Concrescence —

The Australasian Journal of Process Thought

Causal Processes:
Steps towards a systematic and formal interpretation
of Alfred North Whitehead’s ontology
Ludwig J. Jaskolla
Hochschule für Philosophie
Philosophische Fakultät SJ
Kaulbachstraße 31a,
80539 München, Germany
l.jaskolla@hfph.mwn.de

The goal of this paper
In recent analytic metaphysics the philosophy of Alfred
North Whitehead has widely been ignored. For once this
seems to be due to the rather difficult textual situation
in which many of Whitehead’s publications present
themselves. But secondly, Whitehead’s philosophy seems
to be opaque and he fails to give an account for it
that would be considered logically sufficient by modern
standards. This can be seen especially in Germany. For
example there is one translation of Process and Reality,
where the reader is advised to use Whitehead’s work as
quarry of philosophical ideas;1 —Whitehead as nothing
more than an aphoristic collection of philosophical
thoughts from which anyone can choose whatever he
likes.
Other accounts that try to read Whitehead systematically
do not meet the formal requirements to position
Whitehead in recent analytic metaphysics. This paper
pursues the goal to set up the basis for a re-interpretation
of Whitehead’s central philosophical concepts in
a terminology that is both systematic and formal.
Concerning ontology, with which I will be occupied
These criteria are:
most of the time, this means that this theory should be
able to cover the whole of reality; especially it should
give us an account of entities and causal structures.
Obviously I will not be able to show that systematicity is
fulfilled for my re-interpretation but I am confident that
Beginning with the last entry of this list, the notion of
I can give some hints why it is systematic.
To reach that goal I will briefly give an overview
over the central methodological concepts introduced
by Whitehead; especially a formal description of the
notion of coherence. Then I will try to present a
theory of creativity that is in accordance with these
methodological concepts. This theory of creativity will
depend mainly on the formal notion of coherence.
In a last step I will try to show that this theory of
creativity implies a concept of causally efficient processes
structuring the world into its actual shape.
1. The Whiteheadian Notion of Coherence
Alfred North Whitehead places his own ontological
ideas within the rich tradition of Rationalism.2 He
summarizes the different aspects of his philosophical
method under the notion of ‘speculative philosophy’
which means that a system of philosophical lemmata,
or “working hypotheses”3 , should fulfill a number of
characteristics in order to be considered to be a ‘good’
philosophical theory.
(1) Coherence of Ideas,
(2) Logicity of Ideas and
(3) Necessity of Ideas.

Concrescence (2009) pp. 11–18 ISSN: 1445–4297 © 2009 The Author

Published online by the Australasian Association for Process Thought, an affiliate of the International Process Network.
12 Ludwig J. Jaskolla

‘Necessity of Ideas’ means that the structure of the system (A) and (B′′ ). Therefore, it will be necessary to give a
of philosophical ideas should be applicable to a wide systematic interpretation of the notion of Coherence
range of different experiences.4 For ontological theories that doesn’t fall prey to the Circularity-Problem. By
this means that this structure should be applicable to proceeding this way my central idea will be that
reality as a whole. The second notion of ‘Logicity of Whitehead himself has a strong modal intuition
Ideas’ simply means: The different relations between the constructing the notion of Coherence. In Process and
lemmata of a system of philosophical ideas should be Reality he writes: “It means that what is definable in one
such that these relations do not violate the laws of first such notion cannot be abstracted from its relevance to
order logic. the other notions”.8
The first characteristic, ‘Coherence of Ideas’, poses theTherefore the notion of coherence means that in a
greatest challenge. Whitehead’s own explanation of this coherent system of philosophical ideas it is not possible
notion is—somewhat—cryptic. Thus, in the modern to abstract one of these notions completely from the
debate on Whitehead’s philosophy, there is a wide range others (in particular when it comes to the essential
of different interpretations of this notion. Due to the aspects of these ideas if they are supposed to be
length of this paper I will not be able to give a review of
coherent). To underline this point, Leclerc states that
this debate, but in accordance with Ivor Leclerc I think an incoherent system of philosophical ideas allows for a
that a systematic theory of Coherence is a central key torandom disconnection of different ideas which in reverse
the understanding of Whitehead’s ontology.5 means that all relations between different ideas of a
9
Whitehead introduces the notion of Coherence in philosophical system are equally random. It is easy to
Process and Reality by stating that in a coherent system see that in this conception there cannot be any essential
of philosophical ideas “each presupposes the other that relations, which is highly counter-intuitive.
in isolation they are meaningless”.6 Prima facie, this This specified notion of coherence implies a rather
seems to imply the following semantic structure for a interesting metaphysical consequence. In a coherent
dual system of working hypotheses A and B: (i) ‘A system of philosophical ideas there are no ideas (or
presupposes B’ and (ii) ‘B presupposes A’. The semantic philosophical concepts) that describe isolated facts. An
structure of Coherence seems to be circular in the isolated fact would stand in no essential relation to
sense that one is unable to decide which hypothesis is any other fact, and thus it would not be possible to
prior to the other. This would be less of a problem if find a philosophical concept that (a) describes this fact
these considerations were only of semantic importance, and (b) is coherent with the other concepts of the
but Whitehead tells us that the charateristics (1) to philosophical system. In particular this means that
(3) are fundamental relations of the world’s ontological for example a theory that describes concrete objects as
structure.7 Therefore, one can construct the following ‘bare substrata’ could never be a coherent philosophical
problem. system of ideas, and so in Whiteheadian terms could
The Circularity-Problem of Coherence: never be an adequate description of reality.
(A) Logicity of Ideas: At the basic level of the After this first specification of the notion of coherence,
ontology there are no violations of the laws of first I want to return to what I promised some paragraphs
order logic. above. As stated, Whitehead’s notion of Coherence
(B) Coherence of Ideas: At the basic level of the is based on a deep modal intuition. In the following
ontology the different ideas presuppose each other paragraphs I want to argue for this assertion. First, I
(causally). will give the formal description of Coherence for a dual
system of philosophical ideas and then comment on it.
(B′ ) Corollary: The ontological structure between (If some readers are not familiar with logical symbols
these ideas is circular. used in this paper, please refer to the Appendix at the
(B′′ ) Corollary: This violates the law of end of this paper, where some basic logical notions are
non-circularity, implied by first order logic. defined.)
It easily can be seen that there is a logical conflict between
 Causal Processes 13

Definition 2-1: Coherence of a dual system meaning of this by an example—let’s suppose a theory in
◻(A ⊃ ¬ ◇ ¬B ∧ B ⊃ ¬ ◇ ¬A) which all the facts about humans are physical facts. This
theory would tell us that:
We can transform this Definition 2-1 by the following ◻ Struct. of Mental Facts ⊃ ¬ ◇ ¬ Struct. of Physical Facts
rule— ◻(A ∧ B) = ◻A ∧ ◻B —into a Corollary 2-1*:
This is a hidden supervenience thesis for the mental
◻(A ⊃ ¬ ◇ ¬B) ∧ ◻(B ⊃ ¬ ◇ ¬A) facts because they depend completely on the physical
and split up 2-1* to take a closer look at the parts facts. Definitions 2-1, 2-1* and 2-2 give us a tool
of the conjunction 2-1*. This formal description of to understand the logical structure of such bifurcative
Coherence postulates for a system to be coherent, that theories of nature. And Whitehead would tell us that
if concept A is part of that system it has to hold true their problem is their lack of Coherence.
necessarily that it is impossible for concept B not to But this shall not be the topic of this paper. In
be part of the system. Obviously, the same holds vice the following sections I will try to outline a theory
versa for the other part of the conjunction 2-1*. In of Creativity that depends highly on the notion of
other words, the notion of Coherence makes a statement Coherence that has been developed in this section.
about the succession of philosopical concepts: The
possibility-operator determines that the occurence of a
2. Setting up a theory of creativity
concept is to be assumed before one can deduce the
impossiblity of the non-occurence of the other concept. In the first part of this section we will be returning to the
Circularity-Problem of Coherence which was outlined
If we put together the two conjunctive parts of 2-1*
and solved in the preceeding section. The central aspects
and return to the original definition 2-1, it becomes
of Whitehead’s ontology are One, Many and Creativity.10
obvious that the notion of Coherence presupposes
Analogous to what was said in section 2, Whitehead’s
(in a dual system) both philosphical concepts, and
symbolic analysis of the concepts One and Many is
makes a statement about the necessary relations
unproblematic (where ‘symbolic’ denotes all kinds of
between them. In fact, Coherence states that both
references to the real world, for example by human
concepts need to occur necessarily in a ‘well-formed’
language or deictic actions). He states that One denotes
system of philosophical ideas. Thus, 2-1 avoids the
“the general idea {of} {...} singularity {...}”,11 whereas
Circularity-Problem of Coherence because 2-1 tells us
Many denotes “the notion of disjunctive diversity”.12
that coherence makes no statement about the causal
These two concepts stand in the relation of coherence,
structure of system of philosophical ideas.
and as such presuppose each other.
One can easily generalise the Definition 2-1 for a dual
The term many presupposes the term one, and the term one
system to a n-dimensional system of philosophical ideas. presupposes the term many.13
Definition 2-2: Coherence for a n-dimensional system At first this circularity seems only semantic. On
An n-dimensional system of philosophical concepts is reflection, Whitehead tells us, that with respect to
coherent, iff: the fundamental ontological level there cannot be a
∀A i ∀B j ∀i, j ∈ (1...n) ∶ distinction between the semantic and metaphysical level
◻(A i ⊃ ¬ ◇ ¬B j ∧ B j ⊃ ¬ ◇ ¬A i ) of our description of the world.14 It could be noted that
Whitehead himself states due to the distinction between
The notion of Coherence has a central place in presentational immediacy and causal efficacy that all
Whitehead’s philosophy: There is a direct relation of the symbolic reference is in principle deficient. A solution
notion of Coherence to Whitehead’s rejection of, what to this problem is easily found: Reading Symbolism—its
he called, “bifurcative theories of nature”. A bifurcative meaning and effect as some kind of propaedeutics to
theory of nature would be one that takes one aspect of a Process and Reality, we can say that there must be
system of philosophical ideas as absolute. Such a theory some kind of reference to the world that is not in
would only take one part of the conjunction 2-1* and principle deficient (cf. the example of colour perception
state that this is the whole of reality. We can spell out the in (Whitehead, 1928, 18)). The concepts of One and
14 Ludwig J. Jaskolla

Many are so basic that it is impossible not to think of as complete abstractions are best understood via the
reality as consisting of unities and multiplicities. That mathematical concept of a ‘limes’; they are hypothetical
there is no real argument for this, only “direct, intuitive constructs of the human mind which tries to abstract the
experience”,15 doesn’t seem to be much of problem. Even coherent concepts of One and Many towards isolated,
in recent analytic metaphysics many ideas are introduced autonomous facts. In a strict ontological sense these
intuitively 16 . ‘limites’ are dispensable, but they are a nice way to
describe the boundaries of the continuous spectrum of
However, the circularity of the symbolic level is
reality.
transferred to the ontological level. Thus, we face the
pressing problem that Whitehead’s ontology is circular at If we take a closer look at the Definition 3-1, we can see
its most basic level. There have been three main strategies that each part of the conjunction denotes a function that
to solve this problem: can be used to ascribe a certain amount of self-identity
(i) Christian tells us that Whitehead is not really to every entity on this spectrum. This self-identity
saying anything of systematic ontological importance, is determined by two different processes: the first
when speaking about One and Many—he is talking describing self-formation by stating that real diversity
“pre-systematically”.17 Apart from the fact that is not possible without singularity—one—(cf. the first
Christian is not able to provide a clear-cut criterion part of the conjunction in 3-1). The second describing
that would enable us to distinguish when Whitehead is that real singularity is only possible in contrast to other
talking systematically and when he is not.18 In addition, real singularities—many—(cf. the second part of the
it seems rather strange to develop an ontology but not conjunction in 3-1).
to talk about anything of ontological relevance at the That is the reason for Whitehead telling us that “an
most basic level of this ontology. actual entity combines self-identity with self-diversity”.22
(ii) Many other authors did not see the Coherence of one and many demands that an actual
Circularity-Problem at the most basic level of entity is always a (ontological) composition of the two
Whitehead’s ontology at all19 . functions one and many. The account provided here can
thus be summarised by:
(iii) But others like Jorge Nobo and Richard Rorty
argued that there is only a feigned Circularity-Problem Definition 3-2:
for One and Many.20 Concerning the Continuum R, the function one assigns
to every state q a certain amount of self-identity in respect
That it is only a feigned Circularity-Problem seems to of q’s being a singular entity. The function many assigns
be reasonable, if we consider our modal interpretation to every state q a certain amount of self-identity in respect
of the concept of coherence that was developed in the of q’s standing in relations to other states q 1 ... q n . The
preceeding section. Then, we can construe Many and composition q(one; many) describes q completely and
One as a dual system of philosophical ideas standing in defines q as one, self-identical entity in R. Thus, fulfilling
the relation of coherence: Quine’s criterion: No entity without identity. One and
Many as isolated facts are the (mathematical) projections
Definition 3-1: Coherence of One and Many of the state q towards the function one or many; that
◻(one ⊃ ¬ ◇ ¬ many ∧ many ⊃ ¬ ◇ ¬ one) means q(one) or q(many).

This solves the Circularity-Problem formally but it
does not tell us anything about the philosophical
consequences that are implied by the concept of
Coherence between One and Many. To avoid isolated
facts (as excluded by the notion of Coherence) reality
must be understood as a continuous spectrum R
between two poles. These two poles denote the concepts
One and Many as isolated facts, or in Whiteheadian
terminology as “complete abstractions”.21 One and Many
With the preceding framework of concepts set up, we can
now ask: How can the most fundamental principle of
Whiteheadian ontology—Creativity—be defined?23
According to my interpretation of the texts, there are
three inter-related notions of Creativity in Whitehead’s
work. The first two can be summarised as the
‘metaphysical notions of Creativity’, whereas the third
could also be called the ‘temporal notion of Creativity’.
 Causal Processes 15

(1) The first notion of Creativity is a direct descendent Definition 4-1: Process
from Definition 3-2: It is the composition of the ∆(q, p) is a process (where q and p are states of real system),
functions one and many, and provides the fundamental iff p chronologically follows from q, ∆ is an ontological
principle of Whiteheadian ontology (cf. “Creativity is relation between q and p and ∆ is bijective. Bijectiveness
universals of universals characterizing ultimate matter of ensures that there are no gaps in the corresponding
process.
fact.”.24 To describe the whole process of the universe (or:
reality), we have to ‘maximize’ the concepts of one and
many. Concerning reality as a whole, the composition
of one (here: ultimate matter of fact (the universe as a If we take one of the sides of the conjunctions defined in
unity.)) and many (here: universals of universals (the 3-1, it is possible to define the following process ∆(q(one;
universe in its diversities.)) can be understood as an many), p(one; many)). The central idea would be to
objective principle that governs the whole process of take one part of the conjunction in 3-1 – for example
reality. This first notion of Creativity is commonly used ∆(q(one; many)). This means, speaking in a temporal
in Process and Reality.25 sense, that if one changes in a state q than also many
must change. Therefore two states of a system can be
(2) The second notion of Creativity imports this general interrelated by their continuously changing composition
process into the particular entities in the universe. The of one and many.
Coherence of the functions one and many is the fact that
ensures the self-identity of every entity in the universe, We have to make sure that the conditions from 4-1 are
and therefore makes a statement about the structure of met. Creativity defines a relation which assigns one state
change and persistence in every entity. Again there can of a system to a later state of a system by changing the
be found widespread proof for this notion in Process and composition of one and many within the inital state.
Reality.26 Certainly ∆(q(one; many), p(one; many)) is bijective,
because the spectrum of reality is continuous. It has to be
(3) The third notion of Creativity is often called the noted, that this general process that can be deduced from
Principle of Creative Advance or the Principle of Process. the structure of Coherence implies no favoured direction
It makes a statement about the concrete structure and of time. The direction of time will be dependent upon
sequence of the compositions of the functions one and the initial conditions of the system ‘reality’. Thus, it is
many in reality. This can be best understood if we possible to argue that the formal notion of Coherence
analyse processes as the dynamic composition of the outlined in the preceding section of this paper implies a
functions one and many. In contrast to (2), this notion very abstract and general concept of process, if one uses
of creativity implies that there is favoured direction in it to model the intererelations between different states at
which the ‘creative advance’ evolves. Again this notion is different times.
often used in Process and Reality.27
Concerning the project of a systematic Whiteheadian
The preceding third notion of Creativity should be ontology we can now take stock: it was possible to show
considered as a transition to the following section of that there is a systematic description of the ontological
this paper. There I will discuss whether the composition structure of the world based on the notion of Coherence.
of one and many can be understood as a process and In principle this description should cover the whole of
whether these processes can be understood as causally reality. In the following paragraphs I want to discuss,
efficient. whether this general notion of process implies a theory of
causality. If this can be shown, then we could state that a
Whiteheadian, systematic ontology in terms of a formal
notion of Creativity and Coherence is possible.
3. Causal Processes as a systematic,
metaphysical application of creativity There are many reasons that this general theory of
process must imply a notion of causality. For example
Can the third notion of Creativity be understood as
in his book A Place for Consciousness – Probing the
a process? First I will give a formal definition of the
Deep Structure of the Natural World, Gregg Rosenberg
concept ‘process’.
16 Ludwig J. Jaskolla
points out that in most process-based philosophies
“processes are seen as essential elements of causation”28 .
Whitehead himself gives another hint: Only states of the
continuous spectrum of reality are accepted as causes.29
Nevertheless it remains unclear how exactly this account
of causality should be specified.
In general, a theory of causality should answer the
following questions:
(1) How many states of reality are minimally
interrelated by causality?
(2) What kinds of states are interrelated?
(3) Is there an asymmetric temporal direction implied
in the notion of causality?30 .
The temporal notion of Creativity interrelates at least
two states of reality, changing in their composition of
one and many, or being constant in their composition.
The latter will be interpreted as a ‘change with nothing
happening’, but nevertheless a change, because,
despite of the same structure of the composition, the
spatiotemporal location of this composition has been
changed. Considering question (2), the answer is very
easy to find: Ontologically speaking, there is only one
kind of state, and therefore the temporal notion of
Creativity interrelates all kinds of states of reality. In the
preceeding paragraphs we stated that there is no fixed
temporal direction, implied by the temporal notion of
Creativity. This turns now out to be an advantage: We
can distinguish two accounts of the temporal notion
of Creativity: one that is positively diachronically
temporal-directed and resembles efficient causation;
and one that is synchronously temporal-directed and
resembles conceptual causation.
Concerning efficient and conceptual causation: Efficient
causation denotes that cause and effect progress
chronologically in such a way that the effect always
succeeds the cause. Conceptual causation means that
all complexity levels beneath the level of the conceptual
cause are determined by the complexity level of the
conceptual cause. This has nothing to do with any kind
of Backwards Causation that is sometimes discussed in
recent analytic metaphysics—it can rather be compared
to Rosenberg’s account of final causation, which being
synchronic inter-level causality is almost some kind of The title of this paper shows that much work has to
Aristotelian formal cause. It is interesting to see that the be done in order to construct a systematic and formal
account of causation that is deduced from Whitehead’s
temporal notion of Creativity is internally coherent,
i.e. that Coherence can be shown for conceptual and
efficient causation. Thus, we can define the follwing
account of causality:
Definition 4-2: Causal Processes
The temporal notion of Creativity, i.e. the process from
one state of reality to another, implies the following causal
structure:
A minimal bivalent relation between compositions of one
and many with positive temporal direction
= efficient causation.
A minimal bivalent relation between compositions of one
and many with synchronic temporal direction
= conceptual causation.
4. Conclusion
Now to take stock of what has been achieved during
the progress of this paper: It was possible to construct
the basic items of a Whiteheadian ontology (i) that is
in accordance with Whitehead’s own methodological
demands, (ii) that is formally sufficient and (iii) covers
at least in principle reality as a whole—i.e. that it gives
a general account of what it means to be an entity (cf.
a composition of one and many) and of what kind
the causal structures of the world are (cf. efficient and
conceptual causation). Thus, the fundamental entities
in Whitehead’s ontology are causally efficient processes
governed by the concept of Creativity.
These different concepts were presented in a way that
allows to position them in recent analytic metaphysics.
Due to length of this paper, I am not able to spell
this out: It would be necessary to deduce several
concrete Whiteheadian theories concerning different
issues of recent analytic metaphysics and to compare
them in detail with the answers given in recent
analytic metaphysics. Nevertheless my own research
on positioning Whitehead’s theory of concrete objects
(i.e. actual entities and societies of actual entities) in the
framework of analytic theories (bundle-, bare substrata-
and substance theories) is very encouraging: It was
possible to show that Whitehead’s intuitions bear great
resemblance to neo-aristotelian substance theories, but
with a bundle-theoretic colouring.
 Causal Processes 17

account of Alfred North Whitehead’s ontology. In Endnotes

the context of this paper, it was only possible to take 1. cf. (Holl, 2003, 632)
some initial steps towards such an account. In my
2. cf. (Whitehead, 1979, 9)
opinion the next steps would include setting up a formal
3. (Whitehead, 1967a, 222)
interpretation of Whitehead’s system of categories31 , and
then deducing the different Categories of Existence.32 4. cf. (Whitehead, 1979, 4)
With this forecast, I want to end my analysis of the basic 5. cf. (Leclerc, 1958, 34)
aspects of Whitehead’s ontology. 6. cf. (Whitehead, 1979, 3)
7. cf. (Whitehead, 1979, 3-4)
8. cf. (Whitehead, 1979, 3)
Appendix: Logical symbols used in this paper 9. cf. (Leclerc, 1958, 35-36)
10. cf. (Whitehead, 1979, 21)
The operators and relational characters, like the logical
11. (Whitehead, 1979, 21)
negation ¬ or the logical conjunction ∧, of first order
logic are used without definition. 12. (Whitehead, 1979, 21)
13. (Whitehead, 1979, 21)
q, p, z — denote states of reality — for example
14. cf. (Whitehead, 1928, 7–8)
spatio-temporal entities.
15. (Lowe, 1962, 36)
A, B, C — denote philosophical concepts, for example a 16. cf. as one example (Chisholm, 1992)
certain ‘Structure of the Physical Facts’. It can be shown 17. (Christian, 1959, 10–12)
that also propositions, like ‘There are no mental facts in
18. cf. (Garland, 1983, 214)
this world’ qualify as philosophical concepts.
19. cf. for example (Neville, 1983), (Moser, 1975), (Arena, 1989)
If large sets of philosophical concepts are considered, 20. cf. (Nobo, 1986), (Rorty, 1983, 75–77)
these concepts have indices. 21. (Whitehead, 1979, 28)
∆(...,...), Θ(...,...), Σ(...,...) — denote relations between (a) 22. (Whitehead, 1979, 25)
philosophical concepts, (b) functional states or (c) real 23. The following considerations are mainly based on: (Whitehead,
entities. 1967b, 175f.), (Whitehead, 1979, 21f.), (Whitehead, 1967a, 179-180),
(Whitehead, 1927, 98).
∀x ∶ A(x) — denotes that for all x the philosophical 24. (Whitehead, 1979, 25)
concept A holds.
25. cf. (Whitehead, 1979, 25, 85 iii, 87, 222, 225)
∃x ∶ B(x) — denotes that for at least one x the 26. cf. (Whitehead, 1979, xxi, 25, Cat.Expl., 164, 211 iii)
philosophical concept A holds. 27. cf. (Whitehead, 1979, 21, ix Cat.Obl., 28, 165, 211 iii)
◻A — denotes that A holds in all possible worlds — A is 28. (Rosenberg, 2004, 149)
necessary. 29. cf. (Whitehead, 1979, 24)
30. (Rosenberg, 2004, 148-150)
◇A — denotes that A holds in at least one possible
world — A is possible. 31. cf. (Whitehead, 1979, 22-30)
32. cf. (Whitehead, 1979, 22)
In modal logic the two modal operators ◻ and ◇ are
defined as follows:
If ◇A, then ¬ ◻ ¬A.
If ◻A, then ¬ ◇ ¬A.
18 Ludwig J. Jaskolla
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