Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Dominic
Elson1
Seventy
Three
Pte.Ltd.
2nd
May
2013
Contents
1
Introduction
..........................................................................................................................
2
2
Documentation,
mapping
and
identification
of
existing
information
and
examples
of
investment
into
landscape
restoration
........................................................................................
5
2.1
Knowledge
..............................................................................................................................................................................
5
2.2
Project
examples
..................................................................................................................................................................
5
2.2.1
Carbon
finance
projects
..................................................................................................................................................
6
2.2.2
Conservation
projects
(international
funding)
....................................................................................................
7
2.2.3
General
Country
Examples
............................................................................................................................................
8
2.2.4
Historic
Examples
of
land
restoration
...................................................................................................................
10
2.2.5
Investment
Funds
...........................................................................................................................................................
11
2.2.6
Large
Donor-funded
projects
....................................................................................................................................
12
2.2.7
Private
Sector
companies
&
projects
.....................................................................................................................
13
2.2.8
Project
Sponsors
/
Investors
......................................................................................................................................
14
2.2.9
Projects
led
by
Local
NGOs
and
cooperatives
.....................................................................................................
15
2.2.10
Public-Private
Partnerships
....................................................................................................................................
16
2.2.11
Company-community
partnerships
.....................................................................................................................
17
3
Key
conditions,
analysis
frameworks
and
knowledge
gaps
for
the
main
study
.....................
18
3.1
Defining
private
sector
investment
..........................................................................................................................
20
3.2
What
is
the
role
for
private
sector
investment
in
landscape
restoration?
..............................................
21
3.2.1
The
scale
of
the
problem
is
beyond
the
public
purse
.......................................................................................
21
3.2.2
Improve
the
incentives
for
private
sector
investment
....................................................................................
22
3.3
Aligning
private
sector
investment
goals
with
local
and
global
-
needs
...............................................
23
3.4
Grow
rural
economies,
not
just
trees.
......................................................................................................................
24
3.5
Rural
economies
need
local
businesses
..................................................................................................................
25
3.6
Rural
economies
need
healthy
ecosystems
...........................................................................................................
26
3.7
The
Layered
Investment
Approach
...........................................................................................................................
28
3.8
How
investment
decisions
are
made
.......................................................................................................................
29
3.8.1
Mismatches
between
external
private
investors
and
local
rights-holders
............................................
31
3.9
Possible
investment
frameworks
and
financing
structures
...........................................................................
31
4
Designing
the
main
study
.....................................................................................................
34
4.1
Objective
...............................................................................................................................................................................
34
4.2
Methodology
and
Scope
.................................................................................................................................................
34
4.3
Knowledge
Pathways
......................................................................................................................................................
35
4.4
Study
outlines
.....................................................................................................................................................................
35
5
Bibliography
........................................................................................................................
41
Introduction
The
Global
Partnership
on
Forest
Landscape
Restoration
(GPFLR),
hosted
by
IUCN
generates
and
disseminates
knowledge
for
frontline
policy
makers
and
practitioners
to
take
action
that
helps
quicken
the
pace
by
which
deforestation
is
controlled,
land-based
carbon
stocks
are
enhanced
and
the
concentration
of
atmospheric
CO2
is
stabilized.
One
of
the
most
significant
sources
of
global
CO2
emissions
is
from
land
use
(e.g.
agricultural
practices)
and
changes
in
land
use
(e.g.
conversion
of
forestry
to
cropland).
The
recent
focus
of
international
efforts
to
reduce
emissions
has
tended
to
dwell
on
forestry,
for
instance
REDD+
projects
for
avoiding
further
deforestation
and
degradation,
as
this
has
been
seen
as
the
first
least-cost
method
for
cutting
emissions.
However,
as
these
project
have
been
tested
on
the
ground,
it
has
become
clear
that
forests
are
not
often
so
easily
categorised
and
delineated.
In
reality,
the
line
between
primary
forests,
secondary
forests,
agroforests,
trees
on
farms,
woodlots
and
plantations
is
often
blurred.
Seen
from
above,
this
is
a
mosaic
of
land
types.
Seen
from
below
-
from
the
point
of
view
of
the
local
person
dwelling
there
-
this
is
a
continuum
of
different
land
uses,
all
of
which
have
different
functions
and
useful
outputs.
But
landscapes
need
to
be
understood
in
time
as
well
as
place.
In
the
context
of
socio-economic
change,
these
landscapes
change
over
time.
Formally
this
is
known
as
the
forest
transition
[see
diagram],
whereby
land
use
(and
especially
tree
cover)
changes
over
time,
firstly
through
deforestation,
and
then
later
into
recovery
of
trees
and
ecosystem
functions.
Therefore,
any
landscape
we
encounter
is
somewhere
along
this
transition.
However,
socio-economic
change
is
not
always
the
same
as
development.
It
is
possible
to
have
reversals
of
human
development
(for
instance
war
and
famine),
which
puts
strain
on
landscapes
and
ecosystems,
and
leads
to
rapid
degradation
of
land
and
soil.
Even
when
change
happens
in
the
name
of
economic
progress,
in
a
peaceful
and
prosperous
times,
the
impact
on
landscapes
and
the
people
that
occupy
them
can
be
destructive,
as
in
the
case
of
conversion
of
natural
forests
to
oil
palm
plantations.
At
some
point
in
the
transition,
the
landscape
can
be
regarded
as
degraded,
and
thus
in
need
of
restoration.
This
may
happen
naturally
(as
in
the
case
of
Puerto
Rico),
or
it
may
require
deliberate
intervention
to
bring
it
about.
Such
interventions
may
often
require
investment,
either
from
government,
investors,
donors,
or
by
local
people
themselves.
There
are
still
many
unanswered
questions
about
how
such
investment
can
be
attracted
into
landscape
restoration,
and
how
it
should
be
structured
to
best
serve
the
needs
of
local
people,
ecosystems,
economic
development
and
mitigating
climate
change.
IUCN - Investing in FLR - Feasibility Study (2013)
Initially,
it
is
necessary
to
discuss
the
definition
of
land
that
needs
to
be
restored.
This
may
be
served
by
a
physical
description
of
the
landscape
as
degraded,
denuded
or
in
a
critical
condition.
But
this
view
of
degradation
depends
on
the
beholder.
Not
long
ago
it
was
regarded
as
an
improvement
when
forest
land
was
cleared
for
cropland,
or
peatland
drained,
and
it
would
have
been
strange
to
describe
such
improvements
(which
often
required
substantial
investment)
as
somehow
degrading
to
the
landscape.
For
some
people,
oil
palm
plantations
are
beautiful
in
their
orderliness,
as
well
as
representing
prosperity
and
development.
The
level
of
land
degradation
may
not
be
visible
to
many
people,
as
it
could
be
a
scientific
measurement
of
carbon
stocks,
biodiversity
or
ecosystem
services.
In
order
to
restore
the
landscape,
one
may
first
need
to
agree
which
attribute
is
worth
restoring.
It
is
not
always
the
case
that
these
goals
are
mutually
supporting:
landscapes
restored
for
maximum
carbon
sequestration
may
reduce
the
presence
of
hemiepiphytes,
shrubs
and
lianas
that
are
crucial
for
animal
habitats
and
biodiversity.
From
the
perspective
of
economic
development,
landscape
restoration
may
focus
on
different
outcomes
and
thus
have
different
notions
about
what
is
most
important
(see
table
of
restoration
types).
An
exhausted
logging
concession
may
be
seen
as
degraded
because
it
lacks
density
of
valuable
hardwoods,
and
yet
in
all
other
respects
it
is
still
a
healthy
forest,
with
good
carbon
stocks.
Local
people
may
often
focus
on
food,
fuel
and
fibre
as
desirable
landscape
outputs,
and
thus
alter
landscapes
to
an
agroforestry
system.
This
is
increasingly
being
seen
as
a
positive
restoration
intervention,
yet
for
years
national
parks
and
forest
conservation
areas
have
seen
agroforestry
(e.g.
jungle
rubber,
cocoa,
sago)
as
an
invasive
destructive
activity.
Where
investment
is
required
for
landscape
restoration,
the
first
question
likely
to
be
asked
is:
where
is
the
cashflow?
REDD+
projects
are
being
viewed
warily
by
investors
as
is
becoming
clear
they
are
in
fact
a
risky
derivative
investment
masquerading
as
a
simple
commodity
(indeed,
what
could
be
simpler
than
carbon?).
Landscape
restoration,
on
the
other
hand,
holds
the
prospect
of
real
revenue
from
tangible
tradable
commodities.
However,
just
as
a
singular
focus
on
carbon
may
have
unintended
consequences
for
local
people
and
ecosystems,
a
demand
for
maximum
early
cashflow
may
not
lead
to
the
kind
of
landscape
restoration
indicated
by
the
forest
transition
model.
Monoculture
tree
plantations
may
be
an
improvement
on
abandoned
scrubland,
but
may
not
be
the
most
suitable
intervention
for
that
landscape.
Who
pays
(or
invests)
in
landscape
restoration
will
often
determine
the
goods
and
services
that
will
be
targeted,
and
these
value
judgements
will
be
contested.
Successful
interventions
will
thus
be
site-specific
and
take
account
of
the
whole
landscape,
which
is
not
just
a
physical
survey,
it
also
requires
an
understanding
of
how
people
currently
use
the
land,
and
how
they
perceive
its
potential.
Although
the
term
restoration
implies
returning
the
landscape
to
some
previous
point
in
history,
in
some
cases,
the
land
will
actually
be
improved
rather
than
simply
restored.
As
rural
landscapes
come
under
further
pressure
to
increase
food
production,
and
good
farmland
is
lost
to
urbanization,
it
will
become
more
important
to
bring
unconventional
landscapes
into
production.
Areas
once
though
barren
may
be
restored
by
using
trees,
engineering
and
soil
science.
The
Bonn
Challenge
set
a
target
to
restore
150
million
hectares
of
deforested
and
degraded
lands
by
2020.
Putting
in
place
these
measures
will
contribute
net
benefits
to
local
economies
worth
more
than
84
billion
USD
per
year.2
Even
if
the
political
will
was
present
in
all
the
countries
where
such
restoration
is
necessary,
the
cost
is
probably
beyond
the
scope
of
government
budgets,
even
with
external
donor
assistance.
Private
investment,
from
both
local
people
as
well
as
external
investors,
will
be
necessary
to
pre-finance
the
work
required
to
bring
these
landscapes
back
into
a
shape
whereby
they
can
deliver
economic
outputs,
social
amenity
and
environmental
benefits.
2
GPFLR
Operational
Work
Plan:
Knowledge,
tools
and
capacity
for
implementing
the
Bonn
Challenge
(IUCN,
2013)
IUCN - Investing in FLR - Feasibility Study (2013)
However,
the
concept
of
Private
investment
remains,
in
essence,
the
holy
grail
for
the
NGO
and
donor
community
and
its
mythical
status
obscures
its
true
meaning.
There
is
a
tendency
to
link
the
desirable
outputs
from
landscape
restoration
to
the
apparent
huge
stock
of
private
capital,
and
to
suggest
that
private
investors
ought
to
invest,
or
that
private
assets
can
somehow
be
unlocked
in
order
to
meet
the
Bonn
Challenge
target.
This
magical
thinking
is
counterproductive,
as
it
gives
the
impression
that
landscape
restoration
is
an
end,
in
and
of
itself.
History
suggests
that,
in
order
to
work,
investment
in
landscapes
will
be
the
means
to
an
important
end
that
is
desirable
to
both
government
and
the
locals.
The
private
sector
invests
to
make
a
profit,
not
in
a
collective
effort
to
restore
landscapes.
This
is
as
true
of
the
smallholder
building
terraces
on
a
steep
hillside
in
Kenya
as
it
is
of
the
London
investment
fund
financing
the
planting
of
trees
in
Uganda.
Taken
en
masse,
and
with
tolerable
conditions
of
governance
and
accountability,
the
aggregate
effect
of
the
multitude
of
private
investors,
both
small
and
large,
is
that
landscape
restoration
just
happens,
as
the
pursuit
of
commercial
interests
is
aligned
with
the
wider
economic,
social
and
environmental
objectives.
To
bring
about
this
confluence
of
private
and
public
interest
requires
collective
action
by
governments,
communities,
firms
and
civil
society.
Allowing
any
one
group
to
prevail
at
the
expense
of
another
will
probably
not
lead
to
legitimate
landscape
restoration.
Certain
instruments
of
public
policy
or
donor
action
may
play
a
part
in
de-risking
certain
kinds
of
investments,
or
incentivising
one
type
over
another.
In
many
ways,
the
process
of
mobilising
private
investment
is
the
most
important
and
beneficial
aspect
of
landscape
restoration,
as
to
achieve
it
requires
the
sort
of
convergence
of
public
policy,
democratic
legitimacy
and
institutional
reform
that
is
associated
with
successful
and
resilient
economies.
Table:
Types
of
landscape
restoration
Focus
Natural
forest
restoration
Landscape
rehabilitation
Example
Rehabilitation
of
logged-over
&
badly
managed
forest
Enrichment
planting
of
valuable
species
Reforestation
of
degraded
areas
Agroforestry
-
upgrading
and
market
access
Re-wetting
of
peatlands
Habitat
rehabilitation,
wildlife
corridors
Reserves
and
parks
REDD+
or
VCS
projects
with
main
focus
on
enhancing
C
stock
Afforestation
Improving
unconventional
landscapes
e.g.
sand
dune
stabilization
in
Niger,
hillside
terracing
in
Eritrea
The
purpose
of
this
document
is
to
summarise
the
broad
state
of
knowledge
on
private
sector
investment
in
landscape
restoration,
key
knowledge
gaps
and
options
for
mobilising
private
investment
in
forest
and
landscape
restoration.
This
will
provide
the
basis
for
the
terms
of
reference
of
a
larger
study.
The
main
study
will
therefore
review
landscape
restoration
projects
that
have
taken
place
in
the
past,
those
that
are
being
implemented
today,
and
plans
for
future
projects.
The
aim
is
to
develop
some
practical
frameworks
that
allow
project
developers,
investors,
NGOs,
donors
and
community
based
organizations
to
evaluate
options
for
landscape
restoration
projects,
and
ensure
they
are
likely
to
be
successful
in
the
terms
of
financial,
economic,
ecological
and
socio-cultural
benefits
and
sustainability.
2.1 Knowledge
i)
Reports
Some
recommended
resources
are
listed
in
the
bibliography,
but
this
is
just
a
small
sample
of
the
large
amount
of
literature
in
the
subject.
ii)
Key
Informants
and
project
developers
Organization
Contact
person
Climate
&
Land
Use
Chip
Fay
Alliance
(CLUA)
Eco-Agriculture
Partners
Sara
Scherr
ICRAF
Profor
Frank Place
Ford Foundation
Penny Davies
Enviromarket
Simon Petley
Munden Project
Lou Munden
Dominic
Elson,
Matthias
Rhein
UNEP FI
Ian Henderson
Global
Mechanism
at
UNCCD
Camilla
Nordheim-
Larsson
Notes
Evaluated
the
Ecosystem
Restoration
Concessions
in
Indonesia
Arose
out
of
the
Nairobi
Declaration.
Foremost
research
organization
promoting
landscapes
that
support
both
agricultural
production
and
biodiversity
conservation
Agroforestry
resources
Investment
meetings
(e.g.
Nairobi
2011)
and
background
papers
Developing
global
landscape
approaches
&
climate
smart
agriculture
projects
Design
of
Forest
Bonds
http://www.enviromarket.co.uk
Designing
fund
structures
for
landscape
restoration
and
management:
a)
Dryad
Project
b)
Inari
Project
(with
FAO)
Developed
investment
model
for
community
reforestation
projects,
also
developing
the
Papua
Green
Investment
Facility.
Mobilising
finance
sector
capital
to
stimulate
REDD+
and
sustainable
land
use
http://www.unepfi.org/work_streams/redd_and_su
stainable_land_use/index.html
The
OSLO
approach
involves
assessing
the
net
socio-
economic
benefits
of
sustainable
land
and
ecosystem
management
(http://www.unccd.int/)
Peter Dewees
The
examples
listed
below
may
be
regarded
as
reference
points
for
learning
about
the
success
factors,
risks
and
outcomes
to
establish
a
broad
profile
of
the
existing
public
or
private
sector
investment
models
in
landscape
restoration
that
result
in
enhanced
biomass
and
soil
carbon.
Because
of
the
diversity
of
projects
and
circumstances
where
landscape
restoration
has
or
is
in
the
process
of
taking
place,
the
examples
have
been
grouped
under
various
categories.
IUCN - Investing in FLR - Feasibility Study (2013)
This
list
is
a
starting
point
for
study
and
is
not
yet
complete
there
may
be
important
projects
not
listed,
and
there
could
also
be
projects
listed
here
that
are
not
worth
further
study.
The
GPFLR
has
already
identified
a
number
of
projects
as
learning
sites,
and
these
are
included
in
this
list
and
marked
with
an
asterisk.3
In
each
case,
some
knowledge
gaps
are
identified
that
could
form
the
subject
of
further
study.
2.2.1 Carbon
finance
projects
Conventional
avoided
deforestation
projects
are
reliant
on
the
counter-factual
performance
in
a
natural
forest
setting
against
a
theoretical
business
as
usual
baseline
(what
would
have
happened
if
no
project
was
in
place),
and
therefore
they
are
somewhat
abstract
and
hard
to
value.
The
focus
has
therefore
shifted
to
landscape
restoration
or
forest
rehabilitation,
whereby
carbon
credits
can
be
sold
based
on
the
amount
sequestered
in
the
changing
landscape,
either
through
VCS
or
as
part
of
speculative
REDD+
project.
The
attraction
of
such
a
scheme
is
that
they
seem
to
provide
a
source
of
cashflow
early
in
the
project
before
the
restored
landscape
is
able
to
provide
any
other
income.
However,
the
uncertainty
in
the
carbon
market,
and
the
problems
of
leakage
and
non-permanence,
may
mean
these
schemes
will
struggle
to
survive
on
carbon
revenue
alone.
Critical
questions
To
what
extent
are
REDD+
projects
including
FLR
in
their
goals?
How
do
the
projects
integrate
FLR
in
the
financial
model
for
the
carbon
investors
is
it
an
implementation
cost,
an
investment
for
cashflow,
or
an
additional
project
expense
to
be
covered
by
a
donor?
How
do
the
projects
manage
trade-offs
between
carbon
sequestration
and
local
livelihoods,
e.g.
do
they
accept
less
carbon-rich
restoration
options
if
they
have
better
income
opportunities
for
local
people?
Who
negotiates
these
trade-offs?
Examples
Earth
Carbon
voluntary
carbon
initiative
Mexico,
Uganda,
Mozambique
Livelihoods
Fund
India,
Indonesia,
DRC,
Senegal,
Kenya
PT
Rimba
Makmur
Utama
(Katingan)
Indonesia
Terra
Global
Capital
Cambodia
Ecosystems
Restoration
Associates
Inc.
DRC
Godwana
Link
(Threshold
Environmental)
Australia
3
Projects
in
EU
and
USA
have
been
excluded
from
the
list,
but
may
later
be
brought
back
into
the
study
Uganda
*PRESENCE
*Minshan
Panda
Reserve
South
Africa
China
Indonesia
China
Rwanda
Vietnam
Indonesia
Haiti
DRC
Ghana
Australia
China
10
11
12
13
14
2.2.9 Projects
led
by
Local
NGOs
and
cooperatives
In
the
absence
of
private
sector
investment,
or
often
in
anticipation
of
it,
some
local
NGOS
and
cooperatives
just
organise
themselves
to
undertake
various
forms
of
landscape
restoration.
Often
with
limited
capital,
they
need
to
think
of
smarter
ways
to
achieve
their
objectives.
They
may
not
have
started
out
with
a
focus
on
FLR,
for
instance
KHJL
was
set
up
to
reduce
illegal
logging
by
increasing
the
returns
to
legitimate
teak
cultivation
on
private
lands,
and
then
expanded
into
a
project
to
restore
an
area
of
state-owned
degraded
land.
NGOs
often
have
to
adapt
their
approach,
for
instance
Reforestamos
Mexico
wanted
to
protect
priority
lands
for
preservation,
so
acquired
470
hectares
of
cloud
forest
in
Sierra
Gorda
(which
is
similar
to
how
a
private
investor
may
approach
the
project).
But
they
soon
realized
that
to
ensure
the
recovery
of
forest
landscapes,
they
had
to
work
with
ejidos
and
communities,
who
own
more
than
70%
of
land
in
Mexico.
Lake
Taupo
Forest
Trust
is
an
indigenous
owned
and
operated
forestry
enterprise.
To
overcome
the
problem
of
fragmentation
and
small
scale,
individual
landholdings
have
been
aggregated
into
a
large
estate
with
integrated
management.
The
trust
is
investing
in
tree
planting,
but
also
accruing
a
strong
asset
base
by
enhancing
the
value
of
the
landscape
whilst
also
building
a
business
with
a
strong
balance
sheet.
This
approach
to
asset
growth
and
diversification
(rather
similar
to
a
Sovereign
Wealth
Fund,
in
fact)
is
a
sophisticated
way
to
enable
indigenous
communities
to
move
from
short-term
rent
seeking
and
build
long-term
sustainable
wealth,
comprising
both
natural
and
financial
capital.
Critical
questions
What
are
the
financing
needs
of
local
bottom-up
FLR
projects?
To
what
extent
is
the
prospect
of
timber
revenue
a
driver
for
local
community
and
smallholder
involvement
in
FLR?
What
types
of
land
tenure
are
most
suitable
for
an
FLR
project
to
be
successful?
Do
financial
constraints
lead
to
innovation
in
organisational
approach
or
product
development?
Examples
Agroforestry
in
Central
highlands
of
Embu,
Kenya
Kenya
Bosques
Pico
Bonito
Honduras
Dipantara
Indonesia
*Gomo
(AFED
&
IUCN)
DRC
Isles
of
Harris
and
Lewis
community
trust
Scotland
*Kampar
Peninsula
Peat
Forest
Indonesia
*Kibera
&
Mukungu
Burundi
Koperasi
Hutan
Jaya
Lestari
(KHJL)
Indonesia
Lake
Taupo
Forest
Trust
New
Zealand
Masaranga
(Willie
Smits)
Indonesia
*Mukura
(ARECO)
Rwanda
Reforestamos
Mexico
Mexico
Wana
Lestari
Menoreh
Indonesia
IUCN - Investing in FLR - Feasibility Study (2013)
15
Tanzania
USA
16
17
Key conditions, analysis frameworks and knowledge gaps for the main study
This
paper
will
not
attempt
to
rehearse
the
debate
over
what
is
the
best
option
for
landscape
restoration,
or
cover
the
historical
development
of
the
subject.
However,
this
paper
will
demonstrate
that
scaling
up
FLR
is
not
just
a
case
of
understanding
what
investors
want.
There
are
many
different
types
of
investors,
and
a
myriad
of
combinations
of
restoration
approaches
and
investment
opportunities.
Unpicking
this
requires
a
holistic
approach
that
recognises
the
complexity
of
the
system.
Landscape
restoration
concepts
have
moved
on
from
the
bifurcated
distinction
between
monoculture
tree
plantations
on
one
side,
and
the
goal
of
recreated
natural
forest
on
the
other.
However,
recognising
the
value
of
mosaic
and
agroforestry
landscapes
has
introduced
more
complexity,
both
in
the
physical
sense,
but
also
in
the
social
and
economic
sense.
Crudely
put,
monocultures
and
homeostatic
natural
forest
are
both
relatively
uncomplex.
From
an
investment
perspective,
monoculture
tree
plantations
have
a
clear
revenue
stream
from
timber
or
oils,
whilst
a
protected
natural
forest
may
be
able
to
trade
carbon
or
other
environmental
services.
Although
there
is
now
more
attention
given
to
the
diverse
forest
landscape
approach
there
still
seems
to
be
a
case
of
'pick
your
goal'.
Is
it
for
carbon?
Or
fisheries?
or
flood
control?
or
supplying
pulp
wood
to
the
mill?
The
sense
is
that
an
investor
will
be
led
by
just
one
of
these
things.
But
this
runs
the
risk
of
transferring
the
relative
clarity
of
a
monoculture
plantation
to
the
complexity
of
a
forest
landscape
without
first
recognizing
that
the
whole
dimension
of
the
proposition
changes
in
proportion
to
the
diversification,
but
only
up
to
a
point.
This
can
be
illustrated
with
a
simplified
chart
(below)
that
plots
value
to
local
economy,
biodiversity
and
complexity.
The
sweet
spot
is
the
centre
of
the
chart,
being
the
best
overlap
of
both
economics
and
diversity.
However,
the
best
balance
of
local
economic
value
and
landscape
diversity
is
also
the
point
where
complexity
peaks.
These
landscapes
are
multi-functional
and
multi-story,
encompassing
local
people,
a
broad
range
of
different
products
and
services,
and
overlapping
rights
and
development
plans.
Modelling
the
development
cost,
revenue
streams
and
benefit
sharing
is
more
challenging,
and
matching
investors
to
opportunities
takes
more
work.
On
the
other
hand,
landscape
approaches
are
more
honest
about
the
trade-offs
required
and
the
role
of
local
economic
development
plans.
Any
landscape
change
involves
trade-offs,
for
instance
between
national
and
local
economic
needs
(in
the
case
of
mining),
local
versus
export
crops
(in
case
of
estates
and
plantations),
traditional
swidden
usage
versus
conservation
(in
case
of
preserved
natural
forest).
In
most
cases,
these
trade
offs
are
between
powerful
winners
and
powerless
losers.
Arguably,
mixed
forest
landscape
restoration
narrows
the
asymmetry
between
interest
groups,
by
balancing
economic
value
with
local
needs
and
ecosystem
viability.
This
has
been
the
attraction
of
landscape
approaches.
18
Monoculture
Multi-function
Forest Landscape
Forest
Reserve
Complexity
Degraded
land
Best compromise
for financial return
& biodiversity.
But:
With most complexity
Chart:
Mapping
complexity
in
landscapes
(complexity
is
a
composite
of
social,
environmental
and
economic
aspects)
However,
the
theoretical
appeal
of
landscape
approaches
has
not
yet
led
to
widespread
adoption
at
scale,
except
in
some
notable
cases
which
are
highlighted
in
the
previous
section.
Even
in
countries
where
mixed
forest
landscape
restoration
has
taken
place,
this
is
often
in
spite
of
the
conditions,
rather
than
because
of
them.
For
instance,
Indonesia
has
seen
some
successful
pockets
of
FLR,
but
the
national
discourse
is
in
favour
of
plantations
on
one
side
and
REDD+
ecosystem
restoration
schemes
on
the
other.
Neither
of
these
options
holds
much
potential
for
building
rural
economies,
but
both
of
them
are
undoubtedly
simpler
to
define,
finance
and
implement.
The
challenge
for
the
GPFLR
project
will
be
to
clarify
the
forest
landscape
restoration
business
model,
whilst
recognising
that
it
is
both
complex
and
dynamic,
meaning,
by
default,
the
best
solutions
will
tend
to
be
unique.
The
rest
of
this
section
of
the
paper
will
build
up
an
understanding
of
private
sector
investment
and
how
to
align
investor
objectives
with
local
and
global
needs,
by
placing
the
local
rural
economy
at
the
heart
of
the
system.
There
is
no
one
size
fits
all
model
at
the
end
of
this
road,
and
no
simple
panacea.
A
forest
landscape
restoration
project
that
builds
upon
the
foundation
of
local
social
context
and
economic
potential
is
perhaps
more
likely
to
be
flexible
enough
to
account
for
the
complexity
of
the
system,
and
robust
enough
to
account
for
the
ever-shifting
socio-economic
and
political
context.
Box:
Motivation
for
investing
in
Forest
Landscape
Restoration
If
we
view
investment
only
through
the
lens
of
the
direct
output
(e.g.
return
on
financial
investment
for
the
external
investor,
or
long
term
asset
growth
for
the
smallholder),
then
we
will
miss
the
many
other
reasons
for
restoring
landscapes.
There
is
increasing
evidence
that
investing
in
healthy
landscapes
will
protect
other
investments
and
assets
(Scherr
2011).
In
a
resource-constrained
world,
reliable
flows
of
ecosystem
services
are
increasingly
critical
to
the
business
models
of
a
wide
range
of
industries
and
sectors.
Need
/
sector
Reason
to
invest
in
Landscape
Restoration
Aquaculture
Restore
mangroves
to
improve
aquaculture
and
protect
coastline
from
storm
surges
and
tsunami
Fisheries
Reduce
coral
bleaching
from
run-off
of
nitrates
and
excess
IUCN - Investing in FLR - Feasibility Study (2013)
19
20
are
mutually
exclusive
or
crowd
out
other
types
of
investment.
The
different
types
of
investment
are
summarised
in
the
table
below.
Private
versus
public
investment
in
landscape
restoration
Local
private
investors
Smallholders
Farmers
Forest
dwelling
rights-holders
Indigenous
people
Local
cooperatives
Businesses
owned
by
local
people
and
cooperatives
Local
entrepreneurs
3.2 What
is
the
role
for
private
sector
investment
in
landscape
restoration?
Engaging
with
the
private
sector
to
invest
in
landscape
restoration
is
necessary
because
of
the
scale
of
the
problem,
and
also
because
the
private
sector
is
often
engaged
in
activities
that
work
against
effective
landscape
restoration:
3.2.1 The
scale
of
the
problem
is
beyond
the
public
purse
It
has
been
estimated
that
1.5
billion
hectares
of
lost
or
degraded
forest
lands
worldwide
offer
opportunities
for
restoration
as
forests,
woodlots,
or
agroforestry
(GPFLR
2011).
The
capital
required
to
restore
such
a
huge
expanse
of
land
is
beyond
the
capacity
of
public
sector
finance
or
the
various
bilateral
and
multilateral
funds
committed
to
REDD+.
Furthermore,
a
large
amount
of
this
land,
if
not
actually
formally
owned
by
smallholders
and
local
people,
is
often
under
their
de
facto
control.
Thus
the
management
and
restoration
of
such
landscapes
will
be
subject
to
decisions
taken
in
households
and
within
communities
rather
than
in
government
offices
or
global
planning
meetings.
Besides
the
land
managed
by
local
people,
there
is
a
large
amount
of
degraded
land
held
in
the
name
of
private
corporations,
either
through
freehold
or
lease.
In
some
cases
it
is
the
company
itself
that
degraded
the
land,
as
in
the
case
of
logged-over
natural
forest
concessions
in
Indonesia.
In
other
cases,
previously
denuded
land
has
been
taken
over
by
private
companies
with
a
view
to
investing
in
it
for
biofuels,
cereals
or
pasture
which
may
not
lead
to
its
full
ecological
restoration.
Since
the
global
financial
crisis,
as
many
other
assets
have
become
too
risky
or
bring
too
little
return,
the
commodity
boom
has
led
to
wide
scale
speculation
in
land.
Much
of
the
land
allocated
in
so-called
land
grabs
has
in
fact
been
held
in
portfolios
and
not
been
developed.
Of
the
464
land
acquisitions
identified
by
the
World
Bank
between
October
2008
and
August
2009,
production
had
begun
on
only
one-fifth
of
them,
partly
because
many
deals
were
made
by
land
speculators,
not
agribusiness
investors.
Even
the
land
that
is
still
firmly
under
the
control
of
the
state
may
still
require
private
investment
at
scale
in
order
to
bring
about
restoration.
In
many
countries
the
state
has
been
a
careless
landlord,
allowing
one
of
the
countrys
most
precious
assets
fertile
and
productive
forests
or
mosaic
lands
-
to
become
degraded.
Although
concession
contracts
for
forestry
or
mining
may
include
obligations
to
the
lessee
to
restore
the
land
after
use,
in
many
cases
this
has
not
been
enforced,
and
thus
the
extent
of
degraded
land
has
increased.
Indeed,
poor
management
and
inefficient
usage
of
forests
has
probably
done
more
to
devalue
certain
countrys
asset
base
than
straight-forward
conversion
to
soy
or
oil
palm.
It
is
therefore
clear
that
in
developing
countries
with
weak
institutions
and
lack
of
resources,
21
whoever
may
be
theoretically
responsible
for
land,
or
formally
liable
for
its
restoration,
in
practice
it
will
require
a
joint
effort
to
bring
about
land
restoration
at
scale.
And
the
private
sector
both
the
local
people
and
the
external
investors
will
be
critical
as
suppliers
of
capital,
labour,
know-how
and
access
to
markets.
This
does
not
mean
that
FLR
is
inherently
expensive,
or
that
it
is
impossible
without
external
capital.
There
are
many
examples
where
local
communities
have
restored
forest
landscapes
because
it
matters
to
them.
Therefore,
we
can
learn
from
such
examples
in
order
to
see
how
private
sector
approaches
be
better
designed
and
combined
with
multiple
scales
of
action
by
the
public
sector
-
to
ensure
both
economic
and
environmental
sustainability.
3.2.2 Improve
the
incentives
for
private
sector
investment
The
scientific
literature
is
filled
with
compelling
examples
as
to
why
forest
landscape
restoration
is
a
rational
activity
for
any
kind
of
investor.
It
can
raise
agricultural
yields,
increase
income
diversity
and
resilience,
be
part
of
a
climate
change
adaptation
or
mitigation
strategy,
raise
land
values
and
provide
new
sources
of
renewable
energy.
Yet,
over
1.5
billion
hectares
worldwide
is
degraded.
What
is
going
wrong?
In
classical
economic
theory,
private
sector
investment
is
more
advantageous
than
public
action,
as
it
assumes
private
capital
will
be
invested
rationally,
in
a
manner
that
maximises
an
individual
or
firms
marginal
return.
This
ensures
that
resources
are
allocated
efficiently
for
maximum
welfare.
In
practice,
of
course,
this
outcome
requires
a
perfect
set
of
conditions,
which
is
never
the
case
even
in
developed
country
settings,
and
is
inconceivable
in
the
places
where
investment
in
landscape
restoration
is
required.
Where
conditions
are
not
perfect,
investments
may
be
irrational,
poorly
executed
and
have
unintended
consequences.
In
many
cases,
the
right
sort
of
investment
may
not
be
possible
at
all.
The
forestry
sector
seems
to
be
especially
prone
to
these
kinds
of
market
failures,
for
example:
Industrial
timber
concession
are
rapidly
denuded
in
order
to
accelerate
early
cashflow,
even
though
this
greatly
diminishes
the
longer
term
flow
of
income
from
the
forest.
Forest
land
is
cleared
at
private
expense
but
then
not
deployed
to
productive
purposes
such
as
plantations.
Vertically-integrated
industries
(e.g.
pulp
and
paper
mills)
drive
down
the
cost
of
their
own
raw
material
supply
to
improve
apparent
profitability
in
the
downstream
processing
unit,
thus
diminishing
incentives
to
plant
trees
in
the
local
area,
which
later
leads
to
a
raw
material
shortage
and
possible
closure
of
the
mill.
Degraded
land
lies
unused,
while
natural
forests
are
felled
for
new
plantations
As
nearby
fuel
wood
supplies
are
depleted,
prices
rise
and
smallholders
over-extract
from
their
woodlots
rather
than
aim
for
a
sustainable
supply,
even
though
this
will
lead
to
misery
when
the
fuel
runs
out.
For
some
of
the
these
problems,
the
answer
lies
in
better
regulation,
tenure
reform
and
confronting
monopolies,
oligarchs
and
rent-seekers.
Where
these
market
failures
prevail,
landscape
restoration
may
still
be
possible,
but
the
financial
rationale
for
it
will
be
absent
or
very
thin,
and
thus
subsidy
from
some
public
body
will
be
required.
Most
countries
of
interest
to
this
study
are
in
some
state
of
transition,
both
in
terms
of
landscape
and
governance.
Even
where
good
regulations
are
in
place,
they
may
not
be
implemented.
Private
investment
does
not
waiting
for
good
governance
to
prevail
(if
it
did,
many
countries
would
never
attract
as
much
investment
as
they
do),
but
poor
governance
increases
risk,
leads
to
exclusion
of
local
people
and
may
mean
investments
that
undermine
landscape
goals
rather
than
supports
restoration.
The
incentives
can
work
both
ways:
for
good
or
ill.
Therefore,
analysing
where
investment
in
landscape
restoration
has
been
possible,
and
where
it
has
stumbled,
will
enable
us
to
evaluate
the
level
of
good
enough
governance
that
is
required,
analyse
the
capacity
gaps
in
both
local
and
national
government
and
understand
more
about
how
incentives
may
be
adjusted
in
favour
of
FLR
goals,
and
if
so
at
what
cost.
22
3.3 Aligning
private
sector
investment
goals
with
local
and
global
-
needs
It
is
clear
that
private
sector
investment
at
scale
is
required
for
landscape
restoration.
But
it
is
also
clear
from
recent
history
that
such
investment
may
not
work
in
favour
of
either
eco-systems
or
the
long-term
interests
of
local
people.
It
is
not
sufficient
to
attract
any
investment
at
any
cost
that
is
arguably
what
has
occurred
with
land
grabs,
where
governments
have
failed
to
account
for
the
long
term
cost
of
the
asset
they
are
giving
away
to
the
investor.
It
may
seem
harsh
to
tell
developing
countries
that
you
get
the
investors
you
deserve,
but
there
is
some
truth
in
it.
Where
the
state
sets
high
standards,
insists
on
social
and
environmental
impact
assessments
and
Free
Prior
and
Informed
Consent
(FPIC),
formal
transaction
costs
rise
for
the
investor,
and
the
time
to
close
a
deal
lengthens.
But
only
the
most
tenacious
and
diligent
investors
are
likely
to
remain
in
the
field,
and
they
are
also
those
that
are
most
likely
to
accept
their
obligations.5
But
it
would
be
lazy
to
characterise
profit-driven
private
sector
investors
as
the
wrong
sort,
and
philanthropists,
conservation
NGOs
and
corporate
CSR
projects
as
the
right
sort
of
investor.
Although
conservation
NGOs
may
acknowledge
the
importance
of
improving
socio-economic
conditions
in
order
to
meet
conservation
goals,
they
often
encounter
contradictions
in
the
execution
of
their
projects.
In
particular,
local
livelihood
development
is
often
an
afterthought,
and
may
in
some
cases
be
seen
as
incompatible
with
nature
conservation.6
This
can
reinforce
the
impression
that
the
costs
of
ecosystem
restoration
are
borne
locally
(through
reduced
livelihood
options
and
access
to
land),
whilst
the
benefits
accrue
far
from
the
forest,
as
local
usage
value
is
subordinated
to
global
option
value.
Many
rights-groups
are
worried
that
REDD+
projects
are
likely
to
suffer
from
similar
conflicting
goals.
Different
investors
have
different
goals
for
investing
in
landscapes.
In
a
crude
typology:
Profit-seeking
investors
wish
to
maximise
risk-adjusted
return
on
capital;
processing
companies
want
cheap
raw
materials;
conservation
investors
have
ecological
goals;
social
impact
investors
consider
development
outcomes
such
as
education
and
gender;
local
people
are
interested
in
maximising
income
from
the
next
harvest.
For
the
two
groups,
the
ultimate
goals
of
investing
in
trees
and
landscapes
might
be
summarized
as
follows:
For
the
investor:
Acceptable
returns
on
capital
(economic,
environmental,
or
social
returns,
depending
on
the
type
of
investor)
invested
in
viable
entities,
often
over
relatively
short
time
frames
with
acceptably
low
transaction
costs,
where
stability,
liquidity,
and
measurable
risk
are
preconditions.
For
the
rights-holder:
Strengthening
of
local
control
(autonomy)
over
land,
resources,
and
enterprises
so
that
holistic
social,
environmental,
and
economic
aspirations
can
be
furthered
on
the
rights-holders
terms.
In
most
if
not
all
cases
of
landscape
restoration,
local
people
are
central
to
the
activity,
either
as
rights-holders,
smallholders
or
hired
labour.
There
is
a
growing
recognition
that
locally
controlled
forestry
(LCF)
has
clear
attractions:
it
implies
local
participation,
decentralisation
and
equity.
It
also
claims
some
rationale
as
a
superior
landscape
management
system
(compared
to
top-down
state
or
corporate
control),
as
local
people
are
more
likely
to
have
cultural
and
practical
knowledge
of
the
local
landscape,
and
have
a
vested
interest
in
the
long-term
conservation
of
its
ecological
services
and
income-generating
features.
The
definition
of
locally
controlled
forestry,
that
could
just
as
easily
apply
to
any
landscape,
is:
5
As
The
Munden
Project
(2012)
demonstrates,
there
are
powerful
financial
reasons
for
investors
to
be
diligent
when
negotiating
use
of
land.
Failing
to
do
so
can
significantly
increase
costs
and
even
lead
to
the
project
being
abandoned.
6
For
an
example
of
this
tendency
see
the
Birdlife
Harapan
Ecosystem
Restoration
Concession
in
Sumatra,
Indonesia.
IUCN - Investing in FLR - Feasibility Study (2013)
23
The
local
right
for
forest
owner
families
and
communities
to
make
decisions
on
commercial
forest
management
and
land
use,
with
secure
tenure
rights,
freedom
of
association
and
access
to
markets
and
technology.7
The
investors
response
to
the
demand
for
local
control
will
depend
on
their
goals.
There
is
certainly
a
rights-based
argument
to
be
made
that
all
external
investment
in
farming
and
forestry
should
place
local
people
at
the
heart
of
the
matter
giving
them
a
good
degree
of
control
and
ensuring
they
are
part
of
a
fair
benefits
sharing
plan.
In
landscape
restoration
there
seems
to
be
a
strong
practical
reason
for
doing
this:
the
evidence
shows
that
when
local
people
have
a
degree
of
control
of
the
project,
and
benefit
directly
from
its
success
landscape
restoration
is
more
successful,
replicable
and
scaleable.
The
next
step
for
research
on
this
subject
is
to
test
this
hypothesis,
and
establish
what
conditions
are
required
to
make
it
robust.
BOX:
Devolving
rights
and
responsibilities
in
European
forestry
In
Germany,
community
forests
are
often
managed
by
the
local
government
authority,
as
a
democratically
representative
body
it
is
best-placed
to
navigate
the
trade-offs
required
to
balance
public
and
private
claims
on
the
resource.
This
may
work
because
it
is
a
delegation
of
powers
upwards
(from
the
community
to
the
local
political
institution),
whereas
in
many
tropical
forest
countries,
the
decentralization
movement
has
pushed
some
autonomy
over
forests
outwards
to
district
governments;
with
little
discernible
improvement
in
management,
and
in
many
cases
much
more
degradation.
The
ideal
sequence
of
institutional
change
may
therefore
be
to
start
at
the
bottom
and
allow
self-
declared
communities
to
define
the
boundaries
of
their
forest
and
negotiate
with
proximate
communities
over
rights
and
access
(blending
traditional
norms
with
modern
legal
legibility),
which
may
include
gazetting
smallholdings
in
some
places,
and
then
over
time
allow
these
institutions
to
merge
with
the
local
political
authorities
providing
they
have
legitimacy
and
accountability.
Even
where
local
people
do
have
formal
rights,
as
in
most
northern
hemisphere
smallholder
forests,
they
do
not
necessarily
have
much
influence
over
how
the
land
is
managed.
Unlike
most
other
land
types,
the
forest
is
regarded
as
either
a
local
amenity,
a
national
strategic
asset
or
a
global
public
good.
For
instance,
community
forests
in
Germany
have
clear
legal
title
but
they
are
heavily
regulated,
with
sustainability
and
local
amenity
value
as
the
objectives
rather
than
economic
value.
The
Norwegian
system
gives
the
forest
owner
freedom
with
responsibility,
meaning
that
in
the
event
of
mismanagement
the
forest
will
be
put
under
public
management,
with
the
costs
of
any
work
charged
to
the
owner.
(Elson,
2010)
IUCN - Investing in FLR - Feasibility Study (2013)
24
background
on
this
issue.
It
is
possible
that
agrarian
transition
and
landscape
restoration
are
inter-
dependent.
Autonomous
and
resilient
smallholders
are
more
likely
to
be
receptive
to
landscape
restoration
projects
than
down-trodden
peasants
or
landless
labourers.
This
could
be
a
positive
feedback
loop:
where
the
rural
economy
is
boosted
for
instance
through
increased
yields
brought
about
through
introducing
trees
into
landscapes
this
in
turn
stimulates
the
rural
non-farm
economy,
and
enables
a
benign
agrarian
transition
to
take
place.
This
socio-economic
transition
is
correlated
with
the
forest
transition,
but
it
is
not
clear
which
is
the
cause
and
which
is
the
effect.
Understanding
the
relationship
between
these
transitions
will
be
an
important
part
of
developing
the
correct
set
of
conditions
for
private
sector
investment.
Box:
Small
farm
economics
and
the
agrarian
transition
Productivity
may
be
constrained
by
the
fact
that
many
small
farms
are
simply
too
small
to
be
viable.
The
optimal
farm
size
varies
according
to
crop,
conditions
and
location.
For
farmers
with
less
than
3
hectares,
then
a
quarter
to
half
of
these
smallholders
are
in
marginal
conditions,
in
terms
of
land,
assets,
quality
of
soil,
remoteness,
political
connections,
isolation
from
markets
etc.
It
is
most
unlikely
that
they
will
ever
be
capable
of
investing
in
their
farm
in
order
to
become
a
fully
commercial
operation
from
which
they
can
earn
a
decent
living
(Wiggins,
2011).
The
policy
response
to
this
in
many
developing
countries
has
been
to
favour
very
large
plantations
and
estates,
which
are
assumed
to
benefit
from
economies
of
scale
and
thus
improve
productivity.
However,
there
seems
to
be
no
evidence
that
larger
farms
-
above
a
certain
size
-achieve
any
further
economies
of
scale.
In
developed
countries,
where
the
combination
of
clear
property
rights
and
access
to
finance
would
enable
consolidation
into
huge
farms
if
that
was
the
best
use
of
capital,
most
farms
are
still
owned
and
managed
by
families
(97%
of
farms
in
USA
are
family
farms),
indicating
that
they
have
reached
an
optimal
size.
Many
developing
countries
have
a
large
number
of
very
small
farms
(many
of
which
are
barely
viable),
and
an
increasing
number
of
huge
plantations
(many
of
which
are
not
very
productive
per
hectare).
There
are
very
few
family
farms
that
are
of
the
optimal
size,
producing
staples
at
low
cost
as
well
as
higher
value
crops
and
export
commodities.
This
may
be
because
it
is
difficult
to
consolidate
farm
holdings
when
tenure
is
informal
and
legal
methods
of
transferring
title
are
unavailable.
This
situation
may
be
inhibiting
a
'benign
transition'
from
taking
place,
whereby
some
farmers
would
invest
in
expanding
their
farms,
whilst
others
gradually
move
to
the
rural
non-farm
economy,
or
they
migrate
elsewhere
(probably
to
the
city),
and
improve
their
conditions.
They
do
not
lose
the
rights
over
their
land,
instead
they
probably
continue
to
farm
it
during
the
transition,
and
when
alternative
income
sources
become
more
stable
(e.g.
returns
to
labour
from
rural
non-farm
employment
or
migration
far
outstrip
value
of
subsistence
production,
and
vulnerability
is
reduced)
they
either
sell
the
land,
or
rent
it
to
neighbours,
or
reallocate
amongst
the
extended
family.
The
alternative
to
this
benign
transition
is
where
returns
to
farming
continue
to
stagnate,
rising
rural
populations
farm
ever
smaller
an
unviable
plots,
exhausting
the
soil
and
straining
the
ecosystem.
As
the
resource
base
degrades,
poverty
worsens,
forcing
people
to
migrate
to
the
cities
or
take
up
an
offer
to
migrate
to
a
plantation,
where
over-supply
of
cheap
unskilled
labour
will
bring
down
wages
and
thus
deepen
poverty.
In
this
scenario,
it
is
not
a
case
of
whether
plantations
are
'good'
or
'bad',
but
simply
that
they
may
not
be
tackling
the
key
challenge,
which
is
to
raise
small
farmer
productivity
rather
than
just
to
raise
national
aggregate
production.
Raising
production
in
absolute
terms
is
of
interest
politically,
as
it
chimes
with
the
desire
to
be
'self-
sufficient',
but
if
it
is
achieved
through
expanding
inefficient
plantations
into
forests,
then
it
is
a
chimera.
Increasing
small
farmer
productivity
will
intensify
economic
returns
in
rural
areas
and
allow
for
the
benign
transition
to
urbanization.
25
Where
investment
in
forest
landscape
restoration
has
taken
place,
it
has
often
been
from
governments,
donors
and
philanthropists,
working
through
NGOs
or
state-run
bodies.
In
some
cases
investment
has
also
come
from
the
private
sector,
under
the
umbrella
of
a
Corporate
Social
Responsibility
scheme.
The
downside
of
these
kinds
of
investment
is
that
they
usually
aim
to
achieve
non-business
outcomes,
such
as
social
or
environmental
goals.
That
may
mean
they
bypass
the
essential
business
development
steps
needed
for
long-term
commercial
success.
For
external
investment
in
FLR
to
be
sustainable
(financially
as
well
as
environmentally),
it
will
need
to
catalyze
co-investment
by
local
people
and
thereby
improve
the
likelihood
of
effective
agrarian
transition,
local
enterprise
and
socio-economic
resilience.
This
will
require
a
strategic
combination
of
grants
and
capital
investment
(explained
in
more
detail
below).
Building
local
enterprise
capacity
creates
a
positive
feedback
loop
that
strengthens
the
entities
that
are
engaged
in
landscape
management,
and
generates
local
multiplier
effects
that
enhance
rural
prosperity.
By
focusing
on
building
local
economic
output
managed
by
real
small
businesses,
for
instance
the
enhanced
food,
fuel
and
fibre
outputs
expected
from
restored
landscapes,
the
project
will
simultaneously
mobilise
local
people,
cooperatives
and
SMEs
to
be
involved
in
the
scheme,
but
will
also
improve
the
likelihood
that
FLR
projects
will
be
legitimate
and
sustainable.
Therefore,
we
need
to
understand
where
such
a
focus
on
building
small
business
sector
has
worked,
how
aiming
for
tangible
outputs
from
landscapes
builds
a
stronger
investment
case,
and
the
extent
to
which
a
growing
rural
non-farm
economy
improves
the
legitimacy
and
resilience
of
landscape
restoration.
Box:
The
rural
economy
generates
the
capital
base
and
human
resources
for
equitable,
sustainable
development
The
rural
economy
need
not
be
confined
to
just
cultivation
and
extraction,
and
it
seems
likely
that
agriculture
alone
will
not
lift
rural
communities
out
of
poverty.
In
fact,
more
successful
rural
economies
have
a
broader
base
of
activities,
known
as
the
'rural
non-farm
economy'
(RNFE),
that
alleviates
poverty
through
multiplier
effects.
But
this
state
of
affairs
does
not
arise
out
of
thin
air,
but
depends
on
a
thriving
agriculture
(or
fisheries)
sector
to
generate
demand
for
goods
and
services.
If
smallholders
are
at
the
subsistence
level,
then
there
will
be
insufficient
surplus
income,
and
thus
demand,
in
the
rural
economy.
Thus
improving
agriculture
is
the
first
step
in
building
a
successful
rural
non-farm
economy.
However,
this
is
not
simply
a
matter
of
increasing
total
aggregate
output
from
an
area
(for
instance
by
replacing
small
farms
with
large
industrial
plantations).
Distribution
is
the
key
to
a
stable
rural
economy.
If
rural
income
distribution
is
too
unequal,
for
instance
when
a
small
elite
gain
disproportionate
advantages
from
land
rents
or
by
being
insiders
on
land
grab
deals,
then
they
take
a
larger
share
of
rural
income,
which
they
spend
outside
the
area
(because
their
consumption
patterns
are
different
from
people
of
more
modest
means),
thus
inhibiting
the
benefits
of
linkages
and
multipliers.
Furthermore,
outsiders
(or
elites
that
can
insulate
themselves
from
local
issues)
have
less
of
a
stake
in
the
long-
term
ecological
health
of
the
area.
They
may
therefore
engage
in
deals
that
undermine
landscape
restoration
goals.
Reasonably
equitable
distribution
of
land
and
assets
and
local
ownership
of
businesses
-
may
be
correlated
with
improved
land
management
and
healthy
ecosystem
services.
26
Box:
The
New
York
City
Watershed,
from
coercion
to
partnership
9
million
residents
of
New
York
City
receive
clean
drinking
water
from
the
upper
watershed
area
of
the
Catskills.
This
is
the
largest
unfiltered
water
supply
in
the
United
States,
and
there
is
a
huge
stake
in
keeping
the
streams
and
watersheds
that
supply
the
six
reservoirs
in
the
Catskills
as
clean
as
possible.
Until
recently,
the
relationship
between
New
York
City
government
and
the
communities
living
in
the
upper
catchment
area
where
the
reservoirs
are
located
was
acrimonious.
Through
reduced
economic
opportunities,
land
grabs
(under
the
eminent
domain
law)
and
regulations
on
land
use,
the
rural
communities
were
in
effect
paying
the
costs
of
the
positive
externality
of
clean
water
for
the
city.
Meanwhile,
the
city
faced
the
monumental
cost
of
installing
infrastructure
to
mechanically
filter
the
water
if
the
watershed
could
not
be
relied
upon.
In
1997,
a
new
partnership
was
formed
that
was
able
to
bridge
this
gap.
By
bringing
local
communities
into
the
deal,
for
instance
by
setting
up
the
$60
million
Catskill
Fund
for
the
Future
(CFF)
to
stimulate
rural
economic
development,
the
watershed
has
been
restored
and
is
now
managed
appropriately.8
The
key
to
the
deal
was
for
the
city
to
recognise
not
only
the
economic
value
of
the
ecosystem
services
(which
was
self-evident),
but
also
the
important
role
that
a
vibrant
and
economically
viable
rural
community
plays
in
ensuring
a
sustainable
and
stable
landscape.
One
of
the
reasons
for
the
diminished
economic
opportunity
is
that
the
ecosystem
has
become
degraded
by
the
process
of
rapid
transition,
leading
to
exhausted
soil,
poor
hydrology
and
erosion.
The
only
viable
land
use
(e.g.
pasture)
is
extensive
or
marginal,
with
low
value
per
hectare.
In
an
extractive
model
of
landscape
exploitation
(seen
from
the
point
of
view
of
national
GDP),
these
local
effects
are
barely
discernable,
although
they
will
have
long
term
consequences.
At
the
local
level,
they
are
devastating
as
they
inhibit
the
possibility
of
building
a
viable
rural
economy.
In
such
circumstances,
FLR
could
have
positive
co-benefits,
either
by
protecting
essential
ecosystem
services,
or
by
restoring
services
that
have
been
compromised.
Furthermore,
restoration
may
improve
land
productivity
and
financial
performance
of
farms,
as
shown
in
the
diagram
below.
8
www.catskillcenter.org
IUCN - Investing in FLR - Feasibility Study (2013)
27
28
if
the
anticipated
level
of
financial
return
may
vary
according
to
the
needs
and
attitudes
of
the
investor.
The
investor
deems
the
capital
invested
as
an
asset,
which
either
has
immediate
tangible
value
(for
instance
through
the
payment
of
interest
on
a
loan)
or
gives
the
right
to
receive
future
cash
flow.
The
aim
of
this
kind
of
investment
is
to
create
private
assets.
At
the
project
level,
asset
investments
will
most
likely
need
to
be
made
via
a
portfolio
of
projects,
whereby
certain
risks
can
be
offset.
In
order
to
understand
the
practical
interaction
of
enabling
and
asset
investments,
we
need
to
look
for
examples
of
how
FLR
investments
have
been
structured.
In
some
cases
the
investment
types
may
not
have
been
clearly
delineated,
or
have
confused
goals.
Conversely,
there
may
be
some
cases
where
asset
investment
is
not
possible
until
enabling
investment
is
made
available.
Source(s)
of
Revenue
Return
on
capital
Risk
External
investors
This
depends
on
the
type
of
investor
and
their
objectives.
Plantation
companies
and
investment
funds
usually
prefer
formal
(de
jure)
tenure,
such
as
freehold
or
very
firm
leasehold.
Local
rights-holders
Accustomed
to
de
facto
tenure,
often
grounded
in
local
institutional
norms.
Formal
title
is
preferable,
but
in
practice
not
always
a
pre-
condition.
The
exception
is
where
smallholders
are
moving
into
new
land
(e.g.
former
state
forest),
in
which
case
formal
tenure
will
be
a
precondition
for
longer-term
projects
such
as
tree
planting.
Asset
investors
will
be
looking
cashflow.
Smallholders
are
more
accustomed
In
practice,
this
will
usually
arise
from
a
to
multiple
sources
of
revenue
from
single
commodity,
but
this
need
not
be
a
diverse
portfolio.
the
case.
Asset
investors
will
usually
be
seeking
a
Smallholders
need
a
real
return
on
risk-adjusted
rate
of
return,
but
some
capital,
and
often
will
not
have
the
(e.g.
impact
investors)
may
be
content
luxury
to
invest
for
non-economic
with
merely
a
real
rate
of
return,
or
even
reasons.
However,
they
may
not
just
to
preserve
the
principal.
have
the
tools
or
skills
to
model
and
measure
the
predicted
rate
of
return
accurately.
Investors
will
have
different
time
Local
rights-holders
often
have
a
horizons,
but
the
patient
investor
has
shorter
time
preference
than
often
proved
to
be
elusive.
Investment
investors
from
cities
or
abroad.
funds
can
take
a
longer
term
view,
by
Their
discount
rate
is
higher,
ensuring
they
have
sufficient
liquidity
to
meaning
they
place
greater
value
on
pay
out
to
shorter
term
investors.
quicker
returns.
There
are
many
different
risks
facing
an
In
many
places,
rural
communities
investment
that
need
to
be
quantified
in
are
accustomed
to
living
in
a
state
of
order
to
calculate
the
minimum
rate
of
vulnerability
where
risks
are
a
part
return
needed
to
justify
the
investment.
of
everyday
life.
When
assessing
Risks
can
be
political,
physical,
their
own
investments,
bitter
institutional
or
market-driven.
Note
that
experience
(by
themselves
or
whilst
measurable
risks
are
acceptable
others)
will
tend
to
lead
them
to
be
to
investors,
uncertainty
is
harder
to
risk-averse.
For
instance,
where
11
Elson
(2012)
12
e.g.
Forest
Investment
Review
(2009),
Elson
(2010)
IUCN - Investing in FLR - Feasibility Study (2013)
29
Social impact
Environmental
impact
Investible
Entity
Scale
Track record
30
Transaction costs
3.8.1 Mismatches
between
external
private
investors
and
local
rights-holders
Based
on
the
table
above,
the
mismatches
between
investor
conditions
and
local
needs
can
be
identified.
Most
of
these
will
need
to
be
resolved
in
order
to
ensure
FLR
projects
are
successful.
In
reviewing
previous
projects,
it
may
be
instructive
to
find
out
how
a
projects
failure
may
be
attributable
to
a
mismatch
in
conditions.
Condition
Tenure
Source(s)
of
Revenue
Return
on
capital
Time
to
break
even
Risk
Governance
Liquidity
Social
impact
Environmental
impact
Investible
Entity
Scale
Capacity
of
local
people
&
organisations
Track
record
Transaction
costs
Notes
N
N
M
M
N
N
Y
N
Y
13
von
Braun
&
Meinzen-Dick
(2009)
IUCN - Investing in FLR - Feasibility Study (2013)
31
Figure:
Win-win-win
solutions
for
livelihood,
ecosystem
and
productivity14
However,
not
all
practitioners
may
agree
with
this
analysis,
and
there
may
be
empirical
evidence
of
successful
FLR
that
has
taken
place
absent
of
these
conditions.
Indeed,
one
of
the
purposes
of
a
detailed
FLR
study
will
be
to
use
evidence
to
test
the
proposition
set
out
here.
Based
on
the
quick
scan
of
the
examples
listed
in
section
one,
there
are
a
number
of
different
investment
frameworks
and
financial
structures
that
have
been
applied
in
the
past
to
achieve
some
forms
of
landscape
restoration.
These
may
be
led
from
the
public
or
private
sector,
arise
from
grass-
roots
action,
or
be
various
forms
of
partnership
(e.g.
public-private,
company-community).
Financing
may
come
from
selling
carbon
credits,
or
finding
impact
investors
that
are
willing
to
be
patient
or
accept
lower
rates
of
return.
Some
investment
funds
may
be
able
to
deliver
market
clearing
risk-
adjusted
returns
whilst
also
improving
landscapes,
thus
attracting
much
larger
amounts
of
mainstream
capital.
One
way
to
review
the
case
studies
and
test
the
hypothesis
is
use
the
scoring
framework
below.
The
first
table
evaluates
some
of
the
enabling
conditions,
in
order
to
identify
the
strong
and
weak
spots
that
may
be
predictors
of
the
eventual
outcome
of
an
FLR
project.
The
second
table
assesses
the
main
categories
of
benefits
as
they
pertain
to
different
stakeholders,
using
the
standard
stakeholder
interest
scoring
method
(pluses
and
minuses).
Note
that
financial
benefits
are
distinct
from
economic
benefits
as
they
refer
to
the
private
gains
(or
losses)
from
a
transaction,
whereas
economic
issues
are
public
systemic
gains
or
losses.
14
Liniger
et
al.
(2011,
p.41)
IUCN - Investing in FLR - Feasibility Study (2013)
32
Enabling
Condition
Value
proposition
Tenure
Potential
risk
adjusted
returns
Risk
mitigation
strategies
Risk
and
benefit
sharing
arrangements.
R&D
Capacity
building
Infrastructure
Political
will
Regulations
Transaction
costs
Benefits
Local
land
users
/rights
holders
Financial
Economic
Ecological
Socio-cultural
Score
(0=
weak,
5=
very
strong)
National
level
Enabling
Investment
Observations
Asset
Investment
33
4.1 Objective
The
purpose
of
the
study
is
to
discover
how
best
to
attract
investment
into
successful
landscape
restoration,
and
identify
the
most
appropriate
financing
structures,
ownership
and
benefit
sharing.
It
will
achieve
this
by
filling
in
the
gaps
in
our
knowledge
about
how
and
why
restoration
has
taken
place
in
the
past
(and
is
currently
happening
now)
in
certain
places
around
the
world.
It
will
improve
the
understanding
of
the
complexity
of
the
subject,
for
instance
by
answering
such
questions
as:
How
can
multiple
stakeholders
find
common
ground
in
their
goals,
while
balancing
the
distribution
of
costs
and
benefits,
in
order
to
create
new
impetus
for
landscape
restoration?
What
are
the
key
conditions
that
different
types
of
investors,
including
local
people,
require
to
make
landscape
restoration
investments?
To
what
extent
does
local
control
and
benefit
sharing
ensure
that
landscape
restoration
is
more
successful,
replicable
and
scaleable?
How
can
external
investment
catalyse
the
local
investment
and
improve
the
likelihood
of
effective
agrarian
transition,
local
enterprise
and
socio-economic
resilience?
How
can
Enabling
and
Asset
investments
be
structured
to
deliver
public
goods
(e.g.
ecosystem
resilience,
technology,
community
capacity,
infrastructure)
and
yet
still
build
private
assets
(tradable
commodities,
value
added,
non-farm
financial
assets).
This
will
be
an
iterative
process,
working
with
researchers
and
practitioners
to
understand
the
background
conditions,
test
certain
hypotheses
and
acquire
new
knowledge.
The
final
output
(after
the
September
2014
Investment
Forum)
will
be:
New
knowledge,
evidence
and
analysis
on
key
economic,
social
and
biophysical
opportunities
and
conditions
for
landscape
restoration
generated,
packaged
and
disseminated.
34
Evaluate
effects of action
WB Investment
Forum
(Sept. 2014)
IUCN
Working
Group
Reflection &
Dialogue
Epicycles
Forest
Landscape
Restoration
Knowledge
Pathway
Data
gathering
& Analysis,
identify projects
Collaborative
action &
interaction
Partnership
Meeting
(Sept. 2013)
35
the
project.
Some
of
the
studies
will
also
need
to
build
a
theoretical
case
for
how
an
intervention
can
take
places
(this
is
especially
the
case
for
the
study
into
financial
structures).
Study
A:
Defining
the
type
of
private
sector
investment
and
role
it
plays
Condition
/
theme
Knowledge
Gaps
3.1
-
Defining
Private
Sector
How
do
know
about
different
types
of
investment
interact?
To
what
Investment
extent
do
goals
clash,
leading
to
poor
outcomes?
Are
the
investment
goals
of
local
people
necessarily
at
odds
with
the
goals
of
external
investors?
To
what
extent
does
state-led
investment,
including
SoEs,
crowd
out
private
capital?
3.2
Role
of
the
private
sector
Learn
from
examples
of
joint
action
by
local
communities,
private
investment
investors
and
governments.
How
can
private
sector
projects
be
better
designed
to
ensure
both
economic
and
environmental
sustainability?
3.2.1
The
private
sector
How
can
multiple
scales
of
action
(e.g.
sectoral
strategies,
district
brings
scale
development
plans,
commodity
purchasing
agreements,
etc)
be
reconciled/
harmonized
efficiently
to
create
new
opportunities
for
landscape
restoration?
Relevant
case
study
groups
General
country
examples
Large
donor-funded
projects
Private
sector
companies
and
projects
Projects
led
by
NGOs
and
cooperatives
Public/private
partnerships
Company
/
community
partnerships
Additional
questions
Learning
from
Private
Sector
Investment
To
what
extent
are
timber
investment
funds
differentiated
by
their
approach
to
balancing
timber
yield
with
forest
biodiversity?
Do
investors
care?
Are
non-timber
forest
products
seen
as
part
of
the
business
model,
or
a
co-benefit
outside
the
model
(i.e.
not
part
of
the
target
rate
of
return)?
To
what
extent
are
local
livelihoods
a
core
driver
of
investment
value,
or
are
they
a
co-benefit
to
satisfy
CSR
needs?
Where
are
there
examples
of
projects
where
profit-oriented
investment
funds
have
led
to
successful
FLR?
How
sophisticated
is
the
financing
structure?
To
what
extent
is
donor
finance
blended
with
private
capital?
How
have
investor
goals
changed
over
time?
Is
FLR
becoming
more
common
as
a
deliberate
project
goal?
Where
investors
have
switched
focus
to
FLR,
what
was
the
reason?
What
other
project
goals
does
FLR
support?
36
Study
B:
Governance
and
incentives
Condition
/
theme
Knowledge
Gaps
3.2.2
Changing
the
incentives
Are
there
institutional
models
from
other
sectors
that
we
can
draw
on?
What
informal
/
semi-formal
frameworks
offer
the
best
prospect
to
fill
capacity
gaps
in
governments
to
support
landscape
level
negotiations?
What
does
'good
enough'
governance
look
like?
How
can
incentives
be
adjusted
in
favour
of
FLR
goals,
and
at
what
cost?
Relevant
case
study
groups
Historic
Examples
of
land
restoration
General
country
examples
Public/private
partnerships
Private
sector
companies
and
projects
Projects
led
by
NGOs
and
cooperatives
Role
of
Rules
and
Incentives
Regulations
e.g.
export
bans,
transport
restrictions,
rigid
rules
on
planting
(controlled
list
of
species,
banning
cereals
or
tree
crops)
,
cultivation,
extraction
Law
enforcement
positive
or
negative?
Impact
of
illegal
timber
on
prices
and
financial
incentives
to
plant
trees
Market
incentives:
is
the
market
pull
more
powerful
than
regulatory
push
to
stimulate
tree
planting
and
restoration?
Subsidies:
When
are
they
necessary
to
attract
investment?
When
do
certain
subsidies
work
against
FLR
goals?.
To
what
extent
is
subsidy
earmarked
for
FLR
and
smallholder
development
in
reality
used
to
finance
industrial
plantations?
Are
public
finance
mechanisms,
for
instance
concessional
loans,
subject
to
the
moral
hazard
problem?
To
what
extent
is
formal
tenure
a
pre-condition
for
investment?
37
Study
C:
The
relationship
between
the
rural
economy
and
FLR
Condition
/
theme
Knowledge
Gaps
3.3
Aligning
investment
goals
Test
the
hypothesis
that
when
local
people
have
a
degree
of
control
of
with
local
needs
the
project,
and
benefit
directly
from
its
success
landscape
restoration
is
more
successful,
replicable
and
scaleable.
What
conditions
are
required
to
make
this
possible?
3.4
Growing
rural
economies
What
is
the
role
of
the
benign
agrarian
transition
in
better
landscape
as
the
key
to
landscape
management?
restoration
To
what
extent
are
agrarian
transition
and
landscape
restoration
inter-dependent?
3.5
Rural
economies
need
local
Where
has
focusing
on
building
the
small
business
sector
worked?
businesses
and
a
growing
Does
aiming
for
tangible
outputs
from
landscapes
builds
a
stronger
RNFE
if
they
are
to
thrive
investment
case,
and
the
extent
to
which
a
growing
rural
non-farm
economy
improves
the
legitimacy
and
resilience
of
landscape
restoration.
Relevant
case
study
groups
Projects
led
by
NGOs
and
cooperatives
Private
Sector
companies
&
projects
Company
/
community
partnerships
Additional
questions
Landscape
transition
and
development
Is
land
ownership
reform
(to
redistribute
land
from
large
landowners
to
smallholders),
or
tenure
reform
a
pre-condition
of
more
sustainable
land
use?
To
what
extent
is
FLR
compatible
with
human
social
and
economic
development?
How
can
public
finance
mechanisms
be
made
compatible
with
private
landowner
interests
in
the
cause
of
FLR?
Is
the
forest
transition
an
inescapable
artifact
of
the
long
term
development
process,
which
should
not
be
short-circuited?
What
is
the
difference
in
outcome
between
FLR
on
state
land
and
on
private
land?
Locally
Control
What
is
the
correlation
between
local
ownership
and
control,
and
successful
FLR
outcomes?
Does
local
involvement
in
landscape
planning
lead
to
more
diverse
planting?
To
what
extent
are
local
investors
attracted
by
the
prospect
of
total
landscape
restoration,
or
by
the
prospect
of
timber
revenue?
What
percentage
of
financing
is
dependent
on
either
carbon
/PES,
or
on
donor
grants?
What
are
the
financing
needs
of
local
bottom-up
FLR
projects?
To
what
extent
is
the
prospect
of
timber
revenue
a
driver
for
local
community
and
smallholder
involvement
in
FLR?
What
types
of
land
tenure
are
most
suitable
for
an
FLR
project
to
be
successful?
Do
financial
constraints
lead
to
innovation
in
organisational
approach
or
product
development?
Is
successful
FLR
more
highly
correlated
with
increasing
land-
holding
size,
or
are
smallholders
more
successful
stewards?
38
Study
D:
Incorporating
ecosystem
services
in
FLR
project
design
Condition
/
theme
Knowledge
Gaps
3.6
Rural
economies
need
evaluate
relative
success
of
projects
that
differentiate
between
global
healthy
ecosystems
and
local
value
of
the
ecosystem
service,
and
in
what
circumstances
valuing
the
ecosystem
has
actually
led
to
landscape
restoration,
as
distinct
from
preservation.
Is
pricing
necessary?
Or
is
ES
always
a
co-benefit,
which
as
a
public
good
deserves
some
public
subsidy
or
co-investment
to
bring
about?
Relevant
case
study
groups
General
country
examples
Carbon
finance
projects
Conservation
projects
(international
funding)
Investment
funds
Private
Sector
companies
&
projects
Project
Sponsors
/
Investors
Additional
questions
Carbon
finance
To
what
extent
are
REDD+
projects
including
FLR
in
their
goals?
How
do
the
projects
integrate
FLR
in
the
financial
model
for
the
carbon
investors
is
it
an
implementation
cost,
an
investment
for
cashflow,
or
an
additional
project
expense
to
be
covered
by
a
donor?
How
do
the
projects
manage
trade-offs
between
carbon
sequestration
and
local
livelihoods,
e.g.
do
they
accept
less
carbon-rich
restoration
options
if
they
have
better
income
opportunities
for
local
people?
Who
negotiates
these
trade-
offs?
Can
conservation
be
compatible
with
attracting
investment
to
landscape
restoration?
In
a
national
park
or
conservation
area
setting,
what
is
the
long-term
revenue
model
post-restoration?
Who
pays
for
the
ongoing
restoration
and
maintenance,
and
who
then
benefits
from
the
revenue
streams
(if
any)?
How
do
the
projects
manage
trade-offs
between
biodiversity
and
local
livelihoods,
e.g.
do
they
accept
less
biodiverse
restoration
options
if
they
have
better
income
opportunities
for
local
people?
Who
negotiates
these
trade-offs?
Conservation
Can
conservation
be
compatible
with
attracting
investment
to
landscape
restoration?
In
a
national
park
or
conservation
area
setting,
what
is
the
long-term
revenue
model
post-restoration?
Who
pays
for
the
ongoing
restoration
and
maintenance,
and
who
then
benefits
from
the
revenue
streams
(if
any)?
How
do
the
projects
manage
trade-offs
between
biodiversity
and
local
livelihoods,
e.g.
do
they
accept
less
biodiverse
restoration
options
if
they
have
better
income
opportunities
for
local
people?
Who
negotiates
these
trade-offs?
39
Study
E:
Designing
investment
structures
Condition
/
theme
Knowledge
Gaps
3.7
Ideal
investment
structure
In
order
to
understand
the
practical
interaction
of
enabling
and
asset
investments,
we
need
to
look
for
examples
of
how
FLR
investments
have
been
structured.
In
some
cases
the
investment
types
may
not
have
been
clearly
delineated,
or
have
confused
goals.
Conversely,
there
may
be
some
cases
where
asset
investment
is
not
possible
until
enabling
investment
is
made
available.
Relevant
case
study
groups
Carbon
finance
projects
Investment
funds
Private
Sector
companies
&
projects
Project
Sponsors
/
Investors
Projects
led
by
NGOs
and
cooperatives
Large
donor-funded
projects
Designing
financing
structures
for
FLR
How
can
complex
projects
such
as
climate
smart
agriculture
finance
be
structured
to
account
for
multiple
revenue
streams
and
timelines?
In
public/private
finance
partnerships,
which
is
the
leader
and
which
is
the
follower?
How
is
enabling
investment
kept
separate
from
asset
finance?
Are
public-private
partnerships
superior
to
top-down
state
programmes
in
terms
of
their
success
in
restoring
landscapes
and
improving
livelihoods?
What
is
the
cost
of
FLR?
How
much
external
finance
does
it
actually
require?
How
to
construct
diversified
and
de-risked
landscape
portfolio
approach,
preferable
spreading
across
several
landscapes
Role
of
landscape
bonds
and
forest
bonds
How
can
supply
chain
management,
including
risk
sharing,
leakages,
etc.,
be
improved
to
influence
the
incentives
to
invest
in
FLR?
40
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