G.R. No.

168081, October 17, 2008

ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight
steward who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight
standards of the airline company.
The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to
166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin
and Crew Administration Manual of PAL.
In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an
extended vacation until November 1985. He was allowed to return to work
once he lost all the excess weight. But the problem recurred. He again went
on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight,
petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the
PAL decision for him to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily
complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every
two weeks for weight checks, which he failed to comply with.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to
report for weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given
another set of weight check dates, which he did not report to.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of
Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on weight
requirements. Petitioner insists that he is being discriminated as those
similarly situated were not treated the same.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his
inability to attain his ideal weight, and considering the utmost leniency
extended to him which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5)
years, his services were considered terminated effective immediately.
LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in
view of the nature of the job of petitioner. However, the weight standards
need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not
hamper the performance of his duties.
NLRC affirmed.

CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally
dismissed because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight
standards. It is obvious that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by
petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for being
overweight.
ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed.
HELD: YES
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion
than that they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order
to keep the job. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article
282(e) of the Labor Code.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioners
claims that obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from
1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the
proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the
clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that
[t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight which is 172,
then the answer is yes. I can do it now.
Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the
assistance of the company physician, per the advice of PAL.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of
his work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article
282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His
obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA
correctly puts it, [v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely
attributable to the employee without any external force influencing or
controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under
Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission.
Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary
although it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).
NOTES:
The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational
qualification defense. Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to
persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer
can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for

performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational

qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test of reasonableness of the company
policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid provided it
reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job
performance.
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to
safely transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily
rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on
board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing
strict norms of discipline upon its employees.
The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for
cabin crew is flight safety.
Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an
act of social justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not
for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character.
Duncan Assoc. of Detailman-PTGWO vs. Glaxo Wellcome Phils., Inc.
G.R. No. 162994, September 17, 2004
FACTS:
Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on Oct. 24, 1995.
Contract of employment signed by Tecson stipulates, among others, that he
agrees to study and abide by the existing company rules; to disclose to
management any existing future relationship by consanguinity or affinity
with co-employees or employees with competing drug companies and should
management find that such relationship poses a prossible conflict of interest,
to resign from the company. Company's Code of Employee Conduct provides
the same with stipulation that management may transfer the employee to
another department in a non-counterchecking position or preparation for
employment outside of the company after 6 months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines
Sur-Camarines Norte area and entered into a romantic relationship with
Betsy, an employee of Astra, Glaxo's competition. Before getting married,
Tecson's District Manager reminded him several times of the conflict of
interest but marriage took place in Sept. 1998. In Jan. 1999, Tecson's
superiors informed him of conflict of intrest. Tecson asked for time to comply
with the condition (that either he or Betsy resign from their respective
positions). Unable to comply with condition, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the
Butuan-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. After his request against
transfer was denied, Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo's Grievance
Committee and while pending, he continued to act as medical representative

in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. On Nov. 15, 2000, the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo's policy was
valid...
ISSUE:
Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its
employees from marrying employees of any competitor company is valid
RULING:
On Equal Protection
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas,
marketing strategies, and other confidential programs and information from
competitors. The prohibition against pesonal or marital relationships with
employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo's employees is reasonable
under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might
compromise the interests of the company. That Glaxo possesses the right to
protect its economic interest cannot be denied.
It is the settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause
are addressed only to the state or those acting under color of its authority.
Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of US Supreme Court decisions
that the equal protection clause erects to shield against merely privately
conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful.
The company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the
employee to comply with the policy. Indeed the application of the policy was
made in an impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot of
the employee.
On Constructive Dismissal
Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation
resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable
or unlikely; when there is demotion in rank, or diminution in pay; or when a
clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes
unbearable to the employee. None of these conditions are present in the
instant case.

Manuel vs. N.C Construction Supply

In June 1995, the security guards of N.C. Construction Supply caught an

employee stealing from the company premises. The said employee then
admitted that the incident was part of a series of theft involving four other
employees, namely, Eddie Manuel, Romeo Bana, Rogelio Pagtama, Jr., and
Joel Rea. The four were then invited to the police station for questioning. The
owner of N.C. Construction sent his lawyer, Atty. Ramon Reyes to interrogate
the four employees.
Manuel et al admitted the crime imputed against them before Atty. Reyes.
They agreed that in exchange for N.C. Construction not filing a case, they will
resign as employees instead. But after resigning, the four former employees
sued N.C. Construction for illegal dismissal. They now claim that their
admission made in the police station before Atty. Reyes was coerced by the
lawyer and that they were without the assistance of counsel which is
violative of their constitutional rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manuel et al were dismissed without valid cause.
HELD: No. Manuel et al were positively identified by witnesses as part of the
series of theft. This was not sufficiently controverted by them. Under Article
282 of the Labor Code, such act authorizes the employer to terminate the
services of an employee for loss of trust and confidence, provided that the
loss of confidence arises from particular proven facts.
What is the quantum of proof needed?
Substantial evidence or such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion and not proof beyond
reasonable doubt as in criminal case.
Anent the issue of threat and intimidation, there was no sufficient proof
presented by Manuel et al to prove that the lawyer coerced them to make
the admission.
Anent the issue that Atty. Reyess interrogation of them without the presence
of counsel if violative of their constitutional rights, such argument is
misplaced. The right to counsel accorded by the Constitution only applies to
criminal cases and only on custodial investigations. In this case, this is not a
criminal case and Manuel et al were not under custodial investigation when
they were interrogated by Atty. Reyes. It is also of no moment that Atty.
Reyess interrogation happened in a police station. What Atty. Reyes did was
a private administrative investigation for the interest of his employer, the
N.C. Construction.

However, Manuel et al are entitled to damages (P1,000.00 each) because it

appears that although they were dismissed for a just cause, their dismissal
was without the proper procedure (twin-notice rule not observed by NC
Construction). The two-notice rule provides:
The employer must furnish the worker with two written notices before
termination of employment can be legally effected:
(1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for
which his dismissal is sought, and
(2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employers
decision to dismiss him.
Punzal vs. ETSI Technologies
[G.R. No. 170384-85. March 9, 2007]
Facts:
Lorna Punzal worked as a department secretary in ETSI. One day, she sent an
e-mail to her officemates announcing the holding of a Halloween party that
was to be held in the office the following day. She invited her officemates to
bring their kids to the office in their Halloween costumes and to go trick or
treating in the office. Her immediate superior advised Punzal to seek the
approval of management. Then she learned that Senior Vice President
Geisert did not approve of the plan to hold a party in the office. So, she sent
another email to her officemates expressing her disappointment, particularly
saying that:
He was so unfairpara bang palagi siyang iniisahan sa trabaho
bakit most of the parents na mag-joined ang anak ay naka-VL naman.
Anyway, solohin na lang niya bukas ang office. To those parents who
would like to bring their Kids in Megamall there will be Trick or Treating
at Mc Donalds Megamall Bldg. A at 10:00 AM tomorrow and lets not
spoil the fun for our kids.
The management said that she committed an offense under Article IV, No. 5
& 8 Improper conduct or acts of discourtesy or disrespect and Making
malicious statements concerning Company Officer, punishable by suspension
to termination depending upon the gravity of the offense/s as specified in our
ETSIs Code of Conduct and Discipline.
Issue:
Was Punzal validly terminated?
Held:
A scrutiny of petitioners second e-mail message shows that her remarks
were not merely an expression of her opinion about Geiserts decision; they
were directed against Geisert. Further, her closing statement even invited

her co-workers to join a trick or treating activity at another venue during

office hours, encouraging them to ignore Geiserts authority.
That it has been a tradition in ETSI to celebrate occasions such as Christmas,
birthdays, Halloween, and others does not remove Geiserts prerogative to
approve or disapprove plans to hold such celebrations in office premises and
during company time. In the case at bar, the disapproval of the plan to hold
the Halloween party on October 31, 2001 may not be considered to have
been actuated by bad faith. As the Labor Arbiter noted: the holding of a trick
or treat party in the office premises of respondent ETSI would certainly affect
the operations of the office, since children will be freely roaming around the
office premises, things may get misplaced and the noise in the office will
simply be too hard to ignore.
Given the reasonableness of Geiserts decision that provoked petitioner to
send the second e-mail message, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
"the message x x x resounds of subversion and undermines the authority
and credibility of management and that petitioner
"displayed a tendency to act without managements approval, and even
against managements will."
Moreover, in circulating the second e-mail message, petitioner violated
Articles III (8) and IV (5) of ETSIs Code of Conduct on "making false or
malicious statements concerning the Company, its officers and employees or
its products and services" and "improper conduct or acts of discourtesy or
disrespect to fellow employees, visitors, guests, clients, at any time."
Nevertheless, the violation of her statutory due process right entitles her to
an award of nominal damage, which this Court fixes at P30,000, pursuant to
the ruling in Agabon.
Salaw vs nlrc
Facts:
Herein petitioner was employed by the private respondents and was terminated. That
prior to petitioners termination during the extraction of sworn statement from the
latter
he wasnt assisted by his counsel and thus during the meeting with the PDIC
private
respondent told petitioner to appear before the said committee without his
counsel.Petitioner appealed with the NLRC,Arbiter Benigno C. Villante declared the
dismissalillegal, thus made the private respondent appealed with NLRC which was
approvedand reversing the decision of Arbiter Villante. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration.
Issue: W/N dismissal of the petitioner by the private respondents was legally justified.
Held:

Yes. Investigating committee violated petitioners constitutional right to due process

asmuch as he was not given a chance to defend himself by a competent and
independentcounsel which is a very basic requirement of substantive due process and
this right
cant be waived except in writing however the waiver must be in the
presence of a
counsel.WHEREFORE, premises is considered judgment is hereby rendered setting
aside theappealed decision of the NLRC reinstating the decision of the arbiter.
Waterouse Drug Corporation v. NLRC
G.R. No. 113271. October 16, 1997
Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug
Corp.
Catolico sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit.
However, the normal selling price is P320 per unit. Catolico overcharged by
P64 per unit for a total of P640. YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a
refund for the jacked-up price. It was sent in an envelope addressed to her.
Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. opened the envelope and saw that
there was a check for P640 for Catolico.
Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of
dishonesty.
NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP)
being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by
complainants.
Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers
to the immunity of ones person from interference by government and
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it
within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Issue: W/N the check is admissible as evidence
Held: Yes.
Ratio: (People vs. Marti) Marti ruling: The Bill of Rights does not protect
citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by
private individuals.

It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no
recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits,
such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this,
the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of
Catolico from employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided
by the Labor Code for the termination of Employment.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDRE MARTI (193 SCRA 57) Case Digest

Facts:

On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes
went to Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich,
Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect the
packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the
package making it ready for shipment. Before being sent out for delivery, Job
Reyes, husband of Anita and proprietor of the courier company, conducted
an inspection of the package as part of standard operating procedures. Upon
opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took
sample of the substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and
invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI
agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and found dried-marijuana
leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425
and was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal in the
Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional right of privacy was violated
and that the evidence acquired from his package was inadmissible as
evidence against him.

Issue:

Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private

individuals?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that
the Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the
state.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures

therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its
agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be
invoked against acts of private individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job
Reyes was the one who opened the box in the presence of the NBI agents in
his place of business. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert
the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and
siezure proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe and look at that
which is in plain sight is not a search.

The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime charged was AFFIRMED.

DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY OF TACLOBAN VS. SECRETARYOF LABOR

FACTS:
Divine Word University Employees Union (DWUEU) is thesole and bargaining
agent of the Divine Word University.Sometime in 1985, DWUEU submitted its
collectivebargaining proposals. The University replied andrequested a
preliminary conference which unfortunatelydid not take place due to the
alleged withdrawal of theCBA proposals.

Because of this, the union filed a notice of strike on thegrounds of bargaining

deadlock and unfair labor practice.

Then, an agreement between the University and DWUEU-ALU were held after
the filing of the notice of strike.

DWUEU-ALU, consonant with the agreement, submittedits collective

bargaining proposals but were ignored by theUniversity.
ISSUE:
WON the complaint for unfair labor practice filed bythe Union is with
merit.
HELD:

A thorough study of the records reveals that there was

n o "reasonable eff ort at good faith bargaining" specially on the
partof the University.Its indifferent towards collective bargaining inevitably
resulted int h e f a i l u re o f t h e p a r t i e s t o a r r i v e a t a n a g re e m e n t .
A s i t w a s evident that unilateral moves were being undertaken only by
theD W U E U - A L U , t h e r e w a s n o c o u n t e r a c t i o n o f f o r c e s o r
a n impasse to speak of.W h i l e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g s h o u l d b e
initiated by the union,t h e r e i s a c o r r e s p o n d i n g
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o n t h e p a r t o f t h e employer to respond in some
manner to such acts.ThisisaclearfromtheprovisionsoftheLaborCodeArt250(a)ofwhichstates:
a.)
when a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written
notice upon the other party witha statement of its proposals. The other
party shallmake a reply thereto not later than 10 calendar daysfrom receipt
of such notice.Hence, petitioner's contention that the DWUEU-ALU's
proposalsm a y n o t b e u n i l a t e r a l l y i m p o s e d o n i t o n t h e g r o u n d
t h a t a c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g a g re e m e n t i s a c o n t r a c t w h e re i n
thec o n s e n t o f b o t h p a r t i e s i s i n d i s p e n s a b l e i s
d e v o i d o f merit.A similar argument had already
b e e n d i s r e g a r d e d i n t h e c a s e o f K i o k Lo y v. N L RC , w h e re
w e u p h e l d t h e o r d e r o f t h e NLRC declaring the unions draft CBA
proposal as the collectiveagreement which should govern the
relationship between theparties. Kiok Loy vs. NLRC is applicable in
the instant case,c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t t h e f a c t t h e re i n h a v e a l s o
b e e n i n d u b i t a b l y established in this case. These factors are: (a) the union is the
dulycertified bargaining agent; (b) it made a definite request to bargains u b m i t t e d i t s
c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g p r o p o s a l s , a n d ( c ) t h e University
made no further proposal whatsoever. As we said in K i o k L o y v .
NLRC,
a c o m p a n y ' s r e f u s a l t o m a k e counter proposal if
considered in relation to the entire b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s ,
m ay i n d i c a t e b a d f a i t h a n d t h i s i s especially true
w h e r e t h e U n i o n ' s r e q u e s t f o r a c o u n t e r proposal is left
unanswered.
Malvar vs kraft
PETITIONER Czarina T. Malvar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and
illegal dismissal against respondents Kraft Food Philippines, Inc. (KFPI) and/or
Bienvenido
Bautista.
While her appeal was pending in the Supreme Court, she and respondents
entered into a compromise agreement, whereby she was paid P40,000,000 in
addition to the P14,252,192.12 earlier paid to her. She later filed a motion to

dismiss/withdraw case but before it could be acted upon, a motion for

intervention to protect attorneys rights was filed by the law firm of Dasal,
Llasos and Associates, through its Of counsel, retired Supreme Court
Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo. The motion sought, among others, that
both Malvar and KFPI be held and ordered to pay jointly and severally the
intervenors contingent fees.
In opposing the motion, Malvar claimed that the intervenor lacked the legal
capacity to intervene because it had ceased to exist after Atty. Marwil N.
Llasos resigned from the intervenor and Atty. Richard B. Dasal became
barred from private practice upon his appointment to a position in a
government subsidiary. They both personally handled her case. Besides,
their dismissal was based on a justifiable cause. Does this contention find
merit?
Supreme Court (First Division) ruling: No.
In the absence of the lawyers fault, consent or waiver, a client cannot
deprive the lawyer of his just fees already earned in the guise of a justifiable
reason. Here, Malvar not only downplayed the worth of the intervenors legal
service to her but also attempted to camouflage her intent to defraud her
lawyer by offering excuses that were not only inconsistent with her actions
but, most importantly, fell short of being justifiable.
The letter Malvar addressed to Retired Justice Bellosillo, who represented the
intervenor, debunked her allegations of unsatisfactory legal service because
she thereby lavishly lauded the intervenor for its dedication and devotion to
the prosecution of her case and to the protection of her interests. Also
significant was that the attorney-client relationship between her and the
intervenor was not severed upon Atty. Dasals appointment to public office
and Atty. Llasos resignation from the law firm.
In other words, the intervenor remained as her counsel of record, for, as we
held in Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo and Africa v. Eastern Telecommunication
Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 104600, July 2, 1999, 309 SCRA 566, 574, a client
who employs a law firm engages the entire law firm; hence, the resignation,
retirement or separation from the law firm of the handling lawyer does not
terminate the relationship, because the law firm is bound to provide a
replacement.
The stipulations of the written agreement between Malvar and the
intervenors, not being contrary to law, morals, public policy, public order or

good customs, were valid and binding on her. They expressly gave rise to the
right of the intervenor to demand compensation.
In a word, she could not simply walk away from her contractual obligations
toward the Intervenor, for Article 1159 of the Civil Code provides that
obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the parties
and should be complied with in good faith (Czarina T. Malvar vs. Kraft Food
Phils., Inc. and/or Kraft Foods International, G.R. No. 183952, Sept. 9, 2013).
Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion v Sps. Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma
(in behalf of daughterJasmin), White Falcon Services, and Jaime Ortiz
(Pres. Of White Falcon)Sps. Cuaresma (in behalf of Jasmin) v White Falcon
and BecmenFacts:
Jan 1997
Jasmin was deployed by Becmen to serve as assistant nurse in Al-Birk
Hospital in Saudi undera 3 year contract, for $247/mo.June 1998 - she died. Jessie
Fajardo, co-worker, found her dead inside her dormitory room with mouthfoaming and
smelling of poison. Medical report of Al-Birk Hosp stated that the cause of
death waspoisoning halt in blood circulation, respiratory system and brain damage
due to poisoning fromunknown substance.Sep 1998 her body was repatriated to
Manila. The City Health Officer of Cabanatuan found that Jasmindied under
violent circumstances not poisoning abrasions at her inner lip and gums;
lacerated woundsand abrasions on her left and right ears; lacerated wounds
and hematoma (contusions) on her bows;abrasions and hematoma on her
thigh and legs; intra-muscular hemorrhage at the anterior chest; ribfracture;
puncture wounds; and abrasions on the labia minora.Mar 1999Jasmins body
was exhumed by NBI. Toxicology report tested negative ffor non-volatile,metallic
poison and insecticides.Sps. Cuaresmas received from OWWA the following: 50k
death benefits, 50k loss of life; 20k funeralexpenses; 10k medical reimbursement.Nov
1999
Sps. Filed complaint against Becmen and Rajab & Silsilah Co (principal in Saudi)
claimingdeath andinsurance benefits. Sps. Claim that Jasmins death was work
-related having occurred at the employers premises; their entitled to
iqama insurance; compensatory damages amounting to $103kwhich is the sum of
her monthly salary 35 years (she was 25 yo when she died, assuming she
wouldsurvive until 60 yo).Becmen and Rajab claim that Jasmin committed suicide
and relied on the medical report of Al Birk. Theydeny liability since the Sps. Had already
received their benefits from OWWA. Later, Becmen manifestedthat Rajab had
terminated their agency, and impleaded White Falcon as the new agency of Rajab.
Summary of Rulings
LArb
dismissed for lack of merit, giving credence to Al Birk medical report
NLRC

reversed, found Jasmin a victim of compensable work-connected criminal

aggression;both agencies are solidarily liable to pay $113; later reduced to $80k
CA
affirmed; later reduced the award to $8k (monthly salary x remaining contract period)
Issues
WON entitled to insurance
NO
WON death is compensable
NO
WON death was by suicide
NO
WON Becmen and Falcon are liable
YES, solidary liability
Ratio
1.NOT entitled to insurance.The terms and conditions of Jasmins 1996 Employment
Agreement which she and her employer Rajab freely entered into constitute the law
between them. As a rule, stipulations in anemployment contract not contrary to
statutes, public policy, public order or morals have theforce of law between the
contracting parties. An examination of said employment agreementshows that it
provides for no other monetary or other benefits/privileges than the following:1. 1,300
rials (or US$247.00) monthly salary;2. Free air tickets to KSA at the start of her contract
and to the Philippines atthe end thereof, as well as for her vacation at the end
of each twenty four-month service;3. Transportation to and from work;4. Free
living accommodations;5. Free medical treatment, except for optical and dental
operations, plasticsurgery charges and lenses, and medical treatment obtained outside
of KSA;6. Entry visa fees will be shared equally between her and her employer, but
theexit/re-entry visa fees, fees for Iqama issuance, renewal, replacement, passport
renewal,sponsorship transfer and other liabilities shall be borne by her;7.
Thirty days paid vacation leave with round trip tickets to Manila after
twentyfour-months of continuous service;8. Eight days public holidays per
year;9. The indemnity benefit due her at the end of her service will be calculated asper
labor laws of KSA.Thus, the agreement does not include provisions for insurance, or
for accident, death or otherbenefits that the Cuaresmas seek to recover, and which the
labor tribunals and appellate courtgranted variably in the guise of compensatory
damages.Absence for provisions on social security and other benefits does
not make the contract infirmunder PH laws since under Saudi law, foreign
employer is not obliged to provide her thesebenefits.
2.Death NOT WORK RELATED, therefore not compensable (i.e., not liable for lost
earnings)At time of death, Jasmin was not on duty but at her dormitory room
on personal time. Courtstated that the foreign employer cannot be expected to
ensure her safety even while she is noton duty. What an employee does on free
time is beyond the employers sphere of inquiry.

The dormitory room also cannot be considered as employers premises.

3.Jasmin DID NOT COMMIT SUICIDECourt cannot subscribe to the idea that
Jasmin committed suicide while halfway into heremployment contract. This is
beyond human comprehension for a 25 yo Filipina especially since
suicide is contrary to Christian belief. Court cited Filipinas resilience despite abuse
andmaltreatment. Based on past OFW experiences, Filipinas do not simply commit
suicide but
rather endure.Court also found that Saudi police and autopsy reports are
patently inconclusive. Their report iscontradicted by the City Health Officer and by
NBI. Even the toxicology report tested negativefor poisonous substances.All these
show that Jasmin was manhandled and possibly raped prior to death.
4.Rajab, Becmen, White Falcon solidarily liable for moral and exemplary damages
Court admonished Becmen and Falcon for simply dismissing Jasmins case as
one of suicide instead of fighting for her rights. The Agencies prioritized their
corporate interest over that of Jasmin.RA 8042 Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act provides that the State shall at all timesuphold the dignity of its citizens, whether in
the country or overseas. The rights and interest of distressed overseas Filipinos are
adequately protected and safeguarded.Becmen and Falcon, both licensed
recruitment agencies, miserably failed to abide by RA 8042.Recruitment agencies are
expected to extend assistance to deployed OFWs, be the first to comethe rescue of our
distressed OFWs; and have the primary obligation to protect the rights andensure the
welfare of our OFWs. It should have been them who sought justice for Jasmin.Instead,
it was the parents who requested an autopsy in the Ph to confirm the Saudi
report. Court stated that the parents have done all that was within their power to
investigate Jasmins case on their own.Art 19 CC
every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties,act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art 21 CC any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contraryto morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the later for the damage.Art 24 CCin all contractual, property or other relations,
when one of the parties is at adisadvantage on account of his moral dependence,
ignorance, indigence, mental weakness,tender age or other handicap, the courts
must be vigilant for his protection.Rajab, Becmen and Falcons acts and
omissions are against public policy because they
undermine and subvert the interest and general welfare of our OFWs.Whether
employed locally or overseas, all Fil workers enjoy the protective mantel of
PH laborand social laws, contract stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding. This is in
keeping with theConsti provision for the State to afford protection to labor, promote full
employement, ensureequal work opportunities.All labor legislation and all labor
contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decentliving for the
laborer.As a result of their misconduct, Cuaresmas are entitled to moral damages for
which Becmen andFalcon are solidarily liable.
Grant of moral damages to the employee by reason of misconducton
the part of the employer is sanctioned by Art 2219 (10) CC.
Private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreignbasdemployer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of

employement. This ismeanth to assure the aggrieved worker of immediate

and sufficient payment. If the agency is a juridical being, the corporate
officers and directors and partners are also solidarily liable.
Falcons assumption of Becmens liability does not absolve B
ecmen.CA decision set aside. Awarded P2.5M as moral damages, P250k as exemplary
damages.
Leyte Geothermal Power vs. PNOC
LEYTE GEOTHERMAL POWER PROGRESSIVE EMPLOYEES UNION - ALU - TUCP,
Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY - ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.'

G.R. No. 170351

March 30, 2011

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:

PNOC is a government-owned and controlled corporation engaged in, among

others of energy resources like geothermal energy. Petitioner is a legitimate
labor organization, duly registered with the DOLE. PNOC hired employees for
its Leyte Geothermal Power Project whereby, their employment was only
good up to the completion or termination of the project and would
automatically expire upon the completion of such project. Majority of the
employees hired had become members of petitioner. In view of that
circumstance, the petitioner demands for recognition of it as the collective
bargaining agent of said employees and for a CBA negotiation with it.
However, PNOC did not heed such demands. Sometime in 1998 when the
project was about to be completed, PNOC proceeded to serve Notices of
Termination of Employment upon the employees who are members of the
petitioner.

The petitioner filed a Notice of Strike with DOLE against PNOC on the ground
of purported commission by the latter of ULP for "refusal to bargain
collectively, union busting and mass termination." On the same day, the

petitioner declared a strike and staged such strike. PNOC filed a complaint
for, among others, Strike Illegality with NLRC which ruled in its favour and
whose decision was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE: WON the officers and members of petitioner Union are project
employees of respondent.

RULING:

The litmus test to determine whether an individual is a project employee lies

in setting a fixed period of employment involving a specific undertaking
which completion or termination has been determined at the time of the
particular employees engagement.

In this case, as previously adverted to, the officers and the members of
petitioner Union were specifically hired as project employees for
respondents Leyte Geothermal Power Project located at the Greater
Tongonan Geothermal Reservation in Leyte. Consequently, upon the
completion of the project or substantial phase thereof, the officers and the
members of petitioner Union could be validly terminated. Clearly, therefore,
petitioners being project employees, or, to use the correct term, seasonal
employees, their employment legally ends upon completion of the project or
the [end of the] season. The termination of their employment cannot and
should not constitute an illegal dismissal.
DAVAO INTEGRATED PORT STEVEDORING SERVICES, petitioner,
vs.
RUBEN V. ABARQUEZ, in his capacity as an accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator and THE ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS (ATU-TUCP),
respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent and the exclusive collective bargaining
agent of the rank and file workers entered into collective bargaining
agreement under Sections 1 and 3, Article VIII thereof, provide for sick leave
with pay benefits each year to its employees who have rendered at least one
(1) year of service with the company, thus:
Section 1. Sick Leaves The Company agrees to grant 15 days sick leave

with pay each year to every regular non-intermittent worker who already
rendered at least one year of service with the company. However, such sick
leave can only be enjoyed upon certification by a company designated
physician, and if the same is not enjoyed within one year period of the
current year, any unenjoyed portion thereof, shall be converted to cash and
shall be paid at the end of the said one year period. And provided however,
that only those regular workers of the company whose work are not
intermittent, are entitled to the herein sick leave privilege.
Section 3. All intermittent field workers of the company who are members
of the Regular Labor Pool shall be entitled to vacation and sick leaves per
year of service with pay under the following schedule based on the number
of hours rendered including overtime.
Upon its renewal, the coverage of the said benefits was expanded to include
the "present Regular Extra Labor Pool as of the signing of this Agreement."
Section 3, Article VIII, as revised, provides, thus:
"Section 3. All intermittent field workers of the company who are members
of the Regular Labor Pool and present Regular Extra Labor Pool as of the
signing of this agreement shall be entitled to vacation and sick leaves per
year of service with pay under the following schedule based on the number
of hours rendered including overtime.
Also, all the field workers of petitioner who are members of the regular labor
pool and the present regular extra labor pool hours were extended sick leave
with pay benefits. Any unenjoyed portion thereof at the end of the current
year was converted to cash and paid at the end of the said one-year period
pursuant to Sections 1 and 3, Article VIII of the CBA.
The commutation of the unenjoyed portion of the sick leave with pay
benefits of the intermittent workers or its conversion to cash was, however,
discontinued or withdrawn when petitioner-company under a new assistant
manager, Mr. Benjamin Marzo (who replaced Mr. Cecilio Beltran, Jr. upon the
latter's resignation), stopped the payment of its cash equivalent on the
ground that they are not entitled to the said benefits under Sections 1 and 3
of the 1989 CBA.
The Union objected said discontinuance because it would violate the
principle in labor laws that benefits already extended shall not be taken away
and that it would result in discrimination between the non-intermittent and
the intermittent workers of the petitioner-company. The Union brought it
before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board and said public
respondent issued an award in favour of the Union. Hence, this instant
petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the intermittent field workers are entitled to conversion to
cash of any unused sick leave.
Held:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. It was said that CBA is not an
ordinary contract but impressed with public interest, thus it must yield to the
common good.
It must be noted that the 1989 CBA has two (2) sections on sick leave with
pay benefits which apply to two (2) distinct classes of workers in petitioner's
company, namely: (1) the regular non-intermittent workers or those workers
who render a daily eight-hour service to the company and are governed by
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1989 CBA; and (2) intermittent field workers who
are members of the regular labor pool and the present regular extra labor
pool as of the signing of the agreement on April 15, 1989 or those workers
who have irregular working days and are governed by Section 3, Article VIII
of the 1989 CBA.
It is thus erroneous for petitioner to isolate Section 1, Article VIII of the 1989
CBA from the other related section on sick leave with pay benefits,
specifically Section 3 thereof, in its attempt to justify the discontinuance or
withdrawal of the privilege of commutation or conversion to cash of the
unenjoyed portion of the sick leave benefit to regular intermittent workers
because well-settled is it that the said privilege of commutation or
conversion to cash, being an existing benefit, the petitioner-company may
not unilaterally withdraw, or diminish such benefits.
It is a fact that petitioner-company had, on several instances in the past,
granted and paid the cash equivalent of the unenjoyed portion of the sick
leave benefits of some intermittent workers. Under the circumstances, these
may be deemed to have ripened into company practice or policy which
cannot be peremptorily withdrawn.
PLDT vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 80609 August 23, 1988
Facts:
Abucay, a traffic operator of the PLDT, was accused by two complainants of
having demanded and received from them the total amount of P3,800.00 in
consideration of her promise to facilitate approval of their applications for

telephone installation. Investigated and heard, she was found guilty as

charged and accordingly separated from the service. She went to the
Ministry of Labor and Employment claiming she had been illegally removed.
After consideration of the evidence and arguments of the parties, the
company was sustained and the complaint was dismissed for lack of merit.
Nevertheless, the dispositive portion of labor arbiters decision declared:
WHEREFORE, the instant complaint is dismissed for lack of merit.
Considering that Dr. Bangayan and Mrs. Martinez are not totally blameless in
the light of the fact that the deal happened outhide the premises of
respondent company and that their act of giving P3,800.00 without any
receipt is tantamount to corruption of public officers, complainant must be
given one month pay for every year of service as financial assistance.
Both the petitioner and the private respondent appealed to the National
Labor Relations Board, which upheld the said decision in toto and dismissed
the appeals. The private respondent took no further action, thereby
impliedly accepting the validity of her dismissal. The petitioner, however, is
now before us to question the affirmance of the above- quoted award as
having been made with grave abuse of discretion.
The position of the petitioner is simply stated: It is conceded that an
employee illegally dismissed is entitled to reinstatement and backwages as
required by the labor laws. However, an employee dismissed for cause is
entitled to neither reinstatement nor backwages and is not allowed any relief
at all because his dismissal is in accordance with law. In the case of the
private respondent, she has been awarded financial assistance equivalent to
ten months pay corresponding to her 10 year service in the company despite
her removal for cause. She is, therefore, in effect rewarded rather than
punished for her dishonesty, and without any legal authorization or
justification. The award is made on the ground of equity and compassion,
which cannot be a substitute for law. Moreover, such award puts a premium
on dishonesty and encourages instead of deterring corruption.
For its part, the public respondent claims that the employee is sufficiently
punished with her dismissal. The grant of financial assistance is not intended
as a reward for her offense but merely to help her for the loss of her
employment after working faithfully with the company for ten years. In
support of this position, the Solicitor General cites the cases of Firestone Tire
and Rubber Company of the Philippines v. Lariosa and Soco v. Mercantile
Corporation of Davao, where the employees were dismissed for cause but

were nevertheless allowed separation pay on grounds of social and

compassionate justice.
Issue: WON Separation pay is proper.
Held:
We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of
social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed
for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral
character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual
intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual
relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the
dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever
other name it is called, on the ground of social justice.
A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect, of
rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense. And we
do not agree that the punishment is his dismissal only and that the
separation pay has nothing to do with the wrong he has committed. Of
course it has. Indeed, if the employee who steals from the company is
granted separation pay even as he is validly dismissed, it is not unlikely that
he will commit a similar offense in his next employment because he thinks
he can expect a like leniency if he is again found out. This kind of misplaced
compassion is not going to do labor in general any good as it will encourage
the infiltration of its ranks by those who do not deserve the protection and
concern of the Constitution.
The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply
because it is committed by the underprivileged. At best it may mitigate the
penalty but it certainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for the poor
is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a
rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Social justice cannot be permitted
to be refuge of scoundrels any more than can equity be an impediment to
the punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke social justice may do so only
if their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not simply because
they happen to be poor. This great policy of our Constitution is not meant for
the protection of those who have proved they are not worthy of it, like the
workers who have tainted the cause of labor with the blemishes of their own
character.
Applying the above considerations, we hold that the grant of separation pay
in the case at bar is unjustified. The private respondent has been dismissed

for dishonesty, as found by the labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC and as
she herself has impliedly admitted. The fact that she has worked with the
PLDT for more than a decade, if it is to be considered at all, should be taken
against her as it reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty that she should have
strengthened instead of betraying during all of her 10 years of service with
the company. If regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty of
dismissal, it will actually become a prize for disloyalty, perverting the
meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its
ranks of all undesirables.
Petition granted
COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN CALAMBA, petitioner,
vs.
BELEN P. VILLAS, respondent.
FACTS: respondent Belen Villas was employed by the petitioner School as
high school teacher in September 1985. On May 15, 1995, she applied for a
study leave for six months, from June to December 31, 1995. In a letter
dated June 2, 1995, Mrs. Angelina Quiatchon, principal of the high school
department, told Villas that her request for study leave was granted for one
school year subject to the following conditions:
1. The requested study leave takes effect on June 5, 1995 and ends on March
31, 1996;
2. The requested study leave involves no remuneration on the part of the
School;
3. The documents that justify the requested study leave should be submitted
upon return on April 1, 1996;
4. Faculty Manual Section 40 Special Provisions on the Granting of Leave of
Absence should be observed:
a. Once proven beyond reasonable doubt during the period of the approved
leave of absence that the faculty member shall engage himself in
employment outside the institution, the administration shall regard the
faculty member on leave as resigned;
b. The maximum length of leave of absence that may be applied for by the
faculty member and granted by administration is twelve (12) months. If, at
the lapse of the period, the faculty member fails to return for work, the
administration shall regard the faculty member as resigned.

RESPONDENT ALLEGED: that she intended to utilize the first semester of her
study leave to finish her masteral degree at the Philippine Womens
University (PWU). Unfortunately, it did not push through so she took up an
Old Testament course in a school of religion and at the same time utilized her
free hours selling insurance and cookware to augment her familys income.
However, during the second semester of her study leave, she studied and
passed 12 units of education subjects at the Golden Gate Colleges in
Batangas City. In response to the letters sent her by petitioner to justify her
study leave, she submitted a certification from Golden Gate Colleges and a
letter explaining why she took up an Old Testament course instead of
enrolling in her masteral class during the first semester.
President and Rector of the School, Fr. Ramonclaro G. Mendez, O. P., wrote
her, stating that her failure to enroll during the first semester was a violation
of the conditions of the study leave and that the reasons she advanced for
failure to enroll during the first semester were not acceptable and thus:
In the first place, prudence dictates that you should have ascertained first
that you are still eligible to study at PWU to finish your masteral degree
before applying and securing the approval of your leave by the School. In the
second place, you should have informed the School at once that you could
not enroll in the first semester so that your leave could have been adjusted
for only one-half (1/2) year. Thirdly, your engaging in some part-time
business instead of studying in the first semester of your leave is sufficient
justification for the School to consider you as resigned under the Faculty
Manual. And lastly, your failure to study in the first semester of your study
leave without informing the School beforehand constitutes deception, to say
the least, which is not a good example to the other teachers.
Voluntary Arbitrator Mayuga who found that respondent was illegally
dismissed. MR denied. CA affirmed, Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: whether or not respondents alleged violation of the conditions of the
study grant constituted serious misconduct which justified her termination
from petitioner School.
HELD: NO
Under the Labor Code, there are twin requirements to justify a valid dismissal
from employment: (a) the dismissal must be for any of the causes provided
in Article 282 of the Labor Code (substantive aspect) and (b) the employee
must be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself (procedural
aspect).7 The procedural aspect requires that the employee be given two

written notices before she is terminated consisting of a notice which apprises

the employee of the particular acts/omissions for which the dismissal is
sought and the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the
employers decision to dismiss him.
In the case at bar, the requirements for both substantive and procedural
aspects were not satisfied.
petitioner School argues that the conduct of respondent breached not only
the provisions of the study grant (which was a contractual obligation) but
also the Faculty Manual. Respondent was thus guilty of serious misconduct
which was a ground for termination.
Misconduct is improper or wrongful conduct. It is the transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error of
judgment.9 Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, the misconduct, to be a just
cause for termination, must be serious. This implies that it must be of such
grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant.
The alleged infractions of the respondent could hardly be considered serious
misconduct:
1. Her alleged failure to report for work EXACTLY on April 1, 1996 (respondent
reported on May 15, 1996) is not equivalent to failure to return for work, a
sanctionable offense under the Faculty Manual. Although we give credence to
petitioners argument that a private high school teacher still has work at the
end of the schoolyear to assist in the graduation preparations and in the
beginning of the school year to assist in the enrollment such tasks cannot
be considered a teachers main duties, the failure to perform which would be
tantamount to dereliction of duty or abandonment.
2. With regard to her alleged failure to enroll during the first semester,
although we agree with the President and Rector, Fr. Mendez, that
respondent should have first ascertained whether she was still eligible to
study at the PWU before applying for a study leave,17 such lapse was more
of an error in judgment rather than an act of serious misconduct. If
respondent intended to use her study leave for other unauthorized purposes,
as petitioner would like us to believe, she would not have enrolled at the
Golden Gate Colleges during the second semester. Yet she did, as borne out
by the certification18 prepared by the Registrar of Golden Gate Colleges.
3. Respondent did not violate the prohibition on engaging in employment
outside the school as specified in her study leave grant and as provided in

the Faculty Manual. Section 40 (a) of the Manual. The prohibition against
outside employment was enacted to prevent the teacher from using the
study leave period for unsanctioned purposes since the School pays the
teacher while pursuing further studies. That rationale was not violated by
respondent for the reason that her part-time activity of selling insurance and
cookware could not have prevented her in any way from studying and, more
importantly, she was not being paid by the School while on leave. How did
the school expect her and her family to survive without any income for one
whole year?
Petitioner also failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a valid
dismissal. Petitioner failed to give respondent the first notice which should
have informed the latter of the formers intention to dismiss her. Petitioner
argues that it complied with this requirement as there were several
exchanges of communication between the School and respondent regarding
the cause of her termination. However, we find that these letters did not
apprise respondent that her dismissal was being sought by petitioner School
as said letters only required respondent to submit proof of enrollment.
PETITION DENIED.
________________________
NOTES:
Examples of serious misconduct justifying termination, as held in some of
our decisions, include: sexual harassment (the managers act of fondling the
hands, massaging the shoulder and caressing the nape of a secretary);11
fighting within company premises;12 uttering obscene, insulting or offensive
words against a superior;13 misrepresenting that a student is his nephew
and pressuring and intimidating a co-teacher to change that students failing
grade to passing.
respondent is not entitled to the six-month study leave and vacation pay,
the same was expressly waived by complainant when she signed conforme
to the letter dated June 2, 1995 approving her study leave which states
among others, to wit: 2. The requested study leave involves no
remuneration on the part of the school
INSULAR HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION V. WATERFRONT HOTEL DAVAO
(2010)
Peralta,
J.

- Nov 2000: the Hotel sent DOLE a Notice of Suspension of Operations for 6
months due to severe and serious business losses. - During the suspension,
Rojas, Pres. of Davao insular Hotel Free Employees Union (DIHFEU-NFL) the
recognized labor org in the Hotel, sent the Hotel several letters asking it to
reconsider its decision. The Union members wanted to keep their jobs and to
help the Hotel, so it suggested several ideas in its Manifesto to solve the high
cost on payroll, such as: downsize manpower structure to 100 rank-and-file
EEs, a new pay scale, etc. - DIHFEU-NFL signed a MOA where the Hotel
agreed to re-open the hotel. The retained EEs individually signed a
reconfirmation of Employment. In June 2001, the Hotel resumed its
business operations.
- Aug 2002: Darius Joves and Debbie Planas, local officers of the National
Federation of Labor (NFL), filed a Notice of Mediation before the NCMB,
stating that the Union involved was "DARIUS JOVES/DEBBIE PLANAS ET. AL,
National Federation of Labor." The issue was the diminution of wages and
benefits through unlawful MOA. In support of his authority to file the
complaint, Joves, assisted by Atty. Cullo, presented several SPAs which were,
undated and unnotarized.
- Petitioner and respondent signed a Submission Agreement, where the union
stated was "INSULAR HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL."
- The Hotel filed with the NCMB a Manifestation with Motion for a Second
Preliminary Conference, alleging that the persons who filed the complaint in
the name of the Insular Hotel Employees Union-NFL have no authority to
represent the Union.
- Cullo confirmed that the case was filed not by the IHEU-NFL but by the NFL.
When asked to present his authority from NFL, Cullo admitted that the case
was filed by individual employees named in the SPAs.
- The Hotel argued that the persons who signed the complaint were not the
authorized representatives of the Union indicated in the Submission
Agreement nor were they parties to the MOA. It filed a Motion to Withdraw,
which Cullo then filed an Opposition to where the same was captioned:
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR And 79 Individual Employees, Union
Members, Complainants,
-versusWaterfront Insular Hotel Davao, Respondent. Cullo reiterated that the
complainants were not representing IHEU-NFL.
- The Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator (AVA) denied the Motion to Withdraw.
- The Hotel submitted its MR and stressed that the Submission Agreement
was void because the Union did not consent thereto.
- Cullo filed a Comment/Opposition to the Hotel's MR. Again, Cullo admitted
that the case was not initiated by the IHEU-NFL, saying that the individual
complainants are not representing the union but filing the complaint through
their appointed attorneys-in-fact to assert their individual rights as workers
who are entitled to the benefits granted by law and stipulated in the
collective bargaining agreement. There is no mention there of Insular Hotel
Employees Union, but only National Federation of Labor (NFL). The local

union was not included as party-complainant considering that it was a party

to the assailed MOA.
- The AVA denied the MR. He, however, ruled that the Hotel was correct when
it objected to NFL as proper party-complainant, as the proper one is INSULAR
HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL. In the submission agreement, the party
complainant written is INSULAR HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL and not the
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR and 79 other members. However, since
the NFL is the mother federation of the local union, and signatory to the
existing CBA, it can represent the union.
- Cullo, in subsequent documents, started using the caption "Insular Hotel
Employees Union-NFL, Complainant."
- The case was remanded to the NCMB. The Hotel reiterated to the NCMB
that the individual union members have no standing. The Hotel did not
appear before the NCMB to select a new AVA. The new AVA decided in favor
of Cullo, declaring the MOA invalid. - The Hotel appealed to the CA,
questioning among others the jurisdiction of the NCMB. The CA ruled in favor
of the Hotel, declaring the MOA VALID and ENFORCEABLE. Issues:
1. Did CA err in finding that the AVA has no jurisdiction over the case
because the notice of mediation does not mention the name of the local
union but only the affiliate federation
-- NO. 2. Do the individual members of the Union have the requisite standing
to question the MOA before the NCMB?
-- NO. 3. If the individual members of the Union have no authority to file the
case, does the federation to which the local union is affiliated have the
standing to do so?
-- NO. 4. (moot issue) W/N IHEU-NFL is a non-entity as DIHEU-NFL is the only
recognized bargaining unit -- YES, but Hotel is estopped from questioning the
same as it did not raise the said issue in the proceedings before the NCMB
and the Voluntary Arbitrators.
Ratio:
1. In the Notice of Mediation filed before the NCMB, it stated that the union
involved was "DARIUS JOVES/DEBBIE PLANAS ET. AL., National Federation of
Labor." In the Submission Agreement, however, it stated that the union
involved was "INSULAR HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL." Cullo clarified in
subsequent documents captioned as "National Federation of Labor and 79
Individual Employees, Union Members, Complainants" that the individual
complainants are not representing the union, but filing the complaint through
their appointed attorneys-in-fact.
- While it is undisputed that a submission agreement was signed by
respondent and "IHEU-NFL," then represented by Joves and Cullo, this Court
finds that there are two circumstances which affect its validity: first, the
Notice of Mediation was filed by a party who had no authority to do so;
second, that the Hotel had persistently questioned the authority of Joves,
Cullo and the individual members of the Union to file the complaint before
the NCMB. - Procedurally, the first step to submit a case for mediation is to

file a notice of preventive mediation with the NCMB. It is only after this step
that a submission agreement may be entered into by the parties concerned.
Section 3, Rule IV of the NCMB Manual of Procedure provides who may file a
notice of preventive mediation, to wit: Any certified or duly recognized
bargaining representative may file a notice
or request for preventive mediation... In the absence of a certified or duly
recognized bargaining representative, any legitimate labor organization in
the establishment may file a notice, request preventive mediation or declare
a strike, but only on grounds of unfair labor practice. - It is clear that only a
certified or duly recognized bargaining agent may file a notice or request for
preventive mediation. It is curious that even Cullo himself admitted that the
case was filed not by the Union but by individual members thereof. Clearly,
therefore, the NCMB had no jurisdiction to entertain the notice filed before it.
- Even though the Hotel signed a Submission Agreement, it had immediately
manifested its desire to withdraw from the proceedings after it became
apparent that the Union had no part in the complaint. Only 4 days had
lapsed after the signing of the Submission Agreement when the Hotel called
the attention of the AVA that the persons who filed the instant complaint in
the name of Insular Hotel Employees Union-NFL had no authority to
represent the Union. The Hotel cannot be estopped in raising the
jurisdictional issue, because it is basic that the issue of jurisdiction may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by
waiver or by estoppel.
2. Petitioners have not been duly authorized to represent the union. In Atlas
Farms v. NLRC : x x x Pursuant to Art 260, the parties to a CBA shall name or
designate their respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if
the grievance is unsettled in that level, it shall automatically be referred to
the voluntary arbitrators designated in advance by parties to a CBA. - The
CBA recognizes that DIHFEU-NFL is the exclusive bargaining representative
of all permanent employees. The inclusion of the word "NFL" after the name
of the local union merely stresses that the local union is NFL's affiliate. It
does not, however, mean that the local union cannot stand on its own. The
local union owes its creation and continued existence to the will of its
members and not to the federation to which it belongs.
3. Coastal Subic Bay Terminal v. DOLE
: x x x A local union does not owe its existence to the federation with which it
is affiliated. It is a separate and distinct voluntary association owing its
creation to the will of its members. Mere affiliation does not divest the local
union of its own personality, neither does it give the mother federation the
license to act independently of the local union. It only gives rise to a contract
of agency, where the former acts in representation of the latter. Hence, local
unions are considered principals while the federation is deemed to be merely
their agent. x x x - The NFL had no authority to file the complaint in behalf of

the individual employees. 4. In its Memorandum, the Hotel contends that

IHEU-NFL is a non-entity. While DOLE states that "IHEU-NFL" is not a
registered labor organization, the Hotel is estopped from questioning the
same as it did not raise the said issue in the proceedings before the NCMB
and the Voluntary Arbitrators. The main theory posed by the Hotel was W/N
the individual employees had the authority to file the complaint
notwithstanding the apparent non-participation of the union. It never put in
issue the fact that DIHFEU-NFL was not the same as IHEU-NFL.
Dispositive: CA AFFIRMED.
PAL v. NLRC
G.R. No. 85985
August 13, 1993
Facts:
PAL completely revised its 1966 Code of Discipline. The Code was circulated
among the employees and was immediately implemented, and some
employees were forthwith subjected to the disciplinary measures embodied
therein.The Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) filed a
complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). PALEA
contended that PAL, by itsunilateral implementation of the Code, was guilty
of unfair labor practice, specifically Paragraphs E and G of Article 249 and
Article 253 of the Labor Code. PALEA alleged that copies of the Code had
been circulated in limited numbers; thatbeing penal in nature the Code must
conform with the requirements of sufficientpublication, and that the Code
was arbitrary, oppressive, and prejudicial to the rights of the employees.It
prayed that implementation of the Code be held in abeyance; that PAL
should discuss the substance of the Code with PALEA; that employees
dismissed under theCode be reinstated and their cases subjected to further
hearing; and that PAL bedeclared guilty of unfair labor practice and be
ordered to pay damagesPAL asserted its prerogative as an employer to
prescibe rules and regulations regarding employess' conduct in carrying out
their duties and functions, and alleging that by implementing the Code, it
had not violated the collective bargainingagreement (CBA) or any provision
of the Labor Code. Assailing the complaint asunsupported by evidence, PAL
maintained that Article 253 of the Labor Code citedby PALEA reffered to the
requirements for negotiating a CBA which was inapplicable as indeed the
current CBA had been negotiated.
Issue:
W/N the formulation of a Code of Discipline among employees is a shared
responsibility of the employer and the employees.
Ruling:

Petitioner's assertion that it needed the implementation of a new Code of

Discipline considering the nature of its business cannot be overemphasized.
In fact, its being a local monopoly in the business demands the most
stringent of measuresto attain safe travel for its patrons. Nonetheless,
whatever disciplinary measures are adopted cannot be properly
implemented in the absence of full cooperation of the employees. Such
cooperation cannot be attained if the employees are restive on account, of
their being left out in the determination of cardinal and fundamental matters
affecting their employment.
Manila Electric v. Quisumbing
G.R. No. 127598
Facts:
Members of the Private respondent union were dissatisfied with the terms of a CBA with
petitioner. The parties in this case were ordered by the Sec. of Labor to execute a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) wherein.The CBA allowed for the increase in the wages of the
employees concerned. The petitioner argues that if such increase were allowed, it would pass
off such to the consumers.
Issue: W/N matters of salary are part of management prerogative
RULING: Yes. There is no need to consult the Secretary of Labor in cases involving contracting
out for 6 months or more as it is part of management prerogative. However, a line must be
drawn with respect to management prerogatives on business operations per se and those which
affect the rights of the workers. Employers must see to it that that employees are properly
informed of its decisions to attain harmonious labor relations and enlighten the worker as to their
rights.
The contracting out business or services is an exercise of business judgment if it is for the
promotion of efficiency and attainment of economy. Management must be motivated by good
faith and contracting out should not be done to circumvent the law. Provided there was no
malice or that it was not done arbitrarily, the courts will not interfere with the exercise of this
judgment.