An Analytical Model for Conflict Dynamics

Author(s): N. Gass
Source: The Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 48, No. 10 (Oct., 1997), pp. 978-987
Published by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals on behalf of the Operational Research Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3010117
Accessed: 18-03-2015 18:06 UTC
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journal

of the Operational

Research

Society

(1997) 48, 978-987

1997 Operational Research Society Ltd All rights reserved 0160-5682/97

$12.00

An analyticalmodel for conflict dynamics

N Gass
Decision Matrix, Ottawa, Canada
A coherent dynamic conflict model is developed from basic principles. The governing equations have a striking
resemblanceto the continuity equation in fluid dynamics with an additionaltern for the response to pressureby the
opponent. The salient feature of the model is a moving confrontationline which is an excellent indicator for the
evolution of conflict. The developed model also permitsinvestigationof the necessaryminimuminvolvementof a third
partyactorsuch as an internationalorganizationto establisha statusquo between the actors.The model is demonstrated
on the Russian-Chechenconflict and the Bosnian war.
Keywords: conflict analysis; methodology; modelling

Introduction
With the new political world order, a new distribution of
power has risen in the form of a multipolar system where
the manifold of interactions of political, social, economics,
and military environments tends to raise the ambient level
of regional conflicts potentials.
This will inevitably have an impact on the international
crisis management, policy planning and the structures of
peacekeeping forces due to the widening theatre of operations and the new modes in which they are conducted as
discussed by Bailey and Ferguson.' But most important,
early recognition of potential conflicts will open additional
avenues for conflict resolutions as analyzed by Kaufmann2
and Bennett3 and thus will have a higher chance of success
to stabilize volatile geopolitical regions.
Richardson4 started the trend of mathematical modelling
of conflicts well before the Second World War and since,
numerous models based on a wide variety of mathematical
approaches have been developed as, for example discussed
by Nicholson,5 Gillespie and Zinnes,6 Fraser and Hipel,7
and Gass.8'9
In the development of conflict models, two major
problems have to be overcome. The first is the choice of
the governing equations which are often selected from
other disciplines and adapted to suit the present application
without regard to the mathematical structure and whether it
reflects the basic laws of the processes to be modelled. The
other problem is the choice of conflict parameters and
their numerical values. Clearly, the relationships between
actors are very complex and many rational and subjective
considerations influence their behaviour as described by
Nicholson. 10

Correspondence: Dr N Gass, Decision

Ottawa, Canada, KIS OA4.

Matrix,

77 Havelock

Street,

The present paper is an attempt to eliminate the first

problem by developing a coherent set of differential
equations based on basic principles in conflict theory.
The second problem is also addressed through the choice
of some global parameterswhich are easier to estimate.
Nevertheless, the underlying numerous subjective
factors, such as ethnic particularities, world opinion,
inherent animosity, etc., which are often the impetus
for irrationalactions, are difficult to describe in a rational
way.
The final results of this approachis a moving confrontation line which indicates an imbalance in the status quo
between the actors. This imbalance can be used, for
example, by internationalorganizationas an early warning
signal of possible conflict escalation.
It must be pointed out that the proposed model does
not predict future conflicts at a precise time but rather
investigates the conditions which may lead to such
events, in a similar way to the approachesby Nicholson,5
Gillespie and Zinnes6 where conditions of stability and
equilibrium are studied. Also, the hypothetical question
can be studied of how much intervention by an international organizationis necessary to balance the pressure at
the confrontationline and thus stop its movements.
The governing equations are solved by using the
commercially available software tool ithink, produced by High Performance System Inc., Hanover, NH,
USA. ithink is a dynamic systems tool ideally suited for
trackingtime-dependentevents. Another advantageis that
the results are automatically displayed in graphical form
at each time step. With this feature, an analyst may
interfere in the computation process at any given time
to update or alter various conflict parametersin order to
study some 'what if ..' questions. A complimentarycopy
of the programmedconflict model is available from the
author.

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NGass-An
forconflict
analytical
model
dynamics979

Finally, it is worth mentioning that the governing equations are also applicable to analyze conflicts arising in
labour relations and contractnegotiations.

and
NB
pB=E

cisi(i

EB

1 -d

(r/B-ri),

CB

Basic assumptions
Conflict situations can be caused by many factors such as
differences in political ideologies, legal and economic
systems, ethnic and social particularities, human rights
issues, state-sponsoredterrorism,cross-borderenvironmental problems, territorialand resource claims, etc. Many of
these issues may be subduedfor some time until propelled
forward to surface at the confrontationline between the
actors giving rise to pressure. A detailed list of factors is
given by Gass.8
Consider the different conflict elements between actors
A and B depictedin Figure 1. Let the individualissues have
virtual distances from the confrontationline and different
speeds at which they move towardsit, namely towardsthe
negotiationtable, UN or WTO forums, or towardsmilitary
action,etc.Atthe confrontationline,theseissueswill be metby
moreorless resistancefromthe otheractorandwill causepressure. Let an internationalorganizationinfluence the actors
to decreasetheirconfrontationby using, for example,political
pressure,economic force, or peacekeepingoperations.
Let the perceived importantof the issues S4 and SB of the
actorsA and B be multipliedby the capabilitiesCAand CB
(political power, economic strength,military force) to lend
weight to their issues. For example, if an issue raises a large
confrontationbetween a superpowerand a weak opponent,
the formerdoes not need to worrymuch while the latterhas
to fear possible military actions. Conversely,if there is no
confrontation,then a militaryimbalanceis of no importance
as is the case betweenFranceand Luxembourg,for example.
With these assumptions,two generalizedforce density or
pressurefunctionspA(r'A,t') and pB(r/B, t') for actors A and
B, respectively,can be defined as
pA=

iA

C)(

E1-eA

(1 )

where ri(t'), i = 1,.

N are virtualdistancesof N disputed
issues at time t' in a local coordinatesystem r' with respect
to the confrontationline. An external actor E, such as the
United Nations may resolve part of the issue where Ei
denotes the effort of E and 0 s ei < 1 is the effectiveness
which dependsprimarilyon the acceptanceby the receiving
actor.
Equation 1 is simply the sum of the weighted issues
between the actorswhere the Dirac function 6 conveniently
representsthese issues as discrete entities along a coordinate axis. Thus, if 6(r'

ri) = 0 for r' 0 ri, then there is no

issue present and hence there is no contribution to the

density. Other basic features such as JfiO6(r - a)dr = 1
and J?O_
f(r)6(r - a)dr =f(a) will be used to transform
the discrete weighted issues to a uniformly distributed
pressurealong the confrontationline.
The purpose of the present approach is to develop the
equationsof a moving confrontationline. To do this, let the
response to the issues take place at the confrontationline.
Away from it, the issues become a lesser and lesser target
since they have not surfaced completely from the background and thus do not yet contribute to the present
confrontation. In this way, the difference in pressure
between the actors will move the confrontation line
which is a good indicator of the imbalance of demands
and power of between the actors. Duringthe Cold War, for
example, there was continuous confrontationbetween the
West and the Communist Bloc but the confrontationline
oscillated slowly within narrow bounds since care was
taken to maintainthe status quo.

movementof
confrontation
line

Lagrange
Coordinate
system
Euler

Coordinate
system

- v

HA

AL

withdrawal

02s>

issue

iBssu

eC

The general conflict equations

With the above basic assumptions, a set of governing

equations are developed as shown below. The transition
from the discrete issue density of equation 1 to a uniform
one can be achieved in a similarway to a procedurein fluid
external
L
dynamics by defining a mapping function F(r, t) which
~~~~~~~~~~interference
uniformly distributes the weighted issues along the
ee 0
c
confrontationline between the actors. Thus,
.

, .
,
.....
.... ... ..
issues<0gg\~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.
?;tt;00
\4

ofissues

, I

EAN~~~~~~~~~~~~~~A

A/

for all 0

of

for all O <, e, CiB

. n......

u.........

0~suse

....

averagepressure B

averagepressureAiniida isu
Figre1
efntin
f onlit
..ms.
ndcoodiat.sst

eens
rO

z(t)4(t)

J
-00

dt'

F(r

r', t - t')dr' = 1

(2)

-00

where ,u represents the average linear concentration of

issues along F which is taken as the confrontationline,
and c is the average attack frequency by an actor on the
issues of his counterpart.Substitutingequation2 into 1 and

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980 Journal
oftheOperational
Research
Vol.48,No.10
Society

using some properties of the Dirac function yields the

averaged pressure density of actor A as
r??

0?

t) =

pA(r.A

TBHB

-00

x F(rA
,6B8

pA(rA,

rA, t

,1

t')

-00

t')drdt'

(t ))

)('-E

C(t)(t

00

x F(rA - rA (t'), t - t)dt'

(3)

where
(t)
iEA

=e

'EA(tI

for all O <

CiA(/),

and likewise for actor B. More details on the development

of equation 3 and the following derivations can be found in
Gass.11 To proceed in deriving the movement of the
confrontation line F, equation 3 is differentiated with respect
to global time t, yielding
A

NA
A

_;H
~BBE
C

'.0

,j

(1-

CiA -t1S
CA('S6B

(t ))F t dt,

(4)

-00

and likewise for actor B, where a comma denotes partial

differentiation. The partial derivative F t can be expressed as
aF

- UiF,r

-F,lt

where ui = drJ/dt' denotes the speed at which an issue

moves towards the confrontation line. With this, and using
integration by parts, equation 4 becomes:
Aj?

B div
d

J
i

-B

By

-4(I

c(A1

)F dt'

-00

-CA

00 at

(I

Si

-i

0)}IF

dtl

= O

(S)

Finally, equation 5 can be simplified by averaging the

speeds of the pressure-causing issues in the usual manner as

U (r, t) - L
i

(I

CsUA
Ci

A)F dt'

00

x (

-1Ai)F
CjAS4A(l

dtl)

(6)

and likewise for actor B. With this, the final form of the
conflict equations emerge as
A

+?pAdivUA
P't

pB

+pBdiv

it i

-T B,By

NB
UB

rA lA

a{CA
IS ((1
-oo~~~at
OC

j__

-{CiBSiB(l

e)}F

dt = 0

B)Fdt=O

at

(7)
These equationscan be called the continuityequations of
conflict dynamics and resemble the continuity equation in

fluid dynamics. The first term in equation 7 denotes the

change in pressureof the weighted issues at the confrontation line. The second term represents the withdrawal of
issues from the confrontationline and may be producedby
the externalinterventionof an internationalorganization,for
example, or simply by an actor's decision to drop some
demands.
A feature of this formulation is the appearanceof the
thirdterm in equations7 which governs the responseof one
actor in reaction to the other actor's issues. Depending on
many factors, the response may increase or decrease the
pressure at the confrontation line as will be discussed
below.
Response to pressure
For furtheranalyticaltreatment,some simplificationsto the
responseterms in equations7 are proposed.Actors respond
differentlyto encounteredresponse and can either respond
in an aggressive, provocative, passive or submissive way,
depending strongly on ethnic particularitiesbut also on
rationalfactors such as resourcelimits, political strength,or
military force. A weak submissive actor, for example,
could withdraw from contested issues when met by resistance from a strong actor. Others, as for example Chechnya, with a tiny but very provocative force, mounts
resistance against a comparativesuperpower,defying military rationalityin pursuit of national goals.
Let the weighted issues be averaged,thus eliminatingthe
summationof the thirdterm. Let the imbalance of capabilities between the actors be the driving force behind the
response to the pressure from the opponent. Consider the
expression(CB - C) 1pA and(CA CB) 9 pB for actorA
and B, respectively,where the symbol 0 representsa userdefined rule to combine the two quantitiesand may involve
many rationaland subjective factors such as economic and
military power, ethnic pride, inherent distrust, historical
animosity,internationalopinion, etc.
One reason for 0 is that, in general, it is very difficult to
develop an analytical function for the response term to
describe all influences over the entire period of analysis.
Also, it can be observedthat the response of one actor does
not change continuouslyto infinitesimalactions of the other
actors but rathershifts in leaps and bounds depending on
some thresholds. An example for this is the confrontation
between Russia and the Ukrainewhere threatsand counterthreats are made but the overall relation does not change
with every turn.It ratherremainson one confrontationlevel
until enough additionalpressure is accumulatedto force a
jump to anotherlevel.
An example of a responsematrix C Op is given in Table
1 where the ratingA denotes low pressure,little capability,
and liffle response, while the rating F indicates the opposite.

Table 1 depicts the response profile of an actor who is

cautious if his capabilities are weak compared to his

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dynamics981
model
forconflict
analytical
NGass-An
Table 1

normalized over the width H. Collecting all terms leads to

the response of actor B to the issues of actor A as

Response profile C 0 p

Pressurefrom counterpart

Capability of actor

0
A

-A
-A

-B
-A

0 0 0 00
O
o
G
oo
C
0 0
A
DO
0 0 0
A
E
0 0
A
B
F
B

A
A
B
C

RB = zBB{(CB -CA)

XAp}(1

B (rB, t)drB

)B)I

-_

(8)

A
B
C
D

B
C
D

Again, an external actor may interact to decrease a

pressure-buildingresponse since this could be a self-feeding cycle and any control would be of mutual benefit to
both actors A and B. Likewise, the responseof actorA to B
is

r+H

RA = ,uAy{(CA

counterpart (thus, he decreases the response pressure by

-A) but becomes increasingly aggressive in response when
he is strong.
Clearly, Table 1 will be different for each individual case
since actors respond differently to encountered pressure.
The response profile for Chechnya given in Table 2, for
example, does not contain any negative quantities which
indicates that other factors, than strict military considerations, play a large role.
Let zA and CB be the response rates (also termed aggression factors if C 0p is positive) to the pressure from the
counterpart, thus targeting the other actor's issues in
response. Let the effectiveness in targeting the other actor's
issues be denoted by the parameter p. The further away an
issue is from the confrontation line, the less it has surfaced
to the present and the lesser it becomes a target.
As the simplest choice, let p be a linear function of the
distance, such that A = PA(F - rB) and 9B = B(prA - F)
and
the
conditions
with
boundary
(p(O)= 1
a
more
width
of
the
H
denotes
=
where
>
0
H)
qp(Ir Fl
or less narrow virtual area along F (see Figure 1). H can be
viewed as the issue horizon where within this virtual area,
all issues are of concern at present, while outside, they are
more or less subdued until moving forward into the confrontation zone F ? H. Clearly, an actor must choose the span of
H such as to include all issues of concern.
Finally, let the concentration of issues ,u be given by the
integral over all issues inside the confrontation zone F ? H
Table 2

CB)

pB}(l

CA-CB

(rA, t)dr-A

(9)
With this, equations 7 becomes
RB = ?

pA +?pAdiv

UA+

pBB +?pBdiv

UB +RA

These equations are integrated in Appendix A

Dynamic confrontation line

Further analytical treatment of the conflict equations A7
and A8, developed in Appendix A, is possible by choosing
the distributions 9A = (A(F - rB) and 9B = 9B(rA - F) of
the response effectiveness over the depth of the issue
horizon H. Let these functions have the simplest form
possible with the conditions at the confrontation line
9(A(O) = 9B(O) = 1 and at the horizon sA(H) = YB(H)
= 0 which is satisfied by a straight line. Thus,
A
(1/HB)(F - rB) + 1 and 9B = (1/HA)(rA - F) + 1
and 9pB = 1/HA. Let zA= -0,
with 9IA = 1/HB
=
=
vB i-B, and v7
-F be the velocities of the issues and
the confrontation line, respectively and letpA(t) = CASA(t),
etc., by definition, where CA and Ce are assumed to be
constant over the issue horizon. With this, and setting
SA(t)

SB(t)

SA(H)

SB (H)

Chechen response profile

Russianpressure pB

Capability of imbalance

)HA

-F
-E
-D

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
A
B

B
B
C

C
C
D

D
D
E

E
E
F

-C
-B
-A

0
0
0

A
A
B

B
B
C

C
C
D

E
E
F

F
F
F

D
D
E
E

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Vol.48,No.10
oftheOperational
Research
Society
982 Journal

where u = v4/vB. For numerical purposes, it is of advantage to transformequation 16 in a nondimensionalform as

equations A7 and A8 become

(

- A) + WA + RB =

oA(vF

= 0

WB-RA

UB(VB+ ?F)_

WA = HA{w

+ (1 -w

WB

HB{WB

1)

)A }( C

(1 - WB)?EBJ(UB

HB{(CA

X1

RB

CB)

(13)

BHA{(CB _ CA) 0 CASA(t)}(I -? B)

=-1

(17)

~WA ?RB)

where cx= (SA(t)/SB(t))is the issue ratio at the confrontation line and ,B= (SA(H)/SB(H)) is the issue ratio at the
horizon.

CBSB(t)}

(-)S(){+

+# R )]17

:(

*1?u)[l+

(1)

1)

and RA and RB are the responses to the other actors issues or

demands
RA =

(1+U [

12

B(+

)[

VF

where WA and We denote the issue withdrawals of actors

A and B

Simple examples

Consider the simple case where vB = WA = WB = 0, and

c = ,B.Then equation 17 becomes A = (RA/RA + RB) which

B S) B(H)){2?cB}
(A
S(H)

Substituting equations 11 into each other and resolving

for vF leads to the equation of a moving confrontation line
according to the pressure differential between the actors.
Thus,
A+

=AvA

B)v

BvB

WA + WB + RA

- R

(14)

The Cold War scenario can serve as a trivial check of

equation 14. Let there be no withdrawal and no interference
by an external actor. Let the perceived capabilities and
importance of all issues including their speeds and issue
horizons be equal. With equations 12 and 13, equation 14
becomes
2cvF

= TAH{0

09 CS(t)}B -_,BH{O 0 CS(t)}A

The confrontation line becomes stationary if the aggresstion rates r and the pressure response terms 0 0 CS are
equal. During the Cold War period, small perturbations
about the equilibrium were present reflecting the different
attitudes and viewpoints vis a vis the balance or military
power and external political influences. For this, let
IA =,
TB = oX, R = {O 0 CS(t)}A and {O0 CS(t)}B = fR.
Then, vF = (1 /2)TRH(oc - /) where a and 3 are small
perturbations about 1 which cause slow oscillations of the
confrontation line.
The relationships between the speeds of the issues
towards the confrontation line can be given as
v + vBI,

1 (WA +RB)
crA

1(WB+
crB

RA)

(15)

confirms the obvious situation that the confrontationline

moves faster in favour of actor A if there is less resistance
RB by actor B or more resistanceby actor A against B. If
actor B does not resist the issues of A then A = 1, and the
confrontationline moves with the same speed as the issues
of A arriveat the front.
Figure 2 depicts the relation between the power ratio
C/Cl3 and the issue ratio cx.For this, let WA = WB = 0,
H/HB

+ UW +.B

R )-CA

(1

)(Yx

Let the

(CA/CB)4 (2 + (X)(X2/(l + 2cc).

It is interestingto note that, even for low issue ratios cc,a

power ratio of more than 3 does not warrantthe additional
resources since the speed of the confrontation line is
nearing its maximum of 1. For power ratios less than 1,
the confrontationline moves against actor A despite high
issue ratio. In other words, actors moving forward issues
without the backup of power, will not be taken seriously.
Figure 3 shows the relation between the speed of the
issues moving to the confrontationline and the power ratio.

1.0

a=2

0.5-

a4-1
0.0-

I (1
aB

1, CA = CB = 0.

-0.5

With this, equation 14 becomes

?A = gB = 0

actors be completely rational, such that their reactions

depend on the power ratio C4/Ce. Thus, zA/zB ac CA/CB,
and (CB-CA)
? pA Oc CB/CA .
(CA _CB) ? pB o CA/CB
/
Then equation 17 becomes o [ ?+ 1qDf]-[1?[
+ d=

CB

+ RB()

Figure 2

Influenceof issue density ratio cx.

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NGass-An
analytical
model
forconflict
dynamics983
1.0

I-----

The Chechen-Russian

0.5

-05

CA

C B

Figure 3

Influence of issue speed ratio u.

With above numerical values and o = 1, equation 17

becomes
4-

1?u[

CA

1+u

(cA

41-i

\CB,/j

The influence of the issue speed ratio u is most

pronounced

between

<

CA/GB

< 3 which

is

in the

region of transition in the dominance of power between

the actors. For a power ratio greater than 2, u has practically
no influence on A and there is no need to increase resources.
In comparison to Figure 2, Figure 4 depicts an actor who
is submissive if the power ratio is balanced as shown in
Table 1 and even more so if CA/CB < 1. The resistance
term RA becomes negative which indicates cooperation and
results in a high speed (less than - 1) of the confrontation
line against actor A. For power ratios greater than 1, actor A
becomes increasingly aggressive similar to Table 2. The
graph also shows that the decision of actor A occurs in leaps
and bounds according to some thresholds whereas in Figure
2 an infinitesimal action by actor B caused an infinitesimal
reaction by actor A.

1X0
.0

-2.0

02

Figure

0A

Influence of issue density ratio a for a submissive or

agressiveactor.

conflict

Russia regards the Caucasus as a vulnerable flank vis-a-vis

the neighbouring countries Turkey, Iran, and the general
influx of revolutionary ideas from Islamic countries give
Russia ample reasons for 'protecting' the region. Equally
important are the economic reasons since the region is rich
on mineral resources and oil.
Some of the current instability of the Caucasus originates
from the Russian colonial expansion and the long Caucasian War in the last century. Others stem from the Stalinist
method of splitting ethnic groups through artificial division
of regions into administrative entities.
For some years, Russia has tolerated the secessionist
government of Chechnya but in 1993 has begun to take
military steps to resolve the impasse. The reasons for the
resistance to Chechnya's independence is Russia's determination not to relinquish control of the region since there
are fears of a domino effect if Chechnya separates. These
fears are justified because there are several other candidates
for separation in the Caucasus, notably, the Tartars, Karachai, Lezgins, and Ossetians, to name a few.
Chechens have a long reputation for opposing the
Russians, as was the case in the Caucasian War, despite
having a much inferior military force. Such attitudes are

reflected in the term (CA

CB) 0pB

which can be eval-

uated by developing the response matrices given in Tables

2 and 3. The advantage of such an approach lies in the
flexibility in describing the influences of numerous rational
and subjective criteria on the response of an actor. Indeed,
it would be very difficult to develop functional relationships for this purpose.
For clarity reasons, the rating scale for the capabilities
and resulting response is chosen as {0, A, B, . . ., F) where
A denotes a low level of issues arising, weak capability,
or little response, while F represents the opposite. The
choice is arbitrary but it is ideal to demonstrate the
combinatorial rules of the algebra 0. In the associated
computer program, however, these alpha-numeric ratings
are converted to an arbitrary numerical scale, as for
example A = 1, ..., F = 6.
The response term shows that Chechnya, denoted by the
superscript A, is not submissive or ready for concessions
even when faced with an overwhelming military imbalance
CA - CB to Russian's advantage paired with high Russian
pressure. For example, if the capability imbalance is - E
(large), and Russia's pressure is E (high), the response
(CA _ CB) &pB = D (mediumhigh) at which Chechnyais
resisting Russian demands or issues.
Initially, from 1991 to 1995, Russia sought to resolve the
issues with Chechyna through political and economic
threats and later through some military actions. Chechnya
is politically important to Russia and this is why the
Russian response to the Chechen issues is aggressive as
seen in Table 3.

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Vol.48,No.10
984 Journal
oftheOperational
Research
Society

Table 3 Russian response profile for 1991-1995

Chechenpressure pA

Capability imbalances CA

Since there is no external intervention WA

and equation 17 becomes
VF

I_

t+

CB

0
A
B

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

A
A
B

B
B
C

C
C
D

C
D
E
F

A
B

B
C

C
D

D
E

D
E
E
F

WB = 0,

I_

VB
D (+

P(ucxp

(18)

where p = RA/RB.In 1990-91, Russia was preoccupiedby

othermattersand paid little attentionto the issues concerning Chechnya. Thus, vB = 0, and TB = 0 yielding RB 0
and A becomes A = (p/I + p) = (1 + (RB(t)/RA4(t))j1 = 1.
First reactions by Russia occurredafter PresidentDudajew (in October 1991) unilaterallydeclared independence
and, in retaliation,Russia declareda state of emergency on
Chechnya, threateningpossible military action. The parameters were assumed as: a = ,B= 1, HA = HB = 1,
SA(H)/SB(H) = 1, SA(t)/SB(H) = 2, SB(t)/SA(H) = 1,
2, v = 1,
SA(t)/SB(H) = 3, SA(t)/SB(t) = 3, CB/CA
= B
(CB
CA) ?pA
C = B = 2,
(CA-CB)
pB =
B0 C = C = 3, and vB = 0 since Russia applied only
passive resistance. With this, the response terms becomes
-

and
A = (I + (8z (t)/5zA(t)))

RA(t) = 15 TA(t)

RB(t)

which

6TB(t)

yields

The threat parameters were initially TA = 0.5 and

= 0.2 but steadily increasing until in August 1994 a
coup was launched by the opposition, also supportedby
Russia. This caused a slowdown of the advance of the
conformationline as depicted in Figure 5 with the threat
TB

parameters reaching now

TA

TB

0.6.

0.0

;s\s.
;;s
.-..
...
. .........

eaA Xo
(=,;
C)

........................ ....... . -., .

0
0

D
E
E
F

F
F

In September 1994, President Dudajew declared a state

of war and in November 1994 the opposition started an
attack on Grosny. In January 1995, Russian troops moved
towards Grosny and in February 1995 the capital fell and
fighting spread to other areas. During this period the threat
parameters were steadily approaching the values of TA =
= 3,
TB = 1,
with
u = 1,
SA(t)/SB(t) =-,
CB/CI
=
=
=
CA)
?pA
C
Q
D
C
3,
(CA-CB)
pB=
(CB
?
=
=
C C
C 3, and equation 18 becomes
A=

with

P = 3

(_B(t))_

Figure 5 shows that the conformation line moves now

against Chechnya, an indication that Russia is controlling
the conflict. Recent Russian elections, economic considerations including military resources, and negative public
opinion forced Russia to reduce the crisis which could
lead to a new, more relaxed response matrix given in Table
4, a pre-requisite for negotiations.
In September 1996, a cease fire was announced but
a solution of the conflicting issues has yet to be
addressed. Russia is reluctant to permit Chechnya
to become an independent country and thus Chechnya
may raise the issue pressure which could result in unrest
over the next few years as shown in Figure 5. Using Tables
?pB =-0
? A = B = 2 and
2 and 4 yield (CA-CB)
(CB
C) 0 pA = O 0 D = A = 1 and assuming an optimistic and pessimistic threat parameter such that p
(optimistic) =2 and p(pessimistic) = 9 leads to a slowly
increasing speed of the confrontation line driven by
unsettled issues. The Russian response given in Table 4
and a moderate threat parameter prevents a negative A
namely, a Russian advance but encourages Chechnya to
pursue the goal of independence.

. optimistic
view
.

. ..

External pressure
1991

1996

year
Figure 5 Russia-Chechnyaconflict.

2000

External pressure can decrease the imbalance between the

actors A and B expressed by the movement of the confrontation line. An improvement special case is the status quo

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dynamics985
forconflict
model
analytical
NGass-An

Table 4 Russian response profile for 1996-2000

Chechen pressure

Capability imbalance CA-CB

+ uuA(AB+1)]

[A?A+

(A

CA{ (CA

CB)

& pB

(2 +

CA)

0
0

0
0

A
B

B
C

C
C

C
D

O
9
0

0
0
0

0
0
G

A
B
B

B
C
C

C
D
D

D
D

= !TBUBH

B(CB_ CA)

CpA(t)}(
P)

(21)

1(2 + CB).

(23)
There are many combinationsof eA and BB which render
vF = 0. However,the most desired solution is not only the
minimum efforts EAICA and EB/CB but also considers the
'political correct'solution including factors such as legitimacy of issues raised,humanitarianproblems,social conditions, etc. Thus, an external actor has to select the most
appropriatecombinationsamong the set of possible solutions.
All parametersin above equations are time dependent
and, in orderto keep vf = 0 over a longer time period, the
efforts EA and EB have to be readjustedconstantlyto offset
changes in the conflict evolution.
In the special case where an external actor fully
suppresses the reaction RA or RB of actors A and B by
BA =

gB =

Figure 6 depicts the speed of the confrontation line

against external interventions for some power ratios.
Actor E acts only on actor A and it can be seen that, for
power ratios CA/CB > 2, it becomes increasingly more
difficult for actor E to make an impact on A. For high
powerratios,the involvementratioEA/CA must move closer
to 1 before A changes significantly.
The Bosnian conflict

and
B

+ 1)] +A-B=O

1~~~~~~~~

0
0

where
1U

(20)

A=

0
0

Ignoringthe 'voluntary'withdrawalratesw, above equation

becomes
?B[B

(19)

(WA +RB)

where vF = 0. The necessary minimum interventions?X(t)

and gB(t) can be estimatedby using equation 16 to yield
a

0
A
B

E
F

u(WB? RA)-

pA

1, the status quo is controlled by the withdrawal

(CB + 1) - (HAI/HB)UB(CA + 1) = 0.

terms uuA
In anotherspecial case (as, for example, in the Bosnian
conflict) where an external actor pressuresonly one of the
actors, equation 21 becomes eB = B - A/2 + B where
=
CB = 1 with the admissible solution
CA = O, and u = CA
0 <, &B< I to achieve i = 0.

The decades old subliminal ethnic conflicts in the socialist

Yugoslavia surfaced after Solvenia and Croatia declared
independence in 1991. In Spring 1992 fighting started in
Bosnia-Herzegovina with the declaration of a Serbian
Republic of Bosnia.
The United Nations (UN) placed an economic embargo
on Serbiain May 1992 with additionalsanctionsintroduced
in May 1993. Nevertheless, one year later,the Bosnian Serb
forces had capturedmore than two-thirdsof the territoryof
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The confrontation front against the
Bosnian Muslims moved very swiftly as shown in Figure 7.
The UN peacekeeping forces stationed in Bosnia since
1992 were increasinglyunable to provide humanitarianaid.
The restraintby the UN not to use force was taken by the
Serbs as a sign of weakness which hamperedUN activities
and also had a negative influenceon the peace negotiations.
Towards the end of 1995 the UN finally did use air
strikes to enforce a safety zone around Sarajevo. For the
simulation, the following numerical values were selected
with the indices A and B denoting the Bosnian Moslem
O.75 e
cZ

='=
---~..-

0.0-

?
............

............

CA=4

_>__0A3

CA =2

CA=1
CA =1/2
-0.75-

EA

Figure 6 Influence of external intervention.

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Vol.48,No.10
Society
Research
oftheOperational
986 Journal
1.0

view

.poptimistic

2 -0-02

a)~coue7TeBsna~ ~~~~~~ya
-1 0

1991
forces and the Bosnian

.... .. ofit.

1996
Serbianr.. forces,
......
year

*....

2000
esspecticviewyc=2

Figure 7 The Bosnianconflict.

forces and the Bosnian Serbianforces, respectively:a
HB
/C=
CB =2, H4
/31, u = I CA1
4, o=1,

and
CB) QpB
(CA
= O,
z= = 2,
3,
=1,
(CB - CA) ?pA = 5. The military force applied by the

zA

United Nations (UN) in a small but highly sophisticated

operation matched completely the Bosnian Serb forces, thus
which
gB = 1. Using equations 12, 13, and 17 yields A =
indicates that the issues of the Bosnian Serbs lost pressure
and the confrontation line retreated as depicted in Figure 7.
These events marked the turnaround in negotiations
and in Spring 1996, a peace treaty between the actors
had been negotiated (the Dayton accord). To bring both
actors at the negotiation table, and to reach a status quo
at A = 0, the UN had to apply the minimum pressures
of u4 = 4 and eB = 2. This result was calculated by
1, and
with u = cA = c=
using equations 20-22
=
2.
=
_
?
_
CA) ?$ pA
(CB
pB
(CA cB)
The reached peace treaty is far from ideal but the two
actors are economically ruined and this is part of the reason
why the aggression coefficient T may be small for the
moment and thus reducing the chance of a renewed conflict
considerably.
To estimate a possible confrontation in future, a hypothetical case is studied where it is assumed that the UN would
withdraw but its accumulated impact over the past years
would not evaporate completely. Let the two actors more or
less restrain themselves about the equilibrium conditions
1 but increasing slowly
u = a = p = u, with initially I,
over time in favour of the stronger Bosnian Serbs. The
movement of the confrontation line is then given by
A = (1 - p2)(1 + [L)-2 which is depicted in Figure 7 from
1996-2000. The lower bound is the more pessimistic case
where the actors begin to be dissatisfied with some terms of
the peace treaty while the upper bound denotes with more
or less satisfaction. From this, it can be concluded that no
serious conflict will arise in the next few years.

of conflict. Clearly, the higher the speed, the more imbalance exists between the actors and the more likelihood
there is for the outbreak of war. It was found, that the
analysis of conflict should be done in two parts. The first
part simulates past events in order to establish benchmark
values for the numerousparametersin the equations. In a
second part,these parametersthen can be varied to study a
number of hypothetical future events in the realm of the
what if.. environmentto obtain optimistic or pressimistic
views.
In this way, a catalogue could be created, based on
historical event, to associate the speed of the confrontation
line with the actual magnitude of a conflict. Thus, the
gravity of a futurescenario can be analyzed from the speed
of the confrontationline as the events evolve.
Also, the hypothetical question can be studied of how
much invervention by an international organization is
necessary to establish the status quo between the actors.
This study will open additionalavenues for conflict resolutions and thus will have a higher chance of success to
stabilize volatile geopolitical regions.
Appendix A
Integration of the conflict equations

To facilitatethe task of integrationof equations 10, let F be

only time dependent.Then the withdrawalof some of the
issues of actor A from the confrontation line can be
approximatedby:
pAdiv UA =pAWA(t) + PA(I -W

(t))?A

where 0 <i w(t) < 1 is the withdrawalrate of issues. Withdrawal may be caused by unilateralaction such as change
in policy, fear of military action by the opponent,negotiation or settlementof issues, or may be due to pressureby an
externalorganizationE. Withthis, equation 11 becomes for
actor A
pA +pAY +pA(l

)gA

+ R

Applications show that the speed of movement of the

confrontationline is an excellent indicatorof the evolution

(A2)

and similar for actor B. In the following process, it is of

advantageto use Lagrangiancoordinates(indicatedby the
subscript0) ratherthanEulerianones since it is best to view
the movement of the confrontation line in a stationary
coordinate system. The change from one coordinate
system to the other is trivial here since the all variables
are parallelto the coordinateaxis r.
Substitutingequation 9 into A2 yields a Bernoulli-type
differentequationsince RB does not containPA and only ~B
depends on the coordinate r'4. Therefore, standard the
implicit solution can be written as
pAQ(r t) =poA(HA, 0) + (BPA(FO, t)

Conclusions

(Al)

(A3)

0) at the issue
with the initial boundarycondition poA(HoA,
0) = 0 since there are
horizon with p(H) = 0, and pAO(FO,

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NGass-An
model
forconflict
analytical
dynamics987

no issues at the confrontation line before the start of

conflict. Likewise for actor B
(A4)
pB(rB, t) = p' (Ho, 0) + (pBp(FO, t)

Equations A7 and A8 are the conflict equations of actors

A and B and can be further evaluated if the effectiveness
functions pA and pB of the response are chosen.

and observing that

Differentiating equation A3
apo/aro = aplaFo = 0, leads to
A

P t =p(FO,

ag~&B a(rA -F0)

t) a(r -F0)

at

=A(FO, t

_PO)'P

(A5)
where Fo is the speed of the conformationline and rOis the
velocity of the issues moving towards the confrontation
line. It is interestingto note that, similar to fluid dynamics,
the excerted pressure of a moving fluid on a moving rigid
body increases with the increase in the speed differential.
Likewise, the pressure differentialfor actor B becomes
(A6)

P,t = po (FO, t)(Fo -O B)(P,A

Substituting equations 9 and A5 into A2 yields the

pressureof actor A at the confrontationline F
?

pA(t) (G-F4_p)/
(A(H),)
-

TB{(cB

CA)

p B(H)

?t
WA)EA}I((t)
\p(H)

{WA+ (1_-

?pA}(1l

?)

9p(t)

AdrB3

(H)HB,

PI,(H)P

/
(A7)

F-HB

where the now unnecessary subscript0 has been dropped,

thus,pA(t) =pAO(FO, t), andpA(H) =pAO(HOA,
0) which is the
initial pressureat the issue horizon. Similar, for actor B
_

(p(t)(

iB)A

+ {Bw + (I -

WB) B

I(

)l

r(t~v~1v8~(

V(H)

GB)

CA{(CA
I

I 1A(H)

pB}(

pA(t)

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_?)
rF+H

pB(H) pB(H)HAJF

cA
=PBr

(A8)

(8

Received October 1996;

accepted January 1997 after one revision

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