Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2000 CASES
Q: X had been working for a year as a security guard with company A., a
sister company of company B. He was hired on January 1, 1988 as he was
among those absorbed by company B when it took over the security
contracts of its sister company A. He was forced by company B to sign a new
probationary contract for 6 mos; and on August 1, 1988, his employment was
terminated for allegedly sleeping on post and quarreling with a co-worker.
Was B a regular employee and thereby illegally dismissed?
Q: Union A, of which X was a part, filed with the DOLE a notice of strike
raising charges of ULP and illegal dismissal against Company A. The Labor
Arbiter ordered Company A to pay X separation pay of month pay for every
year of service. X filed a motion for execution of the decision of the Labor
Arbiter. The Rehabilitation Receiver of Company A submitted a Manifestation
with Motion, alleging that petitioner was not yet in a position to comply with
the directive of the Labor Arbiter as it was still under Rehabilitation
Receivership by virtue of the order of the SEC. However, the Labor Arbiter
still granted the motion for execution. Company A contends that the NLRC
should have denied the order of the LA for the immediate payment of
separation pay because of the order of the SEC suspending all claims against
petitioner pending before any court, tribunal or body. Can the order of the
SEC stay the execution of judgment against petitioner?
A: Yes. Petitioners claim that private respondent slept on the job was not
substantiated by any evidence. In other cases, sleeping on the job was found
as a valid ground for dismissal because such cases involved security guards
whose duty necessitates that they be awake and watchful at all times, such is
not the degree of discipline required of a quality control inspector. While an
employer is allowed a wide discretion in the promulgation of company
policies, such should always be fair and reasonable. In this case, the
dismissal meted out on private respondent for sleeping on the job appears to
be too harsh a penalty. (VH Manufacturing, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 130957,
January 19, 2000)
A: No. Petitioner was able to show that private respondents did not render
services during the stated period. X and Y even admitted that they did not
report at the Kalibo office, as Lezo remained to be their office where they
continuously reported. It was not for X and Y to declare the managements
act of transferring the office to Kalibo as an illegal act as there was no
allegation of proof that such was made in bad faith or with malice. Private
respondents were dismissed by petitioner effective January 1992 and were
accepted back, subject to the condition of no work, no pay effective March
1993 which is why they were allowed to draw their salaries again. (Aklan
Electric Cooperative Incorporated v. NLRC, G.R. 121439, January 25, 2000)
Q: A was employed as housekeeper with Company B. He also owned a carfor-hire which he rented to B who operated the car as a taxi. One day, B
approached the front desk clerk at petitioners hotel requesting a collectible
of P2000 be added to a certain Korean guests, Mr. Hus bill. Mr. Hu later
complained that he was overbilled. A explained his side being the front desk
supervisor and owner of the car. Eventually, Company Bs staff confirmed the
error and refunded the amount to the Korean. Company B terminated the
services of A on the ground of loss of confidence for the latters malicious
intent to defraud a guest of the hotel. Was A illegally dismissed?
Q: Union A and Company B were faced with a bargaining deadlock. The union
then filed a notice of strike with the NCMB. Later, the union conducted a
strike vote among its members and the results were submitted to the Alliance
of Nationalist and Genuine labor Organization for submission to the NCMB,
but which was not made. The union went on strike without the report of the
strike vote submitted to the NCMB. Company B filed a petition to declare the
strike illegal alleging that the union barricaded gates of Company B and
committed acts of violence, threats and coercion. Trial on the merits was
conducted wherein Company B presented witnesses and evidence, Union A
did not present any witness but instead relied on their Memorandum
contending that respondents evidence are inadmissible. Was the strike
illegal?
A: Yes. Failure to submit the strike vote to the NCMB immediately makes the
strikek illegal. The illegality of the strike is further affirmed by the acts of
violence, threats and coercion committed during the strike. The
requirements of procedural due process were complied with as both parties
were allowed to present their witnesses and evidence, although petitioner
opted instead to file a memorandum. (Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Moldex
Products, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 119467, February 1, 2000)
A: Yes. PMCI was a labor-only contractor. Although the Neri doctrine stated
that it was enough that a contractor had substantial capital to show it was an
independent contractor, the case of Fuji Xerox clarified the doctrine stating
that an independent business must undertake the performance of the
contract according to its own manner and method free from the control of the
principal. In this case, PMCI did not even have substantial capitalization as
only a small amount of its authorized capital stock was actually paid-in.
to the new site. Are the employees entitled to separation pay by virtue of
their refusal to transfer to the business in Batangas.
Q: Meralco and its union MEWA renegotiated its 1992-1997 CBA insofar as the
last two-year period was concerned. The Secretary of Labor assumed
jurisdiction and granted the arbitral awards. There was no question that
these arbitral awards were to be given retroactive effect. However, the
parties dispute the reckoning period when retroaction shall commence.
Meralco claims that the award should retroact only from such time that the
Secretary of Labor rendered the award. The union argues that the awards
should retroact to such time granted by the Secretary who has plenary and
discretionary power to determine the effectivity of the arbitral award. The
union cited the case of St. Lukes and Mindanao Terminal where the Secretary
ordered the retroaction of the CBA to the date of expiration of the previous
CBA. When should the arbitral award retroact?
A: Labor laws are silent as to when an arbitral award in a labor dispute where
the Secretary has assumed jurisdiction by virtue of Art. 263 (g) shall retroact.
Despite the silence of the law, the Court ruled that the CBA arbitral awards
granted after six months from the expiration of the last CBA shall retroact to
such time agreed upon by both the employer and the employees or their
union. Absent such agreement as to retroactivity, the award shall retroact to
the first day after the six-month period following the expiration of the last day
of the CBA should there be one. In the absence of a CBA, the Secretarys
determination of the date of effectivity as part of his discretionary powers
over arbitral awards shall control. (Manila Electric Company v. Secretary of
Labor, G.R. No. 127598, February 22, 2000)
officers and shop stewards; threats, coercion and intimidation; and union
busting. Members of Union M prayed for the suspension of the effects of their
termination. Secretary Drilon dismissed the petition stating it was a intrauion matter. Later, 78 union shop stewards were placed under preventive
suspension. The union members staged a walk-out and officially declared a
strike that afternoon. The strike was attended by violence. Was the dismissal
of the union officers illegal?
A: Yes. The charges against respondent company proceeded mainly from the
termination of the union officers upon the demand of the federation pursuant
to the union security clause. Although the union security clause may be
validly enforced, such must comply with due process. In this case, the union
officers were expelled for allegedly committing acts of disloyalty to the
federation. The company did not inquire into the cause of the expulsion and
merely relied upon the federations allegations. The issue is not a purely
intra-union matter as it was later on converted into a termination dispute
when the company dismissed the petitioners from work without the benefit of
a separate notice and hearing. As to the act of disaffiliation by the local
union; it is settled that a local union has the right to disaffiliate from its
mother union in the absence of specific provisions in the federations
constitution prohibiting such. There was no such provision in federation
ULGWPs constitution.
A: No. As to the legality of the strike; it was based on the termination dispute
and petitioners believed in good faith that in dismissing them, the company
was guilty of ULP. The no-strike, no lockout provision in the CBA can only be
invoked when the strike is economic. As to the violence, both parties agreed
that the violence was not attributed to the striking employees alone as the
company itself hired men to pacify the strikers. Such violence cannot be a
ground for declaring the strike illegal. (Malayang Samahan ng mga
Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield (MSMG0UWP) v. Ramos, G.R. No. 113907,
February 28, 2000)
The NLRC dismissed the appeal for insufficiency of the bond. Petitioner said
the Star Angel doctrine should apply where the appeal may be perfected after
that period upon posting of a cash or surety bond. However, the NLRC
disagreed stating that in this case, the petitioner did not file a motion for
reduction of bond within the period but instead posted a bond in an amount
not equivalent to the monetary award. Was the motion for the reduction of
the bond filed in time?
A: Yes. That petitioner did file a motion within the period is supported by the
following:
1. The motion for reduction was stamped with the received rubber stamp
marker of the NLRC and indicated the date of filing as 6.7.96.
2. Both the motion and the appeal memorandum were sent to respondents
in one envelope and sent by registered mail under Reg. Receipt 3576.
3. The same person notarized both the motion and the appeal on the same
date.
4. On the last page of their comments, respondents stated that the motion
for reduction should be founded on meritorious grounds. This was found by
the SC to be an implied admittance of the receipt of the motion. Besides,
respondents could just as well have stated in their comments that no motion
was filed. (Coral Point Development Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No.129761,
February 28, 2000)
A: No. The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the
manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional, and noncompliance with such legal
requirement is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and
executory. Perfection of an appeal includes the filing, within the prescribed
A: No. The peculiar circumstance in the case at bar involves neither the
closure of an establishment nor a reduction in personnel as contemplated in
Article 283. The closure contemplated in 283 is a voluntary act on the part of
the employer. The Labor Code does not contemplate a situation where the
closure is forced upon the employer. As such, petitioners are not entitled to
separation pay as private respondents did not voluntary shut down
operations as they even sought to be exempted from the coverage of RA
6657. (National Federation of Labor v. NLRC, G.R. No. 127718, March 2, 2000)
employment are terminated every time their contracts expire. Were A and B
validly dismissed?
A: No. Article 241 has 3 requisites for the validity of the special assessment
for unions incidental expenses, attorneys fees and representation expenses.
They are:
1. authorization by a written resolution of majority of all the members at
the general membership meeting called for the purpose
2.
A: Yes. The core of PALs evidence against A included the report of B. It was
erroneous for the NLRC to have discredited Bs testimony because he
appeared guilty as well. There is substantial evidence showing that private
respondent had direct involvement in the illegal pooling of baggage. As act
is inexcusable as it constitutes a serious offense under petitioners Code of
Discipline. The fact that PAL failed to show it suffered losses in revenue is
immaterial as private respondents mere attempt to deprive petitioner of its
lawful remedy is already tantamount to fraud. Therefore, A was validly
dismissed and as such was for a just cause, he is not entitled to backwages
nor separation pay. (PAL v. NLRC, G.R. No. 126805, March 16, 2000)
Q: The NFL was the sole and exclusive bargaining representative for the rank
and file employees of Company X. NFL started to negotiate for better terms
and conditions of employment; which were met with resistance by Company
X. The NFL filed a complaint for ULP on the ground of refusal to bargain
collectively. LA issued an order declaring the company guilty of ULP and
ordering the CBA proposals submitted by the NFL as the CBA between the
parties. Later, Y claimed that he was wrongfully excluded from the benefits
under the CBA filed a petition for relief. Company X asserts that Y is not
entitled to the benefits under the CBA because he was hired after the term of
a CBA and therefore, is not a party to the agreement and may not claim
benefits thereunder. As for the CBA, Company X maintains that the force and
effect of the CBAs terms are limited to only three years and cannot extend to
terms and conditions which ceased to have force and effect. Are the
assertions of Company X correct?
A: No. As to its first assertion, Y should be able to claim benefits under the
CBA. The benefits under the CBA should be extended to those who only
became such after it expired, to exclude them would constitute undue
discrimination. In fact, when a CBA is entered into by the union representing
the employees and the employer, even the non-union members are entitled
to the benefits of the contract. As to its assertion that the CBAs terms are
limited to only three years, it is clear from Art. 253 that until a new CBA has
been executed by and between the parties, they are duty bound to keep the
status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of
the existing agreement. In the case at bar, no new agreement was entered
between the parties pending appeal of the decision in the NLRC.
Consequently, the employees would be deprived of a substantial amount of
monetary benefits if the terms and conditions of the CBA were not to remain
in force and effect which runs counter to the intent of the Labor Code to curb
labor unrest and promote industrial peace. (New Pacific Timber Supply Co. v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 124224, March 17, 2000)
A: Yes. Execution is the final stage of litigation, the end of the suit. It cannot
be frustrated except for serious reasons demanded by justice and equity. It is
the ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the
judgment. Company Xs contention that there has been a change in the
situation of the parties is without merit. It has been held that back wages
awarded to an illegally dismissed employee shall not be diminished or
reduced by the earnings by him elsewhere during the period of his illegal
dismissal. The decision is final and the total amount representing the salary
differentials and back wages awarded to the petitioner has been garnished
from the account of respondent agency with no opposition or resistance.
Therefore, it is the ministerial duty of the LA to release the money to A.
(Torres v. NLRC, G.R. No. 107014, April 12, 2000)
A: Yes. Computer operators were presently doing clerical and routinary work
and had nothing to do with the setting of management policies for the
university. The access they have to information to the Universitys operations
are not necessarily confidential. The express exclusion of the computer
operators in the past does not pose a bar to re-negotiation for future inclusion
of the said employees in the bargaining unit. Also, as to the employees of
the CSB, they were properly excluded at the two education institutions have
their own separate juridical personality. (De la Salle University v. De La Salle
University Employees Association, G.R. No. 109002, April 12, 2000)
Q: A received a letter calling to his attention his conduct during a Sales and
Marketing Christmas gathering where she allegedly made utterances of
obscene, insulting and offensive words towards the SPCs Management
Committee. A was given two days to explain why no disciplinary action
should be taken against him and he was thereafter placed on preventive
suspension. A replied stating that such utterances were only made in
reference to a decision taken by the management committee on the Cua Lim
Case and not to any specific person. A was thereafter informed in a letter that
his employment was terminated. Was A validly dismissed?
A: Yes. Although X contends that he was investigated simply for the offense
of driving without a valid drivers license, it was clear that he was fully aware
that he was being investigated for his involvement in the vehicular accident.
It was also known to him that the accident caused the victim to suffer serious
injuries leading to expenses which the insurance refused to cover. Due
process does not necessarily require a hearing, as long as one is given
reasonable opportunity to be heard. Xs actions clearly constituted willful
disobedience. Although generally, an employee who is dismissed for just
cause is not entitled to any financial assistance, due to equity considerations
as this was Xs first offense in 18 years of service, he is to be granted
separation pay by way of financial assistance of months pay for every
year of service. (Aparente, Sr. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117652, April 27, 2000)
service for gross and habitual neglect of duties, serious misconduct, and
fraud or willful breach of trust. Y claims that her throwing of the stapler at
plant manager William Chua was because the latter had been making sexual
advances on her since her first year of employment and that when she would
not accede to his requests, he threatened that he would cause her
termination from service. As to the other charges, she claimed that they were
not done with malice or bad faith. Was Y illegally dismissed, and if so, is she
entitled to recover damages?
A: Yes. The grounds by which an employer may validly terminate the services
of an employee must be strictly construed. To constitute serious misconduct
to justify dismissal, the acts must be done in relation to the performance of
her duties as would show her to be unfit to continue working for her
employer. The acts complained of did not pertain to her duties as a nurse
neither did they constitute serious misconduct. On the question of damages,
although Y allowed four years to pass before coming out with her employers
sexual impositions; the time to do so admittedly varies depending upon the
needs, circumstances and emotional threshold of each person. It is clear that
Y has suffered anxiety, sleepless nights, besmirched reputation and social
humiliation by reason of the act complained of. Thus, she should be entitled
to moral and exemplary damages for the oppressive manner with which
petitioners effected her dismissal and to serve as a warning to officers who
take advantage of their ascendancy over their employees. (Philippine Aeolus
Automotive United Corporatoin v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124617, April 28, 2000)
A: No. The Court ruled that since the dismissal is due to an authorized cause
only notice is required and that the employee has no right to present his side.
The 30 day notice is needed in order to afford the employee enough time to
look for work and to give the DOLE time to look into the validity of the
authorized cause. 30 days pay is not enough to replace the notice
requirement because it would not serve the purpose of the notice.
Additionally, backwages are not a severe punishment because it is a
consequence of the employers failure to give notice and due process and
the employee is therefore not deemed terminated so he should be
compensated for that period. (Serrano vs NLRC, GR No 117040, May 4, 2000)
A: No. The Court ruled that an immediate filing of a complaint for illegal
dismissal is incompatible with abandonment. Abandonment is a matter of
intention. There must be proof of deliberate and unjustified intent to sever
the employer-employee relationship. This burden rests on the employer. In
this case, the employer failed to do so. Since they were illegally dismissed,
the employees are entitled to reinstatement with full backwages,
undiminished by their earnings elsewhere. (Villar v. NLRC, GR No 130935,
May 11, 2000)
Q: A school employs both local-hire and foreign-hire teachers. The foreignhire teachers were given an added 25% in their salary and some benefits like
transportation and housing, shipping costs etc. These were given based on
two things: dislocation and limited tenure. The added compensation was the
schools way of remaining competitive on an international level in terms of
attracting competent teachers. The local-hire teachers, part of the union
contested the difference, a deadlock resulted so the teachers went on strike.
Is there discrimination in terms of wages?
A: Yes, there is discrimination. The principle equal pay for equal work
should apply in this case. Persons who work with substantially equal
qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should
be paid similar salaries. If an employee is paid less it is upon the employer to
Q: A company was found to have underpaid their employees and did not pay
the 13th month pay on a routine inspection conducted by DOLE. The regional
director ordered the company to pay the deficiency. Subsequently, the NLRC
affirmed the order. A waiver was signed by 108 of the workers where they
reduced by half the amount that was due. DOLE approved the waiver saying
that it was not contrary to law, good customs and public policy. Later,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging undue influence,
coercion, intimidation, and no assistance of counsel. The motion was denied.
Eduardo Nietes, claiming that he represented the workers, filed a position
paper with the same argument. The NLRC dismissed the case for failure to
acquire jurisdiction. He again filed an appeal but the appeal was denied for
being filed out of time. The appeal was filed 9 days late along with the
appeal fee and research fee. Was the appeal was filed out of time?
A: Yes, the appeal was filed out of time. The perfection of an appeal within
the reglamentary period and in the manner prescribed by law is mandatory
and jurisdictional. Non-compliance renders the judgement appealed final and
executory. An appeal is perfected when there is proof of payment of the
appeal fee and in cases of the employer appealing and there is a monetary
award, payment of the appeal bond. A mere notice of appeal without
complying with the other requisites shall not stop the running of the period
for perfecting an appeal. Sometimes though, in the interest of justice, late
appeals have been allowed. An instance is a class suit. In this case there is
no evidence that there is a class suit. There is no evidence that the workers
chose Nietes to represent them. There is no showing that the workers are
joined by a common interest. As there is no basis to invalidate the waiver the
workers signed, the waiver is valid. (Workers of Antique Electric Cooperative
v. NLRC, GR No 120062, June 8, 2000)
coughing and he needed open heart surgery. He filed for sickness and
disability benefits with the POEA and these were awarded to him. Is the
sickness compensable?
A: No. We have held that an employer acts well within its rights in transferring
an employee as it sees fit provided that there is no demotion in rank or
diminution in pay. The two circumstances are deemed badges of bad faith,
and thus constitutive of constructive dismissal. In this regard, constructive
dismissal is defined as an involuntary resignation resorted to when
continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when
there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when a clear
discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to
the employee. It should be borne in mind, however, that the right to demote
an employee also falls within the category of management prerogatives. An
employer is entitled to impose productivity standards for its workers, and in
fact, non-compliance may be visited with a penalty even more severe than
demotion. Failure to observe prescribed standards of work, or to fulfill
reasonable work assignments due to inefficiency may constitute just cause
for dismissal. (Leonardo v. NLRC, G.R. No. 125303, June 16, 2000)
A: The NLRC decision has become final and executory. Neither a motion for
reconsideration nor appeal was ever taken by petitioners on this point. This
procedural lapse is fatal. Equally significant is the fact that petitioners
actively participated in the enforcement of the execution by garnishing the
supersedeas bond and the bank deposits of PSVSIA. The NLRC prepared a
computation showing the back wages due petitioners for three (3) years. X
not only assented to the computation made when they did not object thereto
but even filed a motion to release the remaining balance amounting to
P398,600.00 still in the hands of the NLRC to fully satisfy the judgment
awards. X cannot now claim that they have remained unpaid, especially
considering that they have already received the judgment award. (PGA
Brotherhood Association, et al., v. NLRC, G.R. No. 131084, June 19, 2000).
A: No. To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: (1) the failure
to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a
clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. Such is
disputed by the fact that private respondent immediately reported back for
work and lost no time in filing a case for illegal dismissal against petitioners.
(Icawat v. NLRC, GR 133572, June 20, 2000)
A:
1. No. The duty to bargain collectively includes the mutual obligation to
meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose
of negotiating an agreement. Petitioner failed to make a timely reply to the
unions proposals, thereby violating the proper procedure in collective
bargaining as provided in Article 250. In order to allow the employer to
validly suspend the bargaining process, there must be a valid PCE raising a
legitimate representation issue. In this case, the petition was filed outside the
60-day freedom period; therefore there was no legitimate representation
issue and the filing of the PCE did not constitute a bar to the ongoing
negotiation.
2. Yes. The dismissal was in violation of the employees right to selforganization. The dismissal must be made pursuant to the tenets of equity
and fair play; wherein the employers right to terminate the services of an
employee must be exercised in good faith; furthermore, it must not amount
to interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in their right to selforganization. The factual backdrop of the Ambas termination reveals that
such was done in order to strip the union of a leader. Admittedly,
management has the prerogative to discipline its employees for
insubordination. But when the exercise of such management right tends to
interfere with the employees right to self-organization, it amounts to unionbusting and is therefore a prohibited act. (Colegio de San Juan de Letran v.
Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran, G.R. 141471, September 18,
2000)
A: Yes, the illness is compensable. Under the Labor Code, as amended, the
law applicable to the case at bar, in order for the employee to be entitled to
1999 CASES
A. The suspension was illegal. Article 83 of the Labor Code (Normal hours of
Work) provides that Health personnel . . . shall hold regular office hours for
eight (8) hours a day, for five (5) days a week, exclusive of time for meals,
(See Art. 85 - Meal Periods; Sec. 7, Rule I, Book III of the Omnibus Rules
(Meals and Rest periods) Thus, the 8-hour work period does not include the
meal break. Nowhere in the law may it be inferred that employees must take
their meals within the company premises, as long as they return to their
posts on time. Private respondents act of going home to take his dinner does
not constitute abandonment. (Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC, 302 SCRA 582
(1999))
A. No. While the SC agrees that the employer should not be required to
continuously employ someone who has betrayed its trust and confidence,
dismissal would not be proportionate to the gravity of the offense. Further, he
is a non-confidential employee. Dismissal as a measure to protect the
interests of Respondent Company is unwarranted under the facts of this case.
Suspension would have sufficed. (Associated Labor Unions-TUCP v. NLRC, 302
SCRA 708 (1999))
A. The SC agrees with the LA and held that private respondent was indeed
illegally dismissed. It was only upon his complaint regarding his low salary
that he was no longer allowed to report for work. This amounted to dismissal
without cause and without the requisite written notice. Such circumstances
make it difficult to sustain any allegation of abandonment. Abandonment, as
a just and valid cause for termination, requires a deliberate and unjustified
refusal of an employee to resume his work, coupled with a clear absence of
any intention of returning to his or her work.
With regard to the salary differentials granted, petitioners claim exemption
under RA 6727 (Wage Rationalization Act) and the Rules Implementing Wage
Order Nos. NCR-01 and NCR-01-A, as well as Wage Order Nos. NCR-02 and
NCR-02-A. However, regardless of the factual circumstances in this case, the
SC was not convinced as the petitioners could not even show any approved
application for exemption, as required by the applicable guidelines issued by
the Commission. (C. Planas Commercial v. NLRC, 303 SCRA 49 (1999))
Q. Is due process served even when the decision of the Labor arbiter is based
solely on position papers?
A. Petitioner likewise contends that it was not granted its right to due
process, as the decision of the LA was based purely on position papers. The
standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a
certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. [Adamson &
Adamson, Inc. v. Amores, 152 SCRA 237, 250 (1987)] Hence it is not legally
objectionable, for being violative of due process, for the LA to resolve a case
based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence
submitted by the parties. (CMP Federal Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC, 303
SCRA 99 (1999))
A. Yes. Petitioner reasons that the employee was caught in flagrante delicto,
and is therefore a cause for dismissal. However, absent any evidence that
would substantiate such imputation against the employee, suspicions and
baseless conclusions by employers are not legal justification for dismissing
employees. The burden of proof to show the validity of the dismissal lies on
the employer. Notably, it was shown that the hotel guest lost nothing.
(Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corporation v. NLRC, 303 SCRA 541 (1999))
A. No the employees were not validly retired. The mere absence of actual
physical force to compel them to ink their application for retirement did not
make it voluntary. They were confronted with the danger of being jobless.
Their acceptance of benefits did not likewise amount to estoppel. If the
intention to retire is not clearly established or if the retirement is involuntary,
such is to be treated as a discharge. In any case, the CBA is not applicable to
them as it expressly excluded supervisory positions which petitioners occupy.
(San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC; July 23, 1999)
Q. San Miguel Corporation shut down some of its plants and declared 55
positions as redundant, in order to streamline operations due to financial
losses. Consequently, the union filed several grievance cases for the said
retrenched employees, and sought the redeployment of said employees to
other divisions of the company. Grievance proceedings were conducted
pursuant to the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement. The procedure
outlined in the CBA required the settlement of grievances on 3 levels department manager, plant manager, and a conciliation board. During the
proceedings, many employees were redeployed, some accepted early
retirement. San Miguel informed the union that the remaining employees
would be terminated, if they could not be redeployed. Subsequently, the
union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB of the DOLE due to a bargaining
deadlock and gross violation of the CBA such as non-compliance with the
grievance procedure. On the other hand, San Miguel filed a complaint with
the NLRC to dismiss the notice of strike. Can the union hold a strike on the
grounds relied upon?
A. The grounds relied upon by the union are non-strikeable. A strike or lockout
may only be declared in cases of bargaining deadlocks and ULP. Violations of
Q. Due to alleged ULP, several employees walked out from their jobs. The
company purportedly sent them notices urging them to return to work,
otherwise their services would be terminated. The employees denied having
received these notices, and claimed that they were merely informed of their
dismissal and prevented from returning to work (removal of their machines
by the company). Was there a valid case of abandonment, as a ground for
dismissal?
A: Yes. In both periods, the company did not specify the criteria for the
termination or retention of the services of S. If the contract was really for a
fixed term, the employer should not have been given the discretion to dismiss
S during the one year period of employment for reasons other than the just
and authorized causes under the Labor Code. In effect, the employer
theorized that the one-year period of employment was probationary. It was
not brought to light that S was informed at the start of his employment of the
reasonable standards under which he would qualify as a regular employee. In
the case of Brent, the Court upheld the principle that when the period was
imposed to preclude the acquisition of tenurial security, they should be
disregarded for being contrary to public opinion. It was clear that S was hired
as a regular employee and his work was necessary and directly related to the
business of the company. S is considered as a regular employee of the
company. At any rate, even assuming that the original employment was
probationary, the fact that he was allowed to work beyond the six-month
probationary period converts him to a regular employee under Article 281 of
the Labor Code. S was reinstated with backwages from the time of dismissal
to payroll reinstatement. (Servidad v. National Labor Relations Commission,
305 SCRA 49, 18 March 1999)
Q: D learned from B that the latter needed factory workers in Taiwan, but B
told D that as a part of his job application, he should give a certain amount. D
gave B the money but was unable to go to Taiwan. Several other persons paid
B the required placement fee but were also unable to work abroad. The
victims filed cases of illegal recruitment in large scale (3 or more persons)
and estafa. Was B guilty of illegal recruitment and estafa?
A: Yes. Illegal recruitment is committed when the (1) offender has no valid
license or authority; and (2) he undertakes any activity within the meaning of
recruitment and placement under the Labor Code. It is the lack of
necessary license or authority that renders the recruitment activity unlawful
or criminal. There is illegal recruitment when one purports to have the ability
to send a worker abroad through without license and authority to do so.
(People v. Borromeo, 305 SCRA 180, 25 March 1999)
Q: At the time AIUP filed a petition for certification election, there was an
existing CBA between the company and CCEA, the incumbent bargaining
agent for all the rank and file employees. This petition was opposed by CCEA
on the ground of the contract bar rule. AIUP filed a notice of strike citing
union busting and unfair labor practice as grounds. The union proceeded to
stage a strike, in the course of which, illegal acts were perpetrated. When
AIUP ignored the TRO enjoining the union members to refrain from blocking
the road, the company dismissed several employees on the ground of illegal
strike and illegal acts perpetrated in connection with the strike. AIUP is
questioning the legality of the dismissal of several AIUP member employees.
Was the strike illegal? Was the dismissal of the AIUP member employees
valid?
A: The Court was not persuaded by the allegation of union busting. The strike
staged by AIUP was a union-recognition-strike. The petition for certification
election (PCE) should not have been entertained because of the contract bar
rule. A PCE may only be entertained 60 days before the expiration of a CBA
(freedom period).
The strike staged by AIUP was illegal as they formed human
barricades to block roads and prevented co-workers from entering company
premises. Even if the strike is valid because its object or purpose is lawful,
the strike may still be declared as invalid where the means employed are
illegal. Union officers who knowingly participate in the commission of illegal
acts in a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status but an
ordinary striking employee cannot be terminated for mere participation in an
illegal strike. However, there must be proof that he committed illegal acts
during the strike. For the severest penalty to dismissal to attach, the erring
strikers must be duly identified. Simply referring to them as strikers is not
enough to justify their dismissal. The petitioning members of AIUP are
ordered reinstated with full backwages. (Association of Independent Unions in
the Philippines v. NLRC, 305 SCRA 219, 25 March 1999)
Q: The original owners of AAC were driven by mounting financial loses to sell
the majority rights of the company to PH. To thwart further losses, PH
implemented a re-organizational plan. Workers occupying redundant
positions that were abolished were terminated. PH duly paid their separation
pay and other benefits. Six of the union members who were terminated filed
a case for illegal termination alleging that the retrenchment program was a
subterfuge for union busting. They claimed that they were singled out for
their active participation in union activities. They also asserted that AAC was
not bankrupt, as it has engaged in an aggressive scheme of contractual
hiring. Were the union members validly dismissed?
A: No. Wage, as defined by the Labor Code, may include any determination
by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate instances the fair and reasonable
value of board, lodging and other facilities customarily furnished by an
employer to his employees. The Court agrees with the OSG that the subject
allowances were temporary and not regularly received by the petitioners. The
allowance given to the employees in the instant case do not represent such
fair and reasonable value because the allowance were given by the company
in lieu of actual housing and transportation needs whereas the Bislig
allowance was given in consideration of being assigned to the hostile
environment then prevailing in Bislig; petitioners continuous enjoyment of
the disputed allowances was based on contingencies the occurrence of which
terminated such enjoyment. (Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission,
305 SCRA 500, 29 March 1999)
A: No. It appears, however, that As Daily Time Record (DTR) and pay slips
showed that he did not incur any unexcused absences, he was not late on
any day and, that no deduction was made from his salary on account of
tardiness or absences. The computer print outs, which constitutes the only
evidence of IBM, afford no assurance of their authenticity because they are
unsigned It is true that administrative agencies are not bound by the
Q: RP filed with the SEC a petition for the suspension of payments and a
rehabilitation plan. A management committee was created to oversee the
rehabilitation plan. Consequently, the SEC issued an order suspending all
actions and claims against RP. Employees of RP filed their respective
complaints for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, and payment of
separation pay.
The Labor Arbiter held that the order of the SEC
suspending all action for claims against RP does not cover the claims of
private respondents in the labor cases because said claims and the liability of
RP as the employer still has to be determined, thus carrying no dissipation of
the assets of petitioners. Are labor claims included in the suspension order of
the SEC?
A: Yes. The law is clear: all claims for actions shall be suspended accordingly.
No exception in favor of labor claims is mentioned in the law. Allowing labor
cases to proceed clearly defeats the purpose of the automatic stay and
severely encumbers the management committees time and resources.
The preferential right of workers and employees under Article 110 of
the Labor Code may be invoked only upon the institution of insolvency or
judicial liquidation proceedings. The purpose of rehabilitation proceedings is
precisely to enable the company to gain a new lease on life and thereby allow
creditors to be paid their claims from its earnings. In insolvency proceedings,
the company stops operations and the claims of creditors are satisfied from
the assets of the insolvent company. The present case involves rehabilitation,
not the liquidation, of RP Corporation. Hence the preference of credit granted
to workers is not applicable. The labor claims filed by the employees will
temporarily be suspended during the period of the rehabilitation plan.
(Rubberworld Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission, 305 SCRA
721, 14 April 1999)
A: No. The Court held in a previous case that RA 7641 granting retirement
benefits is undoubtedly a social legislation. There should be little doubt about
the fact that the law can apply to labor contracts still existing at the time the
statute has taken effect, and that its benefits can be reckoned not only from
the date of the laws enactment but retroactively to the time said
employment contract have started. The aforecited doctrine was elaborated
upon by enumerating the circumstances which must concur before the law
could be given retroactive effect: (1) the claimant must still be an employee
of the employer at the time the statute took effect; and (2) the claimant has
complied with the requirements for eligibility under the statute. In the case
under scrutiny, S retired and ceased to be an employee of JVAC Corporation
eleven months before the effectivity of RA 7641. It is thus decisively clear
that the provisions of RA 7641 could not be given retroactive effect in his
favor. (J.V. Angeles Construction Corporation v. NLRC, 305 SCRA 734, 14 April
1999)
Q: The corporation and ALU inked a CBA effective until 1995. 14 days before
the expiration of the said CBA, NAFLU filed a petition for certification election,
which was granted by the Med-Arbiter. ALU interposed a Motion to Dismiss for
failure of NAFLU to acquire for and in behalf of its local charter affiliates
(COPPER), a legal personality as a legitimate labor organization. ALU and
NAFLU signed an agreement to hold a certification election and NAFLU
promised to furnish ALU a copy of its Certificate of Registration and other
pertinent documents. On the same day COPPER was issued by the DOLE a
Certificate of Registration. Was the PCE duly filed?
Q: A was a police officer assigned to PNP Vigan. While he was driving his
tricycle and ferrying passengers, he was confronted by another police officer
about his tour of duty. A verbal tussle then ensued between the two, which
led to the fatal shooting A. On account of As death, his wife filed a claim for
death benefits with the GSIS. In its decision, GSIS denied the claim on the
ground that at the time of his death, A was performing a personal activity
that was not work-connected. Subsequent appeal to the Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC) proved to be futile as it merely affirmed the
decision of GSIS. The Court of Appeals, however, ruled otherwise. It decided
that as applied to a peace officer, As work place is not confined to the police
precinct or any station, but to any place where his services, as a lawman, to
maintain peace and security, are required. At the time of his death, A was
driving his tricycle at the town complex where the police assistance center is
located. There can be no dispute therefore that he met his death literally in
his place of work. Policemen, by the nature of their functions, are deemed to
be on a round-the-clock duty. Must the activity being performed at the time
of death be work-connected for it to be compenesable?
A: Yes. While it agrees that policemen are at the beck and call of public duty
as peace officers and technically on duty round-the-clock, the same does not
justify the grant of compensation benefits for the death of A. Obviously, the
matter A was attending at the time of his death, that of ferrying passenger
for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it did
from no particular directive or permission of his superiors officers. The 24hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers, serves more as an
after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them within the scope of the
guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit them in all situations that
may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24-hour doctrine should not
be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a
police officer but only tot hose which, although not on official line of duty, are
nonetheless basically police service in character. Therefore, death benefits
under the ECC should not be granted. (Government Service Insurance System
v. Court of Appeals, 306 SCRA 41, 20 April 1999)
A: Yes. The Court held that the appeal lacks merit. Recruitment for overseas
employment is not in itself necessarily immoral or unlawful. It is the lack of
the necessary license or permit, or the engagement of prohibited activities
enumerated in the Labor Code that renders such recruitment activities
unlawful or criminal. The accused asserted that the offense should not have
been qualified into illegal recruitment by a syndicate since there was no proof
that they acted in conspiracy with one another. However, the acts of the
accused showed unity in purpose. One would visit the house of the recruits
several times, convincing them to work abroad. Another would accompany
the recruit to the house of the person collecting the processing fee. All these
acts established a common criminal design mutually deliberated upon and
accomplished through coordinated acts. Against the evidence of the
prosecution, the accused merely posited the defense of denial. Denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are deemed negative and
self-serving evidence unworthy of credence. (People v. Guevarra, 306 SCRA
111, 21 April 1999)
A: No. PRI cannot legally invoke in this case the strict application of the rule
limiting execution of judgment by mere motion within a period of 5 years
only. There have been cases where the Court allowed execution by mere
motion even after the lapse of 5 years. Their common denominator in those
instances was the delay caused or occasion by the actions of the judgment
debtor and/or those incurred for his benefit. In the instant case, PRI unduly
delayed the full implementation of the final decision of the Office of the
President by fling numerous dilatory appeals and persistently refusing to
reinstate private respondent PE. Technicalities have no room in labor cases
where the Rules of Court are applied only in a suppletory manner and only to
effectuate the objectives of the Labor Code, and not to defeat them.
PRI can no longer assail the propriety of the final decision of the Office
of the President issued way back in May 1978. The finality of a decision is a
jurisdictional event that cannot be made to depend on the convenience of a
party. Once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the case whether
or not the decision is erroneous. (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. NLRC and
Evangelista, 306 SCRA 151, 21 April 1999)
A: Yes. Large-scale illegal recruitment has the following elements: (1) The
accused undertook recruitment activities or any prohibited practice under the
Labor Code. (2) He did not have the license or authority to lawfully engage in
the recruitment and placement of workers. (3) He committed the same to two
or more persons. The prosecution evidence proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the foregoing elements were present in this case. There is no question
that RC did not have a license to engage in he recruitment of workers, as she
herself admitted, and that the crime was committed against more than three
persons. The evidence on record belies her argument that she did not engage
in the recruitment and placement of workers. The testimonies of the recruits
unequivocally prove that RC promised the three jobs abroad provided they
would pay the placement fee. The fact that each of them paid the down
payment is evidence by the receipts issued and signed by RC. (People of the
Philippines v. Castillon, 306 SCRA 271, 21 April 1999)
A: No. The remand of the case to the Labor Arbiter for the reception of
evidence has no legal or actual basis. Subject to the requirements of due
process, proceedings before the Labor Arbiter are generally non-litigious,
because technical rules and procedures of ordinary courts of law do not
strictly apply. Thus, a formal or trial-type hearing is not always essential. In
the absence of any palpable error, arbitrariness or partiality, the method
adopted by the Labor Arbiter to decide a case must be respected by the
NLRC.
AA was not deprived of due process of law, the essence of which is simply the
opportunity to be heard. It must be stressed that all the parties to the case
were given equal opportunities to air their respective positions before the
Labor Arbiter. That AA failed to fully air his position by his own inaction or
negligence does not constitute deprivation of due process. (Caete and
Isabida v. National Labor Relations Commission, 306 SCRA 324, 21 April 1999)
Q: AL was a seaman on board the vessel M/V Cast Muskoz. His lifeless body
was found hanging by the neck from the ceiling of an old abandoned
reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the
duties which he has been engaged to discharge. It is the employers
prerogative, based on its assessment and perception of the employees
qualification, aptitude and competence, to move him around in the various
areas of its business operations in order to ascertain where the employee will
function with utmost efficiency and maximum productivity or benefit to the
company.
Deliberate disregard of company rules or defiance of management
prerogative cannot be countenanced. Until and unless the rules or orders are
declared to be illegal or improper by competent authority, the employees
ignore or disobey them at their peril. In the case at bat, the employee was
repeatedly reminded not only by management but also by his union to report
to work station but to no avail. (Westin Philippine Plaza Hotel v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 306 SCRA 631, 3 May 1999)
A: Yes. The essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in largescale can be summarized as follows: (1) the accused engages in acts of
recruitment and placement of workers as defined in the Labor Code; (2) the
accused does not have a license or authority from the Secretary of Labor to
recruit and deploy workers; and (3) the accused commits the same unlawful
acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group.
The theory of the defense unduly strains the credulity of the Court.
The complainants positively identified Enriquez as the one who dealt directly
with them from the time they inquired about the job prospects abroad until
they complied with the requirements and followed up their applications.
Worth reiterating is the rule that illegal recruitment in large-scale is malum
prohibitum, not malum in se, and that the fact alone that a person violated
the law warrants her conviction. Any claim of lack of criminal intent is
unavailing. (People of the Philippines v. Enriquez, 306 SCRA 739, 5 May 1999)
Q: Coca Cola entered into a contract of janitorial services with BJS. Coca Cola
then hired X first, as a casual employee; after the casual employment was
terminated, Coca Cola again hired X as a painter in contractual projects. He
was also hired by BJS, which assigned him to the Coca Cola considering his
familiarity with its premises. Goaded by information that Coca Cola employed
previous BJS employees who filed a complaint against the company for
regularization pursuant to a compromise agreement, X submitted a similar
complaint against Coca Cola to the Labor Arbiter; he included BJS therein as a
co-respondent. He no longer reported to work and when offered by BJS to
work in other firms, he refused. He amended the complaint to illegal
dismissal and underpayment of wages. Is there an employee-employer
relationship in this case?
A: No. The Court takes judicial notice of the practice adopted in several
government and private institutions and industries of hiring janitorial services
on an independent contractor basis. Although janitorial services may be
considered directly related to the principal business of an employer, the Court
deemed them unnecessary in the conduct of the principal business. This
judicial notice rests on the assumption that the independent contractor is a
legitimate job contractor so that there can be no doubt as to the existence of
an employer-employee relationship between the contractor and the worker. It
is also clear that BJS exercises control over the work of X as most of his
assigned task dealt with the maintenance and sanitation of the company
premises pursuant to BJSs contract with the company.
The Court ruled that no employer-employee relation exists between X
and Coca Cola yet the latter shall be jointly and severally liable with BJS for
the wage differentials and 13th Month pay of X. (Coca Cola Bottlers
Philippines v. NLRC, 307 SCRA 131, 17 May 1999)
Q: Admiral Hotel hired Balani as a Cost Controller. She received a memo from
the Managing Director calling her attention to several violation of hotel rules
she had violated such as using the phone for personal calls and entertaining
visitors during office hours, to the detriment of her regular work. The
employee denied the charges leveled against her and she submitted a letter
of resignation. Consequently, she received all salaries, benefits and
separation pay, and executed a quitclaim in favor of the hotel. Did the
employee voluntarily resign?
A: Yes, this is a case if voluntary resignation. The employee claims that she
was constructively dismissed from her office as its location was transferred
from under the steps of the stairs to the kitchen. Such transfer caused her
mental torture, which forced her to resign. However, it was not shown that
her transfer was prompted by ill will of management. Indeed, the resident
manager of the hotel swore that the transfer affected not only the Cost
Control office but also the other offices. The transfer only involved a change
in location of the office. It does not involve a change in the employees
position. Even a transfer in position is valid when based on sound judgment,
unattended by demotion in rank or diminution of pay or bad faith. (Admiral
Realty Company (Admiral Hotel) v. NLRC, 307 SCRA 162, 18 May 1999)
Q: While the oiler was anchored on port, seaman H was directed to open and
clean the main engine. To accomplish this, he had to enter a manhole in a
crouching position. After working for 4 consecutive days, he experienced back
pains and foot swelling. However, he was instructed to continue with his work
until he was finally repatriated to the Philippines where medical examinations
confirmed that he suffered from a slipped disc, which required surgery. Upon
hearing that the surgery would cost more than P 40,000, the company
disregarded the recommendation for surgery and instead proposed a less
costly treatment. But this did not improve the condition of H. After seven
months, H filed a complaint with the POEA against the maritime agencies for
disability and medical benefits. The employers allege that H signed a Receipt
and Release in favor of the maritime agencies while the case was pending in
POEA, that affirmed the findings of the POEA that his illness was workconnected. H supposedly acknowledged receipt of a certain amount in
complete and final settlement of all his wages, benefits and claims. The
maritime agencies assert that the signed Receipt is a quitclaim that releases
them from any liability whatsoever. Is the agreement valid?
A: No, the law does not consider as valid any agreement to receive less
compensation than what a worker is entitled to recover nor prevent him from
demanding benefits to which he is entitled. It is appalling that H would settle
for a measly consideration of P15, 000 which is grossly inadequate, that is
could not have given rise to a valid waiver on the part of the disadvantaged
employee.
In order that a quitclaim may be valid, the requisites are: (1) there
was no fraud or deceit on the part of any party; (2) the consideration of the
quitclaim is credible and reasonable; and (3) that the contract is not contrary
to law, public order, public policy, morals or good custom. But even assuming
that the ailment of H was contracted prior to his employment with the
maritime agency, this fact would not exculpate petitioners from liability.
Compensability of an ailment does not depend on whether the injury or
disease was pre-existing at the time of the employment but rather if the
disease or injury is work-related or aggravated his condition. It is safe to
presume, at the very least, the arduous nature of Hs employment had
contributed to the aggravation of his injury, if indeed it was pre-existing at
the time of his employment. Therefore, it is but just that he be duly
compensated for it. (More Maritime Agencies and Alpha Insurance v. NLRC,
307 SCRA 189, 18 May 1999)
Q: The General Manger of the Toll way received reports that certain security
personnel are involved in mulcting activities. Acting on the complaint, the
manager along with police officers staged an entrapment. Angeles, security
guard on duty in one of the exits was caught in flagrante delicto receiving
bribe money from an undercover passenger pretending to illegally transport
dogs. A notice of dismissal on the ground of serious misconduct was issued.
After formal investigations, dismissal was advised and Angeles was informed
of his dismissal. Angeles claimed that the entrapment was masterminded by
the manager as a retaliation for his being critical of the managers
administration. He now claims separation pay. Is he entitled to separation
pay?
subordinates hand and shoulder, caressing her nape and telling other people
that S was the one who hugged and kissed or that she responded to the
sexual advances are unauthorized acts that damaged her honor. It referred
to the manual of the Philippine Daily Inquirer in defining sexual harassment,
which defined sexual harassment as unwelcome or uninvited sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors and other verbal or physical conduct of
sexual nature with any of the following elements...(including) such conduct as
unreasonably interferes with the individuals performance at work, or creates
an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment. C was charged
with 30 days suspension without pay. C filed a complaint for illegal
suspension. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the petition which ruling was
affirmed by the NLRC. The C assailed the failure to apply RA 7877 in
determining whether or not he actually committed sexual harassment. Was C
correctly charged with sexual harassment justifying his suspension?
A: Yes. RA 7877 was not yet in effect at the time of the occurrence of the act
complained of. IT was still being deliberated upon in Congress. As a rule,
laws shall have no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided. Hence, the
Labor Arbiter had to rely on the MEC report and the common connotation of
sexual harassment as it is generally understood by the public. Also, as a
managerial employee, is bound by more exacting work ethics. When such
moral perversity is perpetrated against a subordinate, there is a justifiable
ground for dismissal based on loss of trust and confidence. (Libres v. NLRC,
307 SCRA 674, May 28, 1999)
A: NO. While Quimba and Lagrana were partially responsible for the
unfortunate incident, their negligence is not gross or habitual, and as such
does not merit outright dismissal. Thus, they would be entitled to
reinstatement, but the employees have accepted the NLRCs judgement for
separation pay instead due to the animosity between the parties. (National
Sugar Refineries Corp. v. NLRC, 308 SCRA 599, June 1999)
Q: R worked as the driver of T, the owner of Ultra Villa Food Haus. During the
May 1992 elections, he acted as a poll watcher for Lakas-NUCD and did not
report for work for two days. For the past years, the T gave R 13th mo. Pay.
He alleged that he was an employee of Ultra Villa Food Haus, and as such, he
was entitled to the benefits accorded to employees under the Labor Code.
What is R entitled to?
A: Yes, they should be allowed. The said employees fall under the category of
supervisory employees. Nothing in the company policies alters the nature
and duty of these supervisory employees to managerial. There is no showing
that the power to discipline erring employees is vested in their immediate
supervisors. As such, they fall outside of the restriction on managerial
employees from joining unions and participating in certification elections.
(Semirara Coal Corporation v. Secretary of Labor, 309 SCRA 292, June 1999)
the law between the parties. Complainants allege that the contracts served
to preclude the application of Article 280 and to bar them from becoming
regular employees. Company F submits that complainants were hired as
special workers under Art. 80 of the Labor Code and they never solicited the
services of petitioners. Were complainants regular employees?
A: Yes. The enactment of RA 7277, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons,
justify the application of Art. 280 of the Labor Code. Such law mandates that
a qualified disabled employee should be given the same terms and conditions
of employment as a qualified able bodies person. The fact that complainants
were qualified disabled persons removes the employment contracts from the
ambit of Art. 280, since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified
able-bodied persons. The task of complainants was necessary and desirable
in the usual trade of the employer and therefore they should be deemed
regular employees. (Bernardo v. NLRC, 310 SCRA 186, July 12, 1999)
Q: A labor dispute arose between Company Y and Union A, which caused the
union to file a notice of stricke with the NCMB charging the company with ULP
for union-busting and violations of the CBA. This was followed by picketing
and the holding of assemblies by the union outside the gate of Company Ps
plant. The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and
certified it for compulsory arbitration. During the pendency of the labor
dispute, Company Y agreed to sell its plant and equipment to Company Z.
The union was informed of the purchase of the plant. Company Z asked the
union to desist from picketing outside its plant. The Union refused petitioners
request, and Company Z filed a compalint for injunction. The Union moved to
dismiss the complaint alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court
and that Company Z was an alter ego of Company Y and not merely an
innocent by-stander.
A: No. The bare assertion of petitioner that the persons who signed the
summons which were sent by registered mail were impostors or persons
unknown to them requires substantiation by competent evidence. In quasijudicial proceedings of the NLRC, procedural rules governing service of
summons are not strictly construed and substantial compliance is therefore
sufficient. Further, official duty is presumed to have been performed regularly
unless the contrary is proven. In administrative proceedings, due process
simple means the opportunity to explain ones side or seek a reconsideration
of the action complained of. Petitioners were able to file an appeal before the
NLRC of the Labor Arbiters decision and a party who has availed of the
opportunity to present his position cannot claim to have been denied due
process.
The Court also ruled that M was constructively dismissed when he was
accused of tampering with the vale sheet and prevented from going to work.
The assertion of petitioner that M abandoned his work is also without merit as
it is highly illogical for an employee to abandon his employment and
thereafter file a complaint for illegal dismissal. Even assuming that there was
abandonment, there was non-compliance with the statutory requirement of
notice; therefore M is entitled to separation pay and backwages. (Masagana
Concrete Products v. NLRC, 313 SCRA 576, 3 September 1999)
illegal dismissal with the NLRC. After the company knew of the illegal
dismissal charge against it, a memorandum was issued ordering the
suspension of L. The company asserted that L remains an employee and was
merely suspended for a month. Proof of this, the company presented the
payrolls where the name of L continued to be listed as a regular employee
during the period after the alleged illegal dismissal. The company claimed
that L abandoned his work when he failed to report for work after notice of
return. Was L illegally dismissed?
A: The Court ruled that the payroll is of doubtful probative value, as it does
not contain the signature of employees as proof that they received their
salaries for the said period. For a valid finding of abandonment, two factors
must be present: (1) failure to report for work without any valid or justifiable
reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship
manifested by some overt acts. It was the company who refused him entry
into the work place and made it impossible for him to return to work.
Moreover, the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal 7 days after the
alleged dismissal negates said charge.
Although fighting within company premises may be considered as a
serious misconduct under Article 282 of the Labor Code, not all fights within
company premises would warrant dismissal. This is especially true if the
employee did not instigate the fight and it appears from the facts of the case
that L was just defending himself from the assault of a co-employee.
The company was ordered to reinstate L and pay backwages
computed from the date of illegal dismissal. (Garcia v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 313 SCRA 597, 3 September 1999)
Q: In a case of illegal dismissal against the petitioner, the Labor Arbiter ruled
that the dismissal of P was illegal and awarded damages, separation pay and
backwages. The company filed a Motion for Appeal and a Motion to Reduce
Appeal Bond before the NLRC reiterating that P voluntarily resigned and was
not illegally dismissed. Petitioners argued that considering the authorized
capital stock of the corporation was only P2, 000,000.00, an award of P1,
870,000.00 as backwages alone was excessive and initially posted only a
P50,000.00 cash bond. The NLRC denied the Motion to Reduce the Appeal
Bond. The NLRC gave the company three extensions (totaling 30 days) for
them to comply with the appeal bond requirement. A certain R, wife of the
companys chairman, posted the required bond. Yet when R learned that she
was not under any obligation to post the bond on behalf of her husband, she
withdrew the bond. Should petitioners still be made to post another bond?
A: The Court rules that the burden of proof that business losses actually
occurred rests on the employers. Since no statements of assets and liabilities
certified by a CPA or accounting firm was offered, nor the corporations
Income Tax Return certified by the BIR was shown, such business losses were
not proven. As regards the liability of the manager, generally, the officers
and members of a corporation are not personally liable for the acts done in
the performance of their duties. An exception is when the employer
corporation is no longer existing and is unable to satisfy the judgment in
favor of the employees. In such a case, the officers should be held liable for
acting on behalf of the corporation. (Restaurante Las Conchas and/or David
Gonzales vs. Llego, 314 SCRA 24, Sept. 9, 1999)
Arbiter. Respondents were given by the Labor Arbiter 10 days to answer the
charges against. Respondents submitted a bill of particulars instead alleging
that X was lacking in the required narration of facts constituting the causes of
action. X, on the other hand, moved to declare respondents in default for
failing to submit their position papers. Both parties agreed that the Labor
Arbiter should decide on the motion on the Bill of Particulars. The Labor
Arbiter, however, declared the respondents in default for failure to submit
their position papers within the period given. Were the respondents denied
due process?
A: Yes. The court rules that there was denial of due process since no notice or
order requiring respondents to file their position paper, nor an order
informing the parties that the case was already submitted for decision. There
was an utter absence of opportunity to be heard at the arbitration level. What
the Labor Arbiter should have done was to rule on the pending motions, or at
least notify private respondents that he would no longer resolve their
motions, and to direct them forthwith to submit within a reasonable time their
position paper as well as all the evidence. (Habana vs. NLRC, 314 SCRA 187,
September 1999)
Q: Petitioner X was an Italian citizen who was the Exec. Vice President and
Gen. Manager of Company Y when he was terminated by the latter. X then
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Company Y based the dismissal of X on
the ground that X failed to secure his employment permit. X, on the other
hand, argued that it was the duty of the company to secure his work permit
during the term of his office. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of
X. Company Y however appealed such decision to the NLRC. X now questions
the jurisdiction of NLRC as he is a corporate officer, it is the SEC who should
have jurisdiction. Did the NLRC have jurisdiction over the case?
A: No. According to Sec 5(c) of P.D. No. 902-A, the SEC exercises exclusive
jurisdiction over controversies over regarding the election and/or designation
of directors, trustees, officers, or managers of a corporation, partnership or
association. Jurisdiction therefore is not which the Labor Arbiter nor the NLRC.
(De Rossi vs. NLRC, 314 SCRA 245, September 1999)
A: Yes. The Court rules that although the employer has managerial
prerogative to transfer personnel, such must be exercised without grave
abuse of discretion. The employer has the burden of proof to show that such
transfer was not unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee,
nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries,
privileges and other benefits. The company in this case, alleges that the
reason for the transfer was loss of trust and confidence. X however, was
never given the chance to refute such reason, nor was she notified in
advance of the transfer. (Blue Dairy Corporation vs. NLRC, 314 SCRA 401,
September 1999)
A. Yes, her preventive suspension was without valid cause since she was
suspended outright. Preventive suspension beyond the maximum period
amounts to constructive dismissal. Likewise, her claim for damages did not
amount to abandonment of work. To constitute abandonment, these should
concur: 1. Failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable
cause; and 2. A clear intention to sever the employee-employer relationship
(more determinative factor manifested by over acts). She merely took steps
to protest her indefinite suspension. Her failure to report for work was even
due to her indefinite suspension. (Premiere Devt Bank v. NLRC)
1998 CASES
Q. In an illegal dismissal case, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the worker.
The total monetary award was more than ONE MILLION Pesos. The employer
appealed and posted a bond in the amount of P700,000.00 only. In
computing the monetary amount for the purpose of posting an appeal bond,
the employer excluded the award for damages, litigation expenses and
attorneys fees. Is the employers computation correct?
A. Yes, the computation of the monetary award is correct. Under the NLRC
New Rules of Procedure, an appeal is deemed perfected upon the posting of
the bond equivalent to the monetary award exclusive of moral and
exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees. The said implementing rule
is a contemporaneous construction of Article 223 of the Labor Code by the
NLRC pursuant to the mandate. The exclusion of moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees from the computation of the monetary award
has been recognized by the Supreme Court in a number of cases.
(Fernandez v. NLRC, 285 SCRA 149, January 28, 1998)
A. No, the ruling is erroneous. Under Article 286 of the labor Code, the bona
fide suspension of the operation of a business or undertaking for a period not
exceeding six months shall not terminate employment. Consequently, when
the suspension exceeds six months, the employment of the employee shall
be deemed terminated. By the same token and applying said rule by
analogy, if the employee was forced to remain without work or assignment
A. No, the dismissal of the appeal is erroneous. The NLRCs ruling is based
on the general rule that after a decision has become final, the prevailing
party becomes entitled as a matter of right to its execution, that it becomes
merely the ministerial duty of the court to issue the execution. This general
rule cannot be applied, however, whhere the writ of execution is assailed as
having varied the decision. In this case, the employer alleged that the writ
of execution materially altered the decision. If this allegation is correct, the
appellant is entitled to the remedy of appeal. The NLRC is vested with
authority to look into the correctness of the execution of the decision and to
consider supervening events that may affect such execution. (SGS Far East
Ltd. V. NLRC, 286 SCRA 335, February 12, 1998)
A. Yes, the ruling is correct. To have the bond reduced is not a matter of
right on the part of the appellant but lies within the sound discretion of the
NLRC upon showing of meritorious grounds. After the NLRC had exercised its
discretion in fixing the bond, the appellant should have complied with it. To
file a subsequent motion seeking another reconsideration of the already
reduced amount of the bond is to request for an extension of time to perfect
an appeal which is prohibited. (MERS Shoes Manufacturing, Inc. v. NLRC, 286
SCRA 647, February 27, 1998)
Q. Juana is a worker in Del Monte Phil., Inc.. The company rules provide for an
Absence Without Permission (AWOP) Policy. If the worker intends to be
absent from work, he should first file an application for leave and wait for its
approval before going on leave. The first offense is punishable by oral
reprimand; 2nd offense written reprimand; 3rd offense 1-7 days
suspension; 4th offense 8-15 days suspension; 5th offense 16-30 days
suspension; and 6th offense dismissal. From 1992-1994, Juana incurred 57
AWOP. Without initially penalizing Juana for her past AWOP, the company
dismissed her from service in 1994.
(a) Is the dismissal valid?
(b) Can Juana be considered to have abandoned her job due to her
intermittent absences without permission?
A. (a) No, the dismissal is not valid. The rule is that an employers power to
discipline its workers may not be exercised in an arbitrary manner as to erode
the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. In this case, the company
rules provide for a graduation of penalties for violation of the AWOP policy.
Even granting that Juana incurred previous AWOPs as far back as 1992, the
company should have initially penallized her with reprimand or suspension for
her previous AWOPs instead of dismissing her outright from service.
(b) No, Juana did not abandon her job. Abandonment, as a just and valid
ground for termination, means the deliberate, unjustified refusal of an
employee to resume his employment. The burden of proof is on the
employer to show a clear and deliberate intent on the part of the employee to
discontinue employment. The intent cannot be lightly inferred from certain
equivocal acts. For abandonment to be a valid ground for dismissal, two
elements must be proved: the intention of an employee to abandon, coupled
with an overt act from which it may be inferred that the employee has no
more intent to resume his/her work. In this case, these elements are not
present. (Del Monte Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, 287 SCRA 71, March 5, 1998)
A. No, the action is not barred. The four year period should not be reckoned
from the time of the accident on May 20, 1983 because Ernesto was not yet
considered terminated at that time. He was merely grounded and advised
to wait. Ernestos cause of action accrued only in December 1986 when
baliwag Transit formally dismissed him from the service. Hence, the action
filed on November 1990 had not yet prescribed. (Mendoza v. NLRC, 287 SCRA
51, March 5, 1998)
A. Yes, the dismissal is valid. The illicit relationship between Jose and Arlene
can be considered immoral as to constitute just cause to terminate the
couple. To constitute immorality, the circumstances of each particular case
must be considered and evaluated in light of the prevailing norms of conduct
and applicable laws. In the present case, the gravity of the charges against
the couple stem from their being married and at the same time teachers.
Teachers must adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency. A
teacher, both in his/her official and personal conduct, must display exemplary
behavior. He/she must freely and willingly accept restrictions on his/her
conduct that might be viewed irksome by ordinary citizens. Teachers must
abide by a standard of personal conduct which not only proscribes the
commission of immoral acts, but also prohibits behavior creating a suspicion
of immorality because of the harmful impression it might have on students.
(Santos v. NLRC, 287 SCRA 117, March 6, 1998)
Q. Philippine Airlines terminated the services of two flight stewards for their
alleged involvement in currency smuggling in Hong Kong. Instead of filing an
illegal dismissal case with the Labor Arbiter, the workers filed with the NLRC
(Commission) a petition for injunction. The NLRC issued a temporary
mandatory injunction enjoining PAL to cease an desist from enforcing its
memorandum of dismissal. The NLRC further ruled that the filing of an
illegal dismissal case with the Labor Arbiter was not an adequate remedy for
the workers. Is the NLRCs ruling correct?
A. No, the NLRCs ruling is erroneous. The power of the NLRC to issue an
injunctive writ originates from any labor dispute, i.e. a case between the
contending parties before the labor arbiter. In the present case, there is no
labor dispute yet between the workers and PAL since there has yet been no
illegal dismissal complaint filed with the labor arbiter. The petition for
injunction directly filed before the NLRC is in reality an action for illegal
dismissal. The petition should have been filed with the labor arbiter who has
the original and exclusive jurisdiction over termination disputes. The Labor
Code does not provide blanket authority to the NLRC or any of its divisions to
issue writs of injunction, considering that the New Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC makes injunction only an ancillary remedy in ordinary labor disputes.
(PAL v. NLRC, 287 SCRA672, March 20, 1998)