Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Case Title
Page
SORIANO, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 162336 - February 1, 2010)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VILLAMIN (G.R. No. 175590 - February 9, 2010)
11
20
KALALO vs OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (G.R. No. 158189 - April 23, 2010)
27
33
39
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs NOQUE G.R. No. 175319 - January 15, 2010)
51
LEE vs KBC BANK N.V. (G.R. No. 164673 - January 15, 2010)
58
69
72
CACAO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 180870 - January 22, 2010)
79
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MORALES (G.R. No. 172873 - March 19, 2010)
88
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HABANA (G.R. No. 188900 - March 5, 2010)
99
103
HILARIO P. SORIANO,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP),
PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC), PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR ANTONIO C.BUAN, and STATE PROSECUTOR ALBERTO
R. FONACIER,
G.R. No. 162336
February 1, 2010
A bank officer violates the DOSRI2 law when he acquires bank funds
for his personal benefit, even if such acquisition was facilitated by a
fraudulent loan application. Directors, officers, stockholders, and
their related interests cannot be allowed to interpose the fraudulent
nature of the loan as a defense to escape culpability for their
circumvention of Section 83 of Republic Act (RA) No. 337. 3
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari4 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the September 26, 2003 Decision 5 and the
February 5, 2004 Resolution6 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 67657. The challenged Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari
is hereby DENIED.7
Factual Antecedents
Sometime in 2000, the Office of Special Investigation (OSI) of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), through its officers,8 transmitted
a letter9 dated March 27, 2000 to Jovencito Zuo, Chief State
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ). The letter attached
as annexes five affidavits,10 which would allegedly serve as bases
for filing criminal charges for Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial
Documents, in relation to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1689, 11 and
for Violation of Section 83 of RA 337, as amended by PD 1795, 12
against, inter alia, petitioner herein Hilario P. Soriano. These five
affidavits, along with other documents, stated that spouses Enrico
and Amalia Carlos appeared to have an outstanding loan of P8
million with the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM),
but had never applied for nor received such loan; that it was
petitioner, who was then president of RBSM, who had ordered,
facilitated, and received the proceeds of the loan; and that the P8
million loan had never been authorized by RBSM's Board of
Directors and no report thereof had ever been submitted to the
converted the same to his own personal use and benefit, in flagrant
violation of the said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.19
Both cases were raffled to Branch 79 of the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan.20
On June 8, 2001, petitioner moved to quash 21 these informations on
two grounds: that the court had no jurisdiction over the offense
charged, and that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
On the first ground, petitioner argued that the letter transmitted by
the BSP to the DOJ constituted the complaint and hence was
defective for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of
Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, such as the statement
of address of petitioner and oath and subscription. 22 Moreover,
petitioner argued that the officers of OSI, who were the signatories
to the "letter-complaint," were not authorized by the BSP Governor,
much less by the Monetary Board, to file the complaint. According
to petitioner, this alleged fatal oversight violated Section 18, pars.
(c) and (d) of the New Central Bank Act (RA 7653).
On the second ground, petitioner contended that the commission of
estafa under paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 of the RPC is inherently
incompatible with the violation of DOSRI law (as set out in Section
8323 of RA 337, as amended by PD 1795),24 hence a person cannot
be charged for both offenses. He argued that a violation of DOSRI
law requires the offender to obtain a loan from his bank, without
complying with procedural, reportorial, or ceiling requirements. On
the other hand, estafa under par. 1(b), Article 315 of the RPC
requires the offender to misappropriate or convert something that
he holds in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to return the same.25
Essentially, the petitioner theorized that the characterization of
possession is different in the two offenses. If petitioner acquired the
loan as DOSRI, he owned the loaned money and therefore, cannot
misappropriate or convert it as contemplated in the offense of
estafa. Conversely, if petitioner committed estafa, then he merely
held the money in trust for someone else and therefore, did not
acquire a loan in violation of DOSRI rules.
29
(like herein petitioner) which are made either: (1) directly, (2)
indirectly, (3) for himself, (4) or as the representative or agent of
others. It applies even if the director or officer is a mere guarantor,
indorser or surety for someone else's loan or is in any manner an
obligor for money borrowed from the bank or loaned by it. The
covered transactions are prohibited unless the approval, reportorial
and ceiling requirements under Section 83 are complied with. The
prohibition is intended to protect the public, especially the
depositors,[49] from the overborrowing of bank funds by bank
officers, directors, stockholders and related interests, as such
overborrowing may lead to bank failures.[50] It has been said that
"banking institutions are not created for the benefit of the directors
[or officers]. While directors have great powers as directors, they
have no special privileges as individuals. They cannot use the
assets of the bank for their own benefit except as permitted by law.
Stringent restrictions are placed about them so that when acting
both for the bank and for one of themselves at the same time, they
must keep within certain prescribed lines regarded by the
legislature as essential to safety in the banking business".51
A direct borrowing is obviously one that is made in the name of the
DOSRI himself or where the DOSRI is a named party, while an
indirect borrowing includes one that is made by a third party, but
the DOSRI has a stake in the transaction.52 The latter type indirect
borrowing applies here. The information in Criminal Case 238-M2001 alleges that petitioner "in his capacity as President of Rural
Bank of San Miguel San Ildefonso branch x x x indirectly
borrow[ed] or secure[d] a loan with [RBSM] x x x knowing fully well
that the same has been done by him without the written consent
and approval of the majority of the board of directors x x x, and
which consent and approval the said accused deliberately failed to
obtain and enter the same upon the records of said banking
institution and to transmit a copy thereof to the supervising
department of the said bank x x x by using the name of one
depositor Enrico Carlos x x x, the latter having no knowledge of the
said loan, and once in possession of the said amount of eight
million pesos (P8 million), [petitioner] converted the same to his
own personal use and benefit".53
The foregoing information describes the manner of securing the
loan as indirect; names petitioner as the benefactor of the indirect
loan; and states that the requirements of the law were not
complied with. It contains all the required elements54 for a violation
of Section 83, even if petitioner did not secure the loan in his own
name.
The broad interpretation of the prohibition in Section 83 is justified
by the fact that it even expressly covers loans to third parties
where the third parties are aware of the transaction (such as
principals represented by the DOSRI), and where the DOSRIs
interest does not appear to be beneficial but even burdensome
(such as in cases when the DOSRI acts as a mere guarantor or
surety). If the law finds it necessary to protect the bank and the
banking system in such situations, it will surely be illogical for it to
exclude a case like this where the DOSRI acted for his own benefit,
using the name of an unsuspecting person. A contrary
interpretation will effectively allow a DOSRI to use dummies to
circumvent the requirements of the law.
In sum, the informations filed against petitioner do not negate each
other.
Third Issue:
Is a Rule 65 petition for certiorari the proper remedy against an
Order denying a Motion to Quash?
This issue may be speedily resolved by adopting our ruling in
Soriano v. People,55 where we held:
In fine, the Court has consistently held that a special civil action for
certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion
to quash an information. The proper procedure in such a case is for
the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part
to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to
quash and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is
rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.
Thus, petitioners should not have forthwith filed a special civil
action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they should have gone
to trial and reiterated the special defenses contained in their
motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional circumstances
in the present case that would justify immediate resort to a filing of
a petition for certiorari. Clearly, the CA did not commit any
reversible error, much less, grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the petition.56
Fourth Issue:
Whether petitioner is entitled to a writ of injunction
The requisites to justify an injunctive relief are: (1) the right of the
complainant is clear and unmistakable; (2) the invasion of the right
sought to be protected is material and substantial; and (3) there is
an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage. A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or
granted by law or is "enforceable as a matter of law." Absent any
clear and unquestioned legal right, the issuance of an injunctive
writ would constitute grave abuse of discretion. 57 Caution and
prudence must, at all times, attend the issuance of an injunctive
writ because it effectively disposes of the main case without trial
and/or due process.58 In Olalia v. Hizon,59 the Court held as follows:
It has been consistently held that there is no power the exercise of
which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation
and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case, than
the issuance of an injunction. It is the strong arm of equity that
should never be extended unless to cases of great injury, where
courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy
in damages.
Every court should remember that an injunction is a limitation upon
the freedom of action of the [complainant] and should not be
granted lightly or precipitately. It should be granted only when the
court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency
demands it.
Given this Court's findings in the earlier issues of the instant case,
we find no compelling reason to grant the injunctive relief sought
by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed September 26,
2003 Decision as well as the February 5, 2004 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67657 are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
10
11
The CA, in its Decision dated July 19, 2006, affirmed the conviction
of accused-appellant. The dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the assailed decision is AFFIRMED
and UPHELD in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellant, in his Brief dated September 20, 2004, ascribes
the following errors, to wit:
I
THE COURT A-QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME
CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A-QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.
Accused-appellant claims that he was not given the opportunity to
know the reason for his arrest, as he was immediately handcuffed
by the arresting officers, making it appear that he was caught in
flagrante selling shabu, which is in contravention of his rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures as embodied under the
1987 Philippine Constitution. He further argues that the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot
prevail over the constitutionally protected rights of an individual.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Brief, states the
argument that:
THE PROSECUTION SATISFACTORILY PROVED THE GUILT OF
APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
The OSG posits that the crime of drug pushing merely requires the
consummation of the sale, whereby the pusher hands over the
drugs to the buyer in exchange for money, which the prosecution is
12
Q: Do you rcall if you have reported for duty on August 17, 2002?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: At what time did you report for duty on said date?
A: At about 9:00 o'clock in the morning, sir.
Q: When you reported for duty, do you recall if there was unusual
incident that transpired thereat?
Q: Mr. Witness, you stated that you are presently assigned at the
San Jose de Monte Police Station, will you please tell before this
Honorable Court what particular unit or division were you assigned?
A: At DEU, sir.
Q: Being assigned at the DEU of the San Jose del Monte Police
Station, will you please tell before this Honorable Court your
specific duties as such?
A: I am the chief of that section, sir.
Q: Being the chief of the said section of the DEU, will you please tell
before this Honorable Court your duties as chief of the office?
13
Q: Will you please tell this Honorable Court your participation in the
actual buy-bust operation?
A: As Poseur buyer, sir.
Q: According to you you were directed by your chief of office to
conduct buy-bust operation in Gumaok, and who is the person or
the subject of the buy-bust to be conducted by you?
A: Fernando Villamin alias Andoy, sir.
Q: Mr. Witness, I am showing to you two (2) one hundred peso bills
which according to you utilized as the buy-bust money, will you
please go over the same and tell before this Honorable Court what
relation if any these two (2) one hundred peso bills?
A: Many, sir.
Q: Why do you say that these are the same two (2) one hundred
peso bills, what were your identifying mark if any?
A: My initial, sir.
Q: Will you please point your initial which according to you you put
there?
14
A: He turned his back and went inside and get the shabu
and came back carrying the shabu already, sir.
Q: Mr. Witness let us be specific, you stated he went inside,
from where did he went inside?
A: Inside his house, sir.
xxx
A: Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
15
16
GR no. 184537
April 23, 2010
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order assailing the July 14, 2008 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263, denying the
Motion for Preliminary Investigation filed by the petitioners who
were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019, and the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration done in
open court on August 13, 2008.
17
new preliminary
established
the
the motion under
for lack of merit.
both accused shall
18
2.
3.
19
20
21
Roberto b. kalalo
vs
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ERNESTO M. DE CHAVEZ and
MARCELO L. AGUSTIN,
G.R. No. 158189
April 23, 2010
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court seeking to nullify and/or set aside the Resolution dated May
14, 2002 and the Order dated October 8, 2002 of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
Petitioner Roberto Kalalo, an employee of Pablo Borbon
Memorial Institute of Technology (PBMIT), now Batangas State
22
PBMIT testing,
account;
admission
and
placement
office
23
II
PUBLIC
RESPONDENT
GRAVELY
ABUSED
ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED
RESOLUTION AND ORDER WITHOUT FACTUAL AND
LEGAL BASES.
III
PUBLIC
RESPONDENT
GRAVELY
ABUSED
ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN NOT FINDING PROBABLE
CAUSE AGAINST BOTH PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
The petition is bereft of merit.
Petitioner extensively and exhaustively discusses in his
petition, the differences between what he claimed to be the
falsified Minutes and what he presented as the true and authentic
Minutes of the general meeting, and by not subscribing to his own
findings, he now comes to this Court alleging that the Office of the
Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion which amounted to lack
and/or excess of jurisdiction.
A careful reading of his arguments shows that the matters he
raised were purely factual. He claims that the Office of the
Ombudsman grievously erred in finding that petitioner had issued
certifications as to the correctness of the resolutions in question,
namely Resolution Nos. 6, s. 1997; 25 and 26, when, according to
petitioner, he positively asserted that the same were signed by
mistake or out of sheer inadvertence. He went on to state that the
signature on the questioned Minutes was forged and that the one
inadvertently signed was the excerpts, not the Minutes. This line of
argument has been repeatedly emphasized along with his own
findings of falsification.
In alleging the existence of grave abuse of discretion, it is
well to remember Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan, where this Court
ruled that:
For grave abuse of discretion to prosper as a
ground for certiorari, it must first be demonstrated
that the lower court or tribunal has exercised its
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by
24
showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and
that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands
more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which
would justify conviction. Unless it is shown that the questioned
acts were done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, this Court will not interfere in the
findings of probable cause determined by the Ombudsman.
The findings of the Office of the Ombudsman, as contained
in its Order dated October 8, 2002, does not, in any way, indicate
the absence of any factual or legal bases, as shown in the
following:
While we do acknowledge that the purpose of a
preliminary investigation is to determine the
existence of probable cause that which engender a
well-founded belief that an offense has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof, we should not, however, lose sight of its
other objective. In the case of Duterte v.
Sandiganbayan, 289 SCRA 721, it is equally intoned
that the rationale for conducting a preliminary
investigation is to secure the innocent against
hasty, malicious, oppressive prosecution, and to
protect him from an open and public accusation of a
crime, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a
public trial. With the questioned minutes bearing
the signature of complainant-movant, the evidence
at hand tends to tilt in favor of the dismissal of the
case. This is rightfully so as complainant-movants
signature was never alleged to have been falsified,
although he claims to have signed the minutes
through inadvertence.
In relation thereto, complainant-movants
assertion that his signature in the disputed minutes
was a case of oversight is hardly impressive. It
should be noted that the minutes of the 129 th Regular
Meeting of the then PBMIT Board of Trustees was
approved during its 130th Regular Meeting held on
November 7, 1997. As the Board Secretary,
complainant-movant could have easily detected the
alleged insertions especially so when we consider
that Board Resolution Nos. 25 and 26, s. of 1997,
25
proceedings;
represent
the
Government and its officers in the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and
all other courts or tribunals in all civil
actions and special proceedings in
which the Government or any officer
thereof in his official capacity is a
party.
The import of the above-quoted provision of
the Administrative Code of 1987 is to impose upon
the Office of the Solicitor General the duty to appear
as counsel for the Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents before
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all
other courts and tribunals in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of a lawyer. Its mandatory character was
emphasized by this Court in the case of Gonzales v.
Chavez, thus:
It is patent that the intent of the
lawmaker was to give the designated
official, the Solicitor General, in this
case, the unequivocal mandate to
appear for the government in legal
proceedings. Spread out in the laws
creating the office is the discernible
intent which may be gathered from the
term
shall,
which is
invariably
employed, from Act No. 136 (1901) to
the more recent Executive Order No. 292
(1987).
xxx
xx
x
xxx
The decision of this Court as early as 1910
with respect to the duties of the Attorney-General
well applies to the Solicitor General under the facts
of the present case. The Court then declared:
In this jurisdiction, it is the duty
of the Attorney General to perform the
duties imposed upon him by law and
he shall prosecute all causes, civil and
criminal, to which the Government of the
Philippine Islands, or any officer thereof,
in his official capacity, is a party xxx.
26
xxx
xxx
xx
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
27
28
accused are the ones responsible for the posting and publication of
the defamatory articles that the article in question was posted and
published with the object of the discrediting and ridiculing the
complainant before the public.
CONTRARY TO LAW.12
Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutors
Resolution by a petition for review to the Secretary of Justice who,
by Resolution of June 20, 2007,13 reversed the finding of probable
cause and accordingly directed the withdrawal of the Informations
for libel filed in court. The Justice Secretary opined that the crime of
"internet libel" was non-existent, hence, the accused could not be
charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC.14
Petitioners, as co-accused,15 thereupon filed on June 6, 2006, before
the public respondent, a Motion to Quash16 the Information in
Criminal Case No. 06-876 on the grounds that it failed to vest
jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the
Information are not punishable by law since internet libel is not
covered by Article 353 of the RPC; and the Information is fatally
defective for failure to designate the offense charged and the acts
or omissions complained of as constituting the offense of libel.
Citing Macasaet v. People,17 petitioners maintained that the
Information failed to allege a particular place within the trial courts
jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published
or that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time the
alleged defamatory material was printed and first published.
By Order of October 3, 2006,18 the public respondent, albeit finding
that probable cause existed, quashed the Information, citing
Agustin v. Pamintuan.19 It found that the Information lacked any
allegations that the offended parties were actually residing in
Makati at the time of the commission of the offense as in fact they
listed their address in the complaint-affidavit at Yuchengco Tower in
Binondo, Manila; or that the alleged libelous article was printed and
first published in Makati.
The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the
Information,20 insisting that the Information sufficiently conferred
jurisdiction on the public respondent. It cited Banal III v.
Panganiban21 which held that the Information need not allege
29
30
31
32
May 5, 2010
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the Court of
Appeals, in its Decision1 dated 20 June 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No.
49666, is correct when it dismissed the petition for certiorari filed
by petitioners Teodoro C. Borlongan, Jr., Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo
E. Manuel, Jr., Benjamin de Leon, P. Siervo H. Dizon, Delfin C.
Gonzales, Jr., Eric L. Lee and Ben Yu Lim, Jr., and ruled that the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago City, did not gravely
abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reinvestigation and
recall of the warrants of arrest in Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684,
6685, and 6686.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea (Atty. Pea) instituted a civil
case for recovery of agents compensation and expenses, damages,
and attorneys fees2 against Urban Bank and herein petitioners,
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago
City. The case was raffled to Branch 62 and was docketed as Civil
Case No. 754. Atty. Pea anchored his claim for compensation on
the Contract of Agency3 allegedly entered into with the petitioners,
wherein the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to
prevent any intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban
Banks property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss4 arguing that they never
appointed the respondent as agent or counsel. Attached to the
motion were the following documents: 1) a Letter5 dated 19
December 1994 signed by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad on behalf
of Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of the
subject property; 2) an unsigned Letter6 dated 7 December 1994
addressed to Corazon Bejasa from Marilyn G. Ong; 3) a
Letter7 dated 9 December 1994 addressed to Teodoro Borlongan, Jr.
and signed by Marilyn G. Ong; and 4) a Memorandum8 dated 20
November 1994 from Enrique Montilla III. Said documents were
presented in an attempt to show that the respondent was
appointed as agent by ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the
petitioners.
33
A.
Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable
by the Regional Trial Court and not covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure, is the finding of probable cause required for
the filing of an Information in court?
The issues raised by the petitioners have not been mooted by the
fact that they had posted bail and were already arraigned.
It appears from the records that upon the issuance of the warrant
of arrest, petitioners immediately posted bail as they wanted to
avoid embarrassment, being then the officers of Urban Bank. On
the scheduled date for the arraignment, despite the petitioners
34
35
36
since such section covers only crimes cognizable by the RTC. That
which is stated in Section 9(a) is the applicable rule.
Under this Rule, while probable cause should first be determined
before an information may be filed in court, the prosecutor is not
mandated to require the respondent to submit his counter-affidavits
to oppose the complaint. In the determination of probable cause,
the prosecutor may solely rely on the complaint, affidavits and
other supporting documents submitted by the complainant. If he
does not find probable cause, the prosecutor may dismiss outright
the complaint or if he finds probable cause or sufficient reason to
proceed with the case, he shall issue a resolution and file the
corresponding information.
The complaint of respondent, verbatim, is as follows:
COMPLAINT AFFIDAVIT
I, MAGDALENO M. PEA, Filipino, of legal age, with address at Brgy.
Ubay, Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, after having been sworn in
accordance with law hereby depose and state:
1. I am the Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 754 pending with the Regional
Trial Court of Bago City entitled "Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea v. Urban
Bank, et al" Impleaded therein as defendants of the board of the
bank, namely, Teodoro Borlongan, Delfin Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin De
Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee, Ben Lim Jr., Corazon Bejasa and
Arturo Manuel.(underlining ours)
2. I filed the said case to collect my fees as agent of Urban Bank,
Inc.(hereinafter referred to as the "bank") in ridding a certain parcel
of land in Pasay City of squatters and intruders. A certified true
copy of the Complaint in the said case is hereto attached as Annex
"A".
3. In the Motion to Dismiss dated 12 March 1996 (a certified true
copy of which is attached as Annex "B"), Answer dated 28 October
1996 (Annex "C"), and Pre-Trial Brief dated 28 January 1997 (Annex
"D") filed by the bank and the respondent members of the board,
the said respondents used as evidence the following documents:
37
HERMAN PONCE
JULIE ABAD
b. Memorandum dated 7 December 1994 supposedly executed by a
certain Marilyn Ong on behalf of ISC, a copy of which is hereto
attached as annex "F", which states:
December 7, 1994
To: ATTY. CORA BEJASA
Marilyn Ong
6. No persons by the name of Herman Ponce and Julie Abad were
ever stockholders, officers, employees or representatives of ISC. In
38
Resolution and Information by the City Prosecutor why Mr. Ben Lim,
Jr. was included. Moreover, as can be gleaned from the body of the
complaint and the specific averments therein, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was
never mentioned.
The City Prosecutor should have cautiously reviewed the complaint
to determine whether there were inconsistencies which ought to
have been brought to the attention of the respondent or, on his
own, considered for due evaluation. It is a big mistake to bring a
man to trial for a crime he did not commit.
Prosecutors are endowed with ample powers in order that they may
properly fulfill their assigned role in the administration of justice. It
should be realized, however, that when a man is hailed to court on
a criminal charge, it brings in its wake problems not only for the
accused but for his family as well. Therefore, it behooves a
prosecutor to weigh the evidence carefully and to deliberate
thereon to determine the existence of a prima facie case before
filing the information in court. Anything less would be a dereliction
of duty.29
Atty. Pea, in his Second Manifestation30 dated 16 June 1999,
averred that petitioners, including Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., were already
estopped from raising the fact that Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was not a
member of the board of directors of Urban Bank, as the latter
participated and appeared through counsel in Civil Case No. 754
without raising any opposition. However, this does not detract from
the fact that the City Prosecutor, as previously discussed, did not
carefully scrutinize the complaint of Atty. Pea, which did not
charge Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. of any crime.
What tainted the procedure further was that the Judge issued a
warrant for the arrest of the petitioners, including, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr.
despite the filing of the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants
of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation raising among others the issue
that Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., was not even a member of the board of
directors. With the filing of the motion, the judge is put on alert that
an innocent person may have been included in the complaint. In
the Order31 dated 13 November 1998, in denying the motion to
quash, Judge Primitivo Blanca ruled that:
Courts in resolving a motion to quash cannot consider facts
contrary to those alleged in the information or which do not appear
on the face of the information because said motion is hypothethical
39
40
41
very start those falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations,
expenses and anxiety of a public trial.53
We do not see how it can be concluded that the documents
mentioned by respondent in his complaint-affidavit were falsified. In
his complaint, Atty. Pea stated that Herman Ponce, Julie Abad and
Marilyn Ong, the alleged signatories of the questioned letters, did
not actually affix their signatures therein; and that they were not
actually officers or stockholders of ISCI.54 He further claimed that
Enrique Montillas signature appearing in another memorandum
addressed to respondent was forged.55 These averments are mere
assertions which are insufficient to warrant the filing of the
complaint or worse the issuance of warrants of arrest. These
averments cannot be considered as proceeding from the personal
knowledge of herein respondent who failed to, basically, allege that
he was present at the time of the execution of the documents.
Neither was there any mention in the complaint-affidavit that
herein respondent was familiar with the signatures of the
mentioned signatories to be able to conclude that they were
forged. What Atty. Pea actually stated were but sweeping
assertions that the signatories are mere dummies of ISCI and that
they are not in fact officers, stockholders or representatives of the
corporation. Again, there is no indication that the assertion was
based on the personal knowledge of the affiant.
The reason for the requirement that affidavits must be based on
personal knowledge is to guard against hearsay evidence. A
witness, therefore, may not testify as what he merely learned from
others either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such
testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof
of the truth of what he has learned.56 Hearsay is not limited to oral
testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as
evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements. 57
The requirement of personal knowledge should have been strictly
applied considering that herein petitioners were not given the
opportunity to rebut the complainants allegation through counteraffidavits.
Quite noticeable is the fact that in the letter dated 19 December
1994 of Herman Ponce and Julie Abad, neither of the two made the
representation that they were the president or secretary of ISCI. It
was only Atty. Pea who asserted that the two made such
representation. He alleged that Marilyn Ong was never a
stockholder of ISCI but he did not present the stock and transfer
book of ISCI. And, there was neither allegation nor proof that
Marilyn Ong was not connected to ISCI in any other way. Moreover,
even if Marilyn Ong was not a stockholder of ISCI, such would not
prove that the documents she signed were falsified.
The Court may not be compelled to pass upon the correctness of
the exercise of the public prosecutors function without any showing
of grave abuse of discretion or manifest error in his
findings.58 Considering, however, that the prosecution and the court
a quo committed manifest errors in their findings of probable
cause, this Court therefore annuls their findings.
Our pronouncement in Jimenez v. Jimenez59 as reiterated in Baltazar
v. People is apropos:
It is x x x imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may
be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial
once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a
sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no
general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable
cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions
obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large
degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the
examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before
the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reasons. The
judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in
the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during
trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the
courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary
lives up to its mission by visualizing and not denigrating
constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be
so.
On the foregoing discussion, we find that the Court of Appeals erred
in affirming the findings of the prosecutor as well as the court a quo
as to the existence of probable cause. The criminal complaint
against the petitioners should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 20 June 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666,
isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order
dated 2 August 2000 is hereby made permanent. Accordingly, the
42
The Charges
43
guilty to both charges. Pre-trial conference was conducted and upon its
Article III in relation to Section 21 (e), (f), (m), (o), Article 1 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 6425, as amended by Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1683 and as
further amended by RA 7659 reads:
That on or about January 30, 2001, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not having been
authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any regulated drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly sell or offer for sale, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute 2.779 (two point seven
seven nine grams) and 2.729 (two point seven two nine
grams) of white crystalline substance known as shabu
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a
regulated drug.
Contrary to law.[2]
being
conducted
at No.
630
San
Andres
Street,
Malate, Manila. Thereafter, SP04 Murillo formed and led a buy-bust team
with POs Balais, Borca, Ramon Pablo, Roberto Godoy, Edgardo Book,
by RA 7659:
44
the marked money to the appellant, the latter brought out from under a
table a pranela bag from which he took two plastic sachets containing
of January 23, 2001 when six policemen led by SPO4 Murillo entered and
slipped out of the house as the pre-arranged signal to the buy-bust team
team
returned
after
30
minutes
and
apprehended
another
person. When they came back the third time, they took him with them
After seeing the informant leave, the team entered appellants
to WPD Station No. 9 where his wallet, belt and shoes were taken. While
house. SPO4 Murillo frisked the appellant and recovered the buy-bust
who were in a pot session with the appellant at the time of the raid
2001 when SPO4 Murillo and his team returned to his house and took
were likewise arrested and brought to the WPD Station No. 9 for
investigation.
hours. Police officers presented him later to Mayor Lito Atienza and
General Avelino Razon for a press conference.
adduced by the prosecution established with moral certainty his guilt for
delicto of selling and possessing a dangerous drug are clear and positive
serving
assertions
unsubstantiated
by
clear
and
convincing
evidence. The trial court also ruled that it cannot deviate from the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty on the part of the
45
police officers since no ill motives were ascribed to them that would
entice them to testify falsely against the appellant.
The trial court also held that while the Informations alleged
methamphetamine hydrochloride as the drug seized from the appellant,
the drug actually confiscated which was ephedrine, is a precursor of
methamphetamine, i.e., methamphetamine is an element of, and is
present
in
ephedrine. Ephedrine
is
the
raw
material
while
Conformably,
the
methamphetamine
contents
of
5.508
46
to
unauthorized
sale
and
possession
of
shabu
or
Our Ruling
of the nature of the crime with which he is accused. The fact that the
chemical structures of ephedrine and methamphetamine are the same
except for the presence of an atom of oxygen in the former strengthens
this ruling.[8]
47
seconstitutes prima
this illegal merchandise after giving the appellant the marked money as
accused,
drug.
was his duty to explain his innocence on the regulated drug seized from
The prosecutions
evidence
satisfactorily
proved
that
appellant illegally
possessed
a
dangerous drug.
to
facie evidence
explain
the
absence
of
knowledge
of
knowledge
or animus
or animus
his person. However, as already mentioned, he did not offer any excuse
or explanation regarding his possession thereof.
There
is
no
evidence showing
that the police
officers
are
actuated by ill
motives.
The police buy-bust team apprehended the appellant for the sale
of a white crystalline substance then proceeded to search the
premises. They found a large quantity of the same substance inside the
bag that contained the two sachets of the regulated drug sold to PO1
The only issue raised by the appellant in this petition is that his
conviction for the sale and possession of shabu, despite the fact that
what was established and proven was the sale and possession of
48
and cause of the accusations against him since the charges in the
Informations
are
for
selling
and
possessing
methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
We agree with the findings of the CA and the trial court, as well as
the testimony of the forensic chemical officer, that the drug known as
the offenses charged, which are included in the crimes proved. Under
these provisions, an offense charged is necessarily included in the
form part of those constituting the latter. At any rate, a minor variance
between the information and the evidence does not alter the nature of
the offense, nor does it determine or qualify the crime or penalty, so that
against him has not been violated because where an accused is charged
with a specific crime, he is duly informed not only of such specific crime
The Penalties
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
In Criminal Case No. 01-189458, appellant is found guilty of
Moreover, as correctly observed by CA, the offenses designated
in the Informations are for violations of Sections 15 and 16 of RA 6425,
which define and penalize the crimes of illegal sale and possession of
49
IMPOSABLE
to 49.25
prision
person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the
reclusion
reclusion
in
illegal
possession
of
339.6075
grams
of
prohibited
drug. Therefore, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P500,000.00 to
appellant.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 00684 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
50
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
51
52
53
[17]
for review on
The Issues
54
Lee and Lim claim that the Court of Appeals erred when it
reviewed the findings of Secretary Perez. They stated that:
[T]he Court of Appeals cannot indirectly review the
findings of the Secretary under the pretext of
correcting the actuation of the trial court. x x x
[T]he only ruling before the Court of Appeals is the ruling of the trial
court x x x.
But the Court of Appeals ignored the fact that the case
before it is not one for the review of the final order of the Secretary
of Justice, acting as a quasi-judicial officer, which is governed by
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The actual case filed with it was
rather a petition for review on certiorari of the dismissal order of
the trial court under Rule 45.[24]
xxxx
III
RESPONDENT COURT DID NOT PREMATURELY
ALLOW THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE INFORMATIONS
xxxx
IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABDICATE ITS
DUTY TO DETERMINE THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE
PROSECUTIONS REASON FOR WITHDRAWING THE
INFORMATIONS.[23]
55
When the trial judge issued its Order of February 14, 2002
directing the issuance of warrants of arrest against the
respondents, he clearly found probable cause to sustain the filing of
criminal complaints against the latter. The issuance of a warrant of
arrest is not a ministerial function of the court it calls for the
exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing
magistrate.
Lee and Lim claim that the Court of Appeals erred when it
xxxx
56
Lee and Lim claim that the Court of Appeals erred when it
ruled that Judge Dumayas failed to make his own evaluation and
merely relied on Secretary Perezs recommendation that there was
no probable cause. They stated that:
Contrary to the Court of Appeals[] ruling, the
trial court made an effort to evaluate the merit of the
prosecutions motion to withdraw the informations. It
evaluated the merits of both the prosecutions
motion and respondent banks opposition to the
motion. x x x
Clearly, it cannot be said that the trial court abandoned its
responsibility of making an independent assessment of the
sufficiency of the prosecution motion [sic]. Indeed, it scrutinized
the arguments of respondent bank just as it did the arguments of
the prosecution in order to determine for itself whether or not the
withdrawal of the informations was warranted.[29]
crime of Estafa penalized under par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code
are hereby withdrawn from the docket of this court.
57
THAT:
ONCE A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IS FILED IN
COURT, ANY DISPOSITION OF THE CASE SUCH AS ITS
DISMISSAL OR ITS CONTINUATION RESTS ON THE
SOUND DISCRETION OF THE COURT. TRIAL JUDGES
ARE THUS REQUIRED TO MAKE THEIR OWN
ASSESSMENT OF WHETHER THE SECRETARY OF
58
XXXX
THE TRIAL COURTS ORDER IS INCONSISTENT WITH OUR
REPETITIVE CALLS FOR AN INDEPENDENT AND COMPETENT
ASSESSMENT OF THE ISSUE(S) PRESENTED IN THE MOTION TO
DISMISS. THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS TASKED TO EVALUATE THE
SECRETARYS RECOMMENDATION FINDING THE ABSENCE OF
PROBABLE CAUSE TO HOLD PETITIONER CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR
LIBEL. HE FAILED TO DO SO. HE MERELY RULED TO PROCEED WITH
THE TRIAL WITHOUT STATING HIS REASONS FOR DISREGARDING
THE SECRETARYS RECOMMENDATION.[36] (EMPHASIS SUPPLIED)
VICTORIA P. CABRAL
Vs
JACINTO UY, MICHAEL UY, MARILYN O. UY, RICHARD O. UY, REY
IGNACIO DIAZ, JOSE PO and JUANITO MALTO
G.R. No. 174584
January 20, 2010
HIS ASSESSMENT IN THE ORDER, AND (6) STATE HIS REASONS FOR
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
59
(Moldex);
the
other
respondents
are
its
officers
and
Uy, Richard O. Uy, Rey Ignacio Diaz, Jose Po, and Juanito Malto for
Regulatory
Board
(HLURB)[2] but
the
latter
denied
the
Respondents
Uy, et al.
filed a motion
to quash
the
being with the HLURB alone and, granting that they could take
license to sell.[9]
but she refused because of the pending case for cancellation of the
60
courts power to hear and adjudicate the action, the penalty being
[12]
[13]
upholding the trial courts jurisdiction over the subject case but
both such fine and imprisonment. This penalty brings the offense
Second. P.D. 957 has been enacted to regulate for the public
good the sale of subdivision lots and condominiums. Its Section 5
prohibits such sale without the prior issuance of an HLURB
license[17] and punishes those who engage in such selling. [18] The
1.
Whether or not the office of the public
prosecutor and the trial court have jurisdiction over
criminal actions for violation of P.D. 957; and
2.
Whether or not HLURBs subsequent
issuance to Moldex of a license to sell extinguished
respondents Uy, et al.s criminal liability for selling
subdivision lots prior to the issuance of such license.
Moldex sold a subdivision lot when it did not yet have a license to
do so, the crime was done. Assuming the allegations to be true, the
[16]
the criminal information for violation of P.D. 957 and the trial
61
of
the
contract. This
Court
refused
to
void
the
transaction in the case because the absence of the license was not
in itself sufficient to invalidate the contract. And while there was
no fraud on the part of the developer, the HLURB directed it to pay
an administrative fine of P20,000.00 for selling the lot without the
necessary license. This only shows that the subsequent issuance of
a license, as in this case, will not extinguish the liability of the
developer for violation of Section 5 of P.D. 957.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the June 2, 2006 Decision and the
August 22, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
90468. The Court REINSTATES the May 20, 2004 Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Criminal Case Q-03-116823,
which denied respondents omnibus motion to quash and motion
for judicial determination of probable cause.
SO ORDERED.
HAROLD V. TAMARGO
vs
ROMULO AWINGAN, LLOYD ANTIPORDA and LICERIO ANTIPORDA,
JR.,
G.R. No. 177727
January 19, 2010
62
CORONA, J.:
DECISION
as private prosecutor.
63
of
Atty.
Tamargo)
filed
complaint
against
those
Manila.[10]
prosecutor[11] who
subjected
him
to
clarificatory
questions.[12]
during the May 2004 elections and that the case was instituted by
letter.
Antipordas admitted that Atty. Tamargo was their political rival for
twice by Lloyd and once by Licerio. Before the killing, Atty. Tamargo
64
because of the threats to his life inside the jail. He requested that
[17]
[19]
[20]
65
dated August 24, 2007, the CA likewise granted the petition for
93610, the CA ruled that the RTC judge gravely abused her
evaluation the substantial matters that the DOJ Secretary had fully
petition.
presented
to
establish
the
existence
of
the
Petitioner
argues
that,
based
on
the
independent
66
disregarding
that
against
hearing; (3) his letter dated October 29, 2004 and (4) the May 30,
Columnas
contradicting
extrajudicial
evidence. They
confession
was
also
contend
inadmissible
67
Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res
Had Judge Daguna reviewed the entire records of the
inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be
investigation, she would have seen that, aside from the pieces of
prejudiced
by
an
act,
declaration,
or
omission
of
another.
evidence she relied on, there were others which cast doubt on
[32]
68
Court:
direct
or
circumstantial,
which
the
extrajudicial
than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common
be relieved from the pain of going through a full blown court case.
object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in
[39]
When,
at
the
outset,
the
evidence
offered
during
the
69
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
70
of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 before the RTC of Laoag City. Insofar
No. 29985 dated July 27, 2007 affirming in toto the Decision[4] of the
evidence given during the trial, were briefly synthesized by the Office of
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 13 in Criminal Case No.
71
72
the petitioner
companions.
and
Canlas
that
they
are
(her)
obtaining in this case validly cloaked the arresting officers with the
accordingly, viz:
WHEREFORE x x x
The accused Julius Cacao is likewise found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged of illegal
possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride weighing
1.3987 grams in Criminal Case No. 11489 and is therefore
73
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
the prosecution to establish and prove with certainty that the dangerous
drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same
item recovered from his possession.
Our Ruling
We find merit in the petition.
As a general rule, factual findings and conclusions of the trial
court and the CA are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal. However, if there is any indication that the trial
court
overlooked
certain
facts
or
circumstances
which
would
The testimonies of
the prosecutions
principal witnesses
are inconsistent as
to who delivered
the
prohibited
drug
to
the
74
evidence
custodian.
Thus:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
A:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
75
A:
substantial and significant matter which could well affect the credibility of
the witnesses.
Q:
The
prosecution
failed
to
satisfactorily
establish that the
item presented in
court
was
the
same
item
confiscated from
Cacao.
A:
Q:
A:
necessarily
leads
us
to
doubt
that
the
plastic
sachet
of shabu identified in court is the same item that was allegedly seized
and confiscated from petitioner. If the version of Mangapit is to be
believed, then the most lamentable aspect pertains to his failure to
identify the seized item with certainty. For sure Mangapit, who is the
The only other person who could have identified the subject drug
is Pang-ag. However, we cannot lend credence to his supposed
same:
Q:
A:
Q:
identification,
the
same
not
being
also
positive,
certain
and
76
case. Thus, there is no evidence to prove that what was turned over to
Be that as it may, any identification made by these witnesses on
the evidence custodian by Balolong and later presented in court was the
evident from the records that the sachet of shabu which the evidence
claimed
to
have
confiscated
from
petitioner
and
subsequently
who forwarded the seized item. It is quite strange that Ancheta would
point to Balolong as the sender of the seized items if he had no basis in
saying so. However, our own scrutiny of the records failed to show the
dangerous drugs cases constitutes the drug itself. This means that proof
role of Balolong in the operation since admittedly, the only lawmen who
essential.[35]
How then was Balolong able to get hold of the confiscated substance
when he was neither a party to nor present during the operation? Who
entrusted the substance to him assuming that somebody requested him
to submit it for safekeeping? These are only some of the lingering
questions which must be answered convincingly and satisfactorily so as
to ensure that there had been no substitution, contamination or
tampering with the sachet of shabu allegedly taken from petitioner. It
must be noted that Balolong was never presented to testify in this
77
December
11,
2007
denying
the
motion
ASIDE. Petitioner
for
Julius
reconsideration,
Cacao
Prieto
SO ORDERED.
bow to the superior and immutable rule that the guilt of the accused
DECISION
that
the
accused
is
innocent
unless
and
until
proven
affirming in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City,
Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 11489-13, and its Resolution dated
78
79
totaling P90.00, were given to him by his mother for his bus fare to
Quezon.37 He disclaimed any knowledge of theP10.00 bill.38 He
further testified that he personally knew PO3 Rivera prior to the
arrest, since his first cousin and PO3 Rivera had a quarrel which he
had no involvement whatsoever.39 He noted the fact that it was PO3
Rivera who arrested him.40
Witness Joaquin Artemio Marfori testified that he is the employer of
the appellant in his agricultural and poultry supply store in
Babayan, Calamba, Laguna.41 He further stated that he allowed the
appellant to go on vacation on December 12, 2003 to celebrate the
New Year with his family in Manila. 42 However, the appellant failed
to report back for work at the start of the New Year. 43
Finally, witness Arsenia Morales (Arsenia) corroborated the
testimony of her son that she gave him P90.00, consisting of
one P50.00 bill and two P20.00 bills as bus fare back to Laguna
where he worked.44 Thinking that her son was already on his way
home, she was surprised to receive a call from her daughter
informing her that her son, the appellant, was arrested for
possession and sale of "shabu".45
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On April 29, 2004, the trial court rendered a Decision finding the
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession and
illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The dispositive portion of the said
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, judgment is
hereby rendered finding the accused ROLDAN MORALES y
Midarasa, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. Q03-114257 for violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. [No.] 9165 for
drug pushing [of] zero point zero three (0.03) gram of white
crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine hydrochloride
and is hereby sentenced to suffer Life Imprisonment and to pay a
fine of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos.
The Court likewise finds the accused ROLDAN MORALES y Midarasa
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. Q-03-114256
for violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. [No.] 9165 for drug
possession x x x of zero point zero three (0.03) gram of white
crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine hydrochloride
80
one (1) ten peso bill. PO1 Roy who acted as the poseur-buyer and
PO3 Rivera as his back-up proceeded to University Avenue corner
Commonwealth Avenue, Barangay San Vicente, Quezon City
together with the informant.
PO1 Roy and the informant met appellant at the parking lot of
Jollibee restaurant while PO3 Rivera positioned himself at the side
of a parked car where he can easily have a clear view of the three.
After PO1 Roy was introduced by the informant to the appellant as
a buyer of "shabu", the latter immediately produced a sachet
containing the said prohibited drugs and handed the same to him.
PO1 Roy raised his left hand as the pre-arranged signal that the
transaction was consummated. Thereafter, PO3 Rivera went to the
area, introduced himself as a police officer and frisked appellant
from whom he recovered the marked money and a matchbox,
where the suspected "shabu" was placed, and two (2) aluminum
foils. They informed appellant of his constitutional rights and
brought him to the police station while the two (2) small
transparent heat sealed sachets containing the suspected
prohibited drugs and paraphernalia were turned over to the crime
laboratory for examination, and which [was] later, found to be
positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (commonly known
as "shabu").52
Thence, the CA rendered judgment to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103 dated April 29,
2004 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.53
Appellant elevated the case to this Court via Notice of Appeal.54 In
our Resolution dated July 12, 2006, we resolved to accept the case
and required the parties to submit their respective supplemental
briefs simultaneously, if they so desire, within 30 days from
notice.55 Both parties adopted their respective appellants and
appellees briefs, instead of filing supplemental briefs.56
Our Ruling
Appellant claims that he should not be convicted of the offenses
charged since his guilt has not been proven by the prosecution
81
82
More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material
inconsistencies with regard to when and where the markings on
the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the seized drugs
created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti.
The Court thus acquitted the accused due to the prosecution's
failure to indubitably show the identity of the shabu.
Fiscal Jurado
A- I cannot recall.
Witness
83
A- He was investigated.
Fiscal Jurado
A- Yes, sir.
Witness
A- Recovered.
A- Roldan Morales.
xxxx
Fiscal Jurado
A- Positive, sir.
Witness
xxxx
Fiscal Jurado
Atty. Mosing
xxxx
Court
Witness
A- My companion brought that.
xxxx
Atty. Mosing
xxxx
Q- After the arrest you brought the suspect and the items to
the station?
84
A- Yes, sir.
A- Roldan Morales
Q- And what did you do with him?
Court
Witness
A- Parked vehicle.
A- The same.
Fiscal Jurado
A- Aluminum foil.
Witness
85
their failure to observe the rule. In this respect, we cannot fault the
apprehending policemen either, as PO1 Roy admitted that he was
not a PDEA operative74 and the other witness, PO3 Rivera, testified
that he was not aware of the procedure involved in the conduct of
anti-drug operations by the PNP.75 In fine, there is serious doubt
whether the drug presented in court was the same drug recovered
from the appellant. Consequently, the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the corpus delicti.1avvphi1
Furthermore, the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to
reveal the identity of the person who had custody and safekeeping
of the drugs after its examination and pending presentation in
court. Thus, the prosecution likewise failed to establish the chain of
custody which is fatal to its cause.1avvphi1
In fine, the identity of the corpus delicti in this case was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt. There was likewise a break in the chain
of custody which proves fatal to the prosecutions case. Thus, since
the prosecution has failed to establish the element of corpus delicti
with the prescribed degree of proof required for successful
prosecution of both possession and sale of prohibited drugs, we
resolve to ACQUIT Roldan Morales y Midarasa.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated April 24, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00037
affirming the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 103 dated April 29, 2004 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Appellant Roldan Morales y Midarasa
is ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt, and is ordered to be
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for
any other lawful cause.
The
Director
of
the
Bureau
of
Corrections
is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to this Court
the action taken hereon within five days from receipt.
SO ORDERED.
86
March 5, 2010
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about whether the forensic examiner and the police
investigator are indispensable witnesses in a drugs case to
establish the chain of custody over the substance seized from the
accused.
The Facts and the Case
On July 21, 2003 the public prosecutor of Caloocan City filed two
separate informations1 against the accused Fernando Habana
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of that city in Criminal Cases
C-68627 and C-68628 for violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of Republic Act (R.A.) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
At the trial, the prosecution presented PO1 Fortunato Paras 2 and
PO2 Amadeo Tayag.3 On the other hand, the defense called to the
witness stand the accused Habana and one Amelia Sevilla.4
The prosecution evidence shows that in the morning of July 17,
2003, members of the Anti-Illegal Drug Task Force Unit of the
Caloocan City Police Station met with an informant at Chowking
Restaurant in Sangandaan, Caloocan City. The informant told them
that a certain Loloy, later on identified as the accused Habana, was
selling shabu on Salmon Street.5 Acting on this, the group
proceeded to the place and staked it out. 6
After locating accused Habana, PO3 Rizalino Rangel held a short
briefing with his unit. They decided to undertake a buy-bust
operation with PO1 Paras as poseur-buyer. Rangel told Paras to
scratch his head by way of signal after he had made a purchase of
drugs and handed over two pieces of fifty-peso bills that made up
the buy-bust money.7 Paras placed his initials "FP" on the money. 8
Accompanied by the informant, Paras approached accused Habana
who asked them how much they wanted to buy. Paras handed over
the money to Habana who pocketed it. In turn, the latter handed
over to Paras one plastic sachet that contained what appeared to
be shabu. After PO1 Paras got the plastic sachet, he executed the
pre-arranged signal, introduced himself as a policeman, and
arrested Habana.9
Tayag rushed to the scene and helped Paras collar Habana. Tayag
searched Habanas body and this yielded two more plastic sachets
containing what appeared to be shabu and the marked bills. 10 The
arresting officers handed over custody of his person and the items
seized from him to PO3 Fernando Moran, the investigator on duty,
who placed his marking on them and submitted the same to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for forensic
examination.
Forensic Chemist Police Inspector Erickson Calabocal submitted
Physical Science Report D-848-03, which revealed that the white
crystalline substance contained in the plastic sachets tested
positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, otherwise known as
"shabu."11
At the pre-trial,12 the parties stipulated: 1) that the assigned
forensic chemist got the police request for laboratory examination
of the specimen involved and, upon examination, found it positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride13 and 2) that PO3 Fernando
Moran was the investigating officer assigned to the case to whom
the arresting officers turned over the accused as well as the three
plastic sachets and that it was he who prepared the referral
slip,14 sworn affidavit of the arresting officers,15 and the request for
laboratory examination16 of the specimen subject of this case.17
Accused Habana presented a different version. According to him, on
the afternoon of July 17, 2003 he was on his way home when five to
seven men in civilian clothes blocked his way. He asked what the
matter was and they replied that they had to search him. He
resisted because he was not doing anything illegal. Still, the men
frisked him and took five hundred pesos from his pocket. They then
brought him to the police station where he was detained. When his
wife and sister came, the police officers told them to
produce P20,000.00 for his freedom. When they failed to give the
amount, they charged him with illegal possession and sale of
shabu.18
Amelia Sevilla testified that on the date of the incident, at around
6:00 p.m., she was about to close her store when she saw two men
suddenly approach and frisk accused Habana who was just
87
standing near her store. Habana raised his hands and said, "Bakit
ano po ang kasalanan ko bakit ninyo ako kinakapkapan?" After the
men frisked him, they got the coins in his short pants pocket and
then left with him. On the following day, Sevilla heard from her
neighbors that the police had arrested Habana.
On January 21, 2008, the trial court found Habana guilty of both
charges and sentenced him to a penalty of life imprisonment plus a
fine of P500,000.00 in Criminal Case C-68627 and imprisonment for
12 years and 1 day to 14 years and a fine of P300,000.00 in
Criminal Case C-68628.
Since one of the penalties imposed was life imprisonment, the case
was elevated to the Court of Appeals (CA) for review and
disposition pursuant to the ruling in People v. Mateo. 19 Upon review,
the CA rendered a Decision20 on June 17, 2009, affirming in full the
decision of the trial court. The case is on appeal to this Court.
The Issues Presented
Two issues are presented:
1. Whether or not the prosecutions failure to present the
forensic chemist and the police investigator assigned to the
case is fatal to its case against accused Habana; and
2. Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish the
integrity of the seized substance taken from Habana along
the chain of custody.
The Rulings of the Court
One. Habana points out that the prosecutions failure to present at
the trial the informant, the investigating officer, and the forensic
chemist militates against the trustworthiness of the prosecutions
evidence.
But no rule requires the prosecution to present as witness in a
drugs case every person who had something to do with the arrest
of the accused and the seizure of prohibited drugs from him. The
discretion on which witness to present in every case belongs to the
prosecutor.21
88
Since the failure in this case to comply with the procedure in the
custody of seized drugs compromised the identity and integrity of
the items seized, which is the corpus delicti of each of the crimes
charged against Habana, his acquittal is in order.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
03165 dated June 17, 2009 as well as the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 120, in Criminal Cases C-68627
and C-68628, and ACQUITS the accused-appellant Fernando
Habana y Orante on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of
Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to report the
action he has taken to this Court within five days from receipt of
this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
89
They
claim that since Civil Case 0167 was a forfeiture proceeding filed
under R.A. 1379, the Ombudsman should have first conducted a
previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal
cases before the filing of the case pursuant to Section 2 of the
law.3[3]
of the matter to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for the
filing of the forfeiture case.
[6]
2
3
4
5
6
1379.1[1]
90
reconsideration.7[7]
United States when that investigation took place. They were thus
forfeiture cases.
The Ruling of the Court
The
Romualdezes
point
out
that
the
Office
of
the
In the absence of a
7
8
9
10
91
had no opportunity to take part in the one held in 1991, in OMB-091-0820. They admit that the subpoena for that investigation had
been sent to their last known residence at the time it was
conducted.11[11]
The
Republic
categorically
insists
that
the
SO ORDERED
Court will take judicial notice of the fact that the peoples
ratification of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987 signaled
the return to normalcy of the political situation in the Philippines.
Consequently, the Romualdezes had no valid excuse for not
responding to the subpoena served on them at their last known
address in 1991, which they do not deny having received.
The Ombudsman could not be faulted for proceeding with
the investigation of the Romualdezes cases when they did not
show up despite notice being sent to them at their last known
residence. As the Court held in a case:
The New Rules on Criminal Procedure does not
require as a condition sine qua non to the validity of
11
12
13
14
92
93