case of a categorical judgment, this objective relation is
represented
by the copula “is” connecting the subject- and predicate-
concepts.
13
Now to say that judgment possesses a necessary unity is
not to deny
that there are empirical or contingent judgments. The
54
objective unity
of the judgment, even if empirical, resides in the fact
that judgments
represent assertible thoughts about objects or objective
states of affairs.
Even if it is only a contingent truth that my cat is orange,
the judgment
“Buroker’s cat is orange” unifies diverse representations
to produce
an assertible claim about an object. Unfortunately Kant’s
examples at
the end of the section obscure this point, since he tries
to express an
association of perceptions by the conditional judgment
“If I carry a
body, I feel a pressure of weight.” By his own argument,
however, once one judges an association, one has
thereby unified the representations in the objective unity
of apperception.
As Allison points out, Kant’s theory of synthesis entails
that all judgments confer objective validity on
representations, even if the objects of judgment are
55
“subjective” states.
This step clarifies the notion of objective validity, for
unlike asso-
ciations of representations, judgments are true or false.
For a repre-
sentation to have objective validity is for it to be capable
of having
a truth value. What Kant has shown, then, is that
subjects who can
recognize their own representations must be able to
ascribe them to
themselves by the “I think.” This act is synthesis, which
connects
a given manifold of representations in the (objective)
unity of self-
consciousness. But synthesis is equivalent to judging; in
judging one
conceives a manifold as related in a way that can be
asserted to obtain.
Since assertions are true or false, Kant has argued that
the t.u.a. is
both necessary and sufficient for producing
56
representations that have
objective validity, that are assertible. The objects here
are objects of
judgment or thought. There is as yet no reference to
spatiotemporal
objects of human intuition.
[…]
Sections 24–5: the paradox of self-knowledge

To complete this discussion, let us look at Kant’s view of
self-
knowledge in sections 24 and 25.AtB152–3 he describes
the “para-
dox” of self-knowledge as following from the Aesthetic
doctrine that
in inner sense we are presented to ourselves “only as we
appear to
ourselves, not as we are in ourselves, since we intuit
ourselves only as
we are internally affected, which seems to be
contradictory, since we
would have to relate to ourselves passively.” The
57
paradox follows from
transcendental idealism. Because space and time are
merely subjec-
tive forms of sensibility, all objects intuited in space and
time are only
appearances, and not things in themselves. This applies
equally to
the empirical self, given in inner sense. Accordingly, we
can no more
intuit the self in itself than we do physical objects in
themselves. In
the Analytic, however, Kant has shown that the “I” that
thinks is
active and spontaneous. Judging is an activity consisting
of synthetic
operations the “I” performs on the manifold given in
intuition. So it
seems paradoxical to claim both that the “I” must be
active and that
it can know itself only as it passively appears to itself.
Kant’s solution is to deny both that the “I think” is a
cognition
58
of the self, and that we can cognize the thinking self. In
transcen-
dental self-consciousness, Kant says, “I am conscious of
myself not
as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that
I am. This
representation is a thinking, not an intuiting”(B157). Self-
awareness in
the t.u.a. is not a cognition of the self as an object, but a
merely formal
representation of one’s existence as thinking. (This is
why Kant dis-
agrees with Descartes’s view that the “I” of the cogito
must be a mental substance.) This self-awareness is
devoid of the intuition required to distinguish oneself
from other objects and thus to represent oneself as a
particular object. In his footnote at B157 Kant says, “The
I think expresses the act of determining my
existence.The existence is thereby already given, but the
way in which I am to determine it, i.e., the manifold that I
am to posit in myself as belonging to it, is not yet
thereby given.” And at B158n he denies that we can
59
intuit the activity of thinking: “Now I do not have yet
another self-intuition, which would give the determining
in me, of the spontaneity of which alone I am
conscious . . . thus I cannot determine my existence as
that of a self-active being, rather I merely represent the
spontaneity of my thought.”
Thus Kant dispels the paradox by denying that the t.u.a.
is a cognition of the thinking self. It is only a formal
awareness of the
activity of thinking, identical for all discursive
intelligences. Since the
sensibility yields only appearances, we can know
ourselves only as we
appear to ourselves, not as things in themselves.
Although this too
seems paradoxical, the “I” of “I think” is neither an
appearance nor a
thing in itself, but a condition of all thought.
Summary
The Transcendental Deduction contains Kant’s central
justification
60
for applying the categories to objects of experience. The
A edi-
tion version argues that apprehending the data of
intuition succes-
sively requires the imagination to reproduce previously
apprehended
representations, which presupposes concepts of the
understanding.
Although this version introduces Kant’s theory of
synthesis and the
t.u.a., it does not link the categories to judgment. The
significantly
revised B edition version corrects this defect, arguing
that the cate-
gories are required to represent objects of both thought
and percep-
tion. By analyzing the notion of an object in terms of
judgment, Kant
links the categories to the logical forms of judgment
identified earlier.
Thus he defends the application of pure concepts
expressed in syn-
61
thetic a priori principles to the objects of experience.
Because these
metaphysical concepts and principles have their seat in
the subject,
they apply only to appearances and not to things in
themselves. But
because they are necessary for experiencing objects,
they represent
real features of appearances, and thus ground empirical
knowledge.
Like the forms of intuition, they represent
transcendentally ideal but
empirically real features of experience.
62

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Introduction to German Idealism 5/26 - Robbert Veen at www.wiziq.

Reading material for the lecture on

The text of Hegel will be read in detail

1. Hegel on Kant (History of Philosophy)

2. Phenomenology of Spirit: Selfconsciousness

3. Jill Vance Buroker: Kant's Critique of Pure

NB the passages marked in red will be used for Monday's

Hegel on Kant (History of Philosophy)

1. Critique of Pure Reason

a. The a priori fact of sensuous existence, the forms of

b. The second faculty, the understanding, is something

The understanding thus obtains from the sensuous its

As self-consciousness I am the completely void, general

Now as ‘I’ is the universal transcendental unity of self-

I know of this sensation only and not of the thing. But, in

IN the kinds of certainty hitherto considered, the truth for

There has now arisen, however, what was not

3. Jill Vance Buroker:

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. An

The Metaphysical Deduction is the ﬁrst stage in Kant’s

1. Consciousness of conceptual unity presupposes a

“The I think must be able to accompany all my

This sentence includes several claims. First, it is

Now the act of attaching the “I think” is the act of

Once we put these points together we can get a better

First Kant describes the understanding as the faculty of

At B137–8 Kant emphasizes that the mere manifold

1. It is necessarily true of humans as discursive intellects

Section 19: objective unity and judgment

Sections 24–5: the paradox of self-knowledge

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