ECP 3-14

BASIC COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

FOR

GROUND UNITS

DECEMBER 1968

Publiahed For Instructional

PUrpo<Ie<O

Only

EDUCATION CENTER
MARINE CORPS DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCAnON COMMAND
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA

UNITEO STATES MARINE CORPS

EDUCATlON CENTER
MARINE CORPS OEVEL.OPMENT AND EDUCATION COMMAND
QUANTICO, VIMGINIA 22134
N ItI:I>LY l1li1[1'1['" TO

45R/ad
27 November 1968

""

From:
To:

Director, Education Center

Distribution List

Subj:

ECP 3-14, Basic Combat Intelligence for Ground Units

1. Purpose. To promulgate the publication ECP 3-14, Basic Combat

Intelligence for Ground Units, for use in instruction conducted by the
Marine Corps Development and Education Command.
2. Cancellation. MCS 3-14, Basic Combat Intelligence for Ground
Units, dated November 1966.

3. Scope. This manual discusses tile production of combat intelligence

with particular emphasis upon intelligence functions at the battalion
level and below.
4.

Certification. Reviewed and approved this date.

DISTRIBUTION: "E" plus

C&SC (250)
COS (10)
ExtScol (5)
TBS (6000)
OCS (5)
SupDept (250)
NCOScol (5)

BASIC COMBAT INTELUGENCE FOR GROUND UNITS

TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION 1.

THE IMPORTANCE OF COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

Paragraph
101
102
103
104
105

SECTION 2.
201
202
203
204
SECTION 3.
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
SECTION 4.
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413

Introduction
Strategic Intelligence
Combat Intelligence
Theory of Combat Intelligence
The Commander's Decision

1
1
2
2
3

THE BATTALION S-2

General
Duties and Responsibilities
The Infantry Battalion S- 2 Section
Staff Relations

5
5
6

SOURCES OF INFORMATION
General
Prisoners of War
Handling of Prisoners of War
Interrogation of Prisoners of War
Enemy Documents
Enemy Materiel
Enemy Communications
Escapees, Civilians, and Refugees
Aerial Imagery
Maps and Terrain Models
Enemy Activity
Summary

9
9
10
12
14
16
17
17
18
19
20
20

COLLECTION MEANS AND AGENCIES

General
Observation Posts
listening Posts
Ground Surveillance Radar
Patrolling
Foot Patrols
Motorized (including :Vlechanized) Patrols
Helicopter Patrols
Aerial Reconnaissance
Visual Air Observation
Aerial Imagery
Reconnaissance Organizations
Reconnaissance Battalion, Marine Division

21
21
25
28
28
30
32
34

36
36
40
42
42

Page

Paragraph
414
415
416
SECTION 5.
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
SECTION 6.
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
SECTION 7.
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
SECTION 8.
801
802
803
804
805
806
807

ii

Force Reconnaissance Company, Fleet Marine

Force
Intelligence Specialist Teams
Adjacent and Higher Headquarters

43
44
44

THE DIRECTION AND COLLECTION EFFORT

General
Essential Elements of information (E EI)
Determination of EEl
Form and Content of EEl
Indications
The Collection Plan
Supervision of the Collection Effort
Summary

47
47
47
48
49
51
53
53

PROCESSING
General
Recording
The Journal File
S-2 Production Worksheet
The Situation Map
other Files
Evaluation
Interpretation
Summary

55
55
55
56
58
59
59
62
62

DISSEMINATION
General
Radio
Telephone

Reports
Conferences
Messenger
Personal Contact
Combat Dissemination

63
63
63
64
65

65
65
65

ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND THE INTELLIGENCE

ESTIMATE
General
Enemy Intentions
Enemy Capabilities
statement of Capability
Probability
The Estimate
Summary

67
67
68
70
71
71
72

SECTION 9.

COUl-:TERIl-:TE LUGENCE
~

Paragraph
901
902
903
904
905
906
907

908
909
910

911
912
913

SECTION 10.
1001
1002
SECTION 11.
1101
1102
1103
1104
1105
1106
1107
1108
1109
GU)3SARY

General
Responsibility
:vnssion
Counterintelligence Operations
Indoctrination of Personnel
Security Discipline
Camouflage
Concealment
Communication Security
Press and Radio Control
Mail Censorship
The Counterintelligence Plan
Employment of Counterintelligence Personnel

73
73
74

74
76

77
77
78
78
79
79
79
80

lNTELUGENCE TRAINING
The Individual Marine
Intelligence Section Personnel

83
84

INTELUGENCE AND THE SMALL UNIT LEADER

General
Reporting
Patrolling
Prisoners
Documents and Souvenirs
Counterintelligence
Liaison
Company Collection Plan
Conclusion

85
85
86
87
88
88
89
89
91

Discussion of Some Intelligence Terms

93

iii

SECTION 1. THE IMPORTANCE OF cm,mAT INTELUGENCE

101. INTRODUCTION

Since warfare began, sound application of military intelligence procedures has

been a distinguishing mark of the successful commander. Modern warfare. with
the premium it places on speed and flexibility, highlights the importance of good
intelligence to the commander. Above all, the emphasiS in modern combat on smallunit action, and on initiative on the part of small-unit leaders, makes obvious the
fact that the Marine company grade officer and noncommissioned officer must
have a sound understanding of how essential intelligence concerning the enemy.
terrain, hydrography. and weather is obtained. The purpose of this publication is
to set forth in detail the basic procedures of combat intelligence activity at the
platoon. company, and battalion level. As a basic publication. it is intended to provide
the background in combat Intelligence which is essential to an understanding of
combat intelligencertivity in amphibious operations.
a. Before the advent of large armies and the development of fire power, the
commander served as his own intelligence officer. By posting himself on commanding
terrain, he could usually observe what was going on and what the enemy was trying
to do. He questioned prisoners himself and personally dispatched agents to the
enemy camp. On receipt of information. he evaluated and interpreted It himself and
made his decisions.
b. When armies began to expand in size and complexity. the commander found
that he could not supervise single-handedly aU the details by himself. Instead, he
selected a small group of experienced officers to assist him in the difficult task of
command. These officers became known as a staff. Today the staff consists of
officers who are expert in their speCific fields. The staff assistant assigned the
task of planning, coordinating. and supervising the effort to obtain, interpret, evaluate.
and disseminate all possible information about the enemy and the area of operations
for the commander is the intelligence officer. If he serves on a battalion or regimental staff. he is called an S-2. If he serves on a brigade. division, aircraft wing,
or higher staff, he is designated a G-2. But whatever his rank or deSignation, or
whatever his echelon, the intelligence officer has the same duties and responsibilities.
Below the battalion level. the commander must be his own intelligence officer and
must carry out the basic intelligence tasks for which a staff assistant is provided
at all higher levels.
102. STRATEGIC INTELUGENCE
strategic intelligence is Intelligence which is requlred for the formation of
policy and military plans at national and international levels. This type of intelligence is normally produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DlA), which is the
consolidated intelligence effort of the armed services. and the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA). Although strategic intelligence is used to develop national objectives,
it is similar to combat intelligence. in that it seeks data on foreign nations and
possible areas of operations and uses the same intelligence collection and processing
techniques.

103. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

JCS Pub 1, Dictionary of United states l\1ilitary Terms for Joint Usage, defines
combat intelligence as "that knowledge of the enemy, weather. and geographical
features required by a commander in the planning and conduct of tactical operations."
In expansion of this definition it can be said that combat intelligence is carefully
interpreted information regarding the enemy, terrain, and weather which a tactical
commander must have to make his decision and to conceal his own actions from the
enemy. Combat intelligence answers the commander's questions about machineguns,
enemy artillery batteries, reserve components, and probable future action. All
such uncertainties regarding the enemy, terrain, and weather must be reduced to a
minimum. It is. as its name implies. intelligence for. and by. combat units engaged
with the enemy.
104. THEORY OF COMBAT INTELLIGENCE
The military commander must know the environment in which he is going to
operate; he must know where the enemy is, how strong he is, and what he can be
expected to do. These are the commander's intelligence needs or requirements.
The theory of combat intelligence is simply to notify these requirements through a
logical. orderly plan of operation known as the intelligence process,
a. The combat intelligence process is initiated by the commander by determining
his requirements; that is, what he needs to know in order to plan, make a sound decision. or avoid being surprised, This process consists of the following phases:
(1) Direction - Determination of intelligence requirements, collection planning, issuance of orders to collection agencies and supervision of their efforts.
(2) Collection - Systematic procurement and selection of information pertinent
to the command's mission and situation.
(3) Processing Production of intelligence from aVailable and/or newly
collected, raw information by evaluation, analysis, interrogation, and interpretation.
(4) Dissemination -

Getting intelligence to those who need it in time to be

of use.
b. The intelligence process is never-ending; it is a continning effort. New
requirements are determined as the situation changes. information collected or
intelligence produced one hour or one day will generate a need for additional or
new collection efforts, causing the intelligence process to go on and on. For this
reason it is helpful to think of the intelligence process in terms of a cycle, as
depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1. -

The Combat Intelligence Cycle.

c. Each of these steps is necessary to the overall process. A commander who

is assigned a mission or confronted with a task initially applies all applicable.
aVailable intelligence to the making of a sound decision. Invariably, certain information vital to the fulfillment of the decision will be lacking, particularly in relation
to the detailed plans and later decisions. The commander directs the search for
this additional essential information through his intelligence officer. From the
commander's combat intelligence requirements, the intelligence officer makes plans,
and issues Instructions and requests for the collection of the needed information.
Intelligence agencies obtain the required information from a multitude of sources
and forward it to the intelligence officer. The 8-2 then produces intelligence from
the raw information; he records the information, evaluates it, and interprets it in
relation to information and intelligence already on hand and the exisiting situation.
He then presents the resulting additional intelligence to the commander and other
users in usable form. This is the Intelligence cycle; it begins at any steP. and once
started, continues indefinitely with the purpose of constantly providing the commander
and the command with the knowledge necessary to plan, to decide, and to avoid being
surprised.
d. It is particularly important to understand at the very beginning that "intelligence" and "information" are not the same thing. "Information" is simply a fact
or facts about the enemy, weather. and terrain; It is only raw material of intelligence.
For instance, a report that the enemy is entrenching on HILL A and laying mines on
ROAD B is information only. After recording and determining that the information
is reliable and accurate, it is intelligence data. A conclusion that the enemy will
most probably defend rather than attack is Intelligence.
105. THE COMMANDER'S DECISION

a. Comhat intelligence activity is intimately related to the commander's plan.

The primary roll of combat intelligence is to keep the commander up to date on the
enemy situation and to assist him to make his deCision. Making this deCision is the
principal role of the combat leader. He is faced with the problem of finding a wa)
to accomplish his mission in spite of anything the enemy might do to interfere. To
solve this problem, he must have knowledge of the follOwing four factors:

(1) His mission.

(2) His own capabilities.
(3) Enemy capabilities.
(4) Terrain and weather.
b. Of these factors, mission and own capabilities are known, definite quantities.
For example, the mission assigned to General Rupertus to carry out the Cape
Gloucester operation in WW II was simply stated, "to seize and destroy the hostile
garrison at CAPE GLOUCESTER and to defend it against further enemy action, being
prepared for operations to the East as far as TALASEA." Although our own capabilities are variable, they may be readily determined by examination of personnel,
ammunition, supply, and casualty reports.
c. Enemy capabilities and terrain and weather are unknown factors. Enemy
capabilities, all possible courses of action open to the enemy, are an unknown because
they are subject to a will that is free and independent. A course of action absolutely
unreasonable to use may seem practical to the enemy. The first question, therefore,
is not whether a course of action is reasonable or unreasonable, but whether it is
possible.
Terrain and weather, which may be understood to comprise all natural
conditions affecting our own and enemy capabilities, are a second unknown, because
the enemy domination of certain terrain hinders our access to it and weather is subject to rapid change.
d. Only from a good knowledge of the total situation, the unknown factors as
well as the known, can the commander arrive at a sound decision, determine if his
scheme of maneuver is capable of overcoming hostile opposition, and raise his
decision from the level of pure chance to the proper level of calculated risk. It
is the intelligence officer's task to fill in the unknown (enemy capabilities, terrain
and weather) to make possible a sound decision by the commander.

SECTION 2. THE BATTALION S-2

201. GENERAL
Commanders of battalions and larger units are provided with officers to assist
them with their command duties. (For purposes of this discussion the infantry battalion is used as typical.) These assistants are organized into a group called an
executive staff at battalion and regiment. and a general staff at division and higher.
These staffs are divided into four sections: personnel. intelligence. operations. and
logistics. The intelligence. or S-2 section. is responsible for all intelligence matters.
The officer-in-charge of the S-2 section is the intelligence officer. At the battalion
level he is a captain; at regiment a major; and at division a colonel. The higher
echelon intelligence sections will not be described in this introductory text. It
suffices to say that. although larger and with more facilities. the higher echelon
sections have the very same responsibilities and mission as are found in the battalion.
202. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The primary responsibility of the battalion S-2 is to provide his commander
with timely. pertinent intelligence data and conclusions as to the effects of the
weather. the terrain. and the enemy situation on the battalion mission. In connection
with this primary responsibility. his duties include the following:
a. He is responsible for the never-ending intelligence process: planning for.
and supervision of. the collection of information; the production of intelligence by
recording. evaluation. and interpretation of information; and the dissemination of
intelligence by a variety of means.
b. He is responsible for the organization. assignment of duties. training. welfare.
and morale of the enlisted men of his section and the non-organic intelligence personnel which may be attached.
c. He also has staff responsibility for the planning for. and supervision
those counterintelligence measures applicable at the battalion level.

0'.

203. THE INFANTRY BATTALION S-2 SECTION

The battalion S-2 is assisted in his duties by 11 enlisted men. This section
consists of one gunnery sergeant as intelligence chief; one staff sergeant as chief
scout; one sergeant as intelligence assistant; six corporal/lance corporal/privates
as scout/radar operators for the AK/PPS 6 (battlefield surveillance radar); and
two privates as scout/drivers.
a. The intelligence section should be trained to take over all routine tasks.
leaving the S-2 free to concern himself with only the vital aspects of the enemy
situation and the ever-important evaluation and interpretation of information as it
comes in. It should be the purpose of all members of the intelligence section to be
proficient in carrying out the following list of tasks particularly appropriate to
the efficient production of intelligence.

(1) General knowledge of the contents of intelligence publications pertinent to

the organization and functioning of the intelligence prodUction effort.
(2) General knowledge of the organization, weapons, equipment. tactics, and
techniques of the enemy.
(3) Ability to prepare sketches. maps. overlays. photographic mosaics. and
terrain models. This. of course. includes proficiency in map reading and a general
knowledge of aerial imagery interpretation.
(4) Ability to plan and conduct reconnaissance patrols or, as Is more probable,
to accompany patrols or raids as an intelligence observer.
(5) Ability to brief and debrief patrols, raids. and similar friendly activities.
(6) Ability to organize and operate observation and listening posts.
(7) Ability to plan and conduct the tactical employment of the ground surveillance radar.
(8) Ability to handle captured enemy personnel, documents. and materiel: and.
within the practical limits of language barriers. to participate in the examination of
the same for Information of immediate tactical value to the unit.
(9) Ability to keep abreast of the enemy situation, terrain, and weather; and
to prepare and disseminate intelligence reports concerning these to higher. lower,
and adjacent units.
(10) Ability to maintain intelligence records. files. journals, and that which is
of particular importance, the situation map.
(11) Ability to organize and supervise the counterintelligence effort of the unit
with emphasis on the denial of information to the enemy.
(12) Ability to train personnel in the principles and techniques of combat
intelligence.
b. Every campaign presents different problems under different Circumstances
and this fact precludes a stereotype method of utilizing the personnel of the 8-2
section. The capahilities of individual members of the section may be limited by
inadequacies in training and experience as would be likely in the case of the six
corporal/lance corporal/privates serving as AN/PPS 6 scout/radar operators.
Flexibility, however. keynotes the handling of the situation and the good intelligence
officer Will constantly look for more efficient ways to use his section.
204. STAFF RELATIONS
The commander's executive staff consists of four sections. The S-2 section is
only one aspect of staff assistance and its activity must be coordinated With the others.
This is particularly true of the relationship between the S-3 and S-2. The S-3 is
responsible for all tactical and operational planning and is concerned With the friendly

situation. Thus, the S-3 and the S-2 supplement each other on the staff. The S-3,
in order to work out the tactical plans assigned to him, must know all possible
pertinent facts about the enemy. The way this usually works at battalion level is that
the S-3 and S-2 sit down together and jointly work out the problem. For instance,
if the S-3 is working on a raid plan, he asks the S-2 for the best targets and routes.
The S-2, being the commander's expert on the enemy, is able to tell the operations
officer where the enemy has, say, a small isolated outpost offering the best chance
of success.
The S-2 should be in a poSition to further advise the S-3 on the best
routes of approach and withdrawal and be able to support his advice with facts. The
close relationship between the 8-2 and S-3 is most important on a well functioning
staff, and for this reason the two staff officers are usually billeted close to one
another.
The S-2. the 8-3 and the battalion executive officer must not have any
secrets between them. Although there is very close working relationship between
the 8-2 and S-3. the 8-2 must never lose sight of the fact that his primary responsibility is to plan for, and supervise the collection of information for the commander;
control and supervise the proceSSing of information into intelligence; and disseminate
intelligence to all who need to know.

SECTION 3. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

301. GENERAL

Before an apprentice workman can begin to learn the techniques of his trade,
he must learn what tools are available to him and how they can be used. So it is
with combat intelligence; before the technique of intelligence can be discussed, the
tools of the trade must be presented. These tools of an intelligence officer are
his available sources and agencies of information. Intelligence sources and agencies
are the answer to the student's question of where Intelligence comes from. (See
fig. 2.) In the language of Intelligence, sources and agencies are not the same,
and this difference should be explained. A source is the actual person, activity,
or thing from which the desired information is obtained. An agency is the means,
unit, or personnel available to the intelligence officer for acquiring information.
If an interrogator-translator team were questioning a POW, the POW would be the
source, and the team the agency.
SOURCES

OF INFORMATION
DERIVED

ORIGINAL

MAPS AND
ENEMY
MATERIEL

Ij'

ENEMY

COMMUNICATIONS

t#

-it

CIVILIANS,
REFUGEES.
ESCAPEES

TERRAIN MODELS

SIGNAL

I~I

DETECTABLE
ENEMY ACTIVITY

Figure 2. -

"),;,f

W;::t...Jl+.
'V)
WEATHER

SPECIAL STUDIES

FORECASTS

Sources of Information.

302. PRISONERS OF WAR

Shortly after a beachhead was established on Iwo Jima in WW II. a Japanese

stepped out of a cave In sight of several Marines. He held his hands to his chest
and began jumping up and down. A Marine sergeant. thinking that the Japanese held
grenades in his hand. shot him in the leg. A corpsman treated the wound. and soon
an interrogator was On hand. The enemy insisted that his rank was private first

class and consistently refused to answer any other questions. The interrogator,
using the psychological approach, hinted that the enemy soldier might be exchanged
for an American POW through Red Cross channels. The enemy immediately showed
concern about this and muttered about his family. The interrogator mentioned that,
if he were returned to Japan, he might indeed be regarded as a coward and his
family might be perpetually shamed by his dishonor. On hearing this. the prisoner
stated his true name and that he was a major of artillery. When convinced that any
information he might give would speed up the end of the war and bring a new way of
Ufe to his homeland, he revealed the enemy plans for the defense of one part of the
island. This Information not only eased the seizure of the objective, but probably
saved the lives of hundreds of Marines.
a. Prisoners of war are one of the most desired sources of Information. They
have been where the commander wishes his S-2 had been. Who better knows the
answers to questions about the enemy than the enemy himself? The systematic
and methodical examination of POWs can yield a wealth of information about enemy
dispositions, organization, morale, and plans. One prisoner, however, cannot be
expected to know everything about all these subjects. Napoleon once said, "Information obtained from prisoners should be estimated at its true value; the soldier
seldom sees beyond his company, and the officer can at most give an account of
a position or the movement of the division to which his unit belongs." There are,
however, many occasions when a single prisoner may supply a key piece of information.
During the battle for Brest in 1944, American forces were held up by a
strongly defended obstacle. the old city wall. The only way into the city was by
infantry assault. Two divisions were to attack the west sector, while the 2nd Infantry
Division was to attack the east sector. The maps showed only one approach into
the city from the 2nd Division sector, and this was a road that was heavily defended.
However. on the night before tbe attack, a German prisoner was taken. This POW
stated that there was a little-used road, unmapped, that led into the heart of the
city. and that this road was defended by only a single pillbox. Eventually the entire
regiment entered the city by this newly discovered route. and within six hours and
after sustaning only light casualties, the division had accomplished its mission.
Later, the captured German commander opined that it was this Infiltration that broke
the back of the defense.
b. :'vTany persons studying interrogation ask, "Why is it that a prisoner will give
such information to his captor?" The explanation is not always simple: sometimes
the soldier is a genuine malcontent or is politically opposed to his regime; sometimes
he hopes to buy better treatment or survival, sometimes his government has so
violently opposed surrender that it could not instruct its troops in what to say if
they were captured; quite often it is simply expert interrogation teChnique that does
the trick. The fact remains, though, that most POWs give information.
303. HA.'iDUNG OF PRISONERS OF \VAR
In order to handle prisoners as efficiently as possible, a system has been
developed that should be known to all troops as well as by the S-2. This system
can best be remembered by calling to mind the 5 S's: Search. Segregate. Silence.
Speed (to the rear), and Safeguard. It is usually covered in the intelligence SOP
and should embrace the follOWing points:

10

a, When enemy soldiers first surrender it Is logical to immediately disarm

them, They should be made to drop their weapons and to place their hands either
over or behind their heads. POWs should then be moved to a place. sheltered at
least from flat trajectory fire. and then searched. During this search the primary
object is to find any concealed weapons. but any documents should be removed
and held by the guard. Later. at company and battalion level. the prisoners will
be searched again and again to be absolutely sure that nothing of interest has escaped
detection. ""hen a guard removes a document or other object from a prisoner,
he must be sure that he can later associate the object with the prisoner from whom
it was removed.
This Is quite important and can be very difficult when several
hundred prisoners surrender at one time. Identification of objects with prisoners
from whom taken is of the utmost importance. especially when the prisoner is being
interrogated.
For example. if the interrogator knows that the prisoner he is interrogating was captured with a radio. he can limit the scope of his interrogation
to those things that a radio operator would know. thereby decreasing the amount of
time required for interrogation and increasing the amount of usable information
obtained from the prisoner.
b. After being searched. the prisoners should be segregated as soon as possible into four groups: officers. NCOs. enlisted men. and deserters. If there Is
another category present. like civilians. suspected guerrillas. women. or military
from a force foreign to the enemy. another separate group should be formed. These
groups should be separated from one another so that the officers or NCOs cannot
communicate with one another or with the men. Sometimes it will be difficult to diStinguish officers. as in some armies combat leaders wear enlisted uniforms to
become less of a target. During the summer and fall of 1952. Chinese Communists
in Korea adopted this procedure. But. even so. officers were usually recognized
by their command presence or by some distinguishing mark. like a white handkerchief
wrapped around the head or arm.
c. Rigid silence must be enforced among all prisoners. These measures are
essential to prevent plans of escape from being made or warnings being passed
against giving information to our interrogators.
d. One of the most important single items to remember in the handling of
prisoners is that they must not be spoiled. To explain the word spoiled here. it
is necessary to say that when an enemy soldier is captured he puts his life into our
hands, and thus is usually in a state of deep shOCk and fear. especially if his commanders have told him that he will be cruelly tortured and killed if captured. This
state of shock and fear is the greatest possible weapon in the hands of our interrogators. as they are in a position to gain the confidence of the prisoner by kind
dignified treatment.
However. if the capturing troops give the prisoner water.
Cigarettes. or other comforts, he will realize that he is going to receive good treatment and regain confidence and composure, often frustrating the best of interrogators. For this reason, the POWs must be kept in doubt as long as possible about
their fate. At the same time, prisoners should be allowed to give another first aid
or be otherwise treated for wounds and should not be harshly or cruelly used.
Friendly troops should not be allowed to vent any indignity on them.
e. After being searched and segregated as has been described. the prisoners
should be evacuated to the rear as soon as possible. The POW evacuation route will

11

usually follow the same route as our wounded, following natural lines of drift. Thus,
slightly wounded Marines may often be used as guards, and prisoners may be used
as litter carriers. Farther to the rear, the route is along the main supply route,
MSR, so that supply trucks returning empty can be utilized for transportation.
(See fig. 3.) At division. the military police company will assume control of POWs
and control their movement farther to the rear. One more thing that should always
be remembered is that prisoners should never be shown or brought within sight of
any important friendly installation. This Is Important. as the prisoners may escape
and successfully return to their own lines with locations of our artillery. dumps.
or command posts.

Figure 3. -

Evacuation Route of Prisoners of War.

3M. INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

Since interrogation of prisoners of war is a job performed usually by highly
trained specialists. details of Interrogation technique are not given in this text.
Interrogation is both an art and a science by itself. and it has been developed to a
very high degree of perfection in the First and Second World Wars. 'What every
Marine must know is that. with exceptions of course, no real interrogation is done
below regimental level; and POWs should be evacuated to the rear as soon as possible.
Are not companies and battalions interested in getting POW information?
Does not Private Zhurnov speak the enemy language? The answer is yes. but companies and battalions must realize that interrogation by untrained interrogators
will almost invariably result in half-baked and confused information. and in spoiled
prisoners.
In Italy. during World War II. Italian-speaking "GIS" in the infantry
companies were the constant bogey of the interrogators and of the S-2s. Let the
"pros" do the interrogation! It is no job for amateurs. This credo does not forbid
a company commander. through his first generation automatic rifleman. asking a
fresh POW the location of a mortar which has been bothering the company, or some

12

other question of immediate tactical value. It is, however, of great importance to

everyone that the prisoner get back to trained interrogators as soon as possible.
One regiment in Korea. during the winter of 1952-53. was unable to send a prisoner
from company level to the division interrogation team in less than six hours due to
amateur interrogation. Not once was a useful report received from this low-level
interrogation. Interrogation of VC POWs in South Vietnam is unique in several
ways. Many of the larger engagements with the enemy occur during joint ARVNU. S. Marine Corps operations and afford the opportunity for front line interrogation
by South Vietnamese troops or liaison teams. Patrols are also accompanied by
South Vietnamese Interpreters to assist In questioning captured personnel and suspected VC sympathizers. A battalion S-l should lend every effort to get POWs
evacuated as soon as possible. Sometimes, in a special situation or separate mission,
a battalion S-2 will have an Interrogation team available to him, in which case a more
detailed interrogation can, of course, be performed at that level.
a. In general, interrogation is divided into two phases. During the first phase,
information of Immediate tactical value Is developed, and if not accomplished by the
capturing troops, the prisoners are tagged with special tags showing time, place,
and circumstances of capture, as well as the capturing unit. This phase is usually
done at the regimental collecting point, but when qualified Interrogators are not
available to regiment, such work is done at MEB or LF level. All Information is
relayed immediately to the S-2 to which the interrogation team Is assigned before
evacuating the POWs further to the rear. The S-2 then forwards the information
to the S-2s of lower units.
b. The second phase of POW interrogation is normally found In division or LF
level. Besides details of immediate tactical value, information of more general
interest is often produced.
Usually division or LF is concerned with enemy organization, identification of units, personalities, enemy equipment. and plans.
c. In larger operations of extended duration more strategic information may be
sought at the LF or MEF level. Such subjects are explored as morale on the home
front and other conditions there; the location of enemy war industry and its capabilities; and which elements of the enemy population are hostile to their regime. In
counterinsurgency operations this information might well be sought in earlier interrogation.
d. The technique of interrogation is a complex subject, as has been stated.
Briefly. it depends on the ability of the interrogator to analyze correctly the character
of the prisoner and to adopt the correct psychological approach. To a great extent,
this depends on the interrogator's knowledge of the enemy nation and its national
characteristics and tendencies. The average German POW was found to give the
best information when treated in a particularly military. firm manner. The Chinese
communist prisoner was usually only too glad to talk out of relief of finding that
his life might be spared. The Russian was discovered to respond best to friendly,
frank treatment. The average Japanese was usually uninstructed in what to say if
captured. and usually would not resist Interrogation. There are a hundred exceptions to each rule In Interrogation and every man reacts differently to it. Quite
frequently the prisoner is found to be friendly and opposed to his own government,
in which case all the interpreter must do is lead the conversation. This will be
found particularly true in nations where the people are ruthlessly controlled and

13

suppressed by a party or government not wholly supported by the population. The

interrogator, in any case, must know his enemy backward and forward. He should
speak the enemy language without a trace of accent and know it so thoroughly that
the words used by the POW and their slightest accent can sometimes tell the interrogator where the man probably came from, his degree of education, or even
possible rank.
e. Even when standard interrogation fails, there are many tricks of the trade
that can be used. Interrogators may be dressed in enemy uniform and introduced
into the POW cage. In the Second World War, a German-born U. S. sergeant. who
was an interrogator for an army division in Europe, was arrested by an alert "Gl"
who heard the man's heavy accent in English. The sergeant was locked up in the
POW cage as an enemy spy for four days before a release could be secured. On
release, he was able to report information that had not even been dreamed of previously, simply from the careless conversation of the POWs who believed him one
of them. Also, dictaphones can be used to gather off-guard conversation. Such
trickery is quite legal. However, in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 1929
and the Geneva Convention of 1949 to which the United States subscribes. no coercion
may be used on prisoners or other personnel to obtain information relative to the
state of their army or country. Prisoners or others who refuse to answer may not
be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of
any kind. The rules adopted at the Geneva Convention do not prohibit the examination
of prisoners or others, and such interrogation, as long as it is not brutal, threatening,
or degrading, is permissible.
305. ENEMY DOCUMENTS
In the fall of 1962, the military forces of the Republic of Vietnam conducted
a number of successful attacks against scattered Viet Cong strongholds. A number
of prisoners were taken and volumes of Communist propaganda was destroyed.
However, one particular document didn't have the flavor of Communist propaganda
and was Immediately forwarded to the intelligence officer for careful analyzation.
As it turned out, this document, along with previous POW and agent reports revealed
the time and place that units would be employed and what support would be required in
a planned-to-happen large scale Viet Cong attack. The Viet Cong carried out this
attack and the result was a decisive victory for the Republic of Vietnam forces. If
this document had not been received and returned to the proper authorities, it could
have been a decisive victory for the Viet Congo

a. Enemy documents are defUled as any reproduction by whatever meanJ3. that

have at one time been in the hands of the enemy. Timely exploitation of such documents has often turned the tide of battle. Documents may be found almost anywhere
on the battlefiflld: on prisoners, on enemy dead, in recently won installatiOns. or
strewn about the field. These documents must be diligently searched for and, when
found, must be immediately put into the hands of competent intelligence interpreters.
All S-2 personnel must be trained to recognize the common types of enemy documents,
and every Marine must be trained to turn them in when they are found. All types of
documents may be important: medical records often have the man's unit on them.
diaries may disclose the state of enemy morale as well as his plans, torn and dirty
shreds of paper may be an operation order or a supply status report, letters from
home may be full of strategic information, even clothes may have the enemy unit

14

written on them in the lining. Of special value are enemy codes, ciphers, and other
cryptographic mater!als. These will be found on the bodies of radio operators and
signal personnel as well as in captured message centers and command posts.
b. Documents are forwarded to the rear through intelligence channels, each
successive S-2 and G-2 extracting whatever tactical information applies to his unit.
After the document is translated, which is often done at regiment, the translation
will accompany It to the rear. If the information is immediately important, a digest
can be transmitted to the appropriate commander. The document itself must always
be carefully safeguarded and handled to avoid loss or damage. No marks of any kind
should be made on the original.
c. The S-2 will find that in combat, no matter how much training has been given
to the troops, he must still personally push his document campaign. Whenever a
patrol or raid returns, he should check closely to see that no document has been
withheld or overlooked. He should frequently tour through the front lines to see if
any more documents can be found. Once, in Korea, a Marine regiment was trying to
confirm the presence of a new enemy division to its front. After a successful raid
on the enemy, some captured documents and material were forth coming, however
there was still not enough information. Several days later, the S-2 heard through
a friend that one Marine had found a sort of telescope while on the raid and was
keeping it as a souvenir. This sort of telescope, after it was examined, proved to
be a new enemy 57mm recoilless rifle sight of great interest to technical intelligence.
But even more interesting, as far as the S-2's view, was that the box in which the
instrument was packed, contained a hidden document under its silk lining. When
this was translated, it was found to list the enemy soldier's unit, all the way from
his squad to his army - finally confirming the presence of a new enemy division.

TO HELP US

KNOW OUR NMY

TURN IN ALI. DOCUMENTS
Figure 4. -

Turn In All Documents.

15

r~iS

JAPANESE
MAP

OF THE MINE FIELDS ON

PELELIU
WAS TURNEO IN BY A MEMBER OF THE ,.,
Bit 1'74 MARINES, ENABLING OUR ENGINEERS
ro SAVE rHE LIVES OF MANY MARINES.

TURN IN ALL DOCUMENTS

to .. _ ' n -:- ' "
t ......... '
"t~HO".

I'

'11.

~,.. . . .~"t.,.

_.'"

...

u" ....

U.U."Clt

.~ ..... _,~& ~

U"_fU

'U~~L'''

'YO ,~~ . ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ,

Figure 5. -

_roO.hOle_

The Japanese Map.

This is a good example of a valuable document that might have never been found
if the 3-2 had not chased down every rumor.
306. ENEMY MATERIEL

a. Another excellent source of enemy information is his materiel. There are

direct benefits from the study of enemy materiel. such as prompt developments
of effective countermeasures. prompt exploitation of new ideas for our own benefit.
deductions as to the state andlocatlonofenemy industry. speed in providing facilities
for training our troops in defense against it, and our own use of this new enemy
equipment. )l Is quite true that a good bit of this value may be considered in the
realm of strategic intelligence, and so it is, but much of it is also of immediate
tactical value.
For Instance. when a new enemy weapon is captured. complete
information can often be disseminated immediately on the capabilities of this new
ordnance and bow best to defend against it. Through the study of captured enemy
materiel such as weapons, vehicles, and aircraft, trained experts produce a great
amount of technical intelligence.
A good example of intelligence obtained from
captured enemy equipment can be found in World War II. Late in December, 1943,
the Germans introduced the pan.r.er-fauzt (German type bazooka) at a troop school
in Italy. In the following January, the weapon was first used near Cassino. During

16

the operation, a U. S. infantry regiment captured a whole case of the new rockets.
On the inside there was a sticker which gave complete information on the operation,
safety precautions, tactical employment, and effectiveness of the weapon. This
vital information was so widely and quickly disseminated that it was in the hands
of our combat troops almost before the enemy was able to train his troops in the
weapons' use. Countermeasures were developed quickly, and the weapon was later
used against the Germans. A similar case involved the recoilless rifle. An experimental German model was captured in North Africa and analyzed in the United States.
Here, its possibilities were realized, and the weapon was further developed and produced. Our combat troops were equipped with this revolutionary weapon before the
war was over while the Germans never did have its use. Besides these advantages
of the examination of enemy equipment, there are other more obscure reasons.
For instance, most pieces of manufactured equipment have factory plates on them.
These plates usually have the name of the factory and sometimes its location. This
information is of great importance to our strategic air intelligence authorities.
Furthermore, the equipment itself can be analyzed to show what kind of metal is
available to the enemy, his standards of workmanship and other facts about his
industrial machine.
b. Enemy equipment is handled initially by intelligence personnel, but usually
at regiment or higher echelons.
It is then put into the channels of the technical
service most applicable.
That is, captured enemy artillery will be evaluated by
artillery personnel, enemy explosives and engineer equipment by engineer units,
and so on as specified by division SOP. This SOP will usually prescribe a system
of tagging similar to that used with POWs. The unit which receives the captured
equipment is usually required to send a report on it to the S-2 or G-2 of its parent
organization, who disseminates the information throughout the entire force. In
this manner, the combat troops get the benefit from early examination of enemy
equipment as soon as possible. The equipment will then be evacuated to the rear
for further exploitation.
307. ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS
Enemy communications can be of great intelligence value. However, it must
be remembered that the enemy also realizes this and will take every precaution
to thwart our communication intelligence attempts. He will use codes, send dummy
or false messages, and otherwise exercise good communication security. Tbe enemy
will slip up at times, particularly during the heat of battle, and will give valuable
information about his situation. While the interception of this information is the
responsibility of higher echelon, the S-2 will do well to take it and use it to his
advantage. If the situation permits, he will evaluate it thoroughly before disseminating
it as intelligence. As the S-2 acquires knowledge of the enemy, this eValuation will
become less difficult.
308. ESCAPEES, CIVIllANS, AND REFUGEES
Long before the invasion of Normandy in WW n there was a small but steady
trickle of escaped and recovered personnel reaching Allied Headquarters in England.
Tbe majority of these were aviators who had been shot down over Europe and had
evaded capture or escaped after being captured. Because they had been traveling
in enemy territory, they were of great intelligence value. Such escapees are

17

frequently found in combat, especially in a fast-moving situation, and can often divulge
very accurate information about enemy installations, terrain, troop movements. and
the general condition of enemy forces. Care must be taken. however, not to identify
people or organizations who assisted in escape or evasion. or the enemy will take
steps to eliminate them.
Otherwise, these people and organizations will not be
available to assist other escapees or evaders.
a. Friendly guerrilla forces provided our units with a great amount of intelligence during World War IL Almost anywhere in the world today. there are people
and organizations friendly to this country. Such persons or groups could provide
the latest and best information in case of operations in their country.
b. Other types of civilians that are of great value to intelligence are the refugees
and displaced persons. Many of these people have worked on enemy fortifications
and are acquainted with the most secret of the enemy works. These individuals
often hate their former oppressors and will be eager to help the 8-2. In fact, they
are often so eager to help that they tend to exaggerate or make faulty conclusions;
their stories must he examined carefully. Of particular value to the battalion 8-2
are the latestlocations of enemy outposts. roadblocks. and checkpoints. The refugees.
who have just traveled through the enemy territory, may have good information
along this line.
c. In the Pacific, even such primitive people as the Melanesians often proved
to be excellent sources of information. Once, after a 135 mile trip by outrigger
canoe from a Japanese-held island, three Melanesian escapees reported that they
had been impressed as laborers and used to build fortifications. These natives, far
from being as stupid as their masters believed, had carefully noted the locations of
all enemy positions and emplacements. and even reported scraps of overheard
Japanese conversation. They were able to fill a large blank on the 8-2's Situation
map. In Korea, thousands of civilian refugees constantly moved south to escape the
communiSts In the early days of the Korean conflict. These people were often useless
or even dangerous, but at the same time a tremendous amount of tactical information,
often of great importance, was drawn from them.

do Warning. - Be careful of civilians on the battlefieldl The civilian Should

always be approached as if he were an enemy agent. The enemy will attempt to
infiltrate agents and guerrillas to our rear, disguised as civilian refugees. Some
agents will deliberately try to "plant" false information in our Intelligence system.
There is 00 all-embracing solution to the problem, but if care is exercised, security
regulations enforced, and counterintelligence personnel assisted in every way. the
8-2 will have done his best. Counterintelligence will be discussed in Section 9,
309. AERIAL IMAGERY
One of the first recorded attempts of a commander to supplement his blgh ground
advantage occurred In our own Civil War, when an observation balloon was launched
to the dizzying belgbt of 800 feettospy on Yankee gunboats moving through the inland
waterways and rivers of the Carolinas. After this breakthrough, it was a natural
evolution from the employment of aerial observers to airborne cameras. The
advent of the airplane provided aerial photography to both sides in WW L During
WW 11 aerial pbotography was very highly developed and photos were literally taken

18

by the millions. Although equipment and techniques have been vastly improved
since WW II, we still must have a basic platform capable of carrying cameras over
the enemy, to bring back to the commander and his staff a graphic record of the
situation.
a. Aerial imagery. as it is now called, has two main purposes: to supplement the
existing maps of the area and to provide up-to-date information on the enemy.
How much imagery a battalion S-2 will receive depends on how much is received by
division; but he should have enough to work on himself. brief the staff, and send
enough to his infantry companies so that patrol and platoon commanders can at least
study them.

b. Interpretation of aerial imagery is broken down in phases. First phase

interpretation looks for important tactical information only. like the location of
enemy trenches, fortifications. and areas of activity. Second phase interpretation
does more detalled work: the type and caliber of enemy weapons and their lanes of
fire. barbed wire or minefields, and enemy command posts. Third phase interpretation is even more detailed and can be used to compose exact terrain studies and
advanced studies of towns orfortifiedpositions. Imagery interpretation will normally
take place at the division/wing level, MEU/MEB level, by the immediate imagery
interpretation center (lIIC). This center is a pool of all imagery interpreters. that
until recently were scattered in the battalions and regiments. Pooling of interpreters in the Imagery Interpretation Center at higher headquarters adjacent to
processing facilities will assure them better utilization and permit better. faster.
more complete interpretation of imagery.
310. MAPS AND TERRAIN MODElS
Maps constitute the basic source of information used by the intelligence officer
in making terrain estimates. topographic studies. and hydrographic studies.
a. Accurate knowledge of terrain is a must for the S-2. He should know the
ground, backward and forward, so that its influence on the enemy can be studied.
Let us say that the enemy is showing signs of attacking a friendly position, and the
artillery forward observer asks the S-2 what routes the enemy will probably use,
so that concentrations can be prepared. If the S-2 knows that enemy tactics prescribe
the use of flank attack. he can, by careful map study (if no time is available for
personal reconnalssance), render the most likely routes of enemy approach. The
S-2's knowledge of his terrain is very important, and it is good mapping that supplies
a great percentage of his knowledge and that of the command. As he is responsible
for map requirements; the S-2 must be familiar with the status of their supply within
the battalion and antiCipate future needs.
b. Terrain models can be built with little effort in a sandbox. and a little imaginative effort can provide realistic details such as houses, trees. streams. and roads.
Such hastily constructed models will be of great value in static situations and for
the planning and briefing of special missions such as assault of fortified areas and
other operations of special difficulty. If more time is available. a detailed terrain
model can be built using plaster of Paris from medical stocks and painted to such
accuracy that squad patrols can be planned from it. The Germans used such a model
in their planning and briefing for the attack of the Belgium Liege Fort in 1940.

19

In conjunction with good intelligence, the model supplied so much information, and
the Germans briefed their troops so thoroughly, that one of the strongest forts in
Europe fell to their assault within hours. The battalion S-2 could do well to realize
the benefits of good briefing and the aid to planning that a simple sandbox terrain
model can afford.

311. ENEMY ACTIVITY

There are many times when the S-2 will find himself without any way of obtaining
enemy information through his usual sources. Dueto a lull at the front and increased
enemy security, there may be no prisoners. Due to poor weather, imagery may not
be available and aerial observers may not fly. How can the intelligence officer
form an estimate in this situation? The answer is that the S-2 will have to analyze
shrewdly the enemy's detectable activity.
Sometimes this can suffice by itself,
even though it is a most incomplete and doubtful method. One of the best sources of
such information is the enemy artillery activity. Is he firing a generally defensive
fire, mostly against our weapons, and harassing fire deep in our sector? Or is he
softening up our lines? All activity should be considered. Is there any tank activity
seen? Has his patrolling become more aggressive? Each enemy action can tell the
alert S-2 something, and the intelligence officer must examine every report about
the enemy activity with a critical and analytical view. In an insurgency situation,
such as in South Vietnam where there has been an insurrection against the constituted
government, the intelligence officer must consider political, economic, psychological
and civic action factors in addition to military and paramilitary activities. Some of
the indications would be anti -government rallies and demonstrations, assassination
of local officials, and destruction of schools. All of these would probably be accompanied by a reluctance on the part of the populace to be cooperative with friendly
forces.
Indications of enemy courses of action will be discussed in more detail
later, but the student should realize at this point that analysis of the enemy's detectable activity alone can often give him invaluable aid in working out the enemy
picture.
312. SUMMARY
In this section, the student has been presented with a partial set of tools. By
no means is the list complete, but the common sources, the ones most likely to
be found in the field, have been listed. No one source can be said to be the best or
the most accurate, as the combat situation wiUdictate which one may be more useful
in a particular area at a particular time. If a group of experienced S-2s were asked
which source supplied them with the most information, some would answer prisoners,
some documents, some photographs, and some would say that it varied in different
operations.
The S-2 must know that the information that he needs is available to
him through these sources; it is up to him to see that these sources are exploited.

20

SECTION 4., COLLECTION MEANS AND AGENCIES

401. GENERAL

The sources information have been discussed in the preceding section.

The
student is now ready to learn how the enemy information reaches the S-2. It is obvious
that the S-2 cannot be everywhere simultaneously. Interpreting aerial imagery,
translating documents. observing enemy action. and presenting estimates to his
commander. Thus. he must depend to a large extent on other means and agencies
to collect the information that he needs. It is these means and agencies. along with
the prinCiples governing their employment. which will be discussed in this section.
402. OBSERVATION POSTS

a. Capabilities and Limitations. - Observation posts are capable of providing

visual coverage of a considerable area with a minimum of personnel. They are able
to render detailed reports of events occurring within their sectors of observation.
They are also capable of recounting a sequence of events and of recognizing the
relationship existing between various occurrences. With appropriate communications
they can rapidly report what they have observed and are responsive to requests
for additional information. The present limitation is the reliance on human vision.
which is subject to interference by darkness. fog. heavy rain or snowfall. smoke,
vegetation, and terrain. However. night observation devices, such as the starlight
scopes and infrared emitters, are proving effective in reducing this interference.
A laCk of skill or alertness on the part of the observer may also be a limiting factor.
Another llmitation is the passive nature of the observation post; its personnel do not
actively seek out information but are restricted to observing activity which is visible
from the single position.
b. Selection of Observation Post Positions. -

(See fig. 6.)

(1) Desirable Characteristics. Observation posts should be located on

ground which affords the optimum visual coverage of the key area. If possible,
good natural concealment should be available; otherwise. the position should be well
camouflaged. Covered routes of approach from friendly positions are highly desirable in order that necessary traffic may move undetected.

(2) Location with Re~pect to Friendly Positions. - Complete visual coverage

of a unit's area of responsibility is usually desired. although consideration must be
given to the coordinate capabilities of other information gathering means. Within
this general criterion. and based on the size of the area and the configuration of the
terrain. observation posts may be located either within or at a distance from friendly
positions. If locations within or just outside of friendly positions will satisfy requirements, they are preferable, since they provide greater security for the observation
post. are easier to maintain, and promote ease of reporting.
(3) Method of Selection. - During his personal reconnaissance the commander
will note locations which afford good observation. He may also direct certain subordinates, including the S-2. to make recommendations concerning observation post
locations based on their reconnaissance. The terrain is then analyzed, and, based
on the desired coverage, the number and general locations of observation posts are
determined.
The observer team assigned to a given observation post makes the

21

Figure 6. -

Selection of Observation Post Positions and Sectors of Observation.

detailed selection of the position from which it can best observe its assigned area.
The location is plotted as precisely as possible and is recorded for use as a reference
point.
c. Selection of Observation Post Personnel. - 1\0 specific provision Is made
in ;\larine infantry tables of organization for ground observer personnel except for
the six privates who serve as scout/radar operators and two privates who serve
as scout drivers in the intelligence section of the infantry battalion. In practice.

22

however, each infantry unit normally establishes a primary observation post utilizing
personnel from the unit headquarters.
In most cases, additional trained ground
observer personnel are available in the forward observer and gunfire spotter teams
organic to, or assigned to, the unit. "''hile these personnel are primarily interested
in gathering information for use in providing fire support, they also will observe
much that is of value to the Infantry unit; and their skill and experience should be
utilized in the overall observation system. However, in order to provide the degree
of visual coverage normally desired, additional observer personnel will be required.
These :\larines, selected from organic troop personnel, should be well trained in
map reading, use of the compass, and the method of systematically scanning a sector
or area.
They should also be thoroughly familiar with enemy organization and
equipment. Sufficient personnel should be located at each observation post to assure
continuous and efficient observation with due consideration of the tedious nature
of the work. However, inordertoreduce the possibility of disclosure of the pOSition,
only the minimum number of personnel required should be used. As few as three
men may be sufficient.
d. Planning for Establishing Observation Posts. - Initial planning is concerned
with determining the degree of coverage desired and the selection of observation
post locations.
Concurrent consideration is given to other information gathering
means to be employed, since these may affect the number and locations of observation
posts. Once observation post locations are selected, sectors of observation are
determined. These often will be dictated by terrain configuration, but in open terrain lateral limits are established, based on the area an observer or observer team
can effectively keep under observation. Requirements for special equipment, particularly observation aids and communication equipment, are determined. Reporting
times and procedures are established. In this respect, specific items of information
which are required are determined and announced. This is important, since even
the best trained observer can note only part of what occurs in his sector, and his
efforts must be directed. Again, this must not cause neglect in reporting all observations. The use of regular reporting times serves as a communication check
and also serves to note the absence of observable events, which in itself may be
Significant. Use of a standard report form which includes such items as time and
duration of observation, azimuth, range reference points and description of the event
observed, is also helpful in ensuring a complete report and providing a ready
reference to previous reports. (See fig. 7.)
e. Operation of Observation Posts. - Each observer team makes the detailed
selection and preparation of its position. If possible, this is completed prior to
enemy contact or under cover of darkness. :'>laximum use is made of cover and concealment or camouflage, and strict light and noise diSCipline is maintained. T:!'affic
to and from the position is held to a minimum. Observation posts are high priority
targets and every effort nrust be made to prevent disclosure of their positions.
Observation posts may be manned continuously. or only during daylight hours, with
the personnel establishing listening posts at night. In addition to fixing the location
of the observation post, reference points throughout the sector of observation are
selected and plotted to promote ease of reporting observations. The observation
post is equipped with a compass or aiming circle. map, aerial imagery binoculars
or telescope. radiO and/or wire communications, and such other equipment as will
facilitate observing and reporting. For security and reliability, primary reliance
is placed on wire communications. Continuous observation is maintained over the

23

GROUND OBSERVER'S REPORT

:<:0.
OP :<:0.

LOCATlO" _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ C:\lT

D,HE A:<:D

IT!::}!

Tl~!E:

Tl)!E

,,0.
1

TO _ _ _ _ _ _ "COIC _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

OBJECTS OBSERI'ED

LOCATiO:,\;

AZ
I)tt!:

FRO)!

II

RA:<:C;E
~uu

ph..

REF. PT

HOW

~tA~Y~

DOI:<:G WH.AT":'

5 tanks movioj.!' in:')

ass}' area

P.EPflRTEl)
WHO~ WHE~

S.::;,

-:

TO
HOW:

(1 .. 11)

r;Hl10

Figure 7. -

Ground Observer's Report Form.

assigned sector and individual observers within the team are changed frequently
for the greatest efficiency.
f. Historical Examples.
(1) Before the Russian attack in the Lemberg- Pizemysk sector in June of
1914, German observation posts were able to observe daily trains moving behind
the Russian front. Those going north were loaded, partly with tanks; those going
south were empty. Supplemented by the interrogation of Soviet POWs, tms ground
observation established the fact that the Soviet 38th Army and the Soviet 4th Armored
Army were being moved into the northern sector. This was particularly important
because the movement had not been reported by German air reconnaissance.

(2) Another clever use of the observation post in the collection of information
is illustrated by the following incident. In January, 19-15, an infantry regiment was
to attack from Malmedy. Smoke screens were laid along the front at speCified
locations in conjunction with small probing attacks. The observation posts were
advised of this planned action and instructed to observe and record the location of
the enemy prepared artillery and IT.'rtar concentrations. This was accomplished
and the reports were consolidated by the S-2. When the regiment attacked, enemy
observed fire was neutralized by our artillery fire laid on the enemy OPS. As the
enemy was forced to rely on his prepared concentrations, the infantry was able to
avoid the enemy fire and take the objective without a casualty in one of the neatest
regimental operations of the war.
(3) On the second morning of the battle of EI Guettar, in the North African
Campaign, a forward observer from the 60th Field Artillery noticed some strange
activity on a road to his front. The road ran across some low hills in enemy territory. A group of five or six men were seen moving along this road, every now and
then stooping over to do something, then moving on. The range of observation was
SO great that it was impossible to determine whether the men were German soldiers
or Arabs. They did not appear to be carrying anything. and the observer presumed
that they were Arabs looting the bodies that lay along the road. After this had been
going on for about an hour, it was finally reported to higher headquarters. although
the incident seemed too trivial to be of interest. Nevertheless, the report reached
the S-2 and was carefully examined in the light of other information already on hand.
What did the report mean?
Was the enemy mining the road or was he removing
mines? Probably neither as the report said that the men did not seem to be carrying
anything. However. intelligence knew that the road was probably mined, as it fitted
in with German tactical doctrine and the particular terrain. The most probable
solution, then. was that the Germans were arming mines that had been previously
laid.
This action would indicate that the enemy no longer desired the use of the
road and was preparing to withdraw. This estimate proved to be correct as the
Germans did execute a general withdrawal shortly after the inCident, showing again
the necessity of accurate and complete reporting and, at the same time. the value
of an observation post.
403. LISTEXING POSTS
a. Capabilities and Limitations. Listening posts are capable of gathering
information by the identification of sounds and by limited visual observation. They

25

may be limited in their perceptiveness by weather or by battlefield conditions which

produce a large volume of background noise. It is difficult to determine accurately
the range and direction of distant noises, except by electronic means, such as
seismic intrusion devices. Another limitation is the element of interpretation produced at the reporting level. since the listener must decide the identity of noises
heard.
b. Selection of Listening Post Positions. - Listening posts are established at
night and during other periods of reduced visibility. Since they rely primarily on
sound rather than vision to obtain information. they are not necessarily related to
commanding ground as is the case Witb observation posts , but rather to likely avenues
of approach and other logical routes of movement. otherwise, the criteria for
selection of observation posts apply also to the selection of positions for listening
posts. (See fig. 8.)
c. Selection of Listening Post Personnel. - The same general requirements
for observation post personnel apply to the selection of personnel for listening posts.
An additional requirement is the ability to identify and determine the significance
of various noises such as those oftank engines and truck motors. Personnel assigned
to observation posts during the daytime may also be used to occupy listening posts
at night, prOViding due consideration Is given to the continuing requirements for a
high degree of alertness in both activities.
d. Planning the Establishment of Listening Posts. - Since it is neither practicable nor desirable to cover a large area with a complex system of numerous listening
posts, discrimination in planning is necessary. A thorough study of the terrain and
enemy dispositions will indicate the locations at which listening posts may be employed
profitably. EmploymentofUsteningpostsmustbecoordinated with the use of surveillance devices, which have their greatest application during the same periods in
which listening posts are utilized.
Information requirements are determined in
order that guidance may be gIven to the listening posts as to the types of noises
which will have the greatest Significance. Provision is made for the listening post
personnel to become familiar with the terrain and the enemy situation prior to
occupying their positions.
As is the case With observation posts, provisions are
made for special equipment and for establishing reporting times and procedures.
e. Operation of Listening Posts. - The method of operation for a listening post
is similar to that for an observation post. The listening post personnel make the
detailed selection and preparation of their position, emphasizing light and noise
discipline. Because of the possibility of enemy patrols operating near the listening
post, activity is kept to aminimum,anda means of communication is employed which
is least likely to be detected by the enemy. Wire communications are preferable.
Reports generally will be limited to the type of sound noted and the estimated range
and bearing. Where possible and applicable, estimates should also be made of the
quantities, types, and nature of activity of such objects as tanks and vehicles. In
some cases visual observation may be possible due to proximity of the activity,
natural or artificial illumination, or light emission by the source.
f. Use of Surveillance Devices. - Surveillance by the human eye is limited by
the perceptibility of a given object, the distance between the viewer and the object,
and tbe prevailing visibility conditions.
Various types of equipment have been

26

\'

//

I,

I,
'I

(b)

!I

il
'I

"'""'\..

Figure 8. -

'.

lDcation of Listening Posts,

27

developed to assist in overcoming these limitations. Electronic devices are available in the Marine Corps to detect phenomena which cannot be seen by the human
eye such as heat and radiation; to extend the range of surveillance; and to penetrate
fog, haze, and darkness, which limit vision. Development is continuing in this field.
Information concerning capabilities, limitations, and employment of surveillance
devices currently available may be found in appropriate classified publications.
g. Historical Example. - During the Saipan operation. listening posts of the
6th Marines heard enemy tanks moving across their front. These listening posts
turned in accurate reports.
Listening posts of the 2d Marines also reported the
route followed by enemy tanks to their front. Based upon an analysis of the terrain
and the positions reported. the CO, 6th Marines, deployed his antitank weapons.
permitted the enemy tanks to enter his position and took them under fire at the
most opportune time. Due to alert listening posts. prompt reporting, and proper
control of antitank weapons. the enemy tanks were destroyed.
404. GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADAR
a. General. The S-2 has primary staff supervision over the tactical employment of the ground surve1llance radar. The S-2 determines how the radar will
be employed; that is. its general location. area of surveillance. type of surveillance
to be conducted (scan. search, or monitor). how and when information is to be reported, and the frequency of coverage desired. He also coordinates closely with
the S-3 and FSC in the overall integration of use of ground surveillance radar in
the battalion's ground surveillance plan. which also includes patrols. observation
posts. listening posts. and other sensory devices.
b. Capabilities and Limitations. - The Ground surveillance radar is capable
of searching for and detecting moving targets in any direction. The set provides
an all-weather, day-and-night combat condition surveillance capability. It is also
useful during periods of limited visibility. such as haze, fog, smoke, dust. and clouds.
It provides a more accurate range and azimuth reading than is possible by eye
estimate. The principle limitation is extreme terrain. Terrain which will mask
normal observation, will also mask the radar beam. The identification of targets
is made by an audio response which is not highly descriptive and it depends to a
great extent on the operator's training and experience. Radar equipment now in test
stage will soon improve present capabilities.
405. PATROLUNG
a. General. While patrolling has long served as a primary method of obtaining information, increased emphasis is placed upon this means under conditiOns
of modern ground combat which emphasize mobility and rapid movement over large
areas. Military operations in a counterinsurgency role also put a premium on extensive patrolling. In situations where wide separation between units exists, it
will be necessary for patrols to operate at relatively great distances from friendly
positions in order to adequately cover assigned areas of responsibility. In situations
where the enemy is moving frequently and rapidly, patrols can assist in finding and
fixing him. For our purposes, we will conSider only the capabilities and limitations
of the various types of patrols. A complete discussion of all aspects of patrol operations may be found in other appropriate texts, such as FMFM 6-4. Marine Rifle
Company/Platoon and FMFM 6-5. Marine Rifle Squad.

28

b. Classification.
(1) Patrols are classified according to their means of movement as follows:
(a) Foot patrols.
(b) Helicopter patrols.
(c) Motorized (including mechanized patrols.)
(2) Patrols also may be classified according to the general type of mission
for which they are employed.
(a) Reconnaissance Patrols are employed to gather information about the
enemy, terrain, or resources, and to verify or confirm information previously
received. They rely on stealth and fight only when necessary to accomplish the mission or to protect themselves.
There are two general types of reconnaissance.

1 Point Reconnaissance. - Your commander may require information

about a specific location or small specific area, usually a known position or activity.
Your patrol secures this information by reconnoitering the location or by maintaining
surveillance over the location.

Area Reconnaissance. - Your commander may require information

about an extended area, or may desire information of certain locations within an
extended area.
Your patrol secures this information by reconnoitering the area,
maintaining surveillance over the area, or by making the point reconnaissance of
a series of locations within the area.
(b) Combat Patrols are employed to destroy or capture personnel, installations, equipment, or documents. Such action is ordinarily followed by a withdrawal
as it is not intended that they remain permanently at the positions they seize or
occupy. The ultimate purpose of a combat patrol may be the obtaining of information
through capture of enemy personnel, equipment, or documents; but regardless of
the type of mission, the patrol will report any information concerning the enemy,
terrain, or resources acquired incidental to the accomplishment of that mission.
Combat patrols are further categorized by the specific tasks assigned: raid, ambush,
harassing, mop-up and security patrols.
c. Planning. Thorough planning for patrol operations facilitates effective
coverage with minimum expense in terms of personnel and effort. Patrols should
be assigned specific missions. The assignment of vague and indefinite "see what
you can see" missions is wasteful in time and manpower and does not produce
effective results. An initial planning consideration involves comparison of patrol
capabilities with other information-gathering means to ensure that patrolling is the
most effective means for obtaining the desired information. Pertinent also is the
decision as to the portion ofthe overall strength of the unit to be utilized in patrolling,
ensuring that combat effectiveness is not seriously reduced. This consideration
assumes great importance in view of the increased patrol requirements characteristic
of dispersed warfare. Detailed analysis of each mission assists in keeping manpower requirements low. The exact items of information desired are determined,

29

and previous knowledge of the enemy and terrain is employed to plan patrol routes
which offer the greatest possibility of success. These means, coupled with the use
of stealth by all patrols, hold the requirements for personnel for patrols to a minimum. The ultimate success is the proper execution of the patrol planning steps.
d. Historical Examples.
(1) "Send ye men up in the land beyond Jordan to spy out the ways thereof,
the goings and comings of the people, the wines and honeys of the land." This
quotation may well be the first recorded reconnaissance mission; it was issued by
:\-loses 15()() years before Christ and shows that the value of good reconnaissance
was no less then than now.
(2) The importance of detailed reporting by patrols is pointed out by the
pre-D-day reconnaissance of Yellow beaches on Tinian. In this situation the only
indication of prepared defenses was a Single row of antiboat mines. An amphibious
reconnaissance party was landed at night for the purpose of ascertaining any additional defenSive preparations on the part of the defender. The detailed report
prepared by the reconnaissance party indicated a strong, well-camouflaged line of
pill boxes and prepared rifle positions within the embankment behind the beaches.
As a result of this report the amphibious troop commander selected the alternate
beaches, which were not properly defended, for the initial assault.

406. FOOT PATROLS

a. General. - With respect to means of locomotion, the most common type of
patrol and that having the Widest applications is the foot patrol. Since the only major
requirement is personnel, foot patrolling lies within the immediate capability of
any size or type of organization. Figure 9 shows a foot patrol route with the control
or cheCk points along the route which will assist in monitoring the location and progress of the patrol.
b. Capabilities.
(1) Foot patrols can traverse almost any type of terrain under varying conditions of weather and visibility. They are not bound to existing roads or trails.
Extremely rough terrain, waterways. or dense vegetation will impede, but will
seldom preclude, the movement of a determined foot patrol. Snow, rain, fog. darkness, and other conditions of reduced visibility may aid a trained patrol by providing
concealment.
(2) Since foot patrols actually traverse the terrain between friendly positions
and the objective, they are able to make a detailed inspection and report on the terrain
covered, to include cultural features and enemy positions to the extent that they can
be observed. Equipment can be provided the patrol to permit the obtaining of information in such detailed form as sketches. photographs, and measurements.
Radio permits rapid reporting of collected information of immediate nature.

(3) Of the various types of patrols ,foot patrols are ordinarily least susceptible
to enemy detection and counteraction. They are able to make use of minimal cover
and concealment. are not restricted to easily negotiated routes, and involve no bulky

30

.~.

OBJECTIVE

. -.: ... _.

FINISH

Figure 9. -

Foot Patrol Route With Check Points to Control Movements.

31

noise-producing equipment.
detection devices.

They present a small and elusive target for various

c. limitations.
(1) Foot patrols comprise the most time consuming means of patrolling under
most circumstances since they are limited to the speed of a man on foot. This limitation is diminished to a certain extent by their ability to follow a direct route crosscountry.
(2) In order to operate within enemy positions. foot patrols must pass through
areas under enemy control and must evade his security. Every effort is made in
planning to provide for the patrol to avoid enemy positions. but the patrol is left
largely to its own devices once it departs friendly positions.
(3) Foot patrols are limited as to the types and amounts of equipment they
can carry. In this respect consideration must be given not only to the carrying
capability of the individual. but also to the restrictions on speed and freedom of
movement imposed by bulky or heavy loads. This consideration is especially important when it is desired that enemy equipment be captured and brought back by
the patrol.
407. MOTORIZED (INCLUDING MECHANIZED) PATROLS

a. General. Motorized patrols are effective in covering large areas associated with dispersed warfare. They are a necessary component of the mechanized or motorized force. whose means of reconnaissance must be at least as fast and
mobile as the force itself. Most motorized patrols are for reconnaissance purposes
which are categorized by type as route. zone. or area reconnaissance. (See fig. 10.)
However. a mounted combat patrol may prove effective in mopping-up operations.
Any type of vehicle can be used - jeeps. trucks. tanks. and landing vehicles. The
jeep-tank combination is a flexibile arrangement. with larger trucks included when
greater carrying capacity is required. Landing vehicles. traCked. may be employed
when terrain considerations are clearly favorable. when the need for lightly armored
personnel carriers is indicated. and when to do so will not interfere with the primary
employment of the vehicle.
b. Capabilities.
(1) Motorized patrols have good speed on roads but limited cross-country
mobility. Judicious selection of the type vehicle to be used will permit operations
in the less rugged types of terrain. but usually with a corresponding loss of speed.
(2) A considerable amount of supplies and equipment can be carried. which
contribules to the conduct of extended patrol operations. and facilitates return of
captured personnel. information, and equipment.
(3) Time requirements for accomplishing a given mission are usually less
than for foot patrols.
(4) A highly developed communication system allows rapid reporting of information over relatively long ranges.

32

ROUTE
(ROUTE OF AIl'JANCE _

COOITRCUlNG TERRAIN FEAT\.I!ES AFfECTING IT ARE RECONNOITEREDl

/
I

/
'--(PROPOSED ASSEMBLY AREA _

AREA

-_/

(PI!(J'()SO ASSEMBLY AREA)

EXTERNAL TERRUI FEAlURES AFFECTING IT

Figure 10. -

ARE

I!!!iO!!NQ!TERED

Types of Motorized Patrolling.

33

(5) Speed. armor. and armament can assist in evading or overcoming enemy
reaction. While motorized and mechanized patrols are more susceptible to hostile
detection than foot patrols. the aforementioned advantages may compensate. in part.
for this limitation.
(6) They can operate in contaminated areas too dangerous for dismounted
patrols.
c. Umitations.
(1) Cross-country mobility is limited by the terrain and by certain types
of vegetation. A careful terrain study should be made prior to deciding to employ
motorized or mechanized patrols. Since vehicular operations are sensitive to the
quality of the road net.
(2) Bad weather and limited visibility or darkness decrease speed and mobility.
Unless good all-weather roads are available heavy precipitation may make vehicular
movement impracticable.
(3) Continuous movement is dependent on logistic support. Extended operations
distant from frtendly positions require provisions for maintenance and resupply of
fuel.
(4) Vehicles are susceptible to detection due to noise. size. and dust created.
They are readily detectable both visually and aurally and present a good target for
detection devices.
This reduces the possibilities of stealth and surprise. which
are desired for most patrol activities.
(5) Obstacles. both natural and artificial. impede motorized movement. In
some cases blown bridges. cratered roads. or minefields may prevent such patrols
from moving over desired routes. Bridges. defiles. roadblocks. and other likely
ambush sites must be reconnoitered by foot prior to passage of the vehicles. with a
corresponding impediment to the movement of the patrol.
408. HEUCOPTER PATROlS
a. General. The most pronusmg means of accomplishing the extensive
patrolling over large areas which is required by dispersed warfare lies in the use
of the helicopter. While helicopter patrolling offers many advantages. it does not
replace. but rather supplements other types of patrolling.
b. Capabilities.
(1) Helicopter patrols are largely unrestricted by terrain since the helicopter
is capable of flying over features which would be obstacles to foot or motor movement.
Even where suitable landing points are non-existent the patrol can often be discharged from the hovering helicopter.
(2) The helicopter can usually deliver the patrol very near to its objective.
(3) Since it is possible to fly over or around enemy positions. the dangers
involved in passing through such poSitions are greatly reduced.

34

(4) Helicopters are capable of operating under most conditions of weather

and visibility; navigational aids are steadily being developed to increase this capability.
When observation from the air is not a major consideration, weather and
visibility will seldom limit use of the helicopter by patrols.
(5) The speed of the helicopter can be utilized to reduce the time required
to accomplish a given mission or to increase the number of missions or the distance
or area covered.
(6) A well developed, long-range communication system inherent to the
helicopter permits rapid reporting over long distances.
(7) Patrols of various sizes and compositions may be matched by helicoptf't'S
of varying capacities.
c. Limitations.
(1) Helicopters are vulnerable to ground and air attack. Their basic character
offers little protection: but experience has shown that, except for a limited number
of vital parts, the helicopter can withstand a number of hits. However, its lack of
armor may result in occupants becoming casualties even though the aircraft itself
is not shot down. Its vulnerability is largely offset by its speed and maneuverability
with respect to ground attack, and by its maneuverability and ability to operate at
low altitude With respect to air attack.
(2) Loss of a helicopter in some cases Will result in failure to accomplish
the mission of the patrol. If the entire patrol is transported in a single helicopter,
the loss of that helicopter may mean that no member of the patrol survives to accomplish or to report on the mission.
7

(3) Certain weather conditions (high winds and heavy rainstorms) may limit
the use of helicopters for patrolling.
If observation from the air is important,
visibility conditions (fog, haze, and snow) may also be a limiting factor.
(4) Secrecy and surprise may be lost due to noise, dust, and hostile observation of the helicopter itself. This limitation can be offset to some extent by careful
selection of landing points and by lOW-level flight, which takes advantage of terrain
and vegetation.
(5) Observation is restricted except from the cockpit. This limits the number
of patrol personnel who may observe while in flight, thereby diminishing coverage
and making it more difficult to keep all members of the patrol oriented with respect
to the ground.
(6) Lift capability of the helicopter varies, based on such factors as weather,
altitude, and fuel load. Planning must be flexible enough to permit ready adaptation
to the circumstances existing at the actual time of the lift.
d. Forms of Helicopter Patrolling.
(1) Helicopter as a Means of Patrol Transportation. - Helicopter patrolling
may involve the use of the helicopter as a means of transporting the patrol to a

35

departure point, whence it will proceed to accomplish its mission by patrol operations on the ground. The helicopter may lift the patrol both to and from its destination
or only one way, with the patrol using other means of covering the remaining portion
of its route. This method Is employed to move the patrol over difficult terrain,
over or around enemy positions, or solely in order to reduce the time required to
accomplish the mission. This employment of the helicopter is applicable to both
reconnaissance and combat patrols. (See fig. 11.)
(a) In the case of the raid, surprise and shock effect are enhanced by the
rapidity of movement to the objective and the decrease in the possibility of ground
contact prior to reaching the objective. A great variety of weapons and equipment,
up to the lift capability of the helicopter employed, can accompany the raiding patrol.
The helicopter permits the conduct of larger raids, deeper into enemy territory, and
with less likelihood of detection and interference en-route, than is feasible by other
means of movement.
(b) The helicopter has only limited application to combat patrols involving
ambushes because of the necessity for careful selection and preparation of the
position and the relatively long periods of remaining in concealment normal to the
ambush. However, information may become available which would allow prediction
of the location of a lucrative target for an ambush sufficiently in advance to permit
an ambush patrol to be moved by helicopter to a suitable poSition nearby.
(c) The helicopter is especially Suitable for the transportation of mop-up
patrols. Since there is usually a large area involved and since targets are generally
of a fleeting nature, rapidity of action is essential. Reports of sigbtings of enemy
groups can be exploited promptly by belicopter borne mop-up patrols.
(2) Patrolling From the Air. - When the area to be observed on the ground
is difficult to traverse, when time is not available for a ground reconnaissance, or
when great distances are involved, the helicopter maybe used to patrol from the air.
(3) Air-Ground Patrolling. - The most effective use of the helicopter for
reconnaissance patrOlling may involve a combination of the two previously described
forms. In this case the patrol observes the designated route or area from the air
and lands at selected points for a more thorough ground reconnaissance. (See fig.
12.)

409. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE

Beyond the organic capability of the Marine ground commander, but available
to assist him in gathering information, are extensive Marine aviation facilities.
These have the effect of extending the range and scope of the reconnaissance and
surveillance effort, as well as reducing the time factors involved. Aerial means
inClude visual observation by trained observers in specially configured aircraft,
visual observation by combat pilots in high performance aircraft, aerial imagery
and electronic emission gathering equipment.
410. VISUAL A1R OBSERVATION

VIsual air observation can be accomplished either by trained observers or by

combat pilots. In the former case, specially configured aircraft are normally

36

--

HELICOPTER DELIVERS
PATROL TO STARTING
POINT OF GROUND

RECONNAISSANCE
HELICOPTER
RETURNS
PATROL FROM
PICK UP
POINT

HELICOPTER
PIO:S UP

PATROL FOLLOWING
FOOT RECONNAISSNKE

Figure 11. -

Use of the Helicopter as a Means of Transporting a Patrol.

37

Figure 12. - Air-Ground Patrolling Showing Areas Assigned for Coverage,

Helicopter Routes, and Landing Points for Ground Reconnaissance.

38

employed under circumstances where there is a close working relationship between

the observer and the supported ground unit. In the latter case the information
gathering is usually incident to the execution of other combat missions.

a. The Employment of Observers and Utility Helicopters.

(1) Observers. The present tables of organization provide for 10 air
observers in the G-2 section of a Marine division, consisting of 1 major, 2 captains,
and 7 lieutenants. In addition, the headquarters battery of the artillery regiment
has an artillery air observer section of 1 captain and 8 lieutenants. Although the
primary mission of the latter is target location and spotting, they may also perform
general aerial observation missions.
(2) Aircraft. The Marine observation squadron (VMO) is equipped with
utility helicopters and OV-I0-A aircraft. The tasks for which this squadron is
equipped include visual observation, limited photography, and electronic surveillance
(radiological surveys) for support of ground components of the landing force. This
squadron works closely with the air observers.
(3)

Capabilities.

(a) The speed and range of observation aircraft permits coverage of a large
area in a relatively short period of time. Similarly. a specific location or a fleeting
target can be checked rapidly.
(b) Aerial observation is little affected by terrain. Areas which are difficult
to traverse on the ground usually pose no problem to viewing from the air. In addition.
the aircraft generally can be maneuvered into a position which affords effective
observation.
(c) A highly developed communication system permits rapid reporting of
information obtained.
(d) The ability to fly slowly at low altitudes permits relatively close inspection of the terrain. This feature. combined with good communications, permits
atr observers to work closely with ground forces. faCilitating their movements and
providing early warning of enemy activities.
(e) Trained observers are skilled in recognizing terrain and cultural
features, enemy activities, and installations in the face of natural concealment or
camouflage.
(f) By on-station relief, observation can be maintained fore:dended periods
of time. Likewise, moving targets can be tracked for some distance.

(4) Limitations.
(a) Severe weather conditions may prevent helicopters from flying. Periods
of reduced visibility will reduce effective observation.
(h) Observation helicopters are vulnerable to both air and ground fires.
Close approach to enemy forces presents danger not only from antiaircraft weapons

39

but from small arms as well. However, the ability to take rapid evasive action at
low altitudes reduces the vulnerability to both ground and air attack.
411. AERIAL IMAGERY
An Important element of the information gathering effort is aerial imagery
which is generally available to the ground commander at all echelons. Imagery
requests are usually a matter of standing operating procedure and include such
information as the following: type of imagery (whether vertical, oblique, blackand-white fllm, color film, camouflage detection film, etc.); scale (the larger the
scale desired, the more photos required to cover a given area); location of target
(boundaries of area, coordinates for pinpoint targets, start and finish of strips);
time (date and time of day it is desired that photos be taken); usage (whether to be
used for photomap construction, water depth determination, etc.); numbers and
types of prints; and delivery instructions (how, where, and to whom to deliver, and
deadline time after which imagery is of no value).

a. Organization. - Utilization of aerial imagery requires photographic aircraft, reproduction facilities, and Imagery interpreters. The Marine composite
reconnaissance squadron (VMCJ) is presently equipped With photographic aircraft
and multi-sensor electronic-reconnaissance aircraft. It is capable of providing all
types of standard imagery coverage and a reporduction capability. Additional reproduction facilities are available in the service company, headquarters battalion,
Marine division. In addition to the VMCJ squadron, hand-held cameras are available for use from helicopters and observation aircraft. The Marine division air
observers are provided with hand-held cameras in order to supplement their observations and to provide rapid spot photo coverage. Imagery Interpretation Teams
are located at force division and wing headquarters. Elements of these teams can
be made available to a MEU or MEB if necessary. Pooling of interpreters at
higher headquarters rear processing facilities assures better use of them and provides faster, more complete interpretation.
b. Types of Coverage.
(1) Conventional Frame Photography.
(al Vertical. - Vertical photograpbs are taken With the axis of the camera
perpendicular to the ground, Some of the types of verticals are: pin point vertical
which is one exposure of a predetermined area. When three pin points are taken in
overlap sequence, they are called stereo-triplets and provide stereoscopic vieWing
of the area covered by the middle exposure; single strip verticals may be taken for
general or detailed study of rail lines, beaches, roads, or any feature that lends
Itself to straight line conformation; split verticals are two simultaneously exposed
vertical strips, taken side by side, with a small amount of side overlap; stereo
vertical coverage involves a series of parallel overlapping vertical strips which
can be made up Into a mosaic for detailed study of an area or can be often used as
a map substitute.
(b) Oblique. Oblique photographs are those taken with the axis of the
camera at any depression angle except the vertical or 90 degrees. These photographs come in two general types: high obliques and low obliques. High obliques

40

include the horizon while low obliques show only the earth's surface. For general
orientation purposes the high obliques are better because they show more terrain.
Low obliques are better when it comes to identifying terrain features, such as the
case of a helicopter pilot attempting to identify a specific object or part of an HLZ.
(c) Trimetrogon. - Trimetrogon coverage combines vertical and oblique
photography by use of three cameras whose fields overlap each other so that a
photographic strip is made from horizon to horizon across the flight line. This
method is used to cover large areas, or to present a complete picture of a specified
area, such as a small island or strip of coast line.
(2) Panoramic Photography. Panoramic (180) coverage is similar to
trimetrogon, but employs only a single camera with a curved lens. It will eventually
replace trimetrogon photography.
(3) Sidelooking Airborne Radar. - Side looking airborne radar (SLAR) imagery
is the product of a sensor that detects differences in reflected energy. The radar
scope presentation is in turn photographed to provide a permanent record.
(4) Infrared. - Infrared (IR) imagery is the product of an airborne sensor
that detects differences in heat radiation.
Its electronic presentation is also
photographed to provide a permanent record.
c. Film.
(1) Black and White. - Black and white film is by far the most commonly
used type film. It comes in many film speeds and can be used under a variety of
light conditions.
(2) Infrared. - Infrared is black and white film which is sensitive to blueviolet and infrared radiation.
The tones on the print vary with the infrared reflectivity of the objects photographed, so that live vegetation appears light, while
water, cultural features, nonreflective paint, and cut vegetation appear darker. The
common use of this film is in detecting camouflaged locations. It also has excellent
capabilities for penetrating smoke and haze.
(3) Color. -

Color film reproduces full colors within the visibility spectrum.

It is extremely valuable when it is necessary to know the true color of objects. Ad-

ditionally it is useful in detecting underwater obstacles since it permits photo

penetration of clear water to limited depths. However, making color prints is not
practicable and all that is produced for interpretation is a roll of transparencies.
(4) Camouflage-Detection. - Camouflage detection film is a reversal color
film which, when used with an orange filter, produces a positive transparency in
false colors. Infrared reflecting subjects appear red, red subjects appear green,
green subjects appear blue, and blue subjects appear black. Thus, natural foliage
appears red while green painted objects show up blue. This film is superior to
infrared for camouflage detection and has considerable value for general interpretative work.

41

d. Capabill ties.
(1) Aerial sensors can be used at great distances and in otherwise inaccessible areas. Distance to the area is limited only by the range of the aircraft.
A wide variety of coverage is available.
(2) Photographs furnish a permanent record. They can be compared with each
other to determine changes and can be kept at hand for frequent and immediate
reference.
(3) Since photographs can be reproduced in quantity, they can be evaluated
simultaneously by a number of users, all of whom may retain the source of information.
(4) These sensors are unprejudiced, recording everything within field of
view. information can be determined by an expert in a favorable atmosphere. In
addition, the Imagery provides preCise locational data and accurate measurements.
e. Limitations.
(1) Certain weather and light conditions prevent or restrict the use of conventional frame and panoramic aerial photography. However, SLAR and lR sensors
are not restricted by these conditions and will normally provide adequate imagery.
(2) Each image records a situation at one split second of time, so that its information is current only as it pertains to that specific time. A target cannot be
observed continuously by imagery for any significant period of time. and activities
outside of the immediate area of the picture cannot be determined.
(3) Much depends on the skill of the interpreter. Many fine details are often
obscured and others have no significance to the untrained user. Generally speaking.
a trained interpreter is required to obtain wholly effective results.
(4) Processing, reprodUCing, and interpreting require time. While much has
been done to reduce the time involved in processing and reproducing imagery, some
delay between exposure and delivery of prints must be accepted. Detailed interpretation is also time consuming.
412. RECONNAISSANCE ORGANIZATIONS
In addition to the information gathering capability inherent in various organizations, two ground organizations with a primary reconnaissance mission have been
established. These are the reconnaissance battalion, Marine division, and the force
reconnaissance company, FMF.

413. RECONNAISSANCE BATTAUON, MARINE DIVISION

a. Mission. - The primary miSSion of the division reconnaissance battalion

is to conduct ground reconnaissance and observation in support of a Marine division
or its elements.

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b. Organization and Equipment.

(1) The reconnaissance battalion consists of a headquarters and service company and four reconnaissance companies. Each of these companies has three reconnaissance platoons. each platoon has two squads, and each squad has two 4-man
reconnaissance teams.
(2) Communication equipment provides reliable communications for continuous
control of SUbordinate units as necessary. Ground mobility for one complete company
is afforded by nineteen 1/4 ton trucks. The battalion is lightly armed to provide
individual protection and facilitate withdrawal in the event of discovery.
c. Concept of Employment. - The reconnaissance battalion, or elements of
it. will be employed to gain intelligence information in support of the Marine division
or subordinate task organization. It is not equipped for decisive or sustained combat
and must accomplish its mission through stealth, maneuver. and rapid reporting.
It is not capable of screening or counterreconnaissanc,\l missions. The battalion is
dependent upon extensive use of helicopters to provide maximum mobility. Additionally, it maintains a limited amphibious capability.
414. FORCE RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY. FLEET MARINE FORCE

a. Mission. - To conduct pre-assault and distant post-assault reconnaissance

in support of a landing force.
b. Organization.
(1) The force reconnaissance company is organized to provide the force
commander individual operational reconnaissance teams to execute specifiC reconnaissance missions. The company does not function as a tactical unit and is not
assigned tactical miSSions. objectives, or tactical areas of responsibility.
(2) The Reconnaissance Company is organized around a company headquarters.
a service and supply platoon. and six reconnaissance platoons.
c. Concept of Employment.
(1) The force reconnaissance company as part of the task organization of a
landing force. is employed to acquire information of the enemy. weather, and terrain
for that force. It accomplishes these tasks by introducing small scout teams oriented
on specific collection missions or by establiShing observation posts at selected
vantage points.
(2) The company teams can be introduced by aircraft and dropped by parachute
into a small unprepared drop zone or landed covertly from a submarine or helicopter.
(3) Major equipment includes parachutes, rubber boats. long-range radio
sets, individual diving equipment. and motion picture and still photographiC equipment.

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415. INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST TEAMS

Teams trained in particular aspects of intelligence operations are attached to,

or are organic to, higher echelon intelligence staffs. Although most will operate at
division level, they can be attached to a regiment or even a hattalion for special
occasions, such as counterinsurgency and riverine operations.

a. Interrogation-Translator Teams. - The interrogation-translator team consist of four officers and seven enlisted and can be broken down into three sub-teams
of one officer and two enlisted each. These teams are trained to obtain or extract
information from sources such as captured personnel, documents, and material.
They are activated when required and asSigned to force headquarters, divisions. and
wings as needed.
b. Interpreter Teams. - An interpreter team consists of one officer and five
enlisted. These teams are not actually in being. but will be activated from within
the regular Marine Corps establishment and from Marine Corps Reserve elements
as required, to support operations in any part of the world. The language requirement for interpreters is that they must be able to read and speak the language of the
people who are indigenous to the area of emplacement. The primary difference
between a translator-interpreter team and an interpreter team is that the interpreters are not trained interrogators or intelligence specialists.
c. Imagery Interpretation Teams. - The Imagery Interpretation Team consists
of five officers and 23 enlisted and can be broken down into four teams of one officer
and five enlisted. The location of these teams will be at Force, Division and Wing
levels.
These teams will have viewing screens that will display infrared, side
lOOking radar and aerial photographic imagery for interpretation. Interpreters will
also have available copies of all aerial imagery and radar imagery of the area of
interest, and by comparing and evalUAting all available information will be able to
provide accurate reports faster to the principally interested units.
d. Counterintelligence Teams. - The counterintelligence team consists of five
officers and 11 enlisted and can be broken down into four sub-teams of one officer
and two enlisted. Counterintelligence teams are normally attached to force headquarters, division, wing, and other major tactical commands requiring counterintelligence support. The counterintelligence mission is to destroy the effectiveness
of inimical foreign intelligence activities and to protect information against espionage, individuals against subversion, and installations or material against sabotage.
Counterintelligence activity will be discussed in Section 9.
416. ADJACENT AND HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

The battalion intelligence officer must not feel alone in his mission of producing
usable combat information: he should remember that he does not have to do the whole
job himself. The battalion 8-2 is a small but important cog in our intelligence
machine, which is like a large family in a way: each member giving help to the
others for the common good. Thus. the battalion or regimental S-2 mus: keep in close
contact with the other parts of the intelligence family. trading all of the latest
information and estimates of the enemy on a twenty-four-hour basis. As many
enemy actions are heralded on other parts of the front. adjacent and higher intelligence

sections Will contribute a large amount of the battalion 8-2's intelligence. The
next higher echelon Will be particularly important in this respect and. at battalion
level. is usually considered the most valu!lble single intelligence source. This Is
particularly true in amphibious operations where intelligence agencies at division
and higher level must be counted on for practically all enemy information in the
planning stages. From regiment (and division) flows the mass of Intelligence resulting from the prisoners. documents. and reports that the battalion 8-2 has efficiently forwarded. The 8-2 should conduct frequent personnel liaison With the
adjoining 8-2 sections. so that he has a good up-to-date idea of his nelghhors' situation
and the activity of the enemy to the flanks. The 8-2 Will be Wise to ensure that the
mutual frontage Is adequately covered by OPS. and that coordination exists between
them so that an enemy target in the open cannot be unobserved or unreported.

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