In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to

three (3) specific questions, did not in any way curb the publics right to
information or diminish the importance of public accountability and
transparency.
This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN
Project in aid of legislation. There is nothing in the assailed Decision that
prohibits respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. They
could continue the investigation and even call petitioner Neri to testify again.
He himself has repeatedly expressed his willingness to do so. Our Decision
merely excludes from the scope of respondents investigation the three (3)
questions that elicit answers covered by executive privilege and rules that
petitioner cannot be compelled to appear before respondents to answer the
said questions
In Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,40 it was stated
that there are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within which
the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged.
Nonetheless, it enumerated the recognized restrictions to such rights, among
them: (1) national security matters, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions,
(3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information. National security
matters include state secrets regarding military and diplomatic matters, as well
as information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of
treaties and executive agreements. It was further held that even where
there is no need to protect such state secrets, they must be "examined
in strict confidence and given scrupulous protection."

Respondent Committees ardently argue that the Courts declaration that

presidential communications are presumptively privileged reverses the
"presumption" laid down in Senate v. Ermita11 that "inclines heavily against
executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
Respondent Committees observation that this Courts Decision reversed the
"presumption that inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of
disclosure" arises from a piecemeal interpretation of the said Decision. The
Court has repeatedly held that in order to arrive at the true intent and meaning

of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to,

but the decision must be considered in its entirety.19
Obviously, the last sentence of the above-quoted paragraph in Senate v.
Ermita refers to the "exemption" being claimed by the executive officials
mentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, solely by virtue of their positions in
the Executive Branch. This means that when an executive official, who is one
of those mentioned in the said Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, claims to be exempt
from disclosure, there can be no presumption of authorization to invoke
executive privilege given by the President to said executive official, such
that the presumption in this situation inclines heavily against executive
secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
First, respondent Committees contend that the power to secure a foreign loan
does not relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential power,"
because the Constitution does not vest it in the President alone, but also in
the Monetary Board which is required to give its prior concurrence and to
report to Congress.
The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not
make such power less executive. The power to enter into an executive
agreement is in essence an executive power. Now, the fact that the President
has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit
to Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting or
guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the
powe
Second, respondent Committees also seek reconsideration of the application
of the "doctrine of operational proximity" for the reason that "it maybe
misconstrued to expand the scope of the presidential communications
privilege to communications between those who are operationally proximate
to the President but who may have "no direct communications with her."
In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege "to a large swath of
the executive branch" (a fear apparently entertained by respondents) is
absent because the official involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus,
properly within the term "advisor" of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a
member of her official family.

Third, respondent Committees claim that the Court erred in upholding the
Presidents invocation, through the Executive Secretary, of executive privilege
because (a) between respondent Committees specific and demonstrated
need and the Presidents generalized interest in confidentiality, there is a need
to strike the balance in favor of the former; and (b) in the balancing of interest,
the Court disregarded the provisions of the 1987 Philippine Constitution on
government transparency, accountability and disclosure of information
It must be stressed that the Presidents claim of executive privilege is not
merely founded on her generalized interest in confidentiality. The Letter dated
November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita specified presidential
communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic
relations with another sovereign nation as the bases for the claim.
Even in Senate v. Ermita, it was held that Congress must not require the
Executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to
compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect.
This is a matter of respect for a coordinate and co-equal department.