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BACKGROUNDER

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T- The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign
111 Northwood Rd. Thomton Heath, Surrey CR7 8HW, U K
Tel. 081 771 2904 Fax 081 653 0322 Email: gn:tapol

Mass Killings in Aceh

In the last two years, Aceh, the most north-westem tip of Sumatra, has become a region of
conflict, mass killings, public executions and political trials. The Acehnese, a fiercely independent and
proud people, have always fitted uncomfortably into the Indonesian Republic. The recent upsurge of
violence can largely be explained by the growing tensions between ABRI, the Indonesian armed forces, and
GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka), the Free Aceh Movement).
Reports of the mass killing of Acehnese villagers have appeared in the international and national
press. Bodies with gunshot or stab wounds continue to be found along roads, in rivers and in plantations.
Recently reperts were published of mass executions and the bodies of the victims bshig dumped in a
ravine, and of public executions in a yillage square.
In several paris of Aceh, daily life has been totally disrupted. Villagers, afraid of repercussions,
have sought refuge in the mountains while coastal people have fled by boat to neighbouring Malaysia.
Since April this year more than 200 Acehnese have sought asylum in Malaysia.
In March a series of subversion trials began in courts in Aceh and Medan. Twenty four trials have
been announced and many others are expected to follow. The sentences already passed are severe, varying
from 5 to 20 years. However, no independent fact-finding mission has been allowed in by the Indonesian
government. No independent observers have been able to attend the political trials. The International Red
Cross (ICRC) has been allowed to visit Acehnese political prisoners. As a mark of its concern about the
general situation, the ICRC has asked for permission to have a permanent office in Aceh.
The US-based Asia Watch has produced two detailed reports on the atrocities in Aceh; Amnesty
International has launched several urgent actions, and T A P O L has reported extensively on the atrocities
and initiated several campaigns. Although some journals and newspapers have filed stories, the killings and
atrocities sweeping Aceh are still unknown to world public opinion; the gravity of conditions in Aceh has
not yet made an impact on governments and international bodies able to exert pressure on the government
in Jakarta.
This backgrounder has been prepared to inform politicians, non-governmental organisations,
human rights activists and others concerned to increase efforts to end the human rights violations in Aceh
and to ensure that due attention is given to the sufferings of the people of Aceh.
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There are five sections:

1.

A Brief History of Aceh

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2.
3.
4.
5.

The Roots of the Conflict

Social and Economie Aspects
Human Rights Violations
The International Dimension

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1.

A Brief History of Aceh

The history of Aceh is a long and impressive one. The Acehnese Sultanate was once the most powerful
in the region and in the 16th and 17th centuries was almost permanenlly at war with kingdoms in Malacca
and with the Portuguese. During the reign of Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636), Aceh controlled parts
of the mainland including Johore, Pahang, Kedah and Perak. It was during this period that a distinct
Acehnese culture came into being, with strong Muslim values becoming intertwined with Acehnese social
structures. The Acehnese proudly call their region "Serambi Mekah", the Verandah of Mecca'. They are
a distinct people, influenced by their contacts with Arabs, Indians and Portuguese. Banda Aceh, the capital,
is nearer to Asian capitals like Singapore, Rangoon, Pnom Penh and Colombo than to Jakarta.
When the various parts of the Indonesian archipelago were incorporated into the Dutch colonial
empire, Aceh proved to be one of the most difficult areas for the Dutch to subdue. In 1903 after 30 years
of war, the Dutch more or less managed to pacify Aceh but resistance was never really extinguished. After
the Japanese occupation from 1942 - 1945, the Dutch fought to restore their rule over the archipelago but
Aceh was the one place where they did not even try.
Following the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia in 1949, a Muslim-inspired rebellion in Aceh
fought the Republic of Indonesia for more than a decade and only after long deliberations and the promise
of special status did the Acehnese agree to become part of the Indonesian Republic. Daud Beureuh, who
died in 1988, was the leader of the rebellion and won concessions from Jakarta. Both Indonesian presidents,
Sukarno and Suharto, recognised that they had to treat Aceh with greater caution than other parts of the
country.
Aware of the sensitivity of the relationship with Aceh, the authorities in Jakarta avoided imposing
too much control from the centre in religious and educational affairs. Aceh was the last bastion of the
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), formerly a Muslim party federation, while the government party,
G O L K A R , always suffered heavy defeats in elections despite heavy-handed manipulations. In 1982 Aceh
was the only province to send a majority of non-GOLKAR MPs to Parliament.
Only after the PPP was forced to shed its Muslim character in 1986 and accept the Pancasila state
ideology did G O L K A R manage to creep forward. GOLKAR fortunes in Aceh improved at the 1987
elections after a devout Muslim of Acehnese birth was appointed governor. By making promises of material
gains in the form of development projects, the governor convinced many Muslims to switch to GOLKAR.
Even so, G O L K A R ' s 1987 victory in 1987 was shaky while the PPP held its majority in the three northern
districts, Aceh Besar, Pidie and Aceh Utara.
The G O L K A R victory in Aceh led some Aceh watchers to draw hasty conclusions about the rapid
pace of "Indonesianisation", believing the Acehnese had starting to accept the notion of being Indonesian
first and Acehnese second. But developments since 1989 belie that assessment.

2.

The Roots of the Conflict

On 4 December 1976 Tengku Hasan di Tiro proclaimed the Independence of Aceh/Sumatra, "reestablishing
Aceh as the successor state to the historie state of Aceh". In this re-declaration as he called it, Hasan di
Tiro, the chairman of the Aceh/Sumatra National Liberation Front and head of state of Aceh/Sumatra,
declared Aceh "free and independent from all political control of the foreign regime of Jakarta and the
alien people of the island of Java ".
Hasan di Tiro, as the direct descendant of the Tengku di Tiros who ruled Aceh and fought the
Dutch, was born in Tiro in the Pidie district of North Aceh, now one of the strongholds of the GAM. The
Tengku di Tiro dynasty has by tradition ruled also as the religious leaders of Aceh and in this connection
fought a holy war against the Dutch infidels in the late 19th century. Hasan di Tiro has taken" it upon
himself to piek up the banner of Aceh independence from his forebears. His independence declaration came
after he had lived for more than two decades as a refugee from the Sukarno regime in the US where he
built up substantial business interests.
The first phase of the insurrection began a year before the 1977 general election in Indonesia and
intensified friction between the Acehnese nationalists and the Indonesian authorities. Many of the 1976
gcr.eration of GAM activists were killed or imprisoned, while others fled the country and are now exiled
in Swcden. From 1977 to 1979, hundreds of Acehnese nationalists were incarcerated for alleged
involvement with the GAM. Hasan di Tiro, who has been able to move easily in and out of Aceh, went
abroad to reorganise the struggle and rally support from outside. Now it appears that GAM forces are
everywhere.
The second phase of the insurrection began in 1989 and achieved much greater success. The
eighties were used to develop a better organisational structure for GAM and many young Acehnese received

training abroad. Hasan di Tiro does not conceal the fact that Libya has provided scholarships and military
training for young GAM activists; he argues that the Indonesian military also receive training abroad, in
western countries. Several thousand trained Acehnese guerrillas may have joined the armed struggle against
the government in Jakarta, and they appear to be well supplied with firearms.

3.

Social and Economie Aspects

The insurrection found fertile soil in the region, in particular in the areas along the north-eastern coast
where an industrial boom has been under way for the last decade. The local people have gained nothing
from the boom which has relied on a workforce from other parts of the archipelago. Aceh is a leading
producer of natural rubber, coffee, tobacco, pepper and coconut oil and possesses vast areas of tropical
rainforest. The development of a plantation economy has created deep cleavages between the new settlers
from Java - the transmigrants - and the local population. With the indigenous population disgruntled by
their marginalisation in the rush for industrial growth, Hasan di Tiro has attracted widespread support from
the Acehnese, already steeped in the tradition of otherness and a separate national heritage. Numerous
clashes have occurred between ABRI and armed GAM units, disrupting daily life in Aceh. The cautious
approach Jakarta took towards the Acehnese has now been replaced by a frenzy of brutality. Methods used
during the mass killings of 1965/66 and during the barbarous military operations in East Timor are now
being repeated in Aceh.
Aceh is rich in natural resources. It contributes some 30% of Indonesia's oil and gas exports. The
Arun complex is the largest L N G (liquified natural gas) facility in the world and has made Indonesia the
world's leading L N G exporter. The discovery of the Arun natural gas field in 1971 changed the social
complexion of the eastern coast of Aceh. This huge complex in Lhokseumawe with associated industries
has transformed the population pattern. Industrialisation has attracted many outsiders, with most jobs in
hi-tech plants like Arun reserved for qualified engineers and managers from elsewhere. The new
professionals live in fenced-off enclaves with their own shops, schools, hospitals and golf-links. The Arun
plant, known by the initials PTA, is disparagingly referred to by the locals as 'pantang terima orang Aceh'
or 'no jobs for the Acehnese'. The PT Arun plant has become the centrepiece of Indonesia's energy
industry; last year Jakarta quietly moved 3,000 special troops to Lhokseumawe to guard the Arun
compound and the other projects that have mushroomed around it.
Many other industrial plants have been set up along the north-east coast. They include PT Kertas
Kraft Aceh, partly owned by the Suharto family, with an output of 165 thousand tons of cement-bags a
year. Other new installations are PT Aceh Asean Fertilizer and another giant fertiliser plant, Pabrik Pupuk
Iskandar Muda. The industrial boom is concentrated in the three north-eastern districts of Pidie, Aceh
Utara and Aceh Timur, the heartland of the armed nationalist Acehnese rebellion.
The eastern part is also traditionally the agricultural centre of Aceh. During the agri-business boom
of the eighties many plantations were established, both state and privately owned, attracting many Javanese
transmigrants. Within a short period, the industrial and agribusiness boom has caused the population to
expand, reaching a density of 105/km2, five times that in the west.
These developments have widened the gap between the Acehnese and the newcomers. The
powerful undercurrent of distrust for everything emanating from Jakarta has been greatly reinforced. Local
people feel that Aceh's distinct traditions are being submerged by newcomers bringing different values. A n
alien set of criteria for land ownership, the use of workers in cash erop plantations, modern entertainment
such as third rate soft-porn western films, oriental video and the like have come as a cultural shock for
the more traditional Acehnese. Moreover, the Acehnese feel like second-class citizens in their own country,
with all the best jobs are reserved for the non-Acehnese.
GAM has made the state and privately-owncd PT Arun and PT K K A the strategie target for their
activities; since late 1989 many armed clashes have occurred between the guerrillas and the Indonesian
military. So far the guerrillas have not managed to penetrate the heavily guarded PT Arun while PT K K A
was reportedly attacked and a sentry ambushed. Reports of a fire at PT K K A are difficult to verify.

4.

Human Rights Violations

Reports of human rights violations in Aceh began to appear intermittently in the national and international
press during 1990. But reporting in the Indonesian press has now been limited to the official government
version after warnings to the editors. Amnesty International and Asia Watch have expressed deep concern
at the massive scale of human rights abuses in the area. A submission about the atrocities was made by
TAPOL at the U N Human Rights Commission in Geneva in February this year.

While in the first half of 1989 it appeared that the Indonesian military were fighting a limited war
against armed units of GAM, by July 1989 ABRI was using heavy handed methods reminiscent of the brutal
pacification of East Timor between 1975-1985. Summary executions, random mass arrests and barbaric
torture, disappearances, 12-hour curfews, house-to-house searches and the deliberate creation of an
atmosphere of fear and terror are now the order of the day.
Some people in government argue that ambushes and attacks against isolated army and police posts
by the armed rebel units justify the heavy handed measures taken by the Indonesian army in retaliation,
but the high death toll and wanton killing of civilians testify to the brutality of the Indonesian military.
In November 1990 Major-General Djoko Pramono, military commander of North Sumatra,
admitted that many people had been killed in Aceh and that killings were occurring every day. In his own
words the military commander made it clear that killing people suspected of being rebels was official
policy. He said:
/ have told the people the important thing is, if you see a GPK, you should kill hint. There's no
need to investigate. Just shoot hm or knife hint. People are forced to do this or that and if they
don't want to, they are shot or gel their throats slit. So I have instructed people to carry weapons,
machetes or whatever. If you see a GPK, just kill him. [Tempo, 17 November 1990] [NB: 'GPK'
stands for 'Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan' or 'security disruptor gangs', the term officially used
for GAM.]
Killings
Estimates of the death toll since mid 1990 range from a conservative figure of 2,000 to 10,000, the figure
used by Hasan di Tiro. Both GAM and the Indonesian army have been responsible for killings but GAM
armed units have been selective, targeting military, police, informers and occasionally, Javanese working
in factories or on plantations. The Indonesian army has been responsible for the vast majority of the
killings which have been perpetrated in a systematic way. In the early period, before the Indonesian press
became wary of reporting atrocities in Aceh, several journals revealed that the random killing of civilians
was becoming widespread.
A variety of motives lie behind the killings.
Revenge for the ambush of police or military personnel. Intensive military operations have been
conducted in the mountainous area of Pidie district, in parts of the North Aceh district and in the coastal
areas of the East Aceh district. In these three districts the military have exhorted the local people to become
vigilantes and take part in army-conducted manhunts of alleged rebels. Many hundreds of youngsters,
organised in 'bands to defend the state', have been armed with spears and traditional daggers to chase and
kill rebels in the forests and mountains.
As a warning to Acehnese not to join the ranks of the rebels. People have been shot and their
bodies left by the roadside, in rivers or in the felds, to be discovered and hastily buried by local people,
creating an atmosphere of fear. With few exceptions, relatives have refrained from filing complaints to the
authorities for fear of reprisals. Most of the dead have been buried without being identified
As a way to dispose of detainees. By the end of 1990 the prisons and garrisons were overflowing
with prisoners; it is thought that the general view among army officers was to bring only a small number
of prisoners to trial. So, what to do with the rest? While some have been released after they were forced
to sign loyalty statements and attend loyalty ceremonies, dozens, perhaps hundreds, have been summarily
shot.
Mass killings and public executions
Reports about mass killings began to leak out late last year but recent reports in the international press
reveal the gravty of the situation.
In June 1991, a Dutch journalist published accounts of two mass murders in Aceh. One occurred
on 12 September 1990 on ihe road from Bireuen to Takengon at the 25km marker. A truck carrying 56
detainees from Rancong Prison, Lhokseumawe stopped and the detainees were forced to alight; all were
shot dead and their bodies thrown down a ravine. Another massacre occurred on the 'KKA' road (named
after the paper factory, Kertas Kraft Aceh) along which pine logs are transportcd to the coast for the
production of cement-bags. Last December, a Javanese truck driver was shot dead. In April, a truck took
41 men and women 30km from Takengon where they were shot dead. Local people insist that the murders
were the work of army death squads wearing civilian clothing.
On 15 May, Reuter reported five public executions by the Indonesian military, quoting a resident
of Sigli: "On Saturday night (May 4) they shot five people in public in Sigli in front of everyone. I saw
it with my own eyes."

Such incidents which have come to light as a result of brief investigations by journalists suggest
that Aceh has been turned into a killing field, in Jakarta's desperate bid to crush a revolt that threatens an
important lifeline of the Indonesian economy.
Arrests, torture and intimidation
Besides official detention centres and prisons, people have been locked up in a variety of military garrisons,
police stations or special houses. The three most frequently mentioncd are the detention centre of the Bukit
Barisan military command in Medan, known as Gaperta, the Rancong camp (barracks of the special redberet troops) and the military detention centre in Lhokseumawe. Arrests occur without warrants, torture is
routine and relatives are hardly ever informed of the whereabouts of the detainee. The following pattern
of arrests has emerged:
Villagers are rounded up after a GAM action, taken from the village and held for a time. Reports
of such incidents vary but in all cases people are routinely beaten. After interrogation, some are released
while others are transferred to other detention centres. Relatives are not informed of the detainee's whereabouts.
There are arrests of persons who have been blacklisted or who were previously arrested. Among
those picked up in the first wave of arrests were many who had been incarcerated in the late seventies.
People are arrested because army intelligence believe they can provide information. It is believed
that Indonesian intelligence agents have set up a fake GAM network in neighbouring Malaysia where many
Acehnese activists have taken refuge. By means of infiltration, the Indonesian intelligence are trying to trap
many new GAM recruits.
Arrests are followed by stage-managed political trials. The Indonesian judiciary has a long
tradition of conducting political trials in order to construct a subversion case around the alleged terrorist
activities of a movement and as a showcase for foreign consumption. So far, 24 trials have been announced
and more are likely to follow. None of the defendants tried thus far appear to be leading GAM activists.
The charges against the defendants lack substance. The nature of the trials suggests that the Indonesian
military have failed to track down the leadership of the movement but are staging the trials to prove to the
outside world that GAM is a dangerous terrorist organisation. The triais have proceeded at such a pace that
it has been difficult to obtain a comprehensive picture. Most trials have lasted for only in 3 or 4 sessions.
Most sentences are between 10 and 15 years and human rights lawyers have described the trials as a fraud;
defence teams must have the approval of the military and the judges have shown little respect for the rules.
[The June 1991 Asia Watch Report gives a comprehensive analysis of the trials.]
Torture
Torture is common, usually starting with severe beatings with rifle butts and kicks at the time of the arrest,
followed by torture during interrogation. Methods include electric shocks to sensitive parts of the body,
often the genitals, the use of burning cigarettes on the body, beatings with blocks of wood and the use of
crude torture instruments for a long period of time. Some defendants were seen to be in bad physical shape
at the trials.
A Black Paper issued by the Information Department of the Aceh/Sumatra National Liberation Front (Black
Paper) gives details of the commonest forms of torture:
-

squeezing testicles with pliers;

holding down the victim's feet under heavy chairs on which soldiers sit, till the victim's toes are broken;
nailing down the victim's hand as if for crucifixion;
immersing the victim in boiling water;
placing the victim in a pool of filthy water for hours or days at a stretch;
stringing the victim upside down;
using cigarettes or hot irons to inflict burns.

The use of torture is commonplace to extract confessions in signed interrogation reports (Berita Acara
Pemeriksaan, BAF). The confessions are constructed in such a way as to provide convincing proof of a
conspiracy concocted by the authorities. In many cases, the events mentioned in the confessions never even
occurred. Defendants appear as witness for the prosecution in other trials being held concurrently and come

with testimonies that all fit into a grand scheme of conspiracy against the state. The courts routinely reject
pleas that the confessions were extracted by force.
Intimidation
In the districts of Pidie, North Aceh and East Aceh, people live under wartime conditions. There are travel
restrictions and after-dark curfews which are imposed without advanced notice or official proclamation.
Anyone caught violating these regulations faces grave consequences. In villages where frequent GAM
activities have occurred, people have been assembled and forced to read out pledges of allegiance to the
Indonesian republic and the Pancasila, the state doctrine, in the presence of military and government
authorities. They are then made to parade round the town, waving the Indonesian flag. A report in the Los
Angeles Times [15 June 1991] quotes an Acehnese resident as describing how an army officer, wanting to
intimidate an entire town, "fires a single shot in the air, at which point all single males must run to a
central square before the soldier fires a second shot. Then, anyone arriving late or not leaving home is shot
on the spot."
Released prisoners have been forced to sign loyalty pledges promising not to follow the Hasan di
Tiro and to refrain from participating actively or passively in activities that are considered to be a threat
to order and political stability.
The war has disrupted life in many villages and some families living along the east coast have
taken the decision to leave their homes, fleeing by boat to Malaysia. More than 200 refugees have reached
the beaches of Penang. N o doubt many more would follow but naval patrols have been reinforced, making
the crossing extremely hazardous. Fishermen have been prevented from taking out their boats and some
suspected of transporting people across the narrow straits have been shot dead.

The International Dimension

Western governments have taken no concrete action to condemn the atrocities in Aceh. The U K and U S
governments have privately expressed concern to the Indonesian Government but only the European
Parliament has expressed public concern by passing a resolution calling on the Indonesian authorities to
stop the killings and torture, and appealing to member states to ban the supply of arms to Indonesia.
But the flow of weapons and military assistance from Western governments to Indonesia continues.
In June 1991, a new agreement was concluded between British Aerospace and the Indonesian state
aerospace company, IPTN, for the co-production of Hawk fighter/trainer jets. In the last two decades,
British arms manufacturers, aided and encouraged by the Government, have concluded many deals with
Indonesia which is now British Aerospace's main customer outside the Middle East.
The Standard response to protests about the sale of war equipment to Indonesia is that it can be
justified "when sold to meet legitimate defence needs.... We pay particular attention to the human rights
record of the country concerned and do not agree to the supply of equipment which, in our judgement, is
likely to be used for internal repression." [Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd to Timothy Raison M P , 3 April
1990.] The government refuses to acknowledge that by selling arms to the Suharto regime, it is bolstering
its armed forces which are engaged in violent repression and gross violations of human rights.
The flight of Acehnese refugees to Malaysia has added a further dimension to the conflict in Aceh.
The Malaysian government, under pressure from Indonesia, announced that the refugees would be returned.
The threat has not yet been carried out, but the situation of the refugees is not secure as Kuala Lumpur,
in defiance of international law, has refused to allow the U N High Commission for Refugees access to the
refugees to determine their status and decide whether they are entitled to asylum.

Resources
Tapol Bulletin no. 94, 96, 99, 100-105
Asia W a t c h Report: Indonesia: Hurnan Rights Abuses in Aceh, December 27, 1990
Asia W a t c h Report: Indonesia: Continuing Human Rights Violations in Aceh, June 19, 1991
N R C Handelsblad [ 13 April 1991 & 1 June 1991 ]
M e m o r a n d u m from Tengku Hasan di Tiro to the Lord Avebury, January 11, 1991
A Black Paper, Information Dept. A S N L F , November 1, 1990
Los Angeles Times [ 16 June 1991 ]
Tempo [ 17 November 1990 ] and reporls from other Indonesian dailies and weeklies.
27 June 1991