CHAOS, DIFFERENCE, RITORNELLO

Francisco Jos Martnez (UNED, Madrid, Spain)

Before all things, at the beginning, was

infinite Chaos
1.- Chaos.
The testimony of mythology places chaos at the origin of all things2
and Hegel himself says that this mythical chaos is represented as the
amorphous foundation of the world. A chaos that Deleuze
understands to be an undifferentiated abyss and an ocean of
dissimilarity. It was, specifically, to ward off this lack of definition,
this dissimilarity, this initial dispersion, that man introduced identity
and stability. For Plato, chaos was a contradictory state that had to
receive order and law from the exterior, it was a rebellious material
that the demiurge had to unfold and structure. Man has always tried
to order the world that surrounds him, to make a cosmos from chaos,
in order to withstand the absolutism of reality (H. Blumenberg). To
this end, philosophy has introduced identity into diversity and
permanent elements to limit incessant transformation. To do this, it
has had to dominate difference. Aristotle, Leibniz, and Hegel have
thought about difference, but they have subjected it to the identity of
the concept, the analogy of judgment, the opposition of predicates,
and the similarity of that which is perceived. Based on Nietzsche,
Deleuze faces the project of constructing an ontology of pure
difference that is not subject to identity.
Chaos presents two complementary aspects: the undifferentiated,
indeterminate abyss, in which everything that Parmenides tried to
exorcize is dissolved, and the ocean of dissimilarity where the
unlinked, fragmentary determinations mentioned by Empedocles
float. In contrast to this indetermination, difference arises as
determination, as a unilateral distinction that drags that from which it
is distinguished along with it. Chaos is the background in which all
forms are dissolved. Representation has tried to conjure this initial

chaos and it has done so by means of four complementary

procedures: identity in the form of an indeterminate concept, analogy
in the relation between ultimate determinable concepts, opposition in
the relation of determinations within the concept, and similarity in the
determinate object of the concept itself (DR, 44-45). An attempt is
made to overcome difference by representing it and this
representation subjugates it to the requirements of the concept.
2.- Difference3
Aristotle distinguishes between the difference of diversity and the
difference of otherness, referring this difference to the concept; this
means that, far from establishing a concept of difference, difference is
integrated into the concept, it is subjected to the identity of an
indeterminate concept. The specific Aristotelian difference inscribes
difference in the identity of an indeterminate concept, while generic
difference inscribes difference in the quasi-identity of more general
concepts, categories, thus subjecting it to the analogy of judgment
(DR, 50). Both differences, specific and generic, are, then located in
the framework of representation, becoming a reflexive concept and
thus subjecting themselves to the demands of representation which
Deleuze, in this case, calls organic representation. Difference, in this
happy Greek moment which inaugurates the primacy of
representation in the western tradition, determines the essence, gives
shape to the shapeless, defines the undefined, and makes it possible
to specify gender by means of specific difference. Difference remains
a reflexive concept and only finds a real concept when it designates
some catastrophe: either a break in continuity in the series of
similarities or an insurmountable fault line between analogous
structures. But, asks Deleuze, is this catastrophic capacity of
difference not the indication that there is an implacable rebellious
background that continues to act underneath the apparent balance of
organic representation? (DR, 52).
When difference faces the infinite and converges toward a foundation
instead of being organic, it becomes orgic and then, under the
apparent calm of that which is organized, the monster, the
catastrophe, arises (DR, 61). If organic representation assumes the
complementariness of two finite moments that can be assigned as
specific difference and generic difference, for example, orgic
representation is based on an alternative between two infinite
processes that can be assigned and that no longer swing between the
Great and the Small but between the infinitely great and the infinitely
small, that is, between Hegel and Leibniz. This means a change in the
notion of limit that, from referring to the extremes of finite
representation, comes to define the framework in which finite
determinations arise and disappear in orgic representation. The limit
is no longer what limits a form but rather what converges toward a
foundation, it is no longer what distinguishes forms but what
correlates that which is based on its foundation, it is no longer the

arresting of power but rather the element in which power takes place
and is based (DR, 62). In orgic representation, there is a double
reference to the limit: there is a constant overcoming of the limit
toward that which is infinitely great in Hegel and a constant process
of going beyond the limit in that which is infinitely small in Leibniz.
For Hegel, in the framework of the essence as reflection, that is,
insofar as the movement of the process of transformation and of
going beyond, which remains in itself, that which is different is
determined absolutely only as that which is negative in itself, that is,
as appearance (CL, II, 21). Orgic representation makes difference,
selecting it when it introduces the infinite that refers difference to the
foundation. In Hegels The Science of Logic, in its treatment of the
doctrine of essence, it is in the section devoted to essence as a
reflection of itself where the movement from appearance to
foundation occurs, passing through the essentialities or
determinations of reflection. This is the moment in which the
treatment of the relations between identity and difference, which
concludes the analysis of contradiction, is located. For Hegel,
according to Deleuze, contradiction resolves difference by referring it
to the foundation. Deleuze takes up, once again, the following
statements by Hegel (the translations have been modified):
Difference in general is already contradiction in itself (CL, II, 62).
Only after having been taken to the extreme of contradiction does
that which is varied and multiform become active and alive in
opposition to one another, achieving negativity, the immanent
pulsation of autonomous, spontaneous, living movement, in
contradiction (CL, I I, 75-76). It is only when difference is pushed far
enough among realities, that diversity is seen to become opposition
and, therefore, contradiction, so that the whole of all realities in
general becomes, in turn, an absolute contradiction in itself (CL II,
76). As we see, for Hegel, difference becomes contradiction so that
varied things thus obtain negativity, which is the key to movement
and change. Difference is the movement of that which is negative.
According to Hyppolites analysis of these Hegelian texts,4 it is
necessary to start with the distinction among things in order to
understand negation in being and in thought, as the immediate
intuition of that which the senses perceive already contains negation
in the form of pure becoming; negation and distinction imply one
another mutually. Empirical thought believes in the privilege of that
which is positive; it only captures exterior differences and considers
them to be indifferent differences because it is not aware of the
extent of negation. The distinction of things leads to the problem of
the other. In the Sophist, Plato substituted the contrary of being for
the other and wished to avoid contrariness and contradiction by not
admitting negation. Plato acknowledges otherness but does not
develop it in the direction of contradiction, in contrast to Hegel, who
goes into opposition in depth until he reaches contradiction. Platonic
dialectics is static while Hegelian dialectics is dynamic, unfolding the
movement that goes from diversity to opposition and from opposition

to contradiction. Empirical thought cannot overcome the separation

between interiorness and exteriorness; it cannot achieve the
speculative point of view according to which the object is the contrary
of itself. The movement from diversity to opposition assumes that
things are reflected in one another and this reflection is their
opposition. Thus, external difference becomes internal, or difference
in essence, and this means that it is necessary to start with that
which is negative in order to understand that which is positive. Each
determination must be understood as negation, which means that
each determinate existent is not identical to itself but rather differs
from itself. The motor of real oppositions is this difference from itself
to itself.
As we can see, Hegel developed the existing exterior diversity among
things first as opposition and later as contradiction in a process of
gradual interiorization of the exterior of difference that culminates in
the contradiction in which each thing contains itself and its opposite
in its interior. Hegel starts with absolute difference or simple
difference, which is the difference of reflection, goes through
determinate difference in itself, which shows itself as the unity of
difference and identity, and arrives at diversity that has in itself two
moments, identity and difference itself. Starting with diversity, Hegel
goes through opposition which is the unity of identity and diversity, of
positive and negative, which present themselves as two moments of
difference which are mutually exclusive. Finally, diversity and
opposition are overcome by contradiction which is revealed as their
ultimate truth.
If Hegel leaps to the infinitely large, Leibniz leaps to the infinitely
small, but this leap to infinite representation does not follow from the
principle of identity as an assumption of representation. Both Hegel
and Leibniz lead difference to the foundation, to sufficient reason, and
in this way have the infinite lead the identical to exist in its own
identity. In Hegel and Leibniz, it does not much matter that the
negative of difference is considered to be a contradictory opposition
or a limitation due to vice-diction, just as it does not matter that
infinite identity is shown as analytic or synthetic; what is important is
that, in both cases, difference remains subordinated to identity,
reduced to the negative, imprisoned in similarity and analogy (DR,
71). Infinite, orgic representation shares the inability to establish an
appropriate concept of difference with finite, organic representation
because they limit themselves to inscribing difference in the identity
of the concept.
What an ontology of difference rejects is the false alternative of
infinite representation: either it falls into that which is
undifferentiated, that which is indeterminate, or a difference
subjected to that which is negative, either the (Hegelian) negative of
opposition or the (Leibnizian) negative of limitation, is stated. What
allows Deleuze to think about a notion of pure difference is the

genealogical, anti-dialectic thinking of Nietzsche who, in his analyses

of forces, considers the origin to be difference, the hierarchical
difference of forces that separates the dominant forces from the
dominated forces. Our author opposes, according to Deleuze, the
speculative element of negation, opposition, and contradiction,
difference as a practical, empirical element, an object of assertion and
pleasure, and proclaims differential assertion in contrast to dialectic
negation (N, 10). The affirmation of difference is what characterizes
the will to power that, in this way, shows difference to be the result of
a practical assertion that is inseparable from the essence and that
constitutes existence (N, 18). Dialectics ignores the real element
from which the forces come, and so its basis, opposition, is only the
law of the relation between abstract products, while difference is
the only principle of genesis or production, the principle that
produces opposition as simple appearance. Dialectics is a superficial
movement that is based on mere external oppositions, without
reaching the level of the subtle, subterranean differential mechanisms
that constitute topological movements and typological variation (N,
181). Dialectics focuses on the differential element from the side of
the reactive forces, from the point of view of nihilism, of resentment,
and of a bad conscience and, because of this, sees it inverted,
reduced to a mere opposition, incapable of generating new ways of
thinking and new ways of feeling. Faced with dialectics, Nietzsche
tries to raise a new image of thinking that breaks with its three main
assumptions: 1) the power of that which is negative shows itself in
opposition and contradiction, 2) the valuation of the sad passions, of
suffering and sadness, and 3) the consideration of positiveness as
derived from negation itself. Dialectics reflects on difference but does
so in an inverted way by substituting the assertion of difference as
such with the negation of that which differs. Dialectics is the thinking
of the theoretical man who attempts to judge life, to limit it and
measure it; it is the thinking of priests, of men who subject life to
working that which is negative. It is the thinking of the slave who
expresses a reactive transformation. Faced with dialectics, Nietzsche
establishes his own method, which Deleuze follows, a dramatic,
typological, differential method in which the will to power appears as
a plastic, genealogical principle, less as force than as the differential
element that determines, simultaneously, the relation of the forces
(quantity) and the respective quality of the forces in relation (N,
225). The ontology of Deleuzian difference, with Nietzschean roots,
has as its speculative postulate the assertion of multiplicity and, as its
practical postulate, pleasure in diversity (N, 225). The ontology of
difference is based on the will to power and on eternal recurrence as a
radical statement of difference whose essential characteristics are the
following: the lightness of that which is stated, against the weight of
that which is negative; the games of the will to power, against the
action of dialectics; the statement of statement, against the famous
negation of negation (N, 225).
3.-The ritornello

We have seen how the ontology of pure, affirmative Deleuzian

difference is an attempt to conjure the power of chaos, an attempt to
shape a chaosmos that introduces some kind of order into a reality
whose chaotic aspect is never completely eliminated. We shall now
present the notion of ritornello as an example of this relative
stabilization of chaos and as a concrete application of this ontology of
difference.
In the ritornello, which presents itself, in its musical form, as the
chorus of lullabies, three moments can be distinguished: a) the
constitution of a territory from the initial chaos by establishing a
stable center and directional components that structure the forces of
chaos in an infra-agency form, b) the organization of territorial agency
in order to be able to inhabit it thanks to dimensional components
that make up the terrestrial forces obtained by filtering the forces of
chaos and that lead to an inter-agency, c) the opening up of a
territory to other territories or even to the entire Cosmos, by means of
the components of passage and flight that connect with cosmic forces
and with the forces of the future and create an inter-agency by means
of the de-territorialization of the already-constituted territory (MP,
383.384). Starting from a black hole where a stable center is marked
as the beginning of an order, a circle is drawn that marks a territory
as home, as the residence and, finally, the circle opens up to the
cosmos. This process assumes that something is obtained from chaos
thanks to the filtering by the territory as a lived space that produces
telluric or terrestrial forces and that, later, this closed territory is
opened up to the cosmic forces, exterior forces, and forces of the
future. The ritornello seeks a territory starting from chaos, deterritorializes it by opening it up to the cosmos and, finally, returns to
re-territorialize it once again, but the point of return is never the initial
point; rather, it introduces a difference.5 It is necessary to take into
account that the organized space of the territory is more an intensive
space constituted by a movement that produces an active spacing,
than a mere extensive space organized in a stable fashion. This
dynamic character of constituted territory is what makes it possible to
graft openings that project this closed territory toward the exterior
onto the constituent movement. The territory that is thus constituted
opens up in the form of errant centrifugal forces toward the sphere of
the cosmos. The ritornello always refers to the earth, to a Natal, to a
Native, producing a Nomos that distributes space, that is constituted
as an ethos, as a dwelling (MP, 383-384).
The Halves and Rhythms are born from chaos. Each half is a timespace block made up of the repetition of its components, shaped by a
code. The halves open up on chaos and the response that they give to
the intrusion of chaos in their structures or to their own dilution in
chaos is the shaping of a rhythm. A rhythm that produce an inbetween that is located between two different halves, ensuring their
communication, the coordination between two heterogeneous timespaces. Each half exists only because of a periodic repetition, but this

repetition is not always the same, but rather introduces a difference,

an interval, a separation, that makes the half evolve toward the other
half. A territory is not simply an environment or a rhythm but the
product of the territorialization of the halves and the rhythms (MP,
386). A territory includes an exterior half, an interior half, an
intermediate half, and an annexed half, that is, an exterior that is
dominated, an interior that is inhabited, limits and membranes where
the interior and the exterior connect, and annexed reserves that feed
it. The territory is defined by the emergence of expressive materials
or qualities, which can serve as a characteristic, singular signature. A
territory is defined by its qualities, which mark its specificity, its
property and identity, its style, its specific manner, and that make it a
specific domain that is distant from other domains. Territories, even if
they are provisional, as the organization of the earths forces, serve
as a defense and refuge from the chaos that is always threatening
with its exterior forces. In this sense, the ritornello is any set of
materials of expression that draws a territory and that develops
through territorial motifs, territorial landscapes (MP, 397).
The ritornello is a form of differentiating repetition with two
dimensions: a spatial and a temporal dimension. The ritornello, on
one hand, produces an alternate movement of territorialization and
de-territorialization, of closing and opening up space, and, on the
other hand, constitutes a specific time that conjugates that which
already exists with the opening up to novelty from infinitesimal
variations. The ritornello is an invention that turns the singular
universal in contrast to the particularities of memory and the
generalities of custom, in the wake of Kierkegaards repetition and
Nietzsches eternal recurrence. The ritornello, as a turning in on itself,
is an immanent fold that opens up to the infinite as a there-and-backagain movement. The ritornello has a privileged relationship with the
Earth, it is the song of the Earth: it appears as the exit from chaos
toward a land, as the organization of this land and as the movement
that comes from the land and goes elsewhere. The movement of the
ritornello with respect to the land is triple: it goes toward a territory, it
installs itself in this territory, and it leaves it (MP, 396). In its creative
aspect, of opening up to the cosmos and to the future, a ritornello
occurs when a territorial component starts to produce new shoots, to
move, to change (MP, 401). The ritornello is a time-space crystal (MP,
418) that organizes a territory and creates a time, an involved time
in Guillaumes sense, that is, a time that expresses the aspect of the
verb and is inherent to it, which it interiorizes, it is the time of the
event, the time the event contains, not the time that contains the
event or universal time.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

G. Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophie, (N), PUF, Pars, 1962.

, Diffrence et rptition, (DR), PUF, Pars, 1968.
, Mille plateaux, (MP), Minuit, Pars, 1980.
G. W.F. Hegel, Ciencia de la Lgica, T. II, (CL,II), Ediciones Solar,
Buenos Aires, 1982.
J. Hyppolite, Logique et existence, PUF, Pars, 1991.
F.J. Martnez, Ontologa y Diferencia: la filosofa de Gilles Deleuze,
Orgenes, Madrid, 1987,
A. Villani, Ritournelle en R. Sasso y A. Villani, Le Vocabulaire de
Gilles Deleuze, CRHI, Niza, 2003.
F. Zourabichvili, Le vocabulaire de Deleuze, ellipses, Pars, 2003

1 Image: Magnum Chaos. Inlay in the chorus of the basilica of Santa Mara Maggiore,
by Capoferri and Lotto (1522-1532).
2 Hesiodo, Theogony, 116, Before all things, at the beginning, was infinite Chaos.
Ovid, Metamorphoses, I, 7, chaos: a raw confused mass, nothing but inert matter,
badly combined discordant atoms of things, confused in the one place. (Trans. by A.S.
Kline http://ovid.lib.virginia.edu/trans/Metamorph.htm)
3 I have dealt with the subject of difference in Deleuze in Chapter X Representacin y
Diferencia in my book Ontologa y Diferencia: la Filosofia de Gilles Deleuze, Orgenes,
Madrid, 1987, pp. 203-218.
4 Cf. J. Hyppolite, Lgica y Existencia, Ensayo sobre la Lgica de Hegel, Universidad
Autnoma de Puebla, Puebla, 1987, pp. 131-167.
5 Cf. F. Zourabichvili, Le vocabulaire de Deleuze, ellipses, Pars, 2003, pp. 74-75.