doi: 10.1111/j.1467-856x.2006.00262.

BJPIR: 2007 VOL 9, 564581

The Logic of Expressive Collective

Action: When will Individuals
Nail their Colours to the Mast?
Philip Jones
Individuals do not act collectively simply because they recognise common interests; collective interests
can be defined as collective goods and collective goods are non-excludable. In large groups
instrumental individuals have no incentive to act because individual action is imperceptible. But
are individuals always this instrumental? If it is a mistake to assume that collective action occurs
naturally when common interests are recognised, it is a mistake to ignore awareness of common
interests. Individuals derive satisfaction from expressing identity with common interests but when
will individuals choose to nail their colours to the mast?

Keywords: expressive; instrumental; collective action

Mancur Olson (1965) rejected the supposition that awareness of common interests
is sufficient to explain collective action. He predicted that a member of a large
group would not voluntarily support an association even if the association had the
potential to advance a groups common interests (e.g. by lobbying for legislative
change). Each member of the group would recognise that a common goal is freely
available; benefits derived from collective action are not contingent on providing
support. Contribution to an association is tantamount to revealing demand for a
collective good. A collective good is non-rival in consumption and non-excludable;
consumption by one individual does not reduce availability to others. If it is
irrational to reveal demand for a non-excludable good, why incur costs to support
an association? The dominant strategy is to free-ride but if all behave rationally
nothing is achieved (there is no free ride).
Olsons analysis does not rely on the assumption that individuals are self-interested.
Even if the member of a large group were to neglect his own interests entirely, he
still would not rationally contribute toward the provision of any collective or public
good since his own contribution would not be perceptible (Olson 1965, 64). The
critical assumption is that behaviour is instrumental (to change outcome). Why act
if action would not be perceptible? Olsons distinction between small and large
groups is premised on this consideration. In large groups individual action is
imperceptible; in small groups individual action can exert an impact on outcome
(Buchanan 1968). Members of a small group might act collectively but large groups
remain latent (Olson 1965).
While Olson distinguished between market groups and non-market groups (e.g.
between firms acting as cartels and groups pressing for legislative change to advan 2007 The Author. Journal compilation 2007 Political Studies Association

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tage the community as a whole), the focus was on instrumental motivation. Patrick
Dunleavy (1991, 77) suggests that associations can be structured to increase perceptions that individual action might be significant. Size manipulation is possible
if influence exerted in a small subset of the association would imply influence in the
association as a whole. Again the emphasis is on action to change outcome. But
surely motivation depends on more than ability to influence outcome? The architects of utility theory identified many sources of utility but the evolution of the
utility concept during our century has been characterised by a progressive stripping
away of psychology (Lowenstein 1999, 315). Bentham (1948 [1789]) argued that
utility is derived from action, quite apart from outcome contingent on action. Is it
really sufficient to assume that the only motivation to act is to change outcome?
There is already more than a hint of another dimension. Collective action is far
more prevalent than predicted (Johansen 1977; Ledyard 1995); empirical studies
insist that perceptions of the intrinsic value of action are relevant (e.g. Andreoni
1988 and 2001; Frey 1997). An individual is intrinsically motivated to perform an
activity when one receives no apparent reward except the activity itself (Deci 1971,
105). Olson focused on action as an investment (to change outcome). What if
individuals also derive consumption from action (Lee 1988)?
Intrinsic value is derived in different ways. Individuals may feel better about
themselves if they act with dignity. Self-esteem might depend on the signal emitted
(to oneself and to others). In behavioural experiments, individuals derive a warm
glow from philanthropic action (Andreoni 1988 and 2001). Action can also yield
intrinsic interest; the difference between liking and disliking work may well be
more important than remuneration (Scitovsky 1976, 103). While all sources of
intrinsic value are relevant the focus in this article falls on action to express identity.
The term identity is used to describe a persons social category (Akerlof and
Kranton 2005, 12, emphasis original). Individuals choose action that creates identity; John Wallis (2003, 227) notes that people define who they are in terms of the
people they interact with and how they interact. Even when identity is preordained (e.g. by race, nationality, etc.) individuals still choose whether to emphasise
identity. George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton (2005, 12) argue that [i]n a model of
utility ... a persons identity describes gains and losses in utility from behaviour that
conforms or departs from the norms for particular social categories in particular
situations.
To explain collective action as a predilection to act collectively explains everything
merely by re-describing it (Barry 1970, 33). Olsons lesson is well taken; his
critique of existing explanations (e.g. by Bentley 1908; Truman 1951) reveals that
individuals do not act collectively just because they [have] similar feelings and
ideals (Dougherty 2003, 29). There is a distinction between common interests and
individual interests. Individuals might be aware of common interests but have no
incentive to act to express identity with common interests. Individuals might derive
utility from action that signals identity with common interests but remain unwilling
to incur the costs. But, does this imply that awareness of common interests should
simply be ignored? If it is a mistake to explain action as recognition of common
interests, it is a mistake to ignore awareness of common interests. Individuals derive
intrinsic value from expressing identity with common interests. The challenge is to
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predict when the perceived intrinsic value of this action exceeds the costs that must
be incurred. Recent empirical studies offer insight; behaviour can be explained with
reference to systematic changes in the perceived intrinsic value of action (e.g. Frey
1997; Gneezy and Rustichini 2000).
The following section revisits the by-product theory of action by large groups.
Analysis premised only on instrumental motivation leaves many questions unanswered, so much so that, in later sections of the article, the question is not whether
to embrace analysis of willingness to express identity but how to embrace analysis
of willingness to express identity.

1. The Logic of Expressive Collective Action

Olson (1965) analysed collective action as a by-product. In the absence of coercion
(closed shop arrangements) associations mobilise large groups by offering selective incentives (e.g. cheap insurance, a journal, an invitation to a social or gala
occasion, etc.all contingent on membership). When individuals are instrumental,
the larger the group the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal supply of
a collective good and very large groups normally will not, in the absence of coercion
or separate outside incentives, provide themselves with even minimal amounts of
a collective good (Olson 1965, 48).
The by-product theory is now common currency.1 The following examples illustrate the inducement of a private good. An instrumental individual is asked to
contribute 5 to finance pursuit of a collective goal. Achievement of the common
objective is worth the equivalent of 10 to the individual. In Table 1 net payoff is 5
if the individual contributes and others contribute. If others do not contribute, a
single contribution will not matter; there is a loss of 5. If the individual makes no
contribution and others contribute, the individual gains the equivalent of 10 (by
free-riding on provision by others); if others also refuse to contribute the payoff is
zero. Payoffs from not contributing dominate those from contributing.
The association might induce action by offering each contributor a private good
worth the equivalent of 6. The cost of contribution is now 5.5 (the additional
0.5 is required to cover the cost of the private good). Payoffs in Table 2 reveal that
the individuals dominant strategy is now to contribute.
It appears a simple matter to demonstrate that a private-good inducement will alter
the balance of payoffs and create an incentive to act. However, this refinement begs

Table 1: Collective Action: The Free-Rider Problem

Contribution
No contribution

Others contribute

Others do not
contribute

10 - 5 = 5
10

-5
0

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Table 2: Collective Action and Selective Incentives

Contribution
No contribution

Others contribute

Others do not
contribute

10 - 5.5 + 6 = 10.5
10

-5.5 + 6 = 0.5
0

so many questions. If the selective incentive is to prove successful, private benefits

must be cheap enough to produce for the surplus generated from contributions to
be large enough to provide both the collective consumption good and the private
benefits (Laver 1997, 40). The inducement must generate sufficient financial
surplus (in this case a minimum of 5 per member for the collective consumption
good). But:
(1) If a financial surplus must be generated there is a profit. If there is a profit
there is an incentive to private firms to produce this private good (Stigler
1974). Surely, private goods (selective incentives) will be supplied by private
firms in the market?
(2) If private firms have an incentive to produce the private good, private firms
are at a competitive advantage. Private firms are able to offer private goods and
services at a lower price (because private firms are not committed to incur
costs to provide a collective good). How are associations to survive?
(3) Even if the association survives, where is the motivation to invest any part of
the financial surplus to provide a common goal? If members are not motivated
by pursuit of the collective goal, political entrepreneurs have no incentive to
devote funds to provide the collective good (this will have no effect on
subscription to associations). Why do associations supply collective goods
(Stigler 1974; Fireman and Gamson 1979; Udehn 1996)? Even if some
members did join the union as a result of the selective benefits on offer,
yielding a surplus for the union that could be deployed in the production of
collective benefits, why would union officials deploy their surplus in this
way? (Laver 1997, 41).
Laver emphasises that political entrepreneurs must be secular saints for the
theory to hold (they must forgo pecuniary gain to devote profit to a common
cause). Of course philanthropy is possible (Glaeser and Schleifer 1998) but the
by-product theory is far from robust (if it appears to rely on a contrived
asymmetry between entrepreneurial aspirations in market and non-market
structures).
(4) Although so many key theoretical questions remain unanswered, critics
usually focus on empirical investigation. If private-good inducements really
provide the motivation, why do empirical studies insist that private goods and
services (selective incentives) are of little concern to members? Questionnaire
studies report that members have little interest in selective incentives. Respondents insist that their motivation is pursuit of common interests (Jordan and
Maloney (1996 and 1998) review this literature).
Some argue that respondents may have misunderstood questions or answered
dishonestly. But such concern is endemic to questionnaire analysis. With
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Table 3: Collective Action: Signalling Identity

Contribution
No contribution

Others contribute

Others do not contribute

10 - 5.5 + 5.8 + 0.2 = 10.5

10

-5.5 + 5.8 + 0.2 = 0.5

0

consensus across questionnaire studies (and the absence of competition from

private firms), perhaps individuals are answering honestly?
Surely something is missing? The analytical importance of selective incentives is
that they explain how a group might be mobilised. They do not explain why a
group exists (the presumption is that individuals are already aware of group
interests). Consider the difference if analysis also embraces individuals choice to
express identity with group interests. In this case selective incentives play a more
complex role. Acquisition of selective incentives also signals identity with common
interests. Selective incentives are invariably distinguishable by design. They take
the form of flags, badges, bumper stickers, sweatshirts with associated logos and
attendance at symbolic events. Selective incentives offer an intrinsic, expressive
gain (SE) as well as a gain derived from the enjoyment of a private good in its own
right (SP).
In Table 3 the expressive gain from acquisition of a selective incentive (as a signal)
is 5.8; the value of a private good (in its own right) is only 0.2. In each cell of
Table 3 there are the same net payoffs as in Table 2. Once again the individual will
contribute but now the analysis is quite different.
Even though net payoffs are identical in Tables 2 and 3, the configuration of gains
in Table 3 matters:
(1) It is no longer necessary that the value of the private goodin its own
rightexceeds the cost of producing the private good. In Table 3 the cost of
the private good is 0.5 and the value of the good, in its own right, is 0.2. If
the value of the private good (as a private good) is less than the cost of
production, there is no incentive for private firms to supply these goods.
(2) The expressive value of signalling identity with common interests depends on
perceptions of the esteem in which common interests are held. Private goods
supplied by private firms yield SP but not SE. Purchase of a symbolic selective
incentive from a private firm lacks credibility as a symbol of identity. Receipt
of a symbolic selective incentive from an association yields SP + SE because the
association also commits resources in pursuit of a common goal. Associations
now have an advantage.
(3) As selective incentives signal identity with common interests there is a rationale to devote resources to a common cause. The expressive gain from acquisition of symbolic selective incentives (SE) depends on pursuit of a collective
goal.
(4) If private goods also signal identity with common interests, questionnaire
responses resonate with theoretical predictions. Even if the value of the
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private good, in and of itself, is negligible (as in Table 3), selective incentives
induce action (to express identity). There is no inconsistency if respondents
insist their main concern is the common goal.
There is evidence that selective incentives play a dual role. Charles Cell (1980)
analysed associations in the USA and reported that private-good inducements (as
private goodsdelivering SP) increased when associations concern with ideological
objectives decreased (and the capacity to deliver SE diminished). One more direct
test is possible. If Olsons analysis (premised only on instrumental rationality) is
apposite, selective incentives furnish revenue to pursue the collective goal (a
one-way relationship). If willingness to pay to express identity is also relevant,
selective incentives finance pursuit of a collective goal but now they are more
attractive (as signals of identity) the more the association spends on pursuit of
common interests (a two-way relationship). Statistical analysis of associations
finances reveals a two-way relationship: Revenues generated on selective incentives ... are contingent on the level of spending on public goods (Lowry 1997,
308).2

2. Willingness to Express Identity

A plethora of criticisms of the by-product theory suggest that behaviour depends
on more than instrumental rationality. A consistent response to criticisms expressed
independently emerges when analysis embraces willingness to express identity.
There is scope for analysis of willingness to express identity, but can predictions be
formed?3

(a) Determinants of the Intrinsic Value of Identity

For Akerlof and Kranton (2005, 12) the term identity is used to describe a persons
social category. It captures how people feel about themselves as well as how those
feelings depend upon their actions. In the military sector and the civilian sector,
output is higher when individuals bond with common goals; effort is not simply a
function of remuneration. The question is what determines perceptions of the
intrinsic value of expressive action. Analysts report that intrinsic value depends on
moral considerations and also on extrinsic signals (e.g. Deci and Ryan 1980 and
1985; Frey 1997); signals that acknowledge action enhance perceptions of intrinsic
value.
A first signal is political rhetoric. Like Hamlet without the Prince, the script fails to
do justice to the role played by political leadership when it is premised only on
instrumental rationality (McLean 2001). If, in Table 1, political rhetoric were to
magnify perceptions of the value of achieving a common goal (say from 10 to
100or to 10,000), the decision is still to attempt to free-ride. If rhetoric minimises perceptions of the value of costs (from 5 to say 0.05), free-riding remains
the dominant strategy. The contrast is stark when comparing the impact of rhetoric
on perceptions of the intrinsic value of action. Returning to Table 3, rhetoric has
only to raise perceptions of the intrinsic value of signalling identity from 5.2 to
5.8 for the decision to change from apathy to participation. Political rhetoric extols
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the virtues of doing the right thing. Producers of mass participation (Schuessler
2000, 91) are often successful when relying on a symbol-intensive, expressiveattachment-inviting approach (ibid., 87). Empiricists estimate the impact that
leaders ethical posture exerts on followers (Vitell and Davis 1990).
A second signal capable of informing perceptions of intrinsic value is the status of
the association. Henry Hansmann (1980) argues that charitable status helps to
reassure instrumental donors that donations are unlikely to be misappropriated
(because administrators have no legal entitlement to any financial surplus). But this
status also acknowledges the importance of action.
Turning to empirical studies of private giving, consider the importance of signals
emitted by government. If only instrumental rationality were relevant, private
giving to charities would decrease on a one-for-one basis when government assists
beneficiaries of private charities (Warr 1982). Altruism is a public good (e.g. Collard
1978) and altruists would free-ride. But, in practice crowd-out parameters are far
less than one (usually 0.1 and very rarely as high as 0.6Schiff 1989 and Jones and
Posnett 1993 survey empirical work). There is also evidence of crowd-in (for a
survey see Jones 2005). Crowd-in is possible because the actions of others seem to
serve as cues to guide behaviour rather than ... as strategies to be counteracted
(Roy 1998, 417). Jones et al. (1998) report this demonstration effect when analysing private giving in the UK. Signals that acknowledge the status of action inform
perceptions of the value of action.
A third determinant of perceptions of intrinsic value is the nature of common
interests. If common interests are collective goods, collective goods have two characteristics. Collective goods are non-excludable and non-rival in consumption.
Non-rivalness in consumption means that consumption by one individual does not
reduce availability to others (McLean 1987). Goods can be classified with reference
to the rate at which availability atrophies when access broadens (e.g. Head 1962;
Buchanan 1968; Musgrave 1969; Craig 1987).4 There is a considerable difference
(for example) between collective action that provides a swimming pool (rival in
consumption above capacity limits) and collective action that provides medical
research (to produce information capable of reducing everyones probability of
contracting a disease).5
Olson focused almost exclusively on the first characteristic, non-excludability
(Olstrom 2003). Implicitly, many of his examples considered the incentive to
contribute to goals that are more rival in consumption.6 Instrumental willingness to
take action is greater the more rival the good. Action matters because it is important
to secure a share of the (rival) output that will be produced. The greater the
incentive to secure a share of output the greater the instrumental incentive to act.
In Figure 1 willingness to pay is reported on the vertical axis and degree of nonrivalness (between 0 and 1) on the horizontal axis. Instrumental motivation (I)
decreases as the degree of non-rivalness increases.
By contrast, the more that common interest is non-rival in consumption, the
greater the intrinsic value of action from expressing identity because it is more
obvious that such action is not simply self-serving. Share of output is no longer
pertinent if one individuals consumption does not reduce availability to others
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Figure 1: Instrumental and Expressive Motivation

I+E

Instrumental
motivation

Expressive
motivation

Degree of non-rivalness

(Jones 2004). Expressive motivation (E) increases with the degree to which
common interests are non-rival in consumption. Robert Putnam (1993, 89) refers
to the relevance of the degree to which common goals are encompassing. Hudson
and Jones (2005) present empirical evidence that individuals are more willing to act
collectively (as altruists) when consumption by others does not reduce availability
of a collective good. E is not a mirror image of I in Figure 1; the position and slope
of E also depend on political rhetoric, charitable status, etc.
Predictions resonate in empirical studies:
(1) Motivation to act collectively depends on the degree to which common interests are non-rival in consumption. David Knoke (1990) analysed 35 associations in the National Association Survey in the USA. Of 35 associations, 15
were classified as political. Classification was based on responses by leaders of
associations. Leaders of the 15 more frequently asserted that lobbying was an
important task (a far greater percentage of the 15 reported that they made
frequent representation to federal government). The motivation of members
was assessed with reference to members questionnaire responses. For the 15,
political activity was cited as the main reason to join by 35 per cent of
members (compared to only 6 per cent of the 4,347 sample members of the 20
non-political organisations). By contrast, 53 per cent of the membership of
non-political organisations gave job-related concerns as the motive for membership (compared to 35 per cent of the membership of 15 political organisations). Members motivations for joining were not distributed randomly
across types of collective action organisations. An associations purpose may
shape its members motivations for involvement (Knoke 1990, 125).
(2) As suggested by the dashed U-shaped function (I + E) in Figure 1, there is a
very clear distinction between groups motivated primarily by instrumental
concerns and groups motivated primarily by willingness to express identity.
Kenneth Shepsle and Mark Bonchek (1997) review empirical studies. They
highlight the distinction between economic associations (trade associations,
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trade unions) focused on more rival goals (higher profits, higher wages) and
expressive associations in pursuit of goals that are less rival. Members of
economic groups join primarily for the selective benefits ... while members of
non-economic groups join primarily for the collective benefits (Shepsle and
Bonchek 1997, 249).
The nature of common interests matters when analysing willingness to act to
express identity. It also matters when considering the way that organisations are
classified. Private firms supply excludable and rival goods (they operate in an
environment in which individuals acquire property rights). Clubs supply excludable
and (below capacity levels) non-rival services (Buchanan 1965). Common pool provision supplies non-excludable but rival services (Olstrom 2003); cartels provide
non-excludable but rival goals when they strive to maximise profit that is rival
between member firms. Representative associations pursue non-excludable and nonrival goals.

(b) The Price of Expressive Action

Perceptions of intrinsic value change systematically but individuals are only willing
to act if perceived intrinsic value exceeds the price that must be paid. Constraints
play a more prominent role than when analysis is premised only on instrumental
motivation. If analysis is premised only on instrumental motivation (as in Table 1),
free-riding remains the individuals optimal strategy whether income is high or
low. But, in practice income matters; income is a strong predictor of giving to
political campaigns (e.g. Ansolabehere et al. 2003) and donations to charities (e.g.
Schiff 1989). What about price?
One way to test the relevance of price is to compare behaviour in different fora. In
the following examples all of the variables remain the same, i.e. the instrumental
gain from achieving a common goal (B), the probability that action might affect
outcome (p), costs of action (C) and the consumption gain from expressive action
(E) are the same. Net expected utility of action is:

pB + E C > 0

(1)

and expressive action is worthwhile if:

E > C pB

(2)

It follows that the price of expressive action is C-pB (price is equal to the cost of
contribution net of any prospective instrumental gain). The price of expressive
action may vary in different fora because price depends on the way costs and
benefits are framed (Tversky and Kahneman 1981; McDermott 2001).
In the first forum an altruist is asked to donate 5 to finance a home for the elderly.
The altruist feels the equivalent of 10 better off if the home is provided and derives
intrinsic value equivalent to 4 by expressing identity with this cause. Table 4
illustrates payoffs. While the individual is aware of common interests there is no
willingness to express identity by contributing (payoffs from not contributing
dominate).
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Table 4: Collective Action: Identity by Donation

Contribution
No contribution

Others
contribute

Others do not
contribute

10 - 5 + 4 = 9
10

-5 + 4 = -1
0

Table 5: Collective Action: At the Ballot Box

Vote for
Vote against

Others vote for

Others vote
against

10 - 5 + 4 = 9
10 - 5 = 5

0 + 4 = +4
0

In the second example the same individual decides whether to vote for publicsector provision of the home for the elderly. The tax cost is 5 per person. The
gain from identity at the ballot box (self-signalling) by voting for is equivalent to
4. In this forum the price of expressive action is systematically lower. The individual is aware that their vote has virtually no impact on electoral outcome and
the tax-cost is only relevant if a majority votes in favour. The individual can vote
for (and identify with the goal) knowing that this will have a negligible impact
on the electoral outcome (and on incurring a tax-cost). The price of expressive
action is lower even though p, B, C and E are identical (in this forum price
is equal to p(C-B) because the cost to the individual of expressing identity with
common interests is only relevant if there is a probability, p, that a single vote will
lead to a tax-cost). In Table 5 payoffs from action to express identity are now
dominant.
Evidence again proves consistent with predictions premised on analysis of expressive collective action; individuals vote charitably and act selfishly (Tullock 1973,
27). For reviews of empirical studies, see Brennan and Lomasky (1993); Hudson
and Jones (1994); Udehn (1996); and Mueller (2003). Even if expressive gain were
greater by donating than voting, the principle remains robust. Price of expressive
action varies in different fora and willingness to act collectively is greater when
price is lower.

3. Willingness to Express Identity: Implications when

Analysing Political Participation
Recent empirical studies shed insight on the determinants of perceptions of willingness to express identity and on the importance of the price of expressive action.
Empirical studies highlight the significance of expressive action (e.g. Akerlof and
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Kranton 2005); individuals behave as if they derive a consumption gain from

action to signal self-image (to themselves and to others). Individuals derive utility
from outcomes contingent on action and from action to express identity. The
individual may be conceived as having a perfectly standard utility function which
includes reference to both the value of various consequential outcomes, and the
value of various expressions or acts (Brennan and Hamlin 2002, 302). While the
instrumental account ... is sometimes taken to be a defining feature of the rational
actor approach to politics (Brennan and Hamlin 1998, 149), the authors emphasise
the importance of expressive action in large number situations. Collective action
can be predicted with reference to systematic response to determinants of perceptions of the intrinsic value of expressive action and with reference to changes in the
price of expressive action.7
In this section the focus falls on the implications when analysing interest group
activity and when analysing other forms of political participation. The first insight
is with respect to alternative assessments of interest group competition. The second
is with respect to apparently anomalous alignments of interest groups. In both cases
analysis that encompasses expressive action provides value added. In the third
example the value added is in terms of new issues that would otherwise be ignored;
the approach raises questions that would not be asked if behaviour were motivated
only by action to change outcome.
(1) Different assessments of interest group activity. Some analysts (Olson 1965 and
1982; Tullock 1965) emphasise the waste (e.g. lower economic growth) that
occurs when instrumental groups compete for rents (e.g. for legislation that
will deliver remuneration above payment received in competitive environments). Others applaud collective action, arguing that it can instil ... habits of
co-operation, solidarity and public spiritness and a sense of shared responsibility (Putnam 1993, 8990; Knack 2003). Different assessments can be
explained with reference to Figure 1. More instrumental groups (e.g. economic associations) frequently waste resources (competing for transfers from
one section of the community to anothergoals that are rival in consumption). Expressive groups are more likely to inculcate a sense of shared responsibility, by focusing on goals that are non-rival in consumption (and have the
potential to benefit one and all).
(2) Anomalous alignments of interest groups. With reference to wastes incurred competing for transfers, Gordon Tullock (1997 and 1998) asks repeatedly why
they are so much lower than anticipated (e.g. the empirical analysis of Ansolabehere et al. 2003 reports lower than anticipated costs). At the same time,
another set of studies expresses surprise that apparently disparate groups align
to press for legislative change. Bruce Yandle (1989, 34) is surprised that
regulation of the Sunday sale of booze ties together bootleggers, Baptists and
the legal operators of liquor stores. Achim Krber (1998) notes the curious
alignment between environmentalists and producers of canned tuna lobbying
for legislation in the USA to protect dolphins (in the 1980s US producers were
supplied with tuna from dolphin friendly waters).
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rily by the immediacy of a consumption gain derived from expressive action,

have little incentive to monitor outcomes (Jones 2006). When civil and
religious groups press for international aid (Kaul and Conceio 2006), governments offer tied aid that proves inefficient because it also delivers
higher profits to domestic producers (Jones 2006). When there is pressure for
trade sanctions against oppressive regimes, governments design sanctions to
serve the interests of import-competing domestic producers (Kaempfer and
Lowenbourg 1988), even though the design means that trade sanctions
seldom achieve their goals (van Bergeijk 1994) in terms of the goals set by
expressive groups.
(3) New issues when individuals act to express identity. If the contest between different
groups is less fierce than anticipated (because those motivated by an expressive gain have little incentive to monitor outcome) there are new concerns.
Analysis of group activity premised only on instrumental motivation indicates
that small groups might exploit large groups if small groups are able to
free-ride on the contribution made by large groups (Olson 1965; Olson and
Zeckhauser 1966). But, when contributions to groups are also motivated by
expressive identity there are new concerns, that those who contribute to
express identity (contributors who have no incentive to monitor outcomes)
might be exploited by those who contribute more instrumentally. Exploitation occurs if expressive groups can be manipulated.8
While these examples focus on interest group activity, there are implications when
analysing political participation more generally. If individuals only motivation
were instrumental (to change outcome) there would be no incentive to turn out to
vote because the probability that an individual vote will change an electoral
outcome is minuscule. But, in practice, turnout rates are high even in national
elections (Aldrich 1993); Grofman (1993) refers to the paradox that ate public
choice.
Electoral turnout might be explained with reference to the importance of action
that expresses identity with the community, i.e. with reference to action that fulfils
civic duty. Jones and Hudson (2000) report evidence that turnout in the 1997 UK
general election fell because the election had been preceded by a plethora of
allegations of political sleaze, allegations that demeaned the intrinsic value of
expressions of civic duty. Some argue that more than one motivation is also
relevant when explaining other forms of participation. Paul Whiteley and Patrick
Seyd (1996) analyse the motives of party activists. They examine the motivation of
activists in the UK Labour Party and conclude that activists are more expressively
attached to the party than inactive members, despite the fact that the incentives to
free ride are the same for strongly attached individuals as they are for weakly
attached individuals (ibid., 227). Justin Fisher and Paul Webb (2003) analyse the
motivation of those employed by political parties. While employees are instrumentally responsive to the terms of their contract, motivation is not purely instrumental. After interview analysis, the authors report the following comment by an
employee of the Labour Party: the first reason, nine times out of ten, is the feeling
that you work for something that you believe in (ibid., 179).
If expressive motivation is important when explaining why individuals participate,
expressive motivation is also relevant when explaining how individuals participate.
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Jones and Dawson (forthcoming) consider the relevance of instrumental evaluation

of policies presented by political parties and the intrinsic value of expressing identity
with a preferred political party. The intrinsic value of expressing party identity
proved significant when explaining choice at the 2002 UK general election. Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin (1998) argue that this motivation is relevant when
explaining why political parties divert from anticipated policy manifestos and adopt
preferred symbolic policy options. Alexander Schuessler (2000) emphasises this
motivation when explaining how politicians set out to win support; they rely on
inclusive statements rather than instrumental discussion of policy options.
The issue of how individuals express choice is also important when analysing
preference for constitutional rules. If analysis is premised only on instrumental
motivation, the value of ... institutions is to be assessed in terms of the outcomes
producedin a manner analogous to that in which market institutions are judged
by reference to the allocation of resources that they induce (Brennan and Hamlin
2002, 310). But, if expressive motivation is important, democratic institutions are
assessed in terms of what those institutions stand for. If these democratic values
might be among expressive concerns of individuals, then in many settings ... these
expressive preferences for particular aspects of democratic institutions per se will be
systematically over-emphasised to the detriment of more instrumental concerns
(Brennan and Hamlin 2002, 310).
The impact of expressive action on well-being is the remit for another paper. There
are instances in which willingness to express identity mobilises collective action to
produce outcomes that would be under-supplied. In Table 3 it is the private consumption gain from expressive action [5.8 - 5.5] that explains willingness to act
collectively and it is the same private consumption gain that explains why the
common goal is achieved. In Table 3 the individual is ultimately better off by
[10 + 5.8 - 5.5 + 0.2] because, if the individual is representative, all act collectively and the common goal is achieved. However, there are also instances in which
willingness to express identity can reduce well-being.9 In this article the proposition
is simply that willingness to express identity cannot be dismissed when explaining
collective action. Signals that inform perceptions of the intrinsic value of action can
prove more potent than instrumental evaluation of outcome (Jones 2003).

Conclusions
As Olson (1965) argued, provision of a private good by an association will change
payoffs and induce instrumental individuals to act collectively. But, as an explanation of collective action this analytical refinement brings in its wake many questions. If the private good were the individuals only concern, the individual would
purchase the good from a private firm. If an association managed to survive
competition from private firms there would be no rationale to devote a financial
surplus to a collective goal. Questionnaire analysis insists that the private good is a
minor concern. When analysis embraces willingness to express identity individuals
also derive satisfaction from expressing self-image. Selective incentives now play a
dual role. They serve as private goods and they also serve to signal identity. If their
relevance as a symbol is greater when they signal identity with an association that
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pursues a common goal, private firms are unable to compete. There is a rationale to
devote a financial surplus to a common goal. Questionnaire responses prove consistent with theoretical predictions.
Collective action can be analysed with reference to the determinants of perceptions
of the intrinsic value of expressing identity with an association. Empirical studies
report systematic behavioural responses. Perceptions of the intrinsic value of action
depend on: ethical posture by political leaders; the status afforded to associations;
and the degree to which common interests are non-rival in consumption. The
degree to which common goals are non-rival in consumption can prove as important as the extent to which common goals are non-excludable.
It has not been argued that collective action is simply a reflection of awareness of
common interests. A distinction must be drawn between the intrinsic value of
expressing identity and the price that must be paid. Individuals might recognise
common interests but have no inclination to express identity with common interests. Willingness to act depends on both perceptions of the intrinsic value of action
and on the price that must be paid. Willingness to act collectively increases if the
perceived intrinsic value of expressive action increases and if the price of expressive
action falls.
Analysis of a private consumption gain derived by expression of identity explains
existing anomalies when analysing interest group competition and raises new
questions (questions that would not be asked if analysis were narrowly premised on
instrumental motivation). It offers insight on the different alignments that exist
between different groups but, in so doing, it also calls in question the possibility that
action by expressive groups might be exploited by those who act more instrumentally. The question of why and how individuals choose to signal self-image (to
themselves and to others) is important when analysing political participation. The
smaller the likelihood that individual action will affect outcome, the greater the
relevance of analysis of willingness to pay to express identity.
Olsons lesson has been well taken, but perhaps too well taken? Awareness of
common interests will not lead naturally to collective action but awareness of
common interests should not be ignored. Too many pieces of the jigsaw are missing
when analysis studiously ignores individuals willingness to nail their colours to
the mast.
About the Author
Philip Jones, Professor of Economics, Department of Economics and International Development,
University of Bath, Bath, BA2 7AY, UK, email: P.R.Jones@bath.ac.uk

Notes
1. It is applied generally. For example, political revolution has been analysed as a career-enhancing
opportunity to secure a better position in a post-revolution government (Tullock 1971; Silver 1974;
Jennings 1998).
2. Hansen (1985) argues that expenditure on a collective good advertises an associations selective
incentives. This explanation implies that private goods are more attractive the more is spent on
pursuit of a common goal.
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Table 6: Collective Action and Frames of Reference

Acquire a symbol
Not acquire a symbol

Others acquire a symbol

Others do not acquire a

symbol

-5 + 5 - 4 = -4
-5

+5 - 4 = 1
0

3. It is not necessary here to consider why utility is derived from identity; this is the remit for another
paper. Some suggest that signalling identity with a common goal enhances reputation for trustworthiness. Frank (1988) analyses the role played by conscience. He suggests that this generates an aura
that others can detect and that expression of identity is relevant for the instrumental pursuit of long
run objectives. All of this is freely acknowledged. Here the focus is narrower; the proposition is that
analysis of collective action is incomplete if willingness to pay to express identity is ignored.
4. If output of an association is defined as X and the number in the group is N, the extent to which a
goal is non-rival is gauged by the exponent h when the amount available for any individual (i) is
qi = X/Nh. When h = 0 the good is non-rival in consumption; when h = 1 the good is rival in
consumption.
5. McLean (1987, 11) notes that Non-rival means that it is not subject to crowding. If G is non-rival
the relationship of the total provision to consumption by individuals A, B and C is G = GA = GB = GC;
if X were rival the relationship is X = XA + XB + XC.
6. Chamberlin (1974) illustrates how the theoretical force of Olsons examples is heightened by choosing collective goods more rival in consumption; Esteban and Ray (2001) offer further analysis of the
relevance of this characteristic.
7. In this journal Dowding (2005 and 2006) and Parsons (2006) have explored the implications that
arise if individuals are motivated to take action because they perceive that they have a duty to act.
Analysis in this article assumes that individuals act because they derive utility from action and, as
Brennan and Hamlin note, in making choices of all sorts, the individuals will behave in a manner that
is consistent with the standard axioms of rationality given such a utility function. Individuals
willingness to give greater emphasis to expressive action depends on (i) perceptions of the intrinsic
value of such action; (ii) institutional structures [that] change the terms of trade between instrumental and expressive elements (Brennan and Hamlin 2002, 302). Both instrumental and expressive
action might prove commensurate but if (in large group situations) there is no motivation to act to
change outcome, the individual might still be motivated to act to express identity.
8. Ethical investing (in the UK and USA) can be explained in terms of willingness to identify with a cause
deemed worthy but there are increasing calls for codes of conduct to restrain instrumental fund
management and ensure that outcomes better match aspirations expressed (see e.g. Cullis et al.
2006).
9. Table 6 reports payoffs when an individual acts to acquire a good simply to signal status. The cost is
4. If others are unable to acquire the good, the payoff is (5 - 4). If others purchase the good, the
status gain of 5 is cancelled. If the individual does not acquire the good, the individual is 5 worse
off when others purchase the good. But if no one purchases the good there is no effect on welfare.
Each individual is motivated to acquire the good to express identity, but if all behave this way, each
person is worse off (by -5 + 5 - 4 in Table 6). There is collective action, albeit informal, but
expression of identity by conspicuous consumption can reduce well-being.

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