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Social Scientist

The Right Politics to Come


Author(s): Radhika Desai
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Social Scientist, Vol. 29, No. 5/6 (May - Jun., 2001), pp. 33-62
Published by: Social Scientist
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3518297 .
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RADHIKADESAI*

The Right Politics to Come1

A century of the greatest political confrontationsin the history of


capitalism has ended with the complete surrenderof the left. But
victory has been paradoxical for the victor: triumph has been
accompaniedby dissipation.No clearelectoralor politicaldividends
have come for parties of the right. This is commonly attributedto
nature of the victory itself: the acceptance of the basics of neoliberalismin all nationsby partiesof the centreand social democratic
left, along with their new closeness to particular sections of the
capitalistclasses,hassimplyblurredthe old politicallinesandidentities
making party system increasinglysimilar to the US model of two
partiesof capital (of which Julius Nyererewas known to have said,
"TheUnitedStatesis also a one-partystate,but with typicalAmerican
extravagance,they havetwo of them").In this sensealmostall politics
today is the politics of the right,the politics of the classes of property
andolderpartiesof the rightcan no longerexpectanyspecialpurchase
on the political situation. And all parties suffer many problems in
common:Disorientedpolicy,corruptionscandalslinkedto the increase
in electionexpenses,erosionof traditionalsocialbases,and significant
sources of dissatisfactionwith globalization, not least from among
capitalistclasses themselves.
But, this hardly means, as some have venturedto suggest, that
right and left have both ceased to exist. Only the left has. As long as
there is an order of propertyto protect, a specificallyright politics
will remainindispensableand distinctlyidentifiable,whetheror not
an organisedopposition to it exists. And it is so today. The political
polarizationsof the 1970s and early 1980s havenot been replacedby
any centrist politics. Ratherthe rise of extreme right groups on the
other side of the political spectrum,which have no counterparton
the left, underlinesthe lopsidednessof the currentpoliticalsituation.
* Associate Professor, Political Science, University of Victoria, Canada.
Social Scientist, Vol. 29, Nos. 5 - 6, May-June 2001

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The almost total rout of the left may be recent, but the force and
resolutionof its opposition to the capitalistorder has been in doubt
since the beginningof the Cold War and the "containment"of the
SovietUnion. RobertBrennerwent furtherand argued,in the case of
the centresof advancedcapital,that the subordinationof labourand
its organizationsin the course of national and internationalclass
struggleswaged by capitaland its representativeswas the basis of the
spectacularand sustained capitalist accumulationof the post-war
period2.The fortunes of a compromised and bureaucraticsocial
democracyin the centresof advancedcapital,andof developmentalism
in the rest of the capitalistworld, remainedyoked, thereafter,to the
healthof capitalismitself.The lackof an organisedpoliticalopposition
does not mean today, as its weaknessdid not mean before, that the
politicaltasksof protectingand managingthe processof accumulation
againstthe obstaclespresentedby natureandculture,as well as coping
with the dynamic imbalancesof capitalist accumulation,political
and economic, can be ignored or neglected.This is itself a form of
class struggle,though it should not be forgottenthat while it may be
quite adequateto the needs of the right, any new left must take the
struggleto higherpolitical, economic and culturallevels to fulfill its
own historicaltasks.
The politics of the right since the Frenchrevolutionhas evolved
through a series of distinct historicalstages, singularconstellations
of constituencies,ideologies and strategies,in the face of changing
configurationsof propertyand the politicalchallengesto it3.Perhaps
the mostradicalreconstitutionit executedwas the one afterthe Second
World War when the order of property it had to defend, and the
domestic and internationalpolitical situation in which it had to do
so, had changed radically enough as to impose a thoroughgoing
reconstitution of its ideologies and strategies. Even so, the
reconstitutionappearedmoreradicalthan it actuallywas. Whichthe
resourcesit could mustertowards it were, for the most part, hardly
novel, to the political necessityof stabilisingcapitalismdomestically
and internationallyin objectivelynew historicalcircumstanceswas
added the imperativefor dissimulatingits real continuities with a
deeply discreditedpast. The effectivenessof the dissimulationcan
still be seen in the pervasive mis-recognition of right politics as
"centrist"from which the right benefitspolitically and which dogs
the understandingof its imperativesand intentionsin broadswathes
of progressivecircles.Nevertheless,objectivelynecessarychangesdid
not just include the institutionsof the welfare state demandedby a

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35

populationmobilisedfor war,but a centralrole for the state, and the


new supra-nationalinstitutionsbeingfashionedunderthe supervision
of the US, in the managementof capitalaccumulation. Similarly,the
presentperiodof transitionand the formthe righttakes at the end of
it will have to answer to certain fundamentalchanges in the terrain
on which the right must operate and the challenges, however
diminished,it mustface. Understandingwhat thesearewill be crucial
for any emergingleft if it is to be more canny this time aroundabout
the exact natureand orientationof the right in the 21stcentury.
Scholarshipon the politics of the Right is, comparedto that on
the left, relativelysparse. Topicalityis, afterall, governedby criterion
of concern:in a culturedominatedby institutionsfavouringthe order,
the acceptable is unquestioned and unexamined while attention
focusseson what appearstroubling,namelythe left,as the voluminous
literatureon it indicates. Butwhile this appliesto the mainstreamof
the academicestablishment,not to mentionintelligenceagencies,what
of leftist and liberalscholars?I think the root of the problemis that
the politics of the right is fundamentallyuncreativeand therefore
basedon a correspondinglyunremarkablepoliticalunderstandingand
strategy.Of course,this is also mainlywhatJ.S.Mill was complaining
about when he said that the Conservativeparty of his country was
the "stupid party". Left parties, by contrast, have to be creative.
Theirpublicdebatesoverthe analysesof situations,andcorresponding
ones over doctrines and policy, their organizational forms and
innovations, the relationshipswith the mass base, and the creative
experimentsand failedpromisesof Leftgovernmentsthemselvesform
a hugecorpusof the self-consciousnessof the left and its penetration
is a crucialdeterminantof then effectivenessof the actions on which
it expendsits sparseresources. Rightpolitics has no realcounterpart
to this.
Indeed, the most penetrating analyses of the right have been
producedpreciselyin the context of these Left debates and not, on
the whole, in the academicstudy of right politics. The weakness of
the left over much of the last 50 years,and its defeat today, have put
the understandingof the dynamicsof contemporaryright politics in
even more dire straits than before. Particularlyafter the Fall of
Communism,it is being conducted, on the whole, in ignorance or
evasion of the most penetratingLeft analysesof the last centuryand
a half. Just when the need for a higherlevel of penetrationbecomes
more and more acute, at the moment of its pervasivetriumph,just
when the extremeright is also risingagain, the analysisof it, and its

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connectionwith the widerpoliticsand politicaleconomyof our time,


has been radicallyimpoverished.
In particular,I would like to stressone insight of Left analysisof
the righthitherto:that,in addition,of course,to the politicaleconomy
which underlies any given order of property,we should pay most
attentionto the surroundingequationor constellationof forceswhen
the problemsandprospectsof rightpolitics,particularly
understanding
that of the extreme right. It is this which will determinehow far it
can go. Marxist analysesbeginningwith Marx'sexaminationsof the
Revolutions of 1848 and of Frenchpolitics 1848-51, have stressed
again and again how much the fortunes of extreme right regimes
dependon the complicityof otherpartiesand forcesof order,including
cultural ones. It is this kind of Marxist, Gramscian and overall
historicalanalysiswhich is crucialtoday.
I want to presentan outline of the main parameterswithin which
right politics must today reconstitute itself in capitalist liberal
democracies.For while the right may take more extreme forms in
authoritariancontexts, the new forms of the right will be more
complex, subtle and arguablyfuller in liberaldemocracies.Political
parties in such contexts must elaborateideologies which can fulfill
the conflictingrequirementsof accumulationand legitimation. They
must give the ruling politicians and the interests behind them an
understandingof theirpurposesin power and a form of legitimation,
as Gramsciwould say, or ,a "politics of power" and a "politics of
support"in AndrewGamble's4terms.
Among the capitalistliberaldemocracieswhere the dynamicsof
the contemporaryrightcan be observednumbernot only the advanced
capitalist liberal democraciessuch as the WesternEuropeanor the
North American, but also a poor countries like India. Both the
capitalismsand the liberaldemocraciesof these very differentsets of
countries,which have always been analysedseparatelyaccordingto
the conventions of mainstreamsocial and political science, have
actuallybeen renderedcomparableby two importantchanges. First,
the penetrationof capitalist relations of productionin the agrarian
economies of much of the former third world has eliminated the
determiningrole of pre-capitalistforms of property,in particularthe
peasantry,in nationalpolitics. This had once radicallydistinguished
them from those of the regions of advancedcapital. Now, however,
remaining forms of pre-capitalist production are politically
marginalisedthe world over. Second, liberaldemocraticpolitics has
becomeestablishedin one versionor anotherin most of the capitalist

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37

nationsof the world.This is less surprisingthanit seemsand bespeaks


its structuralcompatibilitywith capitalism. For liberaldemocracyis
neitheras old as is usuallyassumedin the West5,nor an unbreachable
defense against authoritarianism (whether or not there is a
parliamentaryroad to socialism,we do know there has been one to
fascism)and nor yet, perfectin its operationthere. If the povertyof
its new forms in the thirdworld can be noted, so too must its current
impoverishmentin the richcountries:in all countries,its denaturing
differsonly by forms of power which capital can wield - money and
control over the media in the richercountriesand petty briberyand
physicalintimidation,in additionto them, in the poorer ones.
Of course, the vast chasm which separates the wealth and
prosperityof the countries of advancedcapital and the rest is not
without moment. The greaterrelative deprivationof the masses in
to what is now a globalmediapoor countries(in relation,particularly,
projectedstandard)not only necessitatesgreaterdoses of populism
in them, the extent to which the neo-liberalnostrumsof the rightcan
become commonsensicalamong the electorate is also appreciably
lower. But these are differencesof degree,not quality,and a broadly
comparativeperspectiveon the right in both rich and poor liberal
capitalist democracies is not only possible but also necessary for
identifyingits contemporarydynamicswith clarity.Indeed,in large
part, this paper is impelledby a problemI have experiencedin my
currentwork on the politics of Hindutva6,which is the core of the
politics of the right in Indiatoday. It is that Hindutvais far too often
consideredin isolation, and considereda sui generis. I think, on the
contrary,one can understanda lot more and better by comparing
Hindutva with the politics of the Right in other capitalist liberal
democracies.And intellectualsand political activists of these other
countrieshavea lot to learnfromthecaseof Hindutva.Forit combines
within itselfthe chieffeatureswhich aregermanefor an understanding
of the politics of capitalin all nations:an adherenceto neo-liberalism
and globalizationdespite significantopposition to it from within its
own ranks,a link to a well organisedextremerightformationwhose
fascistinspirationis well known,andits espousalof a formof cultural
nationalism which is the globally respectable face of extreme
nationalismand authoritarianismeverywhere.
The following are the main developmentswhich determinethe
politics of the rightin these countriestoday.They should be valid for
all the saidcountriesbut,whenconsideringa particularcountry,would
have to be furtherspecified.

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THE SOCIALBASISOF CONSERVATISM


AS SUCHHAS DISAPPEARED.

In the long historicalevolution of the modernrightand left new


elements and issues have emerged,old ones have been shed or have
declined in relative importanceas they have sought to fulfill their
respectivehistoricaltasks on the basis of given historicalsituations
and resources. On the right, the enduringchallenge has been the
preservationand adaptation of the order of private property and
associatedcultural,social and political arrangementsupon which it
was based. Quite apartfrom the successivechallengesto the orderof
property,therefore,its own changingnatureas capitalismdeveloped
has determinedthe politics of the right. The disappearanceof the
social basisof Conservatismbelongsamong the changesin the latter
category, a change which is as fundamental as it has been
unacknowledged.
Conservatismwas the most prominentand importantcomponent
of the shifting constellationsof the politics of the right, shaping its
politics at its birthand for a centuryand a half thereafter.It is not, as
so often assumed, synonymous with right politics, but a distinct
historicalelement of it. In its classicalBurkeanform it professed to
advocate only so much change as was requiredfor the maintenance
of order as the developmentof capitalism increased the pace of
historical change and the sources of instability. Of course, such
decisionsbeingcontextual,it was neververyeasyto pin Conservatism
down in any clear doctrinal fashion. But as a historical political
formation of right politics it can be more clearly defined. It was
originally less a defence of capitalismagainst workers' revolution,
than it was a defence of pre-capitalistforms of (naturally)landed
property,and its habitualmodes of surplusextraction, against the
emerging industrial capitalist form itself, though its politics also
changedas landedpropertyformedlinkswith capitalistpropertyand
itself becameincreasinglycapitalist.
Conservatism,with its formativeassociationwith the aristocracy
and its particularculturaland political elan, has benefitedfrom the
widespread and nebulous indulgence towards aristocraticculture
which is unfortunatelyalso evidentin sectionsof the left7. While the
distinction often drawn between Conservatism and more
authoritarian,reactionaryand plebeian forms of right politics is
frequently useful, Conservatives determined to retain political
purchaseon fast-changingcontextsof politicalcrisishavebeenknown
to come aroundto those as well, as they did everywherein Europe
with the rise of fascism8. Indeed, as Arno Mayer analysed it9,

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39

Conservatismas an authentic political vehicle of the defenders of


propertyreachedits historicalterminusin preciselythat crisis, and
its passengershad to board other much less sumptiouslyappointed
trains for their furtherjourneythroughhistory.
Conservatism'slong inningsin the politics of the rightin Western
Europe, and the countriesof advancedcapitalismin general, lasted
until the beginningof the "ThirtyYears'Warof the generalcrisis of
the twentiethcentury"in 1914. Its political strengthuntil then was,
accordingto Mayer,a fact of Europeanhistory as fateful as it has
been overlooked. And the role of Conservatism in causing that
cataclysmhas beenradicallyunderestimated.The GreatWarmarked
"thedeclineand fall of the old orderfightingto prolongits life rather
than the explosive rise of industrialcapitalismbent on imposing its
primacy".But a historicalprofessionpreoccupiedwith elements of
progress, tending to "neglect and underplay and to disvalue the
endurance of old forces and ideas, and their cunning genius for
assimilating, delaying, neutralising and subduing capitalist
modernization,even includingindustrialization",tendedto overlook
the fact that until 1914, despite the developmentof capitalism and
the rise of a post-feudalabsolutiststate, the landedclasses not only
retainedtheir ownershipof land, but they were also assimilatedinto
the apparatusof the new state, which becamesuffusedwith the spirit
and traditionsof feudalnobility."Europe'sold orderwas thoroughly
pre-industrialand pre-bourgeois"".10
Landremained"therulingand governingclasses' principalform
of wealth and revenue until 1914"11 and, even when greater
concentrations of capital emerged in the later 19thcentury, they
remained"of limitedeconomicimportanceuntilthen.Moreover,those
associated with it, "magnates of industry and their associates in
corporatebankingand the liberalprofessionswere more disposedto
collaboratewith the agrariansand the establishedgoverningclasses
than with the older bourgeoisie of manufacturers,merchantsand
bankers"12.This Schumpeterianpicture was complete with postfeudal noble rulingclass skilledat availingcapitalistpossibilitiesand
adapting to the new economy and its political institutions, a
bourgeoisiewhich "excelledat emulation",and a consequent"active
symbiosisof the two social strata":
If the feudalelementsin bothpoliticaland civilsocietyperpetuated
it was largelybecausetheyknewhow
theirdominanceso effectively,
Thepublicservicenobilities,bothcivil
to adaptandrenewthemselves.
in
andmilitary,took qualifiedandambitiousscionsof businessand

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the liberalprofessions,thoughtheywerecarefulto regulateclosely


thisinfusionof newbloodandtalent.Newcomershadto passthrough
theeliteschools,ingestthecorporateethos,anddemonstrate
fealtyto
for advancement.
the old orderas a precondition
Besides,the highest
and militaryservicescontinuedto be
ranksof the statebureaucracy
reservedfor menof highbirthandprovenassimilation."'3
Imperialismitself was never an aristocraticaffair, particularly
when colonial personnel are considered. But it provided another
ground for this symbiosis - for bourgeois emulation. As Perry
Andersonnoted in the case of England: "Imperialismautomatically
sets a premiumon a patricianstyle:as a systemof alien domination,
it always....seeks to maximise the existentialdifferencebetween the
ruling and the ruled race...therecan be no plebeian pro-consuls"14
Bourgeoisemulation also ensuredthat culturallythe "classicaland
academicidioms, conventionsand symbolsin the arts and letters"of
the "historicisthigh culture"ratherthan any independentbourgeois
modernism remained dominant1s. Ultimately based on the actual
materialpowerof theirpropertyandin manycountries,the persistence
of kingly and aristocraticeconomic, political and cultural power
before 1914, this "persistenceof the old regime"properlyended only
in 1914. But it also reverberatedthroughthe politics of the inter-war
period with former Conservatives everywhere embracing more
extreme forms of right politics, includingfascism, and impartingto
it, at times, an unlikelyelan.
Conservatism also enjoyed a strange after-lifeas a new, more
thoroughlycapitalistorder emergedin Western Europeafter 1945.
At that juncture,old wealth was overtaken by the new wealth of
which the wars, with their massive boost to industrial production,
now based on new far more productivetechniqueswhich the Great
Depression kept in abeyanceuntil the SecondWorldWar,had been
midwives. And this new wealth was capitalist. Since then power in
the centres of advanced capitalism has generally been based on
capitalistprivatepropertyand the righthas been requiredto preserve
it, while also fosteringits furtheraccumulation,in this form.Logically,
Conservatismcould no longer be adequateto this task. With its now
exclusively cash and commodity relationships and fast changing
productionandconsumptionpatterns,this purercapitalistorder,now
neithershelterednor burdenedby the overlayof feudalnobility,could
not allow nor expect the politics of continuity, pragmatismand
deference.
However, for roughly a quarter century after 1945, the new

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capitalistrightpolitics,also intimatelycommittedto the US-ledantiCommunist offensive which included extensive retention of fascist
personnelin the politicalandadministrativestructuresof the countries
wore a moderateandorganicist
of advancedcapitalistdevelopment16,
which
could
taken
be
for
Conservatism,particularlyin
appearance
the new context of welfare capitalism. Whether the right had
reinventeditself, as in Britain,in the inter-warperiod or, as in much
of fascistand occupiedEuropeandthe US, thereafter,its leaderscould
still claim a social distinction and deference which had been the
hallmarkof Conservatismhitherto.Not only were aristocraticfigures
notable in the partiesof the rightafter 1945, even more importantly,
as PerryAnderson has pointed out, "the bourgeoisieas a class, in
that meaning of the term in which Max Webercould remarkwith
pride that he belonged to it....a social force with its own sense of
collective identity,characteristicmoralcodes and culturalhabitus ...
a bourgeoismilieu confidentof the moral dignityof its own calling"
still existed.""Inthe politicalrealm,substantialfigureslike Adenauer,
De Gasperi, Monnet embodied this persistence - their political
relationshipto Churchillor De Gaulle, grandeesfrom a seigneurial
past, as if an after-imageof an originalcompactthat socially was no
longervalid"'17.Havingemulatedand deferredto the high cultureof
the aristocracyhitherto,and now bereftof any living Conservatism
or aristocratic culture to follow, never having evolved its own
independentcultureforcefullyenough,sucha bourgeoisiewould soon
reveal itself as the historicalanomalyit actuallywas.
As a capitalist calss, ratherthan a bourgeoisie,the post-Second
world war ruling class sccumbed to the logics of the
verycommodification,includingthat of culture,which it fosteredas
the baasis of its own prosperity.Fromthe late 1960s, as these classes
faded into the historicalbackground,came an "encanillementof the
possessingclasses". Its "starletprincessesand sleazeballpresidents"
were the symptoms. The new right, with its miserly and punitive
ideology, its open racism, social authoritarianism and cultural
nationalism,the commonersocial originsof its leaders,its mediatized
relationship to its electorate, its rationalised organization and its
undeniablerelianceon shock troops of the lumpenis surelythe first
purely and unabashedlycapitalistright emergingin all its Brechtian
glory.Not surprisingly,Liberalismas a distinctivelybourgeoispolitical
currentwas never strong, its bannersappropriatedby working class
parties'strugglefor democraticrightswhere the latter'suniversalist
and egalitarianaspirationsalso transmutedit into various forms of

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bureaucraticand welfarist social democraticideologies particularly


in the English-speakingcountries.Forthe rest, Liberalismin any pure
form lived a politically ineffectuallife in small middle-classradical
groups and parties particularlyon' the continent where electoral
systems of proportionalrepresentationsallowed them of safe and
secureniche.
The forms of politics and ideology which today remainopen to
the right are populism, nationalismand authoritarianmanagement
of social and economic uncertaintywithin a neo-liberalcontext. The
brazenclass biassesof such politics make a sharpcontrastto at least
the appearanceof organicismwhetherof the patronageor the welfare
variety. Neo-liberalism,the crudeeconomic "Manchesterian"wing
of liberalism,was now set againstthe rest of liberalideology with its
politicallyprogressiveelements.Its political accompanimentwas an
anti-democratic, often anti-constitutional right discourse of the
Hayeks and Huntingtons,the Schmittsand the Oakshotts.
Verysimilarchangescan also be traced,with local variations,in
the politics of the poorer capitalist world. In India, it is true that
specificallyaristocraticelites had alreadybeen politicallyweakened
by colonialism. And in the context of nationalistpolitics, they lost
furthergrounddue to the collaborationof those that remained,with
colonialism. Conservative parties based on them, such as the
Swatantraparty,couldneverflourishafterindependence,thoughmany
individualprincesand princesseshave, since the beginningof liberal
democraticpolitics, demonstrateda flair for adaptingto its plebian
demands in many bourgeois parties. Indeed, the popular energies
unleashedby the strugglefor independenceensuredat least that land
reforms, while woefully inadequateby any comparativestandard,
and by the registeredneed, made large sections of the middle caste
tenants into owners, bringing them on a par with corresponding
groups in the rest of the country where they had historically been
that. It was on the basis of this class that a sort of conservative
politics,whichcombinedpatronagerootedin pre-capitaliststructures
of surplusextractionwith the minimallywelfarist structuresof the
independentIndianstate, could be found in Gandhianideology and
practices. These linked more numerous and correspondinglyless
substantialmiddle-castelanded elites in every region and state to a
Congresspartywhose nationalleadershipwas drawnfromthe upper
echelons of the predominantlyHindu upper caste possessing and
professionalclasses with their Brahminicaland Westernizedculture.
The Centre-statesaxis of Indian politics has revolved around the

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evolving relationshipbetween these socially distinctgroups.


In India too, the shift from the developmentalist, minimally
welfaristand egalitarian,and secularpolitics of the Congressto that
of Hindutvaand neo-liberalismhas been based upon a transitionto
more completelycapitalistforms of property.Both are based on the
direct and indirectsupportof the landedelites, the leadingelements
of which have today become capitalist.The dispersedand localised
hegemoniesof the rurallanded dominantcaste elites had originally
reliedon the residuesof theirpre-capitalist"patriarchal-patrimonial"
power, in short their dominance. These dissolved with the
commercializationof agrarianrelationsand with the diminutionof
the opportunitystructures*ofthe minimallywelfarist state. This is
the basisof whatJayantLelehascalledthe "ruralizationof Hindutva"
18. This crisis of authorityin the countrysidehas brought forth an
authoritarianresponse.On the one hand this was due to the lack of
state resourcesto preventthe minimal upward mobility among the
lowest castes and groupsfrom appearingto eat into the privilegesof
the increasingly ambitious propertied. On the other, the caste
subordinationand expectationof deferencewhich the capitalismof
the Indiancountrysidewould still rely on to achieve requiredlevels
of super-exploitationis fast disappearing.The supportof the middle
caste provincialcapitalistclasses for Hindutvacomes both directly,
with the BJPbeing able to absorb them directly into the party, or
more usually, indirectly,with the support for the BJP-ledcoalition
governmentby regionalpartiesbased on these classes.
In sum, Conservatism'sacceptability,its reputation for greater
humanitythan other elements of the right, was everywherealways
exaggerated.Nevertheless,to the extent that it restedon a dullingof
the edge of class conflict, a dulling originallybased on the fanciful
self-understandingof "gracious"nobility whose own fortuneswere
in any case beingmoretightlyyokedto those of capitalism,it afforded
a semblance of a politics of feudal patronage and later on of the
welfare state. With its disappearance,then, the sole "human"face
(and it was more usuallya mask)of right politics has been lost, and
this at a time when,
b) The primary social basis of right politics has expanded
enormouslyin absolutetermsand is morepowerfulin relativeterms.
At one level this point is very simple. It lies at the intersectionof
two obvious ones. There has been an enormous increasein wealth
and incomesin the courseof the last 50 yearsand, particularlyin the
latter half of the period, they have been more and more unequally

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distributed.This has led to an absolute expansion of the classes of


property at a global level and a massive increase in their relative
power,as a collectivity,againstthe propertylessclasses. In greateror
lessermeasurethis phenomenoncan be found in all capitalistliberal
democracies,not to mention, globally.
In the advancedcapitalistcountrieswherethe processof capitalist
developmentis of much longer standing, the expansion among the
classes of propertyas such is less marked.But its true extent is also
masked. Many of the claims to the new wealth, which are mediated
through new financialstructuressuch as pension funds and mutual
trustsarewhat RobinBlackburnhascalled"grey"- "notonly because
it refersto provisionfor the old, but also becausethe propertyrights
of the policy holders are weak and unclear"particularlyunder the
presentregime trusteelaw where they are held in trust funds 19.Of
course, share ownership without controlling interest was itself the
basis, of longer standing, of these less clear propertyrights. This is
the chief form in which the professionalclasses, particularly,hold
"property"in the countries of advancedcapitalism,though among
them too, the phenomenonis strongerin the two economies where
the fruitsof growth over the last two decadesof the 20'hcenturyhave
beenmost unequallydistributed,the US andthe UK.Not surprisingly,
for it has beenone of the chiefinstrumentsthroughwhichthis unequal
distributionof wealth and incomes has been achieved.
There has also been a general consolidation of support for the
right among professionalswho are reliant on corporate sector for
theirincomesand suchpropertyas they have or hope to have. On the
otherhand, those professionalswho arein the state and NGO sectors
haveformedthe basisof the move of SocialDemocracyto the Right.20
The role played by privatisation,which includesthe contractingout
of many functions formerlyperformedby the state bureaucracyto
private agencies, in increasingthe numbersof professionalsreliant
on privatecapital is part of this expansion in the social basis of the
right. Finally the casualisationof the work of many corporate and
stateemployees,professionalsandmanual,also makesfor the increase
in personaluncertaintywhich expandsthe potential basis of a more
right-wingform of politics amongthe workingclassesas well. In this
regard,however,it is well to take note of HerbertKitschelt'sfinding
in his study of radical right wing politics in Europe that "welfare
chauvinist"appealsto which these constituenciescan be expectedto
respond actually lack a "structurallocation in advancedcapitalism
in which to entrench themselves": "short of a major economic

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catastrophe,it appearsunlikelythat the gradualtransformationof


Westerneconomieswill everthreatenor actuallycut freea sufficiently
large section of the workforce into unemploymentto provoke the
riseof significantauthoritarianwelfare-chauvinist
parties.Partieswith
such appealsmay do well for a while in depressedindustrialareasor
in regional protest elections but rarelyon a national scale or for an
extended period of time."2' While many sections of the working
class in advancedcapitalistcountriesmight not be immuneto such
right wing appeals, the political potential of this option is limited.
Right parties, includingextreme right authoritarianones are today
generally anti-statist. Of course, the support which the right has
enjoyedamong certainsectorsof state employees,such as the police,
for example, or the upper reaches of the bureaucracyis of long
standing.
In poor country like India, a capitalist but still predominantly
agricultural country, while many of the above processes can be
observedin its relativelymuch smallermodernand urbancapitalist
economy, the pictureas a whole is dominatedby a single distinctive
phenomenon:the transitionin Indianagricultureto capitalistrelations
of productionwith all that usuallymeans in terms of concentration
of productiveassets,increasinginequalityand povertyandthe cultural
transformationof productionand consumption.The resultis a much
clearer and larger relative increasein the numbersof the capitalist
propertied,as pre-capitalistforms of property,most especiallythat
in land, have become capitalist and the "middle classes" have
expandedby layingdisproportionateclaimon the new wealthcreated
underan economicpolicyregimewhich has becomeincreasinglyneoliberal since the late 1960s. And, though originating in the
countryside,this transformationof the countrysidehas reverberated
out from there,politically,economicallyand culturally,to producea
far more cohesive middle class than the long held opposition of the
"traditional"countrysideand the "modern"city would lead one to
expect.
Initially,in the 1970s, this new addition to the capitalist class
took the shapeof agrarianpartiesand non-partyfarmers'movements
in differentregionsof Indiademandingstate subsidiesfor inputsinto
capitalist farming such as fertilizerand electricityand higher state
procurementpricesfor grain, in short, bettertermsof tradewith the
industrial sector. In this, largely intra-middle class conflict, the
deployment of "urbanbias" argumentsin a new populismor "new
agrarianism"accompaniedby a romanticcelebrationof the authentic

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rusticity of a harmonious pristine "Bharat"pitted against the menacing


might of urban and industrial "India"22was meant, of course, to
obscure the fact that the brunt of the initially adverse terms of trade
have been borne by the agricultural labourers, whereas prosperous
and capitalist farmers have reaped huge cost-plus surpluses on
procurement prices geared to the lower productivity of medium and
small farmers23.Since then, the terms of trade for a politically assertive
agrarian capitalist class have actually bettered themselves now also
to the detriment of urban working class, consumers.
It was the rise of regional parties which, however, which reflected
the more settled reality of this "rural" bourgeoisie. By the 1990s, if
not earlier, it was clear that the character and aspirations of this class
were no longer exclusively rural. While the original wealth of this
segment was certainly in land, a visitor to any of the hundreds of
bustling mid-sized towns and cities of India can tell, their investments
are not confined to agriculture:
A typicalfamilyof this ....class has a landholdingin its native village,
cultivated by hired labour, bataidars,tenants or farm servants and
supervisedby the fatheror one son; businessof variousdescriptionsin
towns - trade, finance, hotels, cinemas and contracts managed by
othersons;andperhapsa youngbrightchildwho is a doctoror engineer
or maybe even a professorat one of the small town universitiesthat
have sproutedall over the countryover the past two decades.24
This class was, therefore, not so much an agrarian bourgeoisie as
what Balagopal rightly called a "provincial propertied class"25.The
regionalisation of Indian politics, reflecting the states-focussed power
base of this new segment of the bourgeoisie, which has become so
settled a pattern by the 1990s, revolved as much around demands for
more state support for industrial development and employment in
general in the regions, as aroung greater support for agriculture. Last
but not least, there were the agitations for discrimination in favour
of middle castes in government education institutions and employment
became such a watershed in Indian politics of the late 1980s. If such
"reservation" has now become more or less a non-issue this is as
much because all parties have had to bow before these demands and
accept them as it has been because, like the older sections of the
propertied, the newly wealthy have also learnt to disdain government
educational institutions and government jobs. For the neo-liberal
dispensation which was contemporaneous with these demands doubly
devalued them through lack of funding and the greater size and
attractiveness of the private sector for education and jobs.

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47

The cultureand politics of this enlargedcapitalistclass naturally


dominates in a context where the Left, still strong in its regional
bases, has been effectively quarantinedin them and is now under
increasingpoliticalpressure.In India,the expansionof this class been
the mainstayof both liberalizationandglobalizationand of Hindutva.
For although, for a brief moment under the CPM-orchestratedUF
government, it appeared that the regional parties, representinga
middlecastepropertiedinterestmightbe opposedto the Brahmanical
politicsof Hindutva,this suppositionoverlookedseveralthings.First,
any simple rural-urban or agriculture-industry opposition had
disappearedwith the entryof agrariancapitalistsinto the urbanand
industrialeconomy. Second, while there are distinct provincialand
national capitalist classes in the country, the latter form, after all,
also the horizonof the ambitionof the former.Finally,the cultivating,
landedor tenant middlecasteswereneverin any simplesenseopposed
to Brahmanism but had, throughout history competitively
collaboratedwith it in a pact of surplusextractionas they are now
doing in the NDA coalition of the ruling BJP with more than 15 of
the regionalparties.
This expandedclass of capitalist property,whatever its internal
tensions, is generallythe basis of politics of the right in capitalist
liberal democracies.It may be noted here in both richerand poorer
capitalistcountries,the significanceof "familyvalues"andthe control
of women, whetherarticulatedin religious,secularor nationalterms
in the politics of the right,can be expectedto be greaterin countries
LEELA
and in sections of society where the significanceof the family as an
FERNANDES
instrumentfor the concentrationand generationaltransmissionof
propertyremainshigh. But, with the increasingentry of women in
the labour force, and with the increasingdependenceof households
on their incomes even in poor countries, the discourse is actually
much more complex (the BJP,for example wants "modern"but not
"Western"Indianwomen) than the atavisticstereotypewould lead
one to expect, spinningnew webs of sexist, if not exactly patriarchal,
control aroundincome (and not just child-) bearingwomen.
The decline of Conservatismas such means that this largerand
relatively more powerful right is also meaner.Indeed, the secular
*Arno Mayerhas called
rightwardshift which this expansionof what
the "cartelof anxiety"26is a lot moreintense than it could be because
c) The proneness of this "cartelof anxiety" to the extremes of
right politics has been intensifiedby the high levels of uncertainty
generatedby the dynamicsof capitalismtoday.

* Arno Mayer, The Dynamics of Counterrevolution in Europe: 1870-1956:

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SOCIALSCIENTIST

This phenomenon is now part of the personal experience of


individualsthe worldoverandhas beenextensivelyanalysedby critical
scholars of globalization. It has to do with the centrality of the
globalizationof financein what is indiscriminatinglyunderstoodas
the globalizationof capitalismitself. In fact it is, for the most part, a
globalizationof capital,one which, moreover,standsoverand against
the growth of productionand its internationalizationthroughtrade,
already far more limited than that of finance. With its basis in
speculationand short-termtime horizons, while it may inflate (and
then, naturally,let crash) asset values here and there, has a more
pervasivelydeflationaryeffect on world capitalistproduction.
Fordespiteits vocationas expandingabstractvalue,evencapitalist
productionmustalwaysbe carriedout in andrelyon particularnatural
and culturalcontexts and relationseven when inter - and intra-firm
relations cross borders. Only money, the ultimate real abstraction
can attain the abstract context-less self-expansion which its
contemporaryspeculativeglobalizationrepresents.Butpreciselysuch
selectiveasset inflationis the symptomof the contradictionon which
it rests. On the one hand, capital's abstract expansion cannot be
sustained indefinitely without a necessarilycontextual productive
expansion, which alone can substantiateits abstractvalue and on
the other, qua abstraction, it underminesthe very investment and
productivegrowth which it requiresfor its realization.This is the
contradictionwhich lies at the heart of the globalization of capital
and makes it necessarilyan unstableprocess.Not surprisingly,some
elements of the capitalist class add their voice to the analysis of
critical scholarswhen they too call for capital controls.
However,as PeterGowan has recentlyshown so well, the process
of the globalizationof capital is not a secularphenomenonbut one
gearedto maintainand increasethe (financial)controland superiority
of metropolitancapitaloverthe peripheryand even moreimportantly
that of USoverthe capitalsof othercountriesof advancedcapitalism27.
The longevity of this phase of globalization of capital will also be
dictated by these considerationsand not merelysecularones about
the productive health of capitalism.
In the meantime, the globalization of capital is experiencedby
individualsand firms primarilyin termsof the extent of uncertainty
it wreaks. Its short term and speculative character destabilises
established productive relationships and obstructs the stable
decisionsand actions,
constructionof new ones. Even"well-informed"
whether of capitalists, workers or professionals, whether about

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49

business or personal finance, become unpredictable in their


consequenceseven as the hedgingof riskbecomesa vain task in which
Nobel Memoriallaureatesin economicssquanderthe reputation(such
as it is) of the prize itself. In such a situationeven, or especially,the
ownersof substantialpropertyandthe holdersof favourablepositions
within the asset structureare more uncertainof the securityof their
hold over it and sharpens punitive, avaricious and authoritarian
tendenciesamong them.
One important consequence of such an architecture of the
productivesystem is that it is also characterisedby instability and
uncertaintyin the relations amongst property-owners. This only
exacerbatesthe fact that, at any time in history,
d) There are divides within this "cartel of anxiety" which, it
appears, can only be masked and minimally bridged by cultural
nationalism.
Even, or perhapsespecially,when all the forms of propertyare
capitalist, there are competing interests among them, both
economically and politically. Smaller locally based capitals, for
example, have to compete with larger ones and those with
multinationallinkages, and productivewith financial. The various
capitalist firms and sectors also compete in the political sphere for
state largesseand support,both domesticallyand in the international
sphere of operation of the larger multinational capitals. Such
competition has increasedrather than decreasedas the balance of
power has shifted towards capital and away from labour and other
social forces 28. Politicalcompetitionamong the partiesof the right,
which usually means all parties where the left is defeated or
marginalised,now mirrorsthis competition between capitals. But
these various sectors of capital are also hierarchicallystructuredin
relationto each other in the economic spherethroughtechnological
and financialties of dependence,and in termsof theirrelativepolitical
influence.Not surprisinglythen,this politicalcompetitiontakesplace
without questioningthis overall hierarchy.It is about the place of
differentcapitals, within nations and of various national capitals in
the internationalspherewithin the unquestionedhierarchy.Neither
a national productivenor a national anti-imperialistproject,which
are usuallyassociatedwith nationalismcan be expectedto emerge in
such a set up despite the consequencesof globalizedfinance for the
productiveecoIiomiesthe world over and the subjectposition of the
capitalsof all countriesto those of the advancedindustrialcountries,

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and ultimatelyto the capitals and state of the US.


In India, until recently,a bourgeoisinterestagainst imperialism
was thought to exist. In tryingto explain why it no longermanifests
itself, PrabhatPatniakand othersproposedthat the very differences
between various sections of capital precludes a coherent national
capitalist economic strategy against globalization 29. They confine
theirargumentto backwardeconomieswhere,they argue,the process
of the expansion of the capitalist class takes the form of a
Schumpeterian "proliferation of capital", in which newer
concentrations of capital necessarily constitute new and distinct
sectors of capitalist production, increasing the multiplicity and
potential for conflict within the capitalistclass itself.
It is not self evident,however,that this appliesonly to backward
economies. Particularlyin situations of economic stagnation, such
"proliferation" is inevitable in all capitalist economies as both
established and emerging sections of capital seek to politically
consolidatetheirpositions.At the sametime, multipleandcompeting
interestswithin the capitalist class can only be seen to be the root
cause of the surrenderto neo-liberalismand globalizationif it could
be shown that a substantialportionof these fractionsof capitalhave
an objective interest in, and a viable strategyfor, doing otherwise.
The evidence does not support this. Given the complex web of
interdependenceand hierarchywithinthe globalhierarchyof capitals,
national and multinational,even in the case of the more powerful
andjustlyfamousdistinctiveformationsof highlyproductivenational
capitalismssuch as Germanyor Japan,the complex hierarchicaland
differentiatedintertwiningof technological, financial and political
relationsbetweenthesecapitalsandcorporationsand "non-national"
ones seem precludethis. The more subordinatedposition of Indian
or third world capitals does put them in a ratherdifferentsituation
vis a vis internationalcapitalwherethe optionof exit mightbe thought
to be more appealing. But whatever the level of advancementof
capitalismin any country,this option is rarelyappealingunlessthere
is political pressurefrom the non-possessingclasses which poses a
problem of legitimation which can be solved by the asserting a
substantial degree of economic autonomy internationally and
focussingon expandingproductionnationally.Withoutit, the ties of
technologicaland financialdependenceon largercapitalistfirmsand
fractionsbothwithincountriesandinternationallyaretoo compelling.
Butpoliticallyculturalnationalism,i.e. a nationalismshornof its
civic-egalitarian and developmentalist thrust, one reduced to its

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51

cultural core, seems to be the only ideology capable of being a


legitimisingideology.Two sets of factorsconvergeinto this necessity.
First,neo-liberalismcannotperformthe rolesinceits simplicitiesmake
it harshnot just towardsthe lower ordersbut give it the potentialfor
damaging politically importantinterests amongst capitalist classes
themselves.Since,as a consequence,the activitiesof the state on their
behalf necessarilyexceed the Spartanlimits which it sets, these can
only be legitimisedas "in the national interest".Second, however,
the nationalismwhicharticulatestheseinterestsis necessarilydifferent
from, but can easily (andgiven its functionas a legitimisingideology,
it must be said, performatively)mis-recognisedas, nationalism as
widely understood hitherto. That nationalism was one which is
historicallyassociated with the creation of equal citizenship under
modern nation-states. Widespread mobilisation which usually
accompaniedthe various national strugglesseemed to requirethat
these nationalisms seek productivity and equality at home and
challenge the imperialistinternationalorder to achieve this. With
the quietus of such popularand progressiveforces in the politics of
most nations,the culturalnationalismof today is neithercommitted
to equality and productivityat home nor to autonomy abroad, but
their contraries.
In this form, culturalnationalismdoes provide national ruling
classes a sense of their identity and purpose as well as a form of
legitimationamong the lower orders.As Gramscisays these are the
main functionsof everyrulingideology.Culturalnationalismas the
culturalcore of nationalismis, in every country, usually structured
around the culture of the dominant classes, with higher or lower
positions accordedto other groups within the nation relative to it.
Thesepositionscorrespond,on the whole, to theireconomicpositions,
and as such it providesthe dominantclasses, and concentriccircles
of theirallies,with a collectivenationalidentity.It also givescoherence
to and legitimisesthe activitiesof the nation-stateon behalfof capital
or sections thereof in the internationalsphere. It is today the only
ideology which can encompass and express the variety and
competitionamongthe interestsof the propertiedat the nationaland
internationallevels. It masks, and to a degree resolves, the intense
competitionbetweencapitalswhichcentresaroundaccessto the state
for support domesticallyand in the internationalarena- in various
bilateraland multilateralfor a - where it is expected to bargainfor
the most favourednational capitals within the global and imperial
hierarchy. Except for a commitmentto neo-liberaland globalizing

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policies, the economic policy content of this nationalismcannot be


consistent: Within the country, and internationally,the capitalist
system is volatile and the positions of the variouselementsof capital
in the nationaland internationalhierarchiesshift constantlyas must
the economic policy of the culturalnationalistgovernments.It is this
volatility which also increasesthe need for corruption- which is just
how competitive access of individualcapitals to the state is today
recognized.
Whateverits utility to the capitalistclasses,
e) Culturalnationalismcan neverhave a settledor securehold on
those who are marginalizedor subordinatedby it.
Particularlyunder a neo-liberalregimes, the scope for offering
genuine economic gains to the people at large, however measured
they might be, is small and getting narrower. This is a problemfor
right politics since even the broadestcoalition of the propertiedcan
never be a majority,even a viable parliamentaryplurality.This is
only in the nature of capitalist privateproperty.While the left is in
retreator disarray,electoralapathyis a useful political resourcebut
even where, as in most countries,political choices are minimal, the
electorate as a whole remainsvolatile, making necessaryvery large
electoral costs (the other side of corruptionin politics today as the
examplesof the ChristianDemocratsin Germanyor the Conservatives
in Britainshow), the extensive and often vain use of the media in
elections and in politics generally,political compromiseswhich may
clash with the high and shrilly ambitious demands of the primary
social base in the middleclasses, and the instability, uncertaintyand
disorientationwhich characterisedthe politics of right parties in all
advanced capitalist despite, nay because of, the triumph of neoliberalism.
But cultural nationalismprovides new instrumentsfor dealing
with this situation.. In all countriesvarious degreesand varietiesof
inclusion in, and othering from, the dominant culture have been
employed in the attemptto create viable electoral majorities.These
electoralcoalitionsof supportare structuredsuchthat the proportion
of economic to merelypsychologicalrewardsdecreasesas one goes
down the economic ladder,and from the centre to the peripheryof
the dominantcoalition of interests.At the lower end of the economic
hierarchyof "cultural"groupsamongthe propertiedthemselvesthere
is a potential for controlling - stopping or slowing - the upward
trajectoryof the propertiedfromotheredgroupsby usingtheirgeneral

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53

cultural othering as a threat unless and until these groups prove


amenableto the terms of the dominantgroups. But since their own
positions are necessarily,either relatively or absolutely, adversely
affected by the rise of such groups, these terms may be ultimately
vain, exhibiting, over time, an irrationaland escalatingcharacter.
This is the situation of Muslims in India today, and the recent call
fromthe votariesof Hindutvathat they "nationalise"or "Indianise"
themselves (which is to say, accept, and not seek to disturb, the
cultural, and thereforeeconomic superiorityof the predominantly
Hindu capitalist classes) is an instance of such demands, as is the
recentdemandsof the GermanChristianDemocratsthat immigrants
acceptthe notion of a leitkultur- a leadingculture.Amongthe lower
sections of the dominant community too, the proportion of
psychologicalto economicrewardsmustof necessitybe high for they
form a "majority"and theireconomic demandsprove hardto fulfill
within the currentneo-liberalcontext. Today,with the lowering of
the culturallevel of the capitalistclasses themselves,it is this which
makes these lower echelons more prone to virulent right-wing
ideological mobilizationratherthan any meaningfuldifferencesin
the cultural habitus of the social segments of the coalition of the
right as was the case with fascist mobilizationspreviously.
Culturalnationalismalso encompassesand practicesever more
finelywhat usedto be calledthe ethnicizedsegmentationof the labour
marketwhich puts obstaclesin the path of a class mobilization.The
ideologyof culturalnationalism,andparticularlythe relativepositions
accordedto variousworkingclassgroupswithinthe nationconstitutes,
as Etienne Balibarso clearly noted, a "mechanismfor differential
reproductionof the labour force". There is "a match between (a)
skill grading; (b) proportion of- foreign [or otherwise othered]
workers; (c) the various modes of work-force reproductionwhich
allow capitalto reducetrainingand upkeepcosts on unskilledworkers
by bringingthem from dominated ('peripheral')regions [within or
outside the nation, but always from outside the dominantgroup] of
the world economy,wherenon-commoditymodesof production[but
more to the point less commodified forms of reproduction]partly
prevailand which lack those 'socialrights'that the labourmovement
of the 'advanced'countrieshas been able to impose for more than a
century"30.Balibarclearlysaw the implicationsof this for the state
itself, a loss of its "public"character:"The state in Europe[but not
institution,
only there]is tendingto disappearas a power-centralizing
one to which responsibilityfor policy can be ascribed and which

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exercises'public'mediation(in both sensesof the term)betweensocial


interests and forces. We might also express this by saying that we
have entereda phaseof a new-style'privatization'of the state, but in
the guise of a multiplication and superimposition of public
institutions"31.We might just add that it is not only the activitiesof
the state in relation to workers but also, as we noted above, its
activitiesin mediatingthe interestsamong the capitaliststhemselves
which impartsto it this new character.
Hindutva in India works, like all cultural nationalisms, by
identifyingthe nationwith the economicallydominantidentitywithin
it - in this case the predominantly"Hindu" capitalist class - and
formulatingall problemsas threatsto this nation originatingin more
or less demonisedminorities.The ethnicizationof the opposition to
the orderalso serves,as we shall see below, as a strategyof managing
the potential for class conflict. Given the elite characterof such a
nationalism,thesecan includeobstinatesubalternstechnicallywithin
the "dominantcommunity"(say, "Hindu")as well as religiousand
ethnic minorities. The emphasis may shift from authoritarianand
violent marginalizationto offersof incorporation.The termsof such
offers, despite the "culturalism" of the discourse, are primarily
economicterms,of the rulingclasses.Of course,the strategytowards
each group is different.
The economic and social costs of this form of political economy
have been borne by the lowest stratain each countryand the level of
social and economicdistressand disorganizationwhich have resulted
mean that
f) Thereare sizeable constituencies,and not just of the lumpen
and the discouragedwho can be, and some of whom have been,
organisedfor reactionand extreme-rightpolitics. It would be useful
to see these forces in Arno Mayer'stermsas counterrevolutionary.
Mayer'swork on counterrevolutionis complex and insightful.It
is also 30 years old now, and, on the left at least, very few of its
statements would be considered particularly original. But, its
systematicdiscussionof the politicsof the extremerightin its relation
to the politics of property more generally is its chief claim to our
attention.Most attemptsto understandthe activitiesof contemporary
extremerightgroupshave focussedon theirsimilaritiesor otherwise
to fascism and Nazism and that too, on the whole in terms of their
respectiveinternalcharacteristizs.These writingsare useful and one
would be foolish not to take the internalsimilaritiesseriously.But, in

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55

both respects,Mayer would say the focus is too narrow for proper
understanding.What he enables us to do, by contrast, is to see these
forcesas partof a familyof counterrevolutionary
phenomenonwhose
practicalresultsare, moreover,determinedmore by the surrounding
situationthan by theirintrinsiccharacteristics.Afterall, fascismitself
in inter-warEurope, as Hobsbawm remindsus, has been part of a
largerthreatto politicaldemocracyfromthe Rightwhich represented
"not merelya threatto constitutionaland representativegovernment,
but an ideologicalthreatto liberalcivilizationas such"in which while
"byno meansall the forcesoverthrowingliberalregimeswere fascist",
fascism "inspiredother anti-liberalforces, supportedthem and lent
the internationalRight a sense of historicconfidence"32.
Mayer saw counterrevolutionarygroups as having a mass base
and a leader.Thoughthey often cut into the base of mainstreamright
they remaineddifferent from and, usually, independentof
mODI?parties,
them, "anew butclaimantpoliticalcounterelite".Theyweretolerated
and kept in existence, rather than crushed, precisely because their
future utility to the established ruling groups cannot be
underestimated,somethingwhich Brechtso well broughtout in The
Resistable Rise of Arturo Ui. Commentingon the rise of the new
right in the 1960s MichaelKaleckisaw the "fascismof our times" in
muchthe same terms,as "a dog on a leash;it can be unleashedat any
time to achieve definite aims and even when on the leash serves to
intimidatethe potential opposition" 33. In our times, however,the
threatof challengefromthe Leftas such is at presentminimal.Surely
it is only the very volatilityof rightsupportamong the populationat
large,the meagrenessof the economicconcessionswhich are possible
to enlargeand stabiliseit, and the furiousambitionsand greedof the
propertied,which can explain the cultivationand tolerationof these
groups on the right. It is thereforethe hystericalcharacterof capital
and capitalistrulingclasseswhich is responsiblefor them. This is not
even a case of what Mayerwould call preemptivecounterrevolution,
rather it would be useful to add another category - hysterical
counterrevolution34.
There are a couple of importantpoints of differencebetweenour
times and those Mayeranalysedback in 1971. While in earliertimes
counterrevolutionaryorganizationsoften separateddistinctsegments
of society from their allegiance to conservatism, the absence of
conservative formations today, as well as the above noted
"encanaillement of the possessing classes" means that their
constituenciesare not so readilydifferentiatedin social terms from

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those of the mainstreamright parties.The "toleration"of extreme


right groups is, in this context, more akin to an active symbiosis,
with partiesof the mainstreamrightendorsing,if in apparentlymore
moderateforms, the discourseand demandsof these groups:racist
rhetoric and practices are turned into a demand for controlling
immigrationand immigrantsin Europe,for exampleand anti-Muslim
and anti-Christiansentimentsaresublimatedinto a demandthat these
minorities"nationalize"themselves.HerbertKitschelt,in an analysis
which is correctlyinformedby attentionto the surroundingpolitical
context, has shown how the rise of extremeright partiesas distinct
entities has occurredparticularlyin those countrieswhere partiesof
the mainstreamright have been less extreme, closer to the centre,
though this situation,he observedin 1995, is fast disappearing35.In
other countries, these types of politics and often the organizations
themselves,are closely linked to the politics of the mainstreamright
partiesor areactivelyor tacitlytoleratedandideologicallyencouraged,
by them.
In India, with the success of the BJPin convincing most of the
capitalist class of its reliabilityas a political vehicle for them, the
interestingthing is that most of the national"counterelite"and much
of the mainstreamrightarein one andthe samepartyand its fraternal
organizations,in the BJPand the SanghParivar.Thereare also some
notable other regional countereliteorganizations,for example the
ShivSenaor the HinduMunani.Theyform,collectively,an interlinked
formation.Alongwith otherrespectablecapitalistparties,in particular
the parties of the provincial propertied,the regional parties, they
form,whetherin coalitiongovernmentor throughless formalpolitical
links, the formationof the right in the country.
But the solidity of the rightis more apparentthan real. With the
passingof the social basis of genuineconservatismwhich is also the
systematic disappearanceof non-capitaliststructuresof economy,
society and cultureon which it was based,
g) Theforms culturalnationalism, the chiefideologyof the right,
now takes are bound to be very unstableand volatile.
AlthoughArnoMayerpointsout that therearecertainconsistent
themesof counterrevolution:"order,hierarchy,authority,discipline,
obedience,tradition,loyalty,courage,sacrificeand nationalism"and
that it has an essentialingredientof "combiningthe glorificationof
traditionalattitudesand behaviourpatternswith the chargethat these
are being corrupted,subvertedand defiled by conspiratorialagents

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57

and influences",(p. 65) on the whole, counterrevolutionaryappeals


"are not derived from a pre-existent doctrine or ideology.....
Counterrevolutionis essentiallya praxis. Its political doctrine is in
the natureof a rationalizationand justificationof prioractions". (p.
62). This is of a piece with the view, so well articulated by Ted
Honderich'sConservatism36,that right wing ideology is usually an
elaborateruseor rationalization,afterthe fact, of actionswhich have
alreadybeencommittedor are seento havebecomenecessaryin order
to preservethe order of property.
In this sense counterrevolution,or extremeright politics, is only
a more popular,mobilisingand virulentversionof this shiftingright
ideology.It is especiallyrelevantthat manyanalystsof Hindutvahave
seen it to have had a strategyoriginally,when it was formed, and to
have worked on the basis of a long term molecular strategy to
propagateit and preserveit until it has finallygot the reins of power
in the country in its hands. This view misses both the actual
changeabilityof this ideology and strategyover time, includingthe
decades when it was more or less in the political doldrums, not to
mention its volatility in the face of the imperativesof the politics of
power and the politics of supportin the 1990s. It also exaggeratesits
separatenessfrom the dominantideology of the surroundingsociety.
In fact, it was alwayslinkedto the latter'sconservative,authoritarian,
religious, nationalist and populist currents. And it continues to
appropriatemoreandmoreof society'sfigures,symbolsanddiscourses
to itself,eventhe most improbable.Hindutva'sattemptto appropriate
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar,the leadingnationalistfigurewho attemptedto
representthe cause of the Untouchablesand is regardedas the father
of India'ssecularconstitution, is of this order37.
Culturalnationalismrests on the ethnic or cultural core which
every nationalism has, no matter how large and weighty the civic
and developmentalistaspect of that nationalism, the forward face
the nationalistJanus. Culturalnationalismis its backwardlooking
face, and has come to predominateas the civic and developmental
aspect has waned with popular energies. The cultural core of
nationalism has its real, material, basis in the persistenceof precapitalist and non-commodified (but in all class and patriarchal
societies, always hierarchicaland potentially authoritarian)social
relationshipsand its utility to the ruling classes lies preciselyin the
extent to which it culturally legitimises the ruling groups though
establishingcontinuities,real and inventedin differingdegrees,with
ruling groups in the past. As such cultural nationalism is not the

58

SOCIALSCIENTIST

ideologicalpropertyof extremerightgroups (whereit takes its most


authoritarianand virulentform)but pervadessocietymoregenerally.
But even as an ideology of the right, culturalnationalismtoday
exhibits a new changeability and volatility. Not only has the
intensificationof capitalistpenetration,extensiveas well as intensive,
underminedthe real basis of cultural nationalism in pre-capitalist
non-commodifiedsocial relations it must now be generatedmore
broadlyin the structuresof culturalproductionwhich are specifically
capitalist and commoditised. The form it takes is to older eyes,
inauthentic- culturalnationalistpop, rock and punk songs, videos,
and otherculturalcommodities(rightlyseenas the oppositeof culture
as hitherto understood). Their effect on the culture they claim to
expresscan only be to mine and underminewhat remainsof it. And
as commoditiesthese culturalproductsare also subjectto endemic
ephemerality.Finally,it also offersincreasingsectorsof the self-same
propertiedclass opportunitiesfor employmentand entrepreneurship.
It is in this context that the wars over cultureversus free trade must
be seen - they arewars betweendifferentkindsof capitalists,often of
the same nation. It is often also in the name of culturein a situation
where culture is commoditised and the commodity (both its
production and sale) is culturalised:culture it is the basis of the
domination of producers, the means through which "material"
commodities are marketedand itself a commodity. The climate of
latecapitalismalso, however,makesthe life of a givenculturalproduct
short and thereforethis culturalnationalismmoves along on shifting
basesand ground,appearsverychangeableand probablycontributes
to the very anxiety which furtherfuels it.
Finally, the surrounding situation faced by these
counterrevolutionary
groupshas neverbeenconfinedto the domestic.
Butthe internationalsituationsincethe Break-upof the SovietUnion
is that thereis now, insteadof a bi-polarworld, a singleinternational
hierarchyof power in the world. In such a hierarchy,
h) Thepositions taken by elites in the morepowerful countriesis
central and often determinantto the fate of counterrevolutionary
forces in less powerful ones.
Internationally,the role of the USA in managingand controlling
the internationalorderpoliticallyis moreapparentthan ever despite
some talk of a kind of tripolareconomy 38. It is also clear that the
politics of the right, even in its most extreme forms, is unlikely to
result,as in the first part of the 20thcentury,in war amongthe major

THE RIGHTPOLITICSTO COME

59

capitalist powers. The military imbalancebetween the US and the


rest of the world, includingadvancedcapitalistcountries, is simply
too great. Moreover,the control which the US exercisesover the rest
of the world is based not on militarypower alone but on a complex
intermeshingof it with financialpower. In this situation, instead of
conflict, all countriespursuean internationalpolicy of competition
and bargainingto gain a more beneficialposition for the capitalist
interests behind them (not necessarily "national" in the hitherto
understoodsense of the word) in the world hierarchy.Barringthe reemergenceof inter-imperialistrivalries,whose shape in the context
of the complex interconnections which now exist between the
economiesof the leadingcapitalistpowers is difficultto imagine,any
significantchange in relative positions is now possible only in the
Third world and with the explicit concurrence of US-led super
imperialism. Most nations in the world are also more open to
internationalinfluence- both as a possibility and as a necessity for
the interferingpowers, than they ever were before .
In this context, right politics in every country is also dependent
on the support of the US-led "internationalcommunity".And this
supporthas not precludedsupportfor,or at leasttoleranceof, extreme
right groups and parties. The apparent contrast between the
"international"censureof JorgHaiderand the acceptanceof the BJP
in Indiamust be understoodin this context. Thereis certainlya great
deal of Eurocentrisminvolvedin all the discourseabout Haider:such
a thing, it is said, is not to be toleratedin "civilised"Europeand in
India the BJPis passedover in silence. However,a sober view might
be that the US has judgedthat Haidermust be tolerated,along with
an appearanceof censure,as extremerightgroupswith variousdegrees
of access to structuresof state power are in all capitalist liberal
democracies.In the case of the BJP,while some of the more extreme
forcesagainstparticularlyChristian
actionsof its counterrevolutionary
minoritieshas come in for censure,on the whole, it is bornein mind
that it is after all at least partlya partyof the mainstreamright. The
arrivalof the BJPin power has confirmedthat Indiais now willing to
be the lynchpinof the US- guaranteedorderin South Asia. In return
it enjoys greaterimpunityfor its actions in the region. As such the
BJPnot only enjoys legitimacybut is also encouragedin its forward
foreign policy in the region. But elsewheretoo, we have witnessed,
for example, in European Italy, the smooth transition of the
demagogue and Mussolini admirer, Fini into a "democratic
statesman".

60

SOCIALSCIENTIST

NOTES
1 I would like to thank Colin Leysand JayantLelefor theircommentson an
earlierdraft.
2 RobertBrenner,"The Economicsof Global Turbulence"New Left Review
226, May-June1998, pp. 41-2.
3 BrianGirvin,The Rightin the TwentiethCentury(London,1994) is a useful
recentoverview.
4 AndrewGamble,The ConservativeNation, London, 1974.
5 See in particularGoran Therborn, "The Rise of Capital and the Rule of
Democracy"in New Left Review, 103, May-June1977.
6 Provisionallyentitiled, Sea Change:From Congressto Hindutvain Indian
Politics,
7 Any attack of such indulgencecan be easily cured by (re)readingMarx's
delightfulremarkson the mutualregardof the aristocratand the capitalist
in Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 Edited with an
introductionby Dirk J. Struik,translatedby Martin Milligan, New York,
1964, pp. 122-126.

8 Martin Blinkhorn(ed.) Fascistsand Conservatives:The RadicalRight and


the Establishmentin the TwentiethCentury,London, 1990.
9 ArnoMayer,The Persistenceof the Old Regime:Europeto the Great War,
New York, 1981.
10 Ibid., pp. 3-4. Seealso, PerryAnderson'sdiscussionof the powerof England's
aristocracy in a comparativeEuropeancontext in "Figuresof Descent"
New left Review 161 January-February1987, and in English Questions,
London, 1992.
11 Mayer,1981, p. 9.
12 Ibid, p. 10.
13

Ibid., p. 12.

14 "Originsof the PresentCrisis"in EnglishQuestions, London, 1992, p. 32.


15 Mayer,1981, p. 14.
16 Michael Kalecki, "The Fascismof Our Times" in The Last Phase in the
17
18

Transformation of Capitalism, New York, 1972.


Perry Anderson, The Origins of Postmodernity, London, 1998, p. 84-5.
See particularly his "Hindutva: The Emergence of the Right, Earthworm

Books, Madras, 1995 and "A WelfareState in Crisis: Reflections on the


Indira-RajivEra",N.K. Choudhryand SalimMansur(eds.)TheIndira-Rajiv
Years:The IndianEconomyand Polity, 1966-1991, Toronto, 1994. On the
declineof "dominance"see also FrancineFrankel,"Conclusion:Decline of
a Social Order"in FrancineFrankeland M.S.A. Rao (eds)StatePower and
Dominance, Vol. II, New Delhi, 1992 and Oliver Mendelsshon, "The
Transformationof Authorityin Rural India", ModernAsian Studies, Vol.
27, no. 4, 1993
19 That these assets are now worth $10, 000 billion world-wide and that
institutionalinvestmentin the US, for example,was 47% of the total market
capitalization,give some indication of the relevanceof this phenomenon.
RobinBlackburn,"TheNew Collectivism:PensionReform,GreyCapitalism
and Complex Socialism",New Left Review 233, JanuaryFebruary1999,
pp. 5-6.

THE RIGHT POLITICS TO COME

20

21
22

23

24

25

26
27
28

29

30
31
32
33
34

61

Harold Perkin, in his The Rise of Professional Society ( London, 1989) makes
this distinction between the economic basis of the two main kinds of
professionals and their political proclivities. Colin Leys and Leo Panitch in
their The End of Parliamentary Socialism (London, 1998) discuss the social
basis of the rise of New Labour. My own Intellectuals and Socialism: "Social
Demcorats and the British Labour Party (London, 1994) discusses the nature
of the attachment of the older generation of professionals to Labourism
and the tensions within this relationship which led to the split in the Labour
party in 1981, leading to the creation of the Social Democratic Party. The
course of its later splits and merger with the Liberal Party has brought this
current to the present Liberal Democrats.
Herbert Kitschelt with Anthony McGann, The Radical Right in Western
Europe: A Comparative Analysis, Ann Arbor, 1997, p. 23
See R. Vidyasagar, "New Agrarianism and Challenges for the Left" in T.V.
Satyamurthy (ed.) Class Formation and Political Transformation in Postcolonial India, New Delhi, 1996; and T.J. Byres, "Land Reform,
Industrialization and the Marketed Surplus: An Essay on the Power of Rural
Bias", David Lehmann (ed.) Agrarian Reform and Agrarian Reformism,
London, 1974.
Prabhat Patnaik, "A Perspective on the Recent Phase of India's Economic
Development", Whatever Happened to Imperialism and Other Essays, Delhi,
1995.
K.Balagopal,, "An Ideology for the Provincial Propertied Class", Economic
and Political Weekly, Vol. XXII, Nos. 36 and 37, September 5-12, 1987, p.
1546-7.
Ibid. Formerly Marxist, Gail Omvedt and Chetana Galla's riposte ("'An
Ideology for a Provincial Propertied Class?" Economic and Polittcal Weekly,
Vol. XXII, no. 45, November 7 1987) making the argument that these
movements reflected the interests not only of capitalist farmers, but of all
engaged in agriculture, including landless labourers, reflects the depth of the
political confusion caused by the rhetoric the farmers' movements
Arno Mayer, The Dynamics of Counterrevolution in Europe: 1870-1956:
An Analytic Framework, New York, 1971, p. 42.
Peter Gowan, The Global Gamble: Washington's Faustian Bid for World
Dominance, London, 1999
Leo Panitch, in particular, has insisted on this in, among others, "The State
in a Changing World", Monthly Review, Vol. 50, no. 5, October 1998 and,
more recently, in "The New Imperial State" New Left Review (n.s.) 2, MarchApril 2000.
Prabhat Patnaik, C.P. Chandrashekher and Abhijit Sen, "The Proliferation
of the Bourgeoisie and Economic Policy" in T.V. Satyamurthy (ed.), Class
Formation and Political Transformation in Post-Colonial India, New Delhi,
1996
Etienne Balibar, "Es gibt keinen Staat in Europa" in New left Review 186,
March-April 1991, p. 13.
Ibid., p. 17.
Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes, New York, 1994, p. 112.
Kalecki, p. 104
Mayer considers the following types: pre-emptive, posterior, accessory,
disguised, anticipatory, externally licensed and externally imposed.

62

35
36
37

39

SOCIALSCIENTIST

Kitschelt, op. cit.


Westview Press, Boulder, 1991
Jayant Lele, "Restructuring Social Relation in the Age of Predatory
Capitalism: Ambedkar's Buddhism as a Critique of Hindutva". Paper
presented at the International Conference on "Recstructuring the World:
Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar's Understanding of Buddhism" at the Department
of Politics, University of Pune, India, (October 7-9, 1998) mimeo.
Michael Hudson's regrettably neglected Super Imperialism : The Economic
Strategy of American Empire (New York, 1968) showed that the US

governmenthas beencentralto the managementof the worldeconomicsystem


at the internationallevel beginningwith the end of the FirstWorldWarand
Peter Gowan ( The Global Gamble: Washington's Faustian Bid for World

Dominance,London, 1999) has recentlybroughtthis story up to the present


state of globalization.It is thereforenot just that the role of states in the
processesof globalizationis central,it is also thatcapitaliststatesareorganised
and directedby the most powerfulone amongthemand the degreeof control
any state exercisesover its destiny,within what is now a singleinternational
hierarchyof capitaliststates dependson its position within it.

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