Professional Documents
Culture Documents
MARCH, 2015
TITLE PAGE
MARCH, 2015
DECLARATION
2
I Abishai Auta Gaiya hereby declare that the work done in this Research was done
by me under the Supervision of Associate Professor Usman Alhaji Tar.
I also declare that all the citations in this Research has been duly acknowledged
and referenced and that it is not an adaptation of any work.
NAME
SIGNATURE
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APPROVAL PAGE
3
DATE
--------
This Research thesis has been read and approved as having satisfied the
requirements for the award of a Master of Science (MSc) degree in Defence and
Strategic Studies, Department of Political Science and Defence Studies, Nigerian
Defence Academy, Kaduna Nigeria.
-----------------------------
----------------------------
Date
SUPERVISOR
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--------------------------
Date
---------------------------
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Dean,
SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE
STUDIES
Date
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EXTERNAL EXAMINER
Date
DEDICATION
In loving memory of my beloved wife, Abiodun Patience Gaiya who exited this
stage gloriously on 4th October, 2014 and our brother, Zachariah John, who was
Martyred on January 8, 2011 in Jos, the day of our wedding.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
To God be the glory! Amen. My thanks to the numerous personalities who in one
way or the other contributed to the success of my studies. In this regard, I must
express my indebtedness to my supervisor, Professor Usman Alhaji Tar for his
skills, support, criticism, keen interest and vast knowledge of the topic. Despite his
5
tight schedules, he made out time to read and correct this work several times over.
May you reach the height you desire in life!
My profound gratitude also goes to Professor Ken Conca, School of International
Service, American University, Washington DC. He is the author of environmental
Peacemaking theory. Thank you for taking personal interest in my research. Your
well informed contributions in the field of environmental peacemaking and
International Relations has helped in no mean measure to shape my ideas in very
many of the issues discussed here. I am also grateful to Professor Christos Kyrou,
Research Director, Center for International Relations Fairfax, VA. I first met you
online and you graciously linked me with Prof. Conca.
I sincerely appreciate the immense academic contributions from my lecturers;
Professors Paul P. Izah, David O. Alabi, Isaac O. Mbachu, Ethan B. Mijah and Dr.
Moses E.U. Tedheke.
I am not unmindful of the contributions of Dr N.C Lord-Mallam.
I am also not mindless of the contributions of my fellow course mates, the famous
and ever interesting Set Four, Lt. Col Olusegun T. Oladuntoye, Yahaya
Abdulkarim, Hafiz Shehu, Ladan I Ahmed, Marafa Aliyu, Hafsat Isa, Vincent
Okafor, Imoudu Abudu Sule, Rahji Nrennbaah, Ashamu, Fatokun SA, Abdulaziz
M. Kida, Onazi S. Obande, Yusuf A.Manu, Yusuf Sule, Haroun Saidu, Adeyemo,
JO and Navy Capt. Dare W.Suleiman. You are forever treasured. I love you all!
I find it imperative to express my profound thanks to Ezekiel Musa Shabi who took
me into his house while in Kaduna without any reservation.
Many thanks to my friend in this academic race, Charles Fawole, who first brought
to my notice the advertorial of the Postgraduate programme of the Nigerian
Defence Academy, thus arousing my interest.
Engrossingly, my profoundest admiration and gratitude goes to the former Curator
of the National Museum, Jos, Dr (Mrs) Carolyn Ezeokeke for your kind permission
to pursue this programme. Only the good Lord can reward you. Same goes to the
present Curator, Mrs Annah M. Dunkrah.
Regrettably, I have restricted the acknowledgements to those who have direct
bearing with this research.
6
ABSTRACT
Keywords: Violence, Tourism, State, Terrorism, Hospitality, Conflict
The assessment of violence in Plateau State, North-Central Nigeria on the one hand and
the Tourism and hospitality industry in Plateau State on the other presupposes a nexus of
impact that violence has had on the development of the State naturally endowed w
potentials for tourism. It is a common place to agree that violence is a precursor to a myri
associated with tourism development. This research on the assessment of the impact
7
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title Page . ii
Declaration .. iii
Approval Page ..iv
Dedication . v
Acknowledgement vi
Abstract .vii
CHAPTER ONE
General Introduction .1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Background of the study.4
8
CHAPTER THREE
3.0 Research Methodology
3.1 Introduction 69
3.2 Method of Research ...70
3.3 Qualitative Research Method .73
3.4 Method of Data Analysis ....74
3.4.1 Analysis of the Experts Interview.....75
3.4.2 Analysis of the Residents Interview .79
3.5 Observation .79
3.6 Reliability and Validity ..80
CHAPTER FOUR
Historical Overview ..85
9
CHAPTER FIVE
The Evolution of Violence in Plateau State
5.1 Introduction 120
5.2 The 1994 Crisis .121
5.3 Gyro Road Crisis of 1998 126
5.4 The 7th September, 2001 Crisis 128
5.5 The Eto-Baba PDP Ward Congress Crisis of 2002 ....136
5.6 The Southern Plateau Conflict 2002 -2004 .138
5.6.1 Introduction 138
5.6.2 The Yelwa-Shendam Conflict 2002 -2004 139
5.6.3 The Wase Conflict ...145
10
11
CHAPTER ONE
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1.1
Introduction
The assessment of violence in Plateau on the one hand and its impact on the
Tourism and hospitality industry in Plateau on the other presupposes a nexus of the
protracted impact that violence has had on the development of the State naturally
endowed with enormous potentials for tourism. Violence is a setback to the
development of tourism in the state.
The Tourism Development Master Plan developed in 2000 by the Nigerian Federal
Government identified Jos as one of the scenic nature sites in Nigeria making it
12
one of the best tourist destinations in Nigeria. This underscores the potentials that
this industry holds for socio economic development for Plateau State. Ogunberu
(2011) notes that tourism is the largest and fastest growing industry in the world, it
accounts to about 7% of world capital investment with revenue predicted to rise up
to 1.55 billion dollars by the year 2015. Africa has a meaningful share in the
growing international tourism trade in terms of both tourist arrival and receipt.
Ogunberu (2011) further notes that the importance of Nigerian tourism industry
lies in its tourism resources in generating foreign exchange. The Central Bank of
Nigeria revealed that the geometric increase in Nigerian tourism industry in which
a total number of 828,906 tourists was registered in 2007 and about 900 billion
tourist arrive worldwide has made tourism industry one of the most vibrant
industries of the world, especially from the economic point of view (CBN in
Ogunberu, 2011). Nigeria has a land mass of about 365,000 square miles and she is
a country of magnificent site, a wide range of fauna, excellent place for vacation,
exploration and sightseeing. In terms of the environment, she has world class
tropical rain forests, savannah, grassland, mangrove swamps and the Sahel
savannah very close to the Sahara desert.
This research attempts to unearth the various scholarly paradigms that have offered
various theoretical explanations for the deficit in the tourism industry as a result of
the protracted violence on the Plateau.
13
The official motto of Plateau State which is the Home of Peace and Tourism
appears to be paradoxically disconnected as the absence of peace is a negation of
the tourism potentials on the Plateau. The re-occurrence of ethno-religious violence
on the plateau has become a major barrier to the development of tourism on the
Plateau. This underscores the thrust of the study with a view to understanding the
various conflicts on the Plateau and how these conflicts have affected the once
prosperous industry.
The research is a contemporary analysis of peace and tourism as the two variables
that can only exist as reinforcing platforms of development and not the contrary.
Unarguably, Tourism remains a major source of socio economic enhancement,
serving as an instrument of development (Best, 2007).
The research is also a deliberate attempt to investigate the impact of violence on
the tourism and hospital industry in Plateau; it seeks to establish the synergetic
cohesion of the potentials of tourism in a peaceful environment and the
opportunities that abound in exploring the potentials for a State so naturally
endowed with so much prospective. The study will use scientific instruments in the
generation of data, basically from primary and secondary sources on the subject
matter to provide informed analysis on the linkages of tourism and peace on the
plateau.
14
This study will also attempt to dig into how Museum collections make
connections; this implies that the different relics in the Museum are sources of
unity across communities. Today, the Museum is not only managing whole
communities in the effort to preserve the Nigerian heritage, but is also promoting
strong relationship across cultures.
and growing of exotic crops. The process of formation of its high relief makes
Plateau State one of the mineral rich states in the country.
The Jos Plateau, an erosional relic covering an area of about 7,780 sq.km, is a
product of distinct phases of volcanic activities when younger granite rocks
extensively intruded into the older basement complex rocks. Each phase of
volcanic activities was followed by a long period of weathering and erosion when
tin bearing rocks were deposited in the valleys and buried by floods of basalt from
subsequent volcanic eruptions.
The landscape of Plateau State rises steeply from 200 metres around the plains of
River Benue in the south to an average height of 1,200 metres on the Jos Plateau.
There are great peaks like the Shere Hills (1829m), extinct volcanoes and crater
lakes on the Jos Plateau which is also the source of great rivers like the Kaduna,
Gongola, Hadejia and Yobe. (http://www.onlinenigeria.com/links/Plateauadv.asp?
blurb=464)
The ethnic groups that populate the state believe they migrated from somewhere
else centuries back, and settled where they are at the moment. Some of them,
especially those from the Chadic group, were most likely ejected from their earlier
northern locations by the turbulence that characterized the rise and fall of states in
16
Hausa land and the ancient Kanem Borno empire region to the north (Best,
2007:16).
1.3
Since 2001, violence has erupted in virtually all parts of Plateau State, in Nigerias
Middle Belt region. The ostensible dispute is over the rights of the indigene
Berom/Anaguta/Afizere (BAA) group and the rival claims of the Hausa-Fulani
settlers to land, power and resources. Indigene-settler conflicts are not new to
Nigeria, but the country is currently experiencing widespread intercommunal strife,
which particularly affects the Middle Belt (African Report, 2012). According to
Best (2007) the Jos crisis is the result of failure to amend the constitution to
privilege broad-based citizenship over exclusive indigene status and ensure that
residency rather than indigeneity determines citizens rights. Constitutional change
is an important step to defuse indigene-settler rivalries that continue to undermine
security. It must be accompanied by immediate steps to identify and prosecute
perpetrators of violence, in Jos and other parts of the country. Elites at local, state
and federal level must also consistently implement policies aimed at reducing the
dangerous link between ethnic belonging and access to resources, power and
security if inter-communal violence is to end.
17
The indigene principle, or indigeneity (that is, local origin), means that some
groups control power and resources in states or local government areas (LGAs)
while others who have migrated for different reasons are excluded. This gives
rise both to grievances and fierce political competition, which too often lead to
violence (Ostein, 2009). Ostein further states that indigeneity was given
constitutional force at independence in 1960 to protect the ethnic minorities from
being submerged by the larger Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba groups and preserve
their cultural and political identity and traditional institutions of governance.
Religion is a pertinent, albeit secondary factor, which reinforces underlying tension
and, over the years, has assumed greater importance, especially since the return of
democracy in May 1999. Fierce and unregulated political competition
characterized by ethnic mobilisation and violence, coupled with poor governance,
economic deregulation and rampant corruption, have severely exacerbated ethnic,
religious and regional fault lines. The notion of national citizenship appears to have
been abrogated by both ethnicity and ancestry (Ostein, 2009)
The African Report (2012) states that
the persistent settler-indigene conflict in Plateau state reflects the
longstanding sense of grievance the Berom, Anaguta, Afezere,
(BAA) including a small Muslim community among them,
continue to nurse against their perceived treatment as secondclass citizens by the Hausa-Fulani. The predominantly Christian
Middle Belt, famous for its history of bitter struggle against
attempts by the Muslim-dominated Far North to subjugate it,
18
19
Thus far, according to the African Report (2012), responses from local and national
authorities have proven mostly ineffective. They have come in three ways. First,
several judicial commissions of inquiry have been appointed to get to the root of
the crises and recommend lasting solutions. But authorities have been slow in
publishing reports and acting on their recommendations. Tough public speeches
have not been translated into tangible political action against instigators and
perpetrators: none of the suspects named by the various commissions have been
prosecuted, and impunity continues to feed violence.
The second response is police and military action, which has had little success
largely because security forces not only fail to share intelligence among them, they
are also suspected of taking sides in the conflict and soldiers are accused of trading
guns for money. Finally, Operation Rainbow (OR), a joint initiative since June
2010 between the federal government and the Plateau state government with
support from the UN Development Programme (UNDP), is considered a holistic
response to the crisis. Still in its infancy, or appears useful but will only be
effective if it can, at the minimum, win the confidence of both sides. It should be
publicised at the grassroots so that the population can own it.
Best (2007:26) provides the synthesis of the perspectives on the conflicts on the
Plateau as thus;
20
It is arguably potent to point out that, the conflicts on the plateau have political
dimensions, ethnic dimensions and religious perspectives. These positions all
border on the fact that Jos ownership as a cosmopolitan city where the metropolis
is, supposed to accommodate all; has become a subject of contention and
competition, leading to untold dimension of conflict and violence.
The casualties of the violence cannot be quantified in terms of measurable context
or the value of lives and properties. The use of violence to extent political and
geographical space cannot be disassociated among the many causes of violence, as
Best (2011) notes, the 2008 post electoral violence was a clear statement of the
increasingly growing intolerance from the realization that political space must be
acquired by any means necessary. While the indigenes control the electoral
instrument for power manipulation on the one hand, the aggression leading to
violence was the response from the settler communities who ideally felt were in the
majority. Such contradictions abound in the society.
21
A closer look at the impact of the conflicts in Jos reveals the near absence of tourist
influx into the state as a result of insecurity and volatile nature of the State. This
constitutes a major nucleus of the problem associated with violence. The Tourist
sites on the Plateau were abandoned by visitors, in fact, it is note worthy to point
out that some of these sites became completely inaccessible to the opposing groups
in the conflict as these sites became death traps to anyone who dared to go there.
The polarization of tourist sites attained such magnitude that there were Christian
and Muslim safe sites.
A survey by Plateau State Tourism Corporation shows another closely related
problem to this was massive downward record of income and patronage for the
hospitality industry on the Plateau as many visitors preferred to go to such
locations where they could guarantee their security and lives. The Plateau State
Tourism Report of 2011 shows that there was huge loss of confidence in the
hospitality industry on the Plateau as a result of insecurity and had recorded the
lowest volume of investors who identified insecurity and recurrent violence on the
Plateau as major source of worry.
The holistic view of the problem associated with violence on the Plateau will show
that apart from the long standing tension for the economic and political control of
resources among the major divides, the attendant effects that such depilating
violence has had on the hospitality and tourism industry remains a cardinal factor
22
to the gradual and inevitable collapse of this once thriving industry. Some of the
questions this thesis hope to address are:
What was the state of tourism in Plateau state before the eruption of the crisis?
In what ways has the violence on the Plateau affected the tourism and hospitality
sector?
Has the violence affected the confidence of tourists coming into the State?
What are the possible ways to bring back confidence and boost tourism?
1.4
The aim of the study is to systematically assess the impact of protracted violence
that has occurred in Jos for the past decade with a view to measuring the empirical
effects associated with these violence and conflicts on the tourism and hospitality
industry in Plateau State.
The objectives of this study are;
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
23
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
The study will also attempt to focus on the causes and implications for the re
occurrences of the conflicts on the growing tourism sector on the Plateau.
The research also hopes to technically evaluate the current security situation on the
Plateau in order to ascertain the extent to which the confidence building process is
effective or not.
The study hopes to expose the weaknesses associated with the plummeted
potentials of the tourism sector on the Plateau with special emphasis on the Jos
Museum and the Jos Wild Life Park.
The study will further contribute to the scholarly research effort currently on going
to establish a more scientific base knowledge and systematic understanding of the
impact of violence on the tourism industry.
Finally, the research will facilitate a comprehensive approach to understanding the
challenges faced by the tourism and hospitality sector and also proffer possible
solutions to addressing the dwindling fortunes of the industry.
24
The subject matter under study here are the nature and dimension of
conflict/violence on the one hand and its impact on the tourism and hospitality
industry on the Plateau on the other.
The study chooses to focus its attention primarily on the data that will be generated
from the Jos Museum and the Jos Wild Life Park under the identified period of
investigation, which is 2001 to 2012.
Some of the forecasted limitations to the study are as follows:
i) The lack of proper documentation of tourists coming to the State is a
fundamental limitation to this study. We hope to overcome this limitation by
directly administering questionnaire to such areas that data are not kept.
ii) It is forecasted that some of the target respondents might not be
accessible in view of the current mistrust among communities on the
26
Hypotheses
3.
The Jos Museum and the Jos Wild Life Park have been negatively affected
by the re-occurrence of conflicts on the Plateau.
al.
2008:
11
in
http://www.sagepub.com/upm-
be a reasonable working definition but violence need not be individual and is very
often collective; the issue of intention is problematic (as we will see below);
psychological harm is different from and more difficult to establish than physical
and sexual harm; the notion of self-harm might often be appropriate but is
sometimes contested; not all harm arises from acts that would conventionally be
regarded as violent they might arise from neglect or negligence, for example
and it is at least worth questioning whether a threat is itself violence. Threats
certainly trade on fear of violence by the threatened person, but there are probably
far more threats made than actual violence (as physical harm). So we can ask under
what circumstances threats and other forms of aggression are manifest as actual
violence in this sense. I am raising these issues not because I have a perfect
definition that escapes these difficulties but in order to highlight the problems
entailed in specifying violence in an unambiguous way. We need to unpick these
kinds of general claims and examine detailed dynamics of violence and aggression.
Bufacchi
(2005)
as
cited
by
(http://www.sagepub.com/upm-
1998)
in
(http://www.sagepub.com/upm-
(Brayne
et
al.
1998
in
http://www.sagepub.com/upm-
intended (http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/39356_978_1_84787_036_0.pdf ).
Voluntary participation in an activity does not offer protection from prosecution for
illegal acts of violence as in the case of the sixteen gay men in the UK who in
December 1990 received prison sentences of up to four and a half years for
engaging
in
consensual
sadomasochistic
activity
(Green
http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/39356_978_1_84787_036_0.pdf
2001
).
in
Another
example of the way violence is subject to socially and legally disputed definitions
is the debate over physical punishment of children, where in 2004 in the UK the
ability to use the defence of reasonable chastisement was reduced.
Proponents of the comprehensive conception of violence avoid some of these
difficulties by broadening the definition to include anything avoidable that impedes
human realization, violates the rights or integrity of the person and is often judged
in
terms
of
outcomes
rather
than
intentions.
Jackman
(2002)
in
(http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/39356_978_1_84787_036_0.pdf ) proposes a
generic definition actions that inflict, threaten or cause injury. Actions may be
corporal, written or verbal psychological, material or social. Felson (2009) in
(http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/39356_978_1_84787_036_0.pdf ) describes
violence as physical aggression, i.e., when people use physical methods to harm
others. However, he continues that The harm they produce is not necessarily
physical.... It could be a social harm or a deprivation of resources. The latter
31
their
potential
(http://www.sagepub.com/upm-
be
encompassed
within
violence.
iek
(2008)
in
verified within legal notions of premeditated intent. The effects of these safety
crimes, he says, far outweigh crimes of conventional violence and there is no
moral basis for treating one-on-one harm as criminal and indirect harm as merely
regulatory. This broadens the concept to that of harms, rather than limit it to
individual offending. Conditions of hunger, sickness and destitution are then
violence and it is often from such structurally induced conditions that further
violence
emanates
(http://www.sagepub.com/upm-
data/39356_978_1_84787_036_0.pdf ).
Thus describing all violence as instrumental on the grounds that some kind of
gain is involved overlooks how goal-directed violence provides gratification for
perpetrators, not least the pleasure of exerting unchallenged power. Rational choice
models of instrumental violence argue that actors will make decisions about the
likely costs and benefits of using violence, which might sometimes be so.
However, in many instances of homicide, for example, there is likely to have been
no such calculation of cost and gain, especially where killing involves ritual and
symbolic aspects. In what Katz (1988) as cited in (http://www.sagepub.com/upmdata/39356_978_1_84787_036_0.pdf ) calls Righteous Slaughter, people murder
to defend what they believe is good, at least at the moment they act. These
murders emerge quickly, most lack premeditation, are fiercely impassioned, are
conducted with an indifference to legal consequences and are therefore unaffected
33
by the risk of certain and severe punishment. Ritual aspects of such killing might
involve degradation and defilement of the body which has no instrumental
purpose. The ritual and non-instrumental dimensions of violence are also apparent
in genocide and other forms of collective violence. Therefore, the analytical
distinction between instrumental and expressive might prove useful and assist in
making distinctions between patterns of violence and its resolution, even if the two
are likely to be present in many instances of violence.
b) Tourism
Tourism has grown significantly since the creation of the commercial airline
industry and the advent of the jet airplane in the 1950s. By 1992, it had become the
largest industry and largest employer in the world. Together with this growth there
have emerged a number of extremely critical issues facing the industry in terms of
the impacts it has already had on destination areas and their residents, and the
future prospects for people and places into the twenty-first century (Theobald
1994:1).
One of the major issues in gauging tourisms total economic impacts is the
diversity and fragmentation of the industry itself. Theobald (1994:1) suggests that
this problem is compounded by the lack of comparable statistics, either at the
national, regional or local levels. This is due to a lack of uniformity in both
defining industry terminology and reporting similar, therefore comparable data.
The origin and derivation of travel and tourism definitions are provided and the
major developments that occurred between 1936 and 1993 whose objectives were
34
36
In his analysis, Dann (1994:2) states that tourism is the nostalgia industry of the
future. He suggests that tourism has employed nostalgia for its own financial
advantage. A strong connection between nostalgia and tourism is explored,
especially tourist resources such as hotels and museums. In addition, it is pointed
out that tourists often have a strange fascination for tragic, macabre or other
equally unappealing historical sites. Nostalgia is grounded in dissatisfaction with
social arrangement, both currently and with the likelihood of their continuing into
the future. Natives in third world countries living for generations in one village
would not be able to comprehend the concept of nostalgia. On the other hand,
todays dislocated western tourist often travels in order to experience nostalgia.
Tourism collateral literature and publicity which are based upon nostalgic images
of the past promote glamour and happiness, provide something to be envied, and
return love of self to the reader. Nostalgia is big business, and when it is associated
with the worlds leading industry, tourism, it offers unlimited financial
possibilities.
The Meaning and Scope of Tourism
Travel has existed since the beginning of time when primitive man set out, often
traversing great distances, in search of game which provided the food and clothing
necessary for his survival. Throughout the course of history, people have travelled
for purpose of trade, religious conviction, economic gain, war, migration and other
equally compelling motivations. In the Roman era, wealthy aristocrats and high
government officials also travelled for pleasure. Seaside resorts located at Pompeii
and Herculaneum afforded citizens the opportunity to escape to their vacation
villas in order to avoid the summer heat of Rome. Travel, except during the Dark
Ages, has continued to grow, and throughout recorded history, has played a vital
role in the development of civilizations (Theobald 1994:3).
37
However, the major problems of the travel and tourism industry that have hidden
or obscured its economic impact are other diversity and fragmentation of the
industry itself. The travel industry includes: hotels, motels and other types of
accommodation; restaurants and other food services; transportation services and
facilities; amusements, attractions and other leisure facilities; gift shops and large
number of other enterprises. Since many of these businesses also serve local
residents, the impact of spending by visitors can easily be overlooked or
underestimated. In addition, Meis (1992) points out that the tourism industry
involves concepts that have remained amorphous to both analysts and decisionmakers. Moreover, in all nations, this problem has made it difficult for the industry
to develop any type of reliable or credible tourism information base in order to
estimate the contribution it makes to regional, national and global economies.
However, the nature of this very diversity makes travel and tourism ideal vehicles
for economic development in a wide variety of countries, regions or communities
(Theobald 1994:3).
Once the exclusive province of the wealthy, travel and tourism have become an
institutionalized way of life for most of the worlds middle-class population. In
fact, Mchlntosh and Goeldner (1990) in (Theobald 1994:3) suggest that tourism
has become the largest commodity in international trade for many world nations,
and for a significant number of other countries it ranks second or third. For
example, tourism is the major source of income in Bermuda, Greece, Italy, Spain,
Switzerland, and most Caribbean countries. In addition, Hawkins and Ritchie
(1991), quoting from data published by the American Express Company, suggest
that the travel and tourism industry is the number one ranked employer in
Australia, the Bahamas, Brazil, Canada, France, (the former) West Germany, Hong
Kong, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Singapore, the United Kingdom and United States.
Because of problems of definition which directly affect statistical measurement, it
39
is not possible with any degree of certainty to provide precise, valid or reliable data
about the extent of world-wide tourism participation or its economic impact. In
many cases, similar difficulties arise when attempts are made to measure domestic
tourism.
The Problem of Definition
It is extremely difficult to define precisely the words tourist and tourism since
these terms have different meanings to different people, and no universal definition
has yet been adopted. For example, Websters New University Dictionary
(Soulchanov and Ellis, 1984) defines tourism as traveling for pleasure; the business
of providing tours and services for tourists, and a tourist as one who travels for
pleasure. These terms are inadequate synonyms for travel, and their use as such
adds further confusion when the field of travel, is variously referred to as the travel
industry, the tourism industry, the hospitality industry and most recently, the
visitor industry.
Why is so much attention given to these definitions? According to Gee, Makens
and Choy (1989) and as noted by (Theobald 1994:5), the concern is both from an
academic and a practical perspective. First, travel research requires a standard
definition in order to establish parameters for research content, and second, without
standard definitions, there can be no agreement on the measurement to tourism as
an economic activity or its impact on the local, state, national or world economy,
therefore, comparable data are necessary requisites, and identical criteria must be
utilized in order to obtain such data. For example, in North America, the US
Census Bureau and US Travel Data Centers annual travel statistics consider only
those trips taken that are 100miles or more (one-way) away from home. However,
Waters (1987) argued that this criterion is unreasonably high, and proposed instead
in his annual compendium on travel that similar to the US national tourism
40
suffix-ist denotes one that performs a given action. When the word tour and the
suffixes-ism and ist are combined, they suggest the action of movement around a
circle. One can argue that a circle represent a starting point, which ultimately
returns back to its beginning. Therefore, like a circle, a tour represents a journey
that it is a round-trip, i.e., the act of leaving and then returning to the original
starting point, and therefore, one who takes such a journey can be called a tourist
(Theobald 1994:6).
There is some disagreement as to when the word tourist first appeared in print.
Smith (1989) suggests that Samuel Pegge reported the use of tourist as a new
word for traveler c.1800; Englands Sporting Magazine introduced the word
tourism in 1911. Feifer (1985) proposes that the word tourist was coined by
Stendhal in the early nineteenth century (1838). Mieczkwoski (1990) states that
the first definition of tourists appears in the Dictionnare universel du XIX sicle in
1876, defining tourists as persons who travel out of curiosity and idleness. Kaul
(1985) argues that even though the word tourist is of comparatively recent origin,
nevertheless invaders were commonly referred to as tourists in the hope that one
day they would leave. In addition, Kaul points out that:
In the 17th and early 18th centuries, the English, the Germans and others,
traveling on a grand tour of the continent, came to be known as tourists
in 1824, scott, in San Romans stated thus, it provoked the pencil of
every passing tourist.
Leiper (1979) relates that the word tourism appears to have first been used in
England to describe young male British aristocrats who were being educated for
careers in politics, government and diplomatic service. In order to round-out their
studies, they embarked upon a customary three year grand tour of the European
continent, returning home only after their cultural education was indeed completed.
According to Inskeep (1991 in Theobald 1994:7), the first guide book for this type
42
of travel was Thomas Nugents the grand tour, published in 1778. Far from the
traveler of 1778, todays tourist tends to connote a singularly negative image, one
who is a bargain hunter, who travels en masse, and according to Eliot (1974 in
Theobald 1994:7), is one who is sought out for his cash, but despised for his
ignorance of culture.
In addition, tourism has been variously defined (or refined) by governments and
academics to relate to such fields as economics, sociology, cultural anthropology
and geography. Economists are concerned with tourisms contributions to the
economy and the economic development of a destination area, and focus on
supply/demand, foreign exchange and balance of payments, employment and other
monetary factors. Sociologists and cultural anthropologists study the travel
behaviour of individuals and groups of people, and focus on the customs, habits,
traditions and life styles of both hosts and quests. Geographers are concerned with
the spatial aspects of tourism, and study travel flows and locations, development
dispersion, land use and changes in the physical environment in (Theobald
1994:7).
It is generally recognized that there are two different types of tourism definitions,
each with its own rationale and intended usage. Burkart and Medlik (1981 in
Theobald 1994:7) suggest that there are conceptual definitions which attempt to
provide a theoretical framework which identify the essential characteristics of
tourism, and what distinguishes it from similar, sometimes related, but different
activity.
Examples of such a conceptual definition would include that proposed by Jafari
(1977 in Theobald 1994:7), who states that tourism is a study of man away from
his usual habitat, of the industry which responds to his needs, and of the impacts
that both he and the industry have on the host socio-cultural, economic, and
43
The trouble with terrorism is that most people think they know what it is
but few can adequately define it. The confusion surrounding the issue
stems from a number of sources. The distinctive methods that many of us
associate with terrorism involves the willful taking of human life and the
infliction of severe mental distress, sometimes entailing, whether
randomized or calculated, attacks on the innocent. Naturally, for many
this introduces ethical dimension and raises all the questions relating to
concepts like just war and non-combatant immunity. Furthermore,
because terrorism is not considered to be value neutral, the word itself
becomes an object for contention among conflicting parties in a conflict.
Political conflict are struggles for power and influence, and part of that
struggle is about who labels whom. Since power tends to be largely
concentrated in the hands of states, it is normally they who are able to
attach the meaning to certain forms of political behavior, which is why
state terror is often ignored in studies of terrorism. The result of this
conceptual mess is that in trying to tie terrorism down for academic
analysis, the word has been all but defined out of existence. Certainly the
writers of this article know of no meaningful conclusion reached using
these approaches.
We do not believe that the definitional problem, which has haunted (as
well as hindered) research on the subject for many decades, can be
resolved through our contribution. Nevertheless, we would contend that
strictly for the purposes of this analysis, it is possible to describe
terrorism as the deliberate creation of a sense of fear, usually by the use
or threat of use of symbolic acts of physical violence, to influence the
political behavior of a given target group. This definition draws on the
work by T.P Thornton, whose main study although 40 years old still
forms one of the most informative and insightful analyses of terrorism. It
highlights three facets of the phenomenon:
The violent quality of most terrorist acts, which distinguishes a program
of terror from other forms of non-violent propagation, such as mass
demonstration, leafleting, etc.
Indeed, although people will sometimes experience fear and anxiety
without the threat of physical harm being present, it appears to be the
case that the most common vehicle for the inducement of terror is forms
of physical violence.
The nature of the violence itself. Thornton calls it extra-normal,
meaning that for a certain level of organized political violence to be
called terrorism, it must go beyond the norms of violent political
agitation accepted by a particular society.
45
The symbolic character of the violent act. An act of terror will imply a
broader meaning than the immediate effects of the act itself; that is to
say, the damage, deaths and injuries caused by the act are of limited
relevance to the political message which the terrorist hopes to
communicate. For this reason, the terrorist act can only be understood by
appreciating its symbolic content or message.
A significant problem regarding this definition of terrorism concerns the
subjective nature of the emotional phenomenon of terror itself. Almost
all of us have different ideas of what constitutes fear. Our thresholds of
terror are likely to differ. As we will see, a terrorist can quite easily
create an atmosphere of defiance rather than fear and anxiety. Neither are
our thresholds of terror absolute and unchanging. A feeling of terror may
dissipate the longer a terrorist campaign goes on giving rise to an
atmosphere of indifference. Likewise, the sensation of terror may be
influenced by the perception of the justness of the cause accorded to the
actions of the terrorists by the affected populace. In that sense, we may
end up back in the old dilemma of having to describe terrorism by
context and notions of morality. There is, it seems, no easy way out of
the terrorist enigma (2008:344-345).
e) Hospitality
There have been different definitions of Hospitality. Broadly speaking,
Hospitality is the act of kindness in welcoming and looking after the basic
needs of guests or strangers, mainly in relation to food, drink and
accommodation. A contemporary explanation of Hospitality refers to the
relationship process between a guest and a host. When we talk about the
Hospitality Industry, we are referring to the companies or organisations
which provide food and/or drink and/or accommodation to people who are
46
f) Conflict
Conflict is a characteristic of human existence. It is part of the dynamic of
life that drives us into the future. But it needs to be managed
constructively. When associated with violence, destruction and killing, it is
no longer a healthy part of living. Violent conflict solves few problems,
creates many, and breeds more unhealthy conflict to come.
47
The structure and process of conflicts are much the same, whether a
conflict is between individuals or between groups and nations. The first
thing to look for is the immediate cause, the event that triggered it off.
Then it's necessary to look for the underlying causes - the state of affairs
which makes that explosion likely. It is the underlying causes that are
particularly
important
to
(http://www.ppu.org.uk/learn/conflict/st_conflict.html ).
1.10 Ethical Considerations:
48
understand
The study will undertake to make use of highest ethical standards of social science
research. The quality control of the study will keep all respondents undisclosed,
neutrality of submissions.
The accuracy of all observations will be clearly observed and the projection of
personal sentiments and biases will be maximally reduced. The study will
acknowledge all references and will make use of an approved format of
referencing.
The extent to which the research will be accepting as a standard of academic
referral it shall accept all such corrections as observed.
1.11 Breakdown of Chapters
The research comprises of seven chapters broken down thus;
Chapter one addresses the introduction to the study. It also gives a
background to the study.
Chapter two reviews relevant literatures and brings out the perceived gaps in
the literature. The theoretical framework was also addressed.
Chapter three deals with the research methodology of the study.
Chapter four looks at the historical overview of Plateau State from its
creation to its current development. It also looks at the relief features of the
49
state as well its ethnic composition. This chapter also looks the brief history
of National Museum, Jos.
Chapter five takes a look at evolution of violence in the state as well as
various measures taken to addressing such conflicts.
Chapter six brings out the results of the findings of the research
Chapter seven summarises the research and proffers possible solutions.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1
In doing a literature review of the Jos conflict, we are confronted with changing
phases of the conflict and how that affects the patterns of analyses done by
scholars. Most of the earlier works from 1994, but particularly after the 2001 crisis
50
makes concerted attempts to analyse the conflict by pointing out the history,
perceptions of the conflict, the issues, the means of resolution and their
weaknesses. This makes sense in view of the fact that prior to the 2001 crisis that
rocked the city of Jos, very little was known about the conflict nationally and
internationally. Before then, the city had been known more for its diversity and
tranquillity than for conflict. Academic work after 2001 such as the Human Rights
Watch (2001) report was to explain the evolution and characteristics of Jos city,
what exactly the conflict was all about, the claims of the parties to the conflict,
including its parties and the earlier efforts to transform the conflict. As such, most
of the scholars were also interested in a conflict management regime that could
ensure lasting peace, sustainable peace or return Jos to its pre-conflict phase.
(Best and Hoomlong 2011: 58).
Very crucial to the analysis of the Jos conflict, and this seems to run through most
of the analyses by different scholars, is the historical dimension. Goshit (2006)
traces the history of Jos conflict to the establishment of colonial rule on the Plateau
from 1902, leading to the influx of many Nigerian and non-Nigerian communities
alike, and subsequently changing the pattern of inter-group relations on the Jos
Plateau and in areas that today constitute Plateau State and Jos, the State capital.
One of the significant groups that migrated to the Jos Plateau, and which has
retained its religion and culture with little alteration is the Hausa community.
51
Goshit (2006) suggests further that the involvement of the settler groups in serious
competition for resources resulted in the violent confrontations that have been
witnessed in the state especially since September, 2001. Goshit (2006:485) points
out that the 1950s marked the beginning of serious competition between the
different ethnic group in Jos especially the Berom and the Hausa / Fulani, and
sentiments over the ownership of Jos and the control of land began to emerge
during the period.
PIDAN (2010:74) bring to the fore, the decision taken in 1934 by the colonial
Provincial Administration, to discard Emirate rule among the native polities and
the devising of Pagan Administration as an alternative due to the realization that
the earlier recognized title of Heads of Mohammedan settlements did not have any
direct relevance to the traditional and historical realities of native populations of
Jos. The new thinking of the colonial regime was resisted by Hausa Fulani.
However, to actualize this dream, the Berom formed the Berom Progresive Union
in 1945 to fight for the ownership of Jos and demand compensation for lands
seized and used for mining. In 1947, the first Gbong Gwom Jos, Da Rwang Pam
was appointed to crown the struggle of Berom and to affirm its ownership of Jos.
PIDAN (2010) also highlight the colonial administration decision in 1951 and
1955 to revert the status of Sarkin Hausawa Jos held by the Hausas to Wakili
(representative). This appointment, viewed by the hausa migrant population to
52
have reversed its traditional administrative gain and grasp of the city, is critical to
the historical evolution of the traditional dimension of the conflict (Goshit, Ibid:
486).
Danfulani and Fwatshak (2002) looked at the September 2001 violent conflict in
the city of Jos, tracing it back to the introduction of Islamic sharia penal code in
most far northern states of Nigeria, causing new migrations into Jos city in fear of
the negative consequences. The scholars trace the genesis of the crisis to tin mining
activities beginning in 1899, through the 1920s and to the early period of
independence after 1960. Tin mining brought in a large number of Hausa/Muslim
northern immigrants who retained their demographic and Islamic characteristics.
On the other hand, Christian missionary activities led to the conversion of the
indigenes and other southern immigrants. The urbanization and cosmopolitan
character of Jos implied the presence of different faiths and ethnicities, and this
eventually found expression in political competition most visibly between the
Hausa/Fulani immigrants, mostly Muslims and the indigenes mostly Christians.
Best (2007) did an analysis of the Jos conflict by looking at the parties to the
conflict, the historical interpretations of Jos by the respective parties to the conflict
and looking at the conflict perspectives held by the major parties (Afizere,
Anaguta, Berom, Hausa, Fulani) and how these perspectives tend to compete and
conflict. According to Best (2007), each perspective of the conflict is deeply rooted
53
Mohammed Bilal Adam (2010) as noted by Best and Hoomlong (2011: 63). The
work of Adam (2010), like some other Hausa sources for instance, suggests that the
Hausa/Fulani founded Jos and nurtured it to a modern city. The works from Hausa
scholars according to Best (2011:63), attach great significance to the assumed role
of Hausa traditional rulers appointed in Jos from its inception to about 1947. Ali
(2002), Umar (2002) all claim that Hausa chiefs ruled Jos from its inception to
1947. The following quote from Umar (2002:49) is perhaps apt about such claims
that have become typical in the literature:
Historically, Jos belongs to the Hausa/Fulani and they are the real
indigenes. What is happening today in terms of rejection is just
distortion of history which will bring more difficulties and
complex questions than solutions.
The position is corroborated by the late Alhaji Inuwa Ali, who maintains that Jos
was founded by the Hausa and is as such owned by them.
Historically, Jos is a Hausa settlement and this had been confirmed
by Mr. Ames, a Colonial Administrator who gave the population
of Jos town in 1950 as 10,107 out of which10, 000 people were of
Hausa/Fulani origin, before the arrival of the British, the present
location of Jos was a virgin land and the situation as could be seen
today shows no concentration of Beroms or any of the tribes in the
neighbourhood as being seen in the heartlands of Jos town (Ali,
2002)
Not all Hausa scholars share this opinion however. Babangida for instance, look at
crisis in Plateau from the angle of poverty. According to him:
The most fundamental underlying forces which propel ethnic
nationalism in Nigeria are those of pervasive poverty, mass
55
unemployment, under development of productive forces and nonabsorbance of the economy. The absence of developed productive forces
constrains the transformation of the structures of the economy and
society. Mass poverty and unemployment create alienation and
insecurity, which in turn encourage Nigerians to experience and prefer
accommodation within the social insurance system of ethnic
nationalities. In this regard, people are easily excited about injustice- of
other groups against their own groups. Poverty also creates frustration
and divisiveness. (Babangida, 2002:34)
Suffice it to say, however, that this view of history promoted by the Hausa/Fulani
is the key to perpetrating the conflict based on supposed injustice and deprivation
against them. However, it remains a truism that as much as the Hausa will claim to
have founded Jos, the area is neither a part of historic hausa land nor does it come
under the territory conquered during the Dan Fodio jihad of early 19 th century and
beyond. Sir Ahmadu Bello, former Premier of the Northern Region and direct
descedant of Dan Fodio stated this clearly (Bello 1962). Moreover claims of this
nature by the Hausa have accounted for violent conflicts in many middle belt
locations like Zangon Kataf, Kafanchan Tafawa Balewa,Wukari, Numan, Tingno,
Potiskum, Jos e.t.c ( Best and Hoomlong, 2011: 64).
In another attempt to draw attention to the cost and consequences of the Jos
conflict and the need for peace, Adam (2010) tries to trace the history of Jos and
the crisis in a not so well researched and inelegantly written work dotted with the
strong opinions of the author. He points to the case of injustice, poor governance
and failure to incorporate the Hausa as causes of the conflict. The work also points
56
to the creation of Jos North L.G.A. and the contestations surrounding the
appointments and elections to political office in the LGA. It further identifies rules
playable by the Islamic and Christian Clergy as well as the security operatives in
bringing about peace and the resolution of the conflict.
Egwu (2009) traces the history of the Jos conflict to the faulty categorization of Jos
as a Hausa town and the resultant consequence of it giving the Hausa residents a
possessive attitude towards Jos city. The coming of new sets of colonial
administrators after the Second World War, and the discovery of the grave error
they had made led to the policy twist that recognized the ethnic minorities as the
owners of Jos. The policy led to the appointment of a Berom as the chief of Jos, all
done in a bid to reverse the error the colonial administration had made.
The matter of ownership of Jos is critical to the conflict for the fact that it relates to
the indigene ship settler dichotomy. The foregoing has been exhaustively
countered to by the publications of the Plateau Indigenous Development
Association Network (PIDAN) which this review will examine. Further research
work has been done by Best (2007), the Plateau Indigenous Development
Association Network (PIDAN) (2010) on the history of the conflict. Ostein
(2009:8) describes historically how the indigenous tribes of Plateau had always
successfully defended Plateau against Jihadist penetration from neighbouring
Bauchi; the advent of colonialism from 1900 to 1960 was the avenue under the pax
57
Botanica that Hausas and other northern Muslims finally found it possible to
occupy parts of Plateau. The PIDAN work stands out as the most authoritative
historical piece of work that clarifies the issues of the establishment and ownership
of Jos as it relates to the claims made especially by the Hausa/Fulani community as
the principal basis for conflict. Its main strength derives from the archival sources
of history and the legal interpretations given to the documents; as well as the
colonial policies and instruments that inform the claims of the Hausa community.
A research carried out by The World Bank/UNDP/DFID-JEWEL PROJECT
(2003:2) also describes Jos as a colonial creation set up by the tin miners who
came to the plateau after the imposition of direct rule and sustained by the missions
who established their headquarters in the state. The Report stated that Jos is well
known as an island of southern and largely Christian- oriented populations in the
otherwise Muslim north. The Report also gives a timeline to when the Fulbe
probably entered the Plateau by the early 1900, due to the fact that prior to
colonialism, the indigenous populations principal interactions with their
neighbours further North was basically through slave raiding.
PIDAN responds to the claims made by the Hausa/Fulani that they established and
founded Jos, nurtured it, had established traditional chiefs numbering 14, and so
deserve the exclusive claim to ownership. The work attests to the importance of
history and claims to address the falsification and re-writing the history of Jos to
58
suit the needs of the Hausa/Fulani. The PIDAN publication raised and addressed a
number of rejoinders/counter-arguments, summarized below:
1 That the Plateau politics, including Jos, were never conquered by the
Fulani jihadists at any point in history and so were independent up to
British colonial rule (PIDAN, 2012: 1-5). Thus ownership as a result of
the might of conquest trough jihad does apply to jos.
2 It established the joint ownerships of Jos by the Afizere, Anaguta and the
Berom ethnic groups (pp. 6-7). PIDAN further referred to reports of
respected commissions of enquiry, state and federal alike the traditional
institutions of the plateau do not bear any semblance to Hausa/Fulani
traditions (p.28) The justice Aribiton Fiberisima, Justice Opene, Justice
Nikki Tobi and Justice Bola Ajibola commissions of Inquiry all attest to
the ownership of Jos by Afizere, Anaguta and berom communities ( pp.
26-29). The works of Sir Ahmadu Bello (Bello 1962) had also alluded to
the fact that Plateau did not come under the domain of the Hausa/Fulani
jihad.
3 It traced the evolution of the city of Jos within specific colonial policies
and ordinances, with the requirements that natives be encouraged to
remain within their native settlements in line with the policy, while land
used by the colonial authority was not compensated or paid for (pp. 916). Thus, the concentration of Hausa and other non-indigenous elements
59
in central Jos was that of the colonial policy. The reason given was that
the indigenous district heads were not sufficiently experienced to cope
with the large number of extraneous towns and villages which had sprung
up due to the mining activities. Ames (cited in PIDAN 2010) clarifies
how four of the settlements were called Hausa village areas: because the
word Hausa is a suitable generic term for all who are not indigenous
pagans. Each of the village areas were brought under the control of a
headman appointed by Government and it includes a multitude of
extraneous villages with its boundaries being coincident with the external
boundaries of three or four adjacent pagan districts. The purpose of such
as clarified by Ames (ibid) was to facilitate co-operation between the
headsman of the Hausa village areas and the district heads and to also
ensure the Hausa village areas will be subdivided without difficulty when
the pagan district heads are able to take over the administration of
everyone and everything in their districts.
4 PIDAN uses documentary evidence to demonstrate that the king list
supplied and claimed by the Jasawa was made up of fictitious names and
unidentified persons, with dates not tallying based on historical records.
The others were merely Hausa community leaders (Sarki Hausawa)
mostly sent from Bauchi, and not chiefs of Jos. As such it contends the
Hausa cannot use them as bases to return to some image of lost past.
60
5 PIDAN avers that the institution of Gbong Gwom Jos, created and first
occupied by Da Rwang Pam in 1947, was based on a comprehensive
review of the traditional political atmosphere by the British colonialists
who had earlier decided to get rid of emirate-type leadership in nonmuslim areas. It did not substitute the Hausa institution as claimed by the
Hausa since theirs was narrowly for the Hausa community of Jos and not
the people of Jos generally, let alone the indigenes.
6 PIDAN further claims that the demands for Hausa chief in Jos are not
new. They date back by subsequent administrations to date. Yet, the
Hausa have remained undeterred in their demands for a Hausa chief in
the city, creating anxiety and conflict.
7 PIDAN addresses recent causes of the conflict identified to include the
formation of the Jasawa Development Association (JDA), the non
transparent manner with which the Jos North LGA was created by the
Babangida Regime, the indigene-settler syndrome, the manipulation of
religion, media propaganda and the mischievous call for the restructuring
and liquidation of Plateau State.
In the context of the above, the PIDAN publication has also offers
explanations for the recurring violence in the city of Jos, as deliberately
created. Reference has been made to uncertain inflammatory fliers in
circulation. One of them reads:
61
Elsewhere, Best (2001) locates the Jos conflict within the general context of
the Hausa / Fulani migrants population growth historical quest for political
control all over the north. He noted that Population growth among Hausa
/Fulani migrants and settlers invariably resulted in claims related to
traditional and chieftaincy institutions as well as partisan party politics. This
often brings them into confrontation with indigenous communities that they
met on arrival. This problem is based on deep suspicion and distrust between
the Hausa / Fulani and indigenous populations who see the former as angling
to uproot the latter politically. On this premise, he traces a pattern of violent
identity based conflict in Northern Nigeria: in Zangon Kataf between the
Atyap and Hausa / Fulani, Kafanchan between the indigenes and the
Hausa /Fulani, Jos between the indigenes and the Hausa. Ilorin between the
62
Afonjas and the Gambaris (ancestrally Fulani), Tafawa Balewa between the
Hausa / Fulani and Sayawa.
Yoroms (2000) has similarly drawn attention to problems of this nature
leading to conflict between the Hausa / Fulani and the minority ethnic
nationalities of Yungar, Higgi, Kilba, Chamba of Ganye and Batta, all of
Adamawa State. Others are the Juke Kona of Jalingo and the Wurkum and
Jenjo in Karim Lamido of Taraba State. These cases go back to the issues of
the Middle Belt which invoke cultural, ethnic religious and political
dimensions of understanding the conflicts in the region. Plateau State and
Jos in particular, are vivid reflection of this problematic.
Egwu (2009) argues that the November 2008 conflict which he noted
claimed over 500 lives is anchored on issues of the ownership of Jos,
citizenship and indigeneship and settlership questions and when settlers
become natives. He situates the conflict within the problem of the Nigerian
national questions as well as identity politics in Nigeria and the dangerous
poisoning of inter-group relations, further given expression by the Federal
and Plateau State governments. These conditions, Egwu (2009) argues,
promote the politics of difference in Jos (ibib: 2). The article traces the
root of the Jos crisis to the colonial era and raised the issues of problems
created by the exploitations of tin ore, the loss of land by the native Berom,
63
the supposed appointment of Hausa Chiefs by the colonial regime and the
projections of the Hausa / Islamic identity in the city Egwu further captures
the absence of issues-based politics and the absence of ideology among
political parties, a vacuum easily filled by ethnic and religious
consciousness. The rise of the Middle Belt identity as opposed to the
northern identity also deepened this divide. Egwus article critiqued the
entranced positions of all the contending parties and suggested a national
interest and national question-based solution hinged on mutual tolerance and
moderation.
In his contribution, Adetula (2005) investigated the problems of ethnicity
and the dynamics of city polities using Jos as a case study. The work
questions the dynamics by which city associations in Jos, defined ethnically
and religiously mobilize to occupy political spaces the ends they seek and
the methods they employ to achieve such ends. The study focuses on the
Berom Educational and Cultural Organization and the crystallization of
Berom Progressive Union into the middle Belt movement, the Jasawa
Development Association of Hausa / Fulani Muslim peoples. The Yoruba
and Igbo association are also discussed. The work argues that ethnic and
cultural associations are important political institutions in urban polities as
64
shown in Jos and they mobilize their members into public life and political
consciousness and participation.
Gwamma (2006) takes a look at the problem of religion and inter-ethnic
relations in the Middle Belt generally, of which Plateau is an important part.
He highlights the effects of the conflict on inter-communal relations and the
emergence of mutual fear, suspicion, mistrust and bitterness leading to
demographic shifts and the relocation syndrome affecting residential
patterns. Worthy of note here is the absence of the effect of these conflicts
on tourism in the region.
Gwammas (2006) literature also contains summaries of reactions by
governments and political authorities to the Jos conflict Omotola (2006)
argues that the conflict is driven by the indigene/settler dichotomy. The work
takes a general look at the instrumentality of the state of emergency invoked
by President Olusegun Obasanjo to deal with the problem of violent conflict
in Plateau State in 2004. The failure of the state of emergency policy to
resolve the conflict perhaps originates from its inability to focus on the
assumed causes of conflict. The significance of this work rests in the fact
that even the most drastic measures have failed to lead to the resolution of
the conflict.
65
The perspective and understandings of the Jos conflict differ from place to
place. Among the international community, there are images of human rights
abuses, pogroms and genocide, crimes against humanity, etc. depending on
how scholars and international agencies understand the conflict, some of the
analyses are captured in the literature. Human rights Watch ( 2001) did a
comprehensive Report on the Jos 2001 crisis and looked into the background
to inter-communal violence in Nigeria generally, the warning signs and
causes of the crisis in Jos, as well as attacks on both Christian and Muslims
during the crisis. This Report also analysed the role played by security forces
and the impact of the conflict on other areas followed by the resources of the
government. The earlier crisis of 2001 which had being analyzed as perhaps
at the embryonic stage of the conflict but events have moved very rapidly
since then. Be that as it may, the Human Rights Watch Report (2001)
established the mutual losses and traumatisation by Christians and Muslims
resulting from the conflict. The lack of trust and deep suspicion developing,
the weak role of authorities and their failure to ensure the violence did not
occur again as well as the need to address the root cause of the problem of
indigeneity.
Most importantly, the Report identified and pointed to the human rights
abuse following the Yelwa crisis of 2004, a similar report was done on the
66
crisis in Yelwa Shendam and its reverberations in Kano city, leading to the
death of hundreds of persons (HRW, 2005) after the November 2008 crises
in Jos city, the organization also did a detailed analyses of the killings by
security forces from a human rights stand point (HRW, 2009). Eye witness
accounts first and second-hand sources of information were used. The
Human Rights Watch Report (2009) further called for the investigations of
all allegations of impunity against government forces, and for political
authorities to investigate and prosecute those suspected to have carried out
the killings.
These Reports were of academic quality and the sources as well as
procedures were credible. Good as those Reports were, they often failed to
understand the limits of indignity as an elite problem and password to access
political opportunities by the power elite and the fact it did not prohibit
persons seeking elective office from doing so. There is also an overglorification of the indigeneity problem as opposed to more fundamental
claims of ownership of Jos alongside claims to the historical traditional
institution of Jos as well as the creation of districts. All said, there is the
problem of impunity on the part of security operatives and political
authorities and their failure to get to the root of the problems so identified.
The studies pointed to the weak capacity of the Nigerian state in maintaining
67
law and order, or to even maintain neutrality among conflict of due process,
the rule of law and human rights as well as the human dignity of Nigerian
citizens
Ostien (2009) in a research report sponsored by Catholic Organisation for
Relief
and
Development Aid
(CORDAID),
Netherlands
based
was created under the Abacha administration in 1996 and retained under the
1999 constitution. It is doubtful if the authors of the federal character
principle believed they were promoting discrimination. They in fact believed
they were projecting inclusion and diversity, and so what we are witnessing
may be the antithesis of that policy. Beyond that, as in the case of Jos, we
begin to encounter conflict caused by the policy. (HWR, 2006).
Osteins work is one of the solid scholarly works on the Jos conflict.
However it fails to mention that the Jos conflict is not narrowly an indigene
settler conflict. Rather, it is an indigene- Hausa conflict in the first instance,
and then implicating the Fulani in the second instance. Many other ethnic
groups who may carry the tag of settlers such as Igbo, Yoruba, Urhobo and
others in the south-south, middle belt groups like the Idoma, Tiv and Igala
(who by virtue of being born and raised in Jos for generations like the
Hausa, are indigenes in that sense) cannot conveniently be named as visible
parties to the conflict. As understood by other scholars, the issues go beyond
Joshua Dariye, Jonah Jang and the Middle Belt going by the fact that the Jos
conflict pre-dated both administration and the Middle belt as a political
construct. While styles adopted by these leaders may affect the conflict, the
indigene-settler, ownership
and
non-ownership
debates
have
been
provided immediate relief services like shelter, food, and clothing and
medical/ambulance services, search and rescue services, documentation and
spiritual counselling (ibid:). Longer term roles played by FBOs are mainly in
the area of provision of education, but hardly did they play any roles related
to livelihoods (ibid).
such work. Most of them only seek to explain specific episodes of violent
conflict rather than trace its historical antecedents and situate it within a
political theory of ethno-religious pluralism in the Nigerian State.
4 The role of the Federal government, including State government as a
mitigator of conflict and its apparent failure in spite of assurances at the
end of each violent conflict. Why does the state continue to fail to bring
perpetrators to justice? Why does the state repeat the same assurances
and promises each time there is violence? What are the consequences of
this failure on conflict resolution?
5 The deepening polarization of Jos and how to bring an end to this
polarization. There is a need to explore the attitudes and mentality of the
people living within the various communities about this division: do they
like it? Should this be reversed and bridged?
6 Whether or not there is gain in dialogue and what gains of dialogue, if
there are any. There is evidence of peace building capacity, building
workshops, but the efficacy, relevance and impact have not been captured
in any of the literatures. The indication is that such topics have been
poorly researched.
7 Overall, there is need to find out why the conflict persists, or why
subsequent regimes at state and federal levels or subsequent efforts have
failed to bring about lasting peace in Jos and other parts of Plateau state.
2.3
Theoretical Framework
72
73
74
[Eco] tourism also can create many other forms of economic interdependence, as
revenue from conservation moves to different sectors of the economy and different
regions. Ecotourism attracts visitors to a central location, but once they arrive,
visitors tend to visit other sites and services, which may cross former adversarial
boundaries. For example, there is an ecotourist operation in Croatia that brings
tourists across the border into Bosnia for river trips on the Neretva, which flows
through both countries. This operation creates a situation in which cross-border
collaboration are necessary to take advantage of the potential revenue stream. Also,
both groups have an incentive to care for the environment between the two
countries because it is serves as the major tourist attraction. Croatia, through
tourism, is expanding cooperation to include other former adversaries such as
Montenegro as well. In a study of cross-border tourist flows, Lagiewski (2006:10)
reports (with respect to Croatia and Montenegro): This information, that both
sides of the border feel working closer within the tourist sector and the governing
bodies that influence it, is a necessary and positive first step towards greater
collaborations.
This form of cooperation is especially valuable in post-conflict situations, where
many peoples livelihoods have been shattered by the conflict, and they often must
rely on the unsustainable use of natural resources. This can perpetuate conflict, as
resources become increasingly scarce and the catalyst for conflict remains. [Eco]
75
tourism, especially if managed at the local level with the majority of the revenue
going to benefit local people and local conservation needs, can help to diffuse the
cycle of conflict and unsustainable resource use (Scorse and Strong-Cvetich,
2007:2).
A second way in which [eco] tourism builds trust amongst people is through
mutual management of natural resources. As Alexander Carius (2006:3) states:
The joint management of shared resources can be not only a way to keep both
parties talking, but the key to negotiating a resolution. This logic is not new, but
in past studies it has only referred to the management of natural resources and
scientific data-gathering activities. Little has been said regarding the effects of
economic development through tourism on peacemaking. This is where much of
the Peace Park literature falls short, as it only considers the management aspects of
threats to plants, wildlife, and human wildlife interaction, not the economic side
(Scorse and Strong-Cvetich, 2007:3).
A third way in which ecotourism can create long-term cooperation in post-conflict
situations is its emphasis on the grassroots cooperation. Ecotourism is generally
considered low politics still need some definition. As Dabelko (2006:5)
contends, When environmental issues are a low political priority, they can offer an
oasis of cooperation within a larger conflict. In this case, environmental issues do
76
not threaten the most contentious issues in the relationship and thereby may
provide a safe first step for dialogue.
In effect, environmental collaboration may be a means to circumvent barriers to
post conflict reconciliation erected by stubborn leaders at the top. Again looking to
the example of Ireland, because tourism was not a hot button issue between the
leadership of the two sides they were able to collaborate for many years with less
scrutiny from the government than in other areas (Scorse & Strong-Cvetich,
2007:3).
There are some additional economic considerations that come into play when
considering the role that ecotourism can play in post-conflict cooperation and
development. Ideally, ecotourism seeks to enhance the conservation of the local
area through limiting the numbers of tourists who visit. On one hand, this can limit
the potential revenue for the local people in the short-term, but it is essential for
both long-term economic and environmental sustainability (Scorse and StrongCvetich, 2007:4).
In his work, Butler outlines the Tourist Area Life cycle model, in which he argues
that:
Visitors will come to an area in small numbers initially, restricted by lack
of awareness, facilities and local knowledge. As facilities are provided
and awareness grows, visitor numbers will increase. With marketing,
information dissemination and further facility provision, the areas
77
78
CHAPTER THREE
3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The research on the assessment of violence on the hospitality and tourism in
Plateau will make use of scientific methodology of generating data for analysis.
The researcher will adopt the participant observer method.
The research will generate data through the use of both primary and secondary
sources of data for a comprehensive analysis of the study.
The primary sources will include, administering of questionnaires to a sample
group of respondents who are mostly tourist who pay visit to the museum. Also
a proportion of the respondents will be sourced from the hospitality industry as
well as the museum to measure the impact of violence of the industry.
79
While the secondary sources of data will be from library materials, newspapers,
articles, journals, online sources, and reports published to harness the tourism
industry issues and also conflict on the Plateau.
The study will be conducted to reflect high academic standards which are the
research design; the random survey method will be used to get respondents.
The population size is designed to sample about three hundred (450) respondents at
random without any particular consideration for gender, race, religion, age and
educational qualification, where there is need for interpretation; research assistant
will serve that purpose.
Data presentation will be done using descriptive statistics such as percentages,
tables and descriptive narrative to establish relationships of the work.
3.2 Method of Research
Data for this research work is obtained through several methods which includes
qualitative research method, direct conversation, and personal research among
others. The type of qualitative research method that is applied in this study includes
interviews, observations from the participant point of view, that participant
observer method, information gathered from tourism experts, as well as people
living and benefiting from and around the National Museum and the Wild Life
Park. In other words, the research method includes data collection and analysis of
80
quality information from the real source rather than numerical data (Veal 2006:193
in Ogunberu 2011:29). Taking into consideration the socio-economic sustainability,
the opinions of the people around the study area are very important in determining
the extent of the impact of the subject matter. As a matter of fact, the information
gathered from both the people from the destination region and the views of the
experts, combined with a few observations and the survey conducted will be
regarded as the authentic base for the outcome of this research. Meanwhile, the
reliability and validity of this research work will be based on the qualitative
research method applied.
In that sense, reliability is an extent to which a questionnaire, interview,
observation, conversation and any other research measures produce the same result
on repeated trials. That is the degree at which interviewees responses would
remain the same on a particular survey over a period of time and is a sign of
reliability. On the contrary, reliability is considered to be at risk when a survey is
carried out over time, performed by different people or the survey is highly
subjective (Last, 2001 in Ogunberu 2011:29). In this vein, different results are
bound to be generated thereby rendering the research work unreliable. For this
study, the research was carried out by one person with a reliable method of
research which extensively reveals the reliability of the work. On the other hand,
validity is the extent at which a research instrument measures what is out to
81
measure in a research work. Validity tends to measure two essential parts: internal
and external. Internal validity measures the legitimacy of the result of a particular
research study because of the way the group is selected and how data were
analyzed; while external validity, also known as generalization, involves weather
the result produced by the research is transferable to other groups of interest to
confirm its validity (Last, 2001 in Ogunberu 2011:29). With all sincerity, it is
through adequate and proper research method and execution of strict formalities
that a high level of validity be internal or external can be achieved. Considering the
quality of this research topic, the type of interview that will be conducted is a semistructured interview. A semi-structured interview is one of the most regularly used
interviews in qualitative research methods. Being an open personal interview, it
includes among others, a few numbers of some qualitative procedures and different
types of materials representing a particular situation. The method of qualitative
research is described as too easy and in that case, there are no forms of guidance on
the qualitative method. But nevertheless, in an industry such as tourism, which is
more descriptive, this type of method still remains the best (Veal, 2006:194 in
Ogunberu 2011:30). In this vein, a quantitative research method was totally opted
out being a method that is more evaluative rather than being descriptive.
Meanwhile, there is a big difference between qualitative and quantitative method.
While the former is based on analysis on qualitative information through
82
interviews and observation, the later has a basis of numerical data collection. And
one of the basic aims of the research work is to derive a subjective understanding
of socio-economic impact of a tourism destination and not actually on the findings
of numerical or statistical figures. The qualitative research method involves
interviews that are semi-structured in nature in which one or more areas will be
explored through a number of questions (Stephen and Smith 2010:109 in Ogunberu
2011:29). The flexibility of a qualitative research method makes it suitable for
interviews in this thesis. Apart from that, one of the reasons why qualitative
method is essential for this research is that with a few interviews, the aim of
carrying out the research is revealed. In other words, there is no need for excess
information, rather little information with concrete fact.
3.3 Qualitative Research Method
The qualitative research method is a research on the natural settings of the subject
matter which attempt to make sense and interpret the phenomenon in terms of
natural meaning brought into it. In other words, the research intends to penetrate
into deeper significance that the subject of the research ascribes to the topic being
researched. It also intends to collate all necessary information about relatively few
cases rather than the more limited facts about each of the large number of cases
which is a typical method used in quantitative analysis method (Veal 2006:193 in
Ogunberu 2011:31). Qualitative research method can also be interpretive and
83
naturalistic in nature to its subject topic and it gives priority to what the data has
contributed in the research or interview question. An interview is a formally
arranged interaction where questions are involved and information is exchanged.
There are three types of interviews namely structured interview, semi-structured
interview and unstructured interview. In this study, the semi structured interview
was adopted in order to get to the root of the research. Observation is one of the
easiest, though technical, parts of research methods. Observation involves looking
and sighting and in most cases it is referred to as an obstructive method of
research. Obstructive in such a way that the observer is not in contact with the
observed and still carries out the observation successfully (Veal, 2006:173 in
Ogunberu 2011:31). Observation is quite necessary in qualitative research in such a
way that it helps in backing up and finalizing the findings (Ogunberu 2011:31).
It is essential to know that qualitative research is the best method for this research
work. The method enables the researcher to get to the root of the study. Apart from
the fact that it will make this thesis easy for anyone to read and understand, it will
also enable the author to properly investigate and make a genuine report on
peoples need and inspiration.
3.4 Method of Data Analysis
The research interview was conducted with five tourism experts and three residents
from the host community. Online survey was also administered to 450 participants.
84
While some participated, a great deal declined to. The average age of the
interviewees range from 35 55 years. Though eight interviews are not enough to
make a general conclusion we hope that the over 50 online participants will make
up for the number. Observation also played a vital role in bringing out the best in
this research work. Thorough observation was made and conclusions are drawn
based on the two qualitative methods applied. The residents and tourism experts
mentioned in the implementation plan are the two categories of people that would
be most effective to reveal, basically, the impact that violence has had on the
tourism and hospitality sector in Jos. While the people from the host community
shed more light on the impact of tourism as it affects their live, the experts give a
general overview of the whole subject matter.
3.4.1 Analysis of the Experts Interview
Category 1 is about the tourism development in Nigeria. This question was meant
to measure the level of tourism development in Nigeria in general. All the
interviewees bear their thought on the recent development, while some shared the
view of how it was in the past. Interviewee A revealed that since 1999, the
government has played a significant role in ensuring that tourism resources are
fully utilized to meet the standards of the developed countries. She appreciated the
master plan that was put in place to drive tourism in Nigeria. She further
emphasized that master plan is the basis for development and it requires the
85
putting some features in place will give way to a better tomorrow as far as tourism
on the Plateau is concerned. They further argued that there should be a data-bank
which will contain the information of incoming tourists, residents, tourism
resources available and peoples opinions on the particular tourist destination. One
of them explained that:
to the rest of the world. Advertisement and awareness campaigns should be a major
focus if Nigeria is to develop her tourism. They further emphasized on the need for
more tourism education in every higher institution in Nigeria. More schools should
be encouraged by the government in the establishment of tourism studies with
well-trained lecturers and good monitoring methods in other to ensure that
professionals in the field were produced. In this vein, they did not fail to appreciate
the effort of the government in the policy of staff training in the tourism
department in various institutions. They further encouraged the government to pay
more attention to tourism development and put more focus on maintenance culture,
as this is one of the key factors for sustainability.
Interviewee A shed more light on the practice of eco-tourism in Nigeria as a
basis for tourism development. He claimed Nigeria is known for natural beauty and
socio-cultural heritage and with the practice of eco-tourism in place; the sky is the
limit to the development of tourism along the coastal line of Lagos and Nigeria in
general. Furthermore, he explained that the tourism resources should be properly
managed and sustained to meet the standard of the western world and for that
reason, attractive infrastructure should be put in place to commensurate the
available resources. Apart from that, he urge that the government to put up a
political-will and show more concern about developing tourism in terms of good
publicity, awareness and documentary to market the tourism sector.
88
90
should
be
evaluated
through
trustworthiness,
credibility
and
information gathered from them are highly reliable, credible and dependable.
Moreover, the information from this thesis work has a great extent of reliability on
the fact that the researcher has been a resident of Jos for over 22 years and all his
stages of education and work has also been on the Plateau which gives him an
upper hand and insight into this research.
Nevertheless, in as much as this research has a great extent of reliability, the issue
of weakness cannot be rule out to a certain level. Carrying out a research on a
community which comprises of group of people that are subjected to changes over
time can create loopholes in a research work. While a personal report may be
accurate, research on numbers of people can present a shady picture based on the
fact that people have different views and opinion about a particular issue.
Furthermore, asking the same questions from different people at different locations
even within the same locality is likely to produce different results. This is the
reason why great caution was exercised in this thesis to ensure generalization in
order to arrive at accurate results. However, the observations carried out in this
thesis were done in a natural setting without a direct contact with the observed.
This creates a picture of accuracy and shows the degree of reliability.
The issue of validity is appreciated irrespective of the type of research method
applied in a study. It is the extent at which a particular test measures what it ought
to measure. In the real sense, the determination of validity in a research work is not
92
interviews and survey with few numbers of people in this thesis justify the interest
of the whole community. However, it should be noted that though the interviewees
were few in numbers, their opinions count a lot in determining the goal and
outcome of this research. Observations were also conducted to back-up the
interviews. The interpretation of the interviews and observations conform to the
aim of the survey. With this set of interviewees and personal observation, the
concept of validity in this thesis work is dependable and trusted. In a nutshell,
validity of this research was good bearing in mind the low number of interviewees.
If the idea of reliability and validity, quality and trustworthiness were meant to
evaluate and differentiate a well structured research work to a bad one, then testing
and upgrading the reliability, validity, trustworthiness and quality will be vital to
the research irrespective of the methodology applied.
The analysis and the result of the online survey conducted is on Chapter Six of this
thesis.
Number of Interviews conducted = 8
Number of online survey administered = 450
Number of online participants = 50
94
CHAPTER FOUR
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
4.1 PLATEAU STATE: BACKGROUND INFORMATION
4.1.1 Historical Development: Plateau State, which derives its name from the Jos
Plateau, is located more or less at the centre of the country. The State has an area of
about 26,899, sq.km and shares common boundaries with Benue, Nassarawa,
Kaduna, Taraba, Bauchi and Gombe States.
Plateau State is a product of half a century of boundary adjustments arising on the
one hand, from the ambition of the colonial masters to create a province which
consisted largely of non-Muslims under one Resident, in order to protect the
railway line being constructed at that time and guarantee the sustenance of tin
mining activities which began in 1902, and the strong desire of the peoples in this
area for political self-determination, on the other hand.
In the formative years of British colonialism in Nigeria, much of Plateau State was
part of Bauchi Province. In 1926, Plateau Province, comprising Jos and Pankshin
95
Divisions, was carved out of Bauchi Province. At various times between 1926 and
1976, the boundary of Plateau Province oscillated, paralleling the general trend of
political development in the country, as the government of the day acquiesced to
the agitation of different ethnic groups to be merged with their kith and kin who
are of larger concentrations in other provinces.
During this period, therefore, some administrative units or Divisions as they were
then called, from neighbouring provinces were added to or subtracted from Plateau
Province. In May 1967, Benue and Plateau Provinces were merged to form BenuePlateau State, one of the twelve states into which the military administration of
General Yakubu Gowon divided Nigeria in place of the four then existing regions.
The division of the country into smaller semi-autonomous states was an attempt to
introduce a sense of balance between the north and the south, and to save the
Federation from total disintegration which was imminent from the polarization of
the country along ethnic lines after the bloody military takeover of 1966 and the
subsequent crisis which led to an attempted secession by the Eastern Region.
Benue-Plateau State emerged as one of those large states of the Federation where
pressure was mounted on the Federal Government immediately after the civil war
for the creation of more states.
96
When the country was however further divided into nineteen states in 1976,
Plateau Province was severed from Benue-Plateau State to become Plateau State.
In 1996, the present Nassarawa State was carved out of the western half of Plateau
State by the Abacha military regime.
( http://www.onlinenigeria.com/links/Plateauadv.asp?blurb=464)
4.1.2 Administrative Areas: Plateau State started off in 1976 with fourteen local
government areas (LGAs). New LGAs were carved out of the large ones in 1989,
1991 and 1996, so that today, the new Plateau State consists of the following
seventeen LGAs: Jos North, Jos South, Jos East, Bassa, Kanam, Barakin Ladi,
Qua'an-Pan, Wase, Langtang North, Langtang South, Pankshin, Shendam, Riyom,
Mikang, Kanke, Mangu and Bokkos.
4.1.3 Administrative Structure: The Plateau State administrative structure
consists of the State Cabinet, House of Assembly and Local Governments. Key
functionaries at the state government level are the Governor (chief executive),
Deputy Governor, Secretary to the state government, Commissioners (cabinet
members), special advisers, permanent secretaries, board chairmen and general
managers.
97
The House of Assembly comprises, the Speaker, Deputy Speaker, Clerk of the
House, majority and minority leaders and chief whip. At the Local Government
level, the chairman is the chief executive, while his cabinet consists of appointed
port folio councilors.
The elected councilors make up the legislative arm. Plateau State is divided into
chiefdoms and emirates, each encompassing ethnic groups who share common
affinities. Leaders of the chiefdoms are elected by the people from amongst
several contestants who may not be related to any past chiefdom leaders, while
succession
to
the
position
of
an
emir
is
hereditary.
(http://www.onlinenigeria.com/links/Plateauadv.asp?blurb=464)
4.1.4 Geology and Relief: The unique physical features of Plateau State are its
98
high relief, especially in the north, and its geological history. The high relief, or
more appropriately, the Jos Plateau, provides a hydrological centre for many rivers
in northern Nigeria and confers on the northern part of the state a cool climate
suitable for livestock rearing and growing of exotic crops. The process of
formation of its high relief makes Plateau State one of the mineral rich states in the
country.
The landscape of Plateau State rises steeply from 200 metres around the plains of
River Benue in the south to an average height of 1,200 metres on the Jos Plateau.
There are great peaks like the Shere Hills (1829m), extinct volcanoes and crater
lakes on the Jos Plateau which is also the source of great rivers like the Kaduna,
Gongola, Hadejia and Yobe.
Climate: Plateau State is characterized by a near temperate climate on the Jos
Plateau and a hot and humid climate on its lower parts. Generally, weather
conditions are warmer during the rainy season (April-October) and much colder
during the harmattan period (December - February). The mean annual temperature
in the state ranges between 20C and 25C, while the mean annual rainfall
figures range from 131.75cm in the southern part to 146cm on the Jos Plateau.
Vegetation: Plateau State falls largely within the northern guinea savannah zone
which consists mainly of short trees, grasses and the Plateau type of mosaic
vegetation. Near some villages are thick hedges of cacti, which have been planted
around household farms or compound lands. Fringing woodlands or gallery forests
can be found along some river valleys.
Soil: The major soil units of Plateau State belong to the broad category of tropical
ferruginous soils, which are much thinner on the high plateau but attain greater
depths in the southern part of the state. There are also sizeable pockets of loamy
100
soil of volcanic origin in the high Plateau. These soil groups respond quite well to
fertilizers. Soil erosion is a major environmental problem on the Jos Plateau. Tin
mining, in its heyday, rendered some localities around Jos, Bukuru, Mangu and
Barakin Ladi more susceptible to soil erosion. Today, however, the soil erosion
menace is being accentuated largely by over-grazing which has resulted in
gullying along the numerous cattle paths which criss-cross the Plateau surface.
The soil erosion problem is being tackled through several conservation measures.
(http://www.onlinenigeria.com/links/Plateauadv.asp?blurb=464)
101
4.1.5 Ethnic Composition, Language, Culture and the Arts: The population of
Plateau State is highly heterogeneous with over forty ethno-linguistic groups. No
single ethnic group is large enough to claim majority position, but the following
are regarded as the major ones: Birom, Angas, Mwangahvul, Taroh, Goemai, Tal,
Fier, Afizere (Jarawa), Miango, Yourn, Bogghom, Rukuba, Piapung, Kwalla,
Montol, Jukun, Challa, Ron-kulere, Pyern, Miship, Mupun and Buji. Each ethnic
group has its own distinct language, but as in every other state of the federation,
English is the official language in Plateau State while Hausa has gained
acceptability as a medium of communication.
A common feature among the ethnic groups in Plateau State is the strong
attachment to dance culture and the performance of festivals, initiation rites and
naming ceremonies, religious rituals and ancestral worship. Recently, there has
been a tendency to incorporate several traditional festivals which normally span
the whole year into one mega festival to save costs and attract many participants.
A few of such mega-festivals performed once a year in different LGAs are
Pusdung (Pankshin LGA), Pus Kai'at (Mangu LGA), Bit Goemai (Shendam '
LGA),and Pandam fishing festival (Quaan Pan . LGA). The main religions of the
people of Plateau State are traditional African religion, Christianity and Islam.
(http://www.onlinenigeria.com/links/Plateauadv.asp?blurb=464)
102
4.1.6 Population Structure and Distribution: The 1991 national census put the
population of Plateau State at 2,959,588, comprising 1,027,926 males and
1,031,662 females. The average population density in the state is sixty-one persons
per sq.km. Plateau State is a sparsely populated area when compared with the
national population density of ninety-six persons per sq. km.
Population density still varies nonetheless among the LGAs of the state. Jos North,
Jos South and Jos East have a combined population density of 391 persons per
sq.km to become the most densely populated parts of Plateau State. The rest of the
state can be said to have fairly low population ranging between forty and 125
persons per sq. km. I The high concentration of people in Jos North, Jos South and
Jos East LGAs can be attributed to the attraction of mining, industrial and
commercial activities, which are concentrated in and around Jos, the state capital.
On the whole, the low population density of Plateau State is due to its rugged
terrain and the extensive land-dependent nature of its rural economy.
(http://www.onlinenigeria.com/links/Plateauadv.asp?blurb=464)
Age and Sex Structure: The population of Plateau State displays an age-sex
structure much like that of the other states of the federation. On the whole, females
are slightly more than males, although the males out-number the females in some
LGAs. In Plateau State, the proportion of the young (ten to fifteen years) is as high
103
as forty-five percent, while those between sixteen to sixty-five years old constitute
about fifty-three percent of the population and the aged account for only two
percent.
2006
Local Govt
Area
Male
Female
Total
Female
Total
Akwanga
54,100
53,857
107,952
Barkin Ladi
90,913
88,892
179,805
Awe
60,704
62,198
122,902
Bassa
94,725
95,109
189,834
Barkin-Ladi
79,333
79,223
158,556
Bokkos
88,560
90,990
179,550
Bassa
60,352
61,300
121,652
Jos-East
44,980
43,321
88,301
Bokkos
45,530
49,688
Jos North
216,361
104
95,218
220,856
437,217
Doma
44,804
45,915
90,719
Jos South
157,067
154,325
311,392
Jos-North
217,75
3
195,678
413,431
Kanam
81,162
86,457
167,619
Jos-South
121,39
6
116,012
237,408
Kanke
61,376
62,892
124,268
Kanam
55,218
58,282
113,500
Langtang North
70,203
72,113
142,316
Karu
60,993
59,134
120,127
Langtang South
53,111
52,062
105,173
Kef
67,575
66,298
133,873
Mangu
148,590
151,930
300,520
Lafia
120,74
5
119,911
240,656
Mikang
47,584
48,804
96,388
LangtangNorth
45,930
48,777
94,707
Pankshin
95,376
94,738
190,114
LangtangSouth
23,037
24,071
47,108
Quaanpan
96,800
100,476
197,276
Mangu
88,857
98,540
187397
Riyom
66,248
65,530
131,778
Nasarawa
63,526
64,317
127,843
Shendam
101,951
103,168
205,119
Nasarawa
Eggon
35,995
37,134
73,129
Wase
79,496
80,365
159,861
Obi
50,182
50,892
101,074
Pankshin
89,343
91,238
180,581
Quaanpan
69,271
71,811
141,082
Shendam
108,87
2
108,533
217,405
Toto
43,909
45,687
105
89,596
89,596
Wase
49,629
52,707
102,336
Total
1,657,
054
1,661,203
3,318,257
1,598,998
1,607,533
3,206,531
Rural Settlements: The settlement pattern in Plateau State has been greatly
influenced by physiographic factors and the emergence of new transport routes.
The pre-colonial settlement pattern in the state was characterized by nucleated
villages located on hill tops for protection. The extended family or lineage lived in
compounds which were sited amidst terraced fields and fringed with cacti hedges
and tight walls of mud and stones. Today, people live largely in low land areas in
dispersed settlements and compounds, usually unfenced.
Urban Development: The city of Jos is the largest settlement in Plateau State. It
owes its origin to the introduction of tin mining on the Jos Plateau and railway
lines linking it with Port Harcourt and Lagos, thus bringing the area into the orbit
of the world economy. The development of the tin mining industry has generated
both positive and negative impacts on Jos and its environs.
On the positive side, tin mining led to the influx of migrants, mostly Hausas, lbos,
Yorubas and Europeans who constitute over half of the population of the town,
making it a highly cosmopolitan and most peaceful urban centre in this part of the
country. Tin mining also provided the base for capital formation by which the
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people were able to diversify into a wide range of commercial and industrial
enterprises.
In addition, tin mining provided the impetus for the early development of western
education, a dense network of roads, in Jos and its environs, as well as the regular
supply of hydro-electricity. On the negative side, tin mining has adversely affected
the morphology of Jos metropolis, which is characterised by a leap-frog type of
development, largely as a result of numerous long term mining leases estimated to
cover about fifty percent of the land of Greater Jos Planning Area.
Not only has much arable land been lost to mining in this area, the numerous mine
pits and heaps of overburden, which were not effectively covered or removed, has
greatly reduced its natural scenic beauty. Furthermore, the initial advantage which
tin mining conferred on Jos and the subsequent concentration of investments there,
have turned it into a primate city within Plateau State with all the attendant socioeconomic problems of unemployment, congestion, over-stretched facilities and
high crime rate. (http://www.onlinenigeria.com/links/Plateauadv.asp?blurb=464)
4.1.7 Agriculture: The soil and climatic conditions of the Jos Plateau favour the
production of exotic crops like Irish potatoes, apples, grapes, wheat, barley and
vegetables. The region produces about 200,000 tons of Irish potatoes annually.
Union Trading Company (U.T.C) recently embarked on large scale production of
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wheat and barley in Mangu LGA. Already, the company's annual production of
both crops is nearly 200,000 ton.
These crops are grown throughout the year: rain-fed during the wet season and
irrigated during the dry season. Irrigation water is derived from two sources, dams
and old mine ponds. The old mine ponds are a special attraction to Hausa migrant
farmers from Kano and Katsina States who rent some of the adjacent lands in the
dry season to grow potatoes and vegetables. Well over 40,000 hectares of land
have been under irrigation every dry season in the last few years, by multinational
companies, government agencies and private individuals. Trade liberalization
which allows unrestricted importation of grains, including wheat, is threatening
irrigated wheat production in Plateau State and other parts of Nigeria. The plains
of the southern part of Plateau State constitute a major food-producing region of
Nigeria. Maize, sorghum, rice and yam are produced in abundance in Wase, Bassa,
Pankshin, Shendam, Quaan Pan and Langtang LGAs.
Cattle Rearing and Dairying: Plateau State has an estimated cattle population of
1.07 million in the hands of the Fulani nomads. A little less than half of these
cattle, graze permanently on the cool tsetse-fly free Jos Plateau, while the
remainder spend the dry season on the rangelands of Benue plains and move up to
the Plateau in the wet season.
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The large concentration of cattle on the Jos Plateau encouraged the early
establishment of a veterinary research centre and a dairy factory in Vom. The dairy
factory was to make up for the short fall in imported dairy products during the
Second World War. The Vom dairy factory proved so successful that another one
was opened soon after at Kumbul in Pankshin LGA.
At the initial stage, these factories produced butter, cheese and clarified butter fat,
using milk entirely purchased from the local Fulani nomads. The nerve centre of
modern dairying on the Jos Plateau today is the Netherlands Government-assisted
West African Milk Company (WAMCO) located at Vom. WAMCO is an integrated
dairying enterprise which produces a wide range of milk products.
The rapid growth of cattle population on the Jos Plateau has resulted in overgrazing and very stiff competition for land between sedentary farmers and
nomadic Fulanis which is often expressed in violent clashes between the two
groups. These and the grazing-induced soil erosion problems are being tackled
through the establishment of game reserves in Wase and twelve other LGAs for
settling the nomads in some form of mixed farming.
Fish Farming: Fish farming is gradually becoming a major economic activity in
Plateau State. A modern hatchery with a capacity to produce two million
fingerlings of tilapia, carp and mud fish for sale to farmers has been established, as
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110
agricultural development.
Minerals: Plateau State is endowed with rich deposits of a variety of industrial
minerals of high quality. Tin (cassiterite) and columbite have been mined on the
Jos Plateau since 1902. Although production has declined, due to a drastic fall in
demand, this area was once the world's leading producer of tin with an annual
output of 17,000 tons in the peak war period of 1941-45. Other minerals found in
Plateau State in commercial quantities are barytes, kaolin, zircon, monazite,
marble, lime stone, sphalerite, quartz, galena, glass sand, clay and gemstones.
Existing Industries: Existing industries in Plateau State fall into two categories
cottage and factory industries. The cottage industries which are widely distributed
throughout the State include black smithing for the making of simple tools,
pottery, mat making and leather works. Factory industries are mostly concentrated
in Jos, which is one of the leading industrial centres in northern Nigeria.
There are over sixty factory/industrial establishments in Jos. They range in size,
from small to very large, and depend entirely on imported machinery and a
combination of local and imported raw materials for their production. These
industries engage in various forms of manufacturing which include food
processing,
production
of
packaging
materials,
cosmetics,
furniture,
building materials, steel and metal sheets, book publishing, tin smelting and lead
materials.
The Jos Steel Rolling Mills, NASCO, Jos International Breweries and Highland
Bottling Company are examples of modern large scale manufacturing industries in
Jos. Some of these industries have closed down, while others are operating at well
below their installed capacities, as a result of the high cost of imported raw
materials and machinery which followed in the wake of the structural adjustment
programme introduced in 1986.
Local Sourcing of Raw Materials: Many industries have started to take
advantage of the abundant raw materials in Plateau State. These include miningrelated industries such as Makeri Smelting Company, Kaolin industry in Barakin
Ladi, Gold and Base, Exiands and Kaduna Prospectus. Most of the industries in
Plateau State are agro- based types utilising local agricultural materials. A few
well known agro-based industries in the state are NASCO Foods, NASCO Packs,
Jos International Breweries, Northern Nigeria Fibre Products and Grand Cereal
and
Oil
Mills
Ltd.
(http://www.onlinenigeria.com/links/Plateauadv.asp?
blurb=464)
4.2 TOURISM AND HOSPITALITY IN PLATEAU STATE
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Plateau State, the land of opportunities, is an integral part of the middle belt of
Nigeria. And since benign nature projects her on a higher pedestal above sea level
than other parts of the federation, it enjoys pleasant weather conditions that are
more suitable for human habitation in the country.
Even thought there seems to be a threat to human environment due to rigorous
industrial activities of man that culminates in the depletion of the ozone layer with
the attendant severity of heat, the Plateau still enjoys favourable weather. This is
one factor that has continued to attract people from elsewhere including foreigners
to come and settle on the Plateau.
Being a microcosm of Nigeria, Plateau State has well over 50 indigenous ethnic
groups that are spread across the land. Moreover, despite their multiplicity in
composition, they interestingly have a unique feature of hospitality and
accommodation. No doubt, this does not only explain the prevailing peace among
them, but also the open reception accorded other non indigenous groups settling
among them in search of the proverbial Golden Fleece.
Plateau, the land of opportunity, is also naturally endowed with lots of mineral
resources such as tin and columbite that preceded the development of the oil
industry alongside other economic resources. But sadly enough, this has eventually
transformed Nigeria into depending solely on oil economically without
diversification into other viable sectors for national sustenance.
113
Since Plateau, the beautiful, is naturally blessed with hospitable groups, their
spread also makes for the diversity of their cultures and other values that form the
core cultural tourism on the Plateau. Endowed with fine physical tourist sites, spots
abound on the Plateau alongside other potential yet to be developed.
Meanwhile, some of these features of scenic beauty in Plateau State, the tourism
haven of Nigeria, include the Jos Zoo and Museum, Jos Wild Life Park, Shere
Hills, Rayfield Holiday Resort, Kurra Falls, Kahwang Basalt Rock Formation and
the Kwi Conical Hill.
Other tourist sites of international standard on the Plateau include: Assop Falls,
Ampidong Crater Lake in Mangu Local Government Area, Wase Rock and the
Pandam Game Reserve. There are lots more other potentials that the government is
planning to develop in the state to generate revenue.
All these endowments put together appropriately earns the state the nomenclature
Home of Peace and Tourism. This succinctly manifests in the new wave of
cultural festivals being revived by the states government and Ministry of Tourism
and Culture, while the Plateau Tourism Corporation is giving support as partner in
progress. The International Museum Day, celebrated every 18th May is usually a
day that people from all works of life look forward to witnessing (See Appendix
A).
114
The pleasant climate of Plateau, no doubt, offers expatriates and other foreigners
comfort, hence, foreign firms maintain rest houses in and around Jos for spending
vacations. Because of the pleasant and accommodating nature of the state and its
people today, almost everywhere in Jos there are rest houses maintained by
business tycoons, military officers and others from all over the country as second
homes. One interesting aspect of Jos weather is that it could be raining in one part
of the town, while other parts could be sunny and dry.
The diversified tourism potentials that set Plateau State apart from others are her
mild and pleasant climate, natural and cultural heritage, beautiful rock formation,
as well as undulating landscapes, waterfalls, handcraft, and the hospitality and
accommodating attitude of the people. Because of these attributes, Plateau State is
described by the father of Nigerian Tourism, Mr. Matt DaSilva, as a charismatic
state, capital is also referred to by many as the Tin City because of her long
standing history of tin mining activities.
The aggressive resurgence of cultural festivals by indigenous groups in the state for
the protection of their identities against the emergence of threatening aliens and
weird cultures being imbibed by the youths is a testament to the cultural awakening
going on. If the trend is left unchecked, it could lead to the extinction of our rich
cultural heritage.
115
116
Other festivals celebrated in grand style amidst pomp and pageantry include Igoon
Izere, Rukubas Andu, Tehls Kiim Tehl, Tarohs Illum Otaroh and the Irigwes
Zara Chi in addition to many other beautiful festivals celebrated by groups in the
state that cannot all be mentioned here.
Since the real essence of cultural tourism is being appreciated by all and sundry in
the state, government has stated that it is planning a cultural calendar to serialize
the staging of these cultural festivals. This is to avoid clashes in dates of
celebrations and would also make room for proper packaging of the festivals to
boost the tourism profile of the state which is always on the rise.
Moreover, since the government has intervened with expertise to revamp the
cultural fiesta of the state, it is also to be sued as veritable instrument for peace
building among all citizens of the state in order to enhance co-existence and
development. Plateau state still remains the Home of Peace and Tourism despite
all distractions in the recent past.
4.3 Brief History of National Museum, Jos
According to Bernard E.B Fagg, Colonial British Archaeologist and founding
father of the National Museum, Jos, discussing how the Museum came into being
(during a party organized on his behalf in 1973 by members of the Zoological
Society): Mr. E.A. Langslow-Cock, the first chief Inspector of mines, Mr. Stanley
Williams, Lt. Col.J.Dent-Young and others connected with the mining industry,
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together formed a Museum collection for the Department of mines, which in the
early forties was divided into two sections, Mineralogical and Geological, the
other Archaeological and Anthropological. In 1943, I was invited to be secretary of
a committee formed to find ways and means of building a Museum to house the
archaeological and anthropological collections. I spent some years looking for a
suitable, accessible and attractive site. Having selected this site, between P. W. D
yard and the post office, Joe Allens and the banks and the Nigerian Police and
Prison Departments, it was finally granted.
Jos itself was the centre of the Nigerian alluvial mines field which covers the Jos
Plateau and neighbouring lowlands and had been producing tin and a variety of
other minerals since its discovery in 1903. Early in the history of mining on the
Plateau it was found that the Quaternary and recent deposits contained relics of
human occupation. It is a proportion of these finds that led to the establishment of
National Museum, Jos. However, its origin can really be attributed to the discovery
of Nok culture figurines in Southern Kaduna in 1944 (a single specimen had been
found and preserved since 1926), whose fundamental importance to the study of
African history was quickly appreciated. (The Nok culture dates back from 500BC
-200 AD). Thus with the land for the Museum acquired, 6, 500 was made
available in October 1949, and Bernard Fagg built it himself using direct labour.
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By the 26th of April 1952, the building had been completed and opened to the
public by Sir John Mcpherson, then Governor General of Nigeria. A year after in
1953 Fagg, with K.C Murray, worked to get the Government of the day to establish
the Federal Department of Antiquities to safeguard our patrimony from being
carted away to foreign lands.
Since then, National Museum Jos has grown and expanded to become a complex,
sporting many units. These include the galleries where objects made by different
ethnic groups in Nigeria and remains of animals are exhibited. For example the
Permanent Gallery is presently having the Millennium Exhibition, in tune with
the turn of the century (from 20 th to 21st). Its title is Nigerias Journey Through
The Ages: Artistic Traditions of Its Past.
Using a combination of photographs and real objects, the exhibition highlights the
role of art in all aspects of human endeavour, notably politics, social life, economy
and religion. In front of this Galley is a fish pond.
From this Gallery one can proceed into the rich Pottery Museum, exhibiting
pottery from all over Nigeria, second to none in the country. Within it can be found
some more fish ponds.
The Natural History Gallery displays whole or part of preserved/stuffed skins of
dead animals and birds.
119
We have live animals in the zoo, described in childrens story or biology books.
These animals and birds are caged for the viewing of our visitors at close range
without much fear, such as the Lions/Lioness, Pythons, Ostriches, Chimpanzees,
Hyenas etc. To the zoo is added a rich Botanical garden. Some of the plants and
trees in it have been labeled for the benefit of our visitors.
Jos Museums display of Traditional Nigerian Architecture (MOTNA) is the first
and only one of its type in the whole of Africa. In this unit, unique replicas of
buildings from all parts of Nigeria are presented. They include the Kano Wall
(example of African defence) Katsina Palace (Royal status), Zaria Mosque (Place
of Worship), Rukuba Compound (Community life), and Chief Ogbuas house.
This is not all, Jos Museum has a combined open-air theatre and dancing arena,
planned and executed in a natural amphitheatre form by a horseshoe-shaped
outcrop of granite with stone benches built into the rocks and a stage which serves
for dramatic performances, located at the Northern Wing of MOTNA.
At a corner of the Northern part of MOTNA is the workshop of the Centre for
Earth Construction Technology, which promotes earth building technology. It was
established in the early 1990s by the National Commission for Museums and
Monuments in partnership with the French Government. This method of building is
now being appreciated all over Nigeria.
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has a Library of 200 books, journals, magazines etc., and an Auditorium which
seats 200 people at a time, a Conservation laboratory and maintenance offices. A
Vetinary Clinic was added to the Jos Museum in 2005.
From Bernard E. B. Fagg (1943-1957) there have been other Curators. These
include:
CURATORS:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
The present exhibition in the main gallery was mounted in December 1999.
Though christened the millennium exhibition the theme is Nigerias journey
through the ages: the artistic tradition of her past. It is intended to showcase
aspects of our artistic evolution through the ages.
It was a deliberate attempt in the pursuit of this objective that the choice of some
photographs and real objects were used to highlight roles and aspects of human
endeavour especially in the political, social, economic, agricultural, religious and
technological development of the people.
This exhibition is divided into different sections with a view to highlighting these
artistic developments.
POTTERY GALLERY
Pottery, the art of pot making dates back to antiquity and are one of the oldest
surviving crafts the earlier generations have bequeathed to the present. Pots vary
in shapes, sizes, composition, texture and style and in the uses to which they are
put into. Pottery in Nigeria has been associated with traditional beliefs, festivals,
rituals, domestic and other activities. Pottery production cuts across ethnic,
religious and cultural boundaries.
TRANSPORT EXHIBITION
124
125
became the Narraguta Mines. By 1907, they had exported 120 tons of Cassiterite
and 23 tons of smelted tin. Today the mine pits are abandoned.
Bauchi Light Ralway: Built in 1909 to connect the Tin fields of Jos with Zaria and
Kano, and to alleviate transport difficulties.
THE ZOOLOGICAL GARDEN
In the late 1940s when the National Museum Jos was being constructed, animals
were taken through its premises from the Mining Village of Tudun Wada to the
Native Authority (N.A) market now Jos Main Market by people who wanted to
sell them. Benefactors bought them in a bid to rescue them, knowing they may end
up in soup pots, and gave them to Mr. Bernard E.B Fagg, who was in charge of the
Museum, so that they could form the Natural History section of the Jos Museum.
Fagg himself, was one of those that rescued animals in this way and took them to
his house at No. 2 Zaria road (now J. D. Gomwalk road) where he had constructed
some cages for them
The Museum was declared open in April 1952. Between that period and 1955,
Fagg constructed two welded-mesh cages opposite the Museum by the stream
where he housed a pair of Patas Monkeys and Baboon for the viewing interest of
the public. An additional area was later fenced using mesh-wire to house a male
Grimms duiker.
126
Meanwhile, the collection of animals had so expanded that the Federal government
approved the formation of the Zoological Society of Jos in 1960 as its managing
body. Today, the Zoo is fully managed by the Federal Government through the
National Commission for Museums and Monuments.
MUSEUM OF TRADITIONAL NIGERIAN ARCHITECTURE
(MOTNA)
MOTNA is an acronym which stands for Museum of Traditional Nigerian
Architecture. It is a unique museum in Africa and due to its special character of
exhibits, unique to the world. The idea was conceived by Bernard Fagg around
1948 to preserve both tangible and intangible cultures in architecture and historic
buildings with a focus on the use of traditional building materials, for the purpose
of study and research by Nigerian students of architecture; serve as landscape
garden and open-air museum; boost culture and ecotourism for posterity.
The preliminary master plan of the site as well as the precise scale drawings were
made from measured field notes between 1958 1966 at the Research field centre
for tropical Architecture at Gdanzk Technical University Poland under direct
supervision of Prof. Z.R Dmochowski. The leading and most sought after labour
forces were the traditional master builders. It was accepted then as a Dominican
rule that the actual construction of any edifice should be done by native craftsmen
127
brought to Jos from the actual place where the copied building was originally
erected. Thus the replica of the oldest palace of Kastina was executed by the court
master builders- Sarkin Mason(Sarkin Gini) of his Royal Highness the Emir of
Katsina. The Kano walls and gates were constructed under the supervision of old
master builder (Sarkin Gini) of Kano, Mallam Dan Baba. The Tiv settlement was
erected by a group of Gboko builders, the Pategi Gate house was erected by
craftsmen directed by Etsu Pategi.
Originally 65 acres of land was marked out for the construction of 48 ethnic
structures (buildings). The sites are organized with groups of buildings
representing the various ethnographic groupings of Nigeria. It is of great
significance that the scenery of each site should be as close as possible to its
original environment (through the planting of typical crops and local flora). Also
the relationship of the groups should where practicable be analogous to their actual
geographical positions. Consequently the whole area will present a miniature map
of Nigeria.
So far most of the buildings erected are on the Northern wing of MOTNA
corresponding to the Northern lands of Nigeria. However, some buildings have
been completed on the Eastern and middle Belt wings. Meanwhile other buildings
are at foundation level at the Western wing corresponding to the western Lands of
128
Nigeria. With these buildings being erected, MOTNA was opened to the public
during the Pan African congress of 11th 17th December, 1983.
CENTRE FOR EARTH CONSTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY ( CECTECH) JOS
The move towards the commencement of the activities of the Centre for Earth
Construction Technology was initiated in 1987 at the then Lagos Headquarters of
the National Commission for Museums and Monuments. The Coordinating
Department was the Projects and Works Units, established to handle project on
direct labour basis for the Commission, headed by Arch. Sam Galadima, who
played the link between the French Government and the Commission.
A technical cooperation agreement was reached and the Centre for Earth
construction Technology was established and commissioned in Jos in September
1992. Arch. Valentine Ogunsusi was the pioneer head of the Centre.
The creation of CECTECH was meant to be an answer to the growing strong
pressure coming from builders, architects, Departments of Building and
Architecture in Universities and Polytechnics, small and medium scale industries
both in public and private sectors. The public had been requesting for technical and
practical information on building materials for low cost housing and wanted to
benefit from a specific academic and professional training or technical assistance
129
CHAPTER FIVE
130
131
Established around 1915 as a tin mining and transportation hub, its early history
was invariably related to the prosperity of the tin mining industry. Plateau State has
a predominant Christian population and Significant Muslim populations in three of
the 17 Local Government Areas (Jos North, Kanam and Wase). Located in the
North-central region of Nigeria, Plateau is endowed with a beautiful topography
comprising undulating hills and picturesque landscapes that serve as the coolest
weather among Nigerian states, a very attractive features for many, mid-1990s the
ethno-religious disparity and competing political interests in Jos in one hand and,
the Hausa-Fulani settler community on the other hand, had become poignant. This
has led to unprecedented tension and violence with devastating consequences, loss
of lives and property in 1994, 2001, 2002, 2008, 2009 and 2010. These violent
ethno-religious clashes have stealthily spread to other Local government areas and
communities in the state at large, incorporating other communal groups that were
earlier not part of the conflict. It is pertinent to note that as the crises spread to the
rural areas it took a guerilla warfare pattern where communities were ambushed,
people killed and displaced in increasingly large numbers on both sides of the
conflict.
This section gives a historical overview of some of the major ethno-religious
conflicts that have plagued Jos and the state at large with increasing frequency,
132
intensity and casualty since 1994 as well as the government intervention schemes
initiated to address them.
5.2 The 1994 Crisis
On the 12th April 1994 riot broke out in sections of the Jos metropolis leading to
the destruction of property and loss of lives. This was the first amongst several
outbreak of ethno-religious violence that have engulfed Jos and other parts of the
state.
Immediate Causes
The immediate causes of the crises was the appointment of Alhaji Aminu Mato, A
Hausa and Muslim, as Chairman, Caretaker Management Committee of Jos North
LGA by the Military Administrator of Plateau State, Col. Mohammed Maina.
While the choice was welcomed by the Hausa/Fulani community in Jos the
appointment was roundly rejected by the indigenous ethnic groups of Jos, the
Anaguta, Berom and Afizere. The Indigenous groups protested the appointment
and vowed not to allow Mato assume office on the grounds that he was a nonindigene. In a petition written to the Military Administrator, they demanded that he
should be replaced by an indigene. However, the Military Administrator went
ahead to swear in Alhaji Mato (Best, 2007). This fact of the origin of the crisis was
133
captured by the Fiberesima Commission of Inquiry into the riots of 1994. The
commission of inquiry maintained that:
From the evidence placed at the disposal of this commission, it is
obvious that the immediate cause of the crisis in Jos stemmed from the
appointment of Alhaji Aminu Mato as the chairman of the Caretaker
Managemnt Committee of Jos North LGA. Evidence showed that Alhaji
Aminu Mato was a Hausa-Fulani man. While his kinsmen noded
approval to his appointment, the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom tribes gave
it an outright rejection. A battle line was drawn between the tribes
(Plateau State Government, White paper, 2009:6).
The indigenous groups construed this act as a substantiation of their fears that the
government wanted to provide a foothold for the Hausa/Fulani to take up Political
hegemony in Jos. (Sha, 1998). In reaction, the indigenous groups barricaded the
LGA secretariat preventing the handing over ceremony. In view of the eminent
threat to security and palpable tension generated by these events, the Military Sole
Administrator ordered the director of personnel management to take over the
affairs of the council. This measure appeared to have calmed the nerves of the
indigenous group; nonetheless, it infuriated the Hausa/Fulani group who perceived
the act as a capitulation to intimidation of the indigenous groups by government.
This situation for the Hausa/Fulani was unacceptable. In reaction, they mobilized
their supporters for a mass protest. Hausa/Fulani butchers slaughtered animals on
the highway close to the abattoir in Jos as a form of protest. The protest later
resulted into a riot and violent confrontation with the indigenous groups causing
the death of 5 persons, the destruction of part of the Jos Ultramodern market, part
134
of the Gada Biyu market, an Islamic school and a Mosque along Rukuba Road
(Best, 2007:55; Ostien, 2007:12, Plateau State Government, 2009:6-7)
Remote Causes
The major remote causes of the 1994 crisis were:
- First, the competition for political power by the settler Hausa/Fulani group and
the indigenous ethnic groups the Afizere, Anaguta and the Berom in Jos North
LGA. According to the Fiberesima Commission of Inquiry;
A recurrent friction for may\ny years between the Berom, Anaguta,
Afizere tribes on one hand, and the Hausa-Fulani tribes on the other hand
is a remote cause of the riot. Each part lays claim on Jos. The Berom,
Anaguta, and Afizere claim that they are the indisputable indigenous
people of Jos, that the Hausas are settlers, strangers, who migrated for
various reasons which include commerce, employment and repair of
fortune. But the Hausa-Fulani contend that they, as owners of Jos, had
had the privilege of producing the rulers of the town since way back in
1902. They also claim political ascendancy over the other communities
at all time. This feeling of one having supremacy simmered for years
only to break out into open confrontation and riot on 12th April, 1994
(Plateau State Government, 2009:4)
- Second was the creation of Jos North LGA in 1991 out of the former Jos LGA.
This totally went against the wishes of the Anaguta, Afizere and Berom
communities who had submitted a memorandum for the creation of Federe
LGA out of Jos LGA. Majority of the indigenous group found themselves in Jos
South LGA while the Hausa/Fulani enjoyed pre-eminence in Jos North LGA.
Furthermore, the paramount ruler of Jos, the Gbong Gwom Jos was isolated in a
predominantly Hausa/Fulani area of Jos North. The indigenous groups
135
interpreted this as a conspiracy to take Jos away from them (Abdu (Date
unavailable).
Government Interventions and Strategies in Response to the 1994 Crisis
Security forces were drafted to the metropolis to restore law and order and
forestall further violence.
Many people were arrested by the security forces in connection with the riot.
The Plateau State Government led by the Military Administrator, Lt. Col.
Mohammed Mana, on 22nd April 1994 set up a commission of inquiry under
the following terms of reference.
a. To identify the individuals, group of person and institutions directly or
indirectly connected with the riots, and their roles in precipitating the
crisis.
b. To establish the remote and immediate causes of the riot in Jos
metropolis on the 12th April, 1994.
c. To identify causes and assess the property destroyed their owners and
those behind the destruction.
d. To apportion blames on persons or group of persons and recommend
appropriate action.
e. To recommend ways of avoiding future re-occurrences of such incident
f. To make any other recommendation incidental to the foregoing terms of
reference (Plateau State Government, 2009).
The commission which was inaugurated on the 22nd April, 1994, received written
memoranda, interviewed and cross-examined witnesses and visited affected areas.
At the end of its sitting, it submitted a report to the state government.
136
later led to his death. Infuriated by the incident, the Berom Kinsmen of the dead
man at Bukuru-Gyel reacted violently. A fight then broke out between the two
groups in the area resulting in the death of many people, mainly of the
Hausa/Fulani extraction.
The conflict did not spill over into other areas beyond Bukuru. However, it added
considerably to the increasing tension and deterioration in harmonious
relationships between the Hausa/Fulani community and the Berom in Jos and its
environs.
Remote Causes
Among the remote causes of this crisis were the past tensions and strained
relationship between the Hausa/Fulani in Jos and the Berom people.
138
On the 7th September, 2001 the city of Jos witnessed the first major outburst of
ethno-religious conflict in its history.
Immediate Causes
The proximate cause of the crisis was an altercation involving a Muslim
congregation and a young woman, Miss Rhoda Haruna Nyam, following an
attempt by her to pass through a road blocked by a Muslim congregation for their
Jumaat prayer at Congo-Russia area, a slum neighborhood in Jos. The
confrontation later degenerated into an orgy of violence between Christians and
Muslims that lasted from the 7th to the 12th of September, engulfing the whole city
and its environs (Best, 2007, Ostien 2007, HRW, 2001, Plateau State Government,
2009B). In its account of the genesis of the crisis, the Hon. Justice Niki Tobi
Commission of Inquiry noted that:
The crisis started when Miss Rhoda Nyam, in an attempt and effort to
pass and the refusal of the Muslim congregation to allow her pass during
the Jumaat prayers. It was agreed by the contending parties and indeed
by all witnesses who testified before the commission that the fracas
which sparked or set in motion the gruesome events of 7 th to 12th
September, 2001 occurred at the Congo-Russia area of Jos on a road just
in front of a small Mosque belonging to CW67, Alhaji Tijan Abdullahi. It
was a Friday and as usually was the case on all previous Friday
afternoons since 1996, the Muslims who normally held their Jumaat
prayer there had gathered to pray when CW17, Miss Rhoda Haruna
Nyam, a Christian, attempted to return to her place of work after her
lunch break as usual through the portion of the road blocked by the
worshippers. She was denied passage. These facts are echoed in virtually
all the memoranda which dealt with this aspect of the crisis (Plateau
State Government, 2009B: 12 13).
139
Death is the best friend of Hamas, be rest assured that we will do even better.
The seat is dearer to us than our lives in that case; do you have the monopoly of
violence? Blood for blood, we are ready (HRW, 2001:6).
There was a flurry of exchange of correspondences at the official level between the
indigenous groups and the state government on one hand, and between the
Hausa/Fulani groups and the state government, on the other hand. None of the
groups appeared willing to make any concession; rather the letters to the state
government from both groups were inflammatory. These verbal and written
exchanges made the fragile peace and tense situation even more volatile. From
September 7th to 13th, Jos became an arena of killing and devastation for the first
time in its contemporary history. Hundreds of people were killed and tens of
thousands displaced in less than one week. Violence suddenly erupted between
Christian and Muslims in a city where diverse communities had coexisted in
relative peace for years (HRW, 2001).
The police appeared to be totally impotent in stopping the killing and destruction
once it started. Thus, the violence spread like wildfire, raging on until the 13 th
when most of the killings and destruction ceased. Most victims of violence were
attacked on the basis of their religion. The areas most affected by the hostilities
were Angwan Rogo, a slum-like neighbourhood close to the Bauchi Campus of the
University of Jos, Congo-Russian where the fighting started, Nassarawa Gwom,
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Ali Kazaure, Jenta-Adamu, Jenta-Mangoro and Rikkos. The violence which started
within the township eventually spread beyond Jos to other places within the state.
Tens of thousands were displaced, without food, water or shelter. According to the
Norwegian Refugee Council (2002) more than 30,000 people were displaced and
took refuge in schools, churches, mosques, police stations and barracks, colleges
and other public and private buildings around Jos ad environs. Human Right
Watch (2001), an international rights organization, believed that more than 1,000
persons were killed in the conflict. The Niki Tobi Judicial Commission of Inquiry
put the total number of deaths at 904. In terms of property destroyed, according to
the Nikki Tobi Judicial Commission of Inquiry individuals and organizations
made a total claim of N3,369,716,404.95 (Plateau State Government, 2009b).
The effect of the 2001 Jos Crisis was also felt in other parts of the country, as it
resulted in reprisal attacks. In most Northern states, tension was palpable. In Kano,
Muslim mobs protested and attacked a church on September 10 th. There were
reports of Igbo mobs attacking the Hausa in Onitsha after some Igbos fleeing the
violence in Jos brought back the bodies of some Igbo killed in the conflict. About
seven Hausas were killed in that confrontation. Violence as a result of the news of
killings in Jos was witnessed in many south-eastern cities. Violence against
Hausas was recorded in Uyo, the Akwa-Ibom state capital.
Remote Causes
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One of the remote causes of the crisis of 2001 was the contest over the ownership
of Jos. The Afizere, Anaguta and Berom claim Jos as their ancestral home while
the Hausa, and to some extent the Fulani, also lay claim to the ownership of the
city (Plateau State Government, 2009b). This dispute had over the years caused a
strain in relationship between the Hausa/Fulani community and the indigenous
Afizere, Anaguta and Berom which had become more visible since 1994 in the
competition for political positions. These contestations have largely been left
unsolved. Thus, the 1990s were characterized by a revival of identity politics this
time centering on the control of Jos North Local Government Area created from
the former Jos Local government in 1991. The creation seemed to have boosted the
Hausa/Fulani hegemonic control of political power in the Local government
(Sha,1998). The competing claims over the ownership of Jos have been dealt with
extensively by the Fiberesima and Niki Tobi Judicial Commission of Inquiry of
1994 and 2001 respectively. Related to the issue of ownership is also that of
indigeneship. The Hon. Justice Niki Tobi Commission of Inquiry noted that:
The issue of indigeneship took a centre in the memoranda presented
before the commission. It caused so much controversy and bad blood.
There were two clearly opposing camps. The three tribes of Afizere,
Anaguta and Berom said in evidence that they are the only indigenes of
Jos. They went further to say that no other tribe, including the Hausa and
the Fulanis, are indigenes of the town. They tendered quite a number of
exhibits to buttress their claim. On the other hand, the Hausas and the
Fulanis also claimed to be indigenes of Jos. They said so in so many
words in both their memoranda and oral evidence. They did not deny the
indigeneship of the Afizere, Anaguta and the Berom. All they said was
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that in addition to the three tribes, they are also indigenes. Indigeneship
is a thorny problem in the sociology and culture of Nigeria. It causes
perennial problem in our polity. Crises are experienced regularly in the
country as a result of problems of indigeneship (Plateau State
Government, 2009B: 57 58).
Government Interventions and Strategies for Restoring Peace in 2001
Deployment of security forces to restore law and order, and also arrest
perpetrators.
The imposition of curfew to limit movement. The curfew time was between
dusk to draw at the initial period but was lengthened to start from 4:00pm to
7:00am. It was later relaxed to 6:00pm to 6:00am.
The constitution of the Hon. Justice Niki Tobi Judicial Commission of
Inquiry by the state government with the following terms of reference:
i.
To investigate the immediate and remote causes of the crisis
ii.
To identify persons or group of persons responsible for the crisis
iii. To establish the extent of damage to properties and loss lives
iv.
To obtain any other relevant information or facts and
v.
To suggest or recommend ways to forestall future reoccurrence.
(Plateau State Government, 2009B).
The setting up of the Justice Suleiman Galadima Judicial Commission of
Inquiry: The terms of references for this panel are not clear. However, the
panel was later tasked with investigating how 22 detainees in Jos prison
were killed during an attempted jail break on 9 th September, 2001. The
connection of the incident to the Jos crisis is not clear except for the timing
which coincided with the Jos crisis.
The convening of peace summit for elders, religious leaders, youth leaders,
trade union leaders, women leaders, traditional and community leaders, and
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The immediate causes of the conflict were the desire to win as many positions as
possible in the ward congress. In this regard, the Hausa/Fulani group came to the
congress with a formidable number of supporters in Lorries and open trucks,
estimated according to some sources at about 60,000 persons. The large number of
Hausa/Fulani supporters at the venue and the neighborhood created a lot of tension
and panic among the indigenous groups who suspect that the supporters may be
mercenaries imported to come and overwhelm them (Best, 2007).
Pandemonium broke out almost immediately and a free for all fight ensued
between the two groups. Before order could be restored many had been killed,
injured and vehicles, mostly belonging to the Hausa/Fulani set ablaze or
vandalized. At the outbreak, news of the violence spread to other parts of the city,
escalation of hostilities was prevented by the timely intervention of the security
forces, halting the carnage in its first day. This outbreak of violence further
deepened the hatred and bitterness between the two groups who were still
recovering from the conflict of September 2001. As consequence of this conflict,
the few Muslims that were residing in the Eto Baba and Angwan Rukuba area
relocate to areas where Muslims had numerical advantage and felt more secure.
Consequently, the relocation of people to comfort zones: neighbourhoods where
members of their faith predominate, became a pattern after these conflicts (Best,
2007: 76-77).
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Langtang south, wase, Mikang, Shendam and Quanpan. The areas mainly affected
in this round of violence were Wase LGA, Langtang south LGA, Langtang North
LGA and Yelwa in Shendam LGA. While these conflicts each had their dynamics,
it appears that the crisis in Jos and environs provided the impetus for the gradual
escalation of the conflict in the region. These violent confrontations between ethnic
and religious identity groups started in Yelwa in Shendam LGA and Wase towns
and villages in the surrounding LGAs.
5.6.2 The Yelwa-Shendam Conflict 2002 2004
Yelwa is a cosmopolitan settlement in a predominantly Goemai speaking area in
Shendam LGA. Its composition is made up of people from various ethnic
nationalities with a predominance of Hausa/Fulani and Jarawa who have migrated
to the areas since the late 19th century. Much of the Yelwa inhabitants identity
themselves as Jarawa originating from Dass (Bauchi State) rather than Hausa,
although their lingua franca and culture is now Hausa. It is a commercial hub in the
zone and boast of a large market which is partronized by both people from the zone
and from the neighbouring states of Nasarawa and Taraba. Yelwa is
administratively under Shendam LGA, which has its headquarters in Shendam
town, about 2o kilometers away. Shendam residents and surrounding areas are
predominantly Christians (Higazi, 2008).
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In June, 2002, a clash between the mainly Muslim Hausa-Fulani and Jarawa, and
Taroh and Goemai who are predominantly Christians with significant practitioners
of African Traditional Religion led to the destruction of a number of places of
worship, homes, property and the loss of lives.
Immediate Causes
The immediate cause of this violence according to some (Christian) sources is the
prohibition on relationships that Christians placed between their women with
Muslim men which led to a fight on the street in the Angwan Pandam area of the
town on the night of 26th June, resulting in the death of a Christian man. Muslims
on the other hand maintained that the crisis started when masquerades were seen
coming towards the town brandishing dangerous weapons, from their shrine at
Angwan Pandam during a Taroh traditional festival that same night. Muslims claim
that the masquerades were part of an armed group, triggering the start of violence
when a Muslim youth was killed and the mosque burned in Angwan Pandam
(Higazi, 2008, HRW, 2005).
Remote Causes
Prior to this confrontation, relationships between Christians and Muslims had been
tense due to many factors which were both internally embedded in the local
political of the town and the zone at large. Other factors like external influences
150
might have also added to the tension. Among the most significant internal remote
causes of violence, were the competition for tradition, political power and also the
ownership of the town. According to Higazi, (2008:12).
The lead-up to the violence in Yelwa was marked by a political crisis centered on a
dispute over political power in the town. This came to head in May, 2002 when
new districts were created in the southern senatorial zone of Plateau State. Yelwa is
majority Muslim in population, but rather than being made a separate district, it
was placed within Nshar district under the authority of Shendam, a Goemai
(mainly Catholic) town. This gave political recognition to Goemi claims to
indigeneity in the area, rather than to Muslim in Yelwa, and to the Control of the
long Goemai (the Goemai paramount ruler) over Yelwa. Although the chief in
Yelwa would likely be a Muslim, he would be appointed directly by the long
Goemai, rather than selected from among his constituency and formally installed
by the Long Goemai. Muslims in Yelwa wanted their own district as a step towards
the creation of new local government area. That would provide financial
opportunities for the local elite and raise the profile of Yelwa in Plateau Politics.
Thus, when the new districts were created by the state government, the Muslim
community was outraged. Best (2007:129) reports that,
Certain groups such as the traditional title holders of Yelwa and
another group called the Yelwa Community and some Muslim
inhabitants were unhappy with the exercise and especially with the citing
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of the headquarters of the new districts. They reasoned that they were
being robbed of a historical heritage through the exercise, as areas that
previously belonged to them were being placed under district heads that
were not their own . . . They blamed the powers that be, namely the
Shendam traditional council (chaired by the Long Goemai), backed by
the speaker of the Plateau State governor dated 23 April, 2002. When the
new districts were being inaugurated on 21st May, 2002, they showed
their displeasure by staging a protest through burning and setting
bonfires on major roads in Yelwa. Some overzealous protestors seized
the opportunity to also destroy a Church signpost, further rubbing in the
religious factor in the problem.
Furthermore, tension was generated in March 2002 by a difference in opinion at
the ward congress of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). In an account of the
events at the ward congress, Higazi (2008:12) maintained that Muslims wanted the
existing chairman to continue in office; Christians on the other hand, wanted the
position rotated. A Christian candidate was presented and the position was
contested in an open ballot option A4 style. A fight broke out between the two
groups of voters who had queued behind their candidates according to religion.
Many people were injured but no death was recorded. The election was cancelled,
however, since Muslims were in the majority in that part of the ward, their
candidate was appointed as the PDP ward chairman.
Other local issues of disagreement between the two ethnic groups which were also
remote causes of the crisis as mentioned earlier included inter-ethnic and
interreligious relationships. Marriage between Goemai girls and Hausa/Fulani men
had increased tension between the two groups preceding the conflict. The attempt
152
by Christian youth vigilante group in Yelwa to prevent Christian girls from having
relationships with Muslim men had significantly increased the anxiety between the
two groups. Another local issue of concern was the practice of blocking of the road
in the town by Muslim adherents during their Jumaat prayers; this constituted an
irritation for the Christian population. Despite intervention by the local government
authority, the long Goemai, who is the first class paramount ruler in the area and
the ban on the blocking of road for Jumaat prayer by the state government
following the Jos Crisis of September 2001, the practice persisted (Best, 2007).
In the aftermath of the June, 2002 clashes in Yelwa, mainly internally displaced
people moved to areas where their kin predominated and hoped to enjoy relative
security. Most people of Hausa-Fulani extraction moved to Wase, Lafia and Bauchi
while some of the Taroh relocated to Langtang North and Langtang South. This
movement aided in catalyzing conflict in other areas. For instance there were
reprisal attacks in Langtang South LGA which led to reprisals in Wase, with the
killing of Christians, leading to escalation of the conflict in the whole zone with
devastating consequences (Blench and Dendo, 2003). The Tarohs and Fulanis, who
had hitherto maintained a good relationship, were now in conflict.
By early 2004, many people who fled the violence of 2002 had returned as a result
of appeals and peace building initiative by the state government and nongovernmental agencies. On February 24, 2004, the fragile peace was once again
153
and properties were completely destroyed at the end of the siege which lasted to
the 3rd of May, 2004. At least 660 Muslims were believed to have died in the
violence and almost the whole population of the town was displaced turning the
area into a ghost town. According to Human Rights Watch (2010) the actual
casualty figure may well be higher. Once again people were displaced to
neighboring states were they took refuge. This resulted in reprisal killings in some
Northern states like Kano.
5.6.3 The Wase Conflict
Wase is the largest LGA in Plateau state in terms of land mass. The emirate of
Wase was founded as a vassal of Bauchi in about 1820 when jihadist forces
conquered the Basharawa. The earliest inhabitants of Wase were the Jukuns. The
two dominant ethnic groups are probably the Fulani and Taroh with the Jukun
constituting a minority. Other ethnic groups such as the Kwalla, Mwaghavul, Ngas
and Montol have also migrated to fertile plains of Wase in search of farmland. The
predominant economic activity in this area is agriculture and centre rearing. The
conflict that engulfed the southern senatorial zone from 2002 to 2004 also has
Wase as one of its major flashpoints (Higazi, 2008.)
155
Immediate Causes
The immediate cause of the Wase crisis was related to the events at YelwaShendam. While the conflict has its own dynamics, It was significantly related to
and driven by the conflict in other parts of the southern zone, most particularly, the
conflict at Yelwa-Shendam. The Wase conflict could be said to have been propelled
as a spill-over of Yelwa crisis which saw reprisal killings against Muslims and the
expulsion of Fulani herdsmen from Langtang south LGA into Wase. This marked
the beginning of a wider crisis in southern senatorial zone. (Blench and Dendo,
2003; Best, 2007: Higazi, 2008).
While much of the violence in Wase was between Hausa/Fulani Muslims and
Christian Tarohs, it is obvious that Christians more generally were a target of
Muslim attacks. The religious bearing of the violence was also expressed in the
destruction of churches and mosques. A precedent replicated throughout the
southern zone. One of the events that gave momentum to the crisis in Wase was the
killing of four prominent Taroh elders by Hausa-Fulani. The elders who were
invited to a peace meeting by the Emir of Wase on the 3 rd, July 2002 were
assassinated outside Wase town on their way back. Many Taroh people were of the
perception that the elders were set up and killed at the instigation of the Emir.
While the Emirate exempted itself from this incident, the killings were significant
156
in fanning the feelings of resentment ad animosity between the Taroh and the
Emirate (Best, 2007: 153). As further noticed:
Armed with this feeling, The Taroh have dismissed the subsequent peace
efforts of the Emir of Wase, and accuse him of importing anti-Taroh
mercenaries to the area. Some examples given include (a) The Emir
visited the Ponzi Taroh, the prominent traditional ruler of the Taroh in
Langtang to assure him of the safety of the Taroh people in Wase, but did
the opposite: (b) The Emir toured Taroh villages in Wase such as Farin
Ruwa and Wadatan Kasuwa to assure them that all was well, but
afterwards, the villages were wiped out by mercenary attacks that
followed (Best, 2007: 153).
On Thursday, 4th July, 2002, it was alleged that five Muslims were killed on their
farms one man at Mai Alewa, in southern Wase, and four at the village of Kogin
Kassa, the outskirt of Wase town. On the same day, Christians were attached in
town, the seat of the emirate predominantly Muslim in population. Several people
were killed and churches, houses and properties were destroyed. As a consequence
all Christians fled the town. Violent clashes and the burning of houses which
followed also made people to flee villages around Wase town, including Kuka,
where around 25 Taroh people were killed on 5th July and Saluwe, where at least 32
Boghom and Fulani villagers were killed between 5th 6th July. Wase town was
subsequently attacked numerous times by Taroh militias in retaliation. The greatest
loss of life in Wase town occurred on the Saturday 19 th April, when about 37
residents and two soldiers were killed during a Taroh raid. It was estimated that
closed to a hundred villages in Wase were destroyed or badly damaged during the
157
159
The early stage of the wase conflict in 2001 was rooted in the dispute over
ownership of farmland (USAID, 2010). The contest over land is not necessitated
by scarcity of land in the LGA but, it springs from the system of land
administration. The Taroh and other non- Hausa/Fulani groups are excluded from
claiming or owing land. The emirate of Wase owned the land under a practice
called Noma Jida. The implication of this practice was that the Tarohs and other
ethnic group pay rent on the land, a practice similar to feudalism, in most cases
giving a significant portion of their agricultural produce to the land owners, in this
instance the Hausa/Fulani. This has aggravated the animosity between the Taroh
and the Hausa/Fulani. The Taroh have always maintained that they inhabited Wase
before the establishment of the emirate; therefore they see no basis for paying rent
on the land (Best, 2007).
5.6.4 Government Interventions and Strategies to Restore Peace in the
Southern Senatorial Zone and the State at Large in 2004.
The Justice Okpene Commission of Inquiry set up by the Federal
Government to look into the conflict of the middle belt zone (Plateau,
Nassarawa, Benue and Taraba), of the country concluded its hearings and
submitted its report to the presidency in April 2003.
160
Aerial surveillance: this was concerned with the use of helicopters for aerial
surveillance of the zone with the view of detecting and checking crossborder attacks and widespread cases of cattle rustling by militias.
The setting up of special peace committees: these committees were tasked
with re-opening communication and dialogue among rival communities in
the zone. Their terms of reference were to:
a. Identify the conflict parties in the area,
b. Hold dialogue and consultations with the parties with a view to resolve
and reconcile their differences,
c. Ensure the cessation of hostilities and work for the attainment of true
among the parties.
d. Guarantee safe and smooth passage along the highways and other routes
in the area.
e. Make any recommendation that will enhance the restoration of lasting
peace.
A census of internally displaced persons (IDPS) was conducted by a
committee set up by the emergency government to ascertain the number of
IDPS with a view of making provision for relief management, resettlement
and rehabilitation. The committee collaborated significantly with the
National Commission for refugees in the presidency. The terms of reference
of the committee were to:
a. Identify and ascertain the number and location of all IDPS with and
outside the state.
b. Authenticate the claims of IDPs on place of domicile prior to
displacement,
162
like normal high courts and magistrates court except that they were
supposed to deal only with cases arising from the conflict. It is not clear if
anyone has been prosecuted by these courts (HRW, 2005).
elections but for the rigging at the new collation centre at Kabong Gada-Biyu. This
was the first election in Jos-North LGA since 1999 (Gofwen, 2011:35). Ambe-Uva,
(2010:49) reported that,
During the election, the PDP chairmanship aspirant, Timothy Buba
polled 92,907 votes to beat his closest rival from ANPP, Aminu Baba
with 72,890 votes. The PDP also won 16 out of the 17 local
governments. It was the alleged rigging at the newly created
controversial collation centre at Kabong, Ali Kazaure, which triggered
the crisis.
Human right watch (2009:4) also described the crisis:
But in the early morning hours of Friday, November 28, following
allegations that the governing PDP had rigged the election results, groups
of young men from Muslim and Christian communities came together to
both defend their neighbourhoods from attacks, and to attack the homes,
business, and religious establishments of the opposing side. These mobs
were armed with machetes, knives, petrol bombs, rocks, sticks, and in
some cases firearms, including locally made hunting rifles and pistols.
The vast majority of both perpetrators and victims were young men,
although some 50 women and children were also killed. The violence
was primarily concentrated in the neighbourhoods of Ali Kazaure, Tudun
Wada, Nasarawa, Rikkos, Dutse Uku, Congo Russia, Congo Junction,
Angwan Keke, Bulbulla and Angwan Rogo.
Most reports have it that some people from the Ali Kazaure area, a largely MuslimHausa neighborhood in the city started protesting the outcome of the Local
Government Election results and became violent following speculations that their
candidate lost the elections. This violence subsequently escalated as rampaging
youths went about looting business premises, setting fire on properties, shops,
homes, churches, and vehicles, subsequently, the crisis took a religious dimension
as the crisis spread to the various parts. According to the police testimony at the
165
Hon. Justice Ajibola Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the unrest of the 28 th
November, 2008, the crisis started when,
As early as between 0230 0330 hours of 28 th November, 2008,
information filtered to the police that some Muslim youths were holding
nocturnal meetings at Muslim dominated areas and soon thereafter there
were reports of people shouting Allahu-Akbar along Ali Kazaure street
and other Muslim dominated areas in Jos North (Report of the Plateau
State Judicial Commission of Inquiry of November 2008, Vol. One, P.
24).
The police testimony was elaborated further in the report of the commission,
The Muslim youths, C.P Samson Wudah continued, mounted road blocks
in some places and at about 0500 to o530 hours attempted an incursion
into the collation centre which was repelled by the police and thereafter
the burning of churches, houses, maiming and killing of non-Muslims in
some Hausa/Fulani Muslim dominated areas of Laranto, Nasarawa
Gwom and Angwan Rogo began (report of the Plateau State Judicial
Commission of Inquiry of November 2008, Vol. 1.P.24).
The testimony of the Plateau State independent electoral commission (PLASIEC)
and other witnesses at the panel corroborated the position of the police on the
immediate cause of the crisis (Gofwen, 2011:37). According to the memorandum
submitted by PLASIEC,
While the results of the election were being collated in all the 17 local
governments of the state, information reached the commissions office
through security reports that trouble had started around Ali Kazaure
Street when the results of the election were not even announced. The
information was that properties were being destroyed or burnt and
fighting has ensured in various parts of Jos North (P. 24-25).
The commission of Inquirys position on the immediate cause of the crisis is
summarized as follows:
166
From this evidence and indeed the totality of the evidence placed before
this commission, it becomes very clear that the immediate cause of the
November 28 crisis in Jos North was the violent attack by the
Hausa/Fulani Muslim youths on the people and against the properties of
the people they perceived as their opponents. This violence started at Ali
Kazaure spreading to other Hausa/Fulani Muslim dominated areas in Jos
North. Their opponents too reacted in self-defense and Jos North local
government was engulfed in unrest. There is no doubt at all that the
Hausa/Fulani Muslim youths started the unrest but the Christians too
reacted in self-defense and also attack the Hausa/Fulani Muslims . . .we
however think that the wanton destruction of lives and properties that
took place during the crisis cannot be justified by a perceived attempt to
rig an election. After all, the result of the election had not been
announced at the time the crisis broke out. Even if the elections were
rigged, there are constitutional ways of seeking redress at the electoral
tribunals. PLASIEC in its presentation before the commission stated that
the outcome of the chairmanship election in the November 27 local
government election for Jos North was not challenged before the local
government election petition tribunal. Unfortunately, this means that the
aggrieved parties rather than following the rule of law chose the path of
lawlessness, mayhem, destruction and jungle justice, more worrisome is
the pattern of the attack. Places of worship rather than party offices were
the targets of attack. Individuals were attacked based on their religious
learning rather than political learning. The whole crisis took a religious
dimension. (P. 27-30).
Areas most affected by the crisis are Katako, Congo-Russia, Tudun Wada, Ali
Kazaure, Rikkos, Sarkin Mangu, Angwan Rogo, Angwan Rimi, Farin Gada,
Dilimi, Nassarawa Gwom and Bauchi Road (HRW, 2009). Others areas such as
Jenta, Zaria Road, Kwararafa and Apata were also not spared. The carnage led to
the death of an estimated 1000 persons in two days of fighting while more than
30,000 persons were displaced according to some unconfirmed sources (HRW,
2009). Even as the police and the army suppressed the violence and created a
buffer zone between the conflicting groups, reprisal attacks were witnessed in
167
several locations in the city and its environs. Many of the displaced took refuge in
Para-military and military institutions such as the Air force Base in Jos, Maxwell
Khobe Cantonment Rukuba, NDLEA base Rikkos and the Police Headquarters
(Gofwen, 2011:38).
Among the casualties of the crisis were also innocent travelers caught in the
crossfire who were passing through Jos on their way to other destinations. Because
of the location of Jos, it strategically links most of the North-East with Abuja.
Similarly most of the people traveling from Lagos, Port Harcourt, Onitsha and
other parts of the south-east and south south to part of the North-East pas through
Jos. Consequently many travelers were caught in the conflict. There were
allegations of fake soldiers, armed mercenaries and the use of military uniforms
by unknown persons. Human Rights Watch, (2009) alleged that the military and
police used excessive force in some instance in suppressing the violence.
It is estimated that more than 46 churches were vandalized and set ablaze with a
number of clergy killed. Similarly, numerous mosques were burnt, destroyed or
vandalized in some neighborhoods in which reprisal attacks took place. In the same
manner, many homes were vandalized or completely burnt down in various
neighborhood rendering residents homeless. The destruction was more intense at
Ali Kazaure where the crisis was reported to have started, Nassarawa Gwom,
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Bauchi road and Tudun Wada where residents of such homes were either killed or
displaced (HRW, 2009:5).
In the Katako area, the timber section, building materials, the foodstuff market and
the palm oil section of the market were vandalized and razed also leading to loss of
millions of naira by innocent Nigerians trying to earn a living (HRW, 2009).
Institution of learning were also affected by the carnage. Schools were set ablaze in
farin Gada, Ali Kazaure, zaria road, Nassarawa Gwom and Dogon Dutse. Hundred
of vehicles for sale comprising of trucks, van and cars were burnt down at AlheriZaria Road. The area is the hub of car dealership in Jos. Many motor vehicles were
also set ablaze in various parts of the city where the crisis was intense (HRW,
2009).
Remote Cause
Similar to the 2001 crisis, the remote cause of the violence was the competition for
political dominance and the contest over the ownership of Jos. As noted earlier, the
Afizere, Anaguta and Berom claim Jos as their ancestral land while the Hausa and
to some extent the Fulani also lay claims to the ownership of the city. These
disagreement had over the years caused a strain in relationship between the
Hausa/Fulani community and the indigenous groups-Afizere, Anaguta and Berom
(USAID, 2009:10) which had become more visible since 1994 in the competition
for political positions and power in general following the appointment of one of
169
their own as sole administrator of Jos North LGA. These disagreements had largely
been left unsolved amidst the controversy surrounding the creation of Jos North
LGA. In general the competition for hegemony in Jos North LGA between the two
groups underscores the Jos November 2008 crisis (Ambe-Uva, 2010).
The Hon. Justice Ajibola Judicial Commission of Inquiry of unrest of November
2008 in Jos also identified the same remote cause of the crisis. The report of the
commission states that:
The ownership of Jos between the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom on one
hand and the Hausa/Fulani on the other is in issue and has been a source
of acrimony for a long time. As earlier stated, the Justice Aribiton
Fiberesima and Niki Tobi Commission Inquiry set up to investigate the
civil unrest of 12th April, 1994 and 7th September, 2001 respectively in
Jos town identified ownership of Jos town as a major remote cause of
these two previous crises. These two commissions considered and
resolved the ownership of Jos in favour of Afizere, Anaguta and
Berom with the decisions and findings of the two commissions on the
ownership of Jos coupled with the Plateau Resolves of 2004, one
would have thought that the ownership of Jos settled in 2004. In exhibits
JCI/J/31/2009/2 and JCI/J/135/2009/4 which are the booklets widely
circulated by the Hausa/Fulani shortly before the November, 2008 crisis
and the advertorial published by coalition of Jasawa Elders in the Daily
Trust Newspaper of 12th January, 2009 the Hausa/Fulani claimed
ownership of Jos. It is the same old stories. Since no new fact has been
adduced by the Hausa/Fulani to the evidence presented before the
Fiberesima and Niki Tobi commissions to dislodge the findings and
conclusions of the commissions, on the ownership of Jos. Indeed we
align ourselves with those findings and conclusions (P. 38-39)
Furthermore the commission also identified the non-implementation of previous
reports into crises in Jos. According to the report of the commission:
170
171
(a) Establish the Remote and Immediate Causes of the November 2008 Jos
unrest.
(b) Identify individuals. Groups of persons and institutions directly or
indirectly responsible for the unrest and their roles in precipitating the
unrest recommend appropriate sanctions.
(c) Ascertain the extent of loss of lives and damage to property:
(d) Recommend ways of avoiding the re occurrence of such unrest in future
and
(e) Make any other recommendations incidental t the commissions terms of
reference (Plateau State Government, 2009C).
The commission has since finished it work and has submitted its report to the state
government. No white paper on the report has been release o the public (Gofwen,
2011:42).
The Emmanuel Abisoye Panel of Investigation into the Jos crisis by the
Federal Government with the following terms of reference
(a) To examine the impact of the crisis on national security,
(b) To assess the impact of the crisis on peace, order and good governance
(c) To examine the extent of involvement of foreign nationals )if any)
(d) To examine the extent of the use of light weapons ammunition and
explosive and
(e) Identify their sources as well as make any other recommendation as may
be deemed appropriate under the circumstance (Federal Government of
Nigeria. 2009).
An ad-hoc panel by the National Assembly was also constituted to look into
the Jos crisis.
172
The State House of Assembly set up a Committee to look into the details of
the November, 28th crisis.
Both state and federal government promised to deal with the perpetrators of
the conflict within the bounds of the law.
5.8 The January, 2010 Crisis
On Sunday 17th January 2010 fighting erupted once again in Jos. The clashes
which started at Jarawa area of Fraka district, near Dutse Uku around the
Nasarawa Gwom area soon spread to other parts of the city.
Immediate Cause
There is no definite position on the immediate cause of the conflict. However,
some sources maintain that the crisis was triggered when a mob of Muslim
youths besieged the ECWA Church in the Nasarawa-Gwom area. Another
source had it that the clashes started when a Muslim man whose house was
burned during the 2008 crisis at Nassarawa-Gwomm area attempted to rebuild it
but was prevented from doing so by his Christian neighbours. According to
Stephanos Foundation (2010), a non-governmental organization that concluded
a research into the conflict in that area,
Various accounts reveal that one Kabiru NEPA (as he is called in the
area) a staff of Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN), brought in
some over 200 Muslim men to rebuild his house on Sunday, 17th January
2010, Kabirus house is one of those burnt during the 28th November
173
(1994, 2001, and 2008). The pattern remained the same as in the previous ones.
Christians in general and indigenous groups on one side, while Muslims and the
Hausa/Fulani on the other (Gofwen, 2011:45).
5.8.1 Government Intervention and Strategies in 2010
The creation of the special Joint Military Task force with the duty of
maintaining law and order in Jos and Environs under the command of the
GOC of the 3rd Armored division, Rukuba, Major Gen. Saleh Maina. The
task force was initially made up of personnel from the army, air force and
the Navy but later included the police.
Imposition of a 24hours curfew on the city and environs. This was later
relaxed to 10:00pm to 5:00am.
Reinforcement of the security apparatus in Jos and its environs (Gofwen,
2011:45).
5.9 The Dogo-Nahawa Massacre of 7th March, 2010
Dog-Nahawa, Rasat and Zat are rural communities within a 5km distance from
each other. Dogo-Nahawa is less than three kilometers from Du village were the
personal residence of Governor, Jonah Jang is located. These villages are
predominantly populated by the Berom who are Christians. All these villages are
located in Du district of Jos-South LGA. In the early morning hours of the 7 th
March, 2010 a group of armed men suspected to be a Fulani pastoralist militia
176
177
179
The group, which also vowed to sustain violent attacks on the city which
it named suldaniyya, added that it was also behind another blast in a
church in Borno State that claimed four lives last Friday. In a statement
posted on its website (Http://mansoorah.net/sb_attacks.php), the group
said the Jos attacks were carried out in retaliation for the atrocities
committed against Muslims in the city and the country in general. It
said that it was operating under the leadership of Abu Muhammad and
Abubakar bin Muhammad Shekau, and reminded Muslims that Allah
and enjoined them to make provisions for fighting the disbelievers,
since they (disbelievers) are fighting Islam and its faithfully (Punch, 28 th
December 2010).
There was however no independent verification of this claim of responsibility by
the group.
Remote Cause
The remote cause of this attack remains the same as the previous conflicts in Josthe contest over the ownership of Jos. The Afizere, Anaguta and Berom claim Jos
as their ancestral home while the Hausa and to some extent the Fulani also lay
claims on the ownership of the city. This dispute has over the years caused strain in
relations between the Hausa-Fulani community and the indigenous groups. These
disputes as earlier mentioned had largely been left unsolved.
Government Interventions and Strategy
180
The Injured were taken to Bingham University Teaching Hospital and the
Jos University Teaching Hospital for treatment at government expense
(Gofwen, 2011:48).
Reinforcement of the security apparatus in Jos and environs. Soldiers were
deployed to Jos from the Maxwel Khobe Cantonment, Rukuba and from the
Army Barracks in Bauchi. Additional divisions of mobile police men were
also deployed to Jos to forestall more clashes.
Partly because of the bombing in Jos, the Federal Government announced
the appointment of a special adviser on terrorism in January 2011. The
National Assembly passed a new anti-terrorism bill in February
2011(Gofwen, 2011:48).
181
CHAPTER SIX
An Assessment of the Impact of Violence on Tourism and Hospitality Sector
on the Plateau.
Chi-Square Formula
2
2=
(OE)
E
Where
O = Observed values
E = Expected values
Ho: Violence has no significant impact on the tourism and hospitality in Plateau
State
H1: Violence has a significant impact in the tourism and hospitality in Plateau
State.
Test of Hypothesis
Table of Observed Frequency
S/
Frequency
Number of respondents
Total
4.2
6.2
26
54.2
80.2
16
33.3
49.3
3.3
12.3
48
100
148
183
E = RT/GT x CT
Where
E
Expected Values
RT
Row total
GT
Grand total
CT
Column total
6.2
26/48 x100
80.2
16/48 x100
49.3
4/48 x100
12.3
4.2/100x148
6.2
54.2/100 x 148
80.2
33.3/100 x 148
49.3
8.3/100 x 148
12.3
TABLE OF CHI-SQUARE
184
(O-E)
(O-E)2
6.2
-4.2
17.6
2.8
26
802
-54.2
2937.6
36.6
16
49.3
-33.3
1108.8
22.5
12.3
-8.3
68.8
5.6
4.2
6.2
-2
0.6
54.2
80.2
-26
676
8.5
33.3
49.3
-16
256
5.2
8.3
12.3
-4
16
1.3
Observed
Expected
(O)
(E)
(OE)
E
83.1
0.711
Comments
Since x2 calculated is greater than x2 tabulated, the null hypothesis (Ho) is hereby
rejected while alternative hypothesis (H1) is accepted which says violence has a
significant impact in the tourism hospitality sector in Plateau State.
The age bracket of the respondent shows the 54.2% are within the age range of 26
35 years, being the highest while those within the age range of 15 25 were the
lowest with 4.2%. See Figure 6.1.
1. What is your age bracket?
Number of participant
48
4.2% : 15-25
54.2% : 26-35
33.3% : 36-45
8.3% : 46 and
above
The education qualifications of the respondent indicated that 83.7% have attended
one tertiary Institution or the other, while 36.7% are private sector workers while
those in the Government sector falls behind in 34.7%. See figure 6.2
186
Tertiary 83.7%
Others 16.3%
Primary 0%
Secondary 0%
Figure 6.2
On the assessment of the level of tourism on the Plateau, 33.3% of the respondents
opined that the tourism level in the state is at the average level. 22.2% agreed that
it is fair, while 17.8% said it is good. (Figure 6.3 and Table 6.3)
Assessment
Very Good
Good
Average
Fair
Poor
Indifferent
Frequency
6
8
15
10
6
0
45
Frequency %
13.3
17.8
33.3
22.2
13.3
-
Table 6.3
What is your assessment on the level of tourism in Plateau State?
Of the number of tourists that have visited the various tourist sites in the state,
45.2% said they are not satisfied with the facilities and arrangement met at the
sites. 38.1% expressed satisfaction while 16.7% are indifferent (Fig 6.4).
Are you usually satisfied after such visit?
Yes 38.10%
No 45.20%
Indifferent 16.70%
Frequency
16
19
7
42
Frequency %
38.1
45.2
16.7
Table 6.4
The National Museum, Jos accounted for 44.2% of the total number of tourists to
the state, while the Jos wild life park accounted for 34.9% of the tourists while
other tourist destinations in the state showed 21% (Fig. 6.5 and Table 6.5).
Which tourist site do you visit most?
188
Jos museum
44.20%
Amusement park
2.30%
Rayfield Resort
4.70%
Others 14.00%
Tourist Sites
Jos museum
Wildlife Park
Amusement Park
Ray field resort
Other
Frequency
19
15
1
2
6
43
Frequency %
44.2
34.9
2.3
4.7
14
Table 6.5
When asked if they think that security is a challenge in Plateau state regarding the
tourism sector? 41 respondents representing 93.2% answered Yes while 2.3%
answered No and 4.5% stated that they dont know (Fig 6.6)
Do you think security is a challenge in Plateau State regarding the Tourism sector?
Yes 93.2%
No 2.3%
I don't Know 4.5%
Frequency %
41
1
2
44
93.2
2.3
4.5
Table 6.6
93.3% also agreed that tourism sector can lead to economic growth and
development in the state if security concern is addressed. The remaining 6.7%
think otherwise. (See Fig 6.7)
Do you think that tourism sector can lead to economy growth and development in the
State if the Security is addressed?
Yes 93.3%
No 2.2%
I don't know 4.4%
Tourism
Industry
Promoting Frequency
Frequency %
42
1
2
93.3
2.2
4.4
190
45
Table 6.7
54.5% believe that the government has not done enough to guarantee the growth of
tourism in the state by taking the necessary security measures. (Fig 6.8)
So far, can you say Government has contributed positively to the tourism industry in
State Security wise?
Yes (18.2%)
No (54.5%)
I don't know (27.3%)
industry
security-wise
Yes
No
Dont Know
in
Frequency %
state
8
24
12
44
18.2
54.5
27.3
Table 6.8
95.6% are convinced that once security concerns are addressed in the state, there
will be benefits accrued; one of such benefits will be alternative source of revenue
generation for the state. (See Fig 6.9)
191
In your opinion, do you think there are benefits obtained or that can be obtained from the
tourism industry in the State if security is addressed?
Yes (95.6%)
No (2.2%)
I don't Know 2.2%)
Frequency %
43
1
1
95.6
2.2
2.2
Table 6.9
On what is the major challenge (s) facing the tourism sector in the state, 51.1% did
not agree that it is security challenge but lack of proper management of tourist
facilities. To help reduce these challenges, 46.7% believe that adequate plans
should be put in place for the proper management of tourist facilities. (Please see
Figure 6.10)
In your own opinion, what is/are your challenges (s) encountered in the Plateau State
Nigerian Sector?
192
lack of awareness
(8.9%)
lack of security
(26.7%)
lack of proper
manangement of
tourist facilitties
(51.1%)
Plateau
State
Tourism Sector
Lack Awareness
Lack of Security
Lack of finding
Frequency %
Nigerian
4
12
the 6
8.9
26.7
13.3
Government
Lack of Proper Management of 23
51.1
from
tourist facilities
Table 6.10
On the assessment of peace, harmony and mutual understanding due to tourism in
the state, 11.4% rate it as excellent 20.5% rate it good 31.8% average, 18.2% fair,
while 18.2% rate it as poor (Fig 6.11).
What is your assessment of peace, harmony & mutual understanding due to tourism in the State?
193
Excellent (11.4%)
Good (20.5%)
Average (31.8%)
Fair (18.20%)
Poor (18.2%)
Figure 6.11
Assessment
of
Peace,
harmony
& Frequency
5
9
14
8
8
Frequency %
11.4
20.5
31.8
18.2
18.2
Responses to the fifteen tourism statements are presented in the table below.
Strongest support was shown for the economic and peace variables where, in the
majority of cases, agreement was indicated by over 70% of the respondents. For a
number of responses to some of the statements, a neutral position was selected.
Such responses pertained primarily to the environmental and awareness variables.
Based on the mean score responses, the respondents generally viewed tourism as
contributing positively to economic development and peace (see table 6.12).
194
Strongly
agree
(1)
1
contribute
s to
national
2
contribute
s to
economy
3.
promotes
infrastruc
ture
4. creates
employme
nt
5 exploits
certain
workers
Arguably
maybe
Contribut
es to the
economy
Creates
stability
I dont
know
I think
tourism
should be
Menial
workers
NA
Agree
(2)
I dont
know
Disagree
(4)
Strongly
disagree
(5)
(3)
1x
%
2.78
%
-
%
-
1.
33
0.
53
67
%
25
x
%
69.
44
10
x
%
27.7
8
24
x
66.
67
11
x
30.5
6
1x
2.78
1.
36
0.
54
61
%
20
x
55.
56
15
x
41.6
7
1x
2.78
1.
47
0.
56
56
%
27
x
75.
0
8x
22.2
2
1x
2.78
1.
28
0.
51
59
%
2x
5.5
6
6x
16.6
7
10
x
27.7
8
11
x
30.
56
7
x
19.4
4
3.
42
1.
16
46
%
1x
1x
100
.0
100.
00
-
3.
00
1.
00
0.
00
0.
00
33
%
33
%
1x
1x
50.0
0
-
100.
00
-
1
x
-
50.0
0
-
3.
00
3.
50
1.
00
0.
00
2.
12
0.
00
67
%
67
%
0%
100.
00
100.
00
-
1x
100.
00
-
100.
00
50.0
0
-
2.
00
2.
00
3.
00
2.
00
5.
00
3.
00
1.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
2.
83
0.
00
33
%
33
%
33
%
100
%
67
%
100
%
67
%
2.
00
3.
00
2.
0.
00
0.
00
0.
33
%
33
%
33
1x
100
.0
1x
1x
Neutral
No
1x
Other
100.
00
-
Strongly
agree
Tourism
can bring
about
Tourism
staf
Uncertain
1x
50.
0
100
.0
1x
100.
00
100.
00
-
1
x
1
x
-
1x
Visitors
1x
100.
100.
00
-
1x
195
Yes
1x
100
.0
Strongly
agree
(1)
6.
conserves
natural
and
7.
preserves
social and
cultural
8. leads
deteriorat
ion
Disrupt
small
communiti
es
00
-
Agree
(2)
I dont
know
Disagree
(4)
00
1.
00
00
0.
00
(3)
1x
%
2.78
%
-
%
-
1.
33
%
69.
44
10
x
%
27.7
8
20
x
55.
56
14
x
38.8
9
1x
2.78
1x
2.7
8
1.
53
0.
70
2x
5.56
4x
11.1
1
16
x
44.
44
14
x
38.8
9
4.
17
0.
85
1x
2.7
8
5x
13.8
9
6x
16.6
7
15
x
41.
67
25.0
0
3.
72
1.
09
Agree
(2)
I dont
know
Disagree
(4)
%
0%
Strongly
disagree
(5)
25
x
Strongly
agree
(1)
10.
Promotes
cultural
exc..
11
promotes
crosscultural
12.
promotes
peace
0.
53
Strongly
disagree
(5)
(3)
1x
%
2.78
%
-
%
-
1.
33
0.
53
68
%
25
x
%
69.
44
10
x
%
27.7
8
25
x
69.
44
10
x
27.7
8
1x
2.78
1.
33
0.
53
70
%
24
x
68.
57
10
x
28.5
7
1x
2.86
1.
34
0.
54
67
%
Table 6.12
196
CHAPTER SEVEN
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1 SUMMARY
This research assesses the impact of violence on the tourism and hospitality sector
in Plateau state. The research has been able to establish that since 2001, violence
has erupted in Jos city, capital of Plateau state, in Nigerias Middle Belt region.
The research noted that the ostensible dispute is over the rights of the indigene
Berom/Anaguta/Afizere (BAA) group and the rival claims of the Hausa-Fulani
settlers to land, power and resources. The research also noted that the Jos crisis is
the result of failure to amend the constitution to privilege broad-based citizenship
over exclusive indigene status and ensure that residency rather than indigeneity
determines citizens rights. Constitutional change is an important step to defuse
indigene-settler rivalries that continue to undermine security. It must be
accompanied by immediate steps to identify and prosecute perpetrators of violence,
in Jos and other parts of the country. Elites at local, state and federal level must
also consistently implement policies aimed at reducing the dangerous link between
ethnic belonging and access to resources, power and security if intercommunal
197
Hausa-Fulani. The predominantly Christian Middle Belt, famous for its history of
bitter struggle against attempts by the Muslim-dominated Far North to subjugate it,
understands the citizenship malaise better than any other region. Reclaiming their
rights, as the indigenous peoples of Plateau state, is the dominant narrative that
runs through the BAAs attempted politics of reverse discrimination against their
perceived ancient oppressors. Conversely, the Hausa-Fulani claim that they, not the
BAA, are the authentic indigenes of Jos and have been aggrieved about their lack
of access to power and resources despite being the majority in the biggest of the
LGAs, Jos North.
Because the settlers are almost entirely Muslim and the indigenous people
predominantly Christian, struggle over land ownership, economic resources and
political control tends to be expressed not just in ethnic but also religious terms.
The dispute is compounded by the fact that, of the settler groups, only the HausaFulani lay proprietary claim to Jos. As violence recurs, spatial polarisation and
segregation accentuate social and political divisions; people become more
conscious of their sub-national solidarity and allegiances and are more forthcoming
about expressing them.
Since the end of 2010, security has further deteriorated in Jos because of terror
attacks and suicide bombings against churches and security targets by suspected
militants of Boko Haram, the Islamist group responsible for an unprecedented
199
wave of terrorist attacks in the north. Thousands have been killed, hundreds of
thousands have been displaced internally and billions of dollars of property have
been destroyed.
Thus far, responses from local and national authorities have proven mostly
ineffective. They have come in three ways. First, several judicial commissions of
inquiry have been appointed to get to the root of the crises and recommend
lasting solutions. But authorities have been slow in publishing reports and acting
on their recommendations. Tough public speeches have not been translated into
tangible political action against instigators and perpetrators: none of the suspects
named by the various commissions have been prosecuted, and impunity continues
to feed violence.
The second response is police and military action, which has had little success.
Security forces not only fail to share intelligence among themselves, they are also
suspected of taking sides in the conflict and soldiers are accused of trading guns
for money. Finally, Operation Rainbow (OR), a joint initiative since June 2010
between the federal government and the Plateau state government with support
from the UN Development Programme (UNDP), is considered a holistic response
to the crisis. Still in its infancy, OR appears useful but will only be effective if it
can, at the minimum, win the confidence of both sides. It should be publicised at
the grassroots so that the population can own it.
200
The crisis in Plateau requires both national and local solutions. Constitutional
provisions, by virtue of their ambiguity over the terms indigene (which the
constitution fails to define satisfactorily) and residency for accessing citizenship
rights, have done little to clarify the situation. Nigerias current conception and
implementation of its citizenship (or national) question are inadequate and flawed.
The way forward is for the National Assembly, via a referendum or by itself,
following its nationwide public hearings on the matter, to replace the indigene
principle with a more inclusive residency provision to fight discrimination and
inequalities between settler and indigenous communities while consciously taking
immediate steps to assuage the fears of ethnic minorities.
At the state level, the current Plateau government should change its approach. It
can no longer carry on as if it is in power to serve only indigenous communities. It
should not wait for national constitutional reform before abolishing discriminatory
policies on education and employment between indigenes and settlers, as did the
Sokoto state government. Otherwise, political differences will harden further, more
pain will be inflicted on the hapless population, and the states and, invariably,
the countrys development will be impaired.
In the review of relevant literatures the following gap were deduced and addressed;
201
1. Conspicuously in all the literatures is the absence of the impact that the
circle of violence has caused in the tourism and hospitality sector in the
State. While this gap in literature was the focal point of this research, it
did not fail to highlights other gaps for further research.
2. The detailed analysis of the management of society and the rules of
engagement, roles and performance of security agencies in the face of
violent conflict. These are normally beclouded by controversy based on
suspected ethnicisation and religionisation of such roles
3. The historicity of the Jos conflict is under-researched as can be seen in
the scanty number of scholarly work available and the narrow scope of
such work. Most of them only seek to explain specific episodes of violent
conflict rather than trace its historical antecedents and situate it within a
political theory of ethno-religious pluralism in the Nigerian State.
4. The role of the Federal government, including State government as a
mitigator of conflict and its apparent failure in spite of assurances at the
end of each violent conflict. Why does the state continue to fail to bring
perpetrators to justice? Why does the state repeat the same assurances
and promises each time there is violence? What are the consequences of
this failure on conflict resolution?
202
Overall, there is need to find out why the conflict persists, or why
subsequent regimes at state and federal levels or subsequent efforts have
failed to bring about lasting peace in Jos and other parts of Plateau state.
7.2 CONCLUSION
The research has confirmed the strong relationship between peace and tourism. In
times of crisis and instability at tourist destination, tourist arrivals decrease
substantially. This can result in huge economic losses. It is therefore imperative
that both the private and public tourism investors should take bold peace initiatives
that can sustain the tourism industry as this study has established that peace is the
very pivot on which tourism rotates.
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7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to ensure sustainable peace in Plateau State, so that tourism can boom, the
following recommendations are made:
Although this research is majorly set to assessed how violence has affected the
tourists sector in Plateau State, it also discover other challenges in the sector and
proffer the following recommendations;
i)
Agents are only deployed when there is crises should give way to permanent and
adequate security arrangement on ground at all times.
ii) Perpetrators of conflicts and instability once identified as has always been
established by Panels and Commissions of Inquiry be punished.
iii) Tourist resorts should employ adequate security measures for the protection of
lives and properties always.
iv) the principle of justice and equity, respect for one another and constituted
authorities, religious harmony, inter-tribal cohesion, dialogue and peaceful
resolution should be adopted by all. The tourism enterprises should embark on
massive publicity, image projection business campaign in order to overshadow the
scaring news on conflicts that may not even affect their businesses.
Despite the existence of a number of funding schemes targeting SME enterprises
and available to applicants in the tourism sector, the conditions are currently too
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restrictive to effectively foster investment in the sector. The conditions and process
to obtain Bank of Industry funding need to be made simpler and more accessible.
The collection and compilation of tourism statistics needs urgent improvement.
The reliability of the current statistics is extremely low and no information was
available on tourists spending and overall tourist revenue for the country. However,
it would appear that the number of international visitors to Nigeria has remained
static over the last 15 years.
At the time of this research, no hotel or hospitality project had been successful in
securing incentives for a proposed investment. The same applies to the mandated
fund available through the Bank of Industry for lending to SME enterprise. This is
a result of complicated application processes and the inability of people in the
sector to prepare adequate business plans
The current marketing approach is very weak. The marketing of Nigeria as a tourist
destination is underfunded and lacks a strategic marketing approach. The
marketing collaterals are not up to international standards; while they are
informative they are not customer friendly.
A survey of tour operators in the UK, Europe and the United States of America
indicated a lack of information or knowledge about Nigeria as a tourist destination.
Where they exist, they are being warned of the securities challenges that Nigeria
has.
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The adoption of a niche marketing approach will be critical to the success of any
future marketing strategy and therefore the success (or otherwise) in developing
tourism in the country.
The potential market segments for development are likely to be leisure (new
experience seekers; Nigerias Diaspora; special interest; expatriate community;
family holidays), conference and meetings, visiting friends and relatives (VFR),
religious sports and other events. These categories of tourists should be encouraged
by all means.
Air transport capacity (both external and internal) is satisfactory to meet the needs
of tourism growth in the immediate future. The safety aspect of the internal air
transport has recently become a matter of concern. In the light of current global
security challenges, these need to be addressed.
The Jos airport needs to be made functional to a greater degree. It currently has one
flight to Lagos in a day. There is a greater need for awareness for air travelers. The
road network is generally adequate with some exceptions of the roads to tourist
sites which should be addressed. City taxis need to be upgraded and fitted with
meters.
The visa regime as it is currently operated is a very real barrier to tourism growth.
It is punitive and does not serve the tourism interests of Nigeria. Applicants for
visas must produce a letter of invitation from Nigeria and apply at the embassy or
high commission in the country where they reside.
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Many of Nigerias competitors have much more friendly visa regimes with some
requiring no visa for nationals of the tourism generating countries. This issue needs
to be addressed as a matter of priority.
The Slave Routes are a strategic element in Nigerias cultural tourism product offer
and need development and packaging as they are not well presented at the present
time. Many of Nigerias historic sites are in a dilapidated state, have no
interpretation or signposting. The current deplorable state of the Nigerian natural
environment is a strategic competitive disadvantage.
The range and number of festivals and events can be a highly marketable product
but they require some strategic improvement to make them more marketable. The
different cultural festivals in the state need to maintain a specific festival calendar
which should be captured on the internet.
Event management needs to be professional, spectator facilities; safety, access and
parking need improvement.
Private locally operated hotels are currently performing poorly but an opportunity
exists for the development of more good quality professionally managed
boutique hotels that are capable to develop niche markets.
Government bodies must remove themselves from operating hotels as they are not
providing an acceptable quality and such hotels would be best managed by the
private sector.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
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World Bank/UNDP/DFID-JEWEL Projects. (2003) Access Rights and
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Yoroms, J.G, (2000). The Dynamic of Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in
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Zubair, I.A, (2011): Development of Domestic Tourism as a Tool for
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fulfillment for the award of Member of the National Institute, mni
http://www.onlinenigeria.com/links/Plateauadv.asp?blurb=464,
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APPENDIX A
A cross Section of Tourists at the 2014 International
Museum Day at the National Museum, Jos
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