Pub Corp Part 8

PUBLIC OFFICERS and CORPORATIONS (Atty.
Rodolfo Elman) 1
2ND EXAM COVERAGE CASE COMPILATION
BONDOC v. PINEDA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991
DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner,
vs.
REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA,
MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL. JUANITO G.
CAMASURA, JR., or any other representative who may
be appointed vice representative Juanita G. Camasura,
Jr., and THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondents.
Estelito P. Mendoza, Romulo C. Felixmera and Horacio S.J.
Apostol for petitioner.
Nicanor S. Bautista for respondent Marciano M. Pineda.
Benedicto R. Palacol for respondent M.M. Palacol.
GRIO-AQUIO, J.:p
This case involves a question of power. May the House of
Representatives, at the request of the dominant political
party therein, change that party's representation in the
House Electoral Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a
decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest
pending therein? May the Supreme Court review and annul
that action of the House?
Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century
ago, in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60 (1803), had
hesitated to embark upon a legal investigation of the acts of
the other two branches of the Government, finding it
"peculiarly irksome as well as delicate" because it could be
considered by some as "an attempt to intrude" into the affairs
of the other two and to intermeddle with their prerogatives.
In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and
weakest branch of our Government, was all too willing to
avoid a political confrontation with the other two branches by
burying its head ostrich-like in the sands of the "political
question" doctrine, the accepted meaning of which is that
'where the matter involved is left to a decision by the people
acting in their sovereign capacity or to the sole determination
by either or both the legislative or executive branch of the
government, it is beyond judicial cognizance. Thus it was
that in suits where the party proceeded against was either
the President or Congress, or any of its branches for that
matter, the courts refused to act." (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile,
59 SCRA 183, 196.)
In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the

constitutionality and validity of legislative or executive action,
especially when private rights are affected came to be
recognized. As we pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case,
a showing that plenary power is granted either department of
government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the
improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a
justiciable controversy. Since "a constitutional grant of
authority is not usually unrestricted, limitations being
provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be
accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility
of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate
branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental
law. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political.
The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld" (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA
183, 196).
That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts
by an express grant under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution of the Philippines which defines judicial power
as both authority and duty of the courts 'to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate
cases, the actions of the executive and legislative branches
of the Government, does not mean that the courts are
superior to the President and the Legislature. It does mean
though that the judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of
inquiring into the constitutionality and legality of legislative or
executive action when a justiciable controversy is brought
before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or
prejudiced by such action, as in this case. It is a plain
exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in courts to
enable them to administer justice according to law. ... It is
simply a necessary concomitant of the power to hear and
dispose of a case or controversy properly before the court, to
the determination of which must be brought the test and
measure of the law. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)
In the local and congressional elections held on May 11,
1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista
Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of
Representative for the Fourth District of the province of
Pampanga. Each received the following votes in the canvass
made by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga:
Marciano M. Pineda.................... 31,700 votes
Emigdio A. Bondoc..................... 28,400 votes
Difference...................................... 3,300 votes
On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the
election. In due time, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No.
PUBLIC OFFICERS and CORPORATIONS (Atty. Rodolfo Elman) 2

25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ( for
short) which is composed of nine (9) members, three of
whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining
six are members of the House of Representatives chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987
Constitution) as follows: x x x
After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence,
and submission of memoranda, Bondoc's protest was
submitted for decision in July, 1989.
By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which
Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23)
votes. At that point, the LDP members in the Tribunal insisted
on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some
precincts, thereby delaying by at least four (4) months the
finalization of the decision in the case.
The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted
in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes.
Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court
Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the
winner of the contest.
Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura
revealed on March 4, 1991, to his 'Chief," Congressman
Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the
final tally in the Bondoc case but also that he voted for
Bondoc "consistent with truth and justice and self- respect,"
and to honor a "gentlemen's agreement" among the
members of the HRET that they would "abide by the result of
the appreciation of the contested ballot 1Congressman
Camasura's revelation stirred a hornets' nest in the LDP
which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to
neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal.
On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of
Promulgation of Decision on March 14, 1991 at 2:30 P.M. in
HRET Case No. 25. A copy of the notice was received by
Bondoc's counsel on March 6, 1991.
On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the
Bondoc decision, Congressman Cojuangco informed
Congressman Camasura by letter 2 that on February 28,
1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur Chapter at Digos, Davao
del Sur, by Resolution No. 03-91 had already expelled him
and Congressman Benjamin Bautista from the LDP for
having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of
Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, and for allegedly having
invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join said political
party; and that as those acts are "not only inimical uncalled
for, unethical and immoral, but also a complete betrayal to
(sic) the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP," in a
meeting on March 12, 1991, the LDP Executive Committee
unanimously confirmed the expulsions. 3
At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker
Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the two congressmen
from the LDP, and asked the House of Representatives,

through the Speaker, to take note of it 'especially in matters
where party membership is a prerequisite. 4
At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the
Tribunal, Mme. Justice Armeurfina M. Herrera, received the
following letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of the
Secretary General of the House of Representatives,
informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the
LDP, the House of Representatives, during its plenary
session on March 13, 1991, decided to withdraw the
nomination and rescind the election of Congressman
Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal. The letter
reads as follows:
13 March 1991
Honorable Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera Chairman
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Constitution
Hills Quezon City
Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:
I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral Tribunal of
the decision of the House of Representatives during its
plenary session on 13 March 1991, to withdraw the
nomination and to rescind the election of the Honorable
Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral Tribunal on
the basis of an LDP communication which is self-explanatory
and copies of which are hereto attached.
Thank you.
For the Secretary-General
(SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon Officer-in-charge Operations
Department (p. 10, Rollo.)
Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the
Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court in
writing, of this "distressing development' and asked to be
relieved from their assignments in the HRET because
By the above action (of the House) the promulgation of the
decision of the Tribunal in the electoral protest
entitled "Bondoc v. Pineda" (HRET Case No. 25), previously
scheduled for 14 March 1991, is sought to be aborted (See
the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Hon.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73777-78
promulgated 12 September 1990). Even if there were no
legal impediment to its promulgation, the decision which was
reached on a 5 to 4 vote may now be confidently expected to
be overturned on a motion for reconsideration by the partylitigant which would have been defeated.
The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early as
October 1990 with a margin of 23 votes in favor of protestant
Bondoc. Because some members of the Tribunal requested

re-appreciation of some ballots, the finalization of the
decision had to be deferred by at least 4 months.
v. Dimaporo (HRET Case No. 45), after the Holy Week

recess.
With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now with a

margin of 107 votes in favor of protestant Bondoc, and
concurred in by Justices Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera,
Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, and
Congressmen Juanita G. Camasura and Antonio H. Cerilles,
is set for promulgation on 14 March 1991, with Congressmen
Honorato Y. Aquino, David A. Ponce de Leon Simeon E.
Garcia, Jr. and Jose E. Calingasan, dissenting.
But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of the

constitutionally mandated task of the Tribunal well ahead of
the completion of the present congressional term.
Congressman Casamura's vote in the Bondoc v.

Pineda case was, in our view, a conscience vote, for which
he earned the respect of the Tribunal but also the loss of the
confidence of the leader of his party.
Under the above circumstances an untenable situation has
come about. It is extremely difficult to continue with
membership in the Tribunal and for the Tribunal to preserve
it. 8 integrity and credibility as a constitutional body charged
with a judicial task. It is clear to us that the unseating of an
incumbent member of Congress is being prevented at all
costs. We believe that the Tribunal should not be hampered
in the performance of its constitutional function by factors
which have nothing to do with the merits of the cases before
it.
In this connection, our own experience teaches that the
provision for proportional representation in the Tribunal found
in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, should be
amended to provide instead for a return to the composition
mandated in the 1935 Constitution, that is: three (3)
members chosen by the House or Senate upon nomination
of the party having the largest number of votes and three (3)
of the party having the second largest number of votes: and
a judicial component consisting of three (3) justices from the
Supreme Court. Thereby, no party or coalition of parties can
dominate the legislative component in the Tribunal.
In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could
perhaps sit as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the House
of Representatives. Similarly, the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole judge of all such
contests involving members of the Senate. In this way, there
should be lesser chances of non-judicial elements playing a
decisive role in the resolution of election contests.
We suggest that there should also be a provision in the
Constitution that upon designation to membership in the
Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should divest
themselves of affiliation with their respective political parties,
to insure their independence and objectivity as they sit in
Tribunal deliberations.
There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision by the
Tribunal. Bondoc should have been promulgated today, 14
March 1991. Cabrera v. Apacible (HRET Case No. 21) is
scheduled for promulgation on 31 March 1991 and Lucman
Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask to be

relieved from the chairmanship and membership in the
Tribunal.
xxx xxx xxx
At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the
same day, the Tribunal issued Resolution No. 91-0018
cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case
No. 25. The resolution reads:
In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received at 9:45
tills morning from the House of Representatives that at its
plenary session held on March 13, 1991, it had voted to
withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of
Congressman Camasura to the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal,' the Tribunal Resolved to cancel the
promulgation of its Decision in Bondoc vs. Pineda (HRET
Case No. 25) scheduled for this afternoon. This is because,
without Congressman Camasura's vote, the decision lacks
the concurrence of five members as required by Section 24
of the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly
promulgated.
The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-members of
the Supreme Court, being of the opinion that this
development undermines the independence of the Tribunal
and derails the orderly adjudication of electoral cases, they
have asked the Chief Justice, in a letter of even date, for
their relief from membership in the Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles also
manifested his intention to resign as a member of the
Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino, Ponce
de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and Calingasan also manifested a
similar intention. (p. 37, Rollo.)
On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the
request for relief of Justices Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano,
resolved to direct them to return to their duties in the
Tribunal. The Court observed that:
... in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the
Electoral Tribunals as the 'sole judge' of all contests
relationship to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of Congress, all members of these bodies are
appropriately guided only by purely legal considerations in
the decision of the cases before them and that in the
contemplation of the Constitution the members-legislators,
thereof, upon assumption of their duties therein, sit in the

Tribunal no longer as representatives of their respective
political parties but as impartial judges. The view was also
submitted that, to further bolster the independence of the
Tribunals, the term of office of every member thereof should
be considered co-extensive with the corresponding
legislative term and may not be legally terminated except
only by death, resignation, permanent disability, or removal
for valid cause, not including political disloyalty.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the
request of justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano to be
relieved from their membership in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and instead to DIRECT
them to resume their duties therein: b) to EXPRESS its
concern over the intrusion of non-judicial factors in the
proceedings of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, which performs functions purely judicial in character
despite the inclusion of legislators in its membership; and c)
to NOTE the view that the term of all the members of the
Electoral Tribunals, including those from the legislature, is
co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and
cannot be terminated at will but only for valid legal cause,
and to REQUIRE the Justices-members of the Tribunal to
submit the issue to the said Tribunal in the first instance.
Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I concur, but I
wish to add that Rep. Camasura should be allowed to cast
his original vote in favor of protestant Bondoc, otherwise a
political and judicial travesty will take place.' MelencioHerrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part. Gancayco, J.,
is on leave.
On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc against
Representatives Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M.
Palacol, Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., or any other
representative who may be appointed Vice Representative
Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, praying this Court to:
1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives of
March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw the nomination and to rescind
the nomination of Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr.
to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;"
2. Issue a wilt of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol or
whomsoever may be designated in place of respondent
Camasura from assuming, occupying and discharging
functions as a member of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal;
3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Camasura
to immediately reassume and discharge his functions as a
member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;
and
4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.
Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due
course, required the respondents to comment 5 on the
petition within ten days from notice and to enjoin the HRET
'from reorganizing and allowing participation in its
proceedings of Honorable Magdaleno M. Palacol or whoever
is designated to replace Honorable Juanita G. Camasura in
said House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, until the
issue of the withdrawal of the nomination and rescission of
the election of said Congressman Camasura as member of
the HRET by the House of Representatives is resolved by
this Court, or until otherwise ordered by the Court." (p. 39,
Rollo.)
Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the
petition.
Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of
the petition is centered on Congress' being the sole authority
that nominates and elects from its members. Upon
recommendation by the political parties therein, those who
are to sit in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(and in the Commission on Appointments as well), hence, it
allegedly has the sole power to remove any of them
whenever the ratio in the representation of the political
parties in the House or Senate is materially changed on
account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion from the
political party; 6 that a Tribunal member's term of office is not
co-extensive with his legislative term, 7 for if a member of the
Tribunal who changes his party affiliation is not removed
from the Tribunal, the constitutional provision mandating
representation based on political affiliation would be
completely nullified; 8 and that the expulsion of Congressman
Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the
LDP 9 and the decision to rescind his membership in the
House Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the
House-of-Representative Representatives, hence, it is a
purely political question beyond the reach of judicial
review. 10
In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M.
Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action
against him because he has not yet been nominated by the
LDP for membership in the HRET. 11 Moreover, the petition
failed to implead the House of Representatives as an
indispensable party for it was the House, not the HRET that
withdrew and rescinded Congressman Camasura's
membership in the HRET. 12
The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in
a similar vein; that the inclusion of the HETH as a party
respondent is erroneous because the petition states no
cause of action against the Tribunal. The petitioner does not
question any act or order of the HRET in violation of his
rights. What he assails is the act of the House of
Representatives of withdrawing the nomination, and
rescinding the election, of Congressman Juanita nito
Camasura as a member of the HRET. 13
Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the
petitioner argued that while the Tribunal indeed had nothing
to do with the assailed decision of the House of
Representatives, it acknowledged that decision by cancelling

the promulgation of its decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his
(Bondoc's) prejudice. 14 Hence, although the Tribunal may
not be an indispensable party, it is a necessary party to the
suit, to assure that complete relief is accorded to the
petitioner for "in the ultimate, the Tribunal would have to
acknowledge, give recognition, and implement the Supreme
Court's decision as to whether the relief of respondent
Congressman Camasura from the Office of the Electoral
Tribunal is valid." 15
shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of

the party having the largest number of votes and three of the
party having the second largest member of votes therein.
The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman. (1 935 Constitution of the Philippines.)
In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the

petitioner explained that Congressman Palacol was
impleaded as one of the respondents in this case because
after the House of Representatives had announced the
termination of Congressman Camasura's membership in the
HETH several newspapers of general circulation reported
that the House of Representatives would nominate and elect
Congressman Palacol to take Congressman Camasura's
seat in the Tribunal. 16
The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral

tribunal in the Batasang Pambansa.
Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the

Constitution to do that, i.e., to interfere with the disposition of
an election contest in the House Electoral Tribunal through
the ruse of "reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of
the majority party?
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the
answer to that question. It provides:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective members, Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935
Constitution, except the provision on the representation of
the main political parties in the tribunal which is now based
on proportional representation from all the political parties,
instead of equal representation of three members from each
of the first and second largest political aggrupations in the
Legislature. The 1935 constitutional provision reads as
follows:
Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who
Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding

votes, aid it was impossible for any political party to control
the voting in the tribunal.
The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987

Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution
underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral
Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The
tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court
although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a nonpolitical body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had
earlier said about the Electoral Commission applies as well
to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and House of
Representatives:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the
Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and
impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to
legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to
transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously exercised
by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections
of its members.
The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge
contests relating to the election and qualification of members
of the National Assembly is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained in the legislature.
The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were
created by the Constitution as special tribunals to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to election returns and
qualifications of members of the legislative houses, and, as
such, are independent bodies which must be permitted to
select their own employees, and to supervise and control
them, without any legislative interference. (Suanes vs. Chief
Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House
Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to
hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be
shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.
The Electoral Commission is a body separate from
and independent of the legislature and though not a power in
the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents and
purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an
independent organ; while composed of a majority of

members of the legislature it is a body separate from and
independent of the legislature.
xxx xxx xxx
The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for
the specific purpose of determining contests relating to
election returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly may not be interfered with by the
judiciary when and while acting within the limits of its
authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the
commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the
election and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)
The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved
undiminished in the 1987 Constitution as the following
exchanges on the subject between Commissioners
Maambong and Azcuna in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, attest:
MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not separate

departments of government, I would like to know again if the
ruling in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 53 Phil. 139,
would still be applicable to the present bodies we are
deciding on, when the Supreme court said that these
electoral tribunals are independent from Congress, devoid of
partisan influence or consideration and, therefore, Congress
has no power to regulate proceedings of these electoral
tribunals.
MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They are independent
although they are not a separate branch of government.
MR. MAAMBONG. There is a statement that in all
parliaments of the world, the invariable rule is to leave unto
themselves the determination of controversies with respect
to the election and qualifications of their members, and
precisely they have this Committee on Privileges which takes
care of this particular controversy.
Would the Gentleman say that the creation of electoral
tribunals is an exception to this rule because apparently we
have an independent electoral tribunal?
MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.

My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we
can. In the case of the electoral tribunal, either of the House
or of the Senate, is it correct to say that these tribunals are
constitutional creations? I will distinguish these with the case
of the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan which are
created by mandate of the Constitution but they are not
constitutional creations. Is that a good distinction?
MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent statement.
MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the
Senate Electoral Tribunal or the House Electoral Tribunal is a
constitutional body.?
MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the electoral tribunals are

independent, but the Gentleman will notice that the wordings
say: 'The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal. 'It is still the Senate
Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal. So,
technically, it is the tribunal of the House and tribunal of the
Senate although they are independent.
MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as we have agreed on,
are independent from both bodies?
MR. AZCUNA. That is correct.
MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my question.

How can we say that these bodies are independent when we
still have six politicians sitting in both tribunals?
MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then

subject to constitutional restrictions?
MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent, Madam

President.
MR. AZCUNA It would be subject to constitutional restrictions

intended for that body.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we discussed a

portion of this in the Committee on the Executive, there was
a comment by Chief Justice Concepcion-Commissioner
Concepcion-that there seems to be some incongruity in
these electoral tribunals, considering that politicians still sit in
the tribunals in spite of the fact that in the ruling in the case
of Sanidad vs. Vera, Senate Electoral tribunal Case No. 1,
they are supposed to act in accordance with law and justice
with complete detachment from an political considerations.
That is why I am asking now for the record how we could
achieve such detachment when there are six politicians
sitting there.
MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in

the case of Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, will still be
applicable to the present bodies we are creating since it
ruled that the electoral tribunals are not separate
departments of the government. Would that ruling still be
valid?
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments
because the separate departments are the legislative, the
executive and the judiciary; but they are constitutional
bodies.
MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the Gentleman, while

chosen on behalf of the opposition, has, with sterling

competence, shown independence in the proceedings of this
Commission. I think we can also trust that the members of
the tribunals will be independent. (pp. 111-112, Journal,
Tuesday, July 22, 1986, Emphasis supplied.)
Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the
independence of the HRET.
The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so
zealously guarded by the framers of our Constitution, would,
however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House
of Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle
and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the
judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the
interests of the party in power.
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing
Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal
for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of
the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear
impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House
Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest
between Pineda and Bondoc.
To sanction such interference by the House of
Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal
would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the
aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three
justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member
would be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may
as well abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.
Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of
membership in the HRET.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be nonpartisan. They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment,
impartiality,
and
independence
even
independence from the political party to which they belong.
Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline,"
are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the
tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the
HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc,
based strictly on the result of the examination and
appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by
the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a
grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the
Constitution.
Its
resolution
of
expulsion
against
Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to
security of tenure.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of
the House of Representatives is that it violates
Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure.
Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional
election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as
members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our
Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore,
membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be

terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of
the member's congressional term of office, his death,
permanent disability, resignation from the political party he
represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another
political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member
may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for
"party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated
with another political group. As the records of this case fail to
show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered
member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP
and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it
violated his right to security of tenure.
There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that
members of the House Electoral Tribunal are not entitled to
security of tenure because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme
Court Justices in the Tribunal were changed before the end
of the congressional term, namely: Chief Justice Marcelo B.
Fernan who, upon his elevation to the office of Chief Justice,
was replaced by Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, and the
latter, who was temporarily replaced by Justice Emilio A.
Gancayco, when he (J. Feliciano) took a leave of absence to
deliver a lecture in Yale University. It should be stressed,
however, that those changes in the judicial composition to
the HRET had no political implications at all unlike the
present attempt to remove Congressman Camasura. No
coercion was applied on Chief Justice Fernan to resign from
the tribunal, nor on Justice Feliciano to go on a leave of
absence. They acted on their own free will, for valid reasons,
and with no covert design to derail the disposition of a
pending case in the HRET.
The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was
expelled from, and by, the LDP to punish him for "party
disloyalty" after he had revealed to the Secretary-General of
the party how he voted in the Bondoc case. The purpose of
the expulsion of Congressman Camasura was to nullify his
vote in the Bondoc case so that the HRET's decision may
not be promulgated, and so that the way could be cleared for
the LDP to nominate a replacement for Congressman
Camasura in the Tribunal. That stratagem of the LDP and the
House of Representatives is clearly aimed to substitute
Congressman Camasura's vote and, in effect, to change the
judgment of the HRET in the Bondoc case.
The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc
for the protection of his rights against the strong arm of the
majority party in the House of Representatives. The Court
cannot be deaf to his plea for relief, nor indifferent to his
charge that the House of Representatives had acted with
grave abuse of discretion in removing Congressman
Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon
the Court, as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its
judicial power and discharge its duty to protect his rights as
the party aggrieved by the action of the House. The Court
must perform its duty under the Constitution "even when the
violator be the highest official of the land or the Government
itself" (Concurring opinion of J. Antonio Barredo in Aquino vs.
Ponce-Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 207).

Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the
House Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives
was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere
with the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to
deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his
favor, the action of the House of Representatives is clearly
violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987
Constitution) which created the House Electoral Tribunal to
be the "sole judge" of the election contest between Pineda
and Bondoc. We, therefore, declare null and void the
resolution dated March 13, 1991 of the House of
Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding
the election, of Congressman Camasura as a member of the
House Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner, Dr. Emigdio
Bondoc, is entitled to the reliefs he prays for in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus is granted. The decision of the House of
Representatives withdrawing the nomination and rescinding
the election of Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. as a
member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared
null and void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution,
and Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered
reinstated to his position as a member of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET Resolution
No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991, cancelling the
promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr.
Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside.
Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the
promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the speedy
resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise of its
equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice, hereby
declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective
upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done
immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against respondent
Marciano A. Pineda.
SO ORDERED.
CSC v. BELAGAN
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 132164. October 19, 2004]
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. ALLYSON
BELAGAN,respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
When the credibility of a witness is sought to be
impeached by proof of his reputation, it is necessary that the
reputation shown should be that which existed before the
occurrence of the circumstances out of which the litigation
arose,[1] or at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at
a period remote from the commencement of the suit.[2] This is
because a person of derogatory character or reputation can

still change or reform himself.
For our resolution is the petition for review
on certiorari of the Court of Appeals Decision[3] dated
January 8, 1998, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 44180, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. 966213 dated September
23, 1996 and Resolution No. 972423 dated April 11, 1997 of
the respondent Civil Service Commission are hereby set
aside. The complaint against petitioner Allyson Belagan filed
by Magdalena Gapuz is hereby DISMISSED.
The dismissal of petitioner Belagan is lifted and he is hereby
ordered to be immediately reinstated to his position without
loss of seniority, retirement, backwages and other rights and
benefits.
SO ORDERED.
The instant case stemmed from two (2) separate
complaints filed respectively by Magdalena Gapuz,
founder/directress of the Mother and Child Learning Center,
and Ligaya Annawi, a public school teacher at Fort Del Pilar
Elementary School, against respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan,
Superintendent of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS), all from Baguio City. Magdalena charged
respondent with sexual indignities and harassment, while
Ligaya accused him of sexual harassment and various
malfeasances.
Magdalenas sworn complaint alleges that sometime in
March 1994, she filed an application with the DECS Office in
Baguio City for a permit to operate a pre-school. One of the
requisites for the issuance of the permit was the inspection
of the school premises by the DECS Division Office. Since
the officer assigned to conduct the inspection was not
present, respondent volunteered his services. Sometime in
June 1994, respondent and complainant visited the school.
In the course of the inspection, while both were descending
the stairs of the second floor, respondent suddenly placed
his arms around her shoulders and kissed her cheek.
Dumbfounded, she muttered, Sir, is this part of the
inspection? Pati ba naman kayo sa DECS wala ng values?
Respondent merely sheepishly smiled. At that time, there
were no other people in the area.
Fearful that her application might be jeopardized and
that her husband might harm respondent, Magdalena just
kept quiet.
Several days later, Magdalena went to the DECS
Division Office and asked respondent, Sir, kumusta yung
application ko? His reply was Mag-date muna tayo. She
declined, explaining that she is married. She then left and
reported the matter to DECS Assistant Superintendent Peter
Ngabit.

Magdalena never returned to the DECS Division Office
to follow up her application. However, she was forced to
reveal the incidents to her husband when he asked why the
permit has not yet been released. Thereupon, they went to
the office of the respondent. He merely denied having a
personal relationship with Magdalena.
Thereafter, respondent forwarded to the DECS
Regional Director his recommendation to approve
Magdalenas application for a permit to operate a pre-school.
Sometime in September 1994, Magdalena read from a
local newspaper that certain female employees of the DECS
in Baguio City were charging a high-ranking DECS official
with sexual harassment. Upon inquiry, she learned that the
official being complained of was respondent. She then wrote
a letter-complaint for sexual indignities and harassment to
former DECS Secretary Ricardo Gloria.
official duties and taking advantage of his office. He is,

however, ABSOLVED of all the other charges of
administrative malfeasance or dereliction of duty.
b)
Respondent Baguio City Superintendent Allyson

Belagan likewise GUILTY of the two counts of
sexual advances or indignities committed against
the person and honor of complainant Mrs. Magdalena
Gapuz, a private school teacher of Baguio City, while in
the performance of his official duties and taking
advantage of his office.
Consequently, respondent Allyson Belagan is HEREBY

ORDERED DISMISSED from the government service, with
prejudice to reinstatement and all his retirement benefits and
other remunerations due him are HEREBY DECLARED
FORFEITED in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED.[5]
On October 4, 1994, respondent was placed under

suspension.
On the part of Ligaya Annawi, she alleged in her
complaint that on four separate occasions, respondent
touched her breasts, kissed her cheek, touched her groins,
embraced her from behind and pulled her close to him, his
organ pressing the lower part of her back.
Ligaya also charged respondent with: (1) delaying the
payment of the teachers salaries;(2) failing to release the
pay differentials of substitute teachers; (3) willfully refusing to
release the teachers uniforms, proportionate allowances and
productivity pay; and (4) failing to constitute the Selection
and Promotion Board, as required by the DECS rules and
regulations.
The DECS conducted a joint investigation of the
complaints of Magdalena and Ligaya. In his defense,
respondent denied their charge of sexual harassment.
However, he presented evidence to disprove Ligayas
imputation of dereliction of duty.
On January 9, 1995, the DECS Secretary rendered a
Joint Decision[4] finding respondent guilty of four (4) counts of
sexual indignities or harassments committed against
Ligaya; and two (2) counts of sexual advances or
indignities against Magdalena. He was ordered dismissed
from the service. The dispositive portion of the Joint
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing disquisitions duly considered,
decision is hereby rendered in the two above-entitled cases,
finding:
Upon appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC), on

September 23, 1996, promulgated Resolution No.
966213[6] affirming the Decision of the DECS Secretary in the
case filed by Magdalena but dismissing the complaint of
Ligaya. The CSC ruled that respondents transgression
against Magdalena constitutes grave misconduct. Thus:
The acts of Belagan are serious breach of good conduct
since he was holding a position which requires the
incumbent thereof to maintain a high degree of moral
uprightness. As Division Superintendent, Belagan represents
an institution tasked to mold the character of children.
Furthermore, one of his duties is to ensure that teachers in
his division conduct themselves properly and observe the
proper discipline. Any improper behavior on his part will
seriously impair his moral ascendancy over the teachers and
students which can not be tolerated. Therefore, his
misconduct towards an applicant for a permit to operate
a private pre-school cannot be treated lightly and
constitutes the offense of grave misconduct.
WHEREFORE, respondent Allyson Belagan is hereby found
guilty of grave misconduct and imposed the penalty
of DISMISSAL from the service with all the accessory
penalties. The decision of the DECS Secretary is modified
accordingly.[7]
On October 29, 1996, respondent seasonably filed a
motion for reconsideration, contending that he has never
been charged of any offense in his thirty-seven (37) years of
service. By contrast, Magdalena was charged with several
offenses before the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Baguio City, thus:
a) Respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the

DECS Baguio City Schools Division GUILTY of
the four
counts of
sexual
indignities
or
harassmentscommitted against the person and honor
of complainant Miss Ligaya Annawi, a Baguio City
public school teacher, while in the performance of his
1.
Criminal Case No. 43416 for LIGHT ORAL
DEFAMATION (December 3, 1980)

2.
Criminal Case No. 45629 for SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES (May 13, 1982)
21.
Criminal Case No.
VEXATION (December 13, 1985)
53404
for
UNJUST
3.
Criminal Case
THREATS (May 13, 1982)
No.
45630
for
GRAVE
22.
Criminal Case No. 55422
VEXATION (October 24, 1986) [8]
for
UNJUST
4.
Criminal Case
THREATS (June 24, 1982)
No.
45914
for
GRAVE
In addition, the following complaints against Magdalena

were filed with the Barangay Chairmen of Barangay
Gabriela Silang and Barangay Hillside, both in Baguio
City:
5.
Criminal Case No. 51532 for MALICIOUS
MISCHIEF (January 25, 1985)
6.
Criminal Case No. 51533 for LIGHT THREATS
(January 25, 1985)
7.
Criminal Case No. 51556 for GRAVE ORAL
DEFAMATION (January 30, 1985)
8.
Criminal Case No. 51818 for LIGHT ORAL
DEFAMATION (March 18, 1985)
9.
DEFAMATION (March 18, 1985)
10.
Criminal Case No. 51820 for MALICIOUS
MISCHIEF (March 18, 1985)
11.
Criminal Case No. 51821 for UNJUST
VEXATION (March 18, 1985)
12.
Criminal Case No. 62173 for UNJUST
VEXATION (May 29, 1991)
13.
DEFAMATION (May 29, 1991)
14.
15.
16.
DEFAMATION (October 24, 1986)
17.
DEFAMATION (November 4, 1986)
18.
DEFAMATION (January 7, 1987)
19.
Criminal Case No.
VEXATION (November 29, 1987)
57312
for
UNJUST
20.
Criminal Case No. 55643 for
PHYSICAL INJURIES (December 13, 1985)
SLIGHT
1.
Ordana vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 11-19-02-A)
for GRAVE THREATS, UNJUST VEXATION, RUMOR
MONGERING
2.
Teresita De Los Santos vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case
No. 86-8-26-8) for GRAVE THREATS & ORAL
DEFAMATION
3.
Mrs. Conchita Ballesteros vs. Gapuz (Brgy.
Case No. 029) for ORAL DEFAMATION and FALSE
ACCUSATION
4.
Mrs. Clara Baoas vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No.
030) for HARASSMENT and THREATS
5.
GABRIELA SILANG TANOD FORCES vs. Gapuz
(Case No. 031) for HABITUAL TROUBLE MAKER
6.
Pablo Ortiz vs. Gapuz (November 1, 1979) for
ORAL DEFAMATION
7.
C. Ballesteros vs. Gapuz (September 11, 1978)
for ORAL DEFAMATION
8.
Mrs. Liza Ancheta vs. Gapuz (September 27,
1978) for RUMOR MONGERING
9.
Mr. Pananin (Beneco Personnel) (October 8,
1978) for ORAL DEFAMATION
10.
Mrs. Minda Valdez vs. Gapuz (November 6,
11.
WOMENS CLUB vs. GAPUZ (February 9,
12.
Vistro Salcedo case (May 8, 1979)
Where Mrs. Gapuz was spreading rumors against

Barangay Captain and Police Chief
13.
Demolition Scandal (May 10, 1979)
Where she called all the residents of their Barangay for an

emergency meeting and where she shouted invectives
against the residents

14.
Incident of June 13, 1979

Mrs. Gapuz shouted invectives against the Barangay
Sanitary Inspector
15.
Incident of August 25, 1979

Mrs. Gapuz shouted invectives against the servants of Mr.
De Leon
16.
Incident of August 26, 1979

Mrs. Gapuz terrorized the council meeting
17.
The character of a woman who was the subject of a

sexual assault is of minor significance in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the person
accused of having committed the offense. This is so
because even a prostitute or a woman of ill repute may
become a victim of said offense.
As such, the fact that complainant Magdalena Gapuz is
shown to have had cases before the regular courts for
various offenses and was condemned by her community for
wrongful behavior does not discount the possibility that she
was in fact telling the truth when she cried about the
lecherous advances made to her by the respondent. x x x
Respondent then filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for review. As stated earlier, it reversed the CSC
Resolutions and dismissed Magdalenas complaint.
Incident of September 2, 1978

Mrs. Clara Baoas was harassed by Mrs. Gapuz
18.

Mrs. Gapuz quarreled with Mrs. C. Ballesteros during the
council meeting
19.

Mrs. Gapuz was hurling invectives along her alley in the
early morning
20.

Mrs. Gapuz tapped electric wire from Mrs. Tessie de los
Santos with the latters consent
21.

Mrs. Gapuz was shouting and
scandalously around her residence
22.
hurling
invectives
Unsatisfied, the CSC, through the Solicitor General,

filed the instant petition raising the following assignments of
error:
I. The Supreme Court may rule on factual issues raised
on appeal where the Court of Appeals misappreciated
the facts. Furthermore, where the findings of the Court
of Appeals and the trial court are contrary to each other,
the Supreme Court may review the record and
evidence. The Court of Appeals erred in not giving
credence to the testimony of complainant Magdalena
Gapuz despite convincing and overwhelming signs of
its truthfulness.

Mrs. Gapuz was shouting, complaining about alleged
poisoned sardines near the premises of her residence
which killed her hen.
23.
The Appellate Court held that Magdalena is an

unreliable witness, her character being questionable. Given
her aggressiveness and propensity for trouble, she is not
one whom any male would attempt to steal a kiss. In fact,
her record immediately raises an alarm in any one who may
cross her path.[11] In absolving respondent from the charges,
the Appellate Court considered his unblemished service
record for 37 years.
II. The Court of Appeals committed reversible error

when it failed to give due weight to the findings of the
DECS,
which
conducted
the
administrative
investigation, specifically with respect to the credibility
of the witnesses presented.

Mrs. Gapuz was shouting unpleasant words around the
neighborhood. She did not like the actuations of a
bayanihan group near the waiting shed.[9]
Respondent claimed that the numerous cases filed

against Magdalena cast doubt on her character, integrity, and
credibility.
In its Resolution No. 972423[10] dated April 11, 1997, the
CSC denied respondents motion for reconsideration, holding
that:
III. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondent

should be penalized under Sec. 22 (o) of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V and not Sec. 22 (e) of said
rules.[12]
In his comment, respondent maintains that
Magdalenas derogatory record undermines the verity of her
charge and that the Court of Appeals is correct in dismissing
it.
The petition is impressed with merit.

The pivotal issue before us is whether complaining
witness, Magdalena Gapuz, is credible. This is a question of
fact which, as a general rule, is not subject to this Courts
review.
It is a rule of long standing that factual findings of the
Court of Appeals, if supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable
by this Court.[13] This Court is, after all, not a trier of facts.
One of the exceptions, however, is when the findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court or
a quasi-judicial body, like petitioner herein.[14]
Here, the Court of Appeals and the CSC are poles
apart in their appreciation of Magdalenas derogatory record.
While the former considered it of vital and paramount
importance in determining the truth of her charge, the latter
dismissed it as of minor significance. This contrariety
propels us to the elusive area of character and reputation
evidence.
Generally, the character of a party is regarded as
legally irrelevant in determining a controversy.[15] One
statutory exception is that relied upon by respondent, i.e.,
Section 51 (a) 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, which we quote here:
SEC. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible;
exceptions.
(a) In Criminal Cases:
xxx
xxx
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended

party may be proved if it tends to establish in any
reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the
offense charged.
It will be readily observed that the above provision
pertains only to criminal cases, not to administrative
offenses. And even assuming that this technical rule of
evidence can be applied here, still, we cannot sustain
respondents posture.
Not every good or bad moral character of the offended
party may be proved under this provision. Only those which
would establish the probability or improbability of the offense
charged. This means that the character evidence must be
limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the type of
offense charged.[16] Thus, on a charge of rape - character for
chastity, on a charge of assault - character for
peaceableness or violence, and on a charge of
embezzlement - character for honesty.[17] In one rape case,
where it was established that the alleged victim was morally
loose and apparently uncaring about her chastity, we found
the conviction of the accused doubtful.[18]
In the present administrative case for sexual

harassment, respondent did not offer evidence that has a
bearing on Magdalenas chastity. What he presented are
charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust
vexation, physical injuries, malicious mischief, etc. filed
against her. Certainly, these pieces of evidence are
inadmissible under the above provision because they do not
establish the probability or improbability of the offense
charged.
Obviously, in invoking the above provision, what
respondent was trying to establish is Magdalenas lack of
credibility and not the probability or the improbability of the
charge. In this regard, a different provision applies.
Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell
the truth in the testimony given. It refers to a persons
integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of belief.[19] A
witness may be discredited by evidence attacking his
general reputation for truth,[20] honesty[21] or integrity.
[22]
Section 11, Rule 132 of the same Revised Rules on
Evidence reads:
SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse partys witness. A
witness may be impeached by the party against whom he
was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his
general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is
bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but not
by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may
be shown by the examination of the witness, or the record
of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an
offense.
Although she is the offended party, Magdalena, by
testifying in her own behalf, opened herself to character or
reputation attack pursuant to the principle that a party who
becomes a witness in his own behalf places himself in
the same position as any other witness, and may be
impeached by an attack on his character or reputation.[23]
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court of Appeals is
correct in holding that the character or reputation of a
complaining witness in a sexual charge is a proper subject of
inquiry. This leads us to the ultimate question is
Magdalenas derogatory record sufficient to discredit
her credibility?
A careful review of the record yields a negative answer.
First, most of the twenty-two (22) cases filed with the
MTC of Baguio City relate to acts committed in the 80s,
particularly, 1985 and 1986. With respect to the complaints
filed with the Chairmen of Barangay Gabriela Silang and
Barangay Hillside, the acts complained of took place in 1978
to 1979. In the instant administrative case, the offense was
committed in1994. Surely, those cases and complaints are
no longer reliable proofs of Magdalenas character or
reputation. The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in
according much weight to such evidence. Settled is the

principle that evidence of ones character or reputation
must be confined to a time not too remote from the time
in question.[24] In other words, what is to be determined
is the character or reputation of the person at the time of
the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote
from the commencement of the suit.[25] Hence, to say that
Magdalenas credibility is diminished by proofs of tarnished
reputation existing almost a decade ago is unreasonable. It
is unfair to presume that a person who has wandered from
the path of moral righteousness can never retrace his steps
again. Certainly, every person is capable to change or
reform.
Second, respondent failed to prove that Magdalena
was convicted in any of the criminal cases specified by
respondent. The general rule prevailing in a great majority of
jurisdictions is that it is not permissible to show that a
witness has been arrested or that he has been charged
with or prosecuted for a criminal offense, or confined in
jail for the purpose of impairing his credibility.[26] This view
has usually been based upon one or more of the following
grounds or theories: (a) that a mere unproven charge against
the witness does not logically tend to affect his
credibility, (b) that innocent persons are often arrested or
accused of a crime, (c) that one accused of a crime is
presumed to be innocent until his guilt is legally established,
and (d) that a witness may not be impeached or discredited
by evidence of particular acts of misconduct.[27] Significantly,
the same Section 11, Rule 132 of our Revised Rules on
Evidence provides that a witness may not be impeached by
evidence of particular wrongful acts. Such evidence is
rejected because of the confusion of issues and the waste of
time that would be involved, and because the witness may
not be prepared to expose the falsity of such wrongful acts.
[28]
As it happened in this case, Magdalena was not able to
explain or rebut each of the charges against her listed by
respondent.
But more than anything else, what convinces us to
sustain the Resolution of the CSC is the fact that it is
supported by substantial evidence. As aptly pointed out by
the Solicitor General, Magdalena testified in a
straightforward, candid and spontaneous manner. Her
testimony is replete with details, such as the number of times
she and respondent inspected the pre-school, the specific
part of the stairs where respondent kissed her, and the
matter about her transient boarders during summer.
Magdalena would not have normally thought about these
details if she were not telling the truth. We quote her
testimony during the cross-examination conducted by DECS
Assistant Secretary Romeo Capinpin and Undersecretary
Antonio Nachura, thus:
Q Was there any conversation between you and Dr.
Belagan during the inspection on the first floor and the
second floor?
A
There was, sir. It was a casual conversation that we
had with regard to my family, background, how the school
came about, how I started with the project. That was all, sir.
Q Nothing about any form of sexual harassment, in words

or in deeds?
A Sir, because he inspected the second floor twice, sir. We
went up to the stairs twice, sir.
Q
Why?
A I really dont know what was the reason behind, sir. But
on the second inspection, sir, I told him that as of that time I
had some transients with me. I was making use of the
premises for transients because that was summer then, sir.
And I already started paying the place so I said, Sir, I have
some transients with me in the evening and he said, You
know Mrs. Gapuz, I am interested to stay in one of the
rooms as one your boarders. But I respectfully declined
saying, Sir, I think for delicadeza I cannot accept you. Not
that I dont want you to be here but people might think that I
am keeping you here and that would prejudice my permit,
sir.
ASEC R. CAPINPIN:
Q When did the alleged kissing occur? Was it during
the first time that you went up with him or the second
time?
A
No, sir, on the second time, sir.
Second time?
Yes, sir. We were going down, sir.
And you were going down?
Yes, sir.
Q Do you recall what portion of the stairs where you

were during the alleged kissing?
A
Sir, on the topmost of the stairs.
Before you went down?
A
Yes, sir. At the topmost because there is a base
floor going up to the stairs and it has 16 steps.
Q So, it was not on the 16th step but still on the
topmost?
A
Yes sir.
Part of the floor of the building?
Yes, sir. Topmost, sir?

ASEC R. CAPINPIN:
I cannot remember, sir.
Q Will you kindly tell us your relative position at that

time?
Was it morning, afternoon?
I think it was in the morning, sir.
Morning.
Yes, sir.
Early morning?
About noon, sir.
A
Sir, on the second time that we went up and I
mentioned about these transients that I had then and he
wanted to stay in the place in one of the rooms and then
I declined and I was still showing the rooms
simultaneously. On the last, the biggest room that I had,
he said, No. Never mind, I am not going to see that
anymore. So he waited for me there and upon reaching
the place, as I was to step down on the first step going
down, he placed his arm and held me tightly and planted
the kiss on my cheek, sir.
Q
You said that he wanted to stay in one of the rooms?
Yes, sir, as a boarder.
Is that room used for transients?
A During that time, sir, during the summertime, I made use

of the time to get some transients.
Q And he was telling you that he wanted to occupy one of
the rooms?
A
Yes, but I declined, sir for delicadeza.
At that time, there were no transients yet.
A When he came over for the inspection sir, nobody was

there.[29]
The above testimony does not stand in isolation. It is
corroborated by Peter Ngabit, DECS Assistant Division
Superintendent. Ngabit testified that Magdalena reported to
him that respondent kissed her and asked her for a date.
Q I would like to call your attention to Exhibit A which is
the affidavit of Mrs. Magdalena B. Gapuz, particularly item
no. 8, and may I read for your information That the
Monday after the incident, I went to the DECS Division Office
expecting to get favorable recommendation from the DECS
Regional Office for the issuance of my permit. That I
proceeded to the Superintendent and asked him, Sir,
kumusta yung application ko and he said, mag date muna
tayo but I refused and explained that I am married, after
which I proceeded to the Office of Asst. Superintendent
Peter Ngabit to relate the incident and then left the Division
Office. Do you remember if Mrs. Gapuz went to your Office
on the particular day?
A
Yes, sir.
What time was that?
Q What transpired between you and Mrs. Gapuz in your

office?
A
When she came to my Office, she was relating about
that and she was even insulting me saying among others
that I was a useless fixture in that Office because I cannot do
anything with the processing of her paper or application.
Q It says here that she would relate the incident to
you. Did she relate any incident?
A
Yes, she did sir.
What was that incident all about?
A She was saying that when Mr. Belagan went to visit

her school, he stole a kiss from her and that she was
saying that when she asked Supt. Belagan for her
papers, she was asked for a date before the
Indorsement. After that, she left.[30]
With Magdalenas positive testimony and that of Ngabit,
how can we disregard the findings of the DECS and the
CSC? Surely, we cannot debunk it simply because of the
Court of Appeals outdated characterization of Magdalena as
a woman of bad reputation. There are a number of cases
where the triers of fact believe the testimony of a witness of
bad character[31] and refuse to believe one of good character.
[32]
As a matter of fact, even a witness who has been
convicted a number of times is worthy of belief, when he
testified in a straightforward and convincing manner.[33]
At this juncture, it bears stressing that more than
anybody else, it is the DECS investigating officials who are in
a better position to determine whether Magdalena is telling
the truth considering that they were able to hear and observe
her deportment and manner of testifying.[34]

In reversing the CSCs Resolutions, the Court of
Appeals ruled that there is ample evidence to show that
Magdalena had a motive in accusing respondent, i.e., to
pressure him to issue a permit. This is unconvincing. The
record shows that respondent had already issued the permit
when Magdalena filed her letter-complaint. Indeed, she had
no more reason to charge respondent administratively,
except of course to vindicate her honor.
Petitioner prays that we sustain its ruling penalizing
respondent for grave misconduct and not merely for
disgraceful or immoral conduct which is punishable by
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1)
year for the first offense.[35] Misconduct means intentional
wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or
standard of behavior, especially by a government official.
[36]
To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct
should relate to or be connected with the performance of the
official functions and duties of a public officer.[37] In grave
misconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct,
the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or
flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest.
[38]
Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in
the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and
wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some
benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and
the rights of others.[39]This is apparently present in
respondents case as it concerns not only a stolen kiss but
also a demand for a date, an unlawful consideration for the
issuance of a permit to operate a pre-school. Respondents
act clearly constitutes grave misconduct, punishable by
dismissal.[40]
We are, however, not inclined to impose the penalty of
dismissal from the service. Respondent has served the
government for a period of 37 years, during which, he made
a steady ascent from an Elementary Grade School Teacher
to Schools Division Superintendent. In devoting the best
years of his life to the education department, he received
numerous awards.[41] This is the first time he is being
administratively charged. He is in the edge of retirement. In
fact, he had filed his application for retirement when
Magdalena filed her complaint. Section 16, Rule XIV, of the
Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292
provides:
The following circumstances shall be appreciated:

xxxxxx
j. length of service
xxxxxx
l. and other analogous cases.
Conformably with our ruling in a similar case of sexual
harassment,[43] and respondents length of service,
unblemished record in the past and numerous awards,[44] the
penalty of suspension from office without pay for one (1) year
is in order.
While we will not condone the wrongdoing of public
officers and employees, however, neither will we negate any
move to recognize and remunerate their lengthy service in
the government.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 8, 1998 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 44180 is REVERSED. The CSC Resolution
Nos. 966213 and 972423 are AFFIRMED, subject to the
modification that respondent ALLYSONBELAGAN is
SUSPENDED from office without pay for ONE (1) YEAR,
with full credit of his preventive suspension.
SO ORDERED.
GONZALES v. CSC
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139131. September 27, 2002]
JESUS R. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, and PHILIPPINE CHILDRENS
MEDICAL CENTER (PCMC),respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
SEC. 16. In the determination of penalties to be

imposed, mitigating and aggravating circumstances may
be considered. x x x.
The mitigating circumstances are enumerated in
Section 53, Rule IV, of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service,[42] which reads in part:
SEC. 53. Extenuating, Mitigating, Aggravating, or
Alternative Circumstances. In the determination of the
penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and
alternative circumstances attendant to the commission of the
offense shall be considered.
Petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the

Resolution[1] dated January 14, 1999 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. UDK-2819, which dismissed
petitioners appeal via a petition for review,[2] for his failure to
comply with Section 6 (c), Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, and
its Resolution[3] dated February 16, 1999, denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration. Subject of said
appeal before the CA were Resolutions Nos. 98-2359[4]and
98-3021[5] of the Civil Service Commission, which upheld the
dismissal of petitioner from respondent Philippine Childrens
Medical Center (PCMC).

The facts of this case, as culled from records, are as
follows:
failure to attach certified true copies of material portions of

the records and supporting papers.
Petitioner Jesus R. Gonzales was one of the two Utility

Workers II assigned at the Pharmacy Section of respondent
Philippine Childrens Medical Center (PCMC), a governmentowned and controlled corporation created under P.D. No.
1631, as amended. At PCMC, petitioner served the patients
and the public from 6:00 A.M. to 10:00 P.M., seven days a
week.
The CA
concluded:
Resolution[11] dated
January
14,
1999,
WHEREFORE, for being formally deficient, the instant

petition for review is hereby DISMISSED.
In a Motion for Reconsideration and Compliance,
petitioner attached the certified true copies of the required
papers. But the CA denied the motion in a
Resolution[13] dated February 16, 1999.
[12]
On March 2, 1998, petitioner started absenting himself

without an approved leave (AWOL) and without explaining
the reason for his absence to his superiors.
In view of the exigency of petitioners functions, Ms.
Jara Corazon O. Ehera, Human Resources Management
Officer III, wrote a letter-notice dated March 5, 1998 to
petitioner directing him to report for work within three (3)
days from receipt of said notice, otherwise, he would be
dropped from the rolls.
During his absence, petitioner was seen on several
occasions within the premises of PCMC, particularly in the
Budget Office, Billing and Cashier, and Personnel Clinic. He
allegedly visited the clinic without consulting any medical
problem and when Dr. Galero once made a surprise visit, he
was not found in his house.[6]
On March 16, 1998, Dr. Corazon D. Rivera, officer-incharge of the Pharmacy Section, reported petitioners
irresponsibility and lack of concern for his work to Dr. Lillian
V. Lee, Executive Director of PCMC, recommending that
petitioner be dropped from the rolls.
Despite the written letter-notice sent to him, petitioner
failed to report for work thus constraining PCMC to drop him
from the rolls, effective March 20, 1998.[7]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). In Resolution No. 98-2359 dated
September 8, 1998, the CSC upheld the action taken by
PCMC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Jesus R. Gonzales is hereby
dismissed. Accordingly, the action of the PCMC Executive
Director, dropping him from the rolls, is upheld.[8]
The decision, however, stated that considering that the
separation of petitioner was not disciplinary in character, he
may be re-employed in the same agency at the discretion of
the appointing authority.[9]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration by the CSC of
Resolution 98-2359, but it was denied.
When he filed a petition for review in the CA, the
petition was denied for failure to comply with Section 6 (c),
Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court, [10] particularly for
Hence, this petition raising the following issues for

resolution:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave
error in dismissing the appeal of herein petitioner based on
pure technicality.
2. Whether or not there is factual and legal basis for
respondent PCMC to drop petitioner from the rolls for his
alleged absences without leave.[14]
On the first issue, petitioner argues that the dismissal of
the petition by CA on mere technicality is unwarranted and
unjustified since pertinent jurisprudence abounds declaring
in no uncertain terms that dismissals of appeals on purely
technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the
Court is to encourage hearings of appeals based on merits.
[15]
The same position is taken by the Office of the Solicitor

General in its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment[16] filed
before this Court. But respondent PCMC asserts that the
dismissal by the CA of the petition for review is in keeping
with Section 7[17] in relation to Section 6 of Rule 43 of the
Revised Rules of Court.[18]
In Cadayona vs. Court of Appeals,[19] however, we
already held that Section 6, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of
Court is not to be construed as imposing the requirement
that all supporting papers accompanying the petition should
be certified true copies. We compared this provision with its
counterpart provision in Rule 42, on petitions for review from
the RTC to the CA, and noted that under the latter, only the
judgments or final orders of the lower court need to be
certified true copies or duplicate originals. In numerous
resolutions issued by this Court we emphasized that in an
appeal via a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 and in an
original civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to
Rules 46 and 56, what is required to be a certified true copy
is the copy of the questioned judgment, final order or
resolution.[20]We see no reason why a stricter requirement
should be made for petitions under Rule 43, which governs
appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial
agencies to the CA. This could not have been intended by
the framers of the rules. A contrary ruling would be too
harsh and would not promote the underlying objective of

securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding.[21]
Further, we note that petitioner had attached certified
true copies of the documents supporting his Motion for
Reconsideration and Compliance.[22] As previously held,
submission of a required document with the Motion for
Reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with
Section 3, Rule 46.[23]
On the second issue, petitioner argues that he was
denied due process[24] when he was dropped from the
rolls. He avers that he received PCMCs letter dated March
5, 1998 only on March 20, 1998 and thus, had until March
23, 1998 within which to comply with the directive; [25] that in
fact, he did report for work on March 21, 1998, but was
barred by security personnel from entering the company
because his name had already been dropped from the rolls
effective March 20, 1998. He contends that his noncompliance with the return to work directive does not
constitute abandonment of work as no person in his right
mind would abandon his job to his own detriment.[26]
For analogous reasons, the Office of the Solicitor
General avers that petitioner was denied due process. The
OSG states that he was summarily dismissed without
affording him a hearing and the opportunity to introduce
witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor.[27]The OSG
also opines that the penalty of dismissal was too severe.[28]
In its reply, respondent PCMC insists that the dismissal
of petitioner is valid and legal, considering that petitioners
actuations were clearly irresponsible. They showed lack of
concern for his work and the smooth operation of PCMC.[29]
Further, PCMC contends that petitioner was given
ample opportunity to explain his side and to submit evidence
and to explain his absence.[30] PCMC points out that they
sent a letter-notice dated March 5, 1998, to petitioner and he
should have taken it upon himself to report to work, even
without any prompting from PCMC, considering the
significance of his work.[31] Besides, PCMC claims, petitioner
showed the clear intent to sever his employer-employee
relationship with PCMC. Finally, PCMC avers that factual
findings of the CSC on this matter are entitled to great weight
and must be accorded respect and finality.[32]
CSC, constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the

service, a ground for disciplinary action under E.O. No. 292
or the Administrative Code of 1987.[35] For his services are
essential to the efficient delivery of medical services and the
exigencies of the service require his presence in the office.
We agree that there is legal basis for dropping
petitioner from the rolls. It is also in accordance with law and
rules, notably Section 35 Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing E.O. 292 and Paragraph 2.1 (b) of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 12, s. 1994 which provides as
follows:
Sec. 35. Officers and employees who are absent for at least
thirty (30) days without approved leave are considered on
Absence Without Leave (AWOL) and shall be dropped from
the service after due notice. However, when the exigencies
of the service require his immediate presence and he
fails/refuses to return to the service, the head of office
may drop him from the service even prior to the
expiration of the thirty (30) day period abovestated.
[36]
(Emphasis ours.)
2.1 Absence without Approved Leave
a. xxx
b. If the number of unauthorized absences incurred is less
than thirty (30) calendar days, written return to work order
shall be served on the official or employee at his last known
address on record. Failure on his part to report for work
within the period stated in the order shall be a valid
ground to drop him from the rolls.[37] (Emphasis ours.)
Petitioners assertion that he was denied due process
is untenable. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.[38]
To avoid circuitous procedure, we shall now consider

the merits of the case. This Court is not a trier of facts, and
its function is limited to reviewing errors of law that might
have been committed by the lower court.[33] In this case, we
find no exceptional circumstance and we find no cogent
reason to set aside the factual findings of the CSC in
sustaining the action of respondent in the dropping of
petitioner from the rolls on the ground that he was found
AWOL (absent without official leave).
Records would show that respondent PCMC had

written a letter to petitioner to report for work [39] and another
letter informing him that he was being dropped from the rolls,
due to his Absence Without Official Leave, with the
enumeration of the reasons and basis thereof.[40]That
petitioner only received the notice on March 20, 1998 is of no
moment. In fact, two notices were given him: (a) the notice
requiring him to report for work; and (b) the notice that he
would be dropped because of his absences without official
leave. Further, petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to
report for duty after he received the return-to-work order, but
he did not report. Thus, the CSC found no error when
respondent PCMC dropped petitioner from the rolls for his
refusal to comply with the return-to-work order within a
prescribed period.[41]
The CSC noted that petitioner had admitted that

effective March 2, 1998, he was absent without approved
leave.[34] Petitioners unauthorized absences, as found by the
Finally, it must be emphasized that under CSC Circular

No. 12, series of 1994, the action dropping petitioner from
the rolls is non-disciplinary in nature and does not result in

the forfeiture of his benefits nor his disqualification from reemployment in the government. Likewise, dropping from the
rolls of petitioner is without prejudice to his re-appointment at
the discretion of the appointing authority and subject to Civil
Service laws, rules and regulations.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated January 14, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. UDK-2819 and
its Resolution dated February 16, 1999 are SET ASIDE
insofar as it denied petitioners appeal for his failure to
comply with Section 6 (c), Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of
Court. But Resolutions Nos. 98-2359 and 98-3021 of the
Civil Service Commission, dropping petitioner from the rolls
of respondent PCMC, without prejudice to his re-employment
in the government service, are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncements as to costs.
First, the incident reports submitted by MCWD employees

Samuela
M.
Suan,8 Editha
Luzano9 and
Jocelyn
10
Lebumfacil stating that, during office hours on January 25,
1999, Romagos suddenly and without provocation began
rambling loudly and incoherently, causing alarm and anxiety
among office visitors and employees;
Second, the incident report issued by Jocelyn
Lebumfacil11 stating that, during the August 4, 1999 HRD
staff meeting, Romagos suddenly and without provocation
began rambling loudly and incoherently, thereby disrupting
the meeting and causing unease among the staff; and
Third, the November 18, 1989 Certification issued by Dr.
Augustus B. Costas that Romagos is suffering from Major
Depression;12 and the January 11, 1991 Certification of Dr.
Renato D. Obra that Romagos is under treatment for Major
Depression.13
SO ORDERED.
MCWD also cited Romagos irregular attendance.14
ROMAGOS v. METRO CEBU WATER DISTRICT
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 156100
September 12, 2007
VILMA E. ROMAGOS, petitioner,

vs.
METRO CEBU WATER DISTRICT, EDITHA D. LUZANO
and DULCE M. ABANILLA, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 5, 2002
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the
appeal2 from Resolutions No. 0107133 and No. 0112224 of
the Civil Service Commission (CSC); and the October 29,
2002 CA Resolution5 which denied the motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are summarized as follows:
Metro Cebu Water District (MCWD) employed Vilma E.
Romagos (Romagos) as Clerk-Processor B. On August 9,
1999, MCWD barred Romagos from entering the work
premises unless she undergoes psychiatric treatment and is
certified by her doctor to be mentally fit to work. 6 Thereafter,
in a letter dated December 1, 1999,7 MCWD informed
Romagos that, effective January 1, 2000, she was being
dropped from the rolls for mental incapacity as shown by the
following evidence:
Romagos filed with the CSC Regional Office (CSCRO) a

Complaint-Appeal,15 questioning the procedure and factual
basis of her dismissal. The CSCRO dismissed the appeal in
its Decision dated June 23, 2000,16 holding that the evidence
cited by MCWD in its December 1, 1999 letter, as well as
new evidence presented by MCWD General Manager Dulce
M. Abanilla (Abanilla), established that Romagos was
mentally incapacitated, thus:
Furthermore, there are other additional evidence submitted
by General Manager Abanilla showing that there were
incidents which happened after August 20, 1999 involving
Ms. Romagos where the latter was observed to again utter
incoherent words and become hysterical. A narration of the
incidents which happened on September 6 and 7, 1999 are
contained in the affidavits executed by Ms. Diosdada Faelnar
and Atty. Vesmindo M. Santiago, the Chief of the Medical
and Dental Services and the Asst. General Manager for
Administration, respectively. Even as of December 1999, Ms.
Romagos mental problems were still observed by the OIC of
the HRD, per the Inter-Office Memorandum dated December
21, 1999, with the latter even going to the extent of asking
for the assistance of the security guards out of fear on what
the appellant might do.
Moreover, we note the different letters and reports/studies/
researches penned by the appellant clearly manifesting her
mental disorder. Her report to General Manager Abanilla
dated December 27 and 29, 1999 are incomprehensible,
incoherent, muddled and so disorganized that we cant help
but conclude that indeed appellant is not in her right frame of
mind. This observa[tion] also holds true when we examine
and read the papers and letters written and prepared by the
appellant dated August 6, 10, 30, 1999 and January 28,
1994.
xxxx

All of these foregoing discussion would clearly prove that
appellant is really suffering from some form of mental
disorder and, as a natural consequence, she is incapable of
discharging her functions x x x.17
In her motion for reconsideration, Romagos questioned the
CSCRO for giving weight to new evidence regarding her
alleged abnormal behavior in September and December
1999, even when MCWD neither cited said evidence in its
December 1, 1999 letter nor disclosed them to her at any
time thereafter.18
The CSCRO denied the motion for reconsideration in a
Decision dated July 26, 2000.19
Romagos appealed20 to the CSC which issued Resolution
No. 01-0713 dated March 29, 2001, affirming the CSCRO
decisions, to wit:
As culled from the records, several incidents (as evidenced
by the reports submitted by several officials and employees)
occurred showing the abnormal behavior of the appellant,
two (2) of which are, as follows:
1. Incident Report dated January 25, 1999 of Mrs. Samuela
M. Susan, Senior Industrial Relations Development Officer A,
the pertinent portion of which states, "I was stunned when
the next thing I knew, she was already behind me at a very
close range and bombarded me with insensible statements. I
remained silent and intentionally observed what would be
her next move while she was at the height of her outburst of
deep seated anger and suspicion. She addressed to me all
her sentiments telling me about corruption, illegal practices,
unfair practices in a loud, emotionally charged voice."
2. Inter-Office Memorandum dated January 25, 1999 of
Editha D. Luzano, Officer-in-Charge of the Human
Resources Department of the said agency, to wit, "On
January 25, 1999, Ms. Vilma Romagos behavior became
unstable again. She began talking to herself and then started
scolding other people in the HRD office. Her actions caused
anxieties to the other employees, thus disturbing their work.
Since December 1998, she has been behaving like this."
Hence, the continuous abnormal behavior of Romagos
cannot be denied. The Commission is convinced that the
dropping of the appellant from the rolls is justified.
On the issue of due process, the Commission is not
convinced that the right of Romagos to due process was
violated. As specifically provided in Section 2, Rule XII of the
Rules abovementioned, "notice shall be given to the
employee containing a brief statement of the nature of his
incapacity to work, and moreover, the said notice of
separation shall be signed by the appointing authority or
head of office." A perusal of the Notice dated December 1,
1999, sent to Romagos reveals that these requirements
were strictly followed.21
Her motion for reconsideration was denied by the CSC in

Resolution No. 01122222 dated July 18, 2001.
In a petition for review23 with the CA, Romagos questioned
the CSC Resolutions for insufficiency of evidence and lack of
due process. The CA issued the July 5, 2002 Decision
assailed herein, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition not impressed with
merit, the same is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.24
Romagos filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA
denied the same in the questioned October 29, 2002
Resolution.
Hence, the present Petition, raising the following issues:
i. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion in failing to squarely rule upon an issue
raised in the petition for review;
ii. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion in lightly adopting the findings of fact of
the Honorable Civil Service Commission Regional Office
without the documents and evidence, which were the very
basis of the latters findings, brought before it for studied
appreciation;
iii. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion in adopting the findings of the
Honorable Civil Service Commission Regional Office which
findings were based on evidence not disclosed to the
petitioner, in violation of her right to administrative due
process;
iv. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion in sustaining the petitioners dropping
from the rolls when there is no shred of proof of the alleged
abnormal behavior manifested in continuing incapacity to
work;
v. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion in affirming the petitioners dropping
from the rolls when the requirement of the rules are not
complied with;
vi. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals and the
Honorable Commission gravely abused their discretion in
holding that no prior notice or opportunity to contest the
alleged unauthorized absences, so included as ground in
Ms. Romagos separation letter, is required by law;
vii. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion in not finding any bad faith on the part
of Editha D. Luzon and Dulce M. Abanilla when adequate
evidence points to the contrary.25

The foregoing issues actually boil down to the question:
whether the CA correctly held that there was proper
procedure and substantial basis for MCWD (respondent) to
declare petitioner mentally unfit to work and drop her from
the rolls.
Normally, we do not entertain such purely factual issues we
avoid weighing conflicting evidence, and substituting our
evaluation for that of the lower courts and administrative or
quasi-judicial tribunals. We accord great respect, even
finality, to the latters factual findings, especially when these
are adopted and confirmed by the CA; instead, we confine
ourselves to merely reviewing and revising their errors of
law.26 But when their findings are not supported by
evidence,27 we step in to review their factual evaluation and
correct their gross error.28
In the present case, existing evidence controvert the CA
finding that respondent correctly declared petitioner mentally
unfit. A review of its finding is called for.
Under Section 46, Book V of Executive Order (E.O.) No.
292,29 one of the causes for separation from government
service of an officer or employee is mental incapacity,30 viz.:
Sec. 46. x x x (b) The following shall be grounds for
disciplinary actions: x x x (19) Physical or mental incapacity
or disability due to immoral or vicious habits. (Emphasis
added)
Separation from the service for such cause is done by way of
a disciplinary proceeding governed by Rule II of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999 (MC 1999).31 The minimum procedural requirements thereof are: a)
that notice of the charge be served on the officer or
employee; and, b) that the latter be given opportunity to be
heard.
While Section 46 of E.O. No. 292 is silent on this matter,
mental incapacity not arising from immoral or vicious habits
is also a cause for separation under Section 26 32 of E.O. No.
292 and Section 2(2), Article IX(B) of the 1987
Constitution,33 which demand of government officers and
employees continuing merit and fitness. Separation from the
service for such cause is carried out through a nondisciplinary process governed by CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 40,34 series of 1998 (MC 40-98).
The only difference between the two modes of separation is
that the first carries administrative disabilities, such as
forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification
from employment in the government service, 35 while the
second does not.36 But both result in loss of employment a
property right protected under the due process
clause.37 Hence, even if considered a non-disciplinary mode
of separation, dropping from the rolls due to mental
incapacity not arising from immoral or vicious habits is
subject to the requirements of due process,38 as prescribed in
the following provisions of MC 40-98:
Rule XII
Section 2. Dropping from the Rolls. Officers and employees
who are either habitually absent or have unsatisfactory or
poor performance or have shown to be physically and
mentally unfit to perform their duties may be dropped from
the rolls subject to the following procedures:
xxxx
2.3 Physically and Mentally Unfit
a. An officer or employee who is continuously absent for
more than one (1) year by reason of illness may be declared
physically unfit to perform his duties and the head of office in
the exercise of his sound judgment may consequently drop
him from the rolls.
b. An officer or employee who is intermittently absent by
reason of illness for at least 260 working days during a 24month period may also be declared physically unfit by the
head of office.
c. An officer or employee who is behaving abnormally for
an extended period which manifests continuing mental
disorder and incapacity to work as reported by his coworkers or immediate supervisor and confirmed by the
head of office, may likewise be dropped from the rolls.
For the purpose of the three (3) preceding paragraphs,
notice shall be given to the employee containing a brief
statement of the nature of his incapacity to work.
xxxx
2.6 This mode of separation from the service for
unauthorized absences or unsatisfactory or poor
performance or physical and mental incapacity is nondisciplinary in nature and shall not result in the forfeiture of
any benefits on the part of the official or employee nor in
disqualifying him from employment in the government;
2.7 The written notice mentioned in the preceding
paragraphs may be signed by the person exercising
immediate supervision over the official or employee.
However, the notice of separation shall be signed by the
appointing authority or head of office. (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, before an officer or employee may be dropped from
the rolls for mental incapacity, the following elements and
process must obtain: first, that it has been observed that the
subject officer or employee has been behaving abnormally
for an extended period; second, that it has been established
through substantial evidence that such abnormal behavior
manifests a continuing mental disorder and incapacity to
work; third, that a written notice is issued by the subjects
immediate supervisor, describing the formers continuing

mental disorder and incapacity to work and citing the reports
of his co-workers or immediate supervisor, as confirmed by
the head of office; and finally, that another notice is issued by
the appointing authority or head of office, informing the
subject of his separation from the service due to mental
incapacity.
Thus, a declaration of mental disorder does not automatically
translate to a judgment of mental incapacity to perform work.
A window remains open for the affected officer or employee
to counter opinion on his mental condition and to show that
his ability to work remains unimpaired. Only then may the
appointing authority or head of office decide on whether said
officer or employee is no longer mentally capable of
performing his work and should be discharged. These
requirements are designed to obviate misuse of nondisciplinary modes of separation for petty vengeance or
vicious harassment.
The procedure adopted by respondent in dropping petitioner
from the rolls substantially complied with the two-notice
requirement of MC 40-98. Respondent issued to petitioner
the August 5, 1999 letter, requiring her to undergo psychiatric
evaluation. Although the letter was addressed to petitioners
spouse (Mr. Romagos), petitioner was sufficiently notified for
she even replied to said letter.39
However, the factual bases relied upon by respondent in
declaring petitioner mentally unfit to work appear inadequate
as they failed to comply with the elements and process
provided for in the MC 40-98, as earlier pointed out.
Petitioner protests the finding that she suffers from mental
incapacity. She disputes the relevance of the medical reports
cited by respondent which refer to her mental condition in
1989 and 1991 but not to her mental state or capacity to
work at the time she was dropped from the rolls in 1999. She
claims that said medical reports have even been superseded
by the August 20, 1999 Certification issued by Dr. Renato D.
Obra,40 which reads:
This is to certify that Mrs. Vilma Romagos, 41 years old,
married, an employee of MCWD, sought consultation last
Aug. 19, 1999 and today.
Psychotherapy done, she is advised to come back for checkup after one month. Rec: Physically and mentally fit to go
back to work.41 (Emphasis added)
She also questions the finding that her purported abnormality
has lasted for an extended period, pointing out that
respondents December 1, 1999 letter cited only two
incidents in January and August 1999. She impugns the
validity of the admission of additional evidence referring to
other incidents in September and December 1999, of which
she was never apprised.42
We only partly agree.
Respondent sufficiently established that petitioner suffers

from a mental disorder. There is overwhelming evidence of
this condition. The 1989 and 1991 medical certifications
issued by Dr. Costas and Dr. Obra establish that petitioner
was diagnosed to be suffering from Major Depression. The
1999 medical certification of Dr. Obra proves that, at the time
of her separation from the service, petitioner was undergoing
psychiatric treatment. The incident reports submitted by
respondents employees uniformly indicate that petitioner is
mentally disturbed. The latters own letters and reports also
reveal an abnormal mental condition.43 Moreover, petitioners
abnormal mental condition appears to be in a continuing
state, considering that she was first diagnosed to be
suffering from Major Depression in 1989, yet, in 1999, she
was still undergoing psychiatric evaluation.
The question, however, is whether respondent sufficiently
proved that petitioners mental condition has rendered her
incapacitated to work as to justify her being dropped from the
rolls.
It did not.
All that the 1989 and 1991 medical certifications established
is that, during said periods, petitioner was diagnosed to be
suffering from Major Depression. These certifications hardly
prove that petitioners behavior manifests a continuing
mental disorder and incapacity to work. In fact, the 1991
medical certification of Dr. Obra points to the contrary for it
states that petitioner "may go back to work provided that
she will come back for check up as scheduled."44 This view is
bolstered by other documents of record, which respondent
did not dispute, such as petitioners school transcripts,
indicating that from 1980 to 1995 the latter took a graduate
course in business administration at the Southwestern
University.45 Such endeavor negates the notion that from the
time of her first diagnosis in 1989 to the time of her
separation in 1999, petitioner was suffering from a mental
impediment to work.
Another evidence of petitioner's continuing capacity to work
despite her mental condition is her performance ratings for
1996 and 1998, copies of which are of record. 46 In both
evaluations, petitioners work performance was rated "very
satisfactory". Petitioners ratee, Editha Luzano, even
remarked
about
an
improvement
in
petitioners
performance.47
More telling is the August 20, 1999 medical certification
issued by Dr. Obra which categorically declared petitioner
"physically and mentally fit to go back to work."48 It is
bewildering that the CSCRO belittled the significance of this
certification, when it held:
As to the bearing to the case of the Certification of Dr. Obra
dated August 20, 1999, we are of the view that it is not of
sufficient weight to negate or outweigh the actual
observations of appellant's co-workers on her abnormal
behavior. It cannot be denied that the time a patient
stays with the doctor during consultation and check-up

is so much less than the time co-workers spend with
one another during working hours. It cannot be denied
also that stress-wise employees during working time are
subject to various work-related pressures. As the person who
are with the appellant in the workplace for a considerable
length of time, co-workers are the ones who can observe the
actuations and behavior of the appellant especially when she
is beset with problems and pressures.49
an illegally dismissed government employee who is later

ordered reinstated is entitled to backwages and other
monetary benefits from the time of her illegal dismissal up to
her reinstatement. This is only fair and just because an
employee who is reinstated after having been illegally
dismissed is considered as not having left her office and
should be given the corresponding compensation at the time
of her reinstatement.
Such reasoning is flawed. To begin with, it was respondent

which elicited the opinion of Dr. Obra when, in a letter dated
August 5, 1999, it required petitioner to undergo evaluation
and conditioned her return to work only upon being certified
as mentally fit, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The July 5, 2002

Decision and the October 29, 2002 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The dropping
from the rolls of petitioner Vilma A. Romagos
isDECLARED ILLEGAL and respondent Metro Cebu Water
District is DIRECTED to reinstate petitioner to her previous
position and pay her backwages.
This has reference to Mrs. Vilma Romagos observed

abnormal behavior, We know you are fully aware of this
considering that every time she creates trouble, Mrs. Faelnar
always sought assistance from you. This year alone, she has
been behaving abnormally on three occasions specifically on
January 25-30, July 12-16 and the most recent incident was
that of yesterday, August 4, 1999 during HRDs departmental
meeting, per attached HRD report.
Thus, for our mutual benefit, you are advised to bring
her to her psychiatrist, Dr. Pureza Trinidad Onate or Dr.
Renato D. Obra, for check-up/treatment immediately.
Starting on Monday, August 9, 1999, we regret that we
cannot allow entry for her. She may go back to work
only when certified by her doctor that she is already
mentally fit.50
Hence, respondent cannot impugn the August 20, 1999
medical certification of Dr. Obra merely because said
document is not favorable to it.
Moreover, respondent itself relied on the 1989 and 1991
medical certifications in declaring petitioner mentally unfit to
work. The CSCRO, CSC and CA also cited said medical
certifications. There is no reason for them not to assign equal
probative value to the August 20, 1999 medical certification
of Dr. Obra.
In sum, the CA gravely erred in affirming the dismissal of
petitioner. While there is no question that at the time she was
dropped from the rolls, petitioner was suffering from a
protracted mental disorder, the same did not render her
incapable of performing her work. There was therefore an
incomplete cause or justification to drop her from the rolls.
Her separation from the service being invalid, petitioner is
entitled to reinstatement to her former position with payment
of backwages computed in accordance with our ruling
in Batangas State University v. Bonifacio,51 viz.:
The Court of Appeals correctly ordered respondents
reinstatement. However, the award of backwages and other
monetary benefits should not be limited to 5 years and must
therefore be modified in line with the recent case of Civil
Service Commission v. Gentallan. We held in said case that
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DAGADAG v. TONGNAWA
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 161166-67. February 03, 2005]
MAYOR
RHUSTOM L. DAGADAG, petitioner, vs.

MICHAEL C. TONGNAWA and ANTONIO
GAMMOD, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing
the joint Decision[2] dated July 31, 2003 and Resolution dated
December 10, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
Nos. 54511 and 57315. The dispositive portion of the joint
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, these consolidated Petitions for Review are
hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated October
21, 1997 and May 31, 1999 of the Civil Service Commission
upholding Respondents [now petitioner Mayor Rhustom L.
Dagadag] Order of Suspension dated June 29, 1999, and
January 24, 2000 upholding Respondents Order of
Separation, are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
Petitioners Michael C. Tongnawa and Antonio B. Gammod
are
hereby
accordingly
REINSTATED
WITH
CORRESPONDING BACKWAGES.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Petitioner was formerly the mayor of the municipality of
Tanudan, Province of Kalinga. Michael Tongnawa and
Antonio Gammod, respondents, are the municipal engineer
and municipal planning and development coordinator,
respectively, of the said municipality.

On July 24, 1995, petitioner, while then the mayor of
Tanudan, sent respondents a memorandum ordering them to
explain within 72 hours why they should not be
administratively sanctioned for acts unbecoming of public
servants and failure to perform their duties. Respondents
submitted to petitioner their respective explanations.
On August 1, 1995, petitioner issued Executive Order
No. 95-002 creating a Municipal Grievance Committee to
investigate the charges against respondents. Guilbert
Dangpason, then the vice-mayor of Tanudan, was
designated Chairman.
After investigation, the Committee found respondents
liable for insubordination, non-performance of duties and
absences without official leaves (AWOL).
On November 27, 1995, petitioner issued an order
suspending respondents from their respective positions for
two months or from December 1, 1995 to February 28, 1996.
Respondents then appealed to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) contending that their right to due process
has been violated. On May 23, 1996, during the pendency
of respondents appeal, petitioner issued an order dropping
them from the roll of employees effective May 28, 1996 by
reason of their unauthorized absences. Again, they
appealed to the CSC.
On October 21, 1997, the CSC issued Resolution No.
974229
affirming
petitioners
order suspending
respondents from the service for two months. They
moved for a reconsideration but was denied by the CSC on
May 31, 1999, prompting them to file with the Court of
Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
54511.
Meanwhile, on June 29, 1999, the CSC issued
Resolution No. 991136 affirming petitioners order dropping
respondents from the roll. When their motion for
reconsideration was denied by the CSC, respondents filed
with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP 57315.
As mentioned earlier, the Court of Appeals, in its joint
Decision in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 54511 and 57315, granted
respondents petitions for review, reversing the CSC
challenged Resolutions and reinstating them to their
respective positions and ordering the payment of their
corresponding backwages.
In reversing the CSC, the Court of Appeals held:
As a general rule, findings of the CSC are not disturbed on
appeal, but if there are substantial facts which may alter the
results of the case, this Court is tasked to evaluate and take
them into consideration.
Petitioners (now respondents) ascribed irregularities in the

conduct of the Grievance Committee hearing and submitted
two Affidavits subscribed by one William Tumbali and by
former Vice-Mayor Guilbert Dangpason, then chairman of the
said Grievance Committee. Dangpason attested that while it
is true that there was a meeting held, no investigation was
actually conducted. The Petitioners maintained that they
were not given an opportunity to explain their side and prove
their defenses. They claimed that the minutes on which the
suspension of the Petitioners was solely based do not state
the true proceedings, therefore, depriving them of their right
to be heard.
None other than the Chairman of the Grievance Committee,
assigned to investigate the alleged negligence of the
Petitioners, had renounced the contents of the minutes of the
supposed investigation. Dangpason who wish(ed) to set the
record straightin fairness to all concerned categorically
declared that the Petitioners were not given an opportunity to
defend themselves since there was no actual investigation
conducted and even expressed his willingness to testify and
confirm his declarations just to ascertain the truth. These
declarations of Dangpason and Tumbali were not denied by
the Respondent. In the absence therefore of any showing of
ill intent or bad faith on the part of Dangpason and Tumbali,
their Affidavits are to be afforded great weight and credence.
In the light of this clear and convincing evidence, Petitioners
were able to rebut or overcome the presumption of regularity
in the conduct of the Grievance Committee hearing.
Accordingly, the minutes cannot solely be the basis for
Petitioners suspension.
xxx
x x x, we find that the suspension of the Petitioners has no
factual basis.
xxx
It must be emphasized that, in administrative proceedings, it
is not the duty of Petitioners to disperse what the
Respondent failed to prove. The Respondent must first
affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that
Petitioners suspension was for a justifiable cause.
Petitioners suspension was not justified and, therefore,
illegal because Respondent failed to prove the allegations
and accusations against the Petitioners.
The Petitioners likewise assailed the resolution of the CSC
affirming Respondents Order of Separation as having been
done in violation of their right to due process.
xxx
The previous rule required that the absences of an officer or
employee before he can be dropped from the roll must be
for at least thirty (30) days without approved leave.
However, the above-quoted rule now provides that the
absences without authorized leave must be continuous,

which means uninterrupted, or unbroken totaling at least 30
days. Clearly, the amendment is intended to make the
requirement on absences continuous and not just totaling
at least 30 days.
Considering that statutes prescribing the grounds for the
suspension or removal of an officer are penal in nature, the
same should be strictly construed. Thus, where the law
enumerates the grounds for disciplinary action, no other
grounds may be invoked for his suspension or removal.
Hence, although the unauthorized absences of Petitioners
Tongnawa and Gammod totaled 41 and 43 days,
respectively, it is clear from the records that the days when
the Petitioners were absent, although more than 30 days,
were not continuous as required by the law, but intermittent.
Furthermore, there was no evidence, much less allegation,
that the gap or break was a special or a regular holiday.
Clearly, one of the requirements for the dropping from the
rolls is not attendant. Hence, there was no valid termination
of Petitioners services.
Inescapable then is the conclusion that since the Petitioners
were illegally suspended and unjustifiably separated from
their work, they are entitled to reinstatement and
backwages.
Petitioner filed a joint motion for reconsideration but
was denied by the Court of Appeals.
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the

real party in interest.
The established rule is that a real party in interest is
one who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or
one entitled to the avails of the suit. The word interest, as
contemplated by the Rules, means material interest or an
interest in issue and to be affected by the judgment, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved or a
mere incidental interest. Stated differently, the rule refers to
a real or present substantial interest as distinguished from a
mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest. As a general rule, one who has no
right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the
court as party-plaintiff in an action.[6]
We hold that the CSC and the mayor of Tanudan are
real parties in interest in this case and, therefore, can contest
the assailed joint Decision of the Court of Appeals before us.
The CSC is the party adversely affected by the
questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals because it has
been mandated by the Constitution to preserve and
safeguard the integrity of our civil service system.[7] Thus,
any transgression by herein respondents of the CSC rules
and regulations will adversely affect its integrity.
Significantly, it has not challenged the assailed Decision.
Basically, petitioner alleges that his suspension and

dismissal orders against the respondents are supported by
substantial evidence.[4] Moreover, the sworn declarations of
William Tumbali and Guilbert Dangpason, the designated
Chairman of the Municipal Grievance Committee, that there
was actually no investigation conducted on petitioners
charges, are devoid of credibility.[5]
As regards the mayor of Tanudan, there are two (2)

reasons why he may interpose such appeal. The first is
rooted in his power to appoint officials and employees of
his municipality.[8] Both respondents were appointed by
petitioner during his incumbency. InFrancisco Abella, Jr. vs.
Civil Service Commission,[9] the Court En Banc (through
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban) held that the municipal
mayor, being the appointing authority, is the real party in
interest to challenge the CSCs disapproval of the
appointment of his appointee, thus:
In their joint comment, respondents aver that petitioner

has no legal personality to file the instant petition because he
had ceased to be the municipal mayor of Tanudan, Kalinga;
and that the CSC, being the aggrieved party, is the proper
party to file this petition.
x x x. The power of appointment necessarily entails the

exercise of judgment and discretion (Sevilla vs. Parina, 128
Phil. 639, 643, October 30, 1967; Manalang vs. Quitoriano,
94 Phil. 903, 911, April 30, 1954). Luego vs. Civil Service
Commission (227 Phil. 303, August 5, 1986) declared:
The fundamental issue before us is: who may appeal

from the Decision of the Court of Appeals?
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must

be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to
his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. If he
does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground
that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred.
This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority
can decide (Rimonte vs. Civil Service Commission, 314 Phil.
421, 430, May 29, 1995).
Hence, the instant petition.
In resolving the issue, the concept of real party in

interest becomes relevant.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, provides:
SEC. 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every
Significantly, the selection of the appointee taking into

account the totality of his qualifications, including those
abstract qualities that define his personality is the
prerogative of the appointing authority (Lapinid vs. Civil

Service Commission, 274 Phil. 381, 387, May 14, 1991, per
Cruz J.; Jimenez vs. Francisco, 127 Phil. 1025, 1032,
February 28, 1957; Branganza vs. Commission on Elections,
127 Phil. 442, 447, August 15, 1967). No tribunal, not even
this Court (Lapinid vs. Civil Service Commission, supra;
Amponin vs. Commission on Elections, 128 Phil. 412, 415,
September 29, 1967), may compel the exercise of an
appointment for a favored person (Sevilla vs. Patrina, supra;
Manalang vs. Quitoriano,supra; Torio vs. Civil Service
Commission, 209 SCRA 677, 691, June 9, 1992; Medalla vs.
Sto. Tomas, 208 SCRA 351, 357, May 5, 1992).
The CSCs disapproval of an appointment is a challenge
to the exercise of the appointing authoritys discretion.
The appointing authority must have the right to contest
the disapproval. Thus, Section 2 of Rule VI of CSC
Memorandum Circular 40, s. 1998 is justified insofar as it
allows
the
appointing
authority
to
request
reconsideration or appeal.
In Central Bank vs. Civil Service Commission (171 SCRA
744, 756, April 10, 1989), this Court has affirmed that the
appointing authority stands to be adversely affected
when the CSC disapproves an appointment. Thus, the
said authority can defend its appointment since it
knows the reasons for the same (id., p. 757, per
Gancayco, J.). It is also the act of the appointing
authority that is being questioned when an appointment
is disapproved (id.).
x x x. (underscoring ours)
Sec. 17. Death or separation of a party who is a public

officer. When a public officer is a party in an action in
his official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns
or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be
continued and maintained by or against his successor if,
within thirty (30) days after the successor takes office or such
time as may be granted by the court, it is satisfactorily
shown to the court by any party that there is a
substantial need for continuing or maintaining it and
that the successor adopts or continues or threatens to
adopt or continue the action of his predecessor. Before
a substitution is made, the party or officer to be affected,
unless expressly assenting thereto, shall be given
reasonable notice of the application therefor and accorded
an opportunity to be heard. (underscoring ours)
Interpreting the above rule, in Miranda vs. Carreon,
Heirs of Mayor Nemencio Galvez vs. Court of Appeals,
[12]
and Roque, et al. vs. Delgado, et al.,[13] we held that where
the petitioner (a public officer) ceases to be mayor, the
appeal and/or action he initiated may be continued and
maintained by his successor if there is substantial need to do
so. If the successor failed to pursue the appeal and/or
action, the same should be dismissed.
[11]
Records show that upon petitioners cessation from

public office, his successor did not file any manifestation to
the effect that he is continuing and maintaining this appeal.
We thus agree with the respondents that petitioner has
lost his legal personality to interpose the instant petition.
Similarly, where
a
municipal
mayor
orders
the suspension or dismissal of a municipal employee on
grounds he believes to be proper, but his order is reversed or
nullified by the CSC or the Court of Appeals (as in this case),
he has the right to contest such adverse ruling. His right to
appeal flows from the fact that his power to appoint carries
with it the power to remove. Being chief executive of the
municipality, he possesses this disciplinary power over
appointive municipal officials and employees.[10] To be sure,
whenever his order imposing administrative sanctions upon
erring municipal personnel is challenged, he should be
allowed to defend his action considering that he is the
appointing authority.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.
The second reason why the municipal mayor of

Tanudan has legal personality to challenge the Decision of
the Court of Appeals is because the salaries of the
respondents, being municipal officials, are drawn from the
municipal funds. Obviously, the mayor has real and
substantial interest in the outcome of the administrative
cases against respondents.
DECISION
Admittedly, however, petitioner, at the time he filed with

this Court the instant petition assailing the Appellate Court
Decision, was no longer the mayor of Tanudan.
SO ORDERED.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. RODRIGUEZ
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 172700 : July 23, 2010]
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER, VS.
ROLSON RODRIGUEZ, RESPONDENT.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] of the 8 May 2006 Decision [2] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00528 setting aside
for lack of jurisdiction the 21 September 2004 Decision [3] of
the Ombudsman (Visayas) in OMB-V-A-03-0511-H.
The Antecedent Facts
Section 17, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, as amended, is relevant, thus:
On 26 August 2003, the Ombudsman in Visayas received a

complaint[4] for abuse of authority, dishonesty, oppression,
misconduct in office, and neglect of duty against Rolson
Rodriguez, punong barangay in Brgy. Sto. Rosario,
Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. On 1 September 2003,
thesangguniang bayan of Binalbagan, Negros Occidental,
through vice-mayor Jose G. Yulo, received a similar
complaint[5] against Rodriguez for abuse of authority,
dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, and neglect of
duty.
the sangguniang bayan since the latter had granted their

motion to withdraw the complaint. In a rejoinder,[20] Rodriguez
averred that thesangguniang bayan resolution dismissing the
case filed against him was not valid because only the vicemayor signed it.
In its 8 September 2003 notice, [6] the municipal vice-mayor

required Rodriguez to submit his answer within 15 days from
receipt of the notice. On 23 September 2003, Rodriguez filed
a motion to dismiss[7] the case filed in the sangguniang
bayan on the ground that the allegations in the complaint
were without factual basis and did not constitute any
violation of law. In a compliance[8] dated 22 October 2003,
Rodriguez alleged complainants violated the rule against
forum
shopping.
In its 21 September 2004 Decision,[21] the Ombudsman found

Rodriguez guilty of dishonesty and oppression. It imposed on
Rodriguez the penalty of dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of all benefits, disqualification to hold public office,
and forfeiture of civil service eligibilities. Rodriguez filed a
motion for reconsideration.[22] In its 12 January 2005 Order,
[23]
the Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration. In
its 8 March 2005 Order,[24] the Ombudsman directed the
mayor of Binalbagan, Negros Occidental to implement the
penalty
of
dismissal
against
Rodriguez.
Meanwhile, in its 10 September 2003 order,[9] the

Ombudsman required Rodriguez to file his answer.
Rodriguez filed on 24 October 2003 a motion to
dismiss[10] the case filed in the Ombudsman on the grounds
of litis pendentia and forum shopping. He alleged that
the sangguniang bayan had already acquired jurisdiction
over his person as early as 8 September 2003.
The municipal vice-mayor set the case for hearing on 3
October 2003.[11] Since complainants had no counsel, the
hearing was reset to a later date. When the case was called
again for hearing, complainants' counsel manifested that
complainants would like to withdraw the administrative
complaint filed in the sangguniang bayan. On 29 October
2003, complainants filed a motion[12] to withdraw the
complaint lodged in the sangguniang bayan on the ground
that they wanted to prioritize the complaint filed in the
Ombudsman. Rodriguez filed a comment[13] praying that the
complaint be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping,
not on the ground complainants stated. In their opposition,
[14]
complainants admitted they violated the rule against
forum shopping and claimed they filed the complaint in
the sangguniang bayan without the assistance of counsel. In
his 4 November 2003 Resolution,[15] the municipal vicemayor dismissed the case filed in the sangguniang bayan.
In its 29 January 2004 order,[16] the Ombudsman directed
both parties to file their respective verified position papers.
Rodriguez moved for reconsideration of the order citing the
pendency of his motion to dismiss.[17] In its 11 March 2004
order,[18] the Ombudsman stated that a motion to dismiss was
a prohibited pleading under Section 5 (g) Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 17. The Ombudsman reiterated its
order for Rodriguez to file his position paper.
In
his
position
paper, Rodriguez
insisted
that
the sangguniang bayan still continued to exercise jurisdiction
over the complaint filed against him. He claimed he had not
received any resolution or decision dismissing the complaint
filed in the sangguniang bayan. In reply,[19] complainants
maintained there was no more complaint pending in
The Ruling of the Ombudsman
Rodriguez filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for review

with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its 8 May 2006 Decision, [25] the Court of Appeals set aside
for lack of jurisdiction the Decision of the Ombudsman and
directed the sangguniang bayan to proceed with the hearing
on the administrative case. The appellate court reasoned
that the sangguniang bayan had acquired primary jurisdiction
over the person of Rodriguez to the exclusion of the
Ombudsman. The Court of Appeals relied on Section 4, Rule
46 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction over person of respondent, how
acquired. - The court shall acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent by the service on him of its order or
resolution indicating its initial action on the petition or by his
voluntary submission to such jurisdiction.
The appellate court noted that the sangguniang
bayan served on Rodriguez a notice, requiring the latter to
file an answer, on 8 September 2003 while the Ombudsman
did so two days later or on 10 September 2003.
Petitioner Ombudsman contends that upon the filing of a
complaint before a body vested with jurisdiction, that body
has taken cognizance of the complaint. Petitioner cites
Black's Law Dictionary in defining what "to take cognizance"
means to wit, "to acknowledge or exercise jurisdiction."
Petitioner points out it had taken cognizance of the complaint
against Rodriguez before a similar complaint was filed in
the sangguniang bayan against the same respondent.
Petitioner maintains summons or notices do not operate to
vest in the disciplining body jurisdiction over the person of
the respondent in an administrative case. Petitioner
concludes that consistent with the rule on concurrent
jurisdiction, the Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction should
be to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan.

Private respondent Rolson Rodriguez counters that when a
competent body has acquired jurisdiction over a complaint
and the person of the respondent, other bodies are excluded
from exercising jurisdiction over the same complaint. He
cites Article 124 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of Republic Act No. 7160,[26] which provides that an elective
official may be removed from office by order of the proper
court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other. Private respondent
insists the sangguniang bayan first acquired jurisdiction over
the complaint and his person. He argues jurisdiction over the
person of a respondent in an administrative complaint is
acquired by the service of summons or other compulsory
processes. Private respondent stresses complainants
violated the rule against forum shopping when they filed
identical complaints in two disciplining authorities exercising
concurrent jurisdiction.
cognizable by regular courts, the Ombudsman has

concurrent jurisdiction with other investigative agencies of
government.[27] Republic Act No. 8249, otherwise known as
An
Act
Further
Defining
the
Jurisdiction
of
theSandiganbayan, limits the cases that are cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan to public officials occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher.
The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over private
respondent who, as punong barangay, is occupying a
position corresponding to salary grade 14 under Republic Act
No. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation and
Position
Classification
Act
of
1989.[28]
The Issues
SEC. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. - A

verified complaint against any erring elective official shall be
prepared
as
follows:
The issues submitted for resolution are (1) whether

complainants violated the rule against forum shopping when
they filed in the Ombudsman and the sangguniang
bayan identical complaints against Rodriguez; and
(2)
whether it was the sangguniang bayan or the Ombudsman
that first acquired jurisdiction.
The Court's Ruling
The
petition
has
merit.
Paragraph 1, Section 13 of Article XI of the Constitution

provides:
Sec. 13. The Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions,
and
duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public official, employee, office, or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient.
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, states:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions, and Duties. - The Ombudsman
shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
Under Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local

Government
Code,
the
sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan has disciplinary authority
over any elective barangay official, to wit:
(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be

filed before thesangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan concerned whose decision shall be final and
executory.
Clearly, the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with
the sangguniang bayan over administrative cases against
elective barangay officials occupying positions below salary
grade 27, such as private respondent in this case.
The facts in the present case are analogous to those
in Laxina, Sr. v. Ombudsman,[29] which likewise involved
identical administrative complaints filed in both the
Ombudsman and the sangguniang panlungsod against
a punong barangay for grave misconduct. The Court held
therein that the rule against forum shopping applied only to
judicial cases or proceedings, not to administrative cases.[30]
Thus, even if complainants filed in the Ombudsman and
the sangguniang bayan identical complaints against private
respondent, they did not violate the rule against forum
shopping because their complaint was in the nature of an
administrative
case.
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by

any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. It has
primary
jurisdiction
over
cases
cognizable
by
the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigations of
such cases.
In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction

of two or more disciplining authorities, the body in which the
complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of
the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other
tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction.[31] In this case,
since the complaint was filed first in the Ombudsman, and
the Ombudsman opted to assume jurisdiction over the
complaint, the Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is to the
exclusion of thesangguniang bayan exercising concurrent
jurisdiction.
The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate

any act or omission of a public officer or employee applies
only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. In cases
It is a hornbook rule that jurisdiction is a matter of law.

Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of
the parties but continues until the case is terminated.

[32]
When herein complainants first filed the complaint in the

Ombudsman, jurisdiction was already vested on the latter.
Jurisdiction
could no longer be
transferred to
the sangguniang bayan by virtue of a subsequent complaint
filed
by
the
same
complainants.
As a final note, under Section 60 of the Local Government
Code, the sangguniang bayan has no power to remove an
elective barangay official. Apart from the Ombudsman, only a
proper court may do so. [33] Unlike the sangguniang
bayan, the powers of the Ombudsman are not merely
recommendatory. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority
to directly remove[34] an erring public official other than
members of Congress and the Judiciary who may be

removed
only
by
impeachment.[35]
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the
8 May 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 00528. We AFFIRM the 21 September 2004 Decision of
the Ombudsman (Visayas) in OMB-V-A-03-0511-H.
No
pronouncement
SO ORDERED.
as
to
costs.

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PUBLIC OFFICERS and CORPORATIONS (Atty.

In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the

PUBLIC OFFICERS and CORPORATIONS (Atty. Rodolfo Elman) 2

from the LDP, and asked the House of Representatives,

PUBLIC OFFICERS and CORPORATIONS (Atty. Rodolfo Elman) 3

v. Dimaporo (HRET Case No. 45), after the Holy Week

With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now with a

But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of the

Congressman Casamura's vote in the Bondoc v.

Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask to be

PUBLIC OFFICERS and CORPORATIONS (Atty. Rodolfo Elman) 4

PUBLIC OFFICERS and CORPORATIONS (Atty. Rodolfo Elman) 5

shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of

In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the

The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral

Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the

Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding

The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987

PUBLIC OFFICERS and CORPORATIONS (Atty. Rodolfo Elman) 6

MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not separate

MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.

MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the electoral tribunals are

MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my question.

MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then

MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent, Madam

MR. AZCUNA It would be subject to constitutional restrictions

MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we discussed a

MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in

MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the Gentleman, while

PUBLIC OFFICERS and CORPORATIONS (Atty. Rodolfo Elman) 7

membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be

PUBLIC OFFICERS and CORPORATIONS (Atty. Rodolfo Elman) 8

because a person of derogatory character or reputation can

PUBLIC OFFICERS and CORPORATIONS (Atty. Rodolfo Elman) 9

official duties and taking advantage of his office. He is,

Respondent Baguio City Superintendent Allyson

Consequently, respondent Allyson Belagan is HEREBY

On October 4, 1994, respondent was placed under

Upon appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC), on

a) Respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the

PUBLIC OFFICERS and CORPORATIONS (Atty. Rodolfo Elman) 10

In addition, the following complaints against Magdalena

Vistro Salcedo case (May 8, 1979)

Where Mrs. Gapuz was spreading rumors against

Demolition Scandal (May 10, 1979)

Where she called all the residents of their Barangay for an

PUBLIC OFFICERS and CORPORATIONS (Atty. Rodolfo Elman) 11

Incident of June 13, 1979

Incident of August 25, 1979

Incident of August 26, 1979

The character of a woman who was the subject of a

Incident of September 2, 1978

Incident of September 9, 1979

Incident of September 10, 1979

Incident of September 13, 1979

Incident of September 21, 1979

Unsatisfied, the CSC, through the Solicitor General,

Incident of September 21, 1979

The Appellate Court held that Magdalena is an

II. The Court of Appeals committed reversible error

Incident of September 23, 1979

Respondent claimed that the numerous cases filed

III. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondent