You are on page 1of 12

Industrial Marketing Management 41 (2012) 609620

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

Industrial Marketing Management

Green supply chain management: The role of trust and top management in B2B and
B2C markets
Stefan Hoejmose , Stephen Brammer 1, Andrew Millington 2
Centre for Business Organisations and Society, School of Management, University of Bath, Claverton Down, Bath, BA2 7AY, UK

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history:
Received 14 May 2011
Received in revised form 18 December 2011
Accepted 16 February 2012
Available online 22 May 2012
Keywords:
Environmental management
Trust
Supply chain
Industrial relationships

a b s t r a c t
Green supply chain management (GSCM) has often been associated with highly visible companies (Bowen,
2000) and rms within consumer-focused industries (Buysse & Verbeke, 2003; Hall, 2000; Roht-Arriaza,
1996). As such, GSCM has partly been led by development of consumer awareness of environmental issues (Beamon, 1999; Zhu et al., 2005). This suggest that rms operating in business-to-consumer (B2C) markets have
strong incentives to implement GSCM, due to both institutional and stakeholder pressure. However, this leaves
the role of GSCM in business-to-business (B2B) sectors relatively unexplored and to-date little is known about:
1) the relative engagement with GSCM among rms in business-to-consumer and business-to-business sectors;
2) the conditions that are necessary for successful implementation of green practices in B2B supply chains. This
study addresses these issues within the context of 340 buyersupplier relationships in the United Kingdom,
using an innovative research methodology that captures rms' engagement with GSCM practices and minimizes
social desirability and common source biases. Our results show that GSCM is relatively limited among rms in
B2B markets compared to rms in B2C markets. At the same time, we show that developing trust with supply
chain partners, while also having top management support, is a crucial driver of engagement with GSCM
among rms in B2B sector but less important among rms in B2C sector. These ndings provide considerable insights to managers and marketers of B2B supply chains that seek to respond to a growing interest of environmental performance of supply chain.
2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
The nature of supply chain relationships varies signicantly across
business-to-business (B2B) and business-to-consumer (B2C) sectors.
For example, personal relationships and trust have been suggested to
play an important role in B2B settings (Andersen & Kumar, 2006;
Arnott, 2007), and the different characteristics of B2B and B2C supply
relationships can have signicant implications for the implementation
of green supply chain management (GSCM) (Cruz, 2008; Vachon &
Klassen, 2007). Firms in B2B markets often have few incentives to engage in GSCM and hence their practices are relatively reactive compared
to rms in the B2C sector (Gonzlez Benito & Gonzlez Benito, 2006).
There is, however, increasing pressure for marketing and supply chain
practitioners in B2B settings to improve their environmental practices.
Not only to respond to external pressure, but also because it is generally
accepted that GSCM can improve rm performance and its competitive
position (Sharma, Iyer, Mehrotra, & Krishnan, 2010).

Corresponding author. Tel.: + 44 1225 384763.


E-mail addresses: S.U.Hoejmose@bath.ac.uk (S. Hoejmose),
Stephen.Brammer@wbs.ac.uk (S. Brammer), A.I.Millington@management.bath.ac.uk
(A. Millington).
1
Tel.: + 44 2476 524541.
2
Tel.: + 44 1225 383068.
0019-8501/$ see front matter 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.indmarman.2012.04.008

Green supply chain management has been dened as integrating


environmental thinking into supply-chain management, including product design, material sourcing and selection, manufacturing processes,
delivery of the nal product to the consumers as well as end-of-life management of the product after its useful life (Srivastava, 2007, p. 54).
Existing research within the eld has focused on a number of aspects
that often encompass the entire supply chain (see Srivastava, 2007), including total quality management (Klassen & McLaughlin, 1993; Porter &
van der Linde, 1995), lean supply chain management (Kleindorfer,
Singhal, & Wassenhove, 2005; Rothenberg, Pil, & Maxwell, 2001;
Simpson & Power, 2005), reverse logistics (Chan, 2007; Guide &
Van Wassenhove, 2002; Wu & Dunn, 1995), life cycle assessment
(Beamon, 1999; Hagelaar, van der Vorst, & Marcelis, 2004; Stewart,
Collins, Anderson, & Murphy, 1999), and product stewardship
(Michaelis, 1995; Verghese & Lewis, 2007). Although such approaches have highlighted the dynamics and complexities of implementing GSCM, they tell us little about implementing GSCM within
individual buyersupplier relationships. At the rst-tier supply
chain level, research has shown that the implementation of GSCM
is often driven by regulation (Walker, Di Sisto, & McBain, 2008), customers (Lamming & Hampson, 1996), and requires the support of
top management (Lee, 2008) and employees (Drumwright, 1994).
Nonetheless, little is known about the comparative engagement with
GSCM among rms in B2B and B2C sectors, but it is generally

610

S. Hoejmose et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 41 (2012) 609620

anticipated that rms in B2C sectors are more involved with GSCM because of greater consumer pressure, media scrutiny and their more immediate visibility to stakeholders (Bowen, 2000; Hall, 2000).
In this study we use a novel data collection approach to capture buyer
engagement with GSCM activities within the context of 340 buyer
supplier relationships. Our rst aim is to understand and compare the extent of GSCM across rms in B2B and B2C sectors. In addition, we seek to
examine the conditions under which rms in the B2B sector implement
environmental processes into their individual buyersupplier relationships. We focus in particular on two drivers: The buyer's perceived trust
in its supplier, which has been shown to be a signicant predictor of supply chain outcomes in B2B settings (del Bosque Rodriguez, Agudo, & San
Martin Gutierrez, 2006; King & Burgess, 2008); and top management support which has consistently been found to be a major driver of GSCM
(Drumwright, 1994; Lee, 2008; Walker et al., 2008; Zhu & Sarkis, 2006).
Given the nature of this study, we make three contributions: First,
we provide one of the most comprehensive analyses of green supply
chain management in the U.K. and we explicitly relate and compare
GSCM across rms in B2B and B2C sectors. As such, this study extends
our understanding of the degree to which GSCM is context dependent.
Second, our study furthers existing research in the eld of GSCM,
which suggests that trust is an important factor for its successful implementation (e.g. Boyd et al., 2007; Cheng, Yeh, & Tu, 2008). We therefore
contribute to an emerging literature, which suggests that the implementation of GSCM is sensitive to the characteristics of buyersupplier relationships. Third, we distinguish between industrial, i.e. B2B, and nal
consumer-oriented, i.e. B2C, supply chains, and compare the extent to
which trust, combined with top management support, plays a role in
shaping GSCM in both settings.
In the following section we briey review the literature on GSCM and
its relationship with both trust and top management support. We then
develop a set of testable hypotheses, which encompass trust, top management support and a set of moderating effects. Subsequently, we outline
our methodology before presenting a set of results which incorporate descriptive statistics on the relative engagement with GSCM among rms in
B2B and B2C sectors, and a set of hierarchical ordinary least square regressions, which explains the role of trust and top management in shaping
GSCM. Finally, we discuss the managerial and research implications of
our study.
2. Green supply chain management and trust
Green supply chain management is an increasingly important
issue for business (Sarkis, Zhu, & Lai, 2011; Vachon & Klassen, 2008).
Such practices are expected by employees (Carter & Jennings, 2004;
Salam, 2009) and governments (Lee, 2008; Walker et al., 2008), and
rms are realizing the benets of GSCM, including cost reduction
(Carter & Dresner, 2001; Zhu & Sarkis, 2006), improved product and
process quality (Lamming & Hampson, 1996), risk reduction (Welford
& Frost, 2006) and improved nancial performance (Rao & Holt,
2005). GSCM therefore has the potential to make a signicant contribution to the rm's competitive position and improve both nancial and
non-nancial performance (Carter, Kale, & Grimm, 2000; Lamming &
Hampson, 1996; Walker et al., 2008). Nonetheless, GSCM is also driven
by a number of external factors, including legislation (Green, Morton, &
New, 1996; Hall, 2000) and customer expectations and demands (Lee,
2008; Min & Galle, 2001). The current empirical work has therefore
contributed towards our understanding of the driving factors behind
GSCM, but few studies have considered the nature of the relationships
between buyers and supplier that may facilitate GSCM. Some research
has suggested that the power advantage of the buyer can aid the implementation of GSCM (Carter & Carter, 1998; Hall, 2000), and that power
has the potential to create a multiplier effect (Preuss, 2001). Other research has found that GSCM is contingent on supplier coordination
(Carter & Carter, 1998), supplier capabilities (Zhu & Sarkis, 2006), and
it has also been noted that trust between buyers and suppliers is a

positive inuence on the extent to which a rm is able to green the


supply chain (Vachon & Klassen, 2006a).
Earlier work has also suggested that trust is an important element
of successful buyersupplier relationships, particularly in B2B sectors,
as supply chain management has moved away from the traditional
transactional, and arms-length, view to one where close and reliable
supply chain partnerships are seen as a critical element in the rm's
success (Cater & Cater, 2010; Finch, Wagner, & Hynes, 2010). For example, Leenders and Fearon (2008) and Lummus and Vokurka (1999)
note how supply chain practices used to be fairly standardized and
that costs were the main differentiator. However, these practices
have changed over time in order to respond to demands for greater
exibility and more complex supply chains. As such, there has been
a development in strategic supply chain relationships (Bechtel &
Jayaram, 1997; Hult, Ketchen, & Arrfelt, 2007), and it has been suggested
that trust is a crucial element of strategic supply relationships (Ireland &
Webb, 2007). Empirical evidence has also indicated that trust is essential
for successful supply chain relationships as it can make the supply chain
more agile and responsive (Handeld & Bechtel, 2002), improve commitment and the collaborative nature of the relationship (Kwon & Suh,
2005), which in turn improves performance (Johnston et al., 2004).
In addition to being fundamental in developing strategic supply
chain relationships, trust has several other facilitating roles in interorganizational relationships. First, from a transaction cost perspective,
trust between buyers and suppliers can limit opportunistic behavior, resulting in greater adaptability and reduced governance costs
(Williamson, 1979, 1993). Second, trust has been directly linked to social
capital theory (Bowles & Gintis, 2002; Putnam, 2001), where it has offered a relatively complex framework, compared to transaction cost theory, for understanding supply chain relationships. Social capital in supply
chains is important because it may allow supply chain partners to benet
from assessing [one's and another's] present and future resources
(Batt, 2008, p. 488), and in the context of B2B supply chains, evidence
suggests that social capital will inuence cost, quality, delivery and exibility (Krause, Handeld, & Tyler, 2007). Given these two perspectives
on trust, it can be anticipated that the role of trust in green supply
chains is of particular importance, because it can reduce the monitoring
costs of implementing green practices in the supply chain, and because
it can improve the dynamic and shared value of GSCM in relationships.
Much of the supply chain literature suggests that trust is multifaceted
and a particular focus has been placed on two distinctive features: credibility and benevolence (e.g. Hawes, 1994; Skarmeas & Katsikeas, 2001).
Although these features may not be easily translated into other cultures
(see Wang, 2007), they have consistently been considered as vital components of successful B2B supply chains. Ganesan (1994, p. 3) argues
that the issue of trust, in terms of credibility, has a signicant inuence
on long-term orientation and is based on the extent to which the retailer
believes that the vendor has the required expertise to perform the job
effectively and reliably. As such Ganesan's (1994 , p. 3) denition of
credibility encompasses [] consistency, stability and control. In contrast, benevolence is concerned with genuine interest in one's welfare
(Andersen & Kumar, 2006, p. 523; Doney and Cannon, 1997, p. 36).
Benevolence is based on the extent to which the retailer believes that
the vendor has intentions and motives benecial to the retailer when
new conditions arise, condition for which a commitment was not
made (Ganesan, 1994; p. 3). Furthermore, Ganesan (1994) notes that
benevolence is not focused on trust in the overall supplier, but rather
with the individual supplier representative. Therefore, from a conceptual
perspective, credibility is closer to the term reliance than benevolence,
because benevolence captures trust at a personal level, rather than at
an organizational level (Blois, 1999).
3. Conceptual framework and hypotheses
This study is concerned with the phenomena of green supply
chain management (GSCM). We view GSCM as being concerned

S. Hoejmose et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 41 (2012) 609620

with a rm's active engagement with environmentally friendly and


sound supply chain processes. Therefore, in terms of this study, our
concern is with actual, rather than desired, engagement with GSCM,
and we examine green activities in the individual buyersupplier
relationship, rather than corporate policies themselves. Our study
views GSCM as being inuenced by trust and top management
support, and therefore views GSCM through the conceptual lens of
trust; specically credibility and benevolence. This body of literature
has strong roots in B2B supply chains (e.g. Handeld & Bechtel,
2002; Hingley, 2005) where trust has been suggested to play an
important role in supply chain success and performance (Handeld
& Bechtel, 2002; Johnston et al., 2004). In addition, trust leads to
stronger supply chain relationships (Naud & Buttle, 2000), as it
improves stability (Suh & Kwon, 2006) and encourages collaboration
(Ploetner & Ehret, 2006), while also reducing transaction costs
(Bunduchi, 2008) and supporting social capital development
(Harvey, Novicevic, Hench, & Myers, 2003). Hence, we argue that
trust is important in implementing green supply chain practices,
and improves GSCM engagement.
Nonetheless, we acknowledge the contribution of the existing
GSCM literature, and argue that green supply chain management
begins with a green desire, hence the importance of top management support as a direct facilitator of GSCM (e.g. Lee, 2008; Salam,
2009; Walker et al., 2008). However, we suggest that having a desire
for GSCM performance is not sufcient. Rather, such desire needs to
be complemented with trust, and therefore we argue that the combination of trust at the relationship-level and top management support
at the rm-level, improves the likelihood that GSCM will prosper
within buyersupplier relationships.
Given this, our conceptual model (Fig. 1) suggests that top management support, which is an indication of organizational green desire,
directly inuences GSCM. In addition, we argue that trust in the buyer
supplier relationships directly inuences GSCM. However, the model
suggests that the combination of top management support and trust
improves GSCM behavior and hence we argue that trust moderates the
role of top management support on a rm's ability to implement GSCM.
Furthermore, we suggest that GSCM, trust, and top management support
are inuenced by the type of supply chain relationship. More specically,
we argue that the characteristics of B2B and B2C supply chains are significantly different (Claro, Hagelaar, & Omta, 2003; Vargo & Lusch, 2011),
and that these differences not only inuence overall GSCM performance,
but also the nature and role of trust and top management support in

611

shaping GSCM. These arguments are further developed in the detailed


discussion below.
3.1. GSCM in B2B and B2C supply chains
As the starting point of our analysis we seek to understand the general engagement with GSCM in both B2B and B2C supply chains. Broadly
speaking, GSCM has been identied as an important issue within consumer product industries (and supply chains) (e.g. Carter & Carter,
1998; Roberts, 2003; White, De Smet, Owens, & Hindle, 1995). The literature suggests that such initiatives are often driven by environmental
consumerism (Buysse & Verbeke, 2003; Hall, 2000), and while individual consumers have relatively little bargaining power, the threat of boycotts can still inuence rm environmental performance (Bansal &
Bogner, 2002). Bowen (2000) also notes that rms with greater visibility, i.e. rms with high consumer recognition and advertising spend, will
be subject to greater levels of pressure for environmentally responsible
performance. It is thus clear that consumers often drive GSCM, at least
partially. Walker and Phillips (2009) note that respondents, from focus
groups consisting of policy-makers, academics and practitioners, discussed the importance of nal household consumers and ethical stakeholders in shaping environmentally responsible supply chain practices,
but ignored industrial consumption and their related supply chains.
Rivera-Camino (2007) also notes how the focus of environmental
management has been geared towards B2C markets, while such issues
have been virtually ignored in B2B sectors, which may be because there
is a lack of understanding about integrating green practices with operational strategy in such settings (SAT, 2003; cited in Rivera-Camino,
2007). Gonzlez Benito and Gonzlez Benito (2006) further argue that
environmental performance is inuenced by the position in the supply
chain, and that the supply chain buffers not only environmental consumer pressure but also a rm's environmental effort on public opinion.
Although Haddock Fraser and Fraser (2008) nd empirical support for
Gonzlez Benito and Gonzlez Benito's (2006) claims, in terms of environmental reporting, both authors note that there is limited evidence
regarding the relative engagement with green practices across B2B
and B2C settings. Nonetheless, the discussion above suggests that the
green supply chain management among rms in B2B sectors is likely
to be relatively low compared to rms that predominately operate in
B2C sectors. Hence:
Hypothesis 1. The level of engagement with GSCM will be higher
among rms in B2C sectors than among rms in B2B sectors.
3.2. GSCM and trust

Fig. 1. Conceptual framework.

Trust is an important element of successful B2B supply chains


(Cheng et al., 2008; Mariotti, 1999; Seppanen, Blomqvist, & Sundqvist,
2007), and has the potential to enhance a rm's performance and its
competitive advantage (Barney & Hansen, 1994; Seppanen et al.,
2007). This link is likely to exist because trust, as an informal mechanism, often leads to coordinated joint-efforts that lead to outcomes
that exceed what the rm can achieve acting solely in its own interest
(Ballou, Gilbert, & Mukherjee, 2000; p. 16). Furthermore, some authors
have emphasized the importance of trust in shifting the paradigm of
supply chain management from one that is based on a transactionand domestically-orientated approach towards one that is relationship
and globally orientated (Sheth & Sharma, 1997).
Existing studies have often considered trust from an end-consumer
perspective, where it represents trust in the (buying) rm and the role
of codes of conduct, monitoring, auditing and other activities that signal
trustworthiness and credibility to end-consumers (e.g. Lee & Kim, 2009;
Pedersens & Andersen, 2006). Nonetheless, there is an increasing body
of literature that mentions trust as being a paramount factor in successful
GSCM because it represents a signicant inter-organizational resource
that encourages sustainability (Gold, Seuring, & Beske, 2010), creates

612

S. Hoejmose et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 41 (2012) 609620

stable relationships, facilitates investment (Font, Tapper, Schwartz,


& Kornilaki, 2008), collaboration (Simpson & Power, 2005), and a
common vision for GSCM (Gold et al., 2010).
Developing trust, through both credibility and benevolence is one
of the many challenges to ensuring environmentally sound supply
chain performance (Canning & Hammer-Lloyd, 2007). Focusing specically on the credibility aspect of trust and the expectancy that
the partner's word or written statement can be relied on, it has
been shown that credibility improves the adaptation of green practices in the buyersupplier relationship, because it allows managers
to make a judgment of the reliability and willingness of suppliers to
adhere to environmental requirements (Canning & Hanmer Lloyd,
2001; p.1076). Similarly Tate, Dooley, and Ellram (2011) propose that
as long as the adoption of the buyer's environmental requirements are
perceived as an additional cost to maintaining the ongoing and
long-term relationship, then suppliers are more likely to adhere to
these requirements.
Credibility can also be associated with the development of suppliers and their GSCM practices. Credible commitment between
buyers and suppliers may be strengthened if there are clear mutual
benets to be gained, such as clear evidence of responding to institutional and stakeholder pressure, or if it allows suppliers to signal their
commitment to the buyer, thereby ensuring future orders (Nyaga,
Whipple, & Lynch, 2010). Credibility may also facilitate cooperation between agents/partners and it may reduce relationship tensions
(Rondinelli & London, 2003). However, lack of credibility may pose a
barrier for the successful development of suppliers (Lo & Yeung, 2004).
For environmental management, credibility between partners can create
an invaluable resource, which cannot be easily imitated (Sharma &
Vredenburg, 1998) and is important for green alliances (Hartman &
Stafford, 1997). Indeed, for rms that have strong GSCM credentials,
such as the Body Shop, credibility in suppliers has been suggested to operate as a source of condence that reassures the buyer that the suppliers
are willing to improve their environmental efforts (Wycherley, 1999).
Benevolence, in contrast, is concerned with trust at the individual
(representative) level. It has been argued that benevolence helps instill a culture of responsibility within supply chains (Boyd et al.,
2007), and that the maturity of inter-organizational relations,
which are often characterized by benevolent collaboration, are important for GSCM (Adriana, 2009, p. 1387). These conceptualizations
are supported by recent empirical literature that suggests that benevolence is crucial for knowledge sharing in GSCM (Cheng et al., 2008).
Similarly, Canning and Hammer-Lloyd (2007) note how benevolence
is associated with reduced vulnerability in relationships, which, in
turn, may facilitate environmental activities. This suggests that trust,
and in particular credibility and benevolence, will be positively related to GSCM. We therefore hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2a. The level of engagement with GSCM is positively
inuenced by the buyer's perception of supplier credibility.
Hypothesis 2b. The level of engagement with GSCM is positively
inuenced by the buyer's perception of supplier benevolence.

3.3. GSCM and top management support


Empirical evidence has consistently shown that top management
is an important driver of a range of managerial practices and organizational outcomes including customer relations (King & Burgess, 2008),
product development (Wren et al., 2000), information systems (Thong,
Yap, & Raman, 1996), and project success (Young & Jordan, 2008). The
literature also suggests that top management is crucial in GSCM (E.g.
Badenhorst, 1994; Drumwright, 1994; Lee, 2008; Walker et al., 2008;
Zhu, Sarkis, & Lai, 2008), and that top management must be totally
committed for successful GSCM (Zhu, Sarkis, & Geng, 2005; p. 453).

Top management creates a vision for the rm and nurtures organizational values, which direct the company and give the company an
identity (Hart, 1992). Indeed, Epstein and Roy (1998) argue that it
is only through top management support and commitment that environmental management will be successful. The role of top management support can, therefore, not be underestimated, as they are at the
forefront of the company, driving the organizational culture and institutional systems that encourage desired behavior (Daily & Huang, 2001).
In addition, it has been argued that top management are the decision
makers with respect to the green investments that shape GSCM
(Bowen, Cousins, Lamming, & Farukt, 2001). As such, research in the
GSCM eld has concluded that top management support is necessary
for GSCM (Min & Galle, 2001), and that top management must support
and conceive strategies that acknowledge GSCM (Walton, Handeld, &
Melnyk, 1998), while also facilitating the necessary resources and sanctioning investment into green practices (Hervani et al., 2005). We
thus hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3. The level of engagement with GSCM is positively inuenced by top management support.
3.4. Trust and top management support
Given the importance of top management support, we argue that it
is a prerequisite for GSCM performance. However, we further argue that
top management support is not sufcient, and that implementing
GSCM at the relationship level requires trust. Therefore, our analysis
suggests that trust moderates the role of top management support on
GSCM. It is therefore the combination of top management support and
trust that is likely to create the best conditions under which GSCM
will prosper. Indeed, both trust and top management support have
been found to be among the key factors in successful supply chain relationships (Akintoye, McIntosh, & Fitzgerald, 2000). Mentzer, Min, and
Zacharia (2000) argue that strategic buyersupplier relationships will
fail without the synergy of trust and top management vision. Similarly,
Chandra and Kumar (2000) note how strategic alliances and partnerships must be based on extreme trust and loyalty. However, they also
note that in order to build a competitive advantage for the supply
chain top management support is needed. The combination of top management support and trust therefore appears to generate the most conducive conditions for mutual commitment and collaboration (Fawcett,
Ogden, Magnan, & Cooper, 2006), and hence we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4a. The effect of top management support on GSCM is
positively moderated by credibility.
Hypothesis 4b. The effect of top management support on GSCM is
positively moderated by benevolence.
3.5. Trust, top management support and contextual setting: B2B vs. B2C
Both trust (e.g. Ballou et al., 2000; Bunduchi, 2008; Sheth &
Sharma, 1997) and top management support (e.g. Harvey et al.,
2003; King & Burgess, 2008) have been argued to be important factors in B2B settings. As noted earlier, rms in B2B markets are often
less engaged in green practices. Jamali and Mirshak (2007) and
Bowen (2002) note how responsible business practices are inuenced by managerial discretion and recent evidence suggests that
the environmental practices of B2B rms often exist on a voluntary
and discretionary basis (Haddock-Fraser & Fraser, 2008; HaddockFraser & Tourelle, 2010). It can be argued, therefore, that top management support, and managerial discretion, plays a particularly important role in decisions to prioritize and invest in GSCM in B2B markets.
Trust is also an important factor in B2B markets (Arnott, 2007),
where it has been suggested that it plays a vital role in integrated
B2B supply chains (Flint, 2004). In these cases, trust acts as an

S. Hoejmose et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 41 (2012) 609620

alternative (and softer) mechanism for direct control (Williamson, 2008).


Furthermore, there is strong evidence from the B2B supply chain literature that trust is an important factor for collaboration (Ellinger, 2000;
Voeth & Herbst, 2006) and commitment (Christopher, 2000; Ndubisi,
2011), while it also ensures that partners are prepared for unanticipated
disruptions in the supply chain (Ballou et al., 2000). In turn, these factors
have a positive inuence on rm GSCM performance (Vachon & Klassen,
2006b, 2008; Walton et al., 1998). Therefore, we suggest that:
Hypothesis 5. The effects of trust and top management support on
GSCM are greater among rms in B2B sectors than among rms in
B2C sectors.

4. Method
4.1. Sample and data collection
The sample frame consisted of the FTSE All-Share; the thousand
largest (by turnover) unlisted rms; and the thousand largest foreign
holding rms with operations in the United Kingdom. In each case the
organization was invited to participate in the study through a letter
addressed to the Director of Procurement, supported by an e-mailed
reminder. The nal sample consisted of 340 buyersupplier relationships, drawn from 178 UK-based rms from a broad cross section of
industries. The broad industry composition of our sample roughly
mirrors that of the UK economy, with industrial, consumer goods,
and nancial (including professional services) making up the majority of our sample. 3 A chow breakpoint test (p = 0.36), on the dependent variable, (Armstrong & Overton, 1977) conrmed that there
was no evidence of non-response bias in the sample.
Once the participating companies had been identied, data was
collected through a two-part survey in order to minimize the problems associated with common methods bias. The rst part sought to
capture general organizational characteristics, including size and top
management support for environmentally responsible supply chain
practices. This part was administered through an online questionnaire and was usually completed by a senior procurement ofcer,
such as the Director of Procurement, who had relevant knowledge
of the strategies and polices of the rm and the purchasing department. The second part consisted of a set of closed and open-ended
questions dealing with specic buyersupplier relationships in the
focal rm. 4 This part was administered through a telephone interview
and was usually completed by a purchasing manager 5 who was asked
to identify and discuss two different buyersupplier relationships (i.e.
supply chain relationships). 6 This resulted in an effective sample of
340 supply chain relationships, which forms the basis of the empirical
analysis. In each case the supply chain managers were asked to comment on specic aspects of the buyersupplier relationship, including
questions pertaining to the nature of the product being procured and
power-dependency issues within the relationship. More importantly,
the supply chain managers were also asked to comment, in-depth, on
the environmentally responsible supply chain practices in respect of
the particular supplier.
3
Compared to the data presented by Paul Wetherill in the UK Business: Activity,
Size and Location report of 2010 compiled for the Ofce of National Statistics.
4
The focus of the study was on on-going relationships, involving an external vendor,
which was not a part of the focal rm's core operations, and which did not have a common owner.
5
In some cases, usually within small and medium-sized businesses, the same person
completed the rm- and supply-level part of the survey. We tested for statistical significance between the dependent and independent variables (at both the rm- and
supply-level), to assess whether there were any signicant differences between the
cases where we had one and two respondents. No evidence was found of any statistical
difference for either the dependent or independent variables between the two groups.
6
Within the 178 participating rms, 2 relationships were identied in 160 cases, 1
relationship in 17 cases and 3 relationships in 1 case.

613

4.2. Dependent variable green supply chain management


Capturing information on corporate environmental responsibility
performance is highly problematic and has been subject to extensive
debate (Crane, 1999; Randall & Fernandes, 1991). The collection of
data on GSCM through self-reported questionnaires is likely to be subject to social desirability and common methods bias (Crane, 1999). In
order to minimize these, we deploy a novel data collection approach,
adapted from earlier work on managerial practices by Bloom and Van
Reenen (2007). In this case we developed a measure of green responsible supply chain management, which was based on ve dimensions of
responsible supply management: responsible supply requirements, responsible supply rationale, problem resolution, monitoring, and performance improvement. Data was collected through a set of open-ended
questions on each of the ve dimensions of social supply chain management. In each company respondents were asked to identify a particular
supply relationship and the responses refer to this relationship. Respondents were asked broad, open-ended questions about each dimension
of responsible supply chain management. Subsequent detailed questions were designed to generate an evidential database drawn from actual practices and examples. Questioning on each dimension continued
until the interviewer could form an accurate assessment of the rm's
typical practices following the methods outlined by Bloom and Van
Reenen (2007), and the respondent was asked to provide supporting
evidence of their GSCM processes at each stage. For example, if the respondent mentioned an environmental policy as a requirement, the interviewer would ask the respondent about the specic environmental
issues that were explored through the policy.
The rationale section considered the rm's motives for introducing
green polices and processes, and sought to identify whether such practices were led from within the rm or whether it was due to external factors. Problem process documentation was concerned with how any
environmental problems with this supplier would come to the rm's attention, and how the rm would deal with these problems. In the section
the interviewer asked for explicit examples of any environmental problems, in order for the researcher to evaluate the processes through which
they became aware and dealt with environmental supply chain problems. Monitoring addressed the buyer's attempt to monitor and track
the environmental performance of the supplier. Respondents were
asked how often they audited and visited the supplier, and whether
these audits was announced or unannounced, and if any audits were undertaken by the rm themselves or a third-party agency. The performance dialogue section examined to what extent the rm attempted
to improve the environmental performance of their supplier.
The responses were then evaluated and each of the ve dimensions
of responsible supply chain management was scored on a scale 1 (worst
practice) to 5 (best practice) scoring. As such the scale represent the
level of buyer engagement with GSCM, with 1 indicating that the
buyer has no GSCM processes in place, within a given buyersupplier
relationship, and 5 indicating that the buyer has relatively advanced sophisticated GSCM processes. A score of 3 would, in turn, represent relatively sound processes, but which may lack monitoring or a continuous
GSCM improvement process.
To illustrate the scoring and evaluation process of rm GSCM, we
highlight a set of interview quotes taken from the performance dialogue category. For example, both researchers scored a rm 1, because there was no evidence of a process to improve the supplier's
performance, the reason being that they did not have any leverage
to inuence the supplier's behavior. Another buyer, who also received
a score of 1, responded we do nothing specically on that area [performance dialogue and [improvement] targets are not being set. A
rm was scored 3 because, while there was no formal process in
place, it was clear that if the supplier was not meeting the buyer's expectations they would provide guidance and advice from their internal environmental management team, and also sit down [with
the supplier] and agree on the action and time frame, and monitor

614

S. Hoejmose et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 41 (2012) 609620

the corrective action program. Both researchers scored a buyer 5 because the buyer had a formal escalation process in place, supported by
evidence from actual events, where the buyer would discuss areas of
improvements with the supplier and hire experts to help address specic problems, while also visiting sub-contractors.
To ensure that the environmental scoring was valid two researchers
independently scored each supplier relationship in the entire sample.
The correlation and concordance (inter-rater reliability) between the
two researchers were very high with coefcients of 0.852 and 0.847, respectively. The average score, across the ve categories, of the two researchers was used as the dependent variable.
Utilizing this approach reduced the likelihood of social desirability
bias, as the researcher decided the appropriate value or scoring rather
than the respondent (Podsakoff et al., 2003). In addition the respondents
were not told about the procedure used to evaluate their social responses and were, therefore, unaware that answers would be quantied
at a later stage. Finally, the two-stage interview process, which was
implemented in most cases, effectively separated the dependent and independent variables largely removing the difculties associated with
common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003).7
4.3. Independent variables
Trust was captured by considering both credibility and benevolence,
which were measured using four item scales adapted from Ganesan
(1994). For credibility typical items were This supplier's representative
has been frank in dealing with us and Promises made by this supplier's
representative are reliable. For benevolence, typical items included
This supplier's representative cares for us and This supplier's representative is like a friend. These questions were anchored in seven point scales
where 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. Both credibility
and benevolence loaded on a single factor with Cronbach alpha values
of 0.855 and 0.803, respectively.
Top management support was measured through a three item
scale adapted from Cousins et al. (2006), typical questions included
Top management is supportive of our efforts to improve environmental
supply chain management. The three questions loaded on a single factor with a Cronbach alpha of 0.850. Complete details regarding these
constructs are given in Appendix A, including factor analysis and reliability scores.
In terms of the B2B and B2C split, we dened whether a given rm
was active in a business to business or a business to consumer sector
on the basis of the rm's primary activity as provided by Bureau Van
Dijk's FAME database. We used the 4 digit SIC code that characterized
a rm's primary activity along with data on industry level advertising
intensity to allocate rms to the B2B or B2C sectors. When a rm was
not listed by Bureau Van Dijk's FAME database, we consulted their annual report to examine their target market and main source of income.
4.4. Control variables
Following earlier studies we control for rm size by taking the natural logarithm of the number of employees. Firm size may inuence
the level of nancial resources (Brammer & Millington, 2006), and it
has been used as a proxy for rm visibility in previous research
(Bowen, 2002), both dimensions may be expected to inuence rm
propensity in GSCM activities. In addition, as this research focuses
on buyersupplier relationships in a global context, we use a binary
variable to control for foreign transactions. We also control for relationship length by taking the natural logarithm of the number of
years of trading between the buyer and supplier, because this may inuence the level of trust in the relationship (Doney & Cannon, 1997),
7
Common methods bias was tested for using the methodology developed by
Podsakoff et al. (2003) and Doty and Glick, (1998). The results show no evidence of
common methods bias.

which in turn may affect rm decisions to invest and implement


GSCM in suppliers. Furthermore, to account for Kraljic's (1983) strategic supply arguments, we also control for product/supply complexity and importance. Both complexity and importance were measured
using three item scales adapted from Cannon and Perreault (1999)
and Stump and Heide (1996). Both sets of questions loaded on a single factor, with a Cronbach alpha of 0.910 and 0.854, respectively.
We also control for power-dependency, as this has been suggested
to be critical in the implementation of GSCM (Millington, 2008). We
capture supplier dependence (buyer power), through a three item
scale, and buyer dependence (supplier power), through a four item
scale, adapted from Ganesan (1994). All three supplier dependence
questions loaded on a single factor with a Cronbach alpha of 0.879.
Similarly, the four buyer dependence questions loaded on a single
factor with a Cronbach alpha of 0.857. A power imbalance variable
was subsequently created following the approach of Casciaro and
Piskorski (2005), where we subtracted buyer dependence from supplier dependence. Finally, we control for industry by including a set
of binary variable, 8 and control for the level of supply chain process
sophistication in the buying rm, which also captures industryspecic supply chain features (Krause, 1997; Krause & Scannell,
2002). To this end, we use three established questions adapted from
Krause (1997) and Lee and Humphreys (2007). 9 A typical question
included: We use established guidelines and procedures when evaluating supplier performance. All three questions loaded on single factor,
with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.747.

4.5. Econometric approach


As with other studies in the eld of supply chain and relationship
management (e.g. Claro & Claro, 2010), our hypotheses were tested
by estimating ordinary least square models, which refers to the
estimation of the linear relationship between a dependent and the
independent variables (Claro et al., 2003; p. 710). More specically,
we use a moderated hierarchical multiple regression approach to test
the interaction between trust and top management support and their
inuence on GSCM. Following Spekman, Spear and Kamauff (2002,
p. 49), we assess multicollinearity through a three stage approach by
1) considering the bivariate correlations between predictor variables;
2) analyzing the variance ination factors, and 3) assessing collinearity
diagnostic procedures. As is often the case with moderating effects, we
do nd some evidence of multicollinearity (see Cortina, 1993). In order
to ensure our results are robust, we therefore benchmarked our initial
data analysis (as presented in this text) with a set of regressions that
deployed the NeweyWest standard deviation, which is robust to
multicollinearity, and similar results were found. All our moderating
effects were standardized in order to be able to interpret the actual
impact on the dependent variable, as given by the magnitude of the
independent (moderating) variable(s).
In order to explore whether the role of trust and top management
is contingent upon whether the rm operates in a B2B or B2C market,
we split the sample into two sub-samples, representing B2B and B2C
rms, for four reasons; 1) as argued earlier, the industrial setting (B2B
vs. B2C) does not only alter the intercept of the dependent variable,
but also the slope effect of the independent and control variables;
2) adding another moderating effect would result in further multicollinearity problems; 3) the literature has expressed concerns regarding interpretation of moderating effects for binary variables; 4) our

8
We control for broad industry groups, including publishing, wholesale, nance, engineering, utilities, construction, transport, retail, leisure, consumer goods, chemicals
and others.
9
Supply chain process sophistication was captured at the rm, rather than the relationship, level and the questions were addressed to a senior procurement manager in
the company.

S. Hoejmose et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 41 (2012) 609620

sample size allows for such a split, without having any signicant implications for degrees of freedom and the subsequent critical values.
5. Results
Analyzing the descriptive data for rm GSCM engagement, we nd
strong support for Hypothesis 1, with signicant evidence that the
level of engagement with GSCM is greater in B2C markets than in
B2B markets. The mean GSCM score of rms in B2B and B2C sectors
is 2.23 and 2.52, respectively, and this is signicantly different at
the 95% level. Further, evidence of the comparatively low performance of GSCM in B2B supply chains is supported by Fig. 2. Fig. 2 illustrates the percentage of rms in the B2B and B2C sectors that lie
in each of the four quartiles of the GSCM score. As can be observed,
there is a greater proportion of B2B rms in the rst and second quartile, indicating that a high proportion of rms in B2B sectors have relatively weak overall engagement with GSCM. 58% of all rms in B2B
sectors score below the median for our sample, compared to just
less than 50% of the B2C sample. From Fig. 2, it is also clear that
rms in B2C sectors have signicantly higher levels of engagement
with green supply chain management, and with respect to the
upper quartile of the green score B2C comprise 32%, compared to
19% of B2B rms.
Having conrmed our expectations about the nature of the green
supply chain, which strongly suggested that rms in B2B markets are
generally less engaged with these practices compared to rms B2C markets, we turn our attention to Table 2, which explore the drivers of engagement with GSCM, paying particular attention to the roles of top
management support and trust.
The descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables used in
these models are provided in Table 1. Taking these into consideration,
along with the variance ination factors produced by our base models
1 and 5 in Table 2, we nd no evidence to suggest that mulicollinearity is a concern for our analysis.
The results from the hierarchical regressions are presented in
Table 2. Models 1 to 5 are concerned with rms in the B2B sector
and models 610 with rms in the B2C sectors. In the subsequent
analysis, comparison is drawn between the B2B and B2C models.
The table includes the base models 1 and 6, for B2B and B2C, respectively, with our control variables. Credibility, benevolence and top
management support are then added in models 2 and 7. In models
3 and 8, we then consider the interaction effect of top management
support and credibility. Similarly, we consider the interaction effect
of top management support and benevolence in models 4 and 9, before we add the interaction effect of top management support, credibility and benevolence in the nal models (5 and 10).
The explanatory power is satisfactory for cross-sectional models of
this type and the individual signicant levels provide substantial support for our preceding arguments. More specically, these ndings indicate that trust and top management support are important drivers

615

of GSCM, but that the nature of their inuence is highly context dependent, and considerably more important in B2B supply chains.
Our base models (1 and 6) explain approximately 17% and 14% of
the variation in the green supply chain management of rms in B2B
and B2C markets, respectively. When top management support, credibility and benevolence are included in models 2 and 7, we do not nd
support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b, which suggested that GSCM will be
positively related to trust, but we nd strong support for Hypothesis
3, which suggested a positive relationship between top management
and GSCM, but only in the B2B sector (p = 0.003).
In models 3 and 8, we nd support for Hypothesis 4a, which suggests that credibility positively moderates the role of top management support on GSCM, but only in the context of B2B supply
chains (model 3). In model 3, we observe a signicant increase in
the adjusted R-squared from 0.215 to 0.253, and we also observe
that this is due to the moderating effect of top management support
on credibility, which is strongly associated with improved GSCM engagement in the B2B market (p = 0.005). This suggests that when
rms have both top management support at the rm level and trust
(credibility) in the supplier they have greater GSCM engagement,
compared to rms that only have top management support. Given
the results of model 2, it further suggests that credibility is not sufcient for GSCM, but that it needs to be complemented with top management support in B2B markets. However, in model 8, which
explores the B2C market, we observe no relationship between top
management support or credibility and GSCM in the B2C market,
and neither is the change in the R-squared signicantly different to
model 7.
In models 4 and 9, benevolence is substituted for credibility as the
moderating inuence on top management, and the interaction effect
indicates support for Hypothesis 4b, as benevolence also moderates
the role of top management support on GSCM, but only in the context
of B2B supply chains (model 4) and not in B2C supply chains (model
9). We observe that the moderating effect of benevolence and top
management support is a strong predictor of GSCM (p = 0.012).
Given the negative coefcient of the standalone benevolence variable
in model 4, it suggests that benevolence is contingent upon top management support for GSCM in B2B markets, but not vice versa, as in
the case with top management support and credibility. Top management support and credibility thus appear to be stronger complements
to the improvement of GSCM. As with model 8, model 9 indicates that
neither trust nor top management support, has a signicant role in
the B2C market.
In the nal set of models, models 5 and 10, an interaction term between top management support, credibility and benevolence is added,
in order to capture a broader measurement of trust. As expected, we
nd similar results, which suggest that trust, in a broad sense, does signicantly moderate the role of top management support in inuencing
GSCM, although only in the B2B sector.
In terms of our control variables, the results provide substantial
support for earlier work, and our base model shows that rm size is
a strong predictor of GSCM in both B2B (p = 0.004) and B2C
(p = 0.038) supply chains. Similarly, the relative power imbalance between buyer and supplier is also important in both markets, and indicates that buyer is positively associated with GSCM processes. Finally,
we observe that supplier sophistication also plays an important role
GSCM in both B2B (p = 0.007) and B2C (p = 0.052) supply chains.
This effect, however, disappears in models 2 and 6, with the introduction of top management support.
6. Discussion

Fig. 2. % of rms in the B2B and B2C sector in each of the four quartiles of the GSCM score.

This study empirically examined the implementation of green


supply chain processes, within a cross-sectional sample of 340
buyersupplier relationships. More specically we examined whether such processes were signicantly different across business-to-

616

S. Hoejmose et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 41 (2012) 609620

Table 1
Descriptives and correlations.

1 Green supply chain management


2 Size (ln of employees)
3 Relationships length (ln year)
4 Product/supply complexity
5 Product/supply importance
6 Power imbalance
7 Supply chain sophistication
8 Business-to-business binary
9 Business-to-consumer binary
10 Top management support
11 Credibility
12 Benevolence

Mean

Std. deviation

10

11

2.38
8.95
1.81
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.48
0.52
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.81
2.06
0.96
1.00
1.00
1.28
1.00
0.50
0.50
1.00
1.00
1.00

0.16
0.03
0.07
0.11
0.13
0.24
0.18
0.18
0.32
0.12
0.13

0.00
0.02
0.19
0.15
0.08
0.04
0.04
0.12
0.01
0.03

0.08
0.19
0.03
0.07
0.01
0.01
0.06
0.04
0.03

0.36
0.32
0.09
0.07
0.07
0.04
0.15
0.21

0.26
0.26
0.11
0.11
0.10
0.04
0.09

0.03
0.07
0.07
0.08
0.17
0.18

0.18
0.18
0.41
0.09
0.11

1.00
0.25
0.07
0.08

0.25
0.07
0.08

0.10
0.08

0.64

N varies between 336340 for correlations due to missing data.

business and business-to-consumer sectors. In addition, we explored


how trust and top management support can facilitate green supply
chain practices for rms operating in the B2B sector.
We observe that green practices in B2B supply chains are considerably underdeveloped compared to those in B2C supply chains.
As such, we found compelling support for Hypothesis 1, and our results reect earlier conjectures that GSCM processes are less developed in the B2B sector. For example, the work of Gonzlez Benito
and Gonzlez Benito (2006) and Bowen (2002) indicates that rms
located further down the chain, and therefore not immediately visible
to consumers, might be relatively reactive in terms of their green efforts. Alternatively, it may be that rms in B2B markets lack the appropriate knowledge to systematically implement these processes,
because NGOs and policy intermediacies target rms that are close
to consumers.

Our results also suggest that green supply chain processes are
driven by a set of distinctively different characteristics in B2B markets
compared to B2C markets. In B2B markets, we observe that top management support plays a particularly strong role in the implementation of green supply chain processes. This is not, however, evident
for rms in the B2C sector. As such, our results support the work of
Pujari, Peattie, and Wright (2004), who argued that top management
is important for environmentally responsive industrial products, as
they not only allocate resources, but also drive the culture of the
rm. Our results suggest that this argument can be extended to the
implementation of GSCM processes. In B2C markets, GSCM is driven
by strategic imperatives, motivated by customer demand and the
risk of negative media attention. In B2B markets, rm GSCM activities
are not constrained by strategic imperatives, and hence managerial
preferences (top management support), are more important. The

Table 2
Regression results.

Dependent variable

Business to business sector

Business to consumer sector

Green supply chain management

Green supply chain management

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

Model 9

Model 10

Constant

1.690

2.025

2.05

1.701

Firm size

(0.310)
0.062

(0.468)
0.067

(0.486)
0.068

1.687
(0.486)
0.068

1.707

(0.307)
0.061

1.978
(0.306)
0.067

1.798

(0.309)
0.093

1.926
(0.315)
0.073

(0.479)
0.067

1.643
(0.487)
0.065

(0.032)
0.071
(0.118)
0.020
(0.052)
0.057
(0.060)
0.090
(0.066)
0.085

(0.032)
0.098
(0.119)
0.024
(0.053)
0.069
(0.060)
0.081
(0.067)
0.065
(0.048)
0.067
(0.062)
0.284
(0.195)

(0.032)
0.132
(0.127)
0.020
(0.072)
0.004
(0.067)
0.149

(0.033)
0.128
(0.131)
0.025
(0.074)
0.013
(0.073)
0.157

(0.032)
0.150
(0.130)
0.014
(0.073)
0.014
(0.070)
0.143

(0.032)
0.099
(0.129)
0.023
(0.074)
0.004
(0.073)
0.156

(0.033)
0.126
(0.130)
0.018
(0.074)
0.022
(0.073)
0.162

(0.070)
0.135
(0.053)
0.144
(0.074)

(0.072)
0.131
(0.055)
0.098
(0.086)
0.125
(0.079)
0.049
(0.077)
0.053
(0.087)

(0.071)
0.128
(0.055)
0.087
(0.085)
0.056
(0.369)
0.044
(0.377)

(0.071)
0.122
(0.054)
0.097
(0.085)
0.493
(0.340)

(0.072)
0.130
(0.054)
0.090
(0.086)
0.341

Foreign supplier
Relationship length
Product complexity
Product importance
Power imbalance
Supply chain sophistication

(0.032)
0.084
(0.124)
0.005
(0.054)
0.094
(0.062)
0.080
(0.070)
0.102
(0.047)
0.162
(0.059)

Top management support

(0.032)
0.092
(0.122)
0.029
(0.054)
0.061
(0.062)
0.089
(0.068)
0.053
(0.049)
0.078
(0.063)
0.186
(0.061)
0.017
(0.080)
0.090
(0.073)

Credibility
Benevolence
Top management Credibility

(0.048)
0.087
(0.061)
0.523
(0.252)
0.541
(0.225)

1.040
(0.362)

Top management Benevolence

0.393
(0.201)

0.747
(0.294)

Top management Credibility Benevolence


R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
p b 0.01.
p b 0.05.
p b 0.1.

0.25
0.17

0.32
0.22

0.35
0.25

0.34
0.25

(0.032)
0.085
(0.118)
0.009
(0.053)
0.066
(0.060)
0.096
(0.066)
0.073
(0.048)
0.064
(0.062)
0.150
(0.122)
0.202
(0.105)
0.246
(0.128)

0.409
(0.400)

(0.183)
0.246
(0.169)
0.194
(0.209)

0.086
(0.518)

0.719
(0.229)
0.36
0.27

0.569
(0.514)

0.22
0.14

0.24
0.14

0.24
0.14

0.25
0.15

0.435
(0.333)
0.25
0.15

S. Hoejmose et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 41 (2012) 609620

role of top management in B2B industries was also emphasized by interview responses from supply chain managers. They often mentioned
that top management was driving environmental processes, and
that GSCM was a part of the rm's DNA or ethos.
The results also suggest that buyer perceptions of supplier credibility
and benevolence are not, as stand-alone constructs, important for rms
in B2B or B2C markets. However, when rms in B2B markets have top
management support, both credibility and benevolence in suppliers become additional important resources that can enhance the implementation of green processes. Such relationships are, however, not apparent
in the B2C sector. Credibility and benevolence is likely to create stability,
commitment (Deitz, Tokman, Richey, & Morgan, 2010) and improve collaborative efforts (Bunduchi, 2008), which furthers a rm's ability to implement sound green processes with their suppliers, as long as the rm
in the B2B market has top management support. It may also be argued
that credibility and benevolence create a type of insurance for top management that convinces them that investment in green activities is viable because the relationship is one that is focused on mutual gains and
longevity. Some of the respondents interviewed for this research explicitly noted how trust inuenced GSCM. For example, one participant said:
We trust this supplier. They know us well and they understand the serious nature of what we are talking about., while another mentioned
that they build up a relationship with [suppliers] of trust and friendship
so that they [suppliers] bring [environmental] issues to us.
6.1. Managerial implications
Our ndings, which suggest that rms in B2B supply chains are less
likely to implement GSCM processes, than rms in B2C supply chains,
may have signicant consequences for practitioners. Although environmental proactivity has historically been associated with close proximity
to consumers, because the length of the supply chain buffers the pressure and the environmental efforts of the company on public opinion
(Gonzlez Benito & Gonzlez Benito, 2006; p. 93), GSCM is becoming an
increasingly important issue for rms in the B2B sector. For example,
Gonzlez Benito and Gonzlez Benito (2006) note how the automobile
industry has started to exert signicant pressure on the entire supply
chain to ensure sound environmental standards. There is also evidence
that of increasing pressure for suppliers and sub-operators to develop
environmental management systems, such as ISO 14001 (Darnall,
2006; Darnall et al., 2008). Similarly, Esty and Winston (2009; p. xiv)
note that no company will escape the growing B2B pressure to reduce
environmental impact.
The roles of B2B marketers are therefore twofold: First, they have
to be aware of the consequences of the green movement as it has an
impact across the entire marketing mix (Miles, Munilla, & Russell,
1997), and they have an important role anticipating and preparing
the company for future trends, of which one is business customer expectations of environmental excellence (Sharma et al., 2010). If B2B
supply chain practitioners are not ready to respond to this inevitable
change in the marketplace then they risk losing business customers,
who, in turn, are increasingly expected to implement and ensure
sound GSCM performance by their suppliers (Perry & Towers,
2009). Second, B2B practitioners must make the business case for
GSCM and leverage their environmental credentials with their
other marketing activities, in order to make such activities strategic
and a success for the business (Lantos, 2001). Failure to either anticipate business consumers' demand or to integrate GSCM with the
rms marketing strategy can have signicant implications for both
the rms' environmental and economic success (Rao & Holt, 2005).
Similarly, there exist considerable opportunities for rms in the B2B
sector. By having a proactive environmental strategy they can achieve
considerable rst-mover advantages, including cost reductions and
winning contracts (Kleindorfer et al., 2005; Miles & Covin, 2000).
Our results show that rms in B2B markets are lagging behind
their counterparts in the B2C markets, in terms of GSCM practices.

617

As such, it leaves considerable scope for industrial supply chain practitioners to advocate and excel GSCM processes, which may be used
to win business from down-stream buyers. Nonetheless, this process
requires commitment and support from top management, and will be
enhanced if supply chain managers have established trustful relationships with their suppliers.
6.2. Limitations and further research opportunities
This study is concerned with buyer perceptions of the process of
implementing green supply chain management within particular
supply chain relationships. We have therefore chosen to use a methodology which focuses on buyer perception rather than a dyadic approach and our results are not concerned with green performance
of the supplier. Although we expect a strong link between process
and performance, further should consider the relationships between
implementing (process) GSCM and subsequent GSCM performance
in the supplier.
The data for this research was captured prior to the global nancial crisis, and it is likely that this event has also had an inuence on
rm engagement with GSCM. Although this may inuence the level
of engagement with GSCM, we would expect the observed relationship between top management support, trust and GSCM to remain
signicant. However, further research may consider the impact of
the nancial crisis on the level of engagement with GSCM in B2B
and B2C markets.
The analysis is based on ve dimensions of GSCM, which all loaded
on a single factor, with a Cronbach alpha of 0.911. This suggests that
we have a fairly robust measure of GSCM processes (Bloom & Van
Reenen, 2007), but we acknowledge that green supply chain management may extend beyond these ve dimensions as it is a complex
and often multifaceted task to ensure sound green processes within
the supply chain. Similarly, although social desirability bias cannot be
completely ruled out, the methodology deployed ensures that such
issues are minimized.
Finally, our study suggests that trust, in connection with top management support, is a signicant factor in GSCM, but we do not consider the mechanism through which trust inuences such elements
as transaction costs, social capital and propensity to collaborate,
which in turn may be important for GSCM (Cheng et al., 2008; Tate
et al., 2011; Vachon & Klassen, 2008). Further research is therefore
needed to examine the exact role of trust in the development of
GSCM.
6.3. Conclusion
Green initiatives have often been the subject of B2C supply
chains, but increasingly this is becoming an important issue for B2B
supply chains, since business consumers are increasingly demanding
sound green performance from their suppliers. Within this study
we have explored the relative engagement with GSCM among both
B2B and B2C supply chains, and found that such activities are relatively neglected in the B2B market. We argue that the generally lower engagement with GSCM in B2B supply chains reects lack of visibility
and distance from end household consumers. Nonetheless, we argue
that there are conditions under which GSCM will thrive in B2B settings, notably with top management support and when this is
coupled with trust in the supplier. Our ndings support these arguments, and we verify the importance of trust and top management
support in driving GSCM in B2B supply chains. In contrast, trust appears to be insignicant in B2C supply chains. Finally we outline the
managerial implications of our ndings, and suggest that B2B marketers can, and need to, take advantage of the limited engagement
with GSCM in the B2B sector as there are signicant opportunities
for rst-mover advantages, gained from both reducing costs and winning contracts.

618

S. Hoejmose et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 41 (2012) 609620

Appendix A
Likert scale 17: strongly disagree vs. strongly agree
Top management support adapted from Cousins et al. (2006)
Top management is supportive of our efforts to improve environmentally supply
chain management
In this company, environmentally responsible supply chain is considered a vital
part of our corporate strategy
Purchasing views on environmentally responsible buying are considered
important in most top managers' eyes
Cronbach alpha: 0.850
Supplier credibility adapted from Ganesan (1994)
This supplier's representative has been frank in dealing with us
Promises made by this supplier's representative are reliable
If problems such as shipment delays arise, the supplier's representative is honest
about the problems
This supplier's representative has problems answering our questions
Cronbach alpha: 0.855
Supplier benevolence adapted from Ganesan (1994)
This supplier's representative cares for us
In times of shortages, this supplier's representative has done more for us than
we could possibly expect
This supplier's representative is like a friend
We feel that this representative has been on our side
Cronbach alpha: 0.803
Product complexity adapted from Cannon and Perreault (1999)
Compared to other purchases your rm makes, the product/service is: simple
vs. complex
Compared to other purchases your rm makes, the product/service is:
complicated vs. uncomplicated
Compared to other purchases your rm makes, the product/service is: technical
vs. non-technical
Cronbach alpha: 0.910
Product importance adapted from Stump and Heide (1996)
This item represents a major proportion of the end product's value
This item represents an unimportant element of the end product
This item's specication and quality have a large impact on the performance of
the end product
Cronbach alpha: 0.854
Supplier dependence adapted from Ganesan (1994)
We are important to this supplier
We account for a large proportion of this suppliers' total sales
If we stopped buying from this supplier they would nd it difcult to ll the gap
in their order book
Cronbach alpha: 0.879
Buyer dependence adapted from Ganesan (1994)
This supplier is crucial to our future performance
It would be difcult for us to replace this supplier
We are dependent on this supplier
We do not have a good alternative to this supplier
Cronbach alpha: 0.857
Supply chain sophistication adapted from Lee and Humphreys (2007)
We use established guidelines and procedures when evaluating supplier performance
We perform site visits to supplier premises to help improve their performance
We invite supplier personnel to our premises to increase awareness of how their
product is used
Cronbach alpha: 0.747

References
Adriana, B. (2009). Environmental supply chain management in tourism: The case of
large tour operators. Journal of Cleaner Production, 17(16), 13851392.
Akintoye, A., McIntosh, G., & Fitzgerald, E. (2000). A survey of supply chain collaboration and management in the UK construction industry. European Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management, 6(34), 159168.
Andersen, P. H., & Kumar, R. (2006). Emotions, trust and relationship development in business relationships: A conceptual model for buyerseller dyads. Industrial Marketing
Management, 35(4), 522535.
Armstrong, J. S., & Overton, T. S. (1977). Estimating nonresponse bias in mail surveys.
Journal of Marketing Research, 14(3), 396402.
Arnott, D. C. (2007). Trust Current thinking and future research. European Journal of
Marketing, 41(9/10), 981987.
Badenhorst, J. A. (1994). Unethical behaviour in procurement: A perspective on causes
and solutions. Journal of Business Ethics, 13(9), 739745.
Ballou, R. H., Gilbert, S. M., & Mukherjee, A. (2000). New managerial challenges from
supply chain opportunities. Industrial Marketing Management, 29(1), 718.
Bansal, P., & Bogner, W. C. (2002). Deciding on ISO 14001: Economics, institutions, and
context. Long Range Planning, 35(3), 269290.

Barney, J. B., & Hansen, M. H. (1994). Trustworthiness as a source of competitive advantage. Strategic Management Journal, 15, 175190.
Batt, P. J. (2008). Building social capital in networks. Industrial Marketing Management,
37(5), 487491.
Beamon, B. M. (1999). Designing the green supply chain. Logistics Information Management,
12(4), 332342.
Bechtel, C., & Jayaram, J. (1997). Supply chain management: A strategic perspective.
International Journal of Logistics Management, 8(1), 1534.
Blois, K. J. (1999). Trust in business to business relationships: An evaluation of its status. Journal of Management Studies, 36(2), 197215.
Bloom, N., & Van Reenen, J. (2007). Measuring and explaining management practices
across rms and countries. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4), 13511408.
Bowen, F. E. (2000). Environmental visibility: A trigger of green organizational response? Business Strategy and the Environment, 9(2), 92107.
Bowen, F. (2002). Does size matter?: Organizational slack and visibility as alternative
explanations for environmental. Business & Society, 41(1), 118124.
Bowen, F. E., Cousins, P. D., Lamming, R. C., & Farukt, A. C. (2001). The role of supply
management capabilities in green supply. Production and Operations Management,
10(2), 174189.
Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2002). Social capital and community governance. The Economic
Journal, 112(483), 419436.
Boyd, D. E., Spekman, R. E., Kamauff, J. W., & Werhane, P. (2007). Corporate social responsibility in global supply chains: A procedural justice perspective. Long Range
Planning, 40(3), 341356.
Brammer, S., & Millington, A. (2006). Firm size, organizational visibility and corporate philanthropy: An empirical analysis. Business Ethics: A European Review, 15(1), 618.
Bunduchi, R. (2008). Trust, power and transaction costs in B2B exchanges A socioeconomic approach. Industrial Marketing Management, 37(5), 610622.
Buysse, K., & Verbeke, A. (2003). Proactive environmental strategies: A stakeholder
management perspective. Strategic Management Journal, 24(5), 453470.
Canning, L., & Hanmer Lloyd, S. (2001). Managing the environmental adaptation process in suppliercustomer relationships. Business Strategy and the Environment,
10(4), 225237.
Canning, L., & Hanmer-Lloyd, S. (2007). Trust in buyer-seller relationships: The challenge of environmental (green) adaptation. European Journal of Marketing,
41(9/10), 10731095.
Cannon, J. P., & Perreault, W. D., Jr. (1999). Buyer-seller relationships in business markets. Journal of Marketing Research, 439460.
Carter, C. R., & Carter, J. R. (1998). Interorganizational determinants of environmental
purchasing: Initial evidence from the consumer products industries. Decision Sciences, 29(3), 659684.
Carter, C. R., & Dresner, M. (2001). Purchasing's role in environmental management: crossfunctional development of grounded theory. Journal of Supply Chain Management: A
Global Review of Purchasing & Supply, 37(3), 1227.
Carter, C. R., & Jennings, M. M. (2004). The role of purchasing in corporate social responsibility: A structural equation analysis. Journal of Business Logistics, 25(1),
145186.
Carter, C. R., Kale, R., & Grimm, C. M. (2000). Environmental purchasing and rm performance: An empirical investigation. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and
Transportation Review, 36(3), 219228.
Casciaro, T., & Piskorski, M. J. (2005). Power imbalance, mutual dependence, and constraint absorption: A closer look at resource dependence theory. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 50(2), 167199.
Cater, T., & Cater, B. (2010). Product and relationship quality inuence on customer
commitment and loyalty in B2B manufacturing relationships. Industrial Marketing
Management, 39(8), 13211333.
Chan, H. K. (2007). A pro-active and collaborative approach to reverse logistics A
case study. Production Planning and Control, 18(4), 350360.
Chandra, C., & Kumar, S. (2000). Supply chain management in theory and practice: A
passing fad or a fundamental change? Industrial Management & Data Systems,
100(3), 100114.
Cheng, J. H., Yeh, C. H., & Tu, C. W. (2008). Trust and knowledge sharing in green supply
chains. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 13(4), 283295.
Christopher, M. (2000). The agile supply chain: Competing in volatile markets. Industrial Marketing Management, 29(1), 3744.
Claro, D. P., & Claro, P. B. O. (2010). Collaborative buyer-supplier relationships and
downstream information in marketing channels. Industrial Marketing Management,
39(2), 221228.
Claro, D. P., Hagelaar, G., & Omta, O. (2003). The determinants of relational governance
and performance: How to manage business relationships? Industrial Marketing
Management, 32(8), 703716.
Cortina, J. M. (1993). Interaction, nonlinearity, and multicollinearity: Implications for
multiple regression. Journal of Management, 19(4), 915922.
Cousins, P. D., Lawson, B., & Squire, B. (2006). An empirical taxonomy of purchasing
functions. International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 26(7),
775794.
Crane, A. (1999). Are You Ethical? Please Tick Yes or No on Researching Ethics in Business Organizations. Journal of Business Ethics, 20(3), 237248.
Cruz, J. M. (2008). Dynamics of supply chain networks with corporate social responsibility through integrated environmental decision-making. European Journal of Operational Research, 184(3), 10051031.
Daily, B. F., & Huang, S. (2001). Achieving sustainability through attention to human resource
factors in environmental management. International Journal of Operations & Production
Management, 21(12), 15391552.
Darnall, N. (2006). Why rms mandate ISO 14001 certication. Business & Society,
45(3), 354381.

S. Hoejmose et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 41 (2012) 609620


Darnall, N., Jolley, G. J., & Handeld, R. (2008). Environmental management systems
and green supply chain management: Complements for sustainability? Business
Strategy and the Environment, 17(1), 3045.
Deitz, G. D., Tokman, M., Richey, R. G., & Morgan, R. M. (2010). Joint venture stability
and cooperation: Direct, indirect and contingent effects of resource complementarity and trust. Industrial Marketing Management, 39(5), 862873.
del Bosque Rodriguez, I. R., Agudo, J. C., & San Martin Gutierrez, H. (2006). Determinants of economic and social satisfaction in manufacturerdistributor relationships. Industrial Marketing Management, 35(6), 666675.
Doney, P. M., & Cannon, J. P. (1997). An examination of the nature of trust in buyer
seller relationships. The Journal of Marketing, 61(2), 3551.
Doty, D. H., & Glick, W. H. (1998). Common methods bias: does common methods variance really bias results? Organizational Research Methods, 1(4), 374406.
Drumwright, M. (1994). Socially responsible organizational buying: environmental
concern as a noneconomic buying criterion. The Journal of Marketing, 119.
Ellinger, A. E. (2000). Improving marketing/logistics cross-functional collaboration in
the supply chain. Industrial Marketing Management, 29(1), 8596.
Epstein, M., & Roy, M. J. (1998). Managing corporate environmental performance: A
multinational perspective. European Management Journal, 16(3), 284296.
Esty, D. C., & Winston, A. S. (2009). Green to gold: How smart companies use environmental
strategy to innovate, create value, and build competitive advantage. John Wiley & Sons Inc.
Fawcett, S. E., Ogden, J. A., Magnan, G. M., & Cooper, M. B. (2006). Organizational commitment and governance for supply chain success. International Journal of Physical
Distribution and Logistics Management, 36(1), 2235.
Finch, J., Wagner, B., & Hynes, N. (2010). Trust and forms of capital in business-tobusiness activities and relationships. Industrial Marketing Management, 39(6),
10191027.
Font, X., Tapper, R., Schwartz, K., & Kornilaki, M. (2008). Sustainable supply chain management in tourism. Business Strategy and the Environment, 17(4), 260271.
Ganesan, S. (1994). Determinants of long-term orientation in buyerseller relationships. The Journal of Marketing, 58(2), 119.
Gold, S., Seuring, S., & Beske, P. (2010). Sustainable supply chain management and inter
organizational resources: A literature review. Corporate Social Responsibility and
Environmental Management, 17(4), 230245.
Gonzlez Benito, J., & Gonzlez Benito, . (2006). A review of determinant factors of
environmental proactivity. Business Strategy and the Environment, 15(2), 87102.
Green, K., Morton, B., & New, S. (1996). Purchasing and environmental management:
interactions, policies and opportunities. Business Strategy and the Environment,
5(3), 188197.
Guide, V. D. R., Jr., & Van Wassenhove, L. N. (2002). The reverse supply chain. Harvard
Business Review, 80(2), 2526.
Haddock Fraser, J., & Fraser, I. (2008). Assessing corporate environmental reporting motivations: Differences between close to market and business to business companies.
Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, 15(3), 140155.
Haddock-Fraser, J. E., & Tourelle, M. (2010). Corporate motivations for environmental
sustainable development: Exploring the role of consumers in stakeholder engagement. Business Strategy and the Environment, 19(8), 527542.
Hagelaar, G. J. L. F., van der Vorst, J. G. A. J., & Marcelis, W. J. (2004). Organising lifecycles in supply chains: Linking environmental performance to managerial designs. Greener Management International, 45, 2742.
Hall, J. (2000). Environmental supply chain dynamics. Journal of Cleaner Production,
8(6), 455471.
Handeld, R. B., & Bechtel, C. (2002). The role of trust and relationship structure in improving supply chain responsiveness. Industrial Marketing Management, 31(4),
367382.
Hart, S. L. (1992). An integrative framework for strategy-making processes. The Academy
of Management Review, 17(2), 327351.
Hartman, C. L., & Stafford, E. R. (1997). Green alliances: Building new business with environmental groups. Long Range Planning, 30(2), 184196.
Harvey, M. G., Novicevic, M. M., Hench, T., & Myers, M. (2003). Global account management: A supply-side managerial view. Industrial Marketing Management, 32(7),
563571.
Hawes, J. (1994). To know me is to trust me. Industrial Marketing Management, 23(3),
215219.
Hervani, A. A., Helms, M. M., & Sarkis, J. (2005). Performance measurement for green
supply chain management. Benchmarking: An International Journal, 12(4), 330353.
Hingley, M. (2005). Power to all our friends? Living with imbalance in supplier-retailer
relationships. Industrial Marketing Management, 34(8), 848858.
Hult, G. T. M., Ketchen, D. J., & Arrfelt, M. (2007). Strategic supply chain management:
Improving performance through a culture of competitiveness and knowledge development. Strategic Management Journal, 28(10), 10351052.
Ireland, R. D., & Webb, J. W. (2007). A multi-theoretic perspective on trust and power
in strategic supply chains. Journal of Operations Management, 25(2), 482497.
Jamali, D., & Mirshak, R. (2007). Corporate social responsibility (CSR): Theory and practice in a developing country context. Journal of Business Ethics, 72(3), 243262.
Johnston, D. A., McCutcheon, D. M., Stuart, F. I., & Kerwood, H. (2004). Effects of supplier trust on performance of cooperative supplier relationships. Journal of operations
Management, 22(1), 2338.
King, S. F., & Burgess, T. F. (2008). Understanding success and failure in customer relationship management. Industrial Marketing Management, 37(4), 421431.
Klassen, R. D., & McLaughlin, C. P. (1993). TQM and environmental excellence in
manufacturing. Industrial Management & Data Systems, 93(6), 1422.
Kleindorfer, P. R., Singhal, K., & Wassenhove, L. N. (2005). Sustainable operations management. Production and Operations Management, 14(4), 482492.
Kraljic, P. (1983). Purchasing must become supply management. Harvard Business Review,
61(5), 109117.

619

Krause, D. R. (1997). Supplier development: Current practices and outcomes. Journal of


Supply Chain Management, 33(2), 1219.
Krause, D. R., Handeld, R. B., & Tyler, B. B. (2007). The relationships between supplier
development, commitment, social capital accumulation and performance improvement. Journal of Operations Management, 25(2), 528545.
Krause, D. R., & Scannell, T. V. (2002). Supplier development practices: Product- and servicebased industry comparisons. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 38(2), 1321.
Kwon, I. W. G., & Suh, T. (2005). Trust, commitment and relationships in supply chain
management: A path analysis. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal,
10(1), 2633.
Lamming, R., & Hampson, J. (1996). The environment as a supply chain management
issue. British Journal of Management, 7, 4562.
Lantos, G. P. (2001). The boundaries of strategic corporate social responsibility. Journal
of Consumer Marketing, 18(7), 595632.
Lee, K. H., & Kim, J. W. (2009). Current status of CSR in the realm of supply management: The case of the Korean electronics industry. Supply Chain Management: An
International Journal, 14(2), 138148.
Lee, P. K. C., & Humphreys, P. K. (2007). The role of Guanxi in supply management practices. International Journal of Production Economics, 106(2), 450467.
Lee, S. -Y. (2008). Drivers for the participation of small and medium-sized suppliers in
green supply chain initiatives. Supply Chain Management, 13(3), 185198.
Leenders, M. R., & Fearon, N. H. E. (2008). Developing Purchasing's Foundation*. Journal
of Supply Chain Management, 44(2), 1727.
Lo, V. H. Y., & Yeung, A. H. W. (2004). Practical framework for strategic alliance in Pearl
River Delta manufacturing supply chain: A total quality approach. International
Journal of Production Economics, 87(3), 231240.
Lummus, R. R., & Vokurka, R. J. (1999). Dening supply chain management: A historical perspective and practical guidelines. Industrial Management & Data Systems, 99(1), 1117.
Mariotti, J. L. (1999). The trust factor in supply chain management. Supply Chain Management Review, 3(1), 7077.
Mentzer, J. T., Min, S., & Zacharia, Z. G. (2000). The nature of interrm partnering in
supply chain management. Journal of Retailing, 76(4), 549568.
Michaelis, P. (1995). Product stewardship, waste minimization and economic efciency: Lessons from Germany. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 38(2), 231244.
Miles, M. P., & Covin, J. G. (2000). Environmental marketing: A source of reputational,
competitive, and nancial advantage. Journal of Business Ethics, 23(3), 299311.
Miles, M. P., Munilla, L. S., & Russell, G. R. (1997). Marketing and environmental registration/certication: What industrial marketers should understand about ISO
14000. Industrial Marketing Management, 26(4), 363370.
Millington, A. (2008). Responsibility in the supply chain. In A. Crane, A. McWilliams, D.
Matten, Moon, & D. Siegel (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of corporate social responsibility
(pp. 363383).
Min, H., & Galle, W. P. (2001). Green purchasing practices of US rms. International
Journal of Operations & Production Management, 21(9), 12221238.
Naud, P., & Buttle, F. (2000). Assessing relationship quality. Industrial Marketing
Management, 29(4), 351361.
Ndubisi, N. O. (2011). Conict handling, trust and commitment in outsourcing relationship: A Chinese and Indian study. Industrial Marketing Management, 40(1), 109117.
Nyaga, G. N., Whipple, J. M., & Lynch, D. F. (2010). Examining supply chain relationships: Do buyer and supplier perspectives on collaborative relationships differ?
Journal of Operations Management, 28(2), 101114.
Pedersens, E. R., & Andersen, M. (2006). Safeguarding corporate social responsibility in
global supply chains: How codes of conduct are managed in buyersupplier relationships. Journal of Public Affairs, 6, 228240.
Perry, P., & Towers, N. (2009). Determining the antecedents for a strategy of corporate
social responsibility by small-and medium-sized enterprises in the UK fashion apparel industry. Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, 16(5), 377385.
Ploetner, O., & Ehret, M. (2006). From relationships to partnerships New forms of cooperation between buyer and seller. Industrial Marketing Management, 35(1), 49.
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J. Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). Common method
biases in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and recommended
remedies. Journal of applied psychology, 88(5), 879894.
Porter, M. E., & van der Linde, C. (1995). Green and competitive: Ending the stalemate.
Harvard Business Review, 73(5), 120134.
Preuss, L. (2001). In dirty chains? Purchasing and greener manufacturing. Journal of
Business Ethics, 34, 345359.
Pujari, D., Peattie, K., & Wright, G. (2004). Organizational antecedents of environmental responsiveness in industrial new product development. Industrial Marketing Management,
33(5), 381391.
Putnam, R. (2001). Social capital: Measurement and consequences. Canadian Journal of
Policy Research, 2(1), 4151.
Randall, D. M., & Fernandes, M. F. (1991). The social desirability response bias in ethics
research. Journal of Business Ethics, 10(11), 805817.
Rao, P., & Holt, D. (2005). Do green supply chains lead to competitiveness and economic performance? International Journal of Operations and Production Management, 25(9),
898916.
Rivera-Camino, J. (2007). Re-evaluating green marketing strategy: A stakeholder perspective. European Journal of Marketing, 41(11/12), 13281358.
Roberts, S. (2003). Supply chain specic? Understanding the patchy success of ethical
sourcing initiatives. Journal of Business Ethics, 44, 159170.
Roht-Arriaza, N. (1996). Developing countries, regional organizations, and the ISO 14001
environmental management standard. The Georgetown International Environmental
Law Review, 9, 583.
Rondinelli, D. A., & London, T. (2003). How corporations and environmental groups cooperate: Assessing cross-sector alliances and collaborations. The Academy of Management
Executive, 17(1), 6176.

620

S. Hoejmose et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 41 (2012) 609620

Rothenberg, S., Pil, F. K., & Maxwell, J. (2001). Lean, green, and the quest for superior environmental performance. Production and Operations Management, 10(3), 228243.
Salam, M. (2009). Corporate social responsibility in purchasing and supply chain. Journal
of Business Ethics, 85, 355370.
Sarkis, J., Zhu, Q., & Lai, K. (2011). An organizational theoretic review of green supply chain
management literature. International Journal of Production Economics, 130, 115.
SAT (2003). State-of-the-Art Technology in the Electronics Industry Innovation System,
Summary Report, G1RT-CT-200205066. Austrian Society for Systems Engineering
and Automation, Vienna: European Community Project-GROWTH Programme.
Seppanen, R., Blomqvist, K., & Sundqvist, S. (2007). Measuring inter-organizational
trust A critical review of the empirical research in 19902003. Industrial Marketing
Management, 36(2), 249265.
Sharma, A., Iyer, G. R., Mehrotra, A., & Krishnan, R. (2010). Sustainability and business-tobusiness marketing: A framework and implications. Industrial Marketing Management,
39(2), 330341.
Sharma, S., & Vredenburg, H. (1998). Proactive corporate environmental strategy and
the development of competitively valuable organizational capabilities. Strategic
Management Journal, 19(8), 729753.
Sheth, J. N., & Sharma, A. (1997). Supplier relationships: Emerging issues and challenges. Industrial Marketing Management, 26(2), 91100.
Simpson, D. F., & Power, D. J. (2005). Use the supply relationship to develop lean and
green suppliers. Supply Chain Management, 10(1), 6068.
Skarmeas, D. A., & Katsikeas, C. S. (2001). Drivers of superior importer performance in
cross-cultural supplierreseller relationships. Industrial Marketing Management,
30(2), 227241.
Spekman, R. E., Spear, J., & Kamauff, J. (2002). Supply chain competency: Learning as a
key component. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 7(1), 4155.
Srivastava, S. K. (2007). Green supply-chain management: A state-of-the-art literature
review. International Journal of Management Reviews, 9(1), 5380.
Stewart, J. R., Collins, M. W., Anderson, R., & Murphy, W. R. (1999). Life Cycle Assessment as a tool for environmental management. Clean Products and Processes,
1(2), 7381.
Stump, R. L., & Heide, J. B. (1996). Controlling supplier opportunism in industrial relationships. Journal of Marketing Research, 431441.
Suh, T., & Kwon, I. W. G. (2006). Matter over mind: When specic asset investment affects calculative trust in supply chain partnership. Industrial Marketing Management,
35(2), 191201.
Tate, W. L., Dooley, K. J., & Ellram, L. M. (2011). Transaction cost and institutional drivers
of supplier adoption of environmental practices. Journal of Business Logistics, 32(1),
616.
Thong, J. Y. L., Yap, C. S., & Raman, K. (1996). Top management support, external expertise
and information systems implementation in small businesses. Information Systems
Research, 7(2), 248267.
Vachon, S., & Klassen, R. D. (2006). Green project partnership in the supply chain: The
case of the package printing industry. Journal of Cleaner Production, 14(67),
661671.
Vachon, S., & Klassen, R. D. (2006). Extending green practices across the supply chain: The
impact of upstream and downstream integration. International Journal of Operations
& Production Management, 26(7), 795821.
Vachon, S., & Klassen, R. (2007). Supply chain management and environmental technologies: The role of integration. International Journal of Production Research,
45(2), 401423.
Vachon, S., & Klassen, R. D. (2008). Environmental management and manufacturing
performance: The role of collaboration in the supply chain. International Journal
of Production Economics, 111(2), 299315.
Vargo, S. L., & Lusch, R. F. (2011). It's all B2B... and beyond: Toward a systems perspective of the market. Industrial Marketing Management, 40(2), 181187.
Verghese, K., & Lewis, H. (2007). Environmental innovation in industrial packaging: A
supply chain approach. International Journal of Production Research, 45(18/19),
43814401.
Voeth, M., & Herbst, U. (2006). Supply-chain pricing A new perspective on pricing in
industrial markets. Industrial Marketing Management, 35(1), 8390.
Walker, H., Di Sisto, L., & McBain, D. (2008). Drivers and barriers to environmental supply
chain management practices: Lessons from the public and private sectors. Journal of
Purchasing & Supply Management, 14(1), 6985.
Walker, H., & Phillips, W. (2009). Sustainable procurement: Emerging issues. International
Journal of Procurement Management, 2(1), 4161.
Walton, S. V., Handeld, R. B., & Melnyk, S. A. (1998). The green supply chain: Integrating suppliers into environmental management processes. Journal of Supply Chain
Management, 34(2), 211.
Wang, C. L. (2007). Guanxi vs. relationship marketing: Exploring underlying differences. Industrial Marketing Management, 36(1), 8186.
Welford, R., & Frost, S. (2006). Corporate social responsibility in Asian supply chains.
Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, 13(3), 166176.

White, P. R., De Smet, B., Owens, J. W., & Hindle, P. (1995). Environmental management in
an international consumer goods company. Resources, Conservation and Recycling,
14(34), 171184.
Williamson, O. E. (1979). Transaction-cost economics: The governance of contractual
relations. Journal of Law and Economics, 22(2), 233261.
Williamson, O. E. (1993). Contested exchange versus the governance of contractual relations. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(1), 103108.
Williamson, O. E. (2008). Outsourcing: Transaction cost economic and supply chain
management*. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 44(2), 516.
Wren, B. M., Souder, W. E., & Berkowitz, D. (2000). Market orientation and new product
development in global industrial rms. Industrial Marketing Management, 29(6),
601611.
Wu, H. J., & Dunn, S. C. (1995). Environmentally responsible logistics systems. International
Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management, 25(2), 2038.
Wycherley, I. (1999). Greening supply chains: The case of the Body Shop International.
Business Strategy and the Environment, 8(2), 120127.
Young, R., & Jordan, E. (2008). Top management support: Mantra or necessity? International
Journal of Project Management, 26(7), 713725.
Zhu, Q., & Sarkis, J. (2006). An inter-sectoral comparison of green supply chain management in China: Drivers and practices. Journal of Cleaner Production, 14(5),
472486.
Zhu, Q., Sarkis, J., & Geng, Y. (2005). Green supply chain management in China: Pressures, practices and performance. International Journal of Operations & Production
Management, 25(5), 449468.
Zhu, Q., Sarkis, J., & Lai, K. -H. (2008). Green supply chain management implications for
closing the loop. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review,
44(1), 118.

Further Reading
Doney, P. M., Barry, J. M., & Abratt, R. (2007). Trust determinants and outcomes in global B2B services. European Journal of Marketing, 41(9/10), 10961116.
Fearon, H. E. (1968). Historical evolution of the purchasing function. Journal of Purchasing,
4(1), 4359.
Krause, D. R., & Ellram, L. M. (1997). Success factors in supplier development. International
Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management, 27(1), 3952.
Krueger, D. (2008). The ethics of global supply chains in China Convergences of east
and west. Journal of Business Ethics, 79(1), 113120.
Lambert, D. M., Cooper, M. C., & Pagh, J. D. (1998). Supply chain management: Implementation issues and research opportunities. International Journal of Logistics Management,
9(2), 120.
Lancastre, A., & Lages, L. F. (2006). The relationship between buyer and a B2B emarketplace: Cooperation determinants in an electronic market context. Industrial
Marketing Management, 35(6), 774789.
Peattie, K., & Ratnayaka, M. (1992). Responding to the green movement. Industrial Marketing
Management, 21(2), 103110.
Vaaland, T. I., Heide, M., & Grnhaug, K. (2008). Corporate social responsibility: investigating theory and research in the marketing context. European Journal of Marketing,
42(9/10), 927953.
Stefan Hoejmose is a Lecturer in CSR and Strategy at the University of Bath. His research investigates how rms manage social and environmental issues in their supply
chains. In particular, his research is concerned with the issues of business strategy,
power-dependency and trust and their respective role in facilitating responsible supply chain practices.
Stephen Brammer is Professor of Strategy in the Marketing and Strategic Management
Group at Warwick Business School. His research lies principally in the areas of business
ethics and corporate social responsibility. Specically, his research explores rm
stakeholder relationships, the strategic management of these, and the impacts of these
upon company performance and reputation. His research has been widely published in
leading journals such as the Strategic Management Journal, Journal of Management
Studies, Organisation Studies, Financial Management, and the Journal of Business
Research.
Andrew Millington is Professor of Business and Society at the University of Bath. His
research investigates how companies manage issues of ethics and corporate responsibility, with a particular focus on multinational companies and doing business in China.
His work has been published in many leading scholarly and practitioner journals including the Journal of International Business Studies, the Journal of Management Studies and Human Relations.

You might also like