John Buridan and Donald Davidson on "Akrasia"

Author(s): Risto Saarinen

Source: Synthese, Vol. 96, No. 1, Studies in Early Fourteenth-Century Philosophy (Jul., 1993),
pp. 133-153
Published by: Springer
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RISTO

SAARINEN

AND DONALD

JOHN BURIDAN

DAVIDSON

ON AKRASIA

1.

INTRODUCTORY

REMARKS

some
This article has two objectives.
it is my aim to outline
First,
medieval
views concerning
the acts that oppose one's better judgment.
term akrasia to denote the moral state of an agent
I will use Aristotle's
treatment of akrasia
in
this
way. John Buridan's
(1285-1349)
behaving
is especially
it will be argued that some impor
relevant here. Second,
tant philosophical
ideas proposed
in his
recently by Donald Davidson,
influential study 'How isWeakness
discussion.
pated in the medieval
or
''weakness
Aristotle's
akrasia,

of the Will

Possible?',1

are antici

of the will", has recently received

The
akrasia arise
attention.2
increasing scholarly
concerning
problems
no
one
can know
if we adopt the view of Socrates,
to
which
according
the good and will evil.3 Given
is
to
how
it
the
this,
possible
explain
common
of
one's
better
seemingly
phenomenon
acting against
judg
ment? Aristotle's
discussion of akrasia in the seventh book of his Nico
a paradigmatic
machean Ethics has become
example of how a classical
can
is
and
arise
problem
actually perennial
again in modern
thought.
recent
treatments
of
the
weakness
of
the
will combine historical
Many
of Aristotle
with developments
in analytical philosophy,4
interpretation
thus demonstrating
the importance of historical awareness even inmod
ern action theory.
this awareness
has undoubtedly
been instructive both for
Although
one important aspect of the historical di
historians
and philosophers,
as far as I can see, has been almost completely
mension,
neglected.
on akrasia first deal extensively
The modern
studies and textbooks
with ancient Greek
and then immediately
to the
philosophy
proceed
The
of
2000
discussion.
of
years
twentieth-century
remaining gap
philo
is sometimes
filled with short references
to Augus
sophical reflection
and
Kant.5
tine, Aquinas,
Leibniz,
on akrasia,
One does find sophisticated
discussions
philosophical
or "incontinence"
both
in
medieval
however,
(Lat. incondnenda),6

96: 133-154,
1993.
Synthese
1993 Kluwer Academic
Publishers.

Printed

in the Netherlands.

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134

RISTO

SAARINEN

neo
and in sixteenthand seventeenth-century
philosophy
The conceptual
refinement
of the fourteenth-century
scholasticism.7
to
that are wholly comparable
medieval
discussion makes contributions
those of twentieth-century
philosophers.
as it is well
is rather surprising,
The neglect
of medieval
authors
on the Nicoma
known that many of them wrote lengthy commentaries
in his recent
Justin Gosling,
chean Ethics. Nevertheless,
e.g., wrote
to Weakness
historical
introduction
of the Will that "so far as I know
in medieval
Al
there is no literature on the problem
philosophers".8
scholastic

the medieval
dis
studies have been done,9
though some preliminary
The short chapter on "Aquinas
been neglected.
cussion has obviously
own
in Gosling's
and Others"
is, in any case, not very
monograph10
to
because
he
attention
Anselm
of Canterbury,
pays
only
illuminating,
and John Duns Scotus, none of whom wrote compre
Thomas Aquinas,
hensive
treatises on akrasia}1
for this state of affairs might be
the simplest explanation
Although
to modern
texts are largely unknown
that medieval
per
philosophers,
a
reason
common
more
it
is
the
that the
for
likely
prejudice
haps
notion of 'free will' does not allow any proper philo
to this prejudice,
akrasia has
of akrasia. According
sophical
no special philosophical
considers
interest, since Christian
psychology
an
autonomous
in
human
action.
Such
the will an autonomous
faculty
Judaeo-Christian

discussion

faculty
need

not

is not

bound
reason's

obey

to any

intellectual

judgment;

therefore

the will

commands.12

the Greek notion of 'will' certainly differs from its Judaeo

Although
of the above-named
is
the supposition
Christian
counterpart,
prejudice
In
false.
medieval
Aristotelianism,
e.g.,
acting
historically
proved
to grasp
against one's better judgment was a difficult phenomenon
since it was commonly
regarded that the will, being a
philosophically,
the practical
intellect. Aristotle's
rational capacity,
follows
problems
commentar
in medieval
with akrasia are in fact discussed
extensively

2.

THE

DEVELOPMENT

2.1. Augustine's

OF

"Two Wills":

AKRASIA

Doing

text of Aristotle's
complete
Robert
Grosseteste
by
philosophy

The

IN MEDIEVAL

Something

THOUGHT

Only Reluctantly

to Western
Ethics was
introduced
in the 1240s. Before
that time Augus

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JOHN

BURIDAN

AND

DONALD

DAVIDSON

ON

AKRASIA

135

dominated
the ethical discussion.14 Although
tinian psychology
Augus
ethical works
and
tine (354-430)
had no familiarity with Aristotle's
the lack
although he used the Latin term incontinentia only to denote
of chastity and temperance,15
he often analyzed
of moral
examples
Ethics.
conduct that are similar to those found in Nicomachean
comes to the conclusion
In De spiritu et litera Augustine
that good
or "reluctantly"
actions, if performed
only unwillingly
(invitus), do not
a person does something
count as true merits.
If, for example,
against
his action is not
his primary wishes only in order to avoid punishment,
does he receive
meritorious.16
Only if the person acts wholeheartedly
the merit
toward a true reward. Nonetheless,
also asserts
Augustine
that by acting reluctantly a person can be held responsible
for both his
external act and his intention.17 This reluctant acquiescence
bears some
enkrateia, since in both a person does something
analogy to Aristotle's
to thwart his evil desire to do otherwise.
right and manages
In his Confessiones
Augustine
speaks also of doing evil reluctantly.
before his own conversion,
the church father continued
Immediately
his bad habits only reluctantly,
because his will could already see the
It is no wonder
that some modern
authors have
right alternatives.18
seen here a counterpart
to Aristotle's
akrasia.19 But unlike Aristotle,
thinks that the agent in some sense chooses his own inconti
Augustine
nent behavior,
however
reluctant this assent and choice20 may be.
of 'weakness of the
Moreover,
Augustine's
psychological
explanation
will' differs significantly
from Aristotle's
doctrine. Augustine
speaks of
"two wills" struggling within the same person. He is not referring here
to two autonomous
of the
wills, but rather to two initial tendencies
human appetite.21 He stresses that this disintegration
of the motives
takes place within the same mind and its single will. Moreover,
the act
of willful choice creates a unity and wholeness
within the will.22
in Augustine's
Another
thought is his view of the
important element
of desired ends. The highest goals are to be willed
for the
hierarchy
sake of their own, inherent goodness.
But some lower ends are to be
willed

for the sake of the higher and final goals.23 This distinction
for its own sake (propter se) and for the
willing
something
an integral part of
sake of something
else (propter aliud) will become
medieval
discussions
akrasia.
concerning
only

between

is further qualified by his theological

model
Augustine's
presupposi
tions. He tends to think that God is the only rational agent who never
acts reluctantly.24 Moreover,
his use of continentia
is conditioned
by

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136

RISTO

SAARINEN

the Vulgate
translation of Sapientia Salomonis
8, 21: "And as I knew
be continent,
that I could not otherwise
gave it". For
except God
valid: no man can be continent
this verse is universally
Augustine,
God's grace.25 Thus in Augustinian
the state of being
theology
in the realm of sexuality)
becomes
the fate of
'incontinent'
(mainly
the Aristotelian
scholastics gave up much
every human being. Although
the presupposed
of 'incon
of this Augustinian
background,
universality
is one reason why the topic was so extensively
tinent' behavior
discussed

without

in the later Middle

2.2. Anselm

Ages.

and Abelard

on Reluctant

Actions

In his De

of Canterbury
lib?rtate arbitrii Anselm
radicalizes
(1033-1109)
of
will.
the
For
the will'
"freedom
of
Anselm,
theory
Augustine's
not
to
sin
does
the
but
the
(libertas arbitrii)
ability
only
ability
imply
to carry forward rational decisions.
The freedom of a rational being
means acting in accordance with reason.26 Anselm
holds that a rational
so
can
will
that
he
in
irrational
evil
could resist it
only
being
principle
Because
Anselm
argues strongly that the
(ut possit quidem nolle)27
freedom of the will is a rational capacity, we cannot explain our ir
to
rational behavior
against our better judgment by simply referring
com
this freedom.
In this way the Augustinian
theory of will becomes
action theory.
intellectualistic
patible with Anselm's
discusses
In his Ethics,
Scito teipsum, Peter Abelard
(1079-1142)
or against
act reluctantly
their
what actually happens when people
of a sin
better judgment. He wants to show that the actual committing
in respect to the mere consent
does not increase its degree of sinfulness
to commit
'will' and
sin. This idea leads him to distinguish
between
that resemble Aristot
is relevant in examples
'consent'. The distinction
For instance, a man who falls into longing for a
le's akratic behavior.
or for fruit that does not belong
woman
to him has "the will which
lacks

consent".28

in cases where
is also interested
the consent can be under
Abelard
to
sake of something
else
stood as allowing
for
the
something
happen
if
is
For
that
bears
willed.
actually
somebody
example,
(propter aliud)
a painful operation
in order to be healed, we don't say that he wants
the pain. He doesn't will it, but only allows it to happen for the sake
a "passio",
is for Abelard
in which
of something
else. Such behavior
a person

"endures

what

he does

not will"

(quod

non

vult

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tol?rai)

in

JOHN

BURIDAN

AND

DONALD

DAVIDSON

ON

AKRASIA

137

order to reach something

aliud
else.29 The topic of willing propter
or
from Augustine,
but Abelard
it as "enduring"
derives
interprets
a
in which the will orders itself to remain in passive state.30
"suffering",
2.3.

The Semantics

of Will

in Peter

of Poitiers

in many
and Abelard's
ideas are reflected
twelfth-century
at
that aim
the conceptual
discussions
of Au
understanding
deepening
gustinian topics, such as acting reluctantly and willing something propter
took place in the Sentendae of
aliud.31 Some significant developments
Peter of Poitiers
At least three distinct points are here of
(1130-1205).

Anselm's

interest.

view that a rational being must

One, Peter adheres to the Anselmian
of the right. For him, the so
always to some extent possess knowledge
is the small "spark of reason"
called synteresis
(scindllula
rationis),
which cannot be extinguished.32
But if an evil person simply wills evil,
how can we claim that his synteresis
is still functioning?
Peter solves
this problem by distinguishing
between
wishes
counterfactual
(vellem)
and actual willing
remain in
(volo). Some counterfactual
good wishes
the sinner, even if he doesn't actually want to do the right thing. So
we can say that such people
sense
in some weak and counterfactual
would
like to behave rightly (vellet declinare a malo).33
the plurality of desires within
the
Two, another way of describing
same will is to say that some things are willed without
qualification
is
whereas
others are willed only if some pre-condition
(simpliciter),
For example,
Peter says that we
present
(cum quaedam
conditione).
want
the death of Christ not for its own sake but under the pre
that it is part of God's
salvatory plan.34
Three, according to Peter, willing the antecedens does not necessarily
is also willed.
In other words, N(p ?>q) and
imply that the consequens
= 'it is
'to
that', W=
necessary
Wap together do not imply Waq (N
= 'a wills that
is classical:
consider
will', Wap
example
p')35 Peter's
and q stands for 'a has sinned'.
thatp stands for 'a is showing penitence'
.-*q) is correctly
Now N(p
sins cannot be repented
formed, because
condition

unless they have been committed.

it does not follow from
However,
a
a's willing to show penitence
to have sinned (Waq).36
that
wills
(Wap)
Points one and two above are sometimes
in medieval
connected
so that the counterfactual
discussions
is
(vellem,
wishing
velleitas)
as readiness
to will something
understood
under given pre-conditions

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138

RISTO

SAARINEN

31
Point three above is very con
volendi sub conditione)
(promptitudo
seems
to
it
of willing a goal
troversial, because
say that the side-effects
are not necessarily
themselves
willed. This idea in turn leads to dis
cussion about the possibility
of "doing evil to achieve good".38 How
ever, we will only here follow the results of Peter's analysis insofar they
are relevant

2.4. Albert

for the explanation

the Great

and

of akrasia.

the Problem

of Moral

Certainty

was the first Latin writer to treat compre

the Great
(1200-80)
notion of akrasia. Albert was well trained both
hensively Aristotle's
on
two commentaries
His
in Augustinian
tradition and in Aristotle.
Nicomachean
Ethics give a congenial picture of Aristotle's
akrasia inso
to act against clear and distinct
far as they teach that it is impossible
a
the Augustinian-Chris
of
moral
Albert
preserves
knowledge
goal.39
Albert

stance in his analysis by arguing that all sin is due more

tian theological
or less to ignorance.40 He also recognizes
the Aristotelian
idea that the
In Augustin
akrates acts against his own choice (elecdo, prohairesis).41
ian tradition, as we have seen, the reluctant actions were nevertheless
due to a partial assent or choice.
in his discussion of akra
One of Albert's many original contributions
sia is the distinction
between
various degrees
of moral
certainty. A
this distinction.
aided him in making
The Latin
historical happenstance
translator of Nicomachean
Ethics, Robert Grosse teste, rendered Aris
as certitudo and his endoksos
totle's akribeia ("precision")
("a reputable
as
Greek
inNicoma
when
the
Thus,
probabilis.
philosopher
opinion")
chean Ethics 1104al-6
holds that an account of matters of conduct can
be given only in outline and not precisely, Albert understands Aristotle
to mean
the same degree of
that the science of ethics does not possess
as
some
of
other
branches
science.42
Moreover,
certainty
(certitudo)
Albert grasps the meaning
of Aristotle's
endoksa as implying that ethics
but must rely on "reputable
does not attain strict demonstration,
opin
in a probabilist manner.43
in his
with akrasia, Albert
connected
solving the problems
discusses whether ethics ever attains absolute certainty
first commentary
in Aristotle's
notion of scientia. Albert
ad
(certitudo) as presupposed
of some
view that we have scientific knowledge
heres to the Aristotelian
of ethics, but the judgments
universal principles
concerning
particular
actions must remain opinions, because
they are more or less "probable"
ions"

Before

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JOHN

AND

BURIDAN

DONALD

DAVIDSON

ON

AKRASIA

139

as probabais Albert
endoksos
By rendering Aristotle's
(probabilid)44
we do not possess
thus introduces
the idea of ethical probabilism:
(scientia) of the Tightness of particular actions and, there
knowledge
from more or less probable
fore, must proceed
concerning
opinions
their Tightness. Moreover,
Albert here distinguishes
the strong
between
which has some degree of
(opinio ex rationibus probabilibus)
opinion
is
(opinio ex aliquo debili signo) which
certainty and the weak opinion
very

uncertain.45

on the problem
It is evident
that Aristotle
deliberates
concerning
whether
the akrates can act against his own clear and distinct scientia.
But, in addition to this, Albert now raises the issue whether we might
cases in which we do not
not speak of akrasia even in those ambiguous
In doing this he extends
the Aristotelian
knowledge.46
no
can exist, how
that
absolute
akrasia"47
"clear-eyed
given
problem:
can we describe
that is not based on scientia but
and judge behavior
on more or less probable
evidence?
answer between
Albert
in
his
three senses of 'ambigu
distinguishes
ous'. One,
in some cases neither of two alternatives must necessarily
be chosen;
then it is best to choose
neither
and look for such an
alternative
that has some firmness (firmitas). Two, if one of the alterna
tives must be chosen, the agent should choose the alternative possessing
more firmness (quod magis habet firmitatem).
Acting
against one's bet
as akrasia. But if, three,
ter judgment
in this sense can be described
the case is totally ambiguous,
then we cannot speak of akrasia.49,
answer is interesting for two reasons: first, he holds that we
Albert's
can speak of akrasia as regards cases in which
the agent's judgment
possess

certain

does not reach absolute firmness, and, second, he connects

the idea of
moral probabilism
with Aristotle's
akrasia. This development
is non
as an application
and can perhaps be understood
of the
Aristotelian,
idea of "two wills"; but in any case it seems to be Albert's
Augustinian
own contribution
as inspired by Grosseteste's
translation.49
3.

JOHN

BURIDAN

ON

AKRASIA

John

Buridan's
written
libros Ethicorum,
super decem
Quaestiones
1330, was an influential textbook of ethics until the seventeenth
dis
century.50 Buridan was also well aware of the earlier medieval
about

cussion.51

In Book

III of his Quaestiones

Buridan

develops

an elaborate

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action

140

RISTO

SAARINEN

the agent's
is
process
thought and decision-making
theory in which
into three parts. Each of these parts causes some activation
analyzed
in the will. The first act of the will is the act of complacence
and/or
which emerges as a re
(actus complacentiaeldisplicentiae),
displacence
to
intellect. According
sult of the primary
judgment of the practical
a plu
this first act does not yet lead into action. Moreover,
Buridan,
in respect to their realization
rality of such acts which are incompossible
in the soul. As the first act is something
like
may reside simultaneously
a passive
at
the
of
sense-data
offered
the
will
intellect,
by
reception
no freedom. The second act of the will is called the
this point possesses
act of acceptation
of refutation
The
(actus acceptationis/refutationis).
to its second act: it can either follow the
freedom of the will pertains
action proposed
by the intellect or it can defer its act. The third act is
of the action (prosecutiolfuga).52
manifestation
to the
first and second acts of the will are rather analogous
consent.
and
distinction
between
desire
Moreover,
Stoic-Augustinian
them with the volo-vellem
distinction
he himself connects
by
presented
Peter of Poitiers and others. The first act of the will is the hypothetical
velleitas; only the second act can be called the act of the will in a proper
the external
Buridan's

sense.53

Buridan
defines enkrateia
commentary
us
to right reason
to
that
stick
disposition
helps
But these
deviant
behavior.
and thus to resist the passions
suggesting
an
cause
of
that
the first
additional
resisting impulse, namely,
passions
to become
with our actual
act of the will (displicentia),
connected
in akratic behavior
the resisting displac
behavior.54 Correspondingly,
sense
reason
some
in
within
the agent.55
remains
ency defending
right
occur
in
to
in
situations
akrasia
and
enkrateia
Buridan,
According
are
acts
two or more
first
of
the
will
which
simultaneous
conflicting,
In the seventh book
as a moral
(continentia)

of his

active within
the agent's mind. The incompossible
to the agent sub ratione
B are both presented
desirable. Buridan calls this a situation of "double

alternatives
boni,
i.e.,
inclination"

A and
as being

(inclina
tio duplex).56
that it is impossible
Buridan shares the view of Albert and of Aristotle
to act against knowledge
of the good in the strict sense (scientia per
stresses
fecta). Such 'clear-eyed akrasia' is impossible. But he repeatedly
the agent normally does not possess
that in practical decision-making
a framework
of conflicting
scientia but operates within
such perfect
to the
attention
that
he
It is no wonder,
reasons.57
therefore,
pays

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JOHN

BURIDAN

AND

DONALD

DAVIDSON

ON

AKRASIA

141

process in situations of 'double inclination'. Buridan's

decision-making
main
of akrasia is directed
toward situations
interest in his discussion
marred with some ambiguity. He thus refines Albert's
concept of moral
certainty.

inclination makes akratic judgment "weak" (iudicium debile

Double
seu formidinale).
the second and proper act of the will,
Accordingly,
also remains "weak" (acceptatio debilis).58 The
the act of acceptation,
can be seen in the fact that the
weakness
of the akratic judgment
two inclinations become
actual in the akratic person: after
successively
too develops
sin he suffers regret.59 Like Albert,
Buridan
to act
that it is impossible
of moral certainty and concludes
In order to
(iudicium
completum).
judgment
against a "completed"
a fourfold
is, Buridan
presents
judgment
explain what a completed
in judgment.
In judging between A and B, the
gradation of completion
case arises (1) when no reason supports either A or B; another
weakest
weak case arises (2) when equal reasons support both A and B. In the
third case (3) there is a stronger reason for A than for B; but some
committing
a gradation

even the judgment

reason nevertheless
promotes B. For Buridan,
this third case remains weak and incomplete. Only in case
can we reach a
all doubts, however
small, are removed,
A
In
this
is
case,
judgment.
categorically
supported over
"completed"

other

concerning
(4), where
B.60

also speaks of "uncertain"

(dubium) and "certain" (certum)
a
absolute certainty is it not
when
possesses
judgment
judgments. Only
act
to
But
it.
if
there
is
small and
however
reason,
any
against
possible
the probable
concerning
insignificant,
right, it is
against a judgment
to act akratically.61
possible
on the uncertainty
is con
of moral
Buridan's
judgments
emphasis
Buridan

in its capacity
nected with his idea that the will's freedom consists mainly
to withdraw
view that the free
its own act. Buridan
shares the medieval
to
will is a rational capacity. But then it would be highly misleading
is the source of irrational behavior. There
say that the will's freedom
fore, the free will never resists the rational judgments of the intellect.62
and Albert
the Great
We already saw that Peter Abelard
regarded
to not doing anything as useful in some situations.
the will's consent
it a cornerstone
this view and makes
of his action
Buridan
cultivates
to
not
will's
remain
consider
the
He
does
decision
passive as
theory.63
an irrational liberty, but argues that in cases of double inclination
it is
often

the most

rational

choice.

This

rationality

is founded

in the nature

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142

RISTO

SAARINEN

of practical decision-making:
Buridan
says that it is often better not to
choose to act too rapidly, because what seems good prima facie might
It is difficult
to see
consideration.
prove to be wrong after thorough
of practical decisions;
the latent consequences
therefore
it is useful to
possess the capacity of delaying the actual decision for a while.64 Impor
tant decisions,
too long.65
should not be delayed
however,
an aspect
to postpone
The capacity
the will-act
is thus for Buridan
our
of prudential66
of moral
behavior.
Because
estimations
situations
remain incomplete and our practical judgments weak,
it is often pruden
a decision. Moreover,
in his discussion
of prima facie
tial to postpone
seems to adopt the above-mentioned
view
willing
something Buridan
to which we often will something without
of Peter of Poitiers,
according
all of the consequences.
For Buridan,
the pruden
necessarily
willing
the will-act
derives
from the fact that it offers
tiality of withdrawing
of investigating whether
the agent in fact wants all the
the possibility
implied consequences.
is weak and
We have already seen that the akratic man's
judgment
to the Aristotelian
adheres
uncertain
Buridan
view
(debile, dubium).
that the akratic intellect is somehow
captured by the passions. But, in
to that, with the help of his idea that the freedom of the will
addition
to defer its own act, he also develops
consists in its possibility
another
akratic action. If the agent in the case of conflict
way of understanding
his decision
and weak judgment postpones
for the sake
ing alternatives
the judgment attains greater certainty, until most doubts
of reflection,
as certain as
at which
time it has become
have been extinguished,
act
to
in
accordance
then
is
it
with
it.67
Only
prudential
possible.
seems to think that passion causes the agent to act hastily,
Buridan
that is, without paying enough respect to the eventual consequences
of
if
the action. The weak judgment would have gained more certainty,
the evidence
had given the agent enough
time to weigh
pro
man
reason
the
akratic
later
after
is
also
the
repents:
why
perly.
the passion has extinguished
become
itself, the consequences
evident,
which affords rational consideration.68
can be removed
that all ambiguities
Buridan certainly does not mean
a
he is
of
moral
situation.
On
the
consideration
contrary,
by proper
passion

This

certainty
likely to think that in most cases we do not reach absolute
in the context of ambiguous
and often simply have to make judgments
ifmade
in totally ambiguous
situations. But false judgments
situations,
are not instances of akrasia.69
after proper moral consideration,

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JOHN

BURIDAN

AND

DONALD

DAVIDSON

ON

AKRASIA

143

In sum, we can say that Buridan

concept of
employs Aristotle's
akrasia as a framework
in uncertain moral
for analyzing what happens
situations. He defends Aristotelian
intellectualism
by claiming that free
dom of the will as such does not imply that free action is irrational
But Buridan's
in the sense
behavior.
discussion
is non-Aristotelian
not
that the gradation
is
of moral
relevant
for the Greek
certainty
Like Socrates and Aristotle,
Buridan denies the possibility
philosopher.
of 'clear-eyed' akrasia, but he is in fact more
in the akratic
interested
behavior
that occurs in situations of conflicting
In these
alternatives.
situations,

4.

akrasia

is due

to weak

in Davidson's

elements

'medieval'

of

4.1.

The Distinction

judgment

between

influenced

by passion.

explanation

akrasia

Prima Facie

and Unconditional

Judgments

It is not my aim here to outline wholly Donald Davidson's

argument
nor will I go into the details
in How
isWeakness
of the Will Possible?,
of the far-reaching
recent discussion of Davidson's
ideas.70 I will simply
list some of the ideas that to my view have their obvious counterparts
in the medieval
discussion.
Donald
Davidson
argues

an akratic
to perform
that it is possible
action while judging that, all things considered,
it would be better not
to do it than to do it. Moreover,
Davidson
holds that the existence of
such akrasia is compatible
with the principle
(which he calls P2) that
"[i]f an agent judges that it would be better to do x than to do y, then
he wants to do x more than he wants to do y".71
Davidson
makes
the existence
of akrasia compatible
with P2 by
between prima facie (conditional,
distinguishing
'all-things-considered')
and unconditional
(sans phrase, absolute)
judgments
judgments.72 He
in the sense
argues that the akrates operates with prima facie judgments
that both the reasons for and against an action in question
and the
are not unconditional
and absolute,
but only 'all
resulting decision
But the judgment pre
things-considered'
judgments.
(prima facie)
in
is
P2
absolute.73
supposed
He
further holds
that "reasoning
that stops at conditional
judg
... is
ments
in
its
subject, not in its issue".74 By this he
practical only
means
an action do
that the agent's prima facie thoughts concerning
not necessarily

materialize

as actions. As

such they differ

from absolute

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144

SAARINEN

RISTO

if used in practical
have the proposed
which,
judgments,
syllogisms,
Of course there is something
action as their conclusion.75
irrational in
akratic behavior,
since it is nevertheless
odd to act against one's best
all-things-considered
judgment.76 But akratic actions are not logically
a
prima facie judgment does not compel the action
impossible, because
to materialize.

Therefore

Davidson

can conclude

that

in the fact of incontinence,

for the akrates
there is no (logical)
is characterized
difficulty
as holding
to do b than to do a, even
it would
be better
that, all things considered,
has vanished
logical difficulty
though he does a rather than b and with a reason. The
or
the judgement
that a is better
than b, all things considered,
is a relational,
because
and so cannot
conflict
any unconditional
pf
[prima facie],
judgement,
logically with
judgement.77

We

have

seen that Buridan,

situation

the moral
describing
some
has produced
emerged.
Buridan's

It would
use of

interior

be highly
the term

the expression prima facie in

after the first act of the will
some desires have
that is, when
motion,
of course, to maintain
that
anachronistic,
is synonymous
with
that of
prima facie
also
thing to notice here is that Buridan
too, uses78
that arises

But the interesting

Davidson.
a clear distinction
between
imperfect (iudicium debile, iudicium
and
and
completum,
incertum)
(iudicium
certum),
judgments
perfect
in which
holds that akrasia only occurs in situations
the judgment
is
With
of
this
distinction
Buridan
extends
the
Aristotle's
imperfect.
help
to moral
in which
situations
is
discussion
judgment
reaching perfect
in
is already present
difficult. This
'extended' view of akrasia, which
the Great,
has many
affinities with Davidson's
discussion
of
Albert
makes

prima facie judgments.

In the eighth question of Book VII Buridan
the
asks, e.g., whether
will necessarily
follows
the practical
intellect. He ascribes different
and concludes
that the will
judgments,
degrees of certainty to different
most
the
certain
We
have
follows
ones.79
necessarily
only
already no
does not say very clearly whether we ever in fact
ticed that Buridan
attain judgments possessing
absolute certainty
(iudicium certum). And
to
of
it is evident
the same problem
the
work
Davidson;
pertains
remain 'all-things
that in inductive reasoning even the best judgments
considered'

judgments.80
in how they employ
and Davidson
the
Buridan
differ, of course,
distinction
and
Whereas
between
David
imperfect judgments.
perfect
son describes akratic behavior as an irrational course of action left open

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JOHN

AND

BURIDAN

DONALD

DAVIDSON

ON

AKRASIA

145

nature of prima facie judgments, Buridan

because of the uncompelling
a peculiar dynamics of the will. According
to him, in situ
elaborates
ations lacking certainty the will can be directed
to various alternatives
because
the intellect has not excluded
them; therefore a type of akrasia
not
is
these expla
'clear-eyed' akrasia)
(though
possible. But although
a distinction
nations differ, they both presuppose
between prima facie
and definitive

practical judgments.
to know the
Davidson
remarks that "it is not enough
Moreover,
reasons on each side: he [the agent] must know how they add up".
And he claims that this cannot be done in a syllogistic way.81 Thus, he
stresses the prima facie character of even the best 'all-things-considered'
In holding
that no logical calculus can determine
the out
judgments.
come of moral
in complex
situations, Davidson
reasoning
approaches
Buridan's
view that the so-called
'weak judgment'
the Tightness of the outcome of the action.
4.2.
We

Prima Facie
have

ditional'.

Judgments

as Conditional

seen

does

not guarantee

Judgments

that Davidson
also calls his prima facie
In his article 'Intending' Davidson
concludes

judgments
that

'con

reasons
felt duties,
and obligations
for
[w]ants, desires,
principles,
prejudices,
provide
actions and intentions,
and are expressed
intentions
and the
by prima facie judgements;
are distinguished
that go with
intentional
actions
judgements
by their all-out or uncon
ditional
form.82

From this it again becomes

clear that an unconditional
is
judgment
a final statement concerning
the whole of the situation under consider
ation. It yields intentional
actions, whereas prima facie judgments are
con
valid only relative to their reasons. The suggested unconditional
clusion of the practical
not
i.e.
the
is
'detachable'
action,
syllogism,
from the prima facie reasons
and opposing
it. Davidson
supporting
wants

to point

out

that

an action ought
to learn whether
to be performed
[w]e can hardly expect
simply from
....
the fact that it is both prima facie right and prima facie wrong
... if we are to have a coherent
reason, we must give up the idea
theory of practical
or obligatory
that we can detach conclusions
is desirable
about what
from the
(or better)
principles

that

lend

those

conclusions

colour.83

This line of thought has similarities with the action-theoretical

role
or conditional,
as
of the counterfactual,
of
Peter
willing
by
developed

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146

RISTO

SAARINEN

Poitiers and used by Buridan. The wants and desires that are recognized
as counterfactual,
or con
but not carried forward can be explained
sense
In this
Peter of Poitiers's
of the
ditional,
judgments.
example
wishes
sinner who says that he counterfactually
(vellet) to abstain from
sin would be an instance of Davidson's
Simi
prima facie judgment.84
he wants
larly, in Buridan's
example a continent man is asked whether
to fornicate. He answers that he wants it only conditionally
(non respon
debit "vol?", sed dicet "vellem"),
namely, only under the counterfactual
that it were not sinful. In Buridan's
analysis this answer
pre-condition
means
the fornication.
that there exists a first act of the will supporting
no conclusion
is detached
from that conditional
However,
judgment,
and the second act of the will refutes it.85
and Buridan
in fact operate accord
It looks as though both Davidson
in which
between
desire and assent,
the
ing to a kind of distinction
rea
desires are prima facie evaluations
conditioned
by the respective
sons. This conditional
does not lead to action;
(prima facie) evaluation
as the 'second act' of the agent's
the actual assent can be described
mind,
judgment.
emerging as the result of an unconditional
Reasoning
from Prima Facie Judgment
Evidence
Reasoning
from Probabilistic
4.3.

as an Instance

of

also remarks that moral reasoning on the basis o? prima facie

with
from probabilistic
evi
has an analogy
reasoning
judgments
the fallacies
shown and re-formulations
dence.86 Without
entering
is not
undertaken
here,87 we note that his understanding
by Davidson
far from how Albert
the Great and Buridan also understood
the nature
In ethics we proceed "ex probabilibus"
of moral reasoning.
(Aristotle's
not
and
this
does
yet pre
although
"reputable
opinions"),
expression

Davidson

it is already
any elaborate
suppose
theory concerning
probabilities,
it implies that our moral judgments
evident that for Albert and Buridan
are conditioned
lack absolute certainty.
by finite reasons and, therefore,
The same analogy is also visible in Davidson's
principle of continence,
the action judged best on the
which asserts that we should perform
this directive
is
basis of all available relevant reasons.88 For Davidson,
to
of
total
evidence
for
inductive
the
so-called
analogous
requirement
to the hypo
reasoning, which states that we should give our credence
as
evidence.
Just
this latter
all
available
relevant
thesis supported
by
the
maxim
is not part of the logic of inductive reasoning but a directive

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JOHN

BURIDAN

AND

DONALD

DAVIDSON

ON

AKRASIA

147

has no compel
accept, so the principle of continence
a
of rational be
ling logical force, though it is nevertheless
guideline
the akratic person acts against his own 'all-things-con
havior. When
sidered' best judgment, he is not breaking any syllogistic structure but
only this directive principle.89
to what we
Davidson's
has some resemblance
principle of continence
rational man will

directive of prudentiality,
which asserts that a pru
might call Buridan's
man
his
dent
should postpone
decision until all relevant considerations
have been completed.90 As we have seen, Buridan considers
the will's
of its will-act as prudential
it gives an oppor
postponement
just because
tunity to collect and to weigh properly more evidence.
Davidson's
and Buridan's directive of pruden
principle of continence
the ethical decision-making
tiality are meaningful
only if we consider
evidence. David
process as analogical with reasoning from probabilistic
son's important point in stressing this analogy is that we need to know
reasons
in ethics as well how the different
'add up'. In other words,
of the practical
besides Aristotle's
deductive model
ethical
syllogism,
to be supported
thinking needs
by some kind of inductive
logic of
the Great and Buridan
When Albert
consider ethics
decision-making.
as proceeding
ex probabilibus,
that inductive think
they are recognizing
in situations permeated
with a plurality of, more or
ing is necessary
less, probable prima facie reasons.

NOTES
1

1970. We use the 1980 edition,

of the modern
historical
bibliographies
le's akrasia are Mele
Charlton
(1987, pp. 172-80),
three monographs
also offer
These
pp. 210-12).
2

First

published

Recent

studies.
3
For Socrates'

position,

see,

e.g.,

Charlton

as reprinted with
and philosophical

corrections
discussion

(1988, pp. 185-91),

a general
survey on

(1988,

pp.

13-33).

(1982).
of Aristot

and Gosling
(1990,
the most
important

For Aristotle's

view,

cf.

the will"

as

Charles (1984).
4
Cf. Mortimore (1971); Vermazen and Hintikka (1985);Mele (1987).
5
See Broadie and Pybus (1982); Hintikka (1988); Gosling (1990).
6

We

will

use

the expressions

John Buridan's
Medieval

Thought,

(1968) commentaries.
these commentaries

and "weakness

"incontinence",

"akrasia",

synonymous.
7
the most
medieval
Perhaps
interesting
commentaries
of Albert
the Great
(1891;

discussions
1987),

on

as well

In my forthcoming
will be analyzed.

akrasia

are

of
found

as inWalter

in the

two

(1521) and
Burley's
in
of the Will
study, Weakness

Gosling (1990, p. 3).

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148

RISTO SAARINEN

and Saarinen
See Kent
(1986).
1989), Krieger
(1986, pp. 184-92),
(1984, pp. 269-331;
10
(1990, pp. 69-86).
Gosling
11
see Kent
In my opinion,
the relevant
for Anselm
For Aquinas,
and
(1989).
problem
but rather
Scotus was not the 'fall of the devil' described
(1990, pp. 74-86),
by Gosling
or with
of doing
the help of some
the problem
something
only reluctantly,
'probable'
reasons.
12
This
13
This

and Scotus
For this, see below
Ill, d. 36, q. 1).
(1968: Opus oxon.
is consequently
followed
Charlton
line of thought
(1988, e.g., pp. 5-7,
by
177).
to Charlton
is contrary
Philos
(1988, p. 7), who claims that "Western
European

of will before
the present
century".
ophy has little to show on the subject of weakness
on inconti
to Kent
"Franciscan
literature
(1984, p. 295), even the medieval
According
as voluminous".
nence
can only be described
14
Cf. Wieland
(1982).
15
Cf. Zumkeller
of
got the notion
(1986, p. 35). As Zumkeller
points out, Augustine
from Cicero.
continentia
16
See Augustine
De spiritu et litera, 8.13 and 31.53.56.
latina, Vol.
(1844-: Patrolog?a
44, pp.
17
Cf.,

207-08,
234, 236-37).
De sermone Domini

1294).
18
Cf.

19
E.g.,
20
Cf.,

in monte,

e.g.,

Confessiones,
Charlton
e.g.,

pp.

(Patrolog?a

For an English
translation,
and Gosling
(1990, p. 70).
5.11-12.
is not
Augustine

VIII.5.11-12.
(1988,

11.17.54-55

5-6)
VIII.

For Augustine's
Stoicism,
90-98).
Cf. Bourke
(1966, p. 207).
22
VIII. 10.24.
Confessiones,
23
case is Augustine's
A paradigmatic
that the
the church
father concludes

cf. Colish

of

the eternal

goal

(De

p. 1294).
24
VII.4.6.
Confessiones,
25
"Scivi quoniam
aliter
Wolfson

sermone

34,

p.

(1966).

II, pp.

142-218).

on the Mount,
of the Sermon
where
exposition
temporal
things are to be willed
only for the sake
in monte,
Domini
11.17.56: Patrolog?a
latina, Vol.
34,

non possem
counts

p. 167), who

(1985,

cf. Bourke

Vol.

influenced
by Aristotle's
desire
and (rational)
(animal)
use see, e.g., Lapidge
(1988,

Confessiones,
but by the Stoic distinction
between
and its later Christian
this distinction

prohairesis
(choice),
For
assent/consent.
pp.
21

latina,

(1965,
also Zumkeller
(1986, pp. 35, 39).
26
Cf.
Anselm
(1938, pp. 213-14).
arbitrii".
libertatem
27
Anselm
(1938, p. 217.26-32).
28
Peter Abelard
(1971, pp. 24-25).

esse
over

also

nisi Deus

continens
twenty
p.

references

207.3:

"Potestas

det".

The

to this verse

peccandi

is from

translation
in Augustine.
non

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ad

pertineat

a man
In another
example
(pp. 24-25),
evil will.
his master
in self-defense
has an evil consent without
29
Ibid. (pp. 8.26-10.21).
30
"nolo"
In medieval
"non vol?"
refers to a passive
state, whereas
Latin,
case of active resistance.
31
and Holopainen
See Knuuttila
(1993).
32
For "synteresis",
11.14. Peter
of Poitiers
Sent.
p. 98.256-64).
(1950-61,

Baylor (1977).

See

who

kills

denotes

see,

e.g.,

JOHN
33
34

BURIDAN

Sent.

11.14. Peter

Sent.

11.17.

example
35
Sent.

Peter

of wanting
1.9. Peter

AND

of Poitiers
of Poitiers
the death

DONALD

(1950-61,

ON

DAVIDSON

AKRASIA

149

p. 98.271-84).

p.
(1950-61,
of Christ: Peter

124.84-91).
of Poitiers

See

also

Sent.

IV.16

(1855, pp. 1200-02).

non
"Solvunt
dicentes

of Poitiers
p. 83.141-44):
(1950-61,
ad aliud, et aliquis vult vel potest
antecedens,
quod si aliquid antecedat
. .". Here
as mere
vel possit consequens.
the view is presented
opinion

for

the

accidere
ideo velit

quod

("dicunt quid
in Christ
of the two wills
1855, pp. 1199-1202),
am"), but in his discussion
(Sent. IV.16:
this view.
Peter adopts
36
Sent. IV.16. Peter of Poitiers
(1855, p. 1199).
37
inWilliam
of Auxerre's
Summa
?urea,
I, XII,
4, q. 3 (1980-86,
pp. 235-36).
E.g.,
38
and Ramsey
Cf., e.g., McCormick
(1978).
39
Albert
second commentary:
1987, pp. 532-36;
1891, pp. 474-76).
(first commentary:
40
He here (1987, p. 523.45-47)
Albert
considers
1987, pp. 523-24).
(1891, pp. 206-07;
in keeping with Augustine.
De duabus animabus,
6.6
this view as wholly
Cf. Augustine's
latina, Vol.
42, p. 98).
(Patrolog?a
41
Albert
(1891, pp. 214-19).
42
Ibid. (pp. 53-54).
43
For example,
Albert
(1891, p. 54)
ethics. Later, Albert
(p. 176) concludes

the certainty
of rhetorics with
that of
compares
that the knowledge
of the virtues
is less certain
to the technical
certain than knowledge
pertaining

than the knowledge

of nature, but more
artes.
44
Albert
(1987, p. 523.48-59).
45
I. 2, 14 (1357a-b).
Ibid. (p. 523.61-73).
Rhetorics
Aristotle,
46
Albert
"Tertio
facer? non sit
videtur,
(1987, p. 530.21-22):
quod contra ambiguum
incontinentiae".
47
This expression
is adopted
from Charlton
(1988, p. 58).
48
Albert
In medieval
has also the connotations
Latin,
(1987, p. 530.40-49).
"firmitas"
and "truth".
"authority"
49
to be noted
It ought
in his second
is
here
that Albert
commentary
(1891, p. 467)
to speak of akrasia
in decisions
situations.
concerning
ambiguous
unwilling
50
On the influence of Buridan's
cf. Michael
commentary,
(1985). Walsh
(1966, pp. 24
we find in this commentary
we may be sure was available
to
"Whatever
25) concludes:
. .". Buridan's
over hundreds
is
thousands
of students
of years.
practical
philosophy
by Krieger
(1986).
analyzed
(1986). See also Saarinen
51
are Albert
The most
often quoted
scholastic
in Buridan's
the
authors
commentary
Franciscan
Gerald
Great
and the Augustinian-minded
Odonis
See Walsh
(1290-1349).
(1975, p. 258).
52
This view is presented
in Book
III, q. 3 (Buridan
1968, pp. 41va-43rb).
Buridan
(1968, p. 43ra-rb).
54
. . .
Ibid. (p. 142ra): "Continentia
rectitudini
capitur pro habitu, quo insistentes
non auferentes
totum
in
nobis
resistimus
vehementibus
existentibus
passionibus
53

quaedam
ipsarum, propter quod operi nostro contradicentia
55
Ibid. (p. 143va).
56
Ibid. (p. 141rb-va:
Book VII, q. 3).
57
Cf., e.g., Buridan
sepe, ut mihi
(1968, 143rb): "Quoniam

vel displicentia

videtur,

expertus

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rationis
tractum

annexa

est".

sum, quod

150
cum

rationes

determinabam

RISTO SAARINEN

viderem
ad utramque
partem probabiles,
. . . sed in
...
me
tenebam me
suspenso
Cf. also p. 42va (cited below).

tarnen
. Imo

ad neutram

iudicii
partem
est prius examin

prudentis

are consilia".
58
Ibid. (p. 143va: Book VII, q. 6).
59
Ibid. (pp. 142va, 143va).
60
Ibid. (p. 143ra).
61
that the "certum
Ibid. (p. 145rb). Here Buridan
also concludes
iudicium"
need not be
that the agent adopts because
he has no reason
it can as well be an opinion
"scientia"',
to think otherwise.
whatsoever
62
This point
is made with great clarity by Krieger
the most
radical non
(1986). Only
such as Walter
of Bruges
that the will
Aristotelian
Franciscans,
(around
1270), claimed
See St?dter
could be the source of irrational behavior.
(1971).
63
For this, cf. Krieger
(1986, pp. 146-208).
64
est sciendum
Buridan
III, q. 3): "Ad cuius evidentiam
(1968, p. 42va: Book
quod
fuerit sub
libertas secundum
quam voluntas
potest non acceptare
quod sibi presentatum
vel non

est sub ratione mali,

refutare quod presentatum
valde nobis
prodest
in quibus prima facie sunt alique
rationes
pro tanto, quia in multis,
vel annexe vel cons?quentes,
bonitatis
latent sepe mille malicie,
propter quod
apparentes,
esset nobis
et damnosum.
inconveniens
Et sic
illud quod apparebat
bonum
acceptare
habet aliquando
bonitatem
latentem propter
etiam, quod prima facie videtur esse malum,
illud esset nobis malum".
quam r?futasse
65
Ibid. (p. 42va-vb).
66
For Buridan's
notion
of prudentia,
Cf. again Buridan
(1968, p. 143rb, cited above).
ratione

boni

ad vite

directionem

see Krieger
(1986, pp. 15-145).
67
Buridan
(1968, p. 145rb-va).
68
Cf. again Buridan
(1968, pp. 142va; 143va: Book VII, q. 6).
69
This point was explicitly made by Albert
the Great
Buridan
(1987, p. 530, see above).
that even the "opinio falsa" may be certain,
also concludes
(1968, p. 145rb, see above)
reason opposes
and if it is considered
if no available
the opinion
long enough.
70
and Hintikka
For these, see Vermazen
(1988, pp. 114-34),
(1985), Charlton
Gosling
and Hurley
(1992).
(1990, pp. 103-18),
71
Davidson
(1982a, pp. 22-23).
72
are used
in Davidson's
article.
It is problematic
whether
All
these expressions
they
can

in the

presupposed

be divided
into two
last analysis
in discussion
around Davidson's

synonymous
See
point.

Gosling
(1990, pp. 104-05).
73
Davidson
(1982a, p. 39).
74
Ibid.
75
(1982a, p. 26; 1982b, p. 98).
E.g., Davidson
76
Davidson
(1982a, p. 41).
77
Ibid. (p. 39).
78
Buridan
(1968, p. 42va, cited above).
79
See above.
Ibid. (pp. 144vb-145va).
80
Cf. also Gosling
Davidson
(1982a, pp. 40-41).
81
Davidson
(1982a, p. 36).

(1990,

groups,
Charlton

p.

but

this

(1988,

105).

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is normally
115) and

p.

JOHN
82
83
84
85
86

Davidson

(1982b,

Davidson

(1982a,
of Poitiers

Peter
Buridan

AND

BURIDAN

(1968,

Davidson

p. 102).
p. 37). On
(1950-61,

p. 43ra-rb).

DONALD

ON

DAVIDSON

see also Gosling

"detachment",
Cf.
above.
p. 98).
Cf. above.

AKRASIA

(1990,

pp.

151

107-09).

p. 37).
as we have seen, that in practical
Davidson
it is
claims,
reasoning
(pp. 37-39).
as actions,
to detach absolute
fallacious
i.e. conclusions
from
that materialize
judgments,
of the
prima facie reasons. He compares
practical
reasoning with probabilistic
reasoning
is falling;
falls, it almost certainly will rain; (b) the barometer
type: (a) if the barometer
87

(1982a,

Ibid.

In this example,
(a) and (b) do not "allow detachment
Davidson
further
that practical
should
argues
(p. 37).
reasoning
not proceed
in the form of universalized
conditionals.
For discussion,
cf., e.g., Charlton
and Gosling
(1990, pp. 105-07).
(1988, pp. 118-23)
88
Davidson
(1982a, p. 41).
89
Ibid. (pp. 41-42).
90
Buridan
(1968, pp. 143rb, 42va, cited above).

and (c) it almost certainly

of the modal
conclusion"

will

rain.

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