Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 71137 October 5, 1989
SPOUSES FEDERICO FRANCO and FELICISIMA R. FRANCO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ANTONIO REYES, MRS. SUSAN
CHUAY and LOLITA LUGUErespondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:
The instant petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals deals
mainly with the nature of an employer's liability for his employee's negligent
act.
At about 7:30 in the evening of October 18, 1974, Macario Yuro swerved the
northbound Franco Bus with Plate No. XY320-PUB he was driving to the left to
avoid hitting a truck with a trailer parked facing north along the cemented
pavement of the MacArthur Highway at Barrio Talaga, Capas Tarlac, thereby
taking the lane of an incoming Isuzu Mini Bus bearing Plate No. YL-735 being
driven by one Magdaleno Lugue and making a collision between the two (2)
vehicles an unavoidable and disastrous eventuality.
Dragged fifteen (15) meters from the point of impact (midway the length of
the parked truck with trailer), the mini bus landed right side down facing
south in the canal of the highway, a total wreck. The Franco Bus was also
damaged but not as severely. The collision resulted in the deaths of the two
(2) drivers, Macario Yuro and Magdaleno Lugue, and two (2) passengers of
the mini bus, Romeo Bue and Fernando Chuay.
Consequently, Antonio Reyes, the registered owner of the Isuzu Mini Bus,
Mrs. Susan Chuay, the wife of victim Fernando Chuay, and Mrs. Lolita Lugue,
the wife of driver-victim Magdaleno Lugue, filed an action for damages
through reckless imprudence before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
in Angeles City, Branch IV, docketed as Civil Case No. 2154 against Mr. &

Mrs. Federico Franco, the owners and operators of the Franco Transportation
Company. The complaint alleged that: (a) the recklessness and imprudence
of the Franco Bus driver caused the collision which resulted in his own death
and that of the mini bus driver and two (2) other passengers thereof; (b) that
as a consequence of the vehicular mishap, the Isuzu Mini Bus became a total
wreck resulting in actual damages amounting to P50,000.00 and the loss of
an average net income of P120.00 daily or P3,600.00 monthly multiplied by a
minimum of one more year of serviceability of said mini bus or P40,200.00;
and, (c) that in view of the death of the three (3) passengers
aforementioned, the heirs of each should be awarded a minimum of
P12,000.00 and the expected average income of P6,000.00 each of the
driver and one of the passengers and P12,000.00 of the Chinese
businessman passenger.
In answer to the complaint, defendants set up, among others, the affirmative
defense that as owners and operators of the Franco Transportation Company,
they exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of all their
employees, including the deceased driver Macario Yuro.
Said defense was, however, rejected by the trial court in its decision 1 dated
May 17, 1978, for the reason that the act of the Franco Bus driver was a
negligent act punishable by law resulting in a civil obligation arising from
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code and not from Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. It said: "This is a case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability
arises, and not a case of civil negligence and the defense of having acted like
a good father of a family or having trained or selected the drivers of his truck
is no defense to avoid civil liability." 2 On this premise, the trial court ruled as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiffs, Antonio Reyes, Lolita Lugue, and Susan
Chuay, and against the defendants Mr. and Mrs. Federico Franco,
ordering the latter:
(1) To pay Antonio Reyes, actual and compensatory damages in
the amount of P90,000.00 for the Isuzu Mini Bus;
(2) To pay Lolita Lugue, the widow of Magdaleno Lugue, actual
and compensatory damages in the total sum of P18,000.00;

(3) To pay Susan Chuay, the widow of Fernando Chuay, actual

and compensatory damages in the total sum of P24,000.00; and
(4) To pay attorney's fee in the amount of P5.000.00;
All with legal interests from the filing of this suit on November
11, 1974 until paid; and the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.

On appeal by herein petitioners as defendants-appellants, respondent

appellate court, agreeing with the lower court, held that defendantsappellants' driver who died instantly in the vehicular collision, was guilty of
reckless or criminal imprudence punishable by law in driving appellants' bus;
that the civil obligation of the appellants arises from Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code resulting in the subsidiary liability of the appellants
under the said provisions, 4 that the case subject of appeal is one involving
culpable negligence out of which civil liability arises and is not one of civil
negligence; 5 and that there is nothing in Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised
Penal Code which requires a prior judgment of conviction of the erring
vehicle driver and his obligation to pay his civil liability before the said
provisions can be applied. 6 Respondent appellate court increased the award
of damages granted by the lower court as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified as
follows:
1. To pay Susan Chuay, widow of Fernando Chuay, the sum of
P30,000.00 for the latter's death and P112,000.00 for loss of
earning capacity;
2. To pay Lolita Lugue, widow of Magdaleno Lugue, the sum of
P30,000.00 for the latter's death and P62,000.00 for loss of
earning capacity. The rest of the judgment appealed from is
affirmed. Costs against defendants-appellants.
SO ORDERED.

On April 1, 1985, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the

aforesaid respondent appellate court's decision dated January 2, 1985 but
the same was denied on May 13, 1985.

Hence, the instant petition raising two (2) legal questions: first, whether the
action for recovery of damages instituted by herein private respondents was
predicated upon crime or quasi-delict; and second, whether respondent
appellate court in an appeal filed by the defeated parties, herein petitioners,
may properly increase the award of damages in favor of the private
respondents Chuay and Lugue, prevailing parties in the lower court, who did
not appeal said court's decision.
Petitioners contend that the allegations in paragraph 9 of the Amended
Complaint 8 of herein private respondents as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2154
unequivocally claim that the former as the employers of Macario Yuro, the
driver of the Franco Bus who caused the vehicular mishap, are jointly and
severally liable to the latter for the damages suffered by them which thus
makes Civil Case No. 2154 an action predicated upon a quasi-delict under
the Civil Code subject to the defense that the employer exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees.
We find merit in this contention. Distinction should be made between the
subsidiary liability of the employer under the Revised Penal Code and the
employer's primary liability under the Civil Code which is quasi-delictual or
tortious in character. The first type of liability is governed by Articles 102 and
103 of the Revised Penal Code which provide as follows:
Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern-keepers
and proprietors of establishments. In default of the persons
criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern-keepers, and any other
persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes
committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation
of municipal ordinances or some general or special police
regulations shall have been committed by them or their
employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods
taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging
therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that
such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself,
or the person representing him, of the deposits of such goods
within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions
which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them

with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No

liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's
employees.
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The
subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall
also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by the
servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties;
while the second kind is governed by the following provisions of the Civil
Code:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
Art. 2180. The obligations imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry,
xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the

persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, liability originates from a delict
committed by the employee who is primarily liable therefor and upon whose
primary liability his employer's subsidiary liability is to be based. Before the
employer's subsidiary liability may be proceeded against, it is imperative
that there should be a criminal action whereby the employee's criminal
negligence or delict and corresponding liability therefor are proved. If no
criminal action was instituted, the employer's liability would not be
predicated under Article 103. 9
In the case at bar, no criminal action was instituted because the person who
should stand as the accused and the party supposed to be primarily liable for
the damages suffered by private respondents as a consequence of the
vehicular mishap died. Thus, petitioners' subsidiary liability has no leg to
stand on considering that their liability is merely secondary to their
employee's primary liability. Logically therefore, recourse under this remedy
is not possible.
On the other hand, under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, liability is
based on culpa aquiliana which holds the employer primarily liable for
tortious acts of its employees subject, however, to the defense that the
former exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of his employees.
Respondent appellate court relies on the case of Arambulo, supra, where it
was held that the defense of observance of due diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of employees is not applicable to
the subsidiary liability provided in Article 20 of the Penal Code (now Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code). By such reliance, it would seem that
respondent appellate court seeks to enforce the subsidiary civil liability of
the employer without a criminal conviction of the party primarily liable
therefor. This is not only erroneous and absurd but is also fraught with
dangerous consequences. It is erroneous because the conviction of the
employee primarily liable is a condition sine qua non for the employer's
subsidiary liability 10 and, at the same time, absurd because we will be faced
with a situation where the employer is held subsidiarily liable even without a
primary liability being previously established. It is likewise dangerous

because, in effect, the employer's subsidiary liability would partake of a

solidary obligation resulting in the law's amendment without legislative
sanction.
The Court in the aforecited M.D. Transit case went further to say that there
can be no automatic subsidiary liability of defendant employer under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code where his employee has not been previously
criminally convicted.
Having thus established that Civil Case No. 2154 is a civil action to impose
the primary liability of the employer as a result of the tortious act of its
alleged reckless driver, we confront ourselves with the plausibility of
defendants-petitioners' defense that they observed due diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
On this point, the appellate court has unequivocally spoken in affirmation of
the lower court's findings, to wit:
Anyway, a perusal of the record shows that the appellants were
not able to establish the defense of a good father of a family in
the supervision of their bus driver. The evidence presented by
the appellants in this regard is purely self-serving. No
independent evidence was presented as to the alleged
supervision of appellants' bus drivers, especially with regard to
driving habits and reaction to actual traffic conditions. The
appellants in fact admitted that the only kind of supervision
given the drivers referred to the running time between the
terminal points of the line (t.s.n., September 16, 1976, p. 21).
Moreover, the appellants who ran a fleet of 12 buses plying the
Manila-Laoag line, have only two inspectors whose duties were
only ticket inspection. There is no evidence that they are really
safety inspectors. 11
Basically, the Court finds that these determinations are factual in nature. As
a painstaking review of the evidence presented in the case at bar fails to
disclose any evidence or circumstance of note sufficient to overrule said
factual findings and conclusions, the Court is inclined to likewise reject
petitioners' affirmative defense of due diligence. The wisdom of this stance is
made more apparent by the fact that the appellate court's conclusions are
based on the findings of the lower court which is in a better position to
evaluate the testimonies of the witnesses during trial. As a rule, this Court

respects the factual findings of the appellate and trial courts and accord
them a certain measure of finality. 12 Consequently, therefore, we find
petitioners liable for the damages claimed pursuant to their primary liability
under the Civil Code.
On the second legal issue raised in the instant petition, we agree with
petitioners' contention that the Intermediate Appellate Court (later Court of
Appeals) is without jurisdiction to increase the amount of damages awarded
to private respondents Chuay and Lugue, neither of whom appealed the
decision of the lower court. While an appellee who is not also an appellant
may assign error in his brief if his purpose is to maintain the judgment on
other grounds, he cannot ask for modification or reversal of the judgment or
affirmative relief unless he has also appealed. 13 For failure of plaintiffsappellees, herein private respondents, to appeal the lower court's judgment,
the amount of actual damages cannot exceed that awarded by it. 14
Furthermore, the records 15 show that plaintiffs-private respondents limited
their claim for actual and compensatory damages to the supposed average
income for a period of one (1) year of P6,000.00 for the driver Magdaleno
Lugue and P12,000.00 for the Chinese businessman Fernando Chuay. We feel
that our award should not exceed the said amounts . 16
However, the increase in awards for indemnity arising from death to
P30,000.00 each remains, the same having been made in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence decreeing such increase in view of the depreciated
Philippine currency. 17
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified
decreasing the award to private respondents of actual and compensatory
damages for loss of average income for the period of one year to P6,000.00
for the deceased Magdaleno Lugue and P12,000.00 for the deceased
Fernando Chuay. The rest of the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed.
Costs against the private respondents. This decision is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 132266. December 21, 1999]

CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. VICENTE
VASQUEZ, JR. and LUISA SO VASQUEZ, and CEBU DOCTORS
HOSPITAL, INC.,respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The pivotal issue in this petition is whether an employer may be held
vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by
a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle.
The antecedents, as succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals,
are as follows:
On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So
Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmea
Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic
in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also
only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other
hand, Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial
Corporation, registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no.
GBW-794. On the same date and time, Abad drove the said company car
out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmea rotunda he
made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his
route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St.
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad
collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad
stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands
Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital.
On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital. It
was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party
(Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills, professional
fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur.
After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the
accident, a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was

subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. So, the present action

for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So
Vasquez, parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose
Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation. In the same action,
Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the
medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez.[1]
The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents Vicente and Luisa
Vasquez and ordered Jose Benjamin Abad (hereafter ABAD) and
petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation (hereafter CASTILEX) to pay
jointly and solidarily (1) Spouses Vasquez, the amounts of P8,000.00 for
burial expenses; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00 as
attorneys fees; and P778,752.00 for loss of earning capacity; and (2)
Cebu Doctors Hospital, the sum of P50,927.83 for unpaid medical and
hospital bills at 3% monthly interest from 27 July 1989 until fully paid,
plus the costs of litigation.[2]
CASTILEX and ABAD separately appealed the decision.
In its decision[3] of 21 May 1997, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held that
the liability of the latter is only vicarious and not solidary with the
former. It reduced the award of damages representing loss of earning
capacity from P778,752.00 to P214,156.80; and the interest on the
hospital and medical bills, from 3% per month to 12% per annum from 5
September 1988 until fully paid.
Upon CASTILEXs motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals
modified its decision by (1) reducing the award of moral damages
from P50,000 to P30,000 in view of the deceaseds contributory
negligence; (b) deleting the award of attorneys fees for lack of
evidence; and (c) reducing the interest on hospital and medical bills to
6% per annum from 5 September 1988 until fully paid.[4]
Hence, CASTILEX filed the instant petition contending that the Court
of Appeals erred in (1) applying to the case the fifth paragraph of Article
2180 of the Civil Code, instead of the fourth paragraph thereof; (2) that
as a managerial employee, ABAD was deemed to have been always
acting within the scope of his assigned task even outside office hours
because he was using a vehicle issued to him by petitioner; and (3)

ruling that petitioner had the burden to prove that the employee was not
acting within the scope of his assigned task.
Jose Benjamin ABAD merely adopted the statement of facts of
petitioner which holds fast on the theory of negligence on the part of the
deceased.
On the other hand, respondents Spouses Vasquez argue that their
sons death was caused by the negligence of petitioners employee who
was driving a vehicle issued by petitioner and who was on his way home
from overtime work for petitioner; and that petitioner is thus liable for
the resulting injury and subsequent death of their son on the basis of the
fifth paragraph of Article 2180. Even if the fourth paragraph of Article
2180 were applied, petitioner cannot escape liability therefor. They
moreover argue that the Court of Appeals erred in reducing the amount
of compensatory damages when the award made by the trial court was
borne both by evidence adduced during the trial regarding deceaseds
wages and by jurisprudence on life expectancy. Moreover, they point out
that the petition is procedurally not acceptable on the following
grounds: (1) lack of an explanation for serving the petition upon the
Court of Appeals by registered mail, as required under Section 11, Rule
13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) lack of a statement of the
dates of the expiration of the original reglementary period and of the
filing of the motion for extension of time to file a petition for review.
For its part, respondent Cebu Doctors Hospital maintains that
petitioner CASTILEX is indeed vicariously liable for the injuries and
subsequent death of Romeo Vasquez caused by ABAD, who was on his
way home from taking snacks after doing overtime work for
petitioner. Although the incident occurred when ABAD was not working
anymore the inescapable fact remains that said employee would not
have been situated at such time and place had he not been required by
petitioner to do overtime work. Moreover, since petitioner adopted the
evidence adduced by ABAD, it cannot, as the latters employer, inveigle
itself from the ambit of liability, and is thus estopped by the records of
the case, which it failed to refute.
We shall first address the issue raised by the private respondents
regarding some alleged procedural lapses in the petition.

Private respondents contention of petitioners violation of Section 11

of Rule 13 and Section 4 of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
holds no water.
Section 11 of Rule 13 provides:
SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. -- Whenever
practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be
done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the
court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written
explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation
of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.
The explanation why service of a copy of the petition upon the Court
of Appeals was done by registered mail is found on Page 28 of the
petition. Thus, there has been compliance with the aforequoted
provision.
As regards the allegation of violation of the material data rule under
Section 4 of Rule 45, the same is unfounded. The material dates
required to be stated in the petition are the following: (1) the date of
receipt of the judgment or final order or resolution subject of the
petition; (2) the date of filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration,
if any; and (3) the date of receipt of the notice of the denial of the
motion. Contrary to private respondents claim, the petition need not
indicate the dates of the expiration of the original reglementary period
and the filing of a motion for extension of time to file the petition. At any
rate, aside from the material dates required under Section 4 of Rule 45,
petitioner CASTILEX also stated in the first page of the petition the date
it filed the motion for extension of time to file the petition.
Now on the merits of the case.
The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance. Petitioner
CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously
liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD.
Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer
is not engaged in business or industry. Since it is engaged in the

business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not

covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph should apply.
Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The
phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that
it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or
industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting
within the scope of his assigned task.[5]
A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine
what is applicable. Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth
paragraph, to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise;
and the fifth paragraph, to employers in general, whether or not
engaged in any business or industry. The fourth paragraph covers
negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the
branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the fifth paragraph
encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of
their assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the former in both
employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of employees,
whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry, are
covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned
task, even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor
on the occasion of their functions. For, admittedly, employees
oftentimes wear different hats. They perform functions which are
beyond their office, title or designation but which, nevertheless, are still
within the call of duty.
This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the
employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck
operators[6] and banks.[7] The Court of Appeals cannot, therefore, be
faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to
this case.
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in
any business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed
by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary
to establish the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the
plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was
acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of

was committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary
to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision
of the employee.[8]
It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner
CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence. As to whether he was
acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact, which
the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect, and even
finality at times. This rule is, however, subject to exceptions such as
when the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises, or
conjectures.[9] Such exception obtain in the present case to warrant
review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since
ABAD was driving petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of
his duties as a manager.
Before we pass upon the issue of whether ABAD was performing acts
within the range of his employment, we shall first take up the other
reason invoked by the Court of Appeals in holding petitioner CASTILEX
vicariously liable for ABADs negligence, i.e., that the petitioner did not
present evidence that ABAD was not acting within the scope of his
assigned tasks at the time of the motor vehicle mishap. Contrary to the
ruling of the Court of Appeals, it was not incumbent upon the petitioner
to prove the same. It was enough for petitioner CASTILEX to deny that
ABAD was acting within the scope of his duties; petitioner was not under
obligation to prove this negative averment. Ei incumbit probatio qui
dicit, non qui negat (He who asserts, not he who denies, must
prove). The Court has consistently applied the ancient rule that if the
plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails
to show in a satisfactory manner facts which he bases his claim, the
defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.[10]
Now on the issue of whether the private respondents have
sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his
assigned tasks.
ABAD, who was presented as a hostile witness, testified that at the
time of the incident, he was driving a company-issued vehicle, registered
under the name of petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where

he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done
overtime work for the petitioner.
No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the
complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment, an
employee is engaged in his employers business in the operation of a
motor vehicle, so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the
employees action or inaction; but rather, the result varies with each
state of facts.[11]
In Filamer Christian Institute v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[12] this
Court had the occasion to hold that acts done within the scope of the
employees assigned tasks includes any act done by an employee in
furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the
employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damages.
The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that
the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the
scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances.
We do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service
vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to
charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle
unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or
scope of his employment.
The following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the
employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an
employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle:
I. Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in
going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to
work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his
employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit
to the employer. Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to
and from meals, an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so
devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the finding
that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so
driving the vehicle.[13]

II. Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily
a personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his
services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of some special benefit
to the employer other than the mere performance of the services
available at the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting
within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers
motor vehicle.[14]
The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some special
benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle
as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier
and, presumably, spending more time at his actual duties. Where the
employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed
place or hours of work, or to go to and from his home to various outside
places of work, and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in
his work, the courts have frequently applied what has been called the
special errand or roving commission rule, under which it can be
found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he
actually reaches home. However, even if the employee be deemed to be
acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his
employers vehicle, the employer is not liable for his negligence where at
the time of the accident, the employee has left the direct route to his
work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own.
III. Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the

latters personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not
liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the
period of permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a
regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for
personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental
benefit to the employer. Even where the employees personal purpose in
using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return
trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that
he has not resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for
the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip.
[15]

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our

jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, not on
the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours. Whether the fault or
negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American
law or jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the presumption juris
tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours, it is
indispensable that the employee was acting in his employers business
or within the scope of his assigned task.[16]
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime
work at the petitioners office, which was located in Cabangcalan,
Mandaue City. Thereafter, he went to Goldies Restaurant in Fuente
Osmea, Cebu City, which is about seven kilometers away from
petitioners place of business.[17] A witness for the private respondents, a
sidewalk vendor, testified that Fuente Osmea is a lively place even at
dawn because Goldies Restaurant and Back Street were still open and
people were drinking thereat. Moreover, prostitutes, pimps, and drug
addicts littered the place.[18]
At the Goldies Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat
with friends. It was when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the
incident in question occurred. That same witness for the private
respondents testified that at the time of the vehicular accident, ABAD
was with a woman in his car, who then shouted: Daddy, Daddy![19] This
woman could not have been ABADs daughter, for ABAD was only 29
years old at the time.
To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or
was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the
time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of
28 August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABADs working
day had ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His
being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a haven for
prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts, had no connection to
petitioners business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a
manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even for personal purposes
was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his
position.

Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the
scope of the functions entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty
to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require
that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of
the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.[20]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the appealed decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification
that petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation be absolved of any liability
for the damages caused by its employee, Jose Benjamin Abad.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-55963 December 1, 1989
SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA AND VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
G.R. No. L-61045 December 1, 1989
NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, appellant,
vs.
SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA and VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, appellees.
Cecilio V. Suarez, Jr. for Spouses Fontanilla.
Felicisimo C. Villaflor for NIA.

PARAS, J.:

In G.R. No. L-55963, the petition for review on certiorari seeks the affirmance
of the decision dated March 20, 1980 of the then Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII, at San Jose City and its modification with respect to
the denial of petitioner's claim for moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.
In G.R. No. 61045, respondent National Irrigation Administration seeks the
reversal of the aforesaid decision of the lower court. The original appeal of
this case before the Court of Appeals was certified to this Court and in the
resolution of July 7, 1982, it was docketed with the aforecited number. And in
the resolution of April 3, this case was consolidated with G.R. No. 55963.
It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and
operated by respondent National Irrigation Administration, a government
agency bearing Plate No. IN-651, then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an
employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by
Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at
Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact,
Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the San
Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred
to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died.
Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation
Administration who, at the time of the accident, was a licensed professional
driver and who qualified for employment as such regular driver of
respondent after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic
rules and maintenance of vehicles given by National Irrigation Administration
authorities.
The within petition is thus an off-shot of the action (Civil Case No. SJC-56)
instituted by petitioners-spouses on April 17, 1978 against respondent NIA
before the then Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII at San Jose
City, for damages in connection with the death of their son resulting from the
aforestated accident.
After trial, the trial court rendered judgment on March 20, 1980 which
directed respondent National Irrigation Administration to pay damages
(death benefits) and actual expenses to petitioners. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads thus:

. . . . . Judgment is here rendered ordering the defendant National

Irrigation Administration to pay to the heirs of the deceased
P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 which
the parents of the deceased had spent for the hospitalization and
burial of the deceased Francisco Fontanilla; and to pay the costs.
(Brief for the petitioners spouses Fontanilla, p. 4; Rollo, p. 132)
Respondent National Irrigation Administration filed on April 21, 1980, its
motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision which respondent trial
court denied in its Order of June 13, 1980. Respondent National Irrigation
Administration thus appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals (C.A.-G.R.
No. 67237- R) where it filed its brief for appellant in support of its position.
Instead of filing the required brief in the aforecited Court of Appeals case,
petitioners filed the instant petition with this Court.
The sole issue for the resolution of the Court is: Whether or not the award of
moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees is legally proper in
a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict which resulted in the death of
the son of herein petitioners.
Petitioners allege:
1. The award of moral damages is specifically allowable. under
paragraph 3 of Article 2206 of the New Civil Code which provides
that the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for
mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Should
moral damages be granted, the award should be made to each of
petitioners-spouses individually and
in
varying
amounts
depending upon proof of mental and depth of intensity of the
same, which should not be less than P50,000.00 for each of
them.
2. The decision of the trial court had made an impression that
respondent National Irrigation Administration acted with gross
negligence because of the accident and the subsequent failure of
the National Irrigation Administration personnel including the
driver to stop in order to give assistance to the, victims. Thus, by
reason of the gross negligence of respondent, petitioners

become entitled to exemplary damages under Arts. 2231 and

2229 of the New Civil Code.
3. Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney's fees, the
amount of which (20%) had been sufficiently established in the
hearing of May 23, 1979.
4. This petition has been filed only for the purpose of reviewing
the findings of the lower court upon which the disallowance of
moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees was
based and not for the purpose of disturbing the other findings of
fact and conclusions of law.
The Solicitor General, taking up the cudgels for public respondent National
Irrigation Administration, contends thus:
1. The filing of the instant petition is rot proper in view of the
appeal taken by respondent National Irrigation Administration to
the Court of Appeals against the judgment sought to be
reviewed. The focal issue raised in respondent's appeal to the
Court of Appeals involves the question as to whether or not the
driver of the vehicle that bumped the victims was negligent in
his operation of said vehicle. It thus becomes necessary that
before petitioners' claim for moral and exemplary damages could
be resolved, there should first be a finding of negligence on the
part of respondent's employee-driver. In this regard, the Solicitor
General alleges that the trial court decision does not
categorically contain such finding.
2. The filing of the "Appearance and Urgent Motion For Leave to
File Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief" dated December 28, 1981 by
petitioners in the appeal (CA-G.R. No. 67237-R; and G. R.
No.61045) of the respondent National Irrigation Administration
before the Court of Appeals, is an explicit admission of said
petitioners that the herein petition, is not proper. Inconsistent
procedures are manifest because while petitioners question the
findings of fact in the Court of Appeals, they present only the
questions of law before this Court which posture confirms their
admission of the facts.

3. The fact that the parties failed to agree on whether or not

negligence caused the vehicular accident involves a question of
fact which petitioners should have brought to the Court of
Appeals within the reglementary period. Hence, the decision of
the trial court has become final as to the petitioners and for this
reason alone, the petition should be dismissed.
4. Respondent Judge acted within his
discretion and in conformity with the law.

jurisdiction,

sound

5. Respondents do not assail petitioners' claim to moral and

exemplary damages by reason of the shock and subsequent
illness they suffered because of the death of their son.
Respondent National Irrigation Administration, however, avers
that it cannot be held liable for the damages because it is an
agency of the State performing governmental functions and
driver Hugo Garcia was a regular driver of the vehicle, not a
special agent who was performing a job or act foreign to his
usual duties. Hence, the liability for the tortious act should. not
be borne by respondent government agency but by driver Garcia
who should answer for the consequences of his act.
6. Even as the trial court touched on the failure or laxity of
respondent National Irrigation Administration in exercising due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee, the
matter of due diligence is not an issue in this case since driver
Garcia was not its special agent but a regular driver of the
vehicle.
The sole legal question on whether or not petitioners may be entitled to an
award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees can very well be
answered with the application of Arts. 2176 and 2180 of theNew Civil Code.
Art. 2176 thus provides:
Whoever by act omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing cotractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter

Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 21 80 read as follows:

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even the though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a
special agent.; but not when the damage has been caused by the
official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be applicable.
The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:
1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the
tortious acts of special agents only.
2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private
enterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary employer. (p.
961, Civil Code of the Philippines; Annotated, Paras; 1986 Ed. ).
In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage
caused by the tortious acts or conduct of its special agent.
Under the aforequoted paragrah 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily
assumed liability for acts done through special agents. The State's agent, if a
public official, must not only be specially commissioned to do a particular
task but that such task must be foreign to said official's usual governmental
functions. If the State's agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to
perform non-governmental functions, then the State assumes the role of an
ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its agent's tort. Where
the government commissions a private individual for a special governmental
task, it is acting through a special agent within the meaning of the provision.
(Torts and Damages, Sangco, p. 347, 1984 Ed.)
Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the
government, are more or less generally agreed to be "governmental" in
character, and so the State is immune from tort liability. On the other hand, a
service which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and
particularly when it collects revenues from it, the function is considered a

"proprietary" one, as to which there may be liability for the torts of agents
within the scope of their employment.
The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government
exercising proprietary functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601.
Section 1 of said Act provides:
Section 1. Name and domicile.-A body corporate is hereby
created which shall be known as the National Irrigation
Administration, hereinafter called the NIA for short, which shall
be organized immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall
have its principal seat of business in the City of Manila and shall
have representatives in all provinces for the proper conduct of its
business.
Section 2 of said law spells out some of the NIA's proprietary functions. ThusSec. 2. Powers and objectives.-The NIA shall have the following
powers and objectives:
(a) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
(b) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
(c) To collect from the users of each irrigation system constructed
by it such fees as may be necessary to finance the continuous
operation of the system and reimburse within a certain period
not less than twenty-five years cost of construction thereof; and
(d) To do all such other tthings and to transact all such business
as are directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to
the attainment of the above objectives.
Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality
and not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body
performing non-governmental functions, it now becomes liable for the
damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its driveremployee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an
ordinary employer and as such, it becomes answerable for damages.

This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of

negligence on the part of respondent NIA. The negligence referred to here is
the negligence of supervision.
At this juncture, the matter of due diligence on the part of respondent NIA
becomes a crucial issue in determining its liability since it has been
established that respondent is a government agency performing proprietary
functions and as such, it assumes the posture of an ordinary employer which,
under Par. 5 of Art. 2180, is responsible for the damages caused by its
employees provided that it has failed to observe or exercise due diligence in
the selection and supervision of the driver.
It will be noted from the assailed decision of the trial court that "as a result of
the impact, Francisco Fontanilla wasthrown to a distance 50 meters away
from the point of impact while Restituto Deligo was thrown a little bit further
away. The impact took place almost at the edge of the cemented portion of
the road." (Emphasis supplied,) [page 26, Rollo]
The lower court further declared that "a speeding vehicle coming in contact
with a person causes force and impact upon the vehicle that anyone in the
vehicle cannot fail to notice. As a matter of fact, the impact was so strong as
shown by the fact that the vehicle suffered dents on the right side of the
radiator guard, the hood, the fender and a crack on the radiator as shown by
the investigation report (Exhibit "E"). (Emphasis supplied) [page 29, Rollo]
It should be emphasized that the accident happened along the Maharlika
National Road within the city limits of San Jose City, an urban area.
Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters away from the
point of impact, there is a strong indication that driver Garcia was driving at
a high speed. This is confirmed by the fact that the pick-up suffered
substantial and heavy damage as above-described and the fact that the NIA
group was then "in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible", as
shown by their not stopping to find out what they bumped as would have
been their normal and initial reaction.
Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the
reason that they were travelling at a high speed within the city limits and yet
the supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga, failed to caution and make the
driver observe the proper and allowed speed limit within the city. Under the
situation, such negligence is further aggravated by their desire to reach their
destination without even checking whether or not the vehicle suffered

damage from the object it bumped, thus showing imprudence and

reckelessness on the part of both the driver and the supervisor in the group.
Significantly, this Court has ruled that even if the employer can prove the
diligence in the selection and supervision (the latter aspect has not been
established herein) of the employee, still if he ratifies the wrongful acts, or
take no step to avert further damage, the employer would still be liable.
(Maxion vs. Manila Railroad Co., 44 Phil. 597).
Thus, too, in the case of Vda. de Bonifacio vs. B.L.T. Bus Co. (L-26810, August
31, 1970, 34 SCRA 618), this Court held that a driver should be especially
watchful in anticipation of others who may be using the highway, and his
failure to keep a proper look out for reasons and objects in the line to be
traversed constitutes negligence.
Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed to pay herein
petitioners-spouses the amounts of P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco
Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for hospitalization and burial expenses of the
aforenamed deceased; P30,000.00 as moral damages; P8,000.00 as
exemplary damages and attorney's fees of 20% of the total award.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Vestil v. IAC G.R. No. 74431
G.R. No. 74431 November 6, 1989
PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN VESTIL, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DAVID UY and TERESITA
UY, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a
child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of
Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu
General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on
the forehead" 1 and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio
Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted one week

later due to "vomiting of saliva." 2 The following day, on August 15, 1975, the
child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia. 3
Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were
liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually
killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog
belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and
that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge Jose
R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants
and dismissed the complaint. 4
ISSUE:
In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the
owner of the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet
been partitioned and there are other heirs to the property.
RULING:
Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada
would be held responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she is one
of Miranda's heirs. However, that is hardly the point. What must be
determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was staying in the
house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house.
Article 2183 reads as follows:
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or
be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should
come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered
damage.
Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, 6 a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored
him to death and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for
damages. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was the
caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from causing injury to any one,
including himself.
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still
part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband
were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. She was the only
heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the
property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. 13 Moreover,
there is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the
house, once or twice weekly, according to at least one witness, 14 and used it
virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in
the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog. 15 The dog
itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973
and until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is also noteworthy
that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization
expenses although Purita said she knew them only casually. 16

ISSUE:
The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors
of the dog that bit Theness there was no clear showing that she died as a
result thereof.
RULING:
On the contrary, the death certificate 17 declared that she died of bronchopneumonia, which had nothing to do with the dog bites for which she had
been previously hospitalized. The Court need not involve itself in an
extended scientific discussion of the causal connection between the dog
bites and the certified cause of death except to note that, first, Theness
developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites,
and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her
death, was a complication of rabies. That Theness became afraid of water
after she was bitten by the dog is established by the testimony of Dr. Tautjo.
On the strength of the testimony, the Court finds that the link between the
dog bites and the certified cause of death has beep satisfactorily established.
We also reiterate our ruling in Sison v. Sun Life Assurance Company of
Canada, 20 that the death certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of
death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence of the child's
hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she died because she was bitten
by the dog even if the death certificate stated a different cause of death. The
petitioner's contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote
control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code
holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and
so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that, as the
petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the
child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but
covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged
provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at
the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might
have done to the animal.
According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil
Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of
vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the
damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest
that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must
answer for the damage which such animal may cause. 21
We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and approve the monetary
awards except only as to the medical and hospitalization expenses, which
are reduced to P2,026.69, as prayed for in the complaint. While there is no
recompense that can bring back to the private respondents the child they
have lost, their pain should at least be assuaged by the civil damages to
which they are entitled.