Professional Documents
Culture Documents
297
WENDY L. HANSEN*
ABSTRACT
Bullying has become a new-found crusade. Due to recent events
involving safety in public schools, the nation is taking a closer look at how
to handle aggressive behavior. Many parents worry about the safety of
their children. However, the school does not necessarily have the duty to
protect that one would expect. Courts have held there is no duty to protect
students from third-party actions. This is because there is no special
relationship. A special relationship is an exception for when the state
has an affirmative duty to protect. However, courts have yet to define the
reasoning behind the exception of a special relationship and therefore,
the jurisprudence is murky and unclear. It is important for courts to
consider the likelihood of bullying incidents arising again. Creating a clearcut, well-defined test, would allow for easier decisions in the future
without the risk of inequitable results.
Furthermore, courts should consider a childs right to education and
the effect of excluding a child from school. The School-to-Prison pipeline is
a phenomenon within the United States where children are criminalized
for misconduct in the classroom. This results in earlier prison time, future
delinquent behavior, and most importantly, lack of opportunity to further
the childs education. The objective of every public school is to educate.
Rather than simply brushing the problem aside, schools should attempt to
teach children when disciplinary issues arise. Creating a duty to protect
against bullies, widens the discretion given to administrators and places a
Candidate for Juris Doctor, New England Law | Boston (2015). B.A., History, Brigham
Young UniversityIdaho (2011). I would like to thank my parents, Rhonda and Victor Hansen,
who have supported me throughout law school and all the stress that ensued. Id also like to
thank Kristy Wilson and Suzanne Donnelly for being great supportive friends on Law Review
and reading my Comment multiple times. Most importantly Id like to thank Joan Meschino
and all those who worked at Massachusetts Appleseed Center for Law and Justice. Thank you
for showing me your passion for helping those who cannot help themselves. In memory of
Sondra H. Peskoe.
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INTRODUCTION
See Emily Bazelon, Op-Ed., Defining Bullying Down, N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 2013, at A23.
Id.
3 Policies and Laws, STOPBULLYING.GOV, http://www.stopbullying.gov/laws/index.html (last
visited Apr. 6, 2015).
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that the majority failed to address an opportunity to create a legal test that
will produce equitable results in determining whether there is a special
relationship. Part IV addresses the need to consider all sides of the matter
and how the court and legislature should consider the School-to-Prison
pipeline when discipline is an issue.
I.
Background
A. Bullying
1.
What is Bullying?
ss6104.pdf.
15 Bazelon, supra note 1; see also Effects of Bullying, STOPBULLYING.GOV http://www.stop
bullying.gov/at-risk/effects/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2015).
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This legislation does not just affect the school environment or the
victimit also affects the bully.22 Most school policies encourage
administrators to suspend or expel bullies for their inappropriate or violent
behavior.23 These actions lead to what is called the School-to-Prison
pipeline phenomenon.24
16
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, 37O(b) (West 2009 & Supp. 2014).
Id. 37O(a).
18 Id. 37O(c).
19 Id. 37O(d).
20 Id. 37O(i) .
21 Id.
22 The
Roles Kids Play, STOPBULLYING.GOV, http://www.stopbullying.gov/what-isbullying/roles-kids-play/index.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2015).
17
23
MASS. APPLESEED CTR. FOR LAW AND JUSTICE, KEEP KIDS IN CLASS: NEW APPROACHES TO
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Id.
ROBIN L. DAHLBERG, ARRESTED FUTURES: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE IN
MASSACHUSETTS THREE LARGEST SCHOOL DISTRICTS 22 (2012).
30
31
32
Cf. id. at 9.
See id.
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While schools have their own policies, states rely on the Fourteenth
Amendments Due Process Clause, which provides that no state shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.41 There are two components to the Due Process Clause: procedural
and substantive.42 Substantive Due Process determines whether the
government has an adequate reason for taking away ones life, liberty, or
property.43 [It] looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the
governments action.44
33
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In DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty.,45 the Supreme Court held that the state
did not have a duty to protect against third-party actions under the
Fourteenth Amendments substantive Due Process Clause.46 In DeShaney,
Joshua DeShaneys father beat him so that he suffered permanent mental
impairment.47 Joshuas mother sued the Department of Social Services for
violating his due process rights, alleging the Department failed to
intervene to protect Joshua against the risk of violence. 48 The Court stated
that even though there was a history of violence and the Department was
aware of that history, it still did not create an affirmative duty for the state
to intervene and protect.49
However, there is an exception where the state does have an
affirmative duty; this is called special relationship.50 In Youngberg v.
Romero,51 the Court held that the state possessed a duty to provide healthy
and safe living conditions as well as freedom from injury when a person is
confined involuntarily in a mental institution.52 Similarly, Estelle v. Gamble53
held that prisoners had to show acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to
evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in order to show
the state had a duty to protect.54 In these situations, the Court has
determined there was a special relationship triggering certain rights for
the plaintiff.55 When the state has a special relationship with a citizen, it
follows that it has a duty to protect that person from third-party actions.56
More specifically, in these two cases, those exceptions took effect while the
citizens were imprisoned or in a mental institution against their will.57 Both
instances are similar because the citizens had no choice but to be in that
situation due to their confinement; their ability to remove themselves was
impeded.58 The Court reasoned that the state needs to protect this special
class of persons from third-party actors because of the states control.59
45
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 191, 193 (1989).
Id. at 192.
47 Id. at 19293.
48 Id. at 193.
49 Id. at 195.
50 Id. at 19798.
51 Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 309 (1982).
52 Id. at 324.
53 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 99 (1976).
54 Id. at 106.
55 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 194.
56 Id. at 197.
57 See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324; Estelle, 429 U.S. at 10304.
58 Compare DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191 (recognizing a fathers control over his infant sons
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freedom of location as he moved both of them across state borders), with D.R. v. Middle Bucks
Vocational Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 137172 (3d Cir. 1992) (Middle Bucks) (holding the
requirement of a teenager to attend high school classes was not a restriction of freedom).
59 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 18999; Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324; Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103; see Middle
Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1371.
60 See Hasenfus v. LaJeunesse, 175 F.3d 68, 71 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding there was no duty to
protect a student from bullying, even when it resulted in the student committing suicide);
Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1371 (quoting Pa. State Educ. Assns v. Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 449
A.2d 89, 92 (1982)); Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 731 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding
there was no duty to protect student from another students violent actions).
61
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85
Id. at 165.
Id.
87 Id. For the purposes of this Comment, the state-created-danger doctrine will not be
discussed.
86
88
Id.
Id.
90 Morrow, 719 F.3d at 165.
91 See id. at 168 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
200 (1989)).
89
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ANALYSIS
III. The Majority Missed an Opportunity to Clarify the Law
While the Court does an excellent job relying on established precedent,
it did not dive deeply enough into the Middle Bucks reasoning, which is
similar to the Morrow case.99 In failing to do so, it still has not completely
closed the gap with regard to the states special relationship in certain
circumstances.100 Had the majority come up with a test, as they implicitly
did in their prior decision in Middle Bucks, they would have effectively
created a rule that future courts could use to apply in similar situations. 101
The majority erred in not applying this test.102
A. Morrow Should Have Relied on the Middle Bucks Reasoning to
Come to Its Conclusion Because it Creates a Clear Test and Stronger
Precedent
Both Morrow and Middle Bucks deal with whether the state has a duty
to protect students from third-party actions.103 Both cases rely upon
DeShaney, Estelle, and Youngberg.104 Both cases reason that the state does not
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105
The rationale for this principle is simple enough: when the State by the
affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individuals liberty that it
renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to
provide for his basic human needse.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical
care, and reasonable safety . . . .
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept of Soc. Servs., 498 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)
111
113 Contra Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1370 (Our court has read DeShaney primarily as setting
out a test of physical custody.).
114
See id.
Id.
116 Id.
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(3) they are not free to leave or provide for themselves;117 and (4) they
are wholly dependent on [the] state for food, shelter, clothing, and
safety.118 This is not a simple, broad test of round-the-clock physical
custody.119 Rather, these components, together with the element of
physical custody, help determine whether the state has a special
relationship with the student and is more based on control.120
B. An Applied Physical Custody Test Produces Equitable Results
The Morrow Court had the opportunity to create a test from Middle
Bucks that would clarify the case law concerning special relationships,
but it failed to do so.121 If this test is applied again to prior decisions, those
decisions come out to the same reasonable result, further showing that this
test not only yields reasonable results, but also adds consistency and
predictability to this area of law.122
To demonstrate this, if the Middle Bucks test is applied to Nicini, the
result would still be the same.123 The Nicini court held that though the child
was not in the states absolute physical custody, there was still a special
relationship with a foster child.124 Under the first prong, the childs
restriction of liberty has to be full-time and severe.125 Applying this to the
case of foster children, a representative from Child Services monitors
everything the child does and children do not have the ability to go
wherever they please.126 The second prong states that the child cannot seek
outside help for basic needs.127 For foster children, the primary caregiver is
the state; they are assigned to foster parents by the state and cannot seek
help at other places.128 Prong three articulates that the child cannot provide
117
Id.
Id. at 1371.
119 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199 (1989); Middle
Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1371. Contra Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 188 (3d Cir. 2013) (arguing
that the Middle Bucks opinion creates a test that demands round-the-clock physical custody in
order to have a special relationship).
118
120
127
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for himself or herself.129 Because these are children, they are not able to take
care of themselves properly and would not be able to live on their own. 130
The fourth prong states that they are wholly dependent upon the state for
food, shelter, clothing, and safety.131 Foster parents are paid to care for
foster children by paying for their food, shelter, and clothing. 132 A foster
childs life is controlled completely by the state. 133 Therefore, Nicinis
reasoning comes out the same under the Middle Bucks test.134
One can even apply this test to DeShaney, in which the Supreme Court
established that the state does not have a duty to protect against third
parties.135 Joshua DeShaney was living at his fathers house for the entire
two years he was visited by the Department of Social Services; therefore,
the state did not restrict his liberty as the first prong requires. 136 Because
help could have come from many places other than the state, Joshua was
not completely under the states control as he was still living with his
father; thus, the second prong is not satisfied. 137 The third prong also fails
A relationship between the state and foster children arises out of the
states affirmative act in finding the children and placing them with stateapproved families. . . . By so doing, the state assumes an important
continuing, if not immediate, responsibility for the childs well-being. In
addition, the childs placement renders him or her dependent upon the
state, through the foster family, to meet the childs basic needs.
Id. (quoting Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1372).
129
130
137
Compare DeShaney, 498 U.S. at 191, with Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1371.
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because though Joshua could not have taken care of himself, the state did
not take care of himhis father did.138 Therefore, he was still able to care
for himself through his parent.139 Joshua DeShaney did not rely upon the
state for food, shelter, clothing, or safety as the fourth prong requires; he
relied on his father to provide them. 140 The Middle Bucks test applied to
DeShaney comes out with the same resultthat there is no special
relationship, and the state does not have a duty to protect.141
If the Middle Bucks test is applied to Morrow, the result would again be
the same and show that the majority should have adopted this test to add
consistency to this area of law.142 The Morrows go home every day to their
parents: they have the choice to go to another school, a private school, or be
home-schooled; therefore, there is no full time and severe restriction of
their liberty.143 The second prong fails because the Morrows are not at the
school all day, and their basic needs and outside help are never limited to
the school.144 Further, they are free to leave the school every day when class
is over and be withdrawn if needed.145 In fact, Zebra held that a parent
cannot be denied the right to move a child from the school when his or her
health and safety are threatened.146 Though the Morrows parents cannot
take care of their children while they are in school, the parents still have
ultimate power and control over their children.147 Thus, prong three failed
because the Morrows are able to be cared for by someone other than the
state.148 Although the students rely temporarily on shelter and sometimes
food, through school lunches, they do not wholly rely on the state or the
school for these items.149 Parents provide their clothing, food, shelter, and
safety.150 Therefore, the Middle Bucks test applied to the Morrow facts
138
Compare DeShaney, 498 U.S. at 193, with Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1371.
DeShaney, 498 U.S. at 192.
140 Compare DeShaney, 498 U.S. at 192, with Middle Bucks 972 F.2d at 1371.
141 DeShaney, 498 U.S. at 202; Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1371.
142 See infra notes 14350 and accompanying text.
143 Compare Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 183 (3d Cir. 2013), with Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d
at 1371.
144 Compare Morrow, 719 F.3d at 183, with Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1371.
145 Morrow, 719 F.3d at 183.
146 Zebra v. Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh, 296 A.2d 748, 751 (Pa. 1972).
147 Morrow, 719 F.3d at 169; Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1372 (However, even when enrolled
in public school parents retain the discretion to remove the child from classes as they see
fit . . . .).
139
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159
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160 See supra Part III.B (discussing the reasoning behind the special relationship is that of
control); see also Deborah Austern Colson, Note, Safe Enough to Learn: Placing an Affirmative
Duty of Protection on Public Schools Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 169,
174 (1995) (discussing that courts use custody and special relationship interchangeably but
that DeShaney did not confine the meaning of special relationship to custodial situations).
161 See supra Part III.A; see also Davison, supra note 158, at 287.
162 Morrow, 719 F.3d at 188, 193 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (arguing that because the court in
Nicini held that the state had a special relationship to foster children, then it should have it
in Morrow because there was no full-time physical custody and the school has compulsory
attendance laws thus arguing there is a stronger case for Morrow than Nicini).
163 See id. at 188.
164 But see id.
165 See supra Part III.A; see also DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 203 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The most that can be said of the state functionaries in this case is that they
stood by and did nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a more
active role for them. In defense of them it must also be said that had they
moved too soon to take custody of the son away from the father, they
would likely have been met with charges of improperly intruding into the
parent-child relationship, charges based on the same Due Process Clause
that forms the basis for the present charge of failure to provide adequate
protection.
Id.
166
See supra Part III.A. But see Morrow, 719 F.3d at 188.
See Morrow, 719 F.3d at 193.
168 Id. at 19293.
169 Id. at 193.
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has over students but not the degree of control the school has over the
actions of individual students. 170 Mandatory attendance does not determine
the ability to control third party actions, which is essential to determine
whether a special relationship exists.171 The dissent failed to understand
the underlying question that the precedent sets forth: what degree of
control does the state have over the victim and third party actors?172 The
dissent essentially grasped at straws to make the foundation of its
argument, and ended up arguing in a circle.173
Simply relying on the fact that there is no immediate control of the
situation does not set this case apart from DeShaney, Estelle, Youngberg, or
Middle Bucks.174 The reason why a special relationship exists is because in
those particular situations, the state does have control over the third party and
the victim.175 Simply relying on the fact that there is no immediate control
eliminates the foundational principle of control in general, which is
essential to establishing whether the state has a duty. 176
D. Going Forward, Courts Should Adopt the Middle Bucks Test
Going forward, in determining whether the state has a duty to protect
under the special relationship exception, courts should look at the
elements set forth in Middle Bucks, namely: (1) fulltime severe and
continuous state restriction of liberty;177 (2) [the citizen is not] given the
opportunity to seek outside help to meet [his or her] basic needs;178 (3) the
citizen is not free to leave or provide for themselves;179 and (4) the
citizen is wholly dependent on the state for food, shelter, clothing and
safety.180 Looking at these elements will allow the court to clearly
170
See id.
See id.
172 See id. at 168; supra Part III.A.
173 See Morrow, 719 F.3d at 188 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
174 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196200 (1989);
Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976);
Morrow, 719 F.3d. at 16571; D.R. v. Middle Bucks Vocational Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1371 (3d Cir.
1992).
175 See Davison, supra note 158, at 28081 (stating there is a current confusion with special
relationship and custody and that courts generally rely only on the presence of physical
custody); supra Part III.A.
171
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181
Id.
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185
188
MASS. APPLESEED CTR. FOR LAW AND JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 5.
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189
Id.
Id. at 10.
201 ZERO TOLERANCE TASK FORCE, supra note 187, at 12.
202 MASS. APPLESEED CTR. FOR LAW AND JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 9.
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203 Id. (Students who are repeatedly excluded from school struggle to keep up with their
classmates, do not feel welcomed into the school community, and often leave of their own
volition. Additionally, many of these students are unsupervised while excluded from school,
leaving more time to engage in delinquent behavior.).
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someone else does not solve the issue. 215 Schools are in a better position to
help students realize the consequences of their actions through
constructive discipline rather than kicking a child out of school.216 Schools
should develop a system to teach children why their behavior is wrong. 217
There are many constructive ways to discipline children without taking
them out of the classroom environment, for example: in-school suspension,
detention on Saturdays, service around the school, and alternative school
placements.218 Ultimately, state legislatures should consider implementing
systems in schools that attack both sides of the issue. 219 Courts should also
consider these trends when determining whether schools have a duty to
protect students from bullies.220
CONCLUSION
The Morrow majority had an opportunity to address and clarify the
issue of control in a special relationship, but failed to do so. Though they
came to the right decision, they failed to address and articulate a legal test
and correct a hot-bed issue. By failing to take the opportunity to add to the
jurisprudence, the Morrow Court left the door open for future inequitable
decisions. With school bullying at an all-time high, this issue is bound to
come to a courtroom again. Many state legislatures have addressed
bullying problems. It would have been more effective and stronger had the
Morrow Court considered the underlying principles of special
relationship and determined a test for the states control. Without a test to
rely upon in future cases, one can only hope that future plaintiffs and
defendants are not bullied by the court system.
215