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THEREPUBLIQUEDESLETTRES:AREPUBLICOFQUARRELS?

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MarceloDascalandCristinaMarras
TelAvivUniversity
1.Introduction
FromtheRenaissanceonwards,andespeciallyinthe17 thand18thcenturies,thelearnedfromEuropeconsidered
themselvestobe the citizens ofasupranational communitywhose mainconcern wastheadvancement of
learning.MostofthemconceivedofthiscommunityasarepublicwhosesovereignwasReason,underwhose
solerulecooperationandfreedomofthoughtwouldushermankindintowhatComeniusdescribedastheseventh
andlast terrenial degreeoflightthatofuniversal panharmonia.Thisvirtualrepublicwasmaterially
supportedbyanextremelyeffectivenetworkfortheexchangeofinformationandforcooperation,including
correspondences,scientificandliteraryacademies,visitstofellowscholars,quickprintingandcirculationof
books,journalsandtransactionspublishedwithahighfrequency,promptpublicationofreactions(reviews,
repliestocriticism,etc.)topublishedwork,andsoon.
Both the ideology and the infrastructure of the Rpublique des Lettres, as well as its sociopolitical
environment,havebeenextensivelydescribedandanalyzed.Yet,littleattentionhasbeenpaidtothefactthatnot
everything was harmonic and idyllic in the republic of the learned. In particular, as far as we know, no
description and explanation has been given of the scope and significance ofthe phenomenon of polemics,
disputes,debates,contests,quarrelsandcontroversiesamongthelearnedintheperiodinquestion.
Ouraiminthispaperistodescribe,analyze,andsuggestanexplanationoftheoccurrenceofthisphenomenonin
theEnlightenmentsRpubliquedesLettres.Forthispurpose,wewillrelyuponsomepreliminaryfindingsofa
broadempiricalandtheoreticalstudy,whichiscurrentlybeingperformedbyaGermanIsraeliinterdisciplinary
researchteamtowhichwebelong.Wewillbeginwithanoverviewofthescopeofthephenomenon,pointing
outitswidespreadoccurrence,itsdepthanditsthematicallyencompassingnature.Wewillthenconsiderthe
waysinwhichthescholarsofthetimereactedtoandconceptualizedthephenomenoninquestion.Finally,we
will propose an explanatory hypothesis that suggests how quarrels acquired a constitutive role in the very
conceptofaRpubliquedesLettres.
2.Polemicsallovertheplace
That theeraiscrisscrossedbypolemicsinallareasoflearningcanbeestablishedbothquantitativelyand
qualitatively.Ourdatabasecontainssofarabouteighthundreditems,referringtohundredsofdifferentpolemics.
Everybodywhethershehadalreadyhaveanestablishedreputationtodefendorendeavoredtorisetofame
seemstohavebeenengagedinsomepublicorprivatedebateonsometopicwithsomebody.
Tomentionbutafewprominentthinkersofthe17 thcentury:Descartesseeksobjectionstohismetaphysicsand
viewsthem,alongwithhisreplies,aspartandparcelofhiswork;buthealsopolemizeswithothersregarding

hismathematicalwork(e.g.,withRoberval,Fermat,Hobbes).NewtonpolemizeswithHooke,Huygens,and
Leibniz(withthelatter,notonlyonthequestionofthepriorityintheinventionofthecalculus).Therenowned
classicalscholarRichardBentleysdemonstrationofthenonauthenticityoftheLettersofPhalarisisattacked
onthispointbyBoyle.HobbesandBramhallholdasustaineddiscussiononlibertyandnecessity,inaseriesof
booksthatoriginateinanoraldebateorganizedbytheDukeofNewcastle.Keplersustainsvariouspolemicson
astronomicaswellasonmysticalmatters.LeibnizandBayleholdseveralroundsofdebatewitheachother
(involving also other participants), both before and after the publication of Bayles critique of Leibnizs
metaphysicsinthearticleRorariusofthe DictionnaireHistoriqueetCritique adebatethatculminatesin
LeibnizsThodice,whichisinfactanattempttorefuteBaylesviewsontherelationshipbetweenreasonand
faith.Leibnizsothermajorphilosophicalwork,theNouveauxEssaissurlEntendementHumainisadebatewith
Locke,writtenindialogical form,coveringthetotalityoftopicstreatedbyLockeinhis EssayonHuman
Understanding.
Even those who declare themselves opposed to disputes as useless for the advancement of knowledge, in
practice didnot resist the temptation. Thus,Locke, whoin the Essay adamantly condemns disputations as
uselessandpernicioustotheadvancementoflearning,doesnotrefrainfrompublishingtwoVindicationsagainst
thecriticsofhis TheReasonablenessofChristianity. AndMalebranche,whosetheoryofknowledgeisrather
solipsistic,explicitlydenyingthatdiscussionwithothersisofanyhelpinacquiringknowledge,engagesina
bitterpolemicswithArnauldpreciselyonthenatureofideasandofknowledgeanexchangethatlastsforabout
twentyyearsandcomprisesmanybooks.
Ifoneconsidersthelevelbelowthatofthebignames,polemicsaboundtoo.Aquickexaminationofthetable
ofcontentsandcustomaryeditorsintroductoryremarkstothearticlespublishedinthejournalsofthetime
revealsanamazingnumberofactiveparticipantsinsuchpolemicsthathavebeenalmostcompletelyforgotten.
WhoremembersaMonsieurRenau,ingnieurgeneraldelaMarineenFrance,whoseTraitdelamanoeuvre
desVaisseauxhasbeenseverelycriticizedbyHuygensintheBibliothqueUniverselleofSeptember1693for
containingacapitalerror,acritiquetowhichRenaurepliedinanotherjournal, HistoiredesOuvragesdes
SavantsassoonasJanuary1694?WhoisacertainDr.Bury,authorofTheNakedGospelanddefenderofthe
freedomoftheAnglicanChurchagainsttheineptiasetcalumniesoftheCalvinisttheologianJurieu(HOSMay
1697)?WhataboutthediscussionbetweenM.Maigrot,M.Charmot,andFatherComteaboutthereligion,the
cult,andthemoraloftheChinese(HOSMay1701)orthedisputebetweenthehistoriansBurnet,Larroque,
dHozierandVarillasaboutthelattersHistoiredAngleterreandissuesofreligioushistory(HOS1687;NRL
1697)?WhorememberstheastronomerAzout,whosepolemicswithCassini,Hevelius,Hookandothers,ona
varietyoftopics,werepresentinalmosteveryissueofthefirstvolumeofthePhilosophicalTransactionsofthe
RoyalSociety(16651666)?
Asthebriefsamplementionedaboveindicates,thethematicrangeofthepublicdebateswasquitebroad.Inthe
decades(16801705)wehaveexamined,thereisstillapredominanceoftheologicalandchurchpoliticsissues.
Someofthesedebatesclearlycorrespondtohotpoliticalissuesofthetime(e.g.,thedebatesonCalvinisminthe
wakeoftheHuguenotexodusfromFrance).Thearticlesdealingwithsuchissuesdonothidetheirpolitical

aspectsnordotheirauthorskeeptheiremotionalinvolvementatbay;yet,inspiteofthis,onecannoticean
attempttoholdthedebateattheintellectuallevel,atleastonthesurface.Thereisalsoasignificantnumberof
scientific,literary,philosophical,historical,juridical,medical,andpoliticaldebates,aswellaswhatwouldbe
calledtodayinterdisciplinarydebates(seeTable1).
Thespaceoccupiedbypolemicalwritingsintheperiodicalpublicationsatthetimeisconsiderable.Forexample,
morethanhalfofthearticlespublishedinsomejournalsofthelastquarterofthe17 th centuryandthefirst
quarterofthe18thcenturyhavetodowithpolemicalexchanges,inwhichtheytakepartortowhichtheyrefer.
Manyofthesearticlesbeartitlesthatadvertisethefactthattheytakepartinpolemicalexchanges,displaying
words such as dispute, controversy, defense, against, reply, refutation, objection, critique, etc. The vivid
impressionisthatnothingispublishedinthe RpubliquedesLettres withoutbeingimmediatelynoticedand
criticallyassessed,mostofthetimebyopponentsthatseemtobeonlywaitingfortheopportunitytobite.Quite
often the most attentive contenders in these intellectual skirmishes are intransigent and identifiable
representatives of positions defended by the intellectual parties that crystallized at one time or another
(Cartesians,Newtonians,Leibnizians,Libertins,Eclectics,etc.).ItisasiftheRpubliqueisupheldbyan
armyofalertintellectualactivistswhosemainweaponisthesharpnessoftheircriticaltools.
3.Reflectingaboutpolemicalexchanges
ThecitizensoftheRpubliquedesLettreswereawareofthiswidespreadphenomenon,andwerenotindifferent
toitandtoitsconsequences.Asignificantnumberofthearticlesrelatedtocontroversiesdealtwithwhatmight
becalledmetapolemics,i.e.,theyconsistedinreflectionsaboutpolemics,theirnature,use,andvalue.In
particular,therewasquitealotofcriticismtowardstheexcessesoftenpresentinmanyofthedebates.Toomuch
rhetorical punch, toomuch eagerness towin,toomuchloyaltytoones partywere oftendeplored,onthe
groundsthattheyunderminedinsteadofservingtherealpurposeforwhichsuchintensecriticalactivityshould
beconducted,namely,thesearchfortruth.Somecriticssawintheexcessiveloveofdisputebythesavantsnot
onlysomethingcounterproductivefromanepistemicpointofview,butalsosomethingthatdishonoredthe
RpubliquedesLettresandleditintoapermanentstateofcivilwarwhich,atbest,makesthesavantactivities
goingonthereirrelevantforthecultivatedpublicand,atworst,anexampleofintoleranceandsectarianismthat
could hardly be viewed as consonant with the allegedly democratic spirit of that republic. Other critics
condemned the esprit de secte fostered by partisan groupings as an impediment to the development of a
cooperativescientificenterprise,whichshouldbeconductedbynonsectarianscientificacademies.Stillothers
focused on the psychological drive of the controversialists, blaming their desire to win above all for the
animositydisplayedintheirargumentationandfortheirwillingnesstoemploydubiousrhetoricalstratagems.
Andyet,exceptforafewwhocondemneddisputesaltogether,eitherasanirrelevantresidueofanothereraoras
inherentlydetachedfromtheprocessofgeneratingknowledge(although,aswehaveseen,thesecriticsalsotook
partinpolemicalexchanges),noonereallysuggestedtoforbid,avoid,orinanyotherwaycurtailtheburgeoning
critical activitythat manifested itselfinthisunprecedented flourishingofpolemics.Thisisafact that any
accountoftheactualroleofpolemicsintheRpubliquedesLettresaswellasofthewayitscitizensperceived

this role and, accordingly, conceived the proper way of conducting intellectual polemics should not be
overlooked.
Firstofall,itshouldbenoticedthatthecriticalattitudetowardspolemicsabovementionedhasasitsmainobject
onetypeofpolemicalexchangetheonewehavebeencalling,inourresearch,dispute.Whatcharacterizesthis
particulartypeofpolemicsisindeedthefact thatthemainobjectiveofthecontendersisvictoryoverthe
adversary,regardlessofthemeansemployed.Theadvancementofknowledge,rationalargument,clarificationof
theissuesunderdispute,reconciliation,andtruthare,thus,secondary.Thosecriticswhohavetheseaims,rather
thanvictory,inmind,arethereforejustifiedintheircriticismofthosepolemicalexchangesthatbelongtothe
dispute category.Andtheyarealsorightinnotmakingthefurtherstepofdismissingpolemicalexchanges
altogether,forthereareothertypesofpolemicsthataremoreintunewiththeepistemicaimstheyvalue.
Somethinkersoftheperiodunderconsiderationindeedconceivedofmodelsofdebateotherthanthatofdispute.
One such model,inspired by the successes of mathematics withinthe newly created experimental science,
consistedinviewingaconflictofopinionsabout,say,agivenexplanatoryhypothesisortheory,asakindof
logicomathematicalproblem,sothatbyperformingtheappropriatecalculationsandtakingintoaccountall
therelevantinformation,itwouldbepossibletodeterminewhichoftheconflictingpositionswasright,thereby
puttinganendtothedebatebetweenthecontendersholdingthesepositions.Accordingtothismodel,whichwe
havebeencallingdiscussion,thereisarigorousdecisionprocedurewhoseapplicationshouldthereforecompel
anyrationalbeingtoacceptthetruepositionandrejectthefalseone,whichshouldbeseensimplyastheresult
ofamistake.WhenNewtonbelievesthathisfamousprismexperimentdefinitivelyestablishesthatwhiteisa
mixtureoftheothercolors,hewasimplicitlyusingthisdiscussionmodel.Hedoesntunderstand(orpretends
nottounderstand)howrespectablescientistssuchasHookeandHuygenscanevenopposehisexplanationofthe
phenomenon,andasksthemtoperformcautiouslytheexperimentuponwhichhehadbasedhisaccount,asa
wayofsolvingtheproblemandfindingthetruth:Forthisistobedecidednotbydiscourse,butbynewtryalof
the Experiment (Cohen, 1978, 153); But this, I conceive, is enough to enforce it, and so to decide the
controversy(ibid.,p.131).
TheRoyalSocietyseemstohaveoperatedundertheassumptionthatthediscussionmodelwastheproperwayto
solvescientificdebates,atleastwhenthesedebateswerefactualratherthanspeculative.Insuchcases,the
communityofscientistsacknowledgedasspecializedinthesubjectmatterwouldbecomeasortoftribunal
havingthenaturalcapacitytodecidewhoofthecontenderswasright.Forexample,whenAzoutcontests
Heveliussclaimthathespottedthecomet(thatwasthebigastronomicalnewsofthetime)atacertaindateina
certainlocation,onthegroundsthatsuchanobservationwasinconsistentwiththetrajectoryofthecometplotted
on the basis of many other observations, Henry Oldenburg, secretary of the Society and editor of the
Transactionsproclaimedthat
Thisimportant DifferencebetweentwoveryLearnedandverydeserving
Persons,beingcometotheknowledgeofsomeoftheablest Philosophers
and Astronomers of England, hath been by them thought worthy their

Examination:andtheybeingatthisverypresentemployedinthediscussion
thereof,bycomparingwhathathbeendoneandpublishedbytheDissenters,
andbyconfrontingwiththemtheirownDomestickObservations,arevery
likelytodiscernwherethemistakeliesandhavingdiscerndit,willcertainly
befoundhighlyimpartialandingeniousingivingtheirsenseofthesame
(PTRS,November1665,p.108).
ItisworthnoticingtheextremelycarefullegaleseusedbyOldenburg,whichismildifcomparedtothemuch
morelegalisticformulationsemployedinOfthejudgementofsomeoftheEnglishAstronomerstouchingthe
differencebetweentwolearnedmen,aboutanObservationmadeoftheFirstofthetwolatecometsafew
monthslater(PTRS,February1666,pp.150151),where,althoughtheconclusionisthatthecometcouldnotbe
whereHeveliussaidhehasseenit,thelatterisneveractuallyblamedforhavingmadeamistake,butonlyof
somehowmisinterpretinganappearancehenodoubthadspottedasreportedbyhim.Accordingly,theself
appointedscientifictribunalenjoinshimtojointheverdict,foritsmembers
donotatalldoubt,butthat,therebeingsuchanunanimousconsentin
whathasbeenjustnowdeclared,andtheControversiebeingaboutMatterof
Fact,whereinAuthority,Number,andReputationmustcasttheBalance,M.
Hevelius,whoisaswellknownforhisIngenuity,asLearning,willjoynand
acquiesceinthatsentiment(PTRS,February1666,pp.150151).
Needlesstosaythat,inspiteofalltheweightputononeofthepanesofthebalance,inthistypicalandsymbolic
useofthediscussionmodel,Heveliusdidnotgoalongandattemptedhopelesslytovindicatehisposition.
Thediscussionmodelisalsoimplicitlyassumedbythosewhoinsistthattheuseofprecisedefinitions(Bacon,
Hobbes,Locke,Spinoza,amongothers)correspondingtoclearanddistinctideasshouldpreventidledisputes
and permit the solution of all worthwhile debates. It is tassumption that underlies the attempt to develop
philosophicalorscientificlanguages,whichproliferatedatthetime.ItwasLeibnizwhosawthepotentialof
such languages, if properly conceived, to become a rational tool for the solution of debates. He explicitly
formulatedtheideaofa characteristicauniversalis bymeansofwhichthecontenders,insteadofdisputing
endlessly would be able to resolve their differences by expressing them in a formal notation and then
calculatingthesolution.
ButLeibniz,whowasalso,amongotherthings,ajurist,apoliticaladvisor,andaparticipantintheendless
negotiationsforthereunificationoftheChristianChurchesinshort,apracticalmanknewverywellthatthe
discussionorcalculativeproblemsolvingmodelcouldnotsolveallconflicts.Herealizedthatinmostcasesthe
solutioncouldnotconsistindecidingdemonstrativelywhowasrightandwhowasmistaken,forthesimple
reasonthatbothpartieswerepartiallyrightandpartiallywrong,undersomeinterpretationoftheirpositions.He
believedthatquiteoftentheoppositionbetweenthepartiescouldbeovercomeifeachcouldbebroughtto
recognizetherightandwrongpartsofhisown,aswellasoftheadversarysposition,toweighcarefully
theirrelativeimportance,andtobepersuadedtogiveupwhatwaswrong(orunacceptabletotheadversary)in

hispositionandtoacceptwhatwasright(oracceptabletohim)intheadversarysposition.Noneofthiscouldbe
doneinapurelymechanicalorformalway,norcoulditbeexpectedthatitwouldleadtoabsolutecertainty.
Instead,itrequiredtheactiveinterventionofajudgeofcontroversies,capableofreformulatingthepositionsin
conflict and to use nondeductive types of arguments (based, for example, on probabilities, presumptions,
defensibility,etc.)inshort,usingargumentsorreasonsthat,inhiswords,werenottobe computed,butrather
weighed.Analternativemodelofpolemicalexchangesandtheirresolution,akintowhatwehavebeencalling
controversy, was thus elaborated by Leibniz, side by side with the strict logicomathematical model and
presumablycomplementarytoit.Thisisamodelthatseeksrationalpersuasionandconciliationoftheopponents
ratherthanvictorynomatterwhat,andthatadmitsthatinmanyperhapsmostimportantissueswecannot
reachabsolutecertaintyandmustthereforeconformourselvestotheuseofasofterreasonanexpression
Leibnizhimself employed.When Abbot Villierscharacterizedthe aim ofintellectual debates assclairer
mutuellementandastrouverlavritparlestablissementsquirsultentdescontestationsdeladispute(see
note10above),hemayhaveexpressedtheneedforthesamekindofmodel,softerthanboththedisputeand
thediscussionmodels,thatLeibnizwaselaborating.Inspiteofitsneed,however,suchanalternativeremained
eclipsed, throughout the whole Enlightenment, by the dichotomic conceptualization of debates as either
irrationaldisputesorasstrictlyrationaldiscussions.
4.PolemicsasaconstitutiveelementoftheRpubliquedesLettres
SinceitisclearthattheoccurrenceofpolemicalexchangesintheRpubliquedesLettresis,thus,neitheraminor
noramarginalphenomenon,aphenomenonaboutwhichtheparticipantsthemselveswereconcerned,onemust
askwhetheritshouldnotbeviewedasinherenttotheverynotionoftheRpubliquedesLettresand/ortothe
circumstancesinwhichitmaterialized.Wewishtoproposeatwoprongedargument,historicalandconceptual,
tosupportapositiveanswertothisquestion.
Franoise Waquet (1989) highlighted, among the semantic components of the concept Rpublique des
Lettres, therejectionofanyauthorityotherthanReason.Wewilltakehersuggestionasthebasisforthe
elaborationofourtwoprongedargument.
Historically,althoughusuallyviewedasa17th18th centuriesphenomenon,the RpubliquedesLettres hasits
originsinthelateRenaissance.Inparticular,oneshouldsingleouttheReformation(andsubsequentCounter
Reformation)asasourceofendlesspolemicsthatgoon,aswehaveseen,untilthe18 thcentury.Asfarasthe
notionofauthorityisconcerned,theReformationseverelyundermined(tosaytheleast)thebasisforthebelief
inaninfallibleauthorityonbothsacredandprofanemattersexercisedbyanyparticularbodyorgroupwithin
Christianity.Thescientificrevolutionfollowedsuit,questioningtheauthorityoftraditionalAristotelianscience,
aswellastherightoftheChurchtointerveneinthedeterminationofscientifictruth.Atthesametime,itsetup
thebasisfortheideologyofthe RpubliquedesLettres,namelyabsoluteobediencetoanothersourceof
authority,Reason.But,justastheReformationhadquestionedabsoluteauthoritywithinan intrareligious
context,theriseofSkepticismcalledintoquestionnotonlythepowerofReason,butalsoitsallegedunityinso
tospeakintrarationalaffairs.AsHobbes(whowasfarfrombeingaSkeptic)observed,appealingtoReasonto

resolveanygivenquestionisnotbyitselfaguaranteeofsuccess,forthereareasmanyseveralreasonsasthere
areseveralmen.
Asaresult,Reasoninspiteofthesuccessofthenewsciencewasnotabletowearthecloakofauthoritythat
religion had left vacant and thus all sources of unquestionable authority became in fact questionable. The
emergenceoftheideasoftoleranceandfreedomofopinionisperhapsasortofacknowledgmentofthefactthat
thereisnopossibilitytocompelanyonetoholdcertainbeliefs,norultimateauthoritativegroundstodoso.Inthe
absence of absolute intellectual authority, plurality becomes a fact of life in learned Europe. A common
commitmenttotheauthorityofReasonpermitsthiscommonlife,andiscertainlypreferabletotheviolence
anddestructionofthereligiouswars.Italsoforcesintellectualsofallpartiestotolerateeachother,atleastinthe
minimalistLockeansenseoflettingtheotherholdhisbizarreandobviouslyfalsebeliefs.Butinevitablyit
fosterspolemics,for,intheabsenceofuniversallyacceptedcriteriaofrationalityandevenofreasonableness,the
contendersareboundtodisagreeaboutwhatarethedictatesofReason.Whatisevidentordubious,bizarreor
intuitive,provenorinneedofproofforoneisfarfrombeingsofortheopponent.Polemicsthusseemtobenot
onlypermittedbythelibertyreigningintheRpublique,butalsoinevitableduetothelackofagreementabout
the only unquestionable authority the citizens of that republic are prepared to swear by and obey without
reticence:carlaRpubliquedesLettresnapointdetribunalsouverainpourprononcersurlesjugemensde
partage(HOS,November1692,p.118;quotedinBroekmanetal.1976,p.129).
Undertheseconditions,however,itisbynomeanssurethatthemosttypicalkindofdebatewouldturnouttobe
tolerant, conciliatory, and rational; nor that its basic aim would be to establish the truth and to advance
knowledge,ratherthanpromotingthevictoryofonesownparty.Infact,asthecriticsreferredtoabove(section
3)observed, disputes tendedtopredominateoratleasttobeparticularlyconspicuous.Thus,itseemsthatthe
absenceofasortofabsolutisticruleoftheauthorityofreasondidnotleadtoademocraticrepublic.At
times,itshouldberatherlikenedtoafeudalstate,whereeachpossessorofpoweruseditinordertofosterhis
owninterestsaboveeverythingelse.Thisisparticularlyclearinthewaythepersonalscientificorphilosophical
ideologiesandaffinitiesoftheadvisorsandeditorsofthejournalsofthetimewereusedascriteriainthe
determinationoftheircontents.Infact,thecitizensoftheRpubliquethemselveswerequiteawareofthecivil
warthatwasgoingonintheirRepublic,asituationthatdidnotcorrespondtotheiridealofhowitsaffairs
shouldbeconducted.
Conceptually,thephenomenonofquarrelsintheEnlightenmentseemtoberelatedalsototheslowascensionof
thenotionofcritical reason. Inordertoexercise fullyandseriously itsrole inensuringtheprogressof
knowledge,Reasonmustavoidbyallmeansthetemptationtobecomedogmaticwhichitcanonlydobybeing
critical,especiallyvisvisitsownassumptionsandresults.Criticism,however,isahumanactivityofan
essentiallyagonisticorpolemicalcharacter,wheredifferentopinionsandargumentsconfronteachother.Intense
polemicalactivityis,therefore,thenecessarycorrelateandconditionforCriticalReasontoestablishitselfasthe
paradigm of rationality. To be sure, the Enlightenments dominant trend believed in the universal and
unquestionableauthorityofreasonanditsrepresentativeonearth(Newtonian)science.Accordingly,itsought
certainties and sought to resolve controversial issues through regulated contests where the inputs of the

participants wouldbeevaluatedbycompetent and impartial judges.Voltaire, intheentry critiqueofhis


DictionnairePhilosophiquedepictstheidealcriticasunartistequiauraitbeaucoupdescienceetdegot,sans
prjugsetsansenvie,althoughheisrealisticenoughtoaddthatcelaestdifficiletrouver.Marmontel,in
thearticlecritiquedanslessciencesinthe Encyclopdie islesscautiousandassumesthepossibilityofa
perfectlyobjectivecritic.Similarlythethinkerwhomadetheideaofcriticismtheflagshipofhisaccountof
reasonandofhiswholephilosophyinfactheldincontemptthepolemicsthathadcharacterizedmetaphysicsfor
centuries.Kantindeedconsideredsuchpolemicstobeunsolvable,andthereforemovedthecriticalattitudeone
stageup.Forhim,aseriousphilosophershouldnotholdapositioninanyofthetraditionalmetaphysicalissues,
norcriticizeeitherofthesides,norseektodeterminethetruthinthem.Heshouldratherpositionhimselfasan
observerofthesequarrels,andinquirewhytheyaroseandhowitwouldbepossibletoavoidratherthan
solvingthem.
Nevertheless,itseemsthattheintensityanduncontrollabilityofthepolemicalexchangesinthe17 th and18th
centuries,whileprovokingsuchreactionsasVoltairesandKants,alsopavedthewayfortheposteriorversions
of Critical Reason that would give up the very idea of certainty and accept fallibilism as a good enough
epistemologicalbasisforthescientificenterprise.Onthisview,criticismcannotspareanyview,byfriendor
foe,whichconflictswithreasonandtruth.Yetcriticandcriticizedusuallydonotcoincideintheirappreciation
of what conforms or conflicts with truth and reason. The result is sustained, violent, but also often quite
enlighteningdebate,wherevirtuallyeveryassumption,method,data,andstandardofrationalityisupforgrabs
and a plurality of irreducibly different possibilities emerges. Such a state of affairs, although viewed as
undesirablebymanyofitscitizens,wasnotfarfromwhatactuallyoccurredinthe RpubliquedesLettres.
Therefore,whenBayle,oneofthemostimportantchampionsandperhapsalsovictimsofthe Rpublique,
describesitsnormalstateofaffairsasawarofallagainstall,ratherthanasaharmoniousparadise,heisnotonly
descriptively,butalsoconceptuallyaccurateasfarastheprospectsandrisksinherenttotrustingnoauthority
exceptCriticalReasonareconcerned.
*
**
Thereare,then,descriptive,historical,andconceptualreasonsforacknowledgingtheimportanceofpolemicsin
intellectualhistoryandtodevotespecialeffortstotheirinvestigation.Insodoing,itisnecessarytocarefully
distinguish between the different models of polemical exchanges conceived of and actually used by the
participantsinthemaswellasbyobservers,tostudycomparativelytheseexchangesacrosstime,geographical
areas and disciplines, and not to accept uncritically the way the participants themselves tend to idealize
positivelyornegativelythephenomenon.InsofarastheRpubliquedesLettresofthefirsttwocenturiesof
modernitysetthepatternofintellectuallifewestillfollowtoday,postmodernismnotwithstanding,thistaskis
urgentnotonlyforhistoricalreasons.
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