th

May 27 2014

Thomson Reuters Washington Office

1333 H Street NW
Washington DC 20005

The ISIS War- Where Are We?

Moderator: Milena Rodban: Independent geopolitical risk consultant
Panelists:
Douglas Ollivant: White House National Security Council, Iraq Director, 2008-9, Senior Fellow New
America
Rasha Elass: Global Fellow PS21. Former reporter for Reuters, NPR and others for Damascus
Ahmed Ali: Visiting Senior Fellow and Director of the Iraq Security and Humanitarian Monitor at the
Education for Peace in Iraq Centre (EPIC)

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Milena Rodban: Welcome to this event with the Project for the Study of the 21 Century. My name is Milena
Rodban and Im an independent geopolitical risk consultant. I work with private businesses operating in complex
security and business environments and help them navigate those environments for successful business
operations. Im joined today by a wonderful panel. Theyll introduce themselves and then well get started.

Rasha Elass: My name is Rasha Elass and I covered the war in Syria for Reuters for a couple of years and Im now
repatriating to Washington, D.C., but Ive spent the past ten years in the Middle East, covering it in different
capacities.

Ahmed Ali: Good evening everybody. My name is Ahmed Ali. Im a Senior Fellow at the Education for Peace in
Iraq Center and I dont do Syria. I only do Iraq.

Douglas Ollivant: Good evening. Im Doug Ollivant. Im a managing partner at Mantid International. We do work
for both corporate and commercial and sovereign clients in southern Iraq, Baghdad to Basra. I am also a Senior

Fellow in the Future of War Project at New America. I spent a long in the military and government. My last job in
government was Director for Iraq at the National Security Council.

Milena Rodban: Wonderful. We are all on Twitter tonight with our names as our hashtags except for Ahmed Ali.
Were going to do PS21MidEast as our hashtag. So if youd like to submit questions via Twitter, well watch that for
you. There will be time for question at the end.
First, Id like to pose a question to all of you. How many of you think ISIS is winning in its war? Raise your hands.
Not very many. Thats a good place to get started. Is ISIS winning? Lets have Doug start us off.

Douglas Ollivant: No, ISIS is not winning. ISIS is losing, and in fact, its losing decisively in Iraq. Syria is an entirely
different ball of wax. Its increasing number of affiliates are troubling, but its on a path to losing in Iraq. When it
loses large portions of Iraq, it will be very difficult to keep its narrative up.

Milena Rodban: What sort of timeline are we looking at?

Douglas Ollivant: One to two years in Iraq. Gosh knows how long for Syria.

Ahmed Ali: Its a good question and Im delighted to be with you all here today. When I look at ISIS, particularly in
Iraq, you cannot look at what has happened in Ramadi and see the defining episode in the war against ISIS. This is
a long-term battle. It started officially in 2012 against ISIS. Thats when ISIS was making a comeback in Iraq. As a
result, they only picked up in 2014. Thats when the ground battle started. If you look at that period of time,
clearly, June 2014 to August 2014 was a terrible period for Iraq because ISIS was able to make a lot of advances
and take control of many cities. Since then, you have noticed a change in the dynamic in the war against ISIS,
which has led to ISIS being on the defense. It had all the momentum it needed back then throughout the country.
Now, it only has momentum in western Iraq. In northern Iraq, we see the Kurdish Peshmerga have done a good
job containing ISIS. ISIS was kicked out decisively from Salah ad-Din province, not only from Tikrit, which is the
capital of Salah ad-Din, but almost the whole province. It was not an easy operation. It required a lot of effort and
coordination between different forces. Even you look at a place called Diyala, in north eastern Iraq, ISIS was also
cleared from there. It is a mixed picture in Iraq.
The only place where ISIS has shifted its resources, and I wrote about this in the New York Times last Friday, and
what I say is that what ISIS did in Ramadi and the effort that it decided to shift to Ramadi and to Anbar was the
result of a recognition that it was on the defensive and it was losing in other parts of the country. For ISIS as an
organization, it cannot be seen as a losing organization. It has to be seen as an organization thats on the march.
At the moment, it is not on the march. Despite the fall of Ramadi, its still contained and you have to look at the
decisive factors that have led to this outcome. Those include the forces fighting ISIS, because there are actually
capable forces fighting ISIS on the ground, if you look at the numbers, were talking about 200,000 anti-ISIS
members and many of them have shown a great will to fight despite what our Secretary of Defense has said.
Thats successful effort. But, we do have to understand that this is a long-term battle and it will keep changing
back and forth. Im more confident about what will happen to ISIS in Iraq in terms of being rolled back, than I am
of Syria.

Rasha Elass: Its very unfortunate. ISIS in Syria is not losing. Its winning. Its controlling maybe over 50 percent of
the country, but I think its really dangerous to underestimate ISIS even when it appears like it being rolled back or
it loses a city here, because it thrives on that. I remember a time in Syria before ISIS was a topic of discussion and
this was not very long ago actually. Many in Syria, including the rebels, no one took ISIS seriously. Everyone said,
ISIS cant take hold in a place like Syria. Theres no bread for them. This is an Arabic saying which means that
they cant really thrive in Syria because they rely so much on foreign jihadists. They rely on an ideology that may
not sit well with many Syrians. But, as weve seen, they do very well in a place like Syria, even with a lot of local
suspicion, even with rebels fighting them and, more recently, even the Assad regime fighting them. We can look
outside of Syria, and Im not going to touch Iraq, but, for example, Libya. ISIS has a small presence there, but its
growing slowly and also being underestimated by Europe, for example, is suffering from the human trafficking of
people across the Mediterranean which, by the way, ISIS keeps saying, Were planting sleeper cells among these
migrants.

Milena Rodban: To that point, I believe there was a report recently that one of the Tunisian museum bombers had
come over on a boat and was in Sicily, I believe. Do you buy into that? Do you think that those sleeper agents are
moving into Europe?

Rasha Elass: ISIS claims that they put hundreds of sleeper agents on these boats. It might be difficult to believe
they put hundreds, but realistically, all they need is a dozen or two dozen to wreak havoc in Europe. Im a
newcomer to Washington, but Im finding, among the intelligence community and Washington insiders, a lot of
people dont seem to take ISIS as an immediate threat. A lot of people say, Al-Qaeda is a greater immediate
threat. ISIS maybe in two years, but right now its really al-Qaeda that we really need to worry about. Im not so
sure. Ive heard it before and Ive seen how ISIS takes advantage of this.
Milena Rodban: If we say that ISIS is losing in Iraq and winning in Syria, what do you all see as the strategy going
forward for the U.S. and Europe in rolling back ISISs progress in Syria and maintaining the momentum that its
gained in Iraq?

Douglas Ollivant: Its very clear we have an Iraq-first strategy. We have an Iraq-first strategy for two reasons. In a
positive sense, as my friend was pointing out, there are a lot of partner forces in Iraq that we can rely on to do the
heavy lifting. There are the official Iraqi security forces, the army and police. There are the Shia militias, theres
the Peshmerga, and there are some Sunni tribesmen. There are all kinds of people in Iraq that we can work with
who are extremely motivated to help us fight against ISIS, ISIL, daesh, Islamic State, whichever you prefer. So
thats the positive reason were doing Iraq-first. The negative reason were doing Iraq-first is exactly the flip side of
that. In Syria, we have somewhere in the neighborhood of nobody who is willing to be a partner for us to help us
fight against ISIL and even to the extent we try to generate forces to help us fight ISIL, it turns out they are far
more interested in fighting against the regime than they are about fighting ISIL. Part of our problem with putting
together this entire coalition is, with the notable exception of the U.S. and Baghdad, everyone who is in the
coalition is interested in fighting ISIS, but its no best than their number two priority.

Milena Rodban: How do we change that or what do we expect to happen to change that?

Douglas Ollivant: Nothing is going to happen to change that. Nothing is going to make the Turks, for example,
care more about ISIL than they do about the Assad regime and their own internal Kurdish problem. The best is
looking at the two major protagonists in the region: the Saudis and the Iranians. Do the Saudis hate ISIL? Yes they
do. Do the Iranians hate ISIL? Yes they do. Do the Saudis hate ISIL worse than they hate the Iranians? No. Do the
Iranians hate ISIL worse than they hate the Saudis? No. It is a second-tier problem for almost everyone else in the
region with the notable exception of us and the Iraqis themselves. Even likewise with the Assad regime. The
Assad regime does care about fighting ISIL, but it cares far more about fighting the Free Syrian Army and the Nusra,
which it sees, rightly, as a more immediate threats to its continued existence. Syria is just so hard and, of course,
this administration has put certain redlines in place on Syria that, politically, it cant just move off of. Part of the
Iraq-first strategy really is about the conditions are right in Iraq and theyre not right in Syria. A second piece of
this is we just have to punt this to the next administration because we cant deal with Syria.

Ahmed Ali: The U.S. is a crucial player in the fight against ISIS. We do have a sixty-member anti-ISIS coalition, but
the U.S. remains the most committed. Thats for sure. Its the most able to devote a lot of resources. Its the most
knowledgeable country about Iraq, to an extent. Its not complete, but we do have that institutional memory and
there is a legacy that we have in Iraq. It would be a big mistake for a lot of folks to underestimate ISIS. When I was
talking about the ISIS threat, back in April 2013, people thought I was crazy. I wouldnt underestimate at the
moment, but, at the same time, we shouldnt think of ISIS as ten feet tall and I think, for the administration, it has
to begin from that orientation. Its still a dangerous organization. Ideologically, its very serious. The way it was
explained to me by people fighting on the ground was that it does it by the letter. It implements its ideology by
the letter. So we have to understand this threat. The U.S. is capable of doing a great deal to defeat ISIS, in Iraq in
particular. One major line of effort is the airstrikes. When the U.S. has decided to deploy them effectively and
widely, it made a huge difference on the battlefield. If you look at Kobani, ISIS made it a priority. It became a
priority for the U.S. as well and the U.S. and the Syrian Kurds and the YPJ came out on top. Same thing with Tikrit
and other places. You have to look at the airstrikes and they have to be expanded. There has to be a clearly
expedited delivery of weapons to the Iraqis because, with the fall of Ramadi, one of the deficiencies that was
apparent was the Iraqi forces did not have anti-tank missiles which could have been very effective to deal with 2730 car bombs, armored car bombs, that ISIS sent. They demoralized the security forces. We have to focus on that
effort and we also have to think about the best way to deploy U.S. troops. I dont think it should be 5,000-10,000.
That would be a strategic error on our part, but we have to be open to modifying our strategy because, as Rasha
said, ISIS is an adaptive group and we need to be adaptive as well. We cant stick to the same strategy as the
situation unfolds.

Milena Rodban: So what strategy should the U.S. and Europe pursue with regards to Syria if they find themselves
with few partners willing to engage in the fight?

Rasha Elass: Its sort of like the ongoing war on terrorism, the ongoing war on drugs or poverty. You cant fight a
war like this using just one strategy. In this case, I think with ISIS in Syria anyway, youre right, there are no
trustworthy sustainably long-term partners to work with because a lot of them do switch alliances depending on
who their priority is. There is also, not to be forgotten, the fight for heart and mind. Winning hearts and minds in
Syria hasnt worked very well for America lately. Most Syrians wouldnt trust America. Many rebel factions think
that ISIS is some sort of conspiracy. They hear things like, the West is happy that ISIS is fighting here because it
attracts all their jihadists and they figure the jihadists will go to Syria and get killed and never go back to America or
Europe so thats a good way to get rid of them. By the way, I have heard this from people in the intelligence

community here in Washington who actually do count on that thinking these jihadists will probably get killed there
so we dont need to worry about them.
Bombing ISIS, while Im sure is important in rolling back some of their territory, cant possibly be the only solution
in Syria. There has to be a more comprehensive solution. ISIS thrives on chaos. It thrives on a power vacuum and,
as long as the country is deep in civil war, ISIS will continue to thrive. There are partners that, I think, Washington
can engage to curb the spread of ISIS inside Syria and those partners may be controversial, but Iran and Russia are
definite partners in this. They have to be engaged, just as much as Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Without a full
diplomatic engagement to resolve this in addition to, perhaps, some military prowess, ISIS will continue to run
amuck.

Douglas Ollivant: Let me follow up very quickly on one point because this is a positive thing that we can take a
little bit of solace in. ISIL thrives under a very specific set of conditions. It thrives in Sunni-Arab regions in which
state institutions are weak or nonexistent. When they run up against a place in which these conditions do not
hold, when they bump up against Sunni Arabs in the south of Iraq or they bump up against the Kurds in northwest
or bump against the Turks in the north or, again, the Kurds in Syria or they hit the functioning states like Jordan
and Saudi Arabia, they dont spread. The bad news is this describes a whole lot of the region and we see these
conditions in places like Egypt, where theyre popping up, and Libya, where theyre popping up, and in the
southern part of Tunisia. There are lots of places that fit these conditions where they can pop up, but there does
seem to be a limit to their spread.

Milena Rodban: That is, in fact, a good thing. Id like to divide the question. Theres the sense that ISIS is or isnt
winning militarily and there is a sort consensus among most people that theyre winning the PR war. Just in our
audience, how many people think ISIS is winning the PR war? Quite a few more than think are winning the military
war. Do you agree and why do you think that is? Is there a point at which their brutality starts to turn people
away from them and helps them sort of lose that war in the PR sense?
Ahmed Ali: I think the issue with ISIS being superior in the PR is that a lot of people fall in love with bad guys. Its
as simple as that. We tend to lionize their gains and minimize the gains of the anti-ISIS forces. As a result, you not
only have people who are ISIS adherents who are Tweeting and propagating the ISIS message on social media, but
you even have some non-ISIS supporters who do the same thing because it looks good. Thats why I think, in
particular, the social media war is very crucial to beat ISIS because ISIS has had a hashtag going for almost a year
now that is called The Great Battle of Baghdad and it gets shared. The way ISIS spreads its news, and Im sure its
the same in Syria as it is in Iraq, whenever there is an attack in an area, you see a whole number of accounts
tweeting the same thing and it gets propagated. It gets a lot of replay. Its an issue ISIS can do because it has the
capability and the other governments do not have the same agility which makes it a big challenge and thats why I
think, if we talk about the military campaign, there clearly has to be a counter-propaganda campaign by the antiISIS forces and Im not going to say its going to be 100% successful. Im less confident about it compared to the
military sense, but it has to be part of the thinking.

Milena Rodban: Do you think that the level of brutality, as it increases, is going to dissuade people or are they just
going to continue liking the bad guys?

Ahmed Ali: All these brutal videos and photos that ISIS broadcast tend to do one thing to different groups. It does
inspire supporters and it does intimidate opponents. I can tell you, when ISIS was getting close to Erbil in August

2014, I remember someone told me, My teenage daughter came to me and said, Dad, ISIS is getting close and
Ive seen what it does on YouTube and Twitter and Im very afraid. What should I do? Were talking about a
teenage person here. It does have that purpose and, in the Middle East in particular, people are not as squeamish
about violence as we are here in the U.S. Its not about the social media, its about on the ground. The brutality
will go against ISIS on the ground, but, at the moment, we see that ISIS does permit a brutal act. If somebody
objects to it, they will be more likely to come after them. The brutality has been as strong weapon in ISISs hands.

Rasha Elass: I have to say, I dont necessarily think they are winning the PR war. Now we have social media, but
brutality is not new to humankind. All the time, we have animal abusers and KKK and neo-Nazis in Europe that try
to increase their platform online and then theyre suppressed, but they dont have the money that comes to ISIS.
They dont have any petrodollars that gave birth to them basically. They dont have the weaponry, they dont have
the clout, the scariness. Theyre not necessarily winning the PR war. Theyve just gotten a lot of money and a lot
of visibility for now.

Douglas Ollivant: I think theyve also been very clever in the way theyve approached a lot of these accounts. The
more prominent ones are only about 30-40% pro-ISIS and 60% anti-Iranian. It would get a lot of pickup by the antiIranian lobby, analysts in Washington, in London, in Europe, in Israel, and they would kind of ignore the 30-40%
percent that glorified violence against all kinds of people and instead focused on the fact that this account was a
relatively good source of news highlighting Iranian misdeeds. Theyre very clever in finding ways to infiltrate
certain communities and embedding themselves in these larger contexts. Given how dominated the world has
been by P5+1 over the last year, being anti-Iranian has been a really interesting way to infiltrate some media
streams.

Rasha Elass: Theyre very tech savvy because they recruit a lot of nerds. A lot of the Twitter accounts are actually
echo accounts.
Douglas Ollivant: Their production values are extremely good. I was featured in the first issue of their Englishlanguage propaganda magazine. I give people at the think tanks and businesses I work at a hard time because I say
this is the best layout on me thats ever been done. Their production values are superior to anything thats done
here in Washington. Theyre very good. They have extremely high technical skill and in a technical sense its quite
admirable.

Milena Rodban: So now were relying on private companies like YouTube and Twitter to shut them down and
thats not really working very much is it? How do we share a different message? Show do we prevent the
radicalization that theyre achieving though these savvy campaigns if it has to be a two-pronged approach on the
battlefield and in the PR world?

Ahmed Ali: I do believe its difficult. Thats why I said Im less confident about this field, because its easy to use.
You can do it from your basement. You can do it from your pajamas.

Milena Rodban: There is nothing to stop them from creating their own social network.

Ahmed Ali: ISIS has done that because with the different crackdowns ISIS resorted to other means. At some point
they started using Russian servers and Russian websites, not English websites. Particularly for us in the U.S.,
because we have the capacity, and Twitter goes on suspension binges every once in a while where it shuts down
thousands of ISIS accounts, thats a good thing. As long as you keep them under pressure, those users who are
sympathetic to ISIS, you can do something. There are actually some interesting folks trying to manage the social
media presence against ISIS. There has to be systematic effort, but I dont anticipate it to be easy.

Douglas Ollivant: Its very difficult. There is no one profile of someone who joins ISIL. Its a very very broad
spectrum, but, in general, there are two large pools. In the West, its mostly teen angst. Kids who would otherwise
join the Goth movement or run off to California and join some wacko sex or drug-based cult. Theyre always going
to be looking for something, that demographic, so its hard to see them not finding a way to link themselves with a
movement like ISIL. Their other pool is one from a rational perspective is quite logical. Young men in the Arab
world who are not just unemployed, but unemployable. No possibly of ever joining society or having a family, will
never be able to accumulate money for a dowry so they can have wife and children. You come find someone who
has no future, no prospects at 15 or 16, and you hand them a gun and sense of belonging and a way to have access
to money and goods and sex. What sixteen year old is not going to sign up for that? Let the ideology come later.

Milena Rodban: But theyre not just looking for disillusioned people who are unemployed, right? They are looking
for people who can get into the U.S. and into Europe and have the savvy to blend in.

Douglas Ollivant: These are two pools. There are lots of others from which they also draw.

Ahmed Ali: I think for the foreign fighters, it is about being disillusioned. I think joining ISIS to find a purpose is
attractive to folks who have difficulty assimilating into the U.K. or France or other countries. Some have even tried
in the U.S., but the immigration and assimilation here is easier for Americans who are born here, but not
necessarily indigenous to the country. It is about that pool and I think you have to be realistic. There is an issue
with different Muslim communities around the world especially those in Europe and even here in the U.S. Thats
why I believe one way is for parents to play a big role. We know, particularly for Middle Eastern families or just
Muslim families in general, that family structure is much tighter and stricter, I can tell you from experience with my
parents. There has to be a better understanding by the parents and better education by the parents.

Rasha Elass: I dont think it stops there. I dont think the real question is how to stop them recruiting online or
how to stop them putting out their ideology online and all that, because thats unstoppable and I dont think its a
good idea even to attempt to push them underground and off of Twitter and off of Facebook. No, actually
encourage them to stay on Twitter and Facebook. Thats an old strategy, encourage them to come to the surface.
That way its easier to keep an eye on them. Its easier to keep an eye on whos following them and whos
interested in going there. The real challenge comes when the authorities, the communities, the countries involve
the family structure, get involved in stopping the flow of jihadist, and this is a global effort. Turkey, for one, could
be stricter about monitoring its borders and the flow of jihadist and weapons and money and whatnot. Europe can
be stricter about making sure jihadists dont travel and forget this idea of letting them go because they will just get
killed and we wont have to worry about them anymore. Tunisia, which has no become a major partner with

Washington, can do a lot more about exporting jihadists. Tunisia actually exports the largest number of foreign
jihadists to ISIS. They can do more in stopping that. Thats where the challenge lies.

Milena Rodban: What Im hearing from most of you is that its not just enough to tackle ISIS on the battlefield and
in a PR effort. Youre saying that there are underlying issues in each of these countries that have to be targeted in
some way to prevent these unemployed youths from feeling like they have no future and joining this radical
movement. Now, how do we go about doing that? Its much easier to deploy and force of American troops
somewhere than it is to help these countries fix decades of abuse and mismanagement and poor government
institutions.

Douglas Ollivant: First of all, deploying American troops would be a bad idea, but I take your point. The immediate
fight against ISIL is a necessary step, but thats probably the easiest to handle, particularly in Iraq. Yes, we need to
throw ISIL out of Iraq. We also need to make sure that there is a stable Iraq left behind that ca handle the
reconstruction and re-assimilation. We also need to ensure that that Iraq is oriented more towards the West, from
a U.S. perspective. Then we need to figure out something about the Syrian civil war. Then, in the much broader
sense, we need to figure out how to create legitimate paths for the Arab youth bulge to have both economic and
political participation. Now, if I knew how to solve these, Id get the Nobel Peace prize, but those are the things we
have to do. This is a regional crisis that is expressing itself in ISIL. ISIL burns people alive and they run slave
markets so they just need killing and Im ok with that, but that doesnt mean there arent root causes that we dont
need to be addressing simultaneously. These are decade-long projects were talking about to remove the root
causes that have created the milieu in which ISIL has been able to rise to the surface.

Milena Rodban: With regard to Iraq, which is your specialty, you anticipate Iraq staying one country?

Douglas Ollivant: Yes. The alternative is a civil war that would make Syrias look relatively calm. You can draw lines
on the map and do your own Biden plan, but then you notice that these lines go right through Baghdad. What
happens to the 1.5 million Sunni who live in Baghdad? Will that be peaceful? I suspect not. What happens to the
entire province of Diyala, which is a mixing bowl of Sunni and Shia and Kurds? What happens there? Its really
easy to say lets just split the country into three. The humanitarian cost of that would be very very high. Further,
lets look at the political cost. Much as Kurds like to talk of an independent Kurdistan, its not a viable entity. We
can talk about that later if you want, but the history of landlocked states is not a very pretty one. Sunnistan, as its
called, would become essentially, an Arab Waziristan, no resources, no access to the sea, no particular reason for
existence as a political entity. It would just sit there while Shiastan would get much much richer because they have
all the resources. They would lack the larger population that allows them to stand up Iranian influence and I think
they would become the Iranian proxy theyre falsely accused of being.

Ahmed Ali: Im not a betting man because I dont bet on something I dont control, but on this one, Im willing to
bet Iraq is going to remain united. I have no doubts in my mind and its not because Iraqis like to get along, its
because Iraqis need to get along and as much as you see discussion and a lot of heated debate and political
violence, there is still this understanding that the country is oil-dependent and the oil is mostly in southern Iraq, as
Doug pointed out. As a result, it will be difficult for the other parts to leave Iraq that easily. Plus, todays Middle
East is not the 1920s Middle East. The British and the French, with all due respect to them, theyre not there to
say, This is Iraq, this part is this and this part is that. This is a different Middle East and its not easy to combine

countries. ISIS is doing that at the moment, but that doesnt mean it has been able to be successful, clearly. What
does have to happen, however, to continue to give everybody an incentive to capitalize on their need is further
decentralization by the Iraq government. I think Syria is already actually going that way, unintentionally, with
Assad giving up on some parts. But, there has to be further decentralization. Thats the right thing to do.
Relations between Baghdad and Erbil will always be tense, but they have to improve as well. Especially as this fight
against ISIS goes on, the Iraqis have to keep realizing this is a common threat because, to be very blunt, up until
th
May 17 , when Ramadi fell, Iraqis stopped believing this was a common threat. They had moved on with the
understanding that this is our reality and we have to deal with it somehow, but with Ramadi falling, its a wakeup
call for all Iraqis. That has been, in some ways good, in other ways, not very positive.

Milena Rodban: What about Syria? Where do you see Syria going?

Rasha Elass: You know, there was a time, maybe a couple of years ago, when it was feasible to think that Syria
might divide into two, one rebel-controlled and then the regime-controlled going from Damascus to Homs and the
coastal provinces. Even regime insiders, people who were close to Assad conceded this and said, Well, in the end,
if thats what it comes down to, well never give up Damascus, Homs, and certainly never ever ever give up the
Syrian coastline, and if they want Aleppo and the rest of the country, they can have it. But now, I think its a lot
more complicated than that with ISIS. Decentralized is an understatement. For the country to split, it needs to
have at least two internally coherent, but separate, sections that can go their separate ways and split up, but thats
just no longer the case. There are many many many parts of Syria that are incoherent within their own territory so
if it splits it would look something like polka dots, certainly not to states or three states. In that regard its unified
in its decentralization, if that makes any sense.

Ahmed Ali: You just brought up the fact that ISIS has changed the equation for the Syrian government. The Syrian
government has chosen not to engage ISIS for a very long time. That seems to continue to be the case. Why is the
government calculating that way?

Rasha Elass: As with most things the Assad regime does, its not always easy to figure out what their thinking, but,
certainly, their priority was the rebels and they figured that, We could reign ISIS in and bring it under control. Its
not a real threat, at least not yet anyway. Lets just leverage the ISIS brutality which is often directed against
Syrian rebel groups. Lets leverage that. Lets have them kill the rebels and take over this territory and then well
take the territory from ISIS when the time comes. I think its a strategy that has already gone out of control for
them. I dont know the extent to which they realized that. Its always difficult to read, but its also important to
realize that, to a great extent, Iran runs the show now in government-controlled Syria so its no longer really
necessarily Assads call. Its Irans call.

Milena Rodban: We had a question come up earlier about the radicalization of Kurds. Doug has dismissed the
possibility of Kurdistan emerging independent. How do we see the Kurdish autonomous region being a major
player in this situation?

Ahmed Ali: I think Iraqi Kurdistan is a fact. It is a secure area. When I go there I stay out very late to the dismay of
many people, including my parents. ISIS still clearly wants to destabilize Iraqi Kurdistan and thats why you had the
th
attack near the U.S. consulate in Erbil on April 17 and then you have attack close to Iraqi Kurdistan, whether its
the Kirkuk front, which is also in northern Iraq, or the Mosul front. I do think that Baghdad and Erbil have a lot in
common that they can work on. Baghdad can take step to act as a big brother because it is a big brother and the
end of the day and Erbil can some initiative and some steps to allow for all parties to get along. At the end of the
day, what is bring Baghdad and Erbil together is the money. Of course, you do have to look at the regional picture
as well. Iraqi Kurdish is closer to Turkey and Turkey is very much invested in parts of Iraqi Kurdistan, particularly
Erbil and Dahuk, and the Iraqi government is also influential, so when it comes to calculations about the future of
Iraqi Kurdistan, these countries will have a role as well.

Douglas Ollivant: I dont disagree with anything my friend said. Iraqi Kurdistan is fact and its a stable place and so
long as it continues to exploit, and I say that in a positive way, its status quo. It has this wonderful neither in nor
out status that allows it to hug Ankara on some issues against Baghdad and hug Baghdad in some issues against
Ankara, and occasionally hug Tehran against both of the above, but never the full responsibility of being its own
government and having to deal with the consequences of allying with all these people. So, able to just be a
political party almost. Its in a very good place and I think as long as they continue to play smart politics and
remain within, at least formally, the confines of Iraq, theyre actually going to do extremely well. Im on record as
saying that the Kurds deserve better government than theyve been getting. Theyve had two families governing
them for twenty or thirty years. It might be time to experiment outside that gene poll. That aside, theyve done
very well.
Now, the events of that last couple of years have brought to the fore the various tensions within the various
Kurdish groups. Even a casual observer is starting to observe that there are KDP Kurds and there are PUK Kurds
and there are YPD Kurds. My favorite moments have been all these U.S. former Marines and Rangers going to fight
with the Syrian Kurds and figuring out after a week that these guys are communist and then leaving in disgust. I
could have told you that. There are PKK Kurds. Weve been hearing about Iranian Kurds the last couple weeks.
Kurds are not the unified bloc that sometimes their propaganda would have you believe. They have their own
interests, their own intermural squabbles. International borders matter and whats important to the Kurds in
Turkey is not necessarily as important to the Kurds in Iraq or the Kurds in Iran. But, nonetheless, theyve been
good allies. Theyre clearly interested in the fight against ISIL. Theres been, as weve said, some radicalization of
Kurds. There are probably tens, hundreds, maybe even hitting the very low four-figures of Kurds inside ISIL and
thats a problem that mostly the Kurds are going to have to deal with. That an issue for security in and around
Erbil and Sulaymaniyah and other places. But, for the most part, the Kurds have a pretty good thing going

on. My only concern is their move into disputed territories within Iraq and the possibility for long-term
conflict in the disputed territories, disputed between Iraqi Sunni Arabs and Iraqi Kurds, for the most
part. The occupation by force of these areas by the Kurds overriding any political process or political
concerns and accusations of ethnic cleansing in support of that, has sent up a dynamic that could be
very troubling.

Ahmed Ali: What I always keep in mind, in addition to those regional countries, the U.S. will also have a big say in
what happens in Iraqi Kurdistan. The U.S. is in a very good position actually, to influence relations between
Baghdad and Erbil it can do a lot.

Rasha Elass: its not as big a question for Syria as it is for Iraq, obviously. I think, as you know, the Syrian Kurds
dont necessarily get along with Iraqi Kurds or even Turkish Kurds and theyre very fragmented as you pointed out.
I think many Kurds, and at some point Syrian Kurds, wanted to play a role in a post-Assad Syria and be part of the
social fabric of a democratic Syria. As things stand, I think it just depends on which day of the week you ask. One
day its fighting ISIS and sometimes the Kurds appear to side with the regime. Sometimes they appear to side
against it. Theyre just another player in the countrys civil war at this point.

Milena Rodban: Well, I think we took a complex situation and made it even more complex. But, Id like to thank
the panel for all of their insights. I have a couple more question, but Ill open it up to the floor for now, and maybe
if there is a lull, Ill ask another one of mine.

Audience Question: Im a brigadier general from Iraq. We could not build a very strong foundation to fight ISIL in
all dimensions whether operationally, strategically or even in the immediate or messaging that gets said. We are
offering ISIL very negative messaging that they are getting benefit from. My question is: what are these messages
that we are sending to ISIL that they are getting advantage of?

Douglas Ollivant: I think there have been a series of message, particularly out of Washington that have been less
than helpful. Im a fan of the current Secretary of Defense. Im on the record saying he was a great choice for the
job. But you dont ever ever ever get up and say a major ally of yours has an army with no will to fight. Even if its
true, which I dont believe to be in this particular case. Ive defended this on the record before and would be
happy to talk about this again if we need to. Even were it true, which I think its not, its still not something you
get up and do. You dont let ISIL have a propaganda message that the Iraqi army cant fight. Thats not helpful. I
could go down a further list of examples, but I think that one kind of exemplifies the trend that were talking
about. I think there are many actors in the U.S. political system who do not think about the impact that their
message has in the region. Its contoured for a domestic audience, for a domestic political purpose, and probably
works very well for that, but we dont think about how it plays in the region, how it might harm our allies and
assist ISIS.

Ahmed Ali: Let me first recognize the general. He is the former Defense attach at the Iraqi embassy and one of
the fine Iraqi generals serving his country. Its a very good question. My concern with the messaging is that,
number one, as the U.S. government, we did not get it right. That has resulted in negatively impacting the morale
of Iraq security forces and we can avoid that. Its very simple. For those of you who are interested, at the State
Department, last week, an unnamed senior had a wonderful briefing about what happened in Ramadi and the
challenges ahead. It was not completely rosy. It was not completely pessimistic either. It was right in the middle.
I think thats what we can do. Its a mistake to call out another ally. You can always have private channels to send
your messages. You do have to find that middle ground and I think, at the moment, we do not have that middle
ground. My concern of course, given that this is Washington, is that you will have the politization of Iraq. The
more we get into the debate about what we should do in Iraq, and the elections, this is reminding me of 2006 in
Washington when it was a very political issue and, as a result, it was not conducive to carry out some good policies.
I think there is unity about what to do in Iraq in general and Iraq should not be used in U.S. politics.

Audience Question: Im a White House and foreign policy correspondent for Reuters. Welcome to our offices.
Going back to Obamas strategy, you mentioned some very interesting ideas of how the U.S. could do better in

terms of deployment of forces, something less than 10,000 troops obviously, weapons deliveries, and, I guess,
training comes into play and things of that sort. Weve heard our Defense Secretary express doubt about the Iraqi
forces will to fight. Whats Obamas will to fight, to get into this fight in a way that could sway it in some way?
Has he done enough? What more can he do?

Ahmed Ali: Im sure Doug will have a lot of thoughts on this because he has worked in the government as well and
he knows how it works from the inside, but what I do know was that it was not easy for President Obama to order
the deployment of 3,000 U.S. soldiers into Iraq. Lets keep in mind there are 3,000 U.S. soldiers in Iraq at the
moment and President Obama did not want to do that. Iraq is not his war. I do recognize that as an intellectual
and ideological sacrifice by the President to make this decision and I see it as a positive development and the
deployment of airstrikes is an important development as well. This issue is that no matter how much we do, it is
not enough because the U.S. is a superpower and throughout my trips, when I met with the Iraqis and Syrians and
other people in the Middle East, they think we are representatives of the U.S. government so they eat our heads
alive in critique of the U.S. government, because no matter what we do, it is not enough. We have to be realistic
about what can be done what cannot be done. Im not against deploying U.S. troops in general. I was a supporter
of the 2003 war and I still believe it was the right thing to do, but strategically, for this moment, it will not help us
to deploy 5,000 to 10,000 soldiers into Iraq. This high profile footprint will take a lot of political capital to get it
through both in Iraq and in the U.S. The U.S. government can use our political capital for other issues that can be
worked on. Deploying U.S. troops can be done with smaller numbers and in a more effective way.

Audience Member: Are you talking about forward positions and deploying to the front lines or providing advice or
spotting?

Ahmed Ali: Its a possibility. I generally do not believe that U.S. soldier should put their lives on the line to give
Iraq another chance. Period. But, if it is done safely, as much as possible, I think it could be helpful. But, as far as
U.S. combat troops on the battlefield, it will not work in the long-term and the Iraqis are capable of doing it and
they really have to do it.

Douglas Ollivant: The important thing to remember about additional U.S. troops in Iraq is, one, the U.S. has not
offered to send them and two, Iraq has not asked for them to come. The second thing is a much under-reported
fact for a very simple reason. There are very significant factions within the Iraqi polity who would see the return of
even, I believe, U.S. forward air controllers or Special Forces up front with the troops as the first step towards the
reoccupation of Iraq and would see this as combatants. These are people who are currently fighting against ISIS so
it would be hard to segregate them. You know where ISIS is, more or less, and you can try to keep yourselves away
from them. You cant keep yourselves away from the various Sadrists, not just Muqtada al-Sadr, but the larger
Sadrist tradition of groups who would, in a very nationalist way, just see this as an occupying army. On one level, I
kind of respect that. Id like to think that if someone sent soldiers to occupy my country, Id shoot them too. So, I
think thats much under-stated. The two of us seem to think this is really working in Iraq, and I feel the football
coach who is saying this after his team was just intercepted and they ran a touchdown off it, but nonetheless, the
strategy is working. The strategy is essentially train, equip, provide airstrikes, and provide intelligence. We may
need to look at improvements in all those areas.
Clearly there was lack of anti-tank missiles at Ramadi. Why was there a lack of anti-tank missiles at Ramadi?
Despite all their objections about how they dont have enough equipment, the Kurds had plenty up in the North.

They stopped all the car bombs that came at them because they had anti-tank missiles to shoot them. The Iraqi
soldiers in Ramadi did not. Why were they not there? Did the Americans not know that they didnt have them?
Was there a political decision not to supply them? Did the Iraqis say they didnt want them? I dont know what
the answer to any of these questions is. All I know is, there were no anti-tank missiles there where they needed
them and literally, ISIL provided us the pictures, of an armored bulldozer that very slowly and deliberately moved
all the concrete barriers out of the way so the car bombs could come through. There was nothing the Iraqi soldiers
could do to stop them. That why you hear these numbers from the Pentagon about how they were outnumbered
ten to one. Well, they didnt have the right weapons. They just had to watch as these car bombs came through
and ten to one became nine to one became eight to one became seven to one as the car bombs started blowing
up. It doesnt take very long when youre getting these Tim McVeigh-sized car bombs and we have pictures of
them. Theyre dump trucks full of ammonium nitrate, the same stuff Tim McVeigh used. We all know what that
did to the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City. They had several of these hit in rapid succession in Ramadi.
They didnt have the right weapons. That was a failure of the strategy. There wasnt the right equipment. Clearly
there want the right intelligence. Nor were the airstrikes on hand to make sure that these things didnt happen.
Its not that the strategy is wrong. Its that somehow the strategy was not properly executed in Ramadi. Everyone
involved, the U.S. military, the U.S. State Department, the coalition, all the various Iraqi agencies need to take a
hard look at why the strategy did not work in this particular case. The strategy wasnt wrong. The execution had
problem.

Audience Member: Youre talking about adjustments in tactics, not overall strategy.

Douglas Ollivant: Thats exactly right. Im talking about adjustments in the tactics and executions of the strategy,
not the strategy itself.

Ahmed Ali: A lot of folks want to send 10,000 U.S. soldiers to clear Anbar of ISIS. Thats two brigades. Do keep in
mind that in 2006-07 there were 35,000 U.S. soldiers in Anbar. You had the whole infrastructure of intelligence
that might have worked on some of those missions. You had the whole intelligence infrastructure thats nonexistent at the moment. You have to rebuild it. It will not be easy, even if we just send U.S. troops, it will take a
long time to rebuild. Anbar is not easy. The U.S. lost 4,491 soldiers in Iraq from 03-10. 1,335 were in Anbar. The
second highest in the whole country. Baghdad was the highest. So, Anbar is not easy to clear. Its not going to be
a magic want if we just end 10,000 soldiers. It would be easier, but its not going to be the magic wand.

Audience Question: Recently, Hasan Nasrallah gave a major speech. We are before unparalleled threat, he said.
He sounds really worried. And then he said something else which I thought was really insightful here to his
thinking. There is no political solution in the foreseeable period and it is left to attrition in the battlefield. Left to
attrition. Now, attrition means not only the losses each side suffers, but their ability to replenish the losses. The
U.N. Security Council just released a report. Ill just end with one sentence from the report. The rate of flow is
higher than ever This is the reinforcements of the Islamic State. and is mainly focused on movement into
the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq, with a growing problem also evident in Libya. What I dont understand is how
Iraq can replenish its losses. I can see how the Islamic State can replenish its losses. Thats the U.N. Security
Council Report. How does Iraq replenish its losses?

Douglas Ollivant: Iraq is not taking causalities at a rate that would significantly impact its ability to do demographic
replenishment. Even loss it has is a tragedy. The cemeteries in Najaf are busy. But, its nowhere near hitting a
place where demographically they cant replenish their forces. I dont know exactly what the casualty rates are,
but theyre in the tens a day at worst, not hundreds, not thousands. Thats a rate of loss they can absorb.
Hezbollah proper has few, if any, soldiers in Iraq. Theyre engaged in the Syrian theater. From where hes sitting, I
see no political solution for Syria in the near-term. I hate to admit this in public, but Im not sure I really have a
substantive disagreement with him. This is going to be a grinding of Hezbollah and regime forces against Nusra
and ISIL.

Rasha Elass: To follow up on your point about Syria, it has become a war of attrition. Hezbollah is feeling it to the
bone because they have a finite number of fighters that they need at home.

Douglas Ollivant: Hezbollah has a demographic replacement problem. The Iraqis do not.

Rasha Elass: Hezbollah in Syria is replenished or well-supported by mercenaries brought from Iraq and from
Afghanistan that are fighting alongside the Assad regime and alongside Hezbollah under the supervision of Iranian
advisors. But, certainly, a major war of attrition is ongoing in Syria among all sides.

Douglas Ollivant: On that, I think there is also a lot of work that can also be done on the ISIL side. We all know
where theyre coming from and through. Largely from Saudi Arabia and Tunisia. And theyre largely coming
through Turkey. One particular pass in southwestern Turkey coming into Syria. There is a lot that can be done to
interdict the flow of foreign fighters, still, if we can get some allies to make that a higher priority.

Rasha Elass: Even from the time when they decide to leave their own country which Tunisia and Saudi Arabia can
shape up on.

Milena Rodban: Just a quick question from me. Earlier on, we were joking about different connections between
this and other world events. There is one world event that is coming up and that is the deadline for Iran talks at
the end of June. How do we see that affecting ISIS and the greater war against ISIS, if at all?

Rasha Elass: I think its an excellent opportunity to engage Iran on every point that it wants accomplished and
attach conditions for it to engage in some sort of solution on Syria. I think its a golden opportunity to engage Iran
and really exploit it to the maximum.

Douglas Ollivant: As part of the P5+1 or in the immediate aftermath of the P5+1?

Milena Rodban: As part of the talks.

Douglas Ollivant: Clearly there is a major event that throws a long shadow on the entire effort. Because Iran is the
major figure in the P5+1, because of the response of the Gulf States, primarily the GCC, but other states as well to
the possibility of this happening, and given that these same states also happen to be the major backers of the two
sides in the Syrian civil war, while you wouldnt think that nuclear talks and a mid-grade insurgency are connected,
they clearly are. Just because the protagonists are the same on each side. These events are deeply intertwined, at
least in the diplomatic and informational realms in ways that you wouldnt suspect.

Audience Question: What can we expect to see to indicate that ISIS is weakening and also what can we expect
from them if, in fact, they are weakening?

Ahmed Ali: I think, both Iraq and Syria, you have to anticipate ISIS probing campaigns into Baghdad or Damascus.
It doesnt have to succeed. It just needs to destabilize. That would be a good propaganda coup for ISIS if its able
to somehow demoralize the forces that its fighting through those operations. It would certainly be a great success
and I do take the regional expansion seriously as well, but Im not sure there is a lot that can be done about it, to
be very blunt. When you look at the whole, especially between Iraq and Syria, which is where ISIS is making its
currency. Not real currency, but their reputational currency, essentially. That is where it will focus its effort and
try to be successful. One risk that we can run into as the anti-ISIS coalition is to focus too much on Ramadi and
forget that ISIS exists anywhere else in Iraq and Syria. Thats always a possibility. There has to be continuous over
watch in northern Iraq and the Baghdad area and in Syria and the provisional ISIS capital there. If ISIS loses terrain,
that is clearly a sign of weakness. The difficulty in fighting ISIS, and why its wrong to underestimate it, is if you
lose a neighborhood to ISIS, it is difficult to get hat neighborhood back. Im talking about a neighborhood. A
number of blocks. Thats the nature of the fight so we do have to anticipate a long-term fight.

Audience Question: One issue that was lightly discussed earlier was the problem of the Arab youth bulge in region,
in Iraq for example. To me, thats the biggest concern, because you have generation upon generation of
vulnerable youths that could be taken, the name of the brand doesnt matter, ISIS, ISIL, al-Qaeda in Iraq, it doesnt
matter. Im curious. Do you think that the current U.S.-backed government in Iraq has the ability to push ISIS out
or their influence and gain more stability in the region to avoid this problem of social instability?

Douglas Ollivant: Iraq is probably one of the worst functioning democracies on the planet. That also puts it in the
top 10% of governments in the region. I think we have to realize that part of the problem, part of this
environment, this morass that creates the environment in which young people have to look for meaning with
these groups is the lack of ability to participate. Socially, economically, politically. There are really only three
places in the Arab world where you can do that. Thats Tunisia, Lebanon, and Iraq. None of these are anything to
write home about. These are all extremely weak, fragile, immature, corrupt I could keep going, democracies.
But, theyre all democracies of a flavor. They are places where you can vote, where you can change
representatives, where you can and have had peaceful transitions of power. Thats not nothing. Is Iraq going to
make it? Do they have the resources to help do this? I dont know. Im hopeful, but certainly they are light-years
ahead of the repressive regimes that permeate the region. This is why I get pretty passionate about defending the
Iraqi state. To my mind, it remains our last best hope for the region. If Iraq fails, then the only other models are
Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. To my mind, thats the problem, not the solution. I think the Iraqi state, for all its
problems, remains our best way forward.

Rasha Elass: With regards to Arab youth, I think we live in a time when the war and the violence in the region is so
loud that it overlooks a lot of the interesting and healthy dynamics that are going on among many youth
throughout the region. Theyre working quietly. Theyre trying to keep safe. A lot of them are in exile. Certainly
among Syrians, for example. They are finding a place to exchange ideas and dream up a future they want to
create. It might be too early for us to hear them or see them, but it is going on. When you travel through the
region, you see them and theyre actually quite impressive. There is hope for the youth in the Arab world.

Audience Question: Im from the Iraq embassy. First, Id like to reiterate the comments by the speakers. ISIS
thrives in political vacuums and one of the reasons I think Mosul fell is because there is such a politically toxic
environment in Iraq for many years and that led to dysfunction in government and ultimately a security vacuum. I
think, since the formation of the new government in September, Iraqs political faction have realized that its time
to put aside their differences. They havent necessarily forgotten their differences. There are fundamental issues,
but theyve set them aside because they realize that only a united stronger Iraq can ultimately defeat ISIS. One of
the problems I feel, almost a year after the fall of Mosul, is that external actors, in an effort to vie for influence in
Iraq, are pitting Iraqs political factions against each other. Some of them are seeking to aggravate Iraqs affairs, I
think. So my question really is: what do you think the U.S. can do to create a more constructive environment in
the region as a whole.

Douglas Ollivant: Lets assume the U.S. isnt one of these toxic external powers of which were speaking. I think
you make a very good fundamental point. We have, in Iraq now, a decent government that is better than its
predecessor. Thats all you can ask for in this world. There are things I dont like about the current Iraqi
government. There are things I dont like about my own government. We have something to work with in Iraq. In
particular, I think we need to point to two individuals. The Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, whose is a technocrat
and is as Western oriented as we could hope for in the region. An English speaker who spent much of his
formational years in various places in England. And his counterpart, the Speaker of the Iraqi Parliament, which by
tradition, not strictly Constitution, is an Arab Sunni, Dr. Salim Abdullah al-Jabouri. Both of these men are
significantly more moderate than their predecessors, in the political space, if not necessarily the office. Haider alAbadi certainly than al-Maliki, but then Dr. Salim say a figure of Tariq al-Hashimi, who I believe he was an assistant
to at one point. The policies for these two men remain the same. I dont think Haider al-Abadi really has any
different policy positons than Nouri al-Maliki had. The issue is that he is not as angry as everyone and he is
looking for the deal. Hes looking to cut the deal. Likewise with Dr. Salim Abdullah al-Jabouri. My concern, of
course, is that both these men are relatively new to their office. Neither of them commands the power and
influence that their predecessors had. Neither of them has the grass root ties, and therefore, the popular
legitimacy that their predecessors had. So, I think if the U.S. could do anything, it would be to help support both
these men and help them make the deals that need to be made in Iraq to move forward.

Milena Rodban: So on that note, what role does foreign investment play in, for example, creating a more stable
business environment and growing Iraqs economy beyond oil for example?

Douglas Ollivant: This is what I do professionally, and I like to disclaim that. I have some opinions and I have
interests that I have vested. Foreign investment is what Iraq needs to move forward. With oil at roughly 50% of
what it was last year, Iraq has a hard currency crisis and cant invest in the way that it would like to move things

forward. That said, there is no other word to describe doing business in Iraq than hard. It is really really hard to
do business in Iraq. There is a lot that the Iraqis could do to improve that, but some of it is just native to the place.
When you have Ottoman law with British law on top of it with Baathist law on top of that with CPA law on top of
that and then your latest laws on top of that, five different legal codes all struggling it out, none of them having the
same philosophical basis so you cant really reconcile them. Its a mess. Trying to get your property laws set and
protection for investors set is difficult. Really difficult. And, even if you work through it, getting a contract that
hold up in all five of these legal codes that are built into the DNA of Iraqi law is just hard. There is a significant role
for international investment. I think most official in Iraq are doing the best they can to encourage international
investment. They are trying to find ways to provide the proper protections that investors need. That said, it is
deeply frustrating a really hard. But, if you can make it work, the returns are great.

Ahmed Ali: I thank you very much for your service at the embassy as well. The Iraq embassy is doing great work
here in Washington D.C. after a long time of not doing so. Its refreshing. Its a very good question. I think we
need to look at the region as a whole. If you divide it into pro-Iraq and anti-Iraq, the anti column will be longer
than the pro column. Therefore, many of those countries have good relations with the U.S. Many of them are
allies of the U.S. The U.S. can, especially when it comes to the anti-ISIS war, be more serious about the pressure to
change some of their policies. We talked about the media earlier. If you watch some of the satellite channels that
everyone watches in the Middle East, theyre very popular, a lot of them are based in the U.A.E. or are Saudi
channels. The language and the rhetoric from those channels is very toxic. I think we can work on that front in
addition to the political front. But, as we well know, just because the U.S. advises a country to do something, it
doesnt mean the country is going to do it. Thats an illusion that people outside of the U.S. have. We know
better. The process does not work better this way, but it always has to be part of the discussion with other
countries, and this is one of the most used lines, but the most accurate: Instability in Iraq is instability for the
whole region. As we see it in Syria and as we might see it in Saudi Arabia or maybe Jordan just from ISIS, not from
the other threats that those countries have to handle.

Milena Rodban: Im going to take one last question because were running out of time.

Audience Question: Im at the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason. Basically, what were
talking about is going after the symptom, not the cause. When you talk about the root causes there are just
grievances, trauma, humiliation, moral outrage, and also that ISIS has this idea of an archetypal heroic father
figure, the Caliphate, that is very appealing to people who are humiliated and alienated. You have to have another
energy that has a stronger attraction than that and a positive way to attract people away from that. What about,
aside from just the military aspect of dealing with the underlying conflict, what the parties want and strategies for
that?

Ahmed Ali: its a good question. Its way above my paygrade.

Rasha Elass: We need another hero, basically? Yes, we definitely need a hero. The Arab world suffers from one
main thing and that is the lack of vision and the lack of an idea of who we are and who we want to be in the future
and why did we go to the streets and revolt? What did we want? People in the Arab world know what they dont
want very often, but no one can tell you want they want. Ask ten Syrians what they envision a new Syria to look
like and theyll give you twenty different answers. There is no common ground and no sense of common identity.

Pan-Arabism is dead. Long dead. Pan-Islamism is rising. ISIS is sort of a form of uber Sunni nationalism.
Everybody is looking. We need another hero.

Audience Member: There is also a gender and patriarchal component to that which makes it harder.

Douglas Ollivant: I think youre absolutely right, humiliation is the term. The problem is these humiliations go in
multiple directions and they all can involve the same people on different sides. Right now, I think its safe to say
that there are portions of Iraqs Arab Sunni population who feel humiliated by the fact that the Baath party is
repressed and are very vocal about the fact that they want de-Baathification lifted. Meanwhile, the Kurds are
trying to get the Baath labeled as perpetrators of genocide for what they did to them in the 90s. How do you
reconcile these two visions when what will remove humiliation for one group will increase it for the other? I dont
have any really good answers for you, unfortunately, right now. This is kind of thing I always end my Iraq talks on.
The things that hold Iraq together are coldly logical. Iraq needs to stay together to stand up to its neighbors. The
oil distribution system only works if Iraq hangs together. Any logical analysis tells you that Iraq has to stay
together. Everything pulling Iraq apart is emotion and passion. But, we all know that emotion and passion are
very very powerful forces in this world.

Milena Rodban: I think thats a good place to end. Id like to thank you all for joining us and Id also like to thank
st
the Project for the Study of the 21 Century and its director, Mr. Peter Apps, who is in London, but with us in spirit.
If youve enjoyed the analysis we gave here, Id like to direct you to Carrie who is the editor of the PS21 Mideast
blog, where Im sure youll be reading lots and lots of good analysis in the coming weeks. Id like to thank our
panel: Doug and Ahmed and Rasha and, again, Im Melina Rodban. Im very grateful to you all for joining us and if
you have any additional questions I hope youll reach out to us on Twitter. Thank you.