BRIEFER

ON THE MAMASAPANO INCIDENT INVOLVING THE PNP

SAF and MILF/BIFF


1. BASIC FACTS OF THE INCIDENT

On Saturday evening, January 24, a group composed of members of Philippine
National Polices Special Action Force (392 members) headed to Barangay
Tukanalipao, Mamasapano, Maguindanao.
o Team composed of two groups: one was the strike team that captured
Marwan and the other was the blocking force tasked to secure the
escape of the first group.

Their mission was to serve outstanding arrest warrants to two notorious
terrorists who have long been pursued by authorities, namely Abdulbasit Usman
and Zulkipli Bin Hir, alias Abu Marwan. The operation was called OPERATION
WOLVERINE.
o Marwan is part of the Central Committee of the Jemaah Islamiya, which
was responsible for the Bali bombing in Indonesia. ($6 Million bounty)
o Usman, on the other hand, is connected to nine bombing incidents in
Mindanao. He is the primary accused in the bombing in General Santos
City in 2002, in which 15 people died, and 60 were injured. ($3 Million
bounty)

Past 4:00am in the morning of January 25, the SAF reached the stronghold in
which Marwan and Usman were hiding. In the encounter that followed, the
primary target, Marwan, was allegedly killed. Upon hearing the gunshots, Usman
and his cohorts fought back. There were also non-combatants spotted in the
houses in which Marwan and Usman were located. Marwans house was the first
attacked; Usman responded, and the element of surprise, which was necessary
to avoid detection, was lost.

The SAF decided to withdraw and rendezvous with their companions (blocking
force), who were securing their exit route from the area where the encounter
occurred. 44 SAF members died, while 18 MILF fighters died.
o Initial investigation showed that the SAF men were surrounded by BIFF
and MILF gunmen in a corn field, where they were pinned for 10 hours,
with enemy snipers picking them off one by one.
o In Maguindanao, blood and family ties determine loyalties and many
members of the MILF and BIFF are either relatives or friends.

At past 6 a.m., the joint monitoring team from the MILF and the government
called a ceasefire, According to SAF Chief Napeas, the MILF did not stop
shooting. MILF ignored ceasefire call and refused to heed the monitoring teams

call for a ceasefirel; the firefight continued and the containment or blocking force
was pinned down in an open field, he said.


2. WHO KNEW ABOUT OPERATION WOLVERINE?

The head of SAF, Police Director Getulio Napeas, admitted that he did not
coordinate with the military and the MILF before launching Oplan Wolverine
o It was a command decision and we had been working on it for a long
time and as a commander, I decided that it was best not to inform other
units in the police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines about the plan
of initiating the actual assault. It was a judgment call and I take full
responsibility,
o We worked hard on this and we couldnt allow our work to go to waste
by informing the MILF. We dont trust the MILF, he said.
o President Aquino said he instructed SAF Police Director Getulio Napeas
to coordinate with the concerned groups. But the later did not do so.

Napenas said he made a call to one of his superiors, OIC PNP Chief Deputy
Director General Leonardo Espina, only through a text message at 5:00am of Jan.
25, several hours after jump-off
o I informed him that the operation against Marwan was under way. We
were already there and the troops were already deployed, he said.

NAPENAS DID NOT INFORM AND REPORT TO SEC. MAR ROXAS
o He admitted that he could not go directly and report to Interior Secretary
Mar Roxas, who has supervision over the PNP, because Espina came first
in the chain of command.
o He explained that under police operational procedures, a commander
should inform his superior about a mission before or during the
operation.
o He said the secrecy about the operation was deliberate and
recommended by intelligence operatives on the ground.
o Sec. Roxas during the meeting with Napenas said: I am the SILG but I was
not aware of this operation that involved 400 policemen,
o Sec. Roxas to SAF personnel: They did not tell me about this Im not
saying I would have known better but I also cant help feeling I was not
given a chance to ensure there was better coordination,

INVOLVEMENT OF SUSPENDED PNP CHIEF PURISIMA
o Chief Supt. Getulio Napeas also admitted during a closed-door meeting
with senior police officials in Cotabato City on Monday that suspended
Philippine National Police Director General Alan Purisima directed
the operation that involved 392 SAF troopers.
o A former SAF commander, who asked not to be named due to the
sensitivity of the issue, said the animosity between Purisima and Roxas

was to blame for what could be the worst debacle in the history of the
police commando unit.
o The source also claimed that Purisima directed the botched police
operation by remote control from his office at Camp Crame, the PNP
national headquarters in Quezon City.
o Purisima had long suspected that Roxas was behind his suspension. He
kept the intelligence report about Marwan to himself because he wanted
all the accolade if the operation would be successful, the source said.


3. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE DILG, NAPOLCOM, PNP, SAF

COMPOSITION OF DILG
o Section 6 of RA 6975 (DILG Act of 1990) The Department shall consist
of the Department Proper, the existing bureaus and offices of the
Department of Local Government, the National Police Commission, the
Philippine Public Safety College, and the following bureaus: the
Philippine National Police, the Bureau of Fire Protection, and the
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology.

SECRETARY OF DILG AS EX-OFFICIO CHAIRMAN OF NAPOLCOM
o Section 8 of RA 6975 The head of the Department. The head of the
Department, hereinafter referred to as the Secretary, shall also be the
ex-officio Chairman of the National Police Commission

RELATIONSHIP OF DILG AND NAPOLCOM
o Section 4 of RA 8551 (PNP Reorganization Act of 1998) - The
Commission shall be an agency attached to the Department for
policy and program coordination.

[Org. Structure of DILG from DILG Website] THERE IS ONLY A COORDINATION LINE BETWEEN DILG AND NAPOLCOM

POWERS OF NAPOLCOM
o SEC. 14 of RA 855. The Commission shall exercise the following powers
and functions:
"(a) Exercise administrative control and operational supervision over
the Philippine National Police which shall mean the power to:
"1) Develop policies and promulgate a police manual prescribing rules
and regulations for efficient organization, administration, and
operation, including criteria for manpower allocation, distribution
and deployment
"2) Examine and audit, and thereafter establish the standards for such
purposes on a continuing basis, the performance, activities, and
facilities of all police agencies throughout the country;
XXX
"4) Conduct an annual self-report survey and compile statistical data
for the accurate assessment of the crime situation and the proper
evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of all police units in the
country;
XXX
"10) Inspect and assess the compliance of the PNP on the established
criteria for manpower allocation, distribution, and deployment and
their impact on the community and the crime situation, and thereafter
formulate appropriate guidelines for maximization of resources and
effective utilization of the PNP personnel;
"11) Monitor the performance of the local chief executives as deputies
of the Commission; and
"12) Monitor and investigate police anomalies and irregularities.

WHO HAS THE PRIMARY ROLE OF DIRECTING THE TACTICAL OPERATIONS OF

THE PNP: THE PNP CHIEF
o Section 26 of RA 6975: The command and direction of the PNP shall
be vested in the Chief of the PNP who shall have the power to direct
and control tactical as well as strategic movements, deployment,
placement, utilization of the PNP or any of its units and personnel,
including its equipment, facilities and other resources. Such command
and direction of the Chief of the PNP may be delegated to
subordinate officials with the respect to the units under their
respective commands, in accordance with the rules and regulation

prescribed by the Commission. The Chief of the PNP shall also have the
power to issue detailed implementing policies and instructions regarding
personnel, funds, properties, records, correspondence and such other
matters as may be necessary to effectivity carry out the functions, powers
and duties of the Bureau


[Org. Structure of PNP from PNP Website]

THE SPECIAL ACTIOB FORCE (SAF) IS A SUPPORT UNIT UNDER THE PNP
o Section 35 of RA 6975: Support Units - The operational support units
shall be composed of the Maritime Police Unit, Police Intelligence Unit,
Police Security Unit, Criminal Investigation Unit, Special Action Force
o Section 35 of RA 6975: Special Action Force. Headed by a Director with
the rank of chief superintendent, the Special Action Force shall function
as a mobile strike force or reaction unit to augment regional, provincial,
municipal and city police forces for civil disturbance control,
counterinsurgency, hostage-taking rescue operations, and other special
operations.


4. WHAT THE LAW SAYS ABOUT COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

ADMINISTRATIVE CODE: EO 292, Chapter 9, Sec. 38
o SECTION 38. Liability of Superior Officers

(1) A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the
performance of his official duties, unless there is a clear showing of
bad faith, malice or gross negligence.
(2) Any public officer who, without just cause, neglects to perform a duty
within a period fixed by law or regulation, or within a reasonable period
if none is fixed, shall be liable for damages to the private party concerned
without prejudice to such other liability as may be prescribed by law.
(3) A head of a department or a superior officer shall not be civilly
liable for the wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence, or
misfeasance of his subordinates, unless he has actually authorized
by written order the specific act or misconduct complained of.

EO 226, Sec. 1 and Sec. 2 (INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF
"COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY" IN ALL GOVERNMENT OFFICES, PARTICULARLY
AT ALL LEVELS OF COMMAND IN THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE AND
OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES)
o Sec. 1. Neglect of Duty Under the Doctrine of "Command Responsibility". -
Any government official or supervisor, or officer of the Philippine
National Police or that of any other law enforcement agency shall be
held accountable for "Neglect of Duty" under the doctrine of
"command responsibility" if he has knowledge that a crime or
offense shall be committed, is being committed, or has been
committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of
responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he did not take
preventive or corrective action either before, during, or
immediately after its commission.
o Sec. 2. Presumption of Knowledge. - A government official or supervisor,
or PNP commander, is presumed to have knowledge of the commission of
irregularities or criminal offenses in any of the following circumstances:
a. When the irregularities or illegal acts are widespread within his
area of jurisdiction;
b. When the irregularities or illegal acts have been repeatedly or
regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or
c. When members of his immediate staff or office personnel are
involved.