Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 177566
March 26, 2008
[Formerly G.R. No. 164433]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ROSALINDA TRAPAGO TAN a.k.a. KAYE SUAREZ PALINO, MARIA EL FELASOL
FLORES, a.k.a. MAE FELASOL FLORES, ARMANDO PANAGUITON DE LUNA,
BENITO FEOLOG FELAZOL, EDUARDO FRONDOZO FELAZOL, ANGELITO ANG
DIEGO and ROBERTO TOLENTINO, Appellants
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
On appeal by way of automatic review is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR HC No. 01988, affirming with modification the Judgment 2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), convicting appellants Rosalinda Trapago Tan (Rosalinda), Mae Felasol
Flores (Mae), Armando Panaguiton De Luna (Armando), Benito Feolog Felazol (Benito),
Eduardo Frondozo Felazol (Eduardo), Angelito Ang Diego (Angelito), and Roberto
Tolentino (Roberto) for the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom.
The facts as narrated by prosecution witnesses follow.
At about 8:30 p.m. of 8 September 1997, Ruiz Saez Co (Ruiz) was taking his meal in a
store located just outside his companys premises in Barrio Mamatid, Cabuyao, Laguna.
He noticed three vehicles parked in front of the store a green Nissan Sentra car, a
black Honda Civic car and a red L-300 van. Suddenly, a man alighted from the Nissan
Sentra car and aimed a gun at him. He tried to escape and started running towards the
company plant when two (2) armed men alighted from the L-300 van and blocked his
way. Ruiz was then forcibly boarded into the black Honda Civic car. Inside the car, he
was handcuffed and made to stoop down. After driving for about an hour, Ruiz was led
out of the car, brought inside a house, and locked into a room. A certain Ka Rudy told
him that he had just been kidnapped in exchange for P40 Million for his freedom.3
Meanwhile, at around 9:00 p.m. of the same day, Mrs. Sonia Co (Sonia) received a call
from the vice mayor of Cabuyao, Laguna that her son had been kidnapped. She
immediately called then Vice-President Joseph Estrada to seek assistance. The latter
referred the matter to General Panfilo Lacson (Lacson) who in turn instructed Police

Officer Senior Superintendent Cesar Mancao (Mancao) to dispatch teams to monitor the
alleged kidnappers.4
At 2:30 a.m. of the following day, Sonia finally received a call from the alleged kidnapper
who identified himself as Ka Rudy. The latter confirmed that Ruiz was in his custody. On
his second call, Ka Rudy asked for a P40 Million ransom, which amount was lowered
to P1.2 Million after negotiations.5
During Ruizs captivity, he was also blindfolded and handcuffed but was allowed to go to
the bathroom accompanied by his kidnappers. On 14 September 1997, Mancao
received a tip from an anonymous female caller that the persons responsible for the
kidnapping of Ruiz were the callers husband and the latters girlfriend; and that Ruiz
was being kept in a house somewhere in Palmera Homes Subdivision, Taytay, Rizal.
A team was dispatched to said area the following morning and surveillance was
thereafter conducted.6 In the morning of his eighth day in captivity, Ruiz heard shouts
and rapid gunshots outside the room. He quickly removed his blindfold. After a while, a
man forced open the door and introduced himself as a member of the SWAT. Ruiz was
then secured and taken out of the house. On his way towards the police van, Ruiz saw
two (2) persons lying on their back, another two (2) squatting with their hands tied at the
back of their heads, and two (2) women embracing each other. Ruiz later identified the
women as Mae and Rosalinda, and one of the men with hands tied at the back as
Eduardo.7
Mancao recounted that seven (7) persons were arrested five (5) males and two (2)
females. In addition to those already identified by Ruiz, the other persons were
identified by Mancao as Roberto, Benito and Armando. Several high-powered firearms
were recovered from the house.8 At 7:00 a.m. of 16 September 1997, Sonia received a
call from Lacson who related that Ruiz son had already been rescued. 9
Appellants, who came from various locations in Metro Manila, 10 testified for the defense
and presented their respective alibis.
Benito claimed that on 15 September 1997, he, together with Roberto, went to a house
owned by a certain Sgt. Salazar, located at 421 Thatch Palm Street, Palmera Hills,
Taytay, Rizal, to repair a motor vehicle. They were met by Nympha Salazar (Nympha),
the wife of Sgt. Salazar. At around 4:00 p.m., Eduardo, Benitos cousin, arrived. They
finished the repair work at 6:00 p.m. While waiting for Sgt. Salazar to come home for
their pay, Nympha brought them one case of beer. They then started drinking together
with two guests of the Salazar whom they only knew to be "Toto" and "Ariston." By
10:00 p.m., Benito stopped drinking and fell asleep in the sala. He was awakened in the
morning by a firefight. He was shot in the inner thigh and was taken in by the
police.11 Roberto and Eduardo corroborated his testimony.
Armando explained that he was renting the extension house of the Salazars with his
live-in partner, Mae. At around 7:30 p.m. on 15 September 1997, he came home to find

several persons drinking under the mango tree. A few minutes later, Angelito came
knocking at his door looking for Mae so he could give his payment for the perfume he
purchased from her. Armando then invited Angelito for dinner. At 10:30 p.m., Armando
accompanied Angelito to the gate and were invited to join the drinking spree. The
following morning, they were awakened by gunshots. 12
Mae related that upon hearing the gunshots, she and Armando also heard someone
shouting at them to stand up. They embraced each other. Some armed men then
entered their house and told them to get out. Mae denied knowing Eduardo, Benito,
Rosalinda and Roberto.13 She averred that she only came to know Angelito through the
latters wife.
Rosalinda, for her part, alleged that Sgt. Salazar was a regular customer of the
establishment where she used to work. Nympha, the wife of Sgt. Salazar, called her
through cellphone and asked her to meet with her. At around 11:00 p.m. on 15
September 1997, they met at Grand Central Mall in Monumento. They boarded a taxi
and proceeded to 421 Thatch Palm Street, Taytay, Rizal at 12:00 midnight. Upon arrival
at said address, Rosalinda was informed by Nympha that Sgt. Salazar was already
dead. Nympha then went out and did not come back. Rosalinda decided to sleep in the
room of Mae.14
On 17 September 1997, appellants were charged with the crime of kidnapping for
ransom in an Information the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about September 8, 1997 in the evening of Barangay Mamatid, Cabuyao,
Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused
conspiring, confederating, mutually helping one another and grouping themselves
together, did then and there, by force and intimidation, and use of high powered
firearms, wifully, unlawfully, feloniously take, carry away, and deprive Ruiz Saez-Co y
Lim of his liberty against his will for purposes of extorting money as in fact a demand for
money was made as a condition for his release but before any ransom can be paid, the
victim was rescued after eight (8) days in captivity.
CONTRARY TO LAW.15
On arraignment, appellants entered their plea of not guilty. Trial ensued.
On 5 April 2002, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced each of them to
suffer the penalty of death.16
The records of this case were originally elevated to this Court for automatic review.
Conformably with our ruling in People v. Mateo 17 however, the case was referred to the
Court of Appeals for intermediate review.

Appellants maintained that among the circumstances allegedly established by the

prosecutions evidence, the only link to the accused is that they were all arrested at the
place where the kidnap victim was rescued. Appellants argued that the circumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution failed to prove that they conspired and actually
participated in the kidnapping of the victim. Furthermore, appellants contended that
mere presence at the crime scene cannot be considered as proof of conspiracy. All told,
appellants proffered that their guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt;
hence, they must be acquitted.18
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for its part recommended that appellants be
held guilty of serious illegal detention instead of kidnapping for failure of the prosecution
to prove that appellants were the ones who abducted Ruiz on 8 September 1997, forced
him to board the black Honda Civic, and brought him to the place where he was
rescued eight days later. Likewise, the prosecution failed to prove that demands for
ransom had been made by any, some or all of the appellants. 19
In a Decision dated 27 November 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the
trial court with the following modification:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the April 5, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Bian, Laguna, Branch 24, in Criminal Case No. 9984-B, is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that in view of the passage of R.A. No. 9346, the accusedappellants are suffered to serve the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with the accessory
penalties prescribed under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of the Death
Penalty.20
The appellate court rejected appellants defense of denial and held that it cannot prevail
over the ample amount of circumstantial evidence proffered by the prosecution which
tends to prove their involvement in the crime.
The appellate court likewise sustained the trial courts finding that demands for ransom
had been actually made by appellants.
On 22 August 2007, this Court required the parties to simultaneously file their respective
supplemental briefs.21However, on 10 and 15 October 2007, the OSG and appellants
respectively manifested that they were adopting their brief earlier filed before the Court
of Appeals.22
The fundamental issue to be resolved is whether the guilt of the appellants has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (1) the offender is a private
individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his
liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission

of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or
detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public
authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped and kept in
detained is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is
kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his
detention is immaterial.23
Based on the victims account, the ordeal he had gone through can be divided into three
distinct segments, namely: (1) the forcible taking, (2) the asportation, and (3) the
protracted detention. The first segment was the Mamatid (in Cabuyao, Laguna) episode
where he was held by armed men at gunpoint and forcibly boarded in a car. The second
segment covered the entire forced journey of the victim from Mamatid to the detention
house in Taytay, Rizal. And the third segment was the Taytay episode. It covered the full
length of the victims involuntary confinement spanning eight (8) days until his stirring
rescue. There is no doubt that the victim was deprived of his liberty throughout all the
episodes. But the question is: was the criminal liability of the appellants in each and
every episode established beyond reasonable doubt?
We agree with the OSG that the participation of the appellants in the forcible taking and
journey of the victim was not clearly established. There were no eyewitnesses who
testified on the abduction. While the victim testified on the three episodes, he failed to
see and identify any of his captors until he was rescued as he was blindfolded most of
the time during his captivity. He did not see the face of the persons who abducted him in
Mamatid and those who formed the entourage which brought him to Taytay. To conclude
that those who were captured during the rescue operation were also participants in the
forcible taking and asportation is to lower the level of evidence required for conviction.
Parenthetically, the public prosecutor was not allowed by the trial court judge to
question the victim although he asked for leave to ask additional questions after the
private prosecutor was done with his questions on direct examination. Instead of
granting the requested leave outright, the trial judge consulted the defense counsel and
the private prosecutor who both manifested that whatever questions the public
prosecutor had in mind should be coursed through and asked by the private prosecutor.
Thus, the trial judge directed the private prosecutor to propound whatever questions the
public prosecutor would suggest.24 At this juncture, we find it necessary to remind trial
court judges that under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, all
criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.
The public prosecutor may turn over the actual prosecution of the criminal case to the
private prosecutor, in the exercise of his discretion, but he may, at any time, take over
the actual conduct of the trial.25
The third episode, however, is different. The criminal participation of the appellants
therein was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The OSG correctly recommended that
they should be held liable therefor.

A surveillance operation was conducted before the rescue of the victim, resulting in the
determination that the victim was locked in a small room of a house in Palmera Hills,
Taytay, Rizal. The victims description of the house where he was kept "as small
because the door of the room was adjacent to the comfort room" 26 corresponds to the
description given at the subject house by the members of the Presidential AntiOrganized Crime Task Force.
The seven (7) appellants were all apprehended in the house or in the premises where
the victim was detained. Ruiz identified three (3) of them as present and alive during the
raid resulting to his rescue, including the two (2) women Mae and Rosalinda. 27 Two
(2) other accused were caught hiding in the ceiling, upon the tip given by
Ruiz.28 Angelito was the last to be apprehended as he hid among the grass outside the
house for seven (7) hours, only to be caught later by police officers from Antipolo. 29
1avvphi1

The unexplained presence of appellants in the house where the victim was held captive
leads to no other conclusion than that they participated in his illegal detention. Not a
single appellant could convincingly explain his presence at the crime scene. As aptly
observed by the trial court:
Accused Benito and Eduardo both surnamed Felazol and Robert Tolentino claimed that
they were at the place where Co was rescued because their group repaired the car of
Sgt. Salazar. However, the Court cannot give much weight and credit to the defense of
these three (3) accused considering that if it is true that Sgt. Salazars car has to be
repaired, he should have brought his car to an auto repair shop. Sgt. Salazar has no
reason to request accused Benito Felazol to repair his car, it appearing that the latter is
a driver and not a mechanic, hence, he has no technical know-how to repair a car.
Furthermore, it is unbelievable that Nympha Salazar, the wife of Sgt. Salazar would
allow these persons to sleep in their house considering that these persons are not
personally known to their family, because as testified to by Benito Felazol, he came to
know Sgt. Salazar only when he sidesw[iped] the car of the latter.
As regards the defense of accused Angelito Ang Diego, the Court sees no reason to
believe his testimony that he was at the crime scene because he remitted collection for
some merchandise his wife obtained from Mae Felasol Flores and thereafter, he drank
with the three (3) persons whom he does not know under the mango tree. The Court is
not inclined to believe his story as it is against human experience for a person to drink
with some individuals unknown to him until the wee hours of the morning.
Furthermore, accused Ang Diego testified that during the raid, at around 5:00 a.m., he
jumped over the fence and hides himself in the grasses outside the compound.
However, when he gets out from the grasses at around 12:00 noontime, the policemen
from Antipolo apprehended him. At this juncture, the Court could not see any reason
why accused Ang Diego has to hide himself in the grasses outside the compound for
almost seven (7) hours if it is really true that he has nothing to do with the kidnapping of
Ruiz Saez-Co for an innocent person is bold as a lion.

As to the defense of accused Armando Panaguiton de Luna and Mae Felasol Flores
that they were in the safe house because they were live-in partners and that they were
renting an extension house in the compound, the Court believes and so holds that such
contention is unworthy of belief and credit because of some inconsistencies in their
testimonies. Accused Armando Panaguiton de Luna when asked on direct examination
stated that her live-in partner, Mae Flores was a saleslady at Manuela Crossing.
xxx
However, when Mae Flores was asked on direct examination, she stated that she was a
vendor at Edsa Central Crossing. x x x
Such inconsistencies in the testimonies of de Luna and Flores created a serious doubt
in the mind of the Court as to the truthfulness of their statements considering that if it is
really true that they have been living together, each of them know the place of work of
one another and for how many years they have been living together as husband and
wife.
With respect to the claim of accused Rosalinda Trapago Tan that she was at the said
place because Nympha Estoquia fetched her at Monumento, such defense is unworthy
of belief and credit.
It is implausible that accused Tan would go with a person whom she does not know
personally, as she admitted that she only knew Nympha thru the telephone. Moreover, it
is unbelievable that a woman would go with a stranger for an undisclosed reason at an
undisclosed place in that late hour of the night (11:00 p.m.).
Likewise, the Court is not inclined to believe the story of accused Tan that she will agree
to be left by Nympha in the house owned by the latter when she is not even personally
known to Nympha and without any sufficient justification.
xxx
All the accused admitted that they were at the safe house when Ruiz Saez-Co was
rescued on September 16, 1997, although all of them deny having involvement in the
kidnapping of the victim. Their being present together in a questionable place, during a
questionable hour of the night, only for simple reasons given by each of them, gave
doubt to the mind of the Court, that they are telling the truth. 30
Under the circumstances, the fact that appellants came from different parts of Metro
Manila and offered no plausible reason for their presence at the enclosed estate where
the victim was rescued speaks tomes of their culpability.
Unfortunately, the owners of the house, Sgt. Salazar and Nympha, who could have
corroborated appellants alibis, were not presented in court. Sgt. Salazar was already
dead on 15 September 1997. Strangely, only Rosalinda knew of this fact when she was

allegedly told by Nympha. The other appellants, who admitted their presence in
Salazars house, were not aware or even had the slightest knowledge of Sgt. Salazars
death. Nympha, whose presence in the house was affirmed by all of the appellants, was
not presented as a witness by the defense.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it. It may be proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words or conduct of the alleged conspirators
before, during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or
purpose.31 That the appellants conspired to detain Ruiz was evident in their collective
and concerted acts before, during and after
the illegal detention. In the instant case, the following circumstances prove the
existence of conspiracy among appellants: (1) the nine (9) persons present in the house
during the captivity of Ruiz were all accounted for after the raid; (2) the recovery of highpowered firearms signified that appellants were united in their design to restrain the
victim of his liberty; and (3) the exchange of gunfire resulting in the death of two
kidnappers and wounding of one of the appellants demonstrated their resistance to the
arresting team.
The primary element of the crime of kidnapping is actual confinement, detention and
restraint of the victim. There must be a showing of actual confinement or restriction of
the victim, and that such deprivation was the intention of the malefactor.32 Hence, having
proven that detention was perpetrated by appellants, it is sufficient to convict them of
the crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
However, the demand for ransom was not clearly attributed to any of the appellants.
Ruiz divulged that the demand for ransom was intimated to him by a certain Ka Rudy.
Sonia, in her testimony, corroborated this fact, when she declared that they were able to
negotiate the amount of ransom from P40 Million to P1.2 Million in a
series of calls made by Ka Rudy and a female caller.33 But the duo was never
ascertained to be any of the appellants. Thus, we are constrained to reverse the
judgment of the trial court and appellate court judgment in convicting appellants of
kidnapping for ransom.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that appellants Rosalinda
Trapago Tan a.k.a. Kaye Suarez Palino, Maria El Felasol Flores a.k.a. Mae Felasol
Flores, Armando Panaguiton De Luna, Benito Feolog Felazol, Eduardo Frondozo
Felazol, Angelito Ang Diego, and Roberto Tolentino are found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. By virtue of this modification, and not
Republic Act No. 9346, the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua on each of
the appellants in the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
AT T E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 173022
January 23, 2006
[Formerly G.R. No. 144588]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
DARIUS RODRIGO y FAJARDO (acquitted), FELICIANO FAJARDO, JR., and REY
PLATA, Appellants.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before us on automatic review is the Decision1 rendered by the Court of Appeals,
affirming with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal
Case No. 383-M-97, convicting Rey Plata, alias "Jeffrey" (Plata), Darius Rodrigo, alias
"Jun" (Rodrigo), and Feliciano Fajardo, Jr., alias "Gerry" (Fajardo) of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom, penalized under Republic Act No. 7659 3 with Death. Coaccused Rodrigo was acquitted on reasonable doubt.
On 10 September 1996, Oliver Caparas (Oliver), then 13 years of age, was waiting for a
ride to school in a corner near his house in Matimbo, Malolos, Bulacan, when four (4)
men forcibly seized and boarded him into a car. While inside the car, he was
blindfolded. He was later transferred to a van. 4 The van, tailed by a car, traveled to
Baguio. While there, they slept overnight inside the van in a parking lot. 5
The following day, Eleazar Caparas (Eleazar), the father of Oliver, received a call from
the kidnappers initially asking for P10 million ransom in exchange for the release of
Oliver.6 In the meantime, the kidnappers proceeded to Bonitas Resort in
Pangasinan.7 Oliver was then brought to a room and his blindfold removed. He stayed
inside the room for one (1) week. During his stay, a woman, later identified as Lanie
dela Cruz (dela Cruz), took care of him by feeding him three (3) times a day.8
After three (3) days of negotiation, the kidnappers agreed to lower the ransom to P1.7
million.9 On 17 September 1996, Pedro Navarro (Pedro), an uncle of Oliver, was
instructed by Eleazar Caparas to deliver the ransom money. After receiving a call from
the kidnappers, he proceeded to follow the instructions on the drop-off. He eventually
gave the money to a man whom he would later describe as "mestizo, 55 or 56 feet tall
and wearing sunglasses."10

Later that night, Oliver was made to board the same van and brought to the Petron Gas
Station in Meycauayan Highway. Upon alighting from the van, he was given P500.00
and was told that he would be fetched by his uncle inside a canteen in the gas
station.11 At around 1:00 a.m. of 18 September 1997, the kidnappers called Eleazar
again and asked them to go to the Petron Gas Station located between Meycauayan
and Marilao along the Expressway. Upon arriving at the Petron Station at 3:00 a.m,
Pedro Navarro saw Oliver eating inside the canteen and brought him home where he
was reunited with his father.12
After the kidnapping incident, an investigation was conducted by the Intelligence
Section of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Malolos, Bulacan, through SPO2
Epafrodito Aliling and SPO2 Antonio Chungtuyco. It appears that one of the suspects
was a member of an NPA rebel returnee group headed by Armando Rodrigo, Jr.13 Upon
the killing of Bert Liwanag, his girlfriend, dela Cruz, who was a suspected member of
the group, was invited for questioning. On that occasion, she admitted her participation
in the kidnapping of Oliver Caparas and implicated appellants. 14
An Information was filed on 11 March 1997 against appellants Plata, Fajardo and
Rodrigo, together with dela Cruz, Armando Rodrigo, Helen Joven, Boyong Catindig, Jun
Parubrob, and a John Doe. It reads:
That on or about the 10th day of September 1996, in the municipality of Malolos,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with force, violence and intimidation, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnap and take away one Oliver Caparas y Navarro, a 13-year old boy for the purpose
of extorting ransom and detain and deprive him of his liberty for a period of seven (7)
days, more or less and later released after ransom money in the sum of P1.7M was
paid by the victims father to the accused.
Contrary to law.15
Four of the accused were apprehended, namely: Plata, Rodrigo, Fajardo and dela Cruz.
The rest remained at large. The trial court, upon motion of the prosecution, discharged
Dela Cruz to serve as state witness.16
On arraignment, appellants pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial proceeded. The
prosecution presented the following witnesses: the kidnap victim, Oliver Caparas, his
father Eleazar Caparas, his uncle Pedro Navarro, SPO2 Antonio Chungtuyco, SPO2
Epafrodito Aliling, and accused turned witness dela Cruz. The defense presented their
evidence, which consists of the testimonies of appellants and other witnesses
supporting their alibi.
On 31 May 2000, the RTC rendered its decision finding all appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Appellants elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court affirmed the trial courts decision except that it acquitted Rodrigo.

Appellants Plata and Fajardo submitted their individual appeal briefs. Essentially, the
main issue for resolution is whether the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of appellants.
The guilt of the appellants was established beyond reasonable doubt by the testimonies
of the victim, the man who paid the ransom, and a fellow participant to the crime, who
had turned state witness for the prosecution.
Fajardo questions dela Cruzs discharge as a state witness on the ground that she was
a co-conspirator. He contends that the testimony of Pedro, Oliver and Eleazar Caparas
would already suffice as direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed.17
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court provides:
When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense,
upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more
of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for
the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the
court is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge
is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If
the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn
statement shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The power to prosecute includes the initial discretion to determine who should be
utilized by the government as a state witness. The prosecution has gathered the
evidence against the accused and is in a better position to decide the testimonial
evidence needed by the State to press its prosecution to a successful conclusion. Under
our Rules, however, it is the courts that will finally determine whether the requirements

have been satisfied to justify the discharge of an accused to become a witness for the
government.18
We affirm the finding of the trial court that the testimony of dela Cruz was an absolute
necessity. The trial court observed:
x x x x Without the testimony of dela Cruz, the prosecution is bound to falter in bringing
all the culprits before the bars of justice, the ominous prospect of leaving many of them
not fully identified and their respective role in the crime unraveled loom large for the
prosecution to ignore. True, the prosecution has direct evidence in the person of Pedro
Navarro and Oliver Caparas, but, apparently, in view of the complex situation the two
have found themselves in their testimonies have taken a limited thrust, hence, it
becomes the bounden duty of the prosecution to fill in the void with all the resources
under its command. From the prosecutions standpoint, therefore, insofar, as the other
accused are concerned, no direct evidence is at its disposal at this stage to establish
their complicity in the abduction of Caparas. Only dela Cruz, according to them, could
supply the much needed information to pin down the whole bunch that took Caparas
forcibly for ransom. Following their line of reasoning, without dela Cruzs testimony, the
whole truth would never be known. Along these considerations, the reality of de la Cruz
testimony being an absolute necessity in the trial of this case stands indisputable, and
given the absence of any evidence against some of the accused, as pointed out above,
de la Cruz testimony shall, in legal contemplation, constitute the only direct evidence as
against them..19
Neither does dela Cruz appear to be the most guilty of the accused. The trial court held
that dela Cruz was not privy to the kidnap plan and was merely taken in later by the
group because they suspected that she already knew too much.
Did the lower courts properly consider the testimony of dela Cruz? It is a jurisprudential
rule that the testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the
blame to or implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be
regarded as proof with a moral certainty that the latter committed or participated in the
commission of the crime. The testimony must be substantially corroborated in its
material points by unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances and must be to
such an extent that its trustworthiness becomes manifest. 20 The testimony of dela Cruz
was substantially corroborated by no less than the victim himself, Oliver, as well as
Pedro.
The trial courts decision rested mainly on the harmony in the testimonies of Oliver and
dela Cruz. During the direct examination, Oliver gave an account of how he was seized
by four (4) armed men:
Fiscal:
Q- Mr. Witness, on September 10, 1996, about 12:00 at noon, do you remember where
you were?

A- I was at the corner waiting for a ride, maam.

Q- What corner?
A- Corner near our house in Matimbo, Malolos, Bulacan, maam.
xxxx
Q- While you were there on [that] particular date and time, do you remember of any
unusual incident that took place?
A- I was taken by four (4) men, maam.
xxxx
Q- How about these four (4) men whom, according to you, took you or snatched you,
what were they doing?
A- I was boarded on a car, maam.
xxxx
A- Two of the men held my hand and boarded me at the back seat where theres a man
seating and that man held my head, maam.
xxxx
Q- After your head was held by that man who was seating at the back, what happened?
A- I was pulled and they blindfolded me, maam.
xxxx
Q- What happened after that?
A- The car left, maam.
Q- And do you know as to where the car proceeded?
A- I was transferred to another vehicle, maam.
xxxx
Q- That vehicle that you were transferred to, do you know what type of vehicle was it?
A- It was a van, maam.

Q- How did you know it was a van?

A- Because the door was a sliding, maam.21
xxxx
A- I saw then brought down Oliver from the car blindfolded, maam.
Q- Who brought him down from the car?
A- I cannot remember, maam.
Q- From the car where was Oliver brought or transferred?
A- Into the van, maam.
Q- Are you referring to the van that you are riding on?
A- Yes, maam.22
On direct examination, state witness dela Cruz corroborated Olivers statement. She
recounted that she was riding in the van, together with the other suspects. Their other
cohorts were in a car, which trailed the van. She witnessed how appellants Plata and
Fajardo, Armando Rodrigo and Darius Rodrigo alighted from the said car and grabbed
Oliver from the street corner at around 12:00 p.m. of 10 September 1996. 23
The testimonies of Oliver Caparas and dela Cruz likewise jibed on a couple of material
points, the place and the duration of the victims detention. In his testimony, Oliver
surmised that he was brought to Pangasinan and detained for a week, thus:
Q- After you were transferred to the van, what happened?
A- We slept inside the van, maam.
Q- You said you slept, can you calculate for how long have you slept?
A- No, because I was blindfolded, maam.
Q- At the time that you slept, was the van still traveling or was it parked at the time you
slept?
A- It was parked, maam.
Q- After you slept, what happened?
A- We left, maam.

Q- And do you know where did [sic] you proceed?

A- We went to a house, maam.
Q- At the time that you went to a house, how was your blindfolded [sic]?
A- When I was taken inside the room, they already removed my blindfold, maam.
xxxx
Q- For how long did you stay on that room?
A- For one (1) week, maam.
Q- How were you able to count the days?
A- Because of the lapse of time, I counted the days, maam.
xxxx
Q- How many times in a day were you given something to eat?
A- Three times, maam.
Q- And did you come to know as to what place was that where that house was, wherein
you were taken?
A- I came to conclude that it was in Pangasinan because of the bread wrapper, maam. 24
Dela Cruz confirmed this fact in her testimony, as follows:
Q- After Oliver Caparas was transferred to the van where you were riding at, what
happened next?
A- The van left going to Baguio followed by the car, maam.
xxxx
Q- You said that the van left from Baguio[,] did you reach Baguio?
A- Yes, maam.
Q- Do you know what place in Baguio[,] you went to?
A- They went to an apartment but it was already occupied so we proceeded to a
[p]arking lot, maam.

Q- What did you do with the [sic] parking lot?

A- We stayed and slept there inside the van, maam.
Q- Up to what time did you stay in the van in the [p]arking lot?
A- Overnight, maam.
Q- What happened after that?
A- The following day we went to Pangasinan, maam.
Q- Where in Pangasinan did you go?
A- I do not know the place but we stopped at Bonitas Resort, maam.
xxxx
Q- You said that you were ordered to take care of the child Oliver, did you take care of
him?
A- Yes, maam.
Q- What care did you do?
A- I serve him his meal, maam.
Q- For how many times did you serve him in a [sic] meals all in all at Bonita Resort?
A- One (1) week, maam.
Q- By the way what date was that when Oliver was brought to Bonita Resort?
A- September 11, 1996, maam.
Q- Up to?
A- Up to September 18, maam.25
Further, Plata was positively identified by Oliver as the one who served as a guard,
when the latter was detained in a house in Pangasinan:
Q- In that place wherein [sic] you were taken. I am referring to that house where your
blindfold was already removed. Aside from that man who was giving the food, were
there other persons there that you have seen?

A- Yes, maam.
Q- Who were or who was that person?
A- Rey Plata, maam.
Q- What was Rey Plata doing there?
A- He was guarding me, maam.
xxxx
Q- How did you know that this Rey Plata was guarding you which according to you he
was just on the adjacent room?
A- Because everytime I made a walk, I saw him inside that other room, maam.
Fiscal:
Q- This Rey Plata whom youve seen there, is he inside this courtroom?
A- Yes, maam.
Q- Point to us this Rey Plata.
Interpreter:
Witness is pointing to a man wearing an orange t-shirt and when asked his name,
answered: Reynaldo Plata.26
Before the Court, Plata seeks to discredit the credibility of Oliver as a witness. He
alleges that the positive identification made by Oliver should not be given weight and
credence. He argues that the delay in reporting the crime to the police authorities could
be construed as an afterthought to implicate Plata in the crime. Furthermore, he claims
that the police authorities literally induced the victim to point to him as one of the
kidnappers.27
The failure to immediately report the kidnapping incident does not diminish the
credibility of the witness. People react differently in particular situations and respond to
stimuli in varying ways and degrees. Witnesses of startling occurrences do not react
similarly, depending on the situation and their state of mind. 28 The victim and his
relatives might have been cowed by fear of reprisal from the kidnappers. The
accusation that the police authorities prodded Oliver Caparas to implicate Plata does
not appear plausible. The burden of proving this allegation rests on the defense.
However, these allegations were left unsubstantiated. There is no showing of any
improper motive on the part of the police officers to pin down Plata.

Plata underscores the inconsistencies of dela Cruzs statements made in court, such as
(1) the presence and participation of Plata during the planning and commission of the
crime; (2) the type of vehicle used in returning the kidnap victim; and (3) the incredulous
story regarding the participation of all other accused in the alleged crime. 29
Well-entrenched is the legal precept that findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration
of the testimonies of witnesses, its assessment of the credibility of the said witnesses
and its evidence based on the said findings are given high respect if not conclusive
effect by the appellate court, unless the trial court overlooked, misconstrued or
misinterpreted facts and circumstances of substance which if considered will alter the
outcome of the case.30The trial court lent credence to the positive identification made by
dela Cruz, to wit:
x x x Lanie, in fact, has positively identified the three (3) accused on trial not only by
their faces but also by their aliases pointing to Rey Plata as "Jeffrey," Feliciano Fajardo,
Jr. as "Gerry" and Darius as "Darius." Thus, the identification made by her as to who
actually seized Oliver and took him by car to Tarlac, Tarlac, and the men she rode with
in a van from Sta. Maria, Bulacan to Tarlac, Tarlac up to Baguio City and finally to Bonita
Resort in Pangasinan is credible and trustworthy. True, Lanie incurred some
inconsistencies in the process, but this, to this Court, are brought about by lapses in
memory due to the time interval between the abduction and her testimony in court which
in no way detracts from the credibility of the witness. Lanie finds corroboration from the
victim himself, Oliver Caparas. As established, Lanie took care of Oliver during all the
time, from September 11 to September 17, 1996, that the latter was held and kept at the
Bonita Resort in Pangasinan. Lanie, while Oliver was under care, appeared to have
made no effort to hide her identity much less disguised herself. For Oliver, therefore, to
recognize, and identify Lanie, as he did in court, has to be conceded. 31
Sustaining the testimony of dela Cruz, the appellate court held:
In evaluating Lanies testimony, we note that she indeed made inconsistent statements
about the roles of the various particeps criminis. Whether these are memory lapses or
intentional misdeclarations are not easy to tell with absolute certainty. While we have to
consider her whole testimony, our evaluation[,] however[,] necessarily has to focus on
the aspects relating to the accused-appellants. Thus, other inconsistencies (such as
those relating to the role of the deceased Bert) do not need to unduly concern us. The
more important test too in determining whether to generally accept or reject her
testimony lies in its degree of corroboration with the testimonies of witnesses whose
credibility we have accepted, namely, those of Oliver and Pedro.
We find in this examination that Olivers story dovetails with those of Lanie on the
details of the actual kidnapping, the travel to Baguio and from thence to Bonitas Resort,
the detention of Oliver, and his release. x x x 32
As noted by the trial court, there may have been inconsistencies in the narration of dela
Cruz. These, however, were minor details and simply could be attributed to the frailty of

human memory. It cannot be expected that her testimony would be entirely flawless.
Inconsistencies as to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the credibility of
the witnesses nor the veracity or weight of their testimonies. Such minor inconsistencies
may even serve to strengthen their credibility as they negate any suspicion that the
testimonies have been rehearsed.33Moreover, the testimony of dela Cruz coincides with
that of Oliver and Pedro relating to the principal occurrence and the positive
identification of appellants.
Plata insists that dela Cruz harbored a grudge against him because he was apparently
a member of the Armando Rodrigo group, the lone suspect in the murder of Bert
Liwanag, dela Cruzs boyfriend.
Platas effort to impute ill-motive on the part of de la Cruz to falsely testify against him
does not hold water. Even granting that De la Cruz may have an axe to grind is of no
moment. Plata was positively identified by Oliver. His statement was corroborated by
dela Cruz. Motive becomes essential only when the identity of the culprit is in
doubt34 and not when he is positively identified by a credible witness.
The guilt of Fajardo was further established by the testimony of Pedro, who paid the
ransom. Fajardo questions the manner by which he was identified by Pedro. He avers
that he was arrested on the basis of the sworn statement of Lanie dela Cruz and
brought before Mayor Domingo where Pedro Navarro identified him. 35
Yet, in his testimony, Pedro categorically identified Fajardo as the person who received
the ransom money, viz:
Q- When you were already at the highway by the camachile tree, what happened?
A- After two minutes, two persons riding in a motorcycle approached, one of them
alighted, sir.
Q- And when that man got off from the motorcycle, how far is he from you?
A- One lengt[h], sir.
xxxx
Q- At that distance[,] what did the person you described tell [sic] you if any?
A- He uttered the word Pedro.
Q- What did you do when you heard Pedro?
A- I asked him "Ano[?]"
Q- And when he uttered the man Pedro, what did you do?

A- I handed to him the money and [sic] I am carrying, sir.

Q- And it was placed in what?
A- It was wrapped in an El Shaddai handkerchief and placed inside the guess plastic
bag, sir.
Q- At that time when you handed the money, how far was he in relation to you?
A- arm lengt[h] more or less, sir.
Q- At that distance[,] could you describe that said [sic] uttered Pedro and who received
the money from you?
A- Mestiso looking wearing shades, sir.
COURT:
Q- How tall was he?
A- 56 or 55 tall, Your Honor. Wearing maong pants and white t-shirt.
Q- How about the built?
A- Medium, sir.
Q- How about the age?
A- Around 25 to 30, sir.
Q- How about the hair cut?
A- He is wearing a cap, sir.
Q- If that man will be shown to you again[,] would you identify him.
A- Yes, sir.
Q- Will you look around in this Court?
A- Not here, sir.
Q- Do you know where he is now?
A- Confined at the mental hospital, sir.

Q- Why did you know that the person was confined in the mental hospital?
A- Because when was[sic] were summoned by Mayor Domingo to get our statement[,] I
pointed to him as the man to whom I handed over the money, sir.
COURT:
Q- How did you know that he was confined in the mental hospital.
A- I heard it inside this Courtroom that Gerry Fajardo is presently confined in Mental
Hospital, sir.
Q- When you pointed that man in front of Mayor Domingo were you able to know his
name?
A- Yes, sir.
Q- Who told you his name?
A- Mayor himself, sir.
Q- And after you were just to identify that man, what happened next?
A- No more, sir.36
In his sworn affidavit taken before the Office of the Mayor of Malolos, Pedro Navarro
also made the following declaration:
T. Sinabi mo na ikaw ang nag-abot ng ransom money na P1,700,000.00 sa mga
kidnapper nuong ika-17 Setyember 1996 at ang oras ay ika-10:30 ng umaga sa Super
Highway pagitan ng Meycauayan at Marilao, Bulacan, itong umabot [sic] ng pera sa iyo,
makikilala mo ba ito, kung iyong makikita?
S- Opo.
T- Ipinaaalam naming sa iyo mayroon kaming nahuling suspek sa kidnapping na
kasalukuyang nakakulong ditto sa Malolos, Bulacan, ipapakita namin it sa iyo. (Ipinakita
ng imbestigador ang suspek na si Gerry Fajardo na kasalukuyang nakakulong sa
kulungan ng Malolos, Bulacan).
S- Opo, iyan po. (Itinuro ni Pedro Navarro ang suspek na si Gerry Fajardo at kinilala
niya na siyang umabot at kumuha ng pera sa kanywa, nuong ika-17 ng Setyembre
1996.)37
During his cross-examination, Pedro Navarro insisted on the certainty of his
identification as to Fajardo. He explained:

Q- Right after going [sic] the ransom money, have you bothered by reason of your own
initiative to note down the description of the person to whom you gave the money in
order to guide you in making the statements which are already contained in this Exhibit
A?
A- After I handled [sic] the ransom money I committed to my memory the physical
features of the kidnappers and from here.
COURT:
Witness pointing to the portion of his face from the nose up to ears.
Witness:
And every night even his movement[,] I memorize his movement[,] and at night I am
always recall [sic] the feature that I have seen on his person, sir.
xxxx
A- I observe how he walks when I handed him the money, I saw his hands and his
forearm and I even observed the way he uttered the word "Pedro," I saw his lips move,
sir.
xxxx
A- From the time that they arrived on board the motorcycle and from where he came
from I already observed his movements up to the time that he called me "Pedro" and
then I asked him again to mention the name "Pedro" just to make sure that he is the
man to whom I will give the ransom money as directed by the leader of the kidnap gang,
sir.
Q- Now, and that Pedro was uttered by this man while he was facing you and standing,
correct?38
Pedro Navarros identification of Fajardo was positive and unequivocal. The record is
devoid of any showing that Pedro was impelled by ill motive to impute the commission
of a grave crime to Fajardo.
Even dela Cruz confirmed the presence of Fajardo in the kidnapping incident:
A- I saw Amang, Gerry, Roger and Jeffrey pulled Oliver into the car, maam .39
xxxx
Q- What transpired while you were at Bonita Resort?

A- They were able to get a room and they alighted Oliver from the van, maam.
Q- What happened after that?
A- Oliver was brought upstairs to a room, maam.
Q- What happened next?
A- When they were able to bring Oliver inside the room only Roger and Jeffrey was left
at the resort, maam.
xxxx
Q- Why were Roger, Jeffrey and you left behind?
A- I was ordered to care of [sic] the child and while Roger and Jeffrey were took to
stand guard outside the room, maam.
Q- Do you know where Roger and Jeffrey stayed as you said they guarded?
A- Outside the room, maam.
Q- The room occupied by whom?
A- Oliver Caparas was inside the room while Roger and Jeffrey were staying outside
because there is an ante room, maam.40
xxxx
Q- You are mentioning John-John, Amang, Jeffrey, Darius, and Gerry, are there any of
those persons here inside the court room?
A- Yes, maam.
Q- Will you please point to them?
xxxx
Interpreter:
Witness pointing to a man wearing an inmate uniform and when asked his name
answered Feliciano Fajardo, Jr.41
Plata insisted he was not a member of the kidnap for ransom gang. Instead, he
interposed the defense of alibi. He alleged that he was driving his tricycle and servicing
school children between Tibig to San Jose, Bulacan at the time of the incident. 42 Platas

alibi was supported by the testimony of his wife, Gemma Plata, and that of Esther
Guevarra, whose children were brought and fetched by Plata to and from school
everyday at around 6:30 a.m. and 11:30 a.m.43
Platas alibi is patently weak, considering that the alibi is corroborated by his wife, and a
wife is generally perceived to be partial to her husband. Likewise, the testimony of
Esther Guevarra is unavailing. To establish alibi, the accused must not only show that
he was in a place other than the situs of the crime at the time it was committed, such
that it was physically impossible for him to have committed the same. 44 Granting that
Plata had religiously fetched the children of Ester at 11:30 a.m. every weekday, still it is
highly probable for him to have been physically present at the scene of the crime at the
time of the abduction. The distance between Malolos and Bulacan, Bulacan can be
negotiated with a 15-minute ride.45 At all events, appellants alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the kidnap victim himself, who has no motive to falsely testify.46
Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of kidnapping is committed with
the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1) that the offender is a private
individual; (2) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of
his liberty; (3) that the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) that in the
commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) that the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than five (5) days; or (b) that it is committed
simulating public authority; or (c) that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) that the person
kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.47 It is evident from the
testimonies of the witnesses that the essential elements of kidnapping were present.
First, appellants are private individuals. Second, Oliver was abducted by four (4) armed
men. Third, he was detained in a house in Pangasinan against his will. Fourth, the
detention lasted for seven (7) days. Fifth, Oliver Caparas was a minor at the time of the
kidnapping incident.
Under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7659, the imposition of the death penalty is warranted if
the motive of the accused is to exact ransom for the release of the kidnap victim. We
find that the prosecution has sufficiently established this qualifying circumstance. As
testified to by Eleazar, the kidnappers asked for P1.7 million in exchange for Olivers
freedom. In fact, the said amount was handed by Pedro to Fajardo. However, the death
penalty cannot be imposed in view of the passage of R.A. No. 9346, entitled "An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into
law on 24 June 2006. Accordingly, the penalty imposed upon appellants is reduced from
death to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. 48
We affirm the award of actual damages amounting to P1,700,000.00 representing the
amount of ransom money, as well as that of moral damages of P100,000.00,
conformably with jurisprudence.49

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH

MODIFICATION. The penalties on appellants Rey Plata and Feliciano Fajardo, Jr. are
both reduced to reclusion
perpetua, to which they are accordingly sentenced, without eligibility for parole.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARESSANTIAGO
Asscociate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVALGUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Asscociate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Asscociate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, JR.

Asscociate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Asscociate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Asscociate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 137182

April 24, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
ABDILA SILONGAN Y LINANDANG, MACAPAGAL SILONGAN Y LINANDANG,
AKMAD AWAL Y LAGASI, TEDDY SILONGAN, ROLLY LAMALAN Y SAMPOLNAK,
SACARIA ALON Y PAMAALOY, JUMBRAH MANAP Y BANTOLINAY, RAMON
PASAWILAN Y EDO, MAYANGKANG SAGUILE, HADJI KUTANG OMAR, BASCO
SILONGAN, MONGA ALON, OTENG SIILONGAN, BEDDO LAXAMANA, and FIFTYFOUR (54) OTHERS KNOWN ONLY BY THEIR ALIASES, AND OTHER JOHN
DOES, accused,
ABDILA SILONGAN Y LINANDANG, MACAPAGAL SILONGAN Y LINANDANG,
AKMAD AWAL Y LAGASI, ROLLY LAMALAN Y SAMPOLNAK, SACARIA ALON Y
PAMAALOY, JUMBRAH MANAP Y BANTOLINAY, and RAMON PASAWILAN Y
EDO, appellants.
PER CURIAM:
For automatic review is the decision1 dated January 18, 1999, of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 98-75208 convicting appellants
Abdila Silongan, Macapagal Silongan, Akmad Awal, Rolly Lamalan, Sacaria Alon,
Jumbrah Manap, and Ramon Pasawilan of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with
Serious Illegal Detention2 and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of death. The
appellants were also ordered to pay jointly and severally, Alexander Saldaa 3 and
Americo Rejuso, Jr., indemnification damages of P50,000 each and moral damages of
P100,000 and P50,000, respectively.
The amended information,4 under which the appellants have been tried and convicted,
reads as follows:
That on or about 8:30 o'clock in the evening of March 16, 1996, at Sitio
Kamangga, Barangay Laguilayan, Municipality of Isulan, Province of Sultan
Kudarat, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, in the company with other unidentified persons, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and there, willfully,

unlawfully and feloniously kidnap ALEXANDER SALDANA, AMERICO REJUSO,

JR., ERVIN TORMIS and VICTOR CINCO for the purpose of demanding ransom
in the amount of Twelve Million Pesos (P 12,000,000.00), detaining and depriving
Alexander Saldana of his personal liberty up to September 24, 1996.
CONTRARY TO LAW....
x

Upon arraignment,5 all the appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Subsequently,
this Court issued a Resolution6 on December 9, 1997, granting the request of the
Secretary of Justice for a change of venue from the RTC, Branch 19, Isulan, Sultan
Kudarat, to any of the special crimes court of the RTC of Quezon City. The case was
raffled to the RTC, Branch 103, Quezon City, and trial ensued.
The facts established by the prosecution are as follows:
On March 16, 1996, businessman Alexander Saldaa went to Barangay Laguilayan,
Isulan, Sultan Kudarat with Americo7 Rejuso,8 Jr., Ervin Tormis, and Victor Cinco to meet
with a certain Macapagal Silongan alias Commander Lambada. 9 They arrived in the
morning and were able to talk to Macapagal concerning the gold nuggets that were
purportedly being sold by the latter.10 During the meeting Macapagal told them that
someone in his family has just died and that he has to pick up an elder brother in
Cotabato City, hence, they had better transact business in the afternoon. 11
In the afternoon, Alexander's group and Macapagal, with a certain Teddy Silongan and
another person named Oteng12 Silongan, traveled to Cotabato City to fetch Macapagal's
brother.13 Afterwards, the group returned to Isulan on Macapagal's orders. At Isulan,
Macapagal gave additional instructions to wait until dark allegedly because the funeral
arrangements for his relative were not yet finished. 14 When the group finally got on their
way, Macapagal ordered the driver to drive slowly towards the highway.15 Oteng
Silongan and his bodyguards alighted somewhere along the way.
Then around 7:30 p.m., as they headed to the highway, Alexander Saldaa noticed that
Macapagal Silongan was busy talking over his hand-held radio with someone. But
because the conversation was in the Maguindanaoan dialect, he did not understand
what was being said. At 8:30 p.m., they neared the highway. Macapagal ordered the
driver to stop.
Suddenly, 15 armed men appeared. Alexander and his three companions were ordered
to go out of the vehicle, tied up, and blindfolded. Macapagal and Teddy were also tied

up and blindfolded, but nothing more was done to them. 16 Alexander identified the
appellants Oteng Silongan, Akmad Awal, 17 Abdila Silongan alias Long Silongan,18 and
Rolly Lamalan as belonging to the group that abducted them. 19 He also pointed to an
elder brother of Macapagal, alias Keddy, alias Wet, and an alias Ngunib as also
belonging to the group.20
The four victims were taken to a mountain hideout in Maganoy, Maguindanao, where a
certain Salik Karem, Hadji Kutang Omar alias Commander Palito, and Jumbrah Manap
met them.21 Initially, the three demanded fifteen million pesos (P15,000,000) from
Alexander Saldaa for his release, but the amount was eventually reduced to twelve
million pesos after much haggling.22 They made Alexander write a letter to his wife to
pay the ransom. The letter was hand-carried by a certain Armand Jafar, alias Dante,
and two of the victims, Ervin Tormis and Victor Cinco, who both later managed to
escape.23 No ransom was obtained so Commander Palito and Jumbrah Manap sent
other persons and one of the victims, Americo Rejuso, Jr., to renegotiate with
Alexander's wife. No agreement was likewise reached.
Seven days later, Alexander Saldaa and Americo Rejuso, Jr., were transferred to the
town proper of Maganoy. Commander Palito, Jumbrah Manap, Sacaria 24 Alon alias Jack
Moro,25 Ramon Pasawilan,26 guarded them. When the kidnappers learned that the
military was looking for Alexander, they returned to the mountain hideout and stayed
there for two weeks.27
At one time, Alexander Saldaa was made to stay at a river hideout where a certain
Commander Kugta held him and sheltered his abductors for at least a week. 28 There,
Alexander saw Macapagal Silongan with Jumbrah Manap and other armed men. These
men brought Alexander to Talayan where he met Mayangkang Saguile. From Talayan,
Mayangkang and his men brought Alexander to Maitum, Kabuntalan, Maguindanao,
where Mayangkang's lair is located. Mayangkang made Alexander write more letters 29 to
the latter's family. On several occasions, Mayangkang himself would write letters 30 to
Alexander's wife. Alexander personally was detained in Kabuntalan for a total period of
five (5) months and was kept constantly guarded by armed men. Among his guards
were the appellants Macapagal Silongan, Abdila Silongan, Akmad Awal, and a certain
Basco Silongan.31
On September 24, 1996, Mayangkang released Alexander Saldaa to the military in
exchange for a relative who was caught delivering a ransom note to Alexander's family.
However, only eight of the accused were brought to trial, namely, Abdila, Macapagal,
and Teddy, all surnamed Silongan, Akmad Awal, Rolly Lamalan, Sacaria Alon, Jumbrah
Manap, and Ramon Pasawilan.

The prosecution presented Alexander Saldana; his wife, Carmelita Saldaa, and a
certain Major Parallag who was responsible for Alexander's release. Carmelita testified
as to matters relayed to her by Americo Rejuso, Jr., and identified the ransom notes
sent to her. Major Parallag, for his part, testified as to the operations undertaken by the
military to effect the rescue of Alexander.
In their defense, all the accused, except Macapagal and Teddy Silongan, denied ever
having met Alexander Saldaa and his three (3) companions much less having
kidnapped them.32 Additionally, all eight of the accused established that they came
under the control of the government military authorities when they surrendered as Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
rebels.33 They claim they voluntarily surrendered when a certain Perry Gonzales
convinced them that the government would grant them amnesty, pay for their guns, and
give them the items listed in their lists of demands.34
On the witness stand, appellant Macapagal Silongan admitted being with Alexander's
group in the van when they were waylaid. But he denies involvement in the
kidnapping.35 In fact he said when Alexander Saldaa saw him in the mountains, he was
there specifically to beg Mayangkang Saguile to release Alexander. He further claimed
that he was also hogtied by the armed men who blocked the van that evening of March
16, 1996. He testified that he was separated from Teddy Silongan and did not know
what happened to Teddy.36 He admitted knowing Alexander Saldaa for four months
prior to March 16, 1996 because the latter asked for his help in locating a plane that
crashed in the mountains.37 According to him, Alexander Saldaa hired him to act as a
guide in treasure hunting. When asked to give more information about the plane,
Macapagal Silongan stated that he saw it before he met Alexander, and that when he
saw said plane it had no more sidewalls. He added that many people have already seen
the plane and that vines and mosses have grown about the plane because it had been
quite some time since it crashed.38
Appellant Teddy Silongan, for his part, testified that his cousin Macapagal Silongan
contacted him so he could act as interpreter for Macapagal because Alexander could
not speak Maguindanaoan and Macapagal does not understand any other language. He
added that after the van stopped, one of those who stopped the van opened its rear
door and then someone hit him with the butt of a gun rendering him unconscious. When
he regained consciousness he found himself hogtied like Macapagal but could not find
Alexander's group or the van.39
All eight of the accused, except Akmad Awal, admitted having signed separate extrajudicial confessions40admitting to their complicity in the kidnapping of Alexander Saldaa
and his companions, but they asserted that they did not understand what they were

signing.41 Additionally, they assert that they did not know or hire Atty. Plaridel Bohol III,
the lawyer who appears to have assisted them in making their confessions. 42
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment43 on January 18, 1999, the decretal portion of
which reads as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the herein accused:
1. ABDILA SILONGAN y Linandang;
2. MACAPAGAL SILONGAN y Linandang;
3. AKMAD AWAL y Lagasi;
4. ROLLY LAMALAN y Sampolnak;
5. SACARIA ALON y Pamaaloy;
6. JUMBRAH MANAP y Bantolinay; and
7. RAMON PASAWILAN y Edo
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of the crime, herein charged, of
Kidnapping for Ransom as defined by law, and the said seven (7) accused are
hereby sentenced to DEATH as provided for in Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by RA 7659.
On the civil aspect, the above-named seven (7) accused are hereby ordered
jointly and severally to pay Alexander Saldana the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as indemnification damages and One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) as moral damages; and to pay Americo Rejuso, Jr. the sum of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as indemnification damages and Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages.
The accused TEDDY SILONGAN is hereby ACQUITTED of the charge of
Kidnapping for Ransom filed in this case.
Cost against the accused, except Teddy Silongan.
SO ORDERED.

Hence, this automatic review.44 The appellants in their brief allege that the trial court
committed the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PROSECUTION
EVIDENCE HAS ESTABLISHED THE GUILT OF ACCUSED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT DESPITE MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES IN THE
TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES;
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE DEFENSE
PUT UP BY ACCUSED WHICH ARE VALID, CREDIBLE AND IN ACCORDANCE
WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCES.45
Essentially, the issue before this Court is whether the guilt of the appellants has been
proven by credible evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
The appellants assert that the identification of the kidnappers of Alexander Saldaa is
gravely flawed. They contend that Alexander Saldaa and Americo Rejuso,Jr., could not
have positively identified Rolly Lamalan, Akmad Awal, Sacaria Alon, and Abdila
Silongan as their abductors46 because the incident happened at night in a place where
there was no electricity,47 and more importantly, because both of them were hogtied and
blindfolded at the time.
Americo Rejuso, Jr., erroneously pointed to Akmad Awal when asked to identify the
accused Teddy Silongan. Neither did he know the names of Jumbrah Manap and
Ramon Pasawilan.48 Alexander Saldaa, for his part, testified that Mayangkang Saguile
detained him for five months in Kabuntalan, 49 but when asked in open court to point to
Mayangkang Saguile,50 he pointed to someone who was not Mayangkang Saguile. The
appellants claim the real Mayangkang Saguile remains at large.
The appellants also point to inconsistencies in the testimony of Alexander Saldaa who
testified that Teddy and Macapagal Silongan were among the 15 armed persons who
stopped the vehicle and abducted the group 51 after having earlier testified that the two
were inside the van and were unarmed. 52 Also, Alexander testified that they were
abducted around 7:30 p.m. on March 16, 1996, but at pre-trial, the time of the abduction
was stipulated to be around 8:30 p.m. on the same date. 53
The appellants further argue that the fact that they are rebel surrenderees precludes
conviction for the common crime of kidnapping. 54 Citing People v. Hernandez,55 they

contend that common crimes are absorbed in rebellion. Therefore, the trial court erred
when it convicted them of kidnapping for ransom.
Finally, appellants assert that some of them are illiterate and that the trial court should
have accordingly mitigated their liability.
At the outset, we hold that the trial court correctly ruled that the extrajudicial statements
of the appellants are inadmissible in evidence. The assistance afforded by Atty. Plaridel
Bohol is not the assistance contemplated by the fundamental law. Atty. Bohol limited his
assistance "(f)or the purpose of (the) written waiver" as expressly stated by him in all
confessions. It does not appear that he was present and independently and competently
participated in all the investigation proceedings. All the accused, except Teddy Silongan,
are conversant only in the Maguindanaoan dialect and yet the statements were written
in almost perfect Filipino. There is no evidence that the accused, prior to the taking of
the supposed confessions, were made aware of their right to be silent and to have
independent and competent counsel. Neither is there evidence that, as required by Rep.
Act. No. 7438,56the statements were read to and explained to the accused by the
investigating officer.
This notwithstanding, we find there exist sufficient evidence on record to sustain the
conviction of the appellants.
The rule in evidence, which the Court has always applied, is that positive identification
prevails over the simple denial of the accused. Denial, like alibi, is an insipid and weak
defense, being easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. A positive identification of the
accused, when categorical, consistent and straightforward, and without any showing of
ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over this
defense.57
The conditions which purportedly created serious doubt on the ability of prosecution
witnesses Alexander Saldaa and Americo Rejuso, Jr., to identify positively their
abductors did not perdure throughout the duration of their captivity. The records bear out
that Alexander and Americo both had a number of opportunities to see the faces of the
appellants. They were transferred from one lair to another without blindfolds and often in
broad daylight. These improved circumstances necessarily permitted both Alexander
and Americo to see the faces of the appellants. Moreover, it must be remembered that
Alexander was detained for six months. During this period, Alexander saw them, ate
with them, and actually lived with them. Appellants Akmad Awal and Ramon Pasawilan
have both acted as guards to Alexander many times: Akmad in Kabuntalan 58 and
Ramon in the mountain hideout of Maganoy59 as well as when Alexander was
transferred to the hideout in the town proper of Maganoy.60 For their part, the appellants

Jumbrah Manap, Abdila Silongan, and Sacaria Alon guarded Alexander both in the
mountain hideout of Maganoy and in Kabuntalan. 61 These instances, among many
others, gave Alexander ample time to see and imprint their faces in his memory. We
likewise note that as borne by the records, the kidnappers made little or no attempt to
conceal their identities. In fact, they even told Alexander their names when he asked for
them.62 The positive identification Alexander and Americo made in open court 63 thus
deserves much weight. We have held in People v. Bacungay,64 that "it is the most
natural reaction for victims of crimes to strive to remember the faces of their assailants
and the manner in which they committed the crime."
That prosecution witness Americo Rejuso, Jr., does not know the names of the
abductors is not sufficient to cast doubt on his testimony. It is not necessary that the
name of an accused be specifically stated by a witness in an affidavit or in his testimony.
Victims of crimes cannot always identify their assailants by name. It is imperative,
however, that the attacker be pointed out and unequivocally identified during the trial in
court as the same person who committed the crime.65 We hold that this imperative
requirement has been met as to all appellants.
Moreover, not only are the testimonies of Alexander Saldaa and Americo Rejuso, Jr.,
consistent in all material aspects, they are also replete with precise details of the crime
and the specific involvements of the different accused therein. In more than one
instance, Alexander has identified the appellants to be his kidnappers. He has
recounted both on the witness stand as well as in his sworn statement the specific acts
performed by the appellants. The records of this case reflect that in more than one
instance, the appellants have acted together as guards to Alexander in Kabuntalan,
Maganoy, and while he was being transferred from one lair to another.66There can be no
question, therefore, that the appellants committed the crime. Absent any showing that
the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied any fact or circumstance of
weight and influence which could affect the outcome of the case, the factual findings
and assessment of credibility of a witness made by the trial court remain binding on the
appellate tribunal.67
The records are bereft of any evidence that Alexander Saldaa entertained any
particular or specific prejudice against the appellants especially because there were 68
accused in this case. The trial court correctly opined that it was quite strange that
Alexander would point to the appellants as the perpetrators of the crime if it were true
that all of them, except Macapagal and Teddy, do not know or have not even met
Alexander. Indeed, it was in Alexander's best interest to implicate only those people who
were responsible for abducting him. He has nothing to gain by implicating and testifying
against persons innocent of the crime. In People v. Garalde,68 this Court ruled that when
there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why a prosecution

witness would testify falsely against an accused or falsely implicate him in a heinous
crime, the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.
The essence of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined and
penalized in Article 26769 of the Revised Penal Code is the actual deprivation of the
victim's liberty coupled with proof beyond reasonable doubt of an intent of the accused
to effect the same. It is thus essential that the following be established by the
prosecution: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or
in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or
kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the four
circumstances enumerated in Article 267 be present. 70 But if the kidnapping was done
for the purpose of extorting ransom, the fourth element is no longer necessary.71
There is no mistaking the clear, overwhelming evidence that the appellants abducted
Alexander Saldaa and his companions at gunpoint and deprived them of their freedom.
That the appellants took shifts guarding the victims until only Alexander was left to be
guarded and in transferring Alexander from one hideout to another to prevent him from
being rescued by the military establish that they acted in concert in executing their
common criminal design.
Macapagal's participation is clearly evident from the records. Aside from being one of
Alexander's armed guards in Kabuntalan,72 and having been part of a party which
brought Alexander from the river hideout of Commander Kugta to Mayangkang
Saguile's lair in Talayan,73 indirect evidence also support Macapagal's participation in the
criminal design. First, Macapagal made several postponements of their trip on March
16, 1996 until it was already 7:30 in the evening. His reason that someone in his family
died is not corroborated at all. Teddy, his cousin, never mentioned it, and his other
relative, co-accused Abdila Silongan, was reticent about it. In fact, nobody told the trial
court the name of the deceased relative. Secondly, Americo testified that when they
stopped over at Macapagal's house, he heard the wife of Macapagal utter the words
"kawawa naman sila" as they were leaving.74 Thirdly, it was established that Macapagal
ordered the driver to proceed slowly towards the highway. During this time, he was busy
talking on his handheld radio with someone and the victims heard him say "ok." When
they were near the highway, he ordered the driver to stop whereupon 15 armed men
appeared and blocked their vehicle. Finally,while the 15 men took away Alexander
Saldaa and his three companions, nothing was done to Macapagal or to Teddy
Silongan. By their own admission, they were just left behind after being hogtied. How
they managed to escape was not explained. All these taken together give rise to the
reasonable inference that Macapagal had concocted the funeral for a supposed recently
deceased relative purposely to afford his co-conspirators time to stage the kidnapping.

Then, also, it was through Macapagal's indispensable contribution that the armed men
were able to stop the vehicle at a precise location near the highway.
Likewise, the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the kidnapping
was committed "for the purpose of extorting ransom" from Alexander, as to warrant the
mandatory imposition of the death penalty. For the crime to be committed, at least one
overt act of demanding ransom must be made. It is not necessary that there be actual
payment of ransom because what the law requires is merely the existence of the
purpose of demanding ransom. In this case, the records are replete with instances
when the kidnappers demanded ransom from the victim. At the mountain hideout in
Maganoy where Alexander was first taken, he was made to write a letter to his wife
asking her to pay the ransom of twelve million pesos. Among those who demanded
ransom were the appellants Ramon Pasawilan, 75 Sacaria Alon,76 and Jumbrah
Manap.77 Then, when Alexander was in the custody of Mayangkang Saguile, not only
was he made to write more letters to his family, Mayangkang himself wrote ransom
notes. In those letters, Mayangkang even threatened to kill Alexander if the ransom was
not paid.
As regards the argument that the crime was politically motivated and that consequently,
the charge should have been rebellion and not kidnapping, we find the same likewise to
be without merit. As held in Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte
vs. CA,78 the political motivation for the crime must be shown in order to justify finding
the crime committed to be rebellion. Merely because it is alleged that appellants were
members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front or of the Moro National Liberation Front
does not necessarily mean that the crime of kidnapping was committed in furtherance of
a rebellion. Here, the evidence adduced is insufficient for a finding that the crime
committed was politically motivated. Neither have the appellants sufficiently proven their
allegation that the present case was filed against them because they are rebel
surrenderees. This court has invariably viewed the defense of frame-up with disfavor.
Like the defense of alibi, it can be just as easily concocted.
Finally, that appellants Jumbrah Manap, Abdila Silongan, Rolly Lamalan, Sacaria Alon,
and Macapagal Silongan are illiterate is not sufficient to lower the penalty. Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code is specific. It states that "(i)n all cases in which the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the
deed." Hence, while illiteracy is generally mitigating in all crimes, such circumstance,
even if present, cannot result in a reduction of the penalty in this case.

Considering that it has been proven beyond reasonable doubt that the abduction of
Alexander Saldaa, Americo Rejuso, Jr., Ervin Tormis, and Victor Cinco were for the
purpose of extorting ransom, the trial court correctly imposed the death penalty.
As already stated, the trial court ordered the appellants to pay, jointly and severally,
Alexander Saldaa and Americo Rejuso, Jr., indemnification damages of P50,000 each
and moral damages of P100,000 and P50,000, respectively. However, to be entitled to
actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable
degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available
to the injured party.79 There is no evidence adduced before the trial court as to actual
damages suffered by either Alexander or Americo. Hence, we are constrained to delete
the award. This notwithstanding, under Article 2221 80 of the New Civil Code, nominal
damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated by
the defendant, may be vindicated by him. Conformably, the Court rules that both
Alexander and Americo shall be awarded P50,000 each as nominal damages. 81
We affirm the award of P100,000 to Alexander and P50,000 to Americo as moral
damages. The amount of moral anxiety suffered by the two victims is in no wise the
same. Undoubtedly, Alexander's family had undergone greater distress in the
uncertainty of seeing Alexander again.
Three Justices of the Court maintain their position that R.A. No. 7659 is unconstitutional
insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the
majority that the law is constitutional, and that the death penalty can be lawfully
imposed in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103,
convicting the appellants ABDILA SILONGAN, MACAPAGAL SILONGAN, AKMAD
AWAL, ROLLY LAMALAN, SACARIA ALON, JUMBRAH MANAP, and RAMON
PASAWILAN of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Serious Illegal Detention and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of DEATH is AFFIRMED. Further, the appellants
are ORDERED to pay, jointly and severally, Alexander Saldaa and Americo Rejuso, Jr.,
nominal damages of P50,000.00 each and moral damages of P100,000.00 and
P50,000.00, respectively.
In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded, upon finality of this
decision, to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.SO
ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and
Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 123779

April 17, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RUBEN SURIAGA y CHAVEZ, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
It is always a distressing task to impose the death penalty on an accused. However, it is
the bounden duty of this Court to apply the law imposing such penalty when
justified. Dura lex, sed lex.
On February 22, 1995, an Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Branch 78, Quezon City, charging Ruben Suriaga, Rosita Dela Cruz and Joel Isidera
with kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention committed as follows:
"That on or about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of January 22, 1995, in Quezon
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
RUBEN SURIAGA and ROSITA DELA CRUZ, being private individuals,
conspiring together, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and take away NICOLE
RAMOS, a 2-year old female child, without the consent of her parents, for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the latter, and immediately thereafter, the said
accused still conspiring together, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously detain her and
deprive her of her freedom and liberty up to and until about 4:30 oclock in the
afternoon of the following day.
"That accused JOEL ISIDERA, having learned of the kidnapping and without
having participated therein either as principal or accomplice, take part
subsequent to its commission by assisting the principal accused, RUBEN
SURIAGA and ROSITA DELA CRUZ, to profit by the effects of the crime by
accompanying and driving for accused RUBEN SURIAGA to the place where the
pay-off was made and receiving the ransom money in the amount of
P100,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the parents of NICOLE RAMOS,

spouses Johnny and Mercedita Ramos in the said amount and such other
amounts as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
No bail was recommended for Ruben Suriaga.
During the scheduled arraignment and pre-trial conference on March 8, 1995, accused
Suriaga, through his counsel de parte manifested that he was willing to enter a plea of
guilty to the offense charged provided that the penalty to be imposed is reclusion
perpetua.
Upon arraignment, however, Suriaga and his co-accused entered a plea of "Not guilty."
The relevant facts established by the prosecution are:
On January 22, 1995, at around 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, Edwin Ramos, a
prosecution witness, was cleaning the car of his older brother, Johnny Ramos at
Sangangdaan, Caloocan City. The latter was taking care of his 2-year old daughter,
Nicole, who was then playing inside the car.1
Suriaga, a cousin of the Ramos brothers, arrived. He was accompanied by his live-inpartner and co-accused Rosita dela Cruz.2 Suriaga requested Edwin if he could drive
the car, but the latter declined, saying he did not have the keys. 3 Meanwhile, Johnny
returned to his house because a visitor arrived. At this instance, Rosita held Nicole and
cajoled her. Rosita asked Edwin if she could take Nicole with her to buy barbeque at
Monumento, Caloocan City. Having been acquainted with Rosita for a long time and
because he trusted her, Edwin acceded. When Rosita and the child left, Suriaga joined
them.4
But after the lapse of more than one hour, they failed to return. Worried, Edwin rushed
inside the house and after being told by Johnny that Nicole has not yet arrived, he
(Edwin) searched for her at the Sangangdaan Market, Caloocan City, but there was no
trace of the child, nor of her companions.5
At the same time, Johnny and his wife, Mercedita, began their search in the entire
vicinity of their barangay.6Then they proceeded to Ever Gotesco along Commonwealth
Avenue, Quezon City, but they could not find their daughter and Rosita.
1wphi1.nt

At the Ramos residence, Nicoles grandfather received a phone call asking for ransom
in the amount ofP100,000.00. He recognized that the caller was Suriaga.

When Johnny came to know of such telephone call, he immediately reported it to the
PACC Task Force Habagat in Camp Crame, Quezon City. It was 11:30 in the evening of
January 22, 1995.7
The next day, January 23, at around 7:00 oclock in the morning, Suriaga called
Mercedita, introduced himself and asked her if she and her husband would give the
amount. She gave a positive answer and said, "kahit ipangutang namin." 8 Suriaga
warned her that if she will not deliver the money, her daughter would be placed in a
plastic bag or thrown in a garbage can.9
Thereafter, the Task Force Habagat gave Mercedita instructions on the delivery of the
ransom money. The pay-off site would be in front of the Fairview General Hospital,
Quezon City on that same day, January 23, 1995.
Meantime, surveillance teams from PACC were being organized to rescue Nicole and to
apprehend the suspects.10
At 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, also of that same day, Mercedita, with the cash money,
and while being tailed by the PACC agents, proceeded in a jeepney to the Fairview
General Hospital. She reached the place at around 4:35 oclock in the afternoon and
waited for Suriaga. At around 5:00, Suriaga, accompanied by Joel Isidera, arrived. Then
the three of them boarded a jeepney and disembarked on Regalado Street. It was then
that Suriaga asked Mercedita for the money. Since Joel Isidera was beside her,
Mercedita gave him the money. Subsequently, they boarded a tricycle. After travelling a
short distance, the PACC agents suddenly appeared and arrested Suriaga and Isidera.
Prior thereto, Inspector Jose Duenas Team was able to rescue Nicole in a shanty where
Rositas sister lived located at the NAWASA Squatters Area, Ideal Subdivision, Quezon
City.11 Upon being informed thereof, Mercedita and the PACC agents proceeded to that
place.
Forthwith, the ransom money was properly recovered and returned to spouses Johnny
and Mercedita Ramos. It was photocopied for identification purposes. 12 At the same
time, accused Suriaga, Rosita dela Cruz and Joel Isidera were investigated at the
PACC Headquarters, Camp Crame, Quezon City.
On February 15, 1995, an Information for kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal
detention was filed against Ruben Suriaga and Rosita dela Cruz, as principal, and Joel
Isidera, as accessory.

In his defense, accused Suriaga denied the charges. He claimed that on January 22,
1995, he only "borrowed" Nicole for a stroll with Rosita Dela Cruz along Monumento.
After thirty minutes, Suriaga decided to go to Rositas house to get something. Since the
traffic was heavy, he did not return the child but instead called her grandfather.13 They
slept at Rositas house, the accused being convinced that Nicoles parents would not
worry because he always took care of the child.
The next day, at around 3:00 oclock in the morning, before Suriaga left for B.F. Quezon
City to butcher a pig, he instructed Rosita to call Nicoles parents and inform them that
the child would be returned in the afternoon. When he came back the following day,
January 24, at 10:00 in the morning, Rosita informed him that they have been charged
with the police headquarters for kidnapping Nicole. Forthwith, he immediately called his
uncle (the childs grandfather) denying the imputation, promising he would return her
immediately. His uncle told him that since Mercedita would go to Fairview General
Hospital that afternoon, it would be best if they would just meet there. But he was not
able to bring Nicole to the place because the child was then sleeping.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment finding Suriaga guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of kidnapping for ransom as charged, while acquitting the other accused, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Ruben Suriaga GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom defined and penalized
under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH. For failure of the
prosecution to prove the guilt of accused Rosita Dela Cruz and Joel Isidera
beyond reasonable doubt, they are hereby ACQUITTED. Accused Rosita Dela
Cruz may now be released from detention unless she is being held for some
other legal cause.
"SO ORDERED."
In his appeal, Suriaga attributes to the trial court the following errors:
"I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES.
"II

THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION DESPITE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT."14
which shall be discussed jointly being interrelated.
Appellant laments that he was convicted despite the infirmity of the prosecutions
evidence. He points out that the testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses did not
inspire belief, stressing that if Nicole Ramos was indeed kidnapped for ransom, her
parents should not have delayed the payment of the ransom money until late in the
afternoon of January 23, 1995, the day agreed upon. Their reaction was contrary to
normal human behavior. Moreover, Merceditas claim that she and her husband were
still raising the amount contradicts the latters testimony that they had the money at that
time, having recently sold a lot in GAO, Quezon City.15
Appellants contention obviously lacks merit.
A review of the records shows that the prosecution was able to establish by its
evidence, absent any scintilla of doubt, that appellant is guilty, as charged.
Mercedita Ramos, Nicoles mother, narrated how appellant committed the crime, thus:
"6. TANONG: Maari mo na bang sabihin mo ngayon sa akin ang buot tunay na
pangyayari hinggil sa pagkakadukot sa iyong anak na si Nicole Ramos?
6. 10 SAGOT: Noong ika-22 ng Enero 1995 sa ganap na oras humigit kumulang
sa mga alas 5:00 o 5:30 ng hapon habang ako ay nasa aming bahay aking
nakita na pumunta ang kapatid ng aking asawa at tinanong sa akin ang bata
kung nakita ko. At sabi ko naman sa kanya "hindi ba ikaw yon ang kasama ng
bata," at ang sagot naman niya sa akin na kinuha daw ni Rosita at Ruben para
isama na ibibili ng barbeque. At hinanap namin kasama ang aking asawa sa
buong barangay, at nang hindi namin makita naghintay pa rin po kami sa Ever
Gotesco Commonwealth Avenue kong saan aming tinanong kung nasan nakatira
sa Rosita. Nang wala kaming makuha na impormasyon tumawag po kami sa
bahay kung saan nalaman namin na ipinatubos sa halagang ISANG DAANG
LIBONG PESO (P100,000.00) upang maibalik ang aking anak.
xxx

11. TANONG: Noong ikaw ay umuwi sa inyong bahay at ang iyo namang asawa
ay tumuloy sa PACC Task Force Habagat, ano naman ang mga sumusunod na
pangyayari habang ikaw ay nasa inyong bahay?
1. SAGOT: Hinintay ko po ang muling pagtawag noon kumidnap sa aking anak
nang walang tumawag ay hinintay ko na lang ang pag-uwi ng aking asawa at
doon nalaman ko na siya ay nakipag-coordinate sa PACC Task Force Habagat.
At kinabukasan ng umaga ng ika-23 ng Enero 1995 sa mga oras ng bandang
alas 7:00 o 7:30 ng umaga humigit kumulang ay muling tumawag si Ruben at
tinanong sa akin kung magkano ang hinihingi ni JHUN na pantubos sa bata. At
sinagot ko sa halagang ISANG DAANG LIBONG PISO (P100,000.00). At sinabi
ko sa kanya, "Oo, magbibigay kami kahit ipangutang namin basta lang matubos
ang aming anak," at pagkatapos noon ay binaba na ang telepono." 16
ON DIRECT EXAMINATION
"Q:
In the same Affidavit, in answer to Question No. 11, you testified and I
quote: "At kinabukasan ng umaga ng ika-23 ng Enero 1995 sa mga oras na
bandang alas 7:00 o 7:30 ng umaga humigit kumulang ay muling tumawag sa
aming bahay at hinanap ako at aking nakausap si Ruben." My question is how
did you know that the person who called you between 7:00 and 7:30 in the
morning was Ruben?
A:

He introduced himself, Sir.

Q:

And by Ruben you are referring to the accused, Ruben Suriaga?

A:

Yes, sir.17

ON CROSS EXAMINATION
"Atty. Mijares: You said you also received the 4th call. What time was the same
made?
A:

Around 11:30, sir.

Q:

And who was on the other end of the line?

A:

Again Rosita, sir.

Q:

And what was the conversation between you and Rosita?

A:
That the money should be brought there immediately otherwise they will
put the child in a plastic bag, sir.
Q:
You also mentioned that you received the 5th call. When was the same
made?
A:

Around 1:00 oclock, sir.

Q:

And who was on the other end of the line?

A:

Ruben Suriaga, sir.

Q:

And what was the conversation between you and Ruben Suriaga?

A:
He asked me if we could bring the money to them, and I said we could,
except that my husband is not yet home and so I begged him to give me more
time until 3:00 oclock to be able to deliver the money, sir.
Q:
Let me get this straight. You asked for time to deliver the money because
your husband was not around at the time, right? But the money was only with
you?
A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

And you asked for time up to 3:00 oclock?

A:

Yes, sir.18

Appellant argues that if Nicoles parents really believed that he kidnapped their child
and that her life was in danger, they should have delivered to him the ransom money at
an earlier time, i.e., in the morning of January 23, 1995 (the day after the child was
kidnapped), and not in the afternoon. We agree with the Solicitor General that such an
argument is merely an attempt to deviate from the main issue on why Nicole, who was
just two years old, stayed with him overnight without any permission from her
parents.19 Even if appellant is Nicoles uncle, he should have brought her back to her
parents whose house is just a few steps away, or inform the latter that she was
spending the night with them, rather than kept her indefinitely. Besides, Mercedita
testified that she and her husband would still raise the amount, even to the extent of
securing a loan. But what demolished appellants posture is the indisputable fact that he
called the Ramoses asking for ransom. He even met with Mercedita to claim the same.

Thus, we state anew, what this Court said in a long line of cases, that the trial courts
determination on the issue of the credibility of witnesses and its consequent findings of
fact must be given great weight and respect in appeal, unless certain facts of substance
and value have been overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case.20 This is so because of the judicial experience that the trial courts are in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. It can thus more easily detect
whether a witness is telling the truth or not. 21
Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, or that the
judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves high
respect by the appellate courts.22 The exceptions being absent in this case, this Court is
not disposed to disturb the findings of the trial court.
The chain of events as narrated by the prosecutions witnesses could only lead to the
conclusion that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom, a
continuing crime, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act 7659, thus:
"Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who
shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty,
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
1wphi1.nt

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the

accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.
"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person, even if none of he circumstances above-mentioned were present in
the commission of the offense.
"When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped,
or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed." (Emphasis supplied)

The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty,
coupled with indubitable proof of the accuseds intent to effect the same. 23 And if the
person detained is a child, the question that needs to be addressed is whether there is
evidence to show that in taking the child, there was deprivation of the childs liberty and
that it was the intention of the accused to deprive the mother of the childs custody.24
Undoubtedly, the elements of kidnapping for ransom have been sufficiently established
by the prosecution considering the following circumstances: 1) appellant, a private
individual, took the young Nicole without personally seeking permission from her
father; 2) appellant took the girl and brought her to a shanty where Rositas sister lived,
located at the NAWASA Squatters Area, Ideal Subdivision, Quezon City, without
informing her parents of their whereabouts; 3) he detained the child and deprived her of
her liberty by failing to return her to her parents overnight and the following day;
and 4) he demanded a ransom of P100,000.00 through telephone calls and gave
instructions where and how it should be delivered.
Under the above provision, the imposition of the death penalty is mandatory if the victim
is a minor. In this case, the minority of Nicole Ramos was alleged in the Information and
was never disputed.25 Even assuming that the minority was not proved, still under the
law, the imposition of the death penalty is mandatory where, as here, the kidnapping
was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victims parents or any
other person.26 It bears emphasis that the minority of the victim and appellants demand
for ransom, both specifically alleged in the Information, were clearly established by the
evidence for the prosecution free from any scintilla of doubt. 27 We thus sustain the
appealed decision convicting the appellant and imposing upon him the supreme penalty
of death.
Three (3) members of the court, although maintaining their adherence to the separate
opinions expressed in People vs. Echegaray that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes
the penalty of death is unconstitutional, nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority
that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the trial court convicting RUBEN SURIAGA of
the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentencing him to suffer the DEATH penalty is
hereby AFFIRMED.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of
R.A. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forwarded to
her Excellency, the President of the Philippines, for the possible exercise of her
pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., YnaresSantiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., on official leave.
Corona, J., no part - did not participate in the deliberation.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179570

February 4, 2010

EGAP MADSALI, SAJIRON LAJIM and MARON LAJIM, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00475, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan, Puerto
Princesa City, Branch 50, finding accused Sajiron Lajim and Maron Lajim 2 guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of abduction with rape in Criminal Case No. 12281 and
finding accused Egap Madsali and Sajiron Lajim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of serious illegal detention in Criminal Case No. 12309.
In view of our decision in People v. Cabalquinto, 3 the real name and identity of the rape
victim, as well as the members of her immediate family, are withheld. In this regard, the
rape victim is herein referred to as AAA; her mother, BBB; and her father, CCC.
In Criminal Case No. 12281, Sajiron Lajim (Sajiron) and Maron Lajim (Maron) were
charged with the crime of abduction with rape in an Information 4 dated March 17, 1995,
which reads:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1994, in Barangay Malitub, Municipality of
Bataraza, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating together and helping one
another and by means of force, threat, violence and intimidation, while armed with a
bladed weapon known as "Badong", did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take and carry away one AAA, a girl of 16 years of age, against her will and
consent and brought to the forest and on the occasion thereof the said accused by
means of force, threat, violence and intimidation, and while armed with a knife, accused
Sahiron Lajim, with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with said AAA, against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
That on the occasion of the said Rape, accused Maron Lajim helped Sahiron Lajim by
acting as look-out during the commission of the said crime.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. 12309, Egap Madsali (Egap) and Sajiron Lajim (Sajiron) were
charged with the crime of serious illegal detention in an Amended Information 5 dated
August 28, 1995, which reads:
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1994 in the morning up to December 15, 1994, at
Barangay Malitub, Municipality of Bataraza, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with the use of force, violence
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and detain
AAA, an unmarried woman under 15 years of age in the house of Egap Madsali thereby
depriving said AAA of her liberty all against her will and as a result of that illegal
detention, said AAA was not able to go home to her mother for a period of more than
five (5) months.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon motion of the private prosecutor and with the conformity of the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office, Criminal Case No. 12309 was consolidated with Criminal Case No.
12281, pending before the RTC of Palawan, Puerto Princesa City, Branch 50.
Sajiron was arraigned on April 21, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 12281 and on September
21, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 12309. He pleaded not guilty to both charges. Egap was
arrested and, thereafter, arraigned on March 8, 1996. He pleaded not guilty in Criminal
Case No. 12309. Maron was arrested and, later, arraigned on March 11, 1996. He
pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case No. 12281. A joint trial ensued. However, in July
1996, Egap escaped while under the custody of prison guards.
The evidence presented by the prosecution are as follows:
On July 1, 1994, around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, fifteen-year-old AAA and her aunt
Inon Dama were fetching water in a cave in Barangay (Brgy.) Malitub, Bataraza,
Palawan. Suddenly, Sajiron arrived, running towards them and carrying
a badong (bolo). They tried to run away, but Sajiron overtook them. He held the hair of
AAA and told her, "Sara, you go with me. If you will not go with me, I will kill you." Inon
Dama came to AAA's rescue, but Sajiron tried to hack her. Luckily, she was able to
shield herself with a plastic container. AAA was crying while she held her aunt's hand.
Sajiron then drew his gun, which was tucked in his waist, pointed it at Inon Dama and
said, "If you will not go, I will shoot you." Inon Dama went home and reported the
incident to AAA's mother. When Inon Dama left the place, Maron, Sajiron's father,
suddenly appeared with a gun and told AAA to come with them. When AAA refused,
Sajiron and Maron tied her hands behind her back, covered her mouth with a piece of
cloth, and brought her to the forest. There, AAA was untied and undressed, leaving only
her bra on. While Sajiron was undressing AAA, she pleaded with him not to abuse her,
but Sajiron told her that if she would submit to his desire, her life would be spared.

Sajiron held her breast, touched her private parts and inserted his sex organ inside her
vagina. AAA resisted, but to no avail. She felt pain and she noticed blood on her private
parts. She was sexually abused three times on the ground, where she was made to lie
down on a bed of leaves. During the entire time that AAA was being abused by Sajiron,
Maron stood guard and watched them. They left the forest at around 10:00 o'clock in the
morning of the following day and brought AAA to the house of Egap, where she was
detained in a room. Sajiron instructed Egap to guard AAA and to shoot her if she would
attempt to escape.
On July 2, 1994, AAAs mother came to get AAA, but Egap refused and threatened to kill
her daughter if she would report the matter to the authorities. Out of fear of losing her
daughter, she went home and did not report the incident to the police authorities. 6 Egap
asked AAA if she wanted to marry Sajiron, but she refused. AAA was then forced to sign
an unknown document, which she was not able to read.
Nine days after the abduction, or on July 11, 1994, upon instruction of Egap, AAA and
Sajiron were married by Imam Musli Muhammad. The marriage was solemnized against
AAA's will and without the presence of her parents. After the marriage, AAA and Sajiron
lived in the house of Egap, together with the latter's wife, children and mother-in-law.
AAA stayed in one room with Sajiron. While detained, AAA did not try to escape,
because her house was very far from the place where she was held captive, and her
captors threatened to kill her and her family if she would attempt to escape. During her
detention, Sajiron abused her twice every night. She was free to roam within the vicinity
of the house but she was usually accompanied by Egap's wife who served as her guard.
She was also guarded and threatened by Egap's sons. She got pregnant after some
time.
On November 24, 1994, BBB and Inon Dama went to Puerto Princesa City to report
AAA's abduction to the proper authorities. AAA was detained at the house of Egap from
July 2, 1994 until December 15, 1994. On December 16, 1994, Sajiron and Egap were
arrested by the police.
The defense, on the other hand, denied having committed the crimes charged. Sajiron
claimed that he and AAA were engaged for three years prior to their elopement. During
the period of their engagement, Sajiron lived with AAA in her mother's house. AAA
married Sajiron voluntarily and out of her own free will. The sexual intercourse between
AAA and Sajiron was consensual. The defense further claimed that AAA merely filed
criminal charges against Sajiron because he did not pay the dowry (dower) in the
amount of P10,000.00 to AAA's parents. Sajiron asserted that he did not pay the dowry
because he had already rendered services to AAA's family for about three years prior to
his marriage with AAA. After the marriage, Sajiron and AAA were brought by the latter's
father to his house in Balabac, Palawan. They stayed there for about four months. Then
they went to Brgy. Malitub, Bataraza, Palawan and stayed at the house of Egap for
about two weeks. Sajiron was thereafter arrested by the authorities. He only learned
that a case for abduction with rape was filed against him by AAA when he was being
interrogated by the Bataraza Police.

On July 25, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision 7 finding Sajiron and Maron guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of abduction with rape. Egap and Sajiron were
also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious illegal detention. The
dispositive portion of the Decision is as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, to suffer imprisonment as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 12281, the accused Sa[j]iron Lajim and Maron Lajim are
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or forty (years) and
each of the accused are ordered to indemnify the complainant AAA the same
amount of P50,000.00 as and for civil indemnity;
2. In Criminal Case No. 12309, the accused Egap Madsali and Sa[j]iron Lajim are
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and both accused
are ordered to separately indemnify the complainant AAA the amount
of P50,000.00 as and for civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal, and the records of the case were forwarded to this
Court. However, pursuant to this Courts ruling in People v. Mateo, 8 the case was
transferred to the CA. The CA rendered a Decision dated July 31, 2007 affirming the
decision of the trial court in Criminal Case Nos. 12281 and 12309.
Hence, this petition assigning the following errors:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING THE IMPLICATION
OF THE 5-MONTH INACTION BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S MOTHER IN
REPORTING THE ALLEGED ADBUCTION AND ILLEGAL DETENTION OF HER
DAUGHTER; AND
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING THE UNREBUTTED
TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S OWN FATHER.
With respect to the first assigned error, petitioners allege that the five-month inaction of
BBB through his failure to report the alleged abduction and illegal detention of her
daughter is totally inconsistent with AAA's claim that she was abducted and illegally
detained.
We are not persuaded.
Delay in reporting an incident of rape due to death threats does not affect the credibility
of the complainant, nor can it be taken against her. The charge of rape is rendered
doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained. 9 BBB explained that she

did not immediately report the abduction, rape and detention of her daughter to the
authorities, because Egap threatened to kill AAA, 10 who was then in his custody.
Further, BBB testified that, on another occasion, Egap threatened to kill her if she dared
to report the matter to the authorities. True enough, when Egap learned that she did
what he forbade her to do, he made good his threat and shot her at the back. 11 Thus,
BBB's delay in reporting the incident for five months should not be taken against her.
Anent the second assignment of error, petitioners argue that the unrebutted testimonies
of CCC and Imam Musli Muhammad cast a reasonable doubt on the charge against
them. CCC testified that Sajiron courted his daughter and proposed marriage after their
three-year courtship. He claimed that he gave his consent to the marriage of his
daughter to Sajiron. Prior to the marriage, CCC said that he was even able to talk to his
daughter and his wife, and both were amenable to the marriage. AAA never mentioned
to him anything about having been kidnapped or raped. Neither did his wife tell him of
their daughter's alleged harrowing experience. He and his wife were present during the
marriage celebration.
Again, the testimony of CCC fails to persuade Us. AAA testified that she had never seen
her father since she was a child, as her father had abandoned them. 12 BBB testified that
she and her husband had been separated for a long time, and she did not know his
whereabouts. She further said that CCC left their place in March 1983 to go to Malaysia,
and that was the last time she saw him.13 CCC's allegation that his wife was present
during the marriage celebration was also controverted by the testimonies of AAA, her
mother, and Imam Musli Muhammad. Thus, save for CCC's self-serving allegations, he
could not muster any sufficient evidence to beef up those allegations. It is also very
surprising that CCC, after his long absence, suddenly appeared and testified for the
defense. CCC would like to impress upon this Court that he has maintained constant
communication with his family; however, no single witness was presented to corroborate
this claim.
Furthermore, CCC, in his Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay14 dated December 28, 1995,
alleged that in 1991, his wife wrote and informed him that Sajiron asked for their
daughter's hand in marriage. CCC replied that he was giving his permission for their
daughter to marry. In the same salaysay, he also said that Egap wrote him a letter on
July 4, 1994 and instructed him to proceed to Malitub, Bataraza to discuss the intended
marriage of AAA and Sajiron. However, records are bereft of proof of the existence of
these letters. Clearly, these allegations, being unsupported by evidence, are self-serving
and cannot be given any probative value.
Moreover, Imam Musli Mohammad, while testifying as prosecution witness, attested that
the parents of AAA and Sajiron were not present during the marriage, 15 thus
controverting CCC's allegation that he was present and gave consent to the marriage.
Although Imam Musli Muhammad, when presented as an accused witness, recanted his
earlier testimony that CCC was not present at the wedding, the same cannot be given
credit. Recantations are frowned upon by the courts. A recantation of a testimony is

exceedingly unreliable, for there is always the probability that such recantation may later
on be itself repudiated. Courts look with disfavor upon retractions, because they can
easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary considerations.
Hence, a retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration. They are
generally unreliable and looked upon with considerable disfavor by the
courts.16 Moreover, it would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a
court of justice, simply because the witness who has given it later on changes his mind
for one reason or another.17
As to the defense of denial, the same is inherently weak. Denial is a self-serving
negative evidence, which cannot be given greater weight than that of the declaration of
a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters. Like alibi, denial is an inherently
weak defense, which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of
prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any ill motive to testify against
petitioner.18
The assertion of the accused that the reason why a criminal case was filed against him
was his failure to pay theP10,000.00 dowry is too lame to be accepted as true. No
young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit she has been raped unless that is
the truth. Even in these modern times, this principle holds true. 19 When the offended
parties are young and immature girls from 12 to 16, as in this case, courts are inclined
to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative
vulnerability, but also the public humiliation to which they would be exposed by a court
trial, if their accusation were not true.20
It is highly improbable that a young girl, such as AAA, would concoct a horrid story and
impute to the accused a crime so grave and subject herself and her family to the
humiliation and invasive ordeal of a public trial just to avenge the alleged non-payment
of the dowry, unless she be impelled by a genuine desire to expose the truth, vindicate
her honor and seek justice she so greatly deserves.
Neither is the Court convinced of the "sweetheart theory," the defense of the accused,
by alleging that AAA and Sajiron were engaged for three years prior to their elopement
and marriage. If there were indeed romantic relationship between AAA and Sajiron, as
the latter claims, her normal reaction would have been to cover up for the man she
supposedly loved. On the contrary, AAA lost no time in reporting the incident to the
National Bureau of Investigation,21 right after she was rescued by the authorities.
Moreover, the "sweetheart theory" proffered by the accused is effectively an admission
of carnal knowledge of the victim, which consequently places on him the burden of
proving the supposed relationship by substantial evidence. 22 The "sweetheart theory"
hardly deserves any attention when an accused does not present any evidence, such
as love letters, gifts, pictures, and the like to show that, indeed, he and the victim were
sweethearts.23 In the case at bar, Sajiron was unable to present any evidence to prove
their relationship. Clearly, the "sweetheart theory" is a self-serving defense and mere

fabrication of the accused to exculpate himself and his cohorts from the charges filed
against them. It bears stressing that during her testimony before the trial court, AAA
vehemently denied that she and Sajiron were sweethearts and firmly declared that the
latter never lived in their house.24
More importantly, in rape cases, the credibility of the victim's testimony is almost always
the single most important factor. When the victim's testimony is credible, it may be the
sole basis for the accused's conviction.25 This is so because, owing to the nature of the
offense, in many cases, the only evidence that can be given regarding the matter is the
testimony of the offended party.26
In the case at bar, the trial court found AAA's testimony credible. The trial court held that
AAA's testimony was clear, categorical and consistent. She remained steadfast in her
assertions and unfaltering in her testimony given in court on the unfortunate
incident.27 The trial court found that AAA positively identified Sajiron and Maron as her
abductors and narrated how she was taken and thrice raped by Sajiron in the forest.
AAA recounted her sordid experience as follows:
AAA on Direct-Examination by Private Prosecutor Narrazid.
Q: On July 1, 1994 more or less at 3:30 p.m. do you remember where you were?
A: Yes maam.
Q: Where were you?
A: We fetched water on July 1, 1994.
Q: Where?
A: In a cave, maam.
Q: Was there anything unusual that happened during that time?
A: Yes maam.
Q: What was that incident?
A: I noticed that Sahiron Lajim run towards me and held me by my hair. He was
carrying a Barong and he was forcing me to go with him but I refused maam.
Q: And what did you do if any when he forced you to go with him?
A: He threatened me to kill me if I will not go with him. What I did was to hold the
hair of Inon Dama who came to my rescue, maam.

Q: What did Sahiron Lajim do if any?

A: He hacked Inon Dama but was not hit and it was the container that was hit,
maam. And Sahiron Lajim left and I was forced to go with him telling me, "go with
me if you do not want to die."
Q: When this Inon Dama left what happened next and you were left alone with
Sahiron Lajim?
A: His father suddenly appeared who was also carrying a gun.
Q: What happened next?
A: The father of Sahiron Lajim told me to go with them but I refused. What they
did was to tie my hands behind my back and my mouth was covered by them by
a piece of cloth, maam.
Q: And after that what happened next?
A: Then they brought me to the forest maam.
Q: And when you were in the forest what happened next?
A: Sahiron Lajim raped me while his father was watching maam.
Q: And how did Sahiron Lajim raped you?
A: When we reached the forest my hands were untied and my dress were
removed and only my bra was left maam.
Q: Who removed your dress?
A: Sahiron Lajim maam.
Q: And you stated that it was only your bra that was left in your body how about
your panty?
A: It was already removed.
Q: While Sahiron Lajim was undressing you what did you do, if any?
A: I pleaded to him not to pursue his intention and Sahiron Lajim threatened me
that if I will allow him to do such thing to me he will not kill me, maam.
Q: And did he hold the private parts of your body?

A: Yes maam. (witness pointing to her bust, and the lower part of her body)
Q: What other part did Sahiron Lajim touch in your body?
A: My private part, my vagina, maam.
Q: What else did he do to you?
A: He inserted his organ to my vagina. Then after raping me he required me to
wear my blouse. He repeated the act again for two times up to the following day,
maam.
Q: How long was the private part of Sahiron Lajim inside your private part?
A: A little bit long. Nearing one (1) hour.
Q: That was the first time his organ entered your private part?
A: Yes maam.
Q: Did you notice anything in your private part?
A: I have seen blood. I was even pushing him away.
Q: How did you feel at that time when his organ was inside your private part?
A: It was painful, maam.
Q: And you stated that his organ entered your private part again for the second
time, how long?
A I did not notice anymore how long was it, maam.
Q: And you stated Madam Witness that you were repeatedly raped that night, is
that correct?
A: Yes maam.
Q: Up to what time?
A: The first time that he raped me was about 7:00 oclock in the evening, the
second was midnight. And the third was 3:00 oclock in the morning.
Q: Were you able to sleep that night?
A: No maam.

Q: At the time when you were raped for the first time where was the father of
Sahiron Lajim?
A: He was guarding maam.
Q: How far was his father?
A: He was near a tree which was 10 meters away from us.
Q: Now, the place where you were brought by Sahiron Lajim is a forest?
A: Yes maam.
Q: Was there a hut in that forest?
A: None maam, we were at a place where there were big trees, maam.
Q: So, you mean to say you were raped on the ground?
A: Yes maam.
Q: Without any blanket?
A: He got some leaves of trees, maam.
Q: What did he do with that leaves of trees?
A: He secured some leaves and placed it on the ground, which served as mat,
maam.
Q: Now, the second and the third time that Sahiron Lajim raped you where was
his father?
A: He was also there, maam.28 (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
As a rule, this Court gives great weight to the trial courts evaluation of the testimony of
a witness, because the trial court had the opportunity to observe the facial expression,
gesture, and tone of voice of a witness while testifying, thus, putting it in a better
position to determine whether a witness was lying or telling the truth. 29
However, the Court does not agree with the findings of the CA affirming the trial court's
judgment finding Sajiron and Maron guilty of abduction and rape in Criminal Case No.
12281. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question,
including one not raised by the parties30 Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code spells

out the elements of the crime of forcible abduction, thus: (a) that the person abducted is
a woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation; (b) that the abduction is
against her will; and (c) that the abduction is with lewd designs.
A reading of the Information in Criminal Case No. 12281, for abduction with rape, would
readily show that the allegations therein do not charge the accused with forcible
abduction, because the taking, as alleged, was not with lewd designs. The only act that
was alleged to have been attended with lewd design was the act of rape. Upon further
perusal of the allegations in the information, it appears that the crime charged was
actually the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and rape,
defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Although the information does not specifically allege the term "kidnap or detain," the
information specifically used the terms "take" and "carry away." To "kidnap" is to carry
away by unlawful force or fraud or to seize and detain for the purpose of so carrying
away.31 Whereas, to "take" is to get into one's hand or into one's possession, power, or
control by force or strategem.32 Thus, the word take, plus the accompanying
phrase carry away, as alleged in the information, was sufficient to inform the accused
that they were charged with unlawfully taking and detaining AAA.
Further, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, they being conclusions of law which in no way affect the legal
aspects of the information, but from the actual recital of facts as alleged in the body of
the information.33 Simply put, the crime charged is determined by the information's
accusatory portion and not by its denomination.
The accusatory portion of the information alleges that AAA was taken and carried away
by Sajiron and Maron against her will and brought to the forest; and, on the occasion
thereof, Sajiron -- by means of force, threat, violence and intimidation -- had carnal
knowledge of AAA.
The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code34 are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2)
he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense,
any of the following circumstances are present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for
more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c) any serious
physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill
him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public
officer.35
In the case at bar, Sajiron and Maron, who are private individuals, forcibly took and
dragged AAA, a minor, to the forest and held her captive against her will. The crime of
serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also

of detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty.36 For there to be
kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. 37 Its essence is
the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent
of the accused to effect such deprivation. 38 In the present case, although AAA was not
actually confined in an enclosed place, she was clearly restrained and deprived of her
liberty, because she was tied up and her mouth stuffed with a piece of cloth, thus,
making it very easy to physically drag her to the forest away from her home.
The crime of rape was also proven beyond reasonable doubt in this case. Sajiron
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA through the use of force and intimidation.
For fear of losing her life, AAA had no choice but to give in to Sajiron's beastly and
lustful assault.
Clearly, conspiracy between Sajiron and Maron attended the commission of forcible
abduction and the subsequent rape of AAA. Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. 39 It may be
inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or after the commission of the crime
which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of criminal design,
as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances.
Once established, all the conspirators are criminally liable as co-principals regardless of
the degree of participation of each of them, for in the contemplation of the law, the act of
one is the act of all.40 In the case at bar, it was proven that Sajiron and Maron
cooperated to prevent AAA from resisting her abduction by tying her hands behind her
back and putting a piece of cloth in her mouth. Maron watched and stood guard to make
sure that no one would interrupt or prevent the bestial act perpetrated by his son against
AAA. Maron did not endeavor to prevent his son from raping AAA thrice. The next
morning, Sajiron and Maron brought AAA to the house of Egap to detain her there.
The last paragraph of Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides that if the victim is
killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. In People v.
Larraaga,41 the Court explained that this provision gives rise to a special complex
crime:
This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes, the concept of 'special complex
crime' of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction
drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was
purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not
deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is:
Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of
whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping
and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as
separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last
paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by R.A. No. 7659."

Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the
resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes
under the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3)
kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and
(5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily
prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary
if they were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No.
7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision:
"When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and
that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. (Italics in the original)
Thus, we hold that Sajiron and Maron are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape in Criminal Case
No. 12281.
In Criminal Case No. 12309, we also find Sajiron guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of serious illegal detention.
All the elements of the crime of serious illegal detention are present in the instant case:
AAA, a female and a minor, testified that on July 2, 1994, after she was raped in the
forest, she was brought to and detained at the house of Egap and forced to cohabit with
Sajiron. From the very start of her detention on July 2, 1994, Egap directed Sajiron to
guard her, and shoot her if she attempted to escape. 42 She did not dare to escape
because the accused threatened to kill her and her family if she attempted to flee. 43
AAA was also guarded by Egap's wife.44 Even the two sons of Egap, upon the latter's
instruction, constantly guarded and threatened her to keep her from leaving. 45 In fine,
the accused had successfully instilled fear in AAA's mind that escaping would cause her
not only her own life, but also the lives of her loved ones.
To give a color of legitimacy to AAA's detention, Sajiron married AAA. However, the
marriage between her and Sajiron is considered irregular under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws (Presidential Decree No. 1083). Art. 15 (b) of said the law provides that
no marriage contract shall be perfected unless the essential requisite of mutual consent
of the parties be freely given. And under Art. 32 of the same law, if the consent of either
party is vitiated by violence, intimidation, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, the
marriage is considered irregular (fasid) from the time of its celebration.
AAA did not give her consent to the wedding. 46 The marriage was solemnized only upon
the instruction of Egap.47 She was also forced to sign the marriage contract without the
presence of her parents or any of her relatives. 48 She did not want to marry Sajiron
because she did not love him.49 The Imam who solemnized their marriage did not even
ask for the consent of the parties.50 He was merely compelled to solemnize the marriage
because he was afraid of Egap, and the latter threatened him. 51 Clearly, the marriage

ceremony was a farce, and was only orchestrated by the accused in an attempt to
exculpate themselves from criminal responsibility.
Anent Criminal Case No. 12309, the prescribed penalty for serious illegal detention
under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R. A.) No.
7659, is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or modifying
circumstance in the commission of the offense, the proper penalty to be imposed
isreclusion perpetua, pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
As to Criminal Case No. 12281, the penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention and rape is death. However, R.A. No. 9346, entitled "An
Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was approved
on June 24, 2006, prohibits the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, the penalty of
death is reduced to reclusion perpetua,52 without eligibility for parole.53
As to accused Egap, his act of escaping from his police escort during the pendency of
his case and his subsequent unexplained absence during the promulgation of the
decision convicting him of the crime charged has divested him of the right to avail
himself of any remedy that may be available to him, including his right to appeal. In a
recent case, this Court held that once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country, or escapes from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and
unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have
waived any right to seek relief from it.54 Hence, insofar as accused Egap is concerned,
the judgment against him became final and executory upon the lapse of fifteen (15)
days from promulgation of the judgment.
As to the award of damages.
In Criminal Case No. 12281, AAA is entitled to civil indemnity in line with prevailing
jurisprudence that civil indemnification is mandatory upon the finding of rape. 55
In People v. Quiachon,56 even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed because of the
prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is proper, because it is
not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that
qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the offense. As explained in People v. Salome,57 while R.A. No. 9346
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the fact remains that the penalty provided
for by the law for a heinous offense is still death, and the offense is still heinous.
Accordingly, the civil indemnity for AAA is P75,000.00.
In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 of the Civil
Code,58 without the necessity of additional pleadings or proof other than the fact of
rape.59 Moral damages is granted in recognition of the victim's injury necessarily
resulting from the odious crime of rape.60 Such award is separate and distinct from the
civil indemnity.61 Therefore, the Court awards the amount of P75,000.00 as moral
damages.
1avvphi1

In Criminal Case No. 12309, for serious illegal detention, the trial court's award
of P50,000 civil indemnity to AAA was proper, in line with prevailing jurisprudence. 62
We also find that AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 of the Civil
Code, which provides that moral damages may be recovered in cases of illegal
detention.63 This is predicated on AAA's having suffered serious anxiety and fright when
she was detained for more than five months. Thus, the Court awards the amount
of P50,000.00 as moral damages.64
Finally, AAA was sexually abused on July 1, 1994 and gave birth on April 8, 1995. There
was no showing that AAA had previously been sexually abused or had sexual relations
with other men. Further, Dr. Ma. Rebethia Alcala, a Municipal Health Officer of Bataraza,
Palawan, testified that since AAA gave birth on April 8, 1995, the baby must have been
conceived sometime in July 1994, which was at or about the time of the commission of
the rape. Therefore, it can be logically deduced that Sajiron is the father of the child.
Under Art. 345 of the Revised Penal Code,65 he is civilly liable for the support of his
offspring. Hence, he is directed to provide support to the victim's child born out of the
rape, subject to the amount and conditions to be determined by the trial court, after due
notice and hearing, in accordance with Art. 201 of the Family Code. 66
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 00475 isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 12281, accused Sajiron Lajim and Maron Lajim are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention with rape under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and are sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and to pay jointly and
severally, the offended party AAA, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P75,000.00 as moral damages. Accused Sajiron Lajim is further ordered to
support the offspring born as a consequence of the rape. The amount of support
shall be determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing, with support in
arrears to be reckoned from the date the appealed decision was promulgated by
the trial court; and
(b) In Criminal Case No. 12309, accused Sajiron Lajim is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO*
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
AT T E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusion in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 91262 January 28, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
WILFREDO LLAGUNO, JUDY REYES @ FLORANTE REYES @ LORENZO
PEDROSA and a certain "ATIS, " accused, JUDY REYES @ FLORANTE REYES @
LORENZO PEDROSA, accused-appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
In the information charges a complex crime and the prosecution's evidence is
insufficient to support a conviction for such complex crime or for one of its component
offenses, the accused may still be convicted of the other component offense which may
have been sufficiently proven. Conformably, when an accused who is charged with the
complex crime of kidnapping with murder is erroneously convicted of murder by the trial
court, he may on appeal be relieved from his erroneous conviction but still be found
liable for slight illegal detention, because the elements of the latter crime are necessarily
included in the information for the complex one.
Statement of the Case
On appeal before this Court is the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court 2 of Cebu City, Branch
XVII, in Criminal Case No. CBU 50414, dated July 25, 1989, convicting Judy Reyes of murder.

Appellant Judy Reyes, together with two others, was charged in an Information dated
February 16, 1987, which reads as follows: 3
The undersigned 3rd Asst. Fiscal of the City of Cebu 4 accuses BOY LLGUNO,
JUDY REYES @ FLORANTE REYES and a certain "ATIS" of the crime of KIDNAPPING
WITH MURDER, committed as follows:

That on or about the 4th day of February, 1987, at about 8:00 o'clock in
the evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with firearm, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping with (sic) one another, with
deliberate intent, did then and there kidnap and detain one Bienvenido
Mercado, and while under detention, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there suddenly and unexpectedly shot
said Bienvenido Mercado with said firearm, hitting him on the vital part of
his body, thereby inflicting upon him the following physical injuries (sic):
GUNSHOT WOUND THROUGH AND THROUGH FROM
FRONTAL AREA OF THE HEAD TO OCCIPITAL AREA.
as a consequence of which, Bienvenido Mercado died a few days later. 5
Arraigned on June 11, 1987, Accused Wilfredo (Boy) LLaguno and Judy Reyes,
assisted by Counsel Ernesto Amores, pleaded not guilty to the charge. 6 Accused "Atis"
was at large; hence, he was not arraigned.

A consolidated Motion to Remand Case for Reinvestigation and Motion to Quash

Warrant of Arrest alleging lack of preliminary investigation was filed by Llaguno and
Reyes through Counsel Rolando M. Lim on February 23, 1987. 7 The motion was granted
and the records were returned to the City Fiscal's Office. Subsequently, in an Order dated September 23,
1987, the trial court, then presided by Judge Mario M. Dizon, dismissed the case against Wilfredo "Boy"
Llaguno: 8

It appearing from the Reinvestigation Report & Recommendation dated

September 14, 1987, filed by 3rd Asst. Fiscal Rodolfo V. Perez and duly
approved by the City Fiscal, that the State has no evidence to present
against, and secure the conviction of accused WILFREDO "BOY"
LLAGUNO, as prayed for, the instant case against said accused is
ordered DISMISSED, and, accordingly, he is ordered immediately
released, unless he is also detained for another cause. . . .
On October 26, 1987, Fiscal Generosa Labra requested a resetting of the case because
no witness for the prosecution was available. Atty. Vicente Cabahug, the appellant's
counsel, objected on the ground that the remaining accused, Judy Reyes, was
detained, adding that a previous warning had already been given to the prosecution in
the last hearing during which it also failed to present any witness. Thus, the trial court
provisionally dismissed the case: 9

In view of this, the instant case as against JUDY REYES is hereby

ordered provisionally accused dismissed. The accused Judy Reyes, @
Florante Reyes is hereby ordered released from the BBRC 10 unless he is also
detained for another case.

Two days after, on October 29, 1987, Atty. Ramon B. Ceniza

11

representing the Citizens

Legal Assistance Society of the Philippines (CLASP) as private prosecutor, and with the "conforme" of
Asst. Fiscal Labra, filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying for the reinstatement of the case against the
appellant. 12 In an Order dated November 2, 1987, the trial court granted the motion and trial thereafter
ensued. After the evidence from both parties had been presented, the assailed Decision penned by Judge
Jose P. Burgos was promulgated, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: 13

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court finds the

accused Judy Reyes aliasFlorante Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
not of the complex crime as charged in the information but of the offense
of MURDER defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code with the aggravating circumstances of employing means to weaken
the defense or means to insure or afford impunity, the use of a motor
vehicle, commission of the offense at nighttime and in an uninhabited
place and sentence is hereby rendered ordering the accused to serve the
penalty of reclusion perpetua together with the accessory penalties under
the law, to indemnify the heirs of Bienvenido Mercado the sum of Thirty
[Thousand] (P30,000.00) Pesos and [to] pay the costs.
On September 26, 1989, the accused through Counsel Cabahug filed a Notice
erroneously appealing the judgment to the Court of Appeals. 14 Correcting the lapse, 15 the
Court of Appeals in a letter dated December 6, 1989 16forwarded the records of the case to this Court.
After this Court's receipt of all pleadings and documents, the case is now ripe for resolution. 17

The Facts
According to the Prosecution
The solicitor general's summary of the facts is as follows:
On February 5, 1987 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning, the appellant Judy
Reyes, chief security and rattan controller at GF International Export Inc.,
Cebu City, informed Tomas Banzon, the company duty guard, that he
caught a thief on February 4, 1987 (TSN, November 24, 1987, p. 26).
Appellant then took Banzon to his room where a person named
Bienvenido Mercado was found tied to a wooden post in the room.
Appellant told Banzon that Mercado was the thief he caught (TSN,
November 24, 1987, p. 28).

At 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of February 6, 1987, Dr. Jovita Ceniza,

manager of the company, called up Banzon by phone inquiring if there
was any unusual incident. Banzon replied that he would give a report after
two (2) hours, and when appellant learned of this, he warned Banzon to
keep quiet about Mercado's detention or be killed (TSN, November 24,
1987, P. 31). Appellant at the time was armed with a .45 caliber pistol
(TSN, November 24, 1987, p. 31). When Dr. Ceniza went to the
company's office later in the afternoon, she met the appellant who told her
it was all finished and that he was going to Santo Nio to confess as he
had killed someone (TSN, December 7, 1987, p. 28).
At 9:00 o'clock in the morning of February 7, 1987 Banzon inquired from
appellant as to the whereabouts of Mercado and appellant replied that he
already disposed of him (TSN, November 24, 1987, p. 33). Banzon, at that
time, noticed that appellant's arm had teeth marks, and when Banzon
inquired as to the cause thereof, appellant replied that he was hit by a
piece of wood (TSN, November 24, 1987, p. 33).
Also on February 7, 1987, the body of Bienvenido Mercado was found by
the police in Sogod, Cebu, which showed a gunshot wound on the
forehead and multiple abrasions in the arms and body (TSN, November
24, 1987, p. 11). 18
In the place where they found the body, the police also found an empty shell of a .45
caliber bullet. 19
According to Banzon, on February 5, 1987, he noted that the company-owned Datsun
pickup was still sporting its gray corduroy seat covers, but on February 7, the seat
covers were gone. Banzon asked Cirilo Eric Medico, the guard who relieved him, what
happened to the seat covers, and Medico replied that they had been taken by one Boy
Saragoza to have them washed as they had been bloodstained. Feeling anxious and
suspicious, he called up the Security Agency and asked for permission to take a leave
of absence on February 8. 20
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, appellant narrates the facts as follows:
1. Appellant is of legal age, single and a resident of GF International
Export, Inc. compound located at H. Abellana Street, Basak, Mandaue
City.

1.1. At the time of his arrest, appellant was employed as a

Rattan Controller of GF International Export, Inc.
2. Sometime evening of 4 February 1987, one Bienvenido Mercado, while
in the presence of his mother and common-law wife, was invited by Atis
and a certain Alex to join a drinking spree with the latter.
2.1. At the time of the aforesaid invitation, the aforenamed
Bienvenido Mercado was wearing a blue t-shirt and an
orange short pants.
3. Unfortunately, however, Bienvenido Mercado was last seen alive during
the aforementioned invitation.
4. In the meantime, on the same evening of 4 February 1987, appellant
was, all the while, within the premises of GF International Export, Inc.
5. Moreover, at around 6:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day, or
more appropriately, on 5 February 1987, appellant, from his sleeping
quarter, proceeded to take a bath at a place near the guardhouse of GF
International Export, Inc. and, thereafter, proceeded to dress up and
prepare for work on the said day.
6. On 7 February 1987, at around 5:43 o'clock in the afternoon, the body
of a dead person and an empty caliber .45 shell were recovered.
7. After the aforestated recovery, a Post-Mortem Examination was
immediately conducted.
8. While in his hut, appellant was arrested for Illegal Possession Of
Firearm on 12 February 1987.
9. On 15 February 1987, the previously-mentioned recovered body was
identified to be that of forenamed Bienvenido Mercado. 21
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court held the appellant liable for murder, stating:
It is clear from the established evidence on record that after the victim was
detained by the accused for a day in his rest house at the compound of
GF International, he brought the victim with the use of Datsun pick-up to

Sogod, Cebu for salvaging in the evening of February 5, 1987, the day
when accused ordered for no overtime work in the GF premises to better
perpetuate the offense of killing the victim in Sogod, Cebu with hands tied
using a .45 caliber pistol. 22
Although herein appellant was charged with "kidnapping with murder," the trial court
convicted him only of "murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code with the aggravating circumstances of employing means to weaken the
defense or means to insure or afford impunity, the use of a motor vehicle, commission of
the offense at nighttime and in an uninhabited place." 23 The trial court, however, did not find
him liable for serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code because the victim
was detained only for one day.

The Issues
In his brief, appellant imputes the following "errors" to the trial court, viz:
I
The trial court erred in lending credence to the testimonial evidence of the
prosecution.
II.
The trial court erred in holding that the testimonies of appellant and his
witnesses were mere denials
III.
Therefore, the trial court erred in finding the existence in this case of
circumstances sufficient to sustain a conviction.
The foregoing boil down to the following issues: (1) the credibility of witnesses and (2)
the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. The Court finds appellant liable only for slight illegal
detention, not for murder or kidnapping with murder.
First Issue: Credibility of Witnesses

Long settled in criminal jurisprudence is the rule that when the issue is one of credibility
of witnesses, appellate courts will not disturb the findings of the trial court. This rule is
justified by the fact that the trial court is in a better position to decide the
question. 24 Having the advantage of directly observing witnesses, "the trial judge is able to detect that
sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing
court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance,
like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous
mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes
have darted in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to
distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered
pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on the basis of his
observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict." 25

The records reveal, however, that this doctrinal guide should not apply in this instance,
for the judge who penned the Decision did not personally hear the evidence for the
prosecution. Judge Jose P. Burgos, the ponente, started presiding at the trial only on
January 9, 1989 26 after the first witness for the defense had been presented. 27 Hence, he did not
personally observe or assess any of the prosecution witnesses. Thus, as an exception to the rule, we
meticulously reviewed the evidence to determine for ourselves the credibility of the witnesses and the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the judgment of conviction.

Buttressing his defense of denial, appellant propounds several challenges to the

credibility of the prosecution account. He maintains that Banzon was in no position to
witness the alleged detention. He also denies that he had confided to Banzon and to Dr.
Ceniza that the victim was in his custody and that he intended to "salvage" or kill him.
He posits further that there were several inconsistencies in the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses. We will deal with each of these contentions.
In his Brief, appellant assails the testimony of Banzon that he saw the victim hanging by
his hands at eight o'clock in the evening of February 5, 1987 and for thirty minutes
thereafter. He contends that Banzon was "in no position to have witnessed the
purported detention" of Victim Mercado, because Banzon's work shift ended at eight
o'clock in the evening and the endorsement of his duties to the relief guard rook only a
few minutes. 28
We are not convinced. It was not proven that Witness Banzon left at exactly eight
o'clock that evening, or right after he had turned over his responsibilities to the relieving
guard. In fact, a reasonable allowance of time may be considered in the turnover of
responsibility by one guard to another; Banzon could still have been inside the GF
premises at 8:30 in the evening of February 5, 1987. Banzon himself testified that he
was invited to appellant's room at 8:10 that evening. 29 Thus, we find appellant's attack on
Witness Banzon's allegation that he was at the GF premises on February 5, 1987 to be insignificant.

Appellant further contends that it is unbelievable that he would confide to Banzon the
following: that he had detained Victim Mercado, that he had intended to "salvage" the
latter, or that he had already done so. He maintains that it has not been shown that
Banzon enjoyed his confidence. 30 He raises the same arguments in respect to the revelations he
allegedly made to Dr. Ceniza. He states that he and Dr. Ceniza were already at odds with each other prior
to February 1987. 31

It must be stressed, however, that during the trial appellant never denied the statements
of Banzon. In spite of the damaging accusations of Banzon, appellant, on the stand, did
not dispute the former's presence at the GF premises. Only in his appeal brief did he do
so. We find appellant's denial a mere afterthought, and thus undeserving of credence.
The testimony of Banzon clearly shows appellant's penchant for boasting: 32
Atty. Ceniza:
Q What transpired on the occasion of your meeting of [sic]
the accused?
A He said they were able to catch a robber in the evening of
February 4 but I did not believe him because I have not seen
(the robber).
Q What else transpired in your conversation:
A No more.
Q In the evening of February 5, 1987 what did you do?
A About 8:10 in the evening of February 5 he brought me to
his room.
Atty. Ceniza:
A Who is that he?
Witness:
A Lorenzo Pedrosa.
Q That means Judy Reyes?
A Yes, sir.

Q What was the purpose of Judy Reyes in bringing you to

his room?
A He showed me the person that he hanged. He was tied in
both hands and raised upwards to a wooden brace of the
house.
Q What was the tenor of your conversation if any to Lorenzo
or between Lorenzo and you?
A I asked him why he brought this [sic] here. He told me that
is [sic] a prison cell for those who have committed a crime.
Q Where was the room of Judy Reyes?
A Inside the premises of the company GF International Inc.
Q Was that all that transpired in your conversation on that
occasion?
A I asked why he brought this person here and he answered
me that Boy Saragoza will come back for him and I asked
him what has he done and he said, he is a robber. He has
stolen something.
Atty. Ceniza:
Q Was that all that transpired in your conversation?
A Yes, sir.
Q What else?
A I asked that person who was changed. I asked him what
was his name and he said his nickname was Ben and his full
name is Bienvenido Mercado and he is a resident of Tabo-an
and a "cargador."
The testimony of Dr. Ceniza confirmed Benson's account that appellant detained and
planned to kill the victim. As in the case of Banzon, Ceniza's testimony was not objected
to by appellant. Thus: 33

Atty. Ceniza:
Q And what was the answer of Lorenzo (Pedrosa or Judy
Reyes)?
A And then he said, you know that if I had to narrate (it) all it
will take more than one hour.
Q Please limit your answer. Particularly, what Lorenzo told
you about?
A He asked permission[;] he wanted to use the Datsun
because he was going to salvage a man. He wanted to finish
him before the next day. At this point I plead [sic] with him,
"Please don't do it." And I said, I told him that Dong if that is
your problem, I will help you. Just don't "salvage."
Q And what did Lorenzo told [sic] you?
A He said that he was going to use the Datsun to salvage a
man because he said he wanted to finish him before the next
day. At this point I said, "Dong don't do that. If you have a
problem I will go there and I will talk to you." To the extent I
also told him, "We will give money. I will not do anything to
you." But he said (that) he has to finish this man because if
the man will not be eliminated he will be in hot water. It was
a very long conversation.
Atty. Ceniza:
Q By the way, what did Lorenzo tell you about this man
hanging in one of the buildings of the company?
A He said he is [sic] a thief. So I said, "But why did you have
to bring him there?" and he said, "He has stolen something."
I said, "Why did you not ask the assistance of the security
guard instead of you yourself handling that fellow?" Then he
did not say anything. So I shifted [the topic], I told him "I will
be the one to take case if he will just release him." He said,
"No, I will have to salvage him."

Furthermore, appellant's self-serving negative defense of denial cannot be given greater

weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative
matters. 34 Jurisprudence teaches us that "affirmative testimony has greater value than a negative one,
for the reason that he who denies a certain fact may not remember exactly the circumstances on which
he bases his denial." 35

Appellant also cites inconsistencies in the version of the prosecution. Banzon insisted
that Victim Mercado was in yellow short pants when he last saw the latter alive; when
recovered, Mercado was in orange short pants. 36Appellant further points out the following
inconsistencies: there was a discrepancy in the names of those who invited Mercado to a drinking
session; the duty shift of Banzon was actually 8:00 p.m. to midnight; appellant was arrested on February
11, 1987, not February 12, 1987; and Banzon called up the security agency regarding the matter of
bloodstains on February 7, 1987, not February 14, 1987 as testified to by him. 37

Again, we hold that these significant lapses do not taint the credibility of the witnesses.
Inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details
and collateral matters do not affect the substance, veracity or weight of their
declarations. In fact, these inconsistencies reinforce rather than weaken their credibility,
for they lessen the prospect of a rehearsed testimony. Au contraine, such discrepancies
serve to add credence and veracity to their categorical, straightforward and
spontaneous testimonies. 38
Appellant next assails the credibility of Dr. Ceniza. He alleges that Dr. Ceniza's behavior
towards the incident was surprising, for upon learning of the presence of the victim
inside the company premises, she did her usual rounds at the hospital instead of
checking on the usual occurrence. 39
Admittedly, Company President Ceniza's reaction at a time of crises is open to criticism.
However, this does not lessen the weight of her testimony. Different people react
differently to startling occurrences. In any event, she did testify that she kept in touch
with the personnel at GF at that time.
Second Issue: Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence
In deciding this appeal, we emphasize that the burden of proof in criminal cases is on
the prosecution. Thus, a finding of guilt must rest on the strength of the prosecution's
own evidence, not on the weakness or even absence of evidence for the defense. 40
Circumstantial Evidence Sufficient
to Convict Appellant of Murder?

Because there were no eyewitnesses to the killing, the trial court's resort to
circumstantial evidence was inevitable. A conviction may rest purely on circumstantial
evidence, provided the following requisites concur: 41
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 42
Hence, the Supreme Court has held:
. . . a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, that is, the
circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty. 43
Let us consider the chain of circumstances proven by the prosecution. Banzon testified
that appellant detained Mercado in his (appellant's) room by tying his hands to a brace
in the ceiling with the apparent intention of "salvaging" or killing the victim, a suspected
robber. Appellant threatened Banzon and warned him not to report the incident to Dr.
Ceniza. Appellant took the Datsun pickup on February 6, 1987 and claimed the next day
that he had already "disposed" of the man. Banzon saw the Datsun pickup stained with
blood. He also noticed traces of blood on the canal near the parked Datsun. Appellant
himself asked permission from Dr. Ceniza to use the pickup in order to "salvage" a man.
He later told Dr. Ceniza that he was going to confess because he was feeling bad after
he had killed a man. 44
These circumstances, at first glance, may create a strong suspicion that appellant did
commit the alleged killing. Nevertheless, a closer examination reveals that the facts
from which this inference was derived do not prove beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant was the author of the killing.
These circumstances, at first glance, may create a strong suspicion that appellant did
commit the alleged killing. Nevertheless, a closer examination reveals that the facts
from which this inference was derived do not prove beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant was the author of the killing.

Appellant draws attention to the conflict between the testimonies of Dr. Ceniza and
Banzon 45 regarding the time when the victim was taken out of the GF premises and the time when he
was killed. According to Dr. Ceniza, appellant told her on February 6, 1987 that he was going to
confession in the afternoon because he was feeling bad. Dr. Ceniza took appellant's statement to mean
that the victim had already been taken out of the GF premises and killed. Banzon, on the other hand,
testified that appellant told him in the morning of that same day that the victim was still in the company
premises. Furthermore, he testified that it was only around four o'clock in the afternoon of February 6,
1987 when appellant brought the pickup of the premises of GF. In other words, Banzon's testimony
sought to establish that the victim was taken out of the GF premises after office hours on February 6,
1987. 46 The inconsistencies in their testimonies are evident from the following: 47

Atty. Ceniza:
Q How about the following day, February 6, 1987, do you
recall anything unusual that happened relative to that man
hanging behind the GF International Building?
[Dr. Ceniza]
A The first thing that I know that one of the supervisors told
me that the man was no longer there. On the 6th I went to
the Office and proceeds upstairs. Then when I was upstairs
we met, Lorenzo and I, upstairs and he followed up (sic) and
the he told me it is all finished. So, I said then I asked him,
"What about the rattan?" because we have to look for rattan.
The he followed me to my office and the I sat down my office
and he sat in one of the chairs and he said, "I will go to Sto.
Nono (sic) because I am going to confess. Because I feel
bad. That is the way when you have killed. This afternoon I
will go to Sto. Nino tp (sic) confess."
Based on the above, appellant was assumed to have killed Mercado in the morning of
February 6, 1987. However, this was contradicted by Banzon: 48
Atty. Ceniza:
Q That was February 5 in the evening. On February 6, 1987
in the morning do you recall any unusual incident that
happened?
A Yes, sir. On the following day that was February 6, I was
already on duty at 8:00 o'clock and after a while he
(appellant) about 9:00 o'clock Lorenzo Pedorsa (sic) passed

and I asked him, "Yes." (sic) because By Saragoza did not

come back for him.
Atty. Ceniza:
Q What else transpired in your conversation?
A I asked if it is not dangerous for him and he said it is not.
Q What else transpired?
xxx xxx xxx
Q Was there any other unusual incident that happened in the
evening of February 6?
A I don't know anything.
Q How about the following day, February 7, 1987, do you
recall anything unusual that happened?
A On February 7 when I was on duty again Lorenzo passed
by about 9:00 o'clock in the guardhouse. And then I asked
Lorenzo what happened to him, and he said, "I had already
disposed of him." And I said, What "happened to your arm?
There is showing that it was bitten by human teeth."
This Court cannot rest easy with this discrepancy. Such glaring and material
inconsistency creates a reasonable doubt whether it was appellant himself who took
Mercado, the victim, out of the GF premises and consummated the killing.
The two testimonies are clearly inconsistent. It is possible to conjecture that the victim
was killed between the time when Banzon spoke with Appellant Reyes that morning of
February 6, 1987 about 9:00 a.m. and the time when appellant told Dr. Ceniza that he
would go to confession in the afternoon of that day because he felt guilty about having
killed the victim. However, we find this thought difficult to accept, because the
prosecution failed to establish the time when Dr. Ceniza talked to appellant.
Furthermore, from the supposition of the prosecution , it would follow that the victim was
killed inside the GF premises and that, after office hours, the body was transported from
the premises with the use of the Datsun. It is undisputed, however, that a spent .45
caliber shell was found beside the body, indicating that the victim was shot in the place
where his body was found, i.e., outside the GF premises. Clearly, there are unexplained

missing links in the prosecution account. Where was the victim killed? Inside or outside
the GF premises? Was he dead or alive when his body was taken out of the premises?
Who took the victim out of the GF premises? Was the Datsun pickup used in
transporting the victim from the premises? Where was appellant between the time he
talked to Banzon and the time he talked to Dr. Ceniza on February 6, 1987? Who
actually killed Mercado?
In the light of these unexplained questions, the trial court erred in nonetheless holding
that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution shows, beyond moral
certainty, that appellant was guilty of murder. In so doing, the lower court transgressed
the basic rule that "when the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or
more interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and
the other or other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence, in view of the
constitutional presumption of innocence, has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and
is thus insufficient to support a conviction." 49 Parenthetically, when the prosecution's case is
anchored only on circumstantial evidence, all the circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty of the crime sought to be proved, and no other. In addition, the circumstances
under consideration must not support any rational hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the
accused. 50 Consequently, appellant may not be held criminally liable for killing the victim.

Kidnapping Was Sufficiently Proven

The trial court did not find appellant liable for serious illegal detention under Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code on the ground that the period of detention was less than five
days. This Court, however, finds that the totality of the evidence presented by the
prosecution sufficiently proves beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of the
crime of slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 268
of the Code provides:
Art. 268. Slight illegal detention. The penalty of reclusion temporal shall
be imposed upon any private individual who shall commit the crimes
described in the next preceding article without the attendance of any of the
circumstances enumerated therein. The same penalty shall be incurred by
anyone who shall furnish the place for the perpetration of the crime.
If the offender shall voluntarily release the person so kidnapped or
detained within three days from the commencement of the detention,
without having attained the purpose intended, and before the institution of
criminal proceedings against him, the penalty shall be prision mayor in its
minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding 700 pesos.

The evidence presented by the prosecution, which was sustained by the trial court,
clearly established that appellant had in fact detained the victim without authority to do
so. Banzon testified that he witnessed the victim hanging by the arms in appellant's
room. Banzon's testimony significantly jibes with the physical evidence showing that the
victim sustained multiple abrasions in both arms. 51 Furthermore, Dr. Ceniza narrated that
several employees called her up in the morning of February 5, 1987 asking for permission to go home
because there was a "man hanging at the back in one of the buildings of GF International." 52 Dr. Ceniza's
testimony was unrebutted. All these ineludibly prove beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was
deprived of his liberty by appellant.

It must be emphasized that appellant was charged with the special complex crime of
kidnapping with murder, not of two independent charges of kidnapping and murder. "In a
complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they continue only
one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender." 53 Hence, in
deciding this appeal, the Court is not confined to the conviction for murder; rather, the scope of its review
encompasses the offense charged in the information, which the prosecution sought to prove. It is a wellsettled doctrine that an appeal "throws the whole case wide open for review and empowers (even
obligates) the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the appealed judgment even if
they have not been assigned." 54 When an accused appeals, he stands for a new trial of the whole
case. 55 Since the information charged the complex crime of kidnapping with murder, the acts constituting
slight illegal detention were necessarily included in the information, and may thus be validly taken into
account in the resolution of the present appeal. Manifestly, appellant was fairly apprised of the nature of
the crime of slight illegal detention and granted a fair opportunity to defend himself. At his juncture, we
deem it significant to reiterate that the trial court merely made a finding that appellant could not be
convicted of serious illegal detention for the sole reason that the victim's detention did not exceed five
days. 56 The court a quo, however, found that appellant illegally detained the victim for at least one
day, 57 which act by itself constitutes slight illegal detention. Besides, the trial court appreciated the act
constituting slight illegal detention as a qualifying circumstance, i.e., employing means to weaken the
defense. While we find no proof beyond reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction for murder, the records
indisputably prove culpability for slight illegal detention.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Appellant Judy Reyes is

hereby CONVICTED of slight illegal detention and SENTENCED to the indeterminate
penalty of ten years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to seventeen years and four
months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. He is acquitted of murder. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 118620-21 September 1, 1997

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NARITO @ "NARING" DADLES, accused-appellant.

FRANCISCO, J.:
This case involves the alleged kidnapping of two farmers, Alipio Tehidor and
Salvador Alipan and their respective sons, Dionisio and Antonio from their homes
in Barangay Amontay, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental on May 24, 1989. For the
said kidnapping, appellant Narito alias "Naring" Dadles was charged in two
separate informations, to wit:
That on or about the 24th day of May, 1989, in the Municipality of
Binalbagan, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the first above-named accused, in
company of his five (5) other co-accused, whose true names are still
unknown and herein designated only as "Ka Morito", "Ka Willy", "Ka
Dindo", "Ka Mike" and "Ka Juanito", who are all still at large, armed with
assorted firearms of unknown calibers, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, by means of force, violence and intimidation,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, kidnap, detain,
and keep ALIPIO TEHIDOR and DIONISIO TEHIDOR under guard, from their
residence at Brgy. Amontay of the above-named municipality, and bring
them somewhere in the hinterlands of said municipality, under restraint and
against their will, without proper authority thereof, thereby depriving said
victims of their civil liberties since then up to the present. 1
and

That on or about the 24th day of May, 1989, in the Municipality of

Binalbagan, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the first abovenamed accused, in
company of his nine (9) other co-accused, whose true names are still
unknown and herein designated only as "Ka Dindo", "Ka Morito", "Ka
Tiwi", "Ka Amay", "Ka Bobby", "Ka Pedro", "Ka Juanito", "Ka Bernardo"
and "Ka Mike" who are all still at large, armed with assorted firearms of
unknown caliber, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, kidnap, detain, and keep Salvador
Alipan alias "Bado" and Antonio Alipan under guard, from their residence
at Barangay Amontay of the above-named municipality, and bring them
somewhere in the hinterlands of said municipality, under restraint and
against their will, without proper authority thereof, thereby depriving said
victims of their civil liberties since then up to the present. 2
Of the several accused named in the aforequoted informations, only appellant
was arraigned while the cases against the other accused who remain at large up
to the present have been temporarily archived until their apprehension. At the
arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both counts of kidnapping. Upon
joint manifestation of the Public Prosecutor and the defense counsel, both cases
were ordered consolidated and were jointly tried. 3
On the abduction of victims Alipio and Dionisio Tehidor, prosecution witnesses
Francisca Tehidor and Danilo Tehidor testified as follows:
On May 24, 1989 at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening, the appellant
Narito alias "Naring" Dadles together with five (5) others, namely Dindo, Mike,
Willy, Morito, and Juanito arrived at the residence of one of the victims, Alipio
Tehidor, in Barangay Amontay, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. Alipio, his wife,
Francisca, and their two sons Dionisio and Danilo were awakened from their
sleep when the appellant and his companions called Alipio from downstairs. The
group which was known to the Tehidor family because they used to visit the
latter's house to ask for rice was allowed to enter by Francisca. Once inside, they
told Francisca that they wanted to talk to Alipio downstairs. Francisca asked them
not to bring Alipio outside and to just talk to him upstairs but her request went
unheeded. Then Morito, assisted by the appellant, tied the hands of Alipio and
Dionisio. When Francisca protested, the appellant's group told her that they
would free Alipio and Dionisio if they surrender the firearms of their two other
sons, Logenio and Jenny, both of whom were members of the Civilian Armed
Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU). Unable to surrender the said firearms which

were not in the possession of the spouses Tehidor, the appellant's group forced
Alipio and Dionisio to walk with them to an unknown place. Since then and up to
the present, Francisca has not heard from either her husband or her son. 4
On the other hand, prosecution witnesses Luzviminda Alipan and Vicente Alipan
narrated the alleged kidnapping of Salvador and Antonio Alipan in this wise:
On May 24, 1989 at around 11:30 in the evening while Salvador, his wife,
Luzviminda and their sons, Vicente and Antonio were in their house in Barangay
Amontay, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, they heard somebody calling them
from outside. Luzviminda lighted a lamp and opened the door. She saw the
appellant and his nine (9) companions namely, Dindo, Morito, Amay, Pedro,
Juanito, Bernardo, Tiwi, Mike and Bobby who were all armed. The appellant and
Dindo went upstairs and told Salvador to go with them downstairs as they have
something to talk about. Salvador who was apparently acquainted with the group
acceded and followed the appellant and Dindo downstairs. Then the appellant
told Luzviminda, "Nay, we will borrow Tatay, we will return him tomorrow". When
Luzviminda refused, the appellant assured her saying, "Nay, don't worry, just let
Tatay go with us together with your son because they will be returned tomorrow."
Thereafter, Salvador and Antonio left with the group to an unknown destination.
And like Francisca, Luzviminda never saw her husband and son again after that
night. 5
Appellant denied the charges against him and interposed an alibi. The defense
attempted to prove that on the said date and time of the alleged kidnapping of the
victims, the appellant was in the house of defense witness Rogelio Ariola
sleeping soundly after a round of beer with the latter and his other guests.
The appellant who was engaged in the business of selling fruits claimed that he
delivered fruits to one of his usual customers, Rogelio, on May 23, 1989 in
Barangay San Pedro, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. As Rogelio was not able to
pay appellant on the said date, the former allowed the appellant to sleep over in
his house until the following morning. However, Rogelio was able to pay the
appellant only at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the next day. Thus, upon
the advice of Rogelio, the appellant decided to stay and sleep in the former's
house for another night. He went home to Barangay Amontay at around 7:00
o'clock the following morning. 6
Rogelio Ariola who is a Minister of the Apostolic Church and a resident of
Barangay San Pedro, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental testified that on May 24,
1989, there was an occasion in their church and he went home at around 6:00

o'clock in the evening to attend to his guests, some of whom were members of
his church. The appellant was also in his house as he had delivered fruits to
Rogelio the previous day and was waiting to be paid therefor. It was customary
for the appellant to sleep in Rogelio's house whenever the latter could not
immediately pay him for the fruits delivered. Since Rogelio paid the appellant only
at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of May 24, the latter was no longer able to
go home to Barangay Amontay. Rogelio invited the appellant to sleep in his
house again that night and the latter accepted. 7
In the meantime, Rogelio entertained his guests by buying Gold Eagle Beer for
them to drink. Their drinking session lasted until 10:00 o'clock in the evening,
after which, his visitors went home leaving behind the appellant who then slept in
one of the rooms in Rogelio's house. 8
Finding the alibi of the appellant insufficient to controvert his positive
identification by the prosecution witnesses, Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental rendered a decision convicting the
appellant of two (2) courts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. He was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of "double life imprisonment" and to indemnify
the families of the victims in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) each without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 9
Hence the present appeal before this Court where the appellant raises the
following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT AND CREDENCE ON
(sic) THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION AND IN DISREGARDING
THE EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT NARITO DADLES OF TWO (2) COUNTS OF KIDNAPPING AND
SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION. 10
In assailing the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, the appellant
asseverates that their failure to confront him about the disappearance of the
victims despite several opportunities to do so after the alleged incident casts a
doubt on the truthfulness of their accusation. The appellant brands as

incredulous the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that although they

would see the appellant during Sundays which is the market day in Barangay
Amontay, they did not ask him about their missing relatives. 11 According to the
appellant, likewise puzzling is the failure of the prosecution witnesses to report the incident to the
authorities immediately when their respective husbands and sons failed to return the following
morning as promised by the appellant and his companions. 12

This court finds neither of the aforementioned circumstances sufficient to detract

from the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. It has been held in a large
number of cases that the lapse of a considerable length of time before a witness
comes forward to reveal the identity of the perpetrators of the crime does not
taint the credibility of the witness and his testimony where such delay is
satisfactorily explained. 13Also, this court has had occasion to observe that delay in reporting
the occurrence of a crime or other unusual events in rural areas is well known and should thus,
not be taken against the witness. 14

In the instant case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that it
was their overriding fear of reprisal from the appellant's group that prevented
them from seeking the aid of the authorities. Thus, Vicente Alipan testified as
follows:
QUESTION:
Now, after the alleged incident, did you ever report this matter
to the police authority or any military personnel in your area, if
any?
ANSWER:
I was not able to report this matter to the authorities.
xxx xxx xxx
QUESTION:
And you did not likewise report the incident to any of the
military personnel who were patrolling at your area, is that
correct?
ANSWER:

We were not able to report the matter to the military authority

because we were warned by these people not to report
because if we will report they will kill us all. 15 (Emphasis supplied.)
Danilo Tehidor likewise testified that the appellant and his companions
threatened their family with execution should they report the matter to the
authorities:
QUESTION:
Immediately after that incident when your father and your
brother were forcibly taken by Naring and his group, why did
you not immediately report the matter to the police?
ANSWER:
Because at that time we were warned not to report, they were
guarding us.
QUESTION:
Who were guarding you?
ANSWER:
The companions of the accused.
QUESTION:
Why after the incident were there occasions that this Narito
Dadles and his companions visited you in your house or have
seen you elsewhere, were there instances?
ANSWER:
Yes, sir.
QUESTION:
Do (sic) they visit your house after that incident?
ANSWER:

Not in the house, only in a certain market place.

QUESTION:
Who among your (sic) members of the family being (sic)
warned by Narito Dadles or his group not to report the matter
to the police.
ATTY. LABIS:
No basis. There was no answer that this witness was warned
not to report to the police.
COURT:
Guarded only.
PROSECUTOR AREVALO:
QUESTION:
How do (sic) you know that you and any members (sic) of your
family is (sic) being guarded from the moment you tried to go
out from your place?
ANSWER:
They sent us a letter warning us that if ever we report the
matter to the authorities they will kill all of us.
QUESTION:
Who sent the letter to your family?
ANSWER:
Dindo.
QUESTION:
Whom (sic) did Dindo send the letter?
ANSWER:

The letter was sent to my mother through a child courier. 16 (Emphasis

supplied.)

It is evident that the prosecution witnesses were overcome by fear that the
appellant and his companions would make good their threat the moment they
report the incident to the police. This is undoubtedly the same fear which
deterred them from confronting the appellant despite their many opportunities to
do so. The prosecution witnesses were well aware that the appellant did not act
alone but was aided by several other men and that they all possessed firearms.
Furthermore, the appellant lived in the same barangay as the witnesses and had
easy access to them. Under the circumstances, the witnesses could not be
blamed for reporting the incident only after they were already able to transfer
residence to another barangay. Contrary to appellant's allegation, such a reaction
is natural, spontaneous and logical in view of the witnesses' first impulse for selfpreservation. It is of common human experience that people overcome by great
fear, not only for their lives but also of those of their loved ones, will choose to
remain tight-lipped about an incident and suffer in silence rather than expose to
risk their own safety and of those for whom they care. 17
Anent the appellant's defense, suffice it to state that his alibi even if supported by
the testimonies of his friends, deserves the barest consideration. 18 This court has
held time and again that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused by the prosecution witnesses who had no untoward motive to falsely testify against
him. 19 Relevant is the fact that there appears to be no motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses to fabricate a criminal charge against the appellant who is admittedly an acquaintance
and whom they have welcomed in their respective households several times in the past. It must
be noted that the prosecution witnesses in this case are immediate relatives of the victims whose
natural interest in obtaining justice and redress by securing the conviction of the parties
responsible for the crime would deter them from implicating persons other than the real culprits. 20

Just as oft-repeated is the rule that for alibi to offset the evidence of the
prosecution demonstrating the guilt of the accused, he must establish not only
that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time
that it was committed. 21 The defense has failed to meet the requisites of time and place.
Nowhere from the testimonies of the defense witnesses nor from the circumstances of the case
may we infer that it was physically impossible for the appellant to be at the scene of the crime at
the alleged time of its commission.

Rogelio's testimony succeeds only in establishing that the appellant slept in his
house on the night of May 24, 1989. Rogelio who slept in another room could not
have known if appellant left his house sometime during the night after everyone
else had fallen asleep. Furthermore, from the appellant's own admission,

Barangay Amontay is only 30 kilometers away from Barangay San Pedro. 22 The
defense's theory that as there was no longer any public transportation available after six o'clock
in the evening, it was impossible for the appellant to have been able to reach Barangay Amontay
fails to persuade. The absence of public transportation does not negate the possibility that the
appellant availed of other modes of transportation present at that hour. Thus, it was not totally
improbable for the appellant to have hitched a ride in one of the many trucks plying that route.

As the core issue in the appellant's first assignment of error is ultimately the
credibility of the prosecution vis-a-vis the defense witnesses, it may not be amiss
to state herein the well-settled doctrine that the opinion of the trial court as to
who of them should be believed is entitled to great respect, the latter having had
the unequalled opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and to determine by
their demeanor on the stand the probative value of their testimonies. And none of
the recognized exceptions to the rule, that is, where the record circumstances of
weight and influence have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied by the
trial court which, if considered, would have affected the result of the case, and
when such findings are arbitrary, exist in the case of bench. 23
We now go to the appellant's second assignment of error where he posits that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses fail to make out a case of kidnapping. It
is argued that the prosecution was unable to indubitably prove that the purpose
of the appellant and his companions in taking the victims was to deprive them of
their liberty. 24 We disagree.
Nothing else is clearer from the testimony of Francisca than that her husband,
Alipio and son, Dionisio were taken by the appellant's group by force and against
their will. Thus:
QUESTION:
After that what happened?
ANSWER:
My husband was hogtied downstairs.
QUESTION:
Personally, who hogtied your husband?
ANSWER:
Morito.

QUESTION:
Was he assisted by any of his companions?
ANSWER:
Yes, sir.
QUESTION:
Who among his companions?
ANSWER:
Narito and Mike, only the two of them.
QUESTION:
While these persons you mentioned were hogtying your
husband, what did you do:
ANSWER:
I did not do anything. I asked them why they hogtied their
"tatay". They answered, "we will free "tatay" if he will
surrender the firearm because we knew (sic) that the firearm of
your son is with you.
QUESTION:
In spite of your plea, these persons, who tied your husband,
did not hear (sic) to your request?
ANSWER:
No, sir, they did not.
QUESTION:
While hogtying your husband, what happened?
ANSWER:

They said that if my husband will surrender to them the

firearm, they will free my husband and my son.
QUESTION:
Why, you said awhile ago that it was only your husband Alipio
Tehidor, why what happened to your son?
ANSWER:
They were two, my husband and my son were hogtied.
QUESTION:
The two of them were hogtied?
ANSWER:
Yes, sir. 25 (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing was corroborated by another eyewitness to the crime, Danilo who
testified as follows:
QUESTION:
At around that time on that date, May 24, 1989 at around 11:00
o'clock in the evening, could you recall if there was any
untoward incident that happened?
ANSWER:
Yes, sir.
QUESTION:
What was that unusual incident that happened?
ANSWER:
My father and brother were taken by them on that evening.
QUESTION:

When you said, "taken by them", whom (sic) are you referring,
who took your brother and father?
ANSWER:
Narito Dadles.
QUESTION:
When you said they took your brother and father was Narito
Dadles accompanied by other members of his group?
ATTY. LABIS:
The question is leading.
PROSECUTOR AREVALO:
I was just confronting the witness. That was the statement of
the witness.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
ANSWER:
Yes, sir, his companions were Dindo, Mike, Narito (sic), Willy
and Juanito.
PROSECUTOR AREVALO:
QUESTION:
There were five of them?
ANSWER:
Yes, sir.
QUESTION:
How did they take your brother and father?

ANSWER:
Their hands were tied at the back.
QUESTION:
The two of them, your father and your brother?
ANSWER:
Yes, sir. 26 (Emphasis supplied.)
As regards the victims Salvador and Antonio Alipan, the appellant points out that
the testimony of Luzviminda who witnessed the alleged kidnapping demonstrate
that the victims were not deprived of their liberty because they went with the
appellant and his companions peacefully without being subjected to threats and
coercion. 27 The court is not convinced. That the victims' hands were not tied nor guns poked at
their sides when they were taken by the appellant's do not conclusively preclude the deprivation
of their liberty. The circumstances surrounding the taking of Salvador and Antonio, particularly
the appellant and his companions' previous conduct in kidnapping victims Alipio and Dionisio,
plainly demonstrate their intent to likewise deprive Salvador and Antonio of their liberty.

True it is that "evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is
not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at
another time." 28 However, "it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity,
plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like." 29 Thus we have held that:

The general rule is that evidence is not admissible which shows or tends to
show, that the accused in a criminal case has committed a crime wholly
independent of the offense for which he is on trial. It is not competent to
prove that he committed other crimes of a like nature for the purpose of
showing that he would be likely to commit the crime charged in the
indictment. A man may be a notorious criminal, but this fact may not be
shown to influence a jury in passing upon the question of his guilt or
innocence of the particular offense for which he is on trial. A man may have
committed many crimes and still be innocent of the crime charged in the
case on trial. To permit proof of other crimes would naturally predispose
the minds of the jurors against the defendant. One who commits one crime
may be more likely to commit another; yet logically, one crime does not
prove another, nor tend to prove another, unless there is such a relation
between them that proof of one tends to prove the other. 30

In the early case of United States v. Evangelista, 31 the accused was convicted of arson
after the trial court admitted evidence that he had earlier attempted to set fire to the same
premises. Ruling on the admissibility of the said evidence, we said that:

. . . While it was not the fire charged in the information, and does not by any
means amount to direct evidence against the accused, it was competent to
prove the intent of the accused in setting the fire which was charged in the
information.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . "Where a person is charged with the commission of a specific crime,
testimony may be received of other similar acts, committed about the same
time, for the purpose only of establishing the criminal intent of the
accused." 32 (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case we find that there is such a relation between both incidents of
kidnapping charged in the two informations that "proof of one tends to prove the
other", and evidence of similar acts committed about the same time establishes
the criminal intent of the appellant to deprive Salvador and Alipan of their liberty.
First of all, both incidents happened almost simultaneously. The kidnapping of
Alipio and Dionisio occurred only some thirty (30) minutes before Salvador and
Antonio were taken from their home. The appellant and his companions were
apparently well acquainted with the Tehidors and the Alipans who readily allowed
them entrance into their respective houses on the fateful night of May 24, 1989.
Alipio and Dionisio were taken by the appellant's group on the pretext that they
wanted to talk to Alipio. Similarly, the appellant claims that they took Salvador
and Antonio only because they wanted to talk to the former. Alipio's wife was
warned not to tell the authorities about the incident. The same warning was given
to Salvador's wife.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
circumstances exist to further warrant the conclusion that it was the appellant's
criminal intent to deprive the victims of liberty, to wit:
First. If appellant's group merely wanted to talk to Salvador Alipan, they
could just have talked to him then and there at the house of the latter
without necessarily taking him together with his son.
Second. Appellant's group could have elicited the required information
from Salvador in just a matter of hours. Hence, they should have returned

Salvador and his son the following day as promised. To this date, however,
no trace of the two (2) can be found.
Third. If they did not have any ill-motive against the duo, why did they warn
the family of the victims not to report the incident to anybody or they will
be killed? Clearly, this behavior betrays the falsity of their alleged
intention. 33
The court therefore finds the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
kidnapping the victims, Salvador Alipan, Antonio Alipan, Alipio Tehidor and
Dionisio Tehidor. However, "since none of the circumstances mentioned in Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code (kidnapping with serious illegal detention) was
proved and only the fact of kidnapping . . . was established, we find that the crime
committed is slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal
Code. . . . ." 34 Moreover, in the execution of the crime against the first two (2) victims, Salvador
and Antonio Alipan, more than three (3) armed malefactors acted together in its
commission. 35 Thus, since the generic aggravating circumstance of band 36attended the
commission of the crime and there being no mitigating circumstance present, the penalty
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period. For the slight illegal detention of the latter two (2)
victims, Alipio and Dionisio Tehidor, the aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed
by a band as alleged in the information finds no sufficient factual basis since the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses do not disclose that at least four (4) of the malefactors were
armed. 37 Hence there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attendant in the
commission of the crime, the penalty of reclusion temporal should be imposed in its medium
period.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Narito

Dadles is found guilty of two counts of slight illegal detention and is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum for the slight
illegal detention of Salvador and Antonio Alipan, and the indeterminate penalty of
ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporalmedium as maximum for the slight illegal detention
of Alipio and Dionisio Tehidor, both penalties to be served successively
according to Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code on successive service of
sentences. Appellant is likewise ordered to indemnify the families of the victims
in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) each without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 143644

August 14, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RUBIROSA PASTRANA y TEFORA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18,
convicting accused-appellant Rubirosa Pastrana y Tefora of the crime of kidnapping and
failure to return a minor and imposing upon her the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The information filed against accused-appellant reads:
That on or about March 16, 1997, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
being then entrusted with the custody of one WILLY SIASON Y GARPEN, 2 a minor
child, nine (9) years of age, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap
and detain said Willy Siason y Garpen, by then and there taking and carrying him away
and deliberately failed to restore him to his mother or guardian.
Contrary to law.3
When arraigned on April 7, 1999, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.4 Trial on the
merits thereafter ensued.
The antecedent facts reveal that complainant Erma Postejo was then working as a
domestic helper in Canada. She has four children namely, Jenny, Doroteo, Aresola, and
9-year old Willy Garpen, Jr., her son by a common-law-relationship. 5
Sometime in January 1997, while in Canada, Erma was introduced by her sister, Elma
Saludarez6 to spouses Leopoldo and Rebecca Frias who informed her that their
daughter, accused-appellant Rubirosa Pastrana of Tondo, Manila, can help process
Willys travel documents to Canada. Erma agreed to hand the processing of her sons

papers to accused-appellant and consequently sent her, on various occasions,

Canadian dollars equivalent to a total of P18,300.00. 7
On February 15, 1997, accused-appellant went to the house of Erma at 1229
Sampaguita St., Malaria, Tala, Caloocan City and introduced herself to the children of
Erma as the one who will work out the processing of their travel documents to Canada. 8
In one of the telephone conversations of Erma and accused-appellant, the latter
informed Erma that Willy was suffering from acute bronchitis. Thus, Erma sent
P5,610.00 to accused-appellant with the instruction that P3,000.00 thereof should be
given to her other son, Doroteo, and the balance to be spent for Willys medical
treatment. Accused-appellant, however, gave Doroteo only P2,500.00 and not
P3,000.00 as instructed by Erma.9
On March 16, 1997, accused-appellant fetched Willy and Aresola from Caloocan and
brought them to her apartment in Tondo, for the purpose of bringing Willy to the hospital.
On March 17, 1997, Aresola went home to attend her classes. That same day, Erma
called up accused-appellant who informed her that she was not able to bring Willy to the
hospital because she used the money to pay her personal obligations. 10
On March 19, 1997, Erma learned that Willy had already been treated and that
accused-appellant demanded P4,000.00 for the alleged expenses she incurred for
Willys medical treatment. Accused-appellant also told Erma that the tap water in Tondo
is not safe for Willy, thus, she asked her to send P60,000.00 to purchase a water
purifier. Likewise, accused-appellant requested financial assistance from Erma for her
job application in Singapore. Erma, however, refused to transmit the amounts asked by
accused-appellant and ordered her to return Willy to Caloocan but the latter ignored
her.11
On March 25, 1997, Erma found out from Aresola that accused-appellant did not return
Willy to Caloocan. Aresola then tried to contact accused-appellant in Tondo, but she
was told that she has left her apartment.12
On March 27, 1997, at around 11:00 a.m., accused-appellant went to Caloocan and
informed Doroteo that Willy was missing. He was allegedly last seen playing inside her
apartment in the morning of March 26, 1997. They searched for Willy but their efforts
were fruitless.13
On April 24, 1997, Erma returned to the Philippines to look for her son. Through the help
of the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC), Erma discovered that, contrary

to the claim of accused-appellant, Willy was not actually treated by Dr. Rebecca Nakpil
Miranda.14
Accused-appellant vehemently denied the charges against her. She testified that she
resided in an apartment in Tondo, Manila, and used to work as a liaison officer of a
travel agency. Sometime in February 1997, she received a letter from her parents in
Canada, requesting her to help Erma Postejo in the procurement of the travel papers of
her son, Willy Garpen. On February 15, 1997, she went to the house of Erma Postejo in
Caloocan, and introduced herself to the children of Erma. On March 16, 1997, she took
Willy to her apartment in Tondo for the purpose of bringing him to Mary Johnston
Hospital, where he was treated by Dr. Rebecca Nakpil Miranda for acute bronchitis. On
various occasions, she received the total amounts of P18,000.00 and P5,610.00 from
Erma for the expenses of Willy. On March 26, 1997, Willy disappeared. She allegedly
last saw him playing inside their apartment that morning. 15
On the same day, she reported Willys disappearance to the authorities and did her best
to find him. The following day, March 27, 1997, she went to Ermas relatives in Caloocan
and informed them that Willy was missing. They searched for Willy but to no avail. 16
On May 11, 2000, the trial court rendered the assailed judgment of conviction. The
decretal portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused, Rubirosa Pastrana, y Tefora, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article
270 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences her to suffer reclusion perpetua with all
the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs. On the civil liability of the
accused she is ordered to pay the complainant moral damages and nominal damages
in the sum of P500,000.00 and P100,000.00, respectively, with interest thereon at the
legal rate of 6% per annum from this date until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.17
Hence, the instant appeal based on the following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED WAS ENTRUSTED
WITH THE CUSTODY OF WILLY SIASON Y GARPEN (sic) (WILLY).
II

ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED WAS ENTRUSTED WITH THE CUSTODY OF

WILLY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED KIDNAPPED,
DETAINED AND/OR DELIBERATELY FAILED TO RESTORE WILLY TO HIS MOTHER
OR GUARDIAN.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FOCUSING ON PERCEIVED WEAKNESS OF THE
DEFENSE INSTEAD OF DETERMINING WHETHER THE PROSECUTIONS
EVIDENCE IS STRONG ENOUGH TO MEET THE REQUISITE STANDARD OF
PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED AND IN NOT
ACQUITTING HER ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE ACCUSED TO PAY COMPLAINANT
P500,000.00 MORAL DAMAGES AND P100,000.00 NOMINAL DAMAGES, WITH
INTEREST THEREON AT 6% PER ANNUM FROM DATE OF THE JUDGMENT UNTIL
FULL PAYMENT.18
Kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code
has two essential elements, namely: (1) the offender is entrusted with the custody of a
minor person; and (2) the offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his
parents or guardians. What is actually being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor
but rather the deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his
parents or guardians. The word deliberate as used in Article 270 must imply something
more than mere negligence - it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or
intentionally and maliciously wrong.19
In the case at bar, there is no question that accused-appellant was entrusted with the
custody of 9-year old Willy. Erma and her children trusted accused-appellant that they
sent her money for the processing of Willys travel documents, and more importantly,
they allowed Willy to stay in her apartment. Regardless of whether Willy stayed in
accused-appellants apartment permanently or temporarily, the first element of the
offense charged is satisfied because during said period Willy was entrusted to accusedappellant who undertook the responsibility of seeing to it that he was well-taken care of.

As to the second element, accused-appellant contends that her failure to return Willy
was never deliberate inasmuch as her inability to return him to his mother and/or
guardian was due to his disappearance which was definitely beyond her control.
The contention is without merit. It was actually her failure to heed Ermas order on
March 19, 1997 to return Willy to their residence in Sampaguita St., Malaria, Tala,
Caloocan City, that consummated the offense. We agree with the finding of the trial
court that accused-appellant deliberately failed to return Willy in order to use him as a
pawn when her demands were turned down by Erma. The willfulness of accusedappellants omission is adequately established by the following circumstances, to wit: 1)
accused-appellants representation that she had Willy treated by Dr. Rebecca Nakpil
Miranda of Mary Johnston Hospital which was found to be false; 2) accused-appellants
act of giving Doroteo P2,500.00 and not P3,000.00 as instructed by Erma; 3) accusedappellants use for her personal indebtedness of the money sent by Erma and her
demand for additional P4,000.00 allegedly for the hospital expenses of Willy; 4)
accused-appellants demand of P60,000.00 for the installation of a water purifier in her
apartment allegedly for Willys safety, and for additional money for her job application in
Singapore; and 5) the lapse of seven days during which accused-appellant willfully
failed to return Willy to Caloocan, which is only an hour away from her residence in
Tondo, until his disappearance.
Evidently, accused-appellant deliberately ignored Ermas instruction to return Willy to
Caloocan so she can use him as a pawn to demand money. She had 7 days from the
time she was ordered by Erma on March 19, 1997, until March 26, 1997 when Willy
mysteriously disappeared, to bring him to Caloocan but she stubbornly refused to return
him. It was this deliberate failure of accused-appellant to return custody of Willy to his
relatives that gave rise to her culpability under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code.
Hence, the disappearance of Willy and accused-appellants inability to return him to
Caloocan by reason thereof has no bearing on the crime charged as it was her wilfull
disobedience to Ermas order that consummated the crime. Accused-appellants selfserving denial cannot prevail over the prosecution witnesses positive testimony
disproving her representations. As observed by the trial court, her "demeanor and
attitudeon the witness stand had given [the court] the impression that, unlike the
complainant and the other prosecution witnesses, [she] was not sincere, straightforward
and truthful."20
Then too, the Court is not convinced of accused-appellants argument that the
information filed against her is defective because it states that the crime was committed
on March 16, 1997 when in fact, Willy disappeared on March 26, 1997. To repeat, the
disappearance of Willy on March 26, 1997 is not material to the crime charged. The first
element of the crime was met on March 16, 1997, when accused-appellant took custody

of Willy and the second requisite attached on March 19, 1997, when accused-appellant
deliberately failed to return Willy. Furthermore, the objection to the information should
have been raised by accused-appellant before she entered her plea if she truly believed
that the information failed to conform substantially with the prescribed form. Failure to
do so is deemed a waiver of such ground.21
In the final analysis, the issue posed here is the credibility of witnesses. As consistently
ruled by the Court, we will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining
the credibility of witnesses unless there appears on record some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted. Factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of
witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect. This is so because the trial court has
the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness
or falsehood.22 In the instant case, there is no reason for us to disregard the trial courts
finding that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are entitled to full faith and
credit.
1wphi1

Considering that accused-appellants guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt,

the trial court correctly imposed upon her the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to
Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code.
In People v. Bernardo,23 the Court held that Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code is
clearly analogous to cases of illegal and arbitrary detention or arrest which justify the
award of moral damages as provided for in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Likewise,
under Article 2221 of the Civil Code, nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a
right of the plaintiff, which has been violated by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by
him. Conformably, the Court sustains the trial courts award of damages but reduces the
amount of moral damages from P500,000.00 to P100,000.00, and the nominal damages
from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00.
The award of interest on damages is proper and allowed under Article 2211 of the Civil
Code, which states that in crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as part of the damages
may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the court.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 18, convicting accused-appellant Rubirosa Pastrana y Tefora of the
crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor and imposing upon her the penalty
of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the awards of moral
and nominal damages are reduced to P100,000.00, and P50,000.00, respectively, with

legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from May 11, 2000, the date of the
judgment of the trial court.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 101797 March 24, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ABUNDIO ROLUNA, accused-appellant.
CARLOS DAGUING, PATERNO DAGUING, MAMERTO ASMOLO, TEODULFO
DAGUING, FEDERICO SIMPRON, BIENVENIDO SIMPRON and DIDOC
BONGCALOS (all at large), accused.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ernesto D. Labastida, Sr. for accused-appellant.

PUNO, J.:
In an Information dated June 26, 1990, eight (8) persons were charged with the crime of
Kidnapping with Murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay,
Leyte. 1 They were Abundio Roluna, Carlos Daguing, Paterno Daguing, Mamerto Asmolo, Teodulfo
Daguing, Federico Simpron, Bienvenido Simpron and Didoc Bongcalos. The Information against them
reads:

That on or about the 27th day of May, 1984, in the municipality of Baybay,
Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping with (sic) one another, with the use of firearms and taking
advantage of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously hogtie and kidnap one Anatalio Moronia and take him away to
a place unknown up (to) this time whereat said victim was killed.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Only accused Abundio Roluna was arrested, tried and convicted. The other seven (7)
accused remain at large.
The prosecution presented two (2) witnesses, namely, Conrado Sombilon and
Buenaventura Nogalada, both of whom were residents of barangay Amguhan, Baybay,
Leyte.
CONRADO SOMBILON testified that on May 27, 1984, at around seven o'clock in the
morning, he was on his way to sitio Bungabungan in barangay Amguhan to attend to the
pasture of his carabao. At a distance of thirty (30) meters, he saw his neighbor, Anatalio
Moronia, stopped in his tracks and taken captive by accused Abundio Roluna. Roluna
was then accompanied by seven (7) other persons. viz: Didoc Bongcalos, Federico
Simpron, Bienvenido Simpron, Teodulfo Daguing, Carlos Daguing, Mamerto Asmolo
and Paterno Daguing. Accused Roluna was armed with an armalite while his
companions were carrying short firearms. Using an abaca strip, he saw Carlos Daguing
tie up the hands of Moronia at the back. Frightened, he did not shout for help and
proceeded on his way. With the exception of his wife, he did not inform anyone about
what he saw that fateful day. 2
BUENAVENTURA NOGALADA corroborated in substance the testimony of Sombilon.
He testified that on said day, at around nine o'clock in the morning, he came from his
farm in barangay Monterico, Baybay and was on his way home to barangay Amguhan.
At a distance of about twenty-five (25) meters, he saw Moronia walking along a human
trail in barangay Amguhan, with his hands tied by a rope behind his back. Moronia was
followed by accused Roluna, Carlos Daguing and five (5) other persons whom he did
not recognize. Accused Roluna was carrying an armalite while Carlos Daguing was
armed with a pistol. Frightened, Nogalada immediately left the place. 3
From that time on, both witnesses testified that Moronia was never seen or heard from.
At the trial, accused Roluna hoisted the defense of denial and alibi. Roluna claimed that
on May 24, 1984, Danilo Noroo, a cousin of his wife, went to their house in barangay
Amguhan. They were informed by Danilo that Iluminada Cortines y Noroo, his wife's
grandmother, was bedridden and seriously ill. He and his wife immediately proceeded to
Iluminada's house in barangay Banahaw, Baybay, Leyte. As soon as they arrived, he
gathered some herbal plants for Iluminada. He boiled these plants and regularly applied
them on Iluminada's body. He and his wife attended to Iluminada for three (3) weeks.
After Iluminada recuperated from her illness, they returned to their home in barangay
Amguhan. 4 His testimony was corroborated in substance by his wife, Teresita Roluna and his
grandmother-in-law, Iluminada Cortines de Noroo.

Accused Roluna charged that prosecution witnesses Sombilon and Nogalada, harboring
ill-feelings against him, testified falsely and implicated him in the disappearance of
Anatalio Moronia. He claimed that in 1983, he and Sombilon had a dispute over a cara y
cruz game held in their barangay. Sombilon was then drunk and he, as chairman of the
Kabataang Barangay, tried to pacify Sombilon but the latter got mad at him. Since then,
they have not talked with each other. Nogalada on the other hand, also had a grudge
against him. In 1982, they had an altercation during a volleyball game held during the
barangay fiesta. 5
After the trial, the court a quo promulgated its decision, 6 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Abundio Roluna y Elhig guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Kidnapping With
Murder. As kidnapping (and serious illegal detention) is penalized
with reclusion perpetua to death and murder with reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, under Article 48 of the Code, the herein
accused should be punished with the maximum of the more serious crime,
hereat the supreme penalty of death. Considering that the Constitution of
1987 does not allow the imposition of the death penalty, however, herein
accused is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to indemnify the
heirs of Anatalio Moronia the sum of P30,000.00. He is credited with the
full period of his detention in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, except if he did not sign an agreement to obey
the prison laws, rules and regulations at the inception.
SO ORDERED.
Hence this appeal.
In his brief, accused-appellant charges that the trial court erred in finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping with Murder. Accused-appellant
points and stresses that the corpus delicti was not duly proved by the prosecution. He
submits, inter alia, that considering that the body of Anatalio Moronia was never found,
Moronia's questionable and unexplained absence and disappearance should not be
blamed on him for the alleged victim, in all probability, may still be alive.
In its brief, the People contends that the fact of Moronia's death and the culpability of
accused-appellant were sufficiently established by the evidence. The People relies on
the disputable presumption provided under Section 5 (x) (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court, viz.:

The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the
division of the estate among the heirs:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances
and his existence has not been known for four (4) years.
Undoubtedly, the victim, Moronia, was last seen on that fateful day of May 27, 1984.
During this time, Moronia, with his hands tied at the back, was accompanied by eight (8)
armed men. Clearly, he was then in danger of death. Since that day until the date of the
trial (or for a span of six years), Moronia has not been seen or heard from. The People
urges that these circumstances raised a presumption that Moronia has been killed by
accused-appellant and his companions.
The pivotal issues are: (a) whether or not the circumstances proved by the prosecution
are sufficient to establish the death of Anatalio Moronia, and; (b) if in the affirmative,
whether or not accused-appellants and his companions could be held liable therefor.
Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or substance of the crime and, in its
primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime has been actually committed. As applied to
a particular offense, it means the actual commission by someone of the particular crime
charged. 7 The corpus delicti is a compound fact made up of two (2) things, viz: the existence of a
certain act or result forming the basis of the criminal charge, and the existence of a criminal agency as the
cause of this act or result. 8

Were the two (2) aspects of the corpus delicti proved in this case?
Insofar as the death of Moronia is concerned, the fact that he was last seen on May 27,
1984 with his hands tied at the back and accompanied by eight (8) armed men
undoubtedly shows that his life was then in danger or peril. Coupled with the fact that
Moronia has been absent and unheard from since that time until the trial of this case (or
a total of six years), a presumption of death was sufficiently raised. This is in
consonance with Section 5 (x) (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the
division of the estate among the heirs:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances
and his existence has not been known for four (4) years.

However, the circumstances presented by the prosecution would not be enough to hold
accused-appellant responsible for the death of Moronia.
In the early case of People v. Sasota, 9 the Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for
murder although the body of the victim was not found or recovered. In said case, we ruled that in case of
murder or homicide, it is not necessary to recover the body of the victim or show where it can be found. It
is enough that the death and the criminal agency causing death is proven. The Court recognized that
there are cases where the death and intervention of the criminal agency that caused it may be presumed
or established by circumstantial evidence.

However, the ruling in the Sasota case cannot be applied to the case at bench. In
the Sasota case, the prosecution witnesses saw the four (4) armed accused forcibly
take the victim from his house to a lake, beating him up all the way to the boat. While
sailing, the accused continued ill-treating the victim until the latter died. The body of the
victim was never found.
In this case, however, the prosecution witnesses testified that they merely saw one of
the accused, Carlos Daguing, tie up the hands of Moronia. He was then taken in the
direction of barangay Monterico and was never seen or heard from since. At no point
during the trial was it ever established that any of the eight (8) accused beat up Moronia
or in any way laid a violent hand on him. Nogalada even testified that he did not hear
any shot fired by any of the eight (8) armed accused 10 so as to warrant a reasonable
conclusion that Moronia was killed by accused-appellant or any of his co-conspirators. Indeed, even the
possible motive of accused-appellant and his group for abducting Moronia was not definitively
established. To be sure, the circumstances proved are insufficient to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt for the serious crime of kidnapping with murder.

There being no evidence to the contrary, the disputable presumption under Section 5 (x)
(3), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court would apply, but only insofar as to establish the
presumptive death of Moronia. Whether accused-appellant is responsible for the death
of Moronia is a different matter. The Rules did not authorize that from this disputable
presumption of death, it should be further presumed that the person with whom the
absentee was last seen shall be responsible for the subsequent unexplained
absence/disappearance of the latter. The conviction of accused-appellant for the serious
crime of kidnapping with murder cannot be allowed to rest on the vague and nebulous
facts established by the prosecution. As discussed earlier, the evidence presented by
the prosecution surrounding the events of that fateful day are grossly insufficient to
establish the alleged liability of accused-appellant for the death of Moronia.
It is a well-entrenched principle in criminal law that an accused is presumed innocent
until proven otherwise. No less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to
convict him. On the whole, the evidence adduced by the prosecution would not prove

beyond a shadow of a doubt that accused-appellant should be convicted for the serious
crime of kidnapping with murder.
Since none of the circumstances mentioned in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
(kidnapping with serious illegal detention) was proved and only the fact of kidnapping of
Anatalio Moronia was established, we find that the crime committed is slight illegal
detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code. In the execution of the crime,
more than three (3) armed malefactors acted together in its commission. Thus, since
the generic aggravating circumstance of band 11 attended the commission of the crime and there
being no mitigating circumstance present, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period as
maximum and prision mayor as minimum should be imposed on accused-appellant. 12

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby MODIFIED.

Accused-appellant Abundio Roluna is found guilty of slight illegal detention and is meted
an indeterminate sentence from twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum. 13 Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-32529 May 12, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TY SUI WONG, VICTOR NG alias "TY SING LING" ROQUE DEJUNGCO alias
"GERRY", JOSE DE LOS SANTOS alias "PEPENG KOMANG", ROMUALDO
CARREON alias "OMENG" JUANITO ANG y DEJUNGCO, JOHN DOE and PETER
DOE, defendants. VICTOR NG alias "TY SING LING" and JOSE DE LOS SANTOS
alias "PEPENG KOMANG", defendants-appellants.
Dakila F. Castro & Associates for appellant, Victor Ng.
A. E. Dacanay for appellant Jose de los Santos.
Office of the Solicitor General, for appellee.

ANTONIO, J.:
Appeal by Victor Ng and Jose de los Santos from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch V, Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. Q-7612, finding them
guilty of Murder and imposing upon them the penalties of an indeterminate penalty from
ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum with respect to Victor Ng, and reclusion
perpetua to Jose de los Santos.
Victor Ng and Jose de los Santos, together with Roque Dejungco alias Gerry, Romualdo
Carreon alias Omeng, Juanito Ang y Dejungco, Ty Sui Wong, John Doe and Peter Doe,
were charged with Kidnapping with Murder before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch, as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of December, 1966 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the accused ROQUE DEJUNGCO, JOSE DE LOS SANTOS,
ROMUALDO CARREON and JUANITO ANG, pursuant to a conspiracy
previously had with their co-accused TY SUI WONG, VICTOR NG, JOHN
DOE and PETER DOE, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, by means of force and intimidation, at night time purposely
sought to facilitate the commission of the crime, and with the use of a
motor vehicle, kidnap one MARIANO LIM at the latter's residence at No.
36 Kanlaon, Quezon City, after which said accused, in further pursuing
their conspiracy aforestated, did, then and there employ personal violence
upon the person of said MARIANO LIM, by then and there, with intent to
kill, with evident premeditation, with treachery, by taking advantage of their
superior strength, and in consideration of the price or reward given to
them and promised by, their co-accused TY SUI WONG, VICTOR NG,
PETER DOE and JOHN DOE, attack, assault, and employ personal
violence upon the person of MARIANO LIM, by stabbing the latter with a
bladed weapon thereby inflicting upon the said MARIANO LIM serious and
mortal wounds which was the direct and immediate cause of his death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said MARIANO LIM in such
amount as may be awarded them under the provisions of the civil code.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (CFI Rollo, pp. 1-2).
Upon arraignment, Victor Ng, Roque Dejungco, Jose de los Santos, Romualdo Carreon
and Juanito Ang pleaded not guilty on February 20, 1967, 1 while Ty Sui Wong also pleaded

not guilty on April 14, 1967. 2 Thereafter, trial commenced on May 19, 1967, and ended on December 23,
1968 before Judge Honorato B. Masakayan, after which both the prosecution and "he defenses submitted
their respective memoranda. Meanwhile, or on January 4, 1968, upon motion to dismiss filed on
December 26, 1967 by the counsel for accused Ty Sui Wong, 3 the Court of First Instance of Rizal issued
an Order 4 discharging said accused Ty Sui Wong for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima
facie case against him.

On January 20, 1970, the afore-mentioned decision finding he accused guilty of murder,
qualified by reward, was promulgated and each of said accused were sentenced as
follows:
(a) Jose de los Santos and Gerry Dejungco, for murder, without any
modifying circumstance as already explained in noticing the existence of
one mitigating circumstance, that of not having intended to commit so
grave a wrong as that committed offsetting the aggravating circumstance
of treachery, to suffer reclusion perpetua.
(b) Victor Ng, also for murder, with the mitigating circumstances of lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed and that of passion,
without any aggravating circumstance to offset, them, to suffer the penalty
one degree lower than of the prescribed penalty of from reclusion
temporary maximum to death (Art. 64, par, 5., R.P.C.). Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law he is hereby sentenced to a prison term of
from 10 years of prision mayor, as minimum to 17 years and 4 months
of reclusion temporal as maximum.
(c) Romualdo Carreon. also for murder, but only as accomplice, as already
explained. to suffer a penalty lower by one degree than that prescribed for
the crime of murder, or prision mayor, medium to reclusion
temporal medium. Pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence law, he should
suffer an indeterminate penalty of from 10 years of prision mayor, as
minimum to 17 years and 4 months ofreclusion temporal as maximum.
(d) For Juanito Ang, for murder, but with the privilege mitigating
circumstances of being 16 years old (Art, 68, R.P.C.) to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of from 10 years prison mayor, as minimum, 17
years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
All the foregoing accused are furthermore sentenced to the accessory
penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, jointly
and severally, in the sum of P12,000 (People v. Pantoja) and in the order
of precedence as to principals and accomplice as provided by law, without

subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay said heirs the

sum of P50,000 as moral damages, Likewise jointly and severally, with
proportionate costs. (CFI Rollo, pp. 615-616).
From the above quoted judgment of conviction, accused Victor Ng. Jose de los Santos,
Roque Dejungco and Romualdo Carreon appealed. 5 Roque Dejungco, however, withdrew his
appeal before the records could be forwarded to the Supreme Court, 6 and Romualdo Carreon
abandoned his appeal while the same was pending before the trial court. thus leaving Victor Ng and Jose
de los Santos as the only appellants. 7 Accused Juanito Ang did not appeal and was committed to prison
to serve his sentence on March 25, 1970. 8

The following statement of facts contained in the brief of the Solicitor General are not
disputed:
Earlier that fateful day of December 21, 1966, which was the victim's 30th
birthday, he and his mother Chua Yem, attended mass in a church at
Libertad St., Pasay City, and thereafter, went driving around the
metropolitan area in his jeep to see the different Christmas decorations
put up by big business establishments during the Yuletide season. (tsn,
pp. 26-29, Sept. 15, 1967, testimony of Chua Yem), The two finally arrived
at their residence at 36 Kanlaon St. at about 11:00 o'clock that night. The
mother alighted from the jeep, while waiting for the housemaid, Angelita
Failona, to open the gate. (tsn, p. 31, Ibid; pp. 11-12, 15-18, 35 July 7.
1967, testimony of Failona). It was while the said maid was opening the
gate that two men suddenly approached the victim from each side of the
jeep, One of the two, positively Identified as Juanito Ang, went to the left of
the victim, placed a hand on the victim's mouth, poked a sharppointed
instrument at the victim (see Exhibit '0-5', p. 31, Rec. of Exhibits) and
forced him to move aside from the driver seat. The other man, also
positively Identified as Romualdo Carreon, went to the otherside of the
jeep, pulled the victim towards him, thus placing the victim between him
and Ang. (tsn, pp. 16-18, 21-23, 73, July 7, 1967, testimony of Failona; pp.
31-33, Sept. 15, 1967, testimony of Chua Yem; pp. 10, 36, Aug. 25, 1967,
testimony of Lim Chu Beng).
Ang and Carreon were categorically Identified at the trial by the mother,
the brother and the maid as the same two persons which forcibly took
Mariano Lim that night of December 21, 1966. (t.s.n. pp 21, 22. July 7,
1967. testimony of Failona, p. 72 July 7, 1967, testimony of Lim Chu
Beng; pp. 36-37, Sept. 15, 1967, testimony Chua Yem). Their Identification
was made easy because on the night in question, the vicinity of the family
residence at Kanlaon St. was well lighted by two mercury lamps, one on a

Meralco post 14 meter way and just across the street. and the other
hanging over the middle of the street, 8 meters from where the jeep was
then parked. (tsn, pp. 34-35, July 7, 1967, testimony of Failona: pp. 6-9,
Aug. 25, 1967, testimony of Lim Chua Beng; also, Exh. 'C' p. 4, Rec. of
Exhibits).
The mother shouted after his son while the maid ran back inside the
house and informed a brother of the victim Lim Chu Beng, then watching a
television show, about what was happening outside.(tsn, pp. 23-24, July 7,
1967, testimony of Failona, pp, 65- 68, July 7, 1967, testimony of Lim Chu
Beng, p. 34, Sept. 15, 1967, testimony of Chua Yem). Lim Chu Beng
immediately ran towards the gate of their house and saw two men in the
jeep with his brother. He rushed towards them only to be met with a kick in
the stomach, which sent him sprawling to the ground, by the man
identified as Carreon. (tsn. pp. 68, 72-74, July 7, 1967, testimony of Lim
Chu Beng, pp. 31, 35, Sept. 15, 1967, testimony of Chua Yem). The jeep
with Ang at the steering wheel then backed out, shifted to forward gears
and sped towards the direction of Dapitan Street. The mother and brother
gave chase up to the corner of Kanlaon and Dapitan Streets but their
efforts proved to be a futile gesture. (tsn, p. 76-A, July 7, 1967, testimony
of Lim Chu Beng; p. 37, Sept. 15, 1967, testimony of Chua Yem).
Mother and son, together with the maid, proceeded to Precinct No. 1 of
the Quezon City Police Department, hereinafter referred to simply as
QCPD, to report the incident. The officer on duty assigned a man to
accompany them to the headquarters of the said police department where
the incident was entered in the police blotter as Case No. 14041 for
robbery hold-up (Exh. 'F'; also Exh. 'F-l'; tsn, pp. 10-11, August 25, 1967
testimony of Lim Chu Beng; pp. 38, 65-66 Sept. 15, 1967, testimony of
Chua Yem; pp. 41-47. October 25, 1967, testimony of Pat. Ricardo
Santos; pp. 10-12 Nov. 21, 1967, testimony of Det. Ruiz). Lim Chu Beng
gave to the police a description of the two men who snatched his brother,
the place where the latter worked (which was at Tong's Glassware at 226
Villalobos, St., Quiapo, Manila) and the fact that his brother was a good
friend of Ruby Ng, the daughter of the victim's employer, Ng Tong. (tsn,
pp. 12, 16-18, Nov. 21, 1967, testimony of Det. Ruiz) (pp. 7-9)
xxx xxx xxx
In the early morning of December 22, 1966, at about 6:00 o'clock, Maria
Abrogar, a cook in the household of Henrick Bratt of The Factor

Compound, Paraaque, Rizal saw at a dead end street inside the

aforesaid compound, the inert body of a man whom she thought to be
merely in a state of a deep drunken stupor. She informed Quirino Asido,
gardener in the same household, of what she saw. urging him to go to the
fellow and invite him for a cup of coffee. (tsn, pp. 15, 21-22, 25-26, May
19, 1967, testimony of Quirino Asido). On the insistence of Abrogar, Asido
finally consented to do her bidding and went to the 'drunk' lying on the
street. Instead, he found a man already dead, his mouth gagged with
handkerchief. (tsn p. 27, Ibid).
Asido forthwith went to the Municipal Building of Paraaque, Rizal, to
report his ghastly discovery and the police department of that town
immediately responded by sending two policemen to accompany Asido
back to the scene to investigate. (tsn. pp. 41-42, Ibid). One of these
policemen, Lorenzo Gabriel described the dead man as around 35 years
of age, wearing dark gray pants and a T-Shirt. (tsn, pp. 76-77, May 19,
1967, testimony of Lorenzo Gabriel Rizal Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Bienvenido Reyes later joined the investigation upon being informed of the
matter and conducted his own inquest. Preliminary finding showed that the
dead man had a stab wound on his chest. (tsn, pp. 87-88, Ibid).
Thereafter, the body was brought to the Funeraria Quiogue for
examination by the proper medico-legal officer. (tsn. p. 90, Ibid).
On December 23, 1966, at about 11:30 o'clock in the morning and after a
futile wait for the body to be identified, Dr. Ernesto Brion of the National
Bureau of Investigation performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the dead
man. (tsn, pp. 52, 60, 68, Oct. 25, 1967, testimony Dr. Brion). The
Necropsy Report prepared by him and marked as Exhibit 'G' at the trial
contained the following findings:
Paller, conjunctivae and integument, No evidence of
beginning putrefaction. Ant bites abundant, all over
integument. Mouth gagged with handkerchief, knotted at
nape. Blood oozing from mouth. Stab wound, chest left,
anterior, 2.0 cm. at level of 3rd intercostal space, 1.5 cm.
from anterior median line, running downwards and slight
laterally, edges clean cut, extremities sharp, directed
backwards, medially and almost horizontally, thru the 3rd
intercostal space and grazing the upper border of 4th rib,
into left thoracic cavity, then into the pericardial cavity,
perforating the pulmonary vein, left superior, and puncturing

the hylus of lung left and small bronchi, with an approximate

depth of 12.00 cm. Trachea-bronchial tree contains blood,
Hemopericardium 150 cc. Hemothorax, left side, 960 cc.
liquid and clotting blood, Paller, brain and other visceral
organs. Stomach contains partly digested rice particles
mixed with blood.
Cause of death: Stab wound of left chest. (See p. 10. Rec. of
Exhibits.)
Before performing his post-mortem examination, Dr. Brion took pictures of
the deceased as well as his fingerprints for possible Identification, (tsn, pp.
56-60, 68-69, Oct. 25, 1967. Ibid; Exhs. 'I', 'I-3,'I-3-a'; also, Exh. 'I-4', pp.
13-14, Rec. of Exhibits). According to the doctor, the wound could have
been caused by a sharppointed instrument such as a dagger, fan knife or
such similar instruments (tsn, p. 64, Oct. 25, 1967) and the death blow
must have been delivered with the assailant holding the death weapon
with his right hand, the victim to his left, with both of them either sitting or
standing together. (tsn, pp, 66-67, Ibid). The body could have been dead
for more than one day when he conducted the autopsy. (tsn, p. 61, Ibid).
The body was remained unidentified until January 20, 1967, when the
brother of the dead man, Camilo Lim, after hearing the radio broadcast
about the unidentified body at the Funeraria Quiogue, went to the said
funeral parlor and Identified the dead man as his brother, Mariano Lim,
who had been forcibly taken away from in front of the family residence at
36 Kanlaon St, Quezon City, on the night of December 21, 1966, (tsn. pp.
53-55, 69-70, 71-73. Ibid, Exhs. 'H' and 'H-l', pp, 11-12, Rec. of Exhibits;
also, tsn. pp. 12-13, July 7, 1967, testimony of Lim Chu Beng; pp, 36-38,
Nov. 21, 1967, testimony of Det. Godofredo Ruiz). (pp. 46).
The following facts, according to the trial court, established beyond doubt the criminal
culpability of the appellants Victor Ng and Jose de los Santos, and their other coaccused, thus:
Assigned to the case as reported to the Quezon City Police Headquarters
and entered as Case No. 14041 for robbery hold-up (Exhibit F) Det.
Godofredo Ruiz interviewed first the complainant, Lim Cho Beng, from
whom he got a description of the hold-up men, and information as to
where Mariano worked and his having a girl friend named Ruby Ng, the
daughter of the owner of Tong's Glassware at Villalobos Street, Quiapo,

Manila, where the victim worked. He then went to the glassware store to
interview Ruby Ng and her father, but he received, no information of value
in the solution of the case. On December 24, 1966, Det. Ruiz went again
to the residence of Mariano Lim, this time to interview his father Lim Hok,
Chua Yam, the mother, and Angelita Faylona, the housemaid. It was then
that he learned that on evening in September or October, 1966, one Victor
Ng and his father, Ty Sui Wong, both armed, together with two other
companions, went to the Lim residence looking for Mariano, but when
informed that Mariano was still out. Ty Sui Wong told Mariano's father to
tell his son (Mariano) to keep away from Ruby Ng, otherwise he would be
liquidated. Det. Ruiz also learned in the course of his interview with those
in the Lim family residence and those in the glassware store at Quiapo,
Manila, that shortly before December 21, 1966, Victor Ng and Mariano Lim
figured in an encounter in front of the Tong's Glassware Store in which
Mariano was mauled. From these incidents, Det. Ruiz marked Victor Ng
as a suspect, into whose personal circumstances and background he was
thus prompted to make proper inquiries from the Bureau of Immigration
where he got his photograph. From Caloocan City Treasurer's Office he
also learned that Victor Ng was the Manager of Starlite Manufacturing Co.
at Kangkong, Quezon City.
From then on, Det. Ruiz tried co contact Victor Ng and able to do so only
on February 6, 1961 at the latter's factory compound. He had brought
along with him to the compound a Chinese speaking companion, and
during that meeting, this companion informed Det. Ruiz that he heard
Victor Ng, speaking in Chinese, telling the Chinese persons in the factory
that he would try to escape. This prompted the detective to call for
assistance from his headquarters, and the timely arrival of reinforcement
foiled Ng's escape attempt, although Ng had already managed to get out
of the compound. Victor Ng was then brought to the Detective Bureau of
Quezon City Police Department. In the presence of the Chief of the
Detective Bureau, Mr. Arcilla of the Manila Times, Mr. Tan of the Fookien
Times, and Mr. Lim of the Greater East Asia Newspaper, he was
interrogated about the slaying of Mariano Lim. Victor Ng at first stood firm
in his denial of any knowledge about the killing, but when confronted with
a picture of the dead man taken by the NBI during the autopsy, he looked
aghast with fear and remained speechless. In a short while, however,
Victor Ng broke down with an admission that he had something to do with
the crime. Det. Ruiz then asked Victor Ng if he was willing to give a written
statement, and receiving an affirmative answer, he took down Ng's
statement after reminding him of his constitutional rights as shown in the

statement itself (Exhibit M). The statement consists of three pages in the
form of questions and answers in Tagalog, the language he preferred to
speak in, duly and voluntarily signed by him after reading it, in the
presence of the detective and other witnesses. Det Ruiz then brought
Victor Ng to Fiscal Solano for the verification of his statement. Again Victor
Ng was asked to read his statement, which he did, even making
corrections therein, and thereafter asked to sign it if the contents were
true. Victor Ng signed voluntarily on all the pages of his statement.
In the course of the interrogation of Victor Ng, as well as in his signed
statement (Exhibit M), he confessed to having contacted his classmate,
Gerry Dejungco, to play a leading role in the commission of the crime he
wanted committed, and that it was Dejungco who arranged for the
execution of the hideous plot upon Ng's offer to pay the sum of P2,000 for
the job. With Dejungco's name thus mentioned, his apprehension quickly
followed, at about 1:00 a.m. of the next day, February 7, 1967. Upon being
investigated, Dejungco also confessed and named Jose de los Santos
and Juanita Ang as confederates. Apprehension of these two was also
effected without loss of time, the former in the early morning of the same
day in his residence at 235 Miguelin, Sampaloc, Manila, the latter in
Welfareville, later in the day at 10:00 o'clock a.m. De los Santos and Ang
also signed respective confessions on the same day, The only remaining
confederate named in the confession of De los Santos and Ang still to be
apprehended and questioned by that tune was Romualdo Carreon. He
voluntarily appeared at the QCPD Headquarters on February 13, 1967,
accompanied by Ernesto Lorenzo and Benjamin Gardiola upon being
informed by his father that Det. Ruiz had been looking for him for
questioning about this case. On the same day, Carreon made and signed
his confession. Thus, in the re-enactment of the crime on February 7,
1967, immediately after confessions have been taken down as aforestate,
only Carreon was not there to take part.
In his signed confession (Exhibit N) Dejungco gave the most compact account of the
plan for the killing of Mariano Lim, as well as its actual execution as follows:
Q: Do you know personally the cause of his death?
S: Yes, sir . . . This is the story. In November 1966, I met Mr.
Victor Ng at a Chinese Club somewhere at Pasay City. He
informed (me) that he had again a quarrel with Mariano Lim
Cho Kuan. I told him if I could do any help to him. He told me

'You see Gerry I know you from childhood and I am

cognizant that you know hoodlums at Sampaloc. . . . You
make a preparation to contact two people who can liquidate
Mariano . . . and I'll answer for the expenses', . . After five
days, I met him again in the same place, and told me that he
will be leaving for Zamboanga and Cebu City, and further
told me that if he will leave by the 15th of December 1966,
and if he will arrive on the 23rd of December, 1966, he
doesn't want to see Mariano alive. So I contacted two people
by the name of JUANITO ANG alias Johnny he is my cousin
and one Pepeng Komang, alias JOSE DE LOS SANTOS
alias JOSE VILLANUEVA. I told these two people about the
plan of Victor Ng, and they told me that they are ready at my
disposal.
The confession of Dejungco was taken down after the usual preliminary
interrogations during which he admitted his participation in the dastardly
crime. As in the case of Victor Ng, he was reminded of his constitutional
rights before he gave his statement, allowed to read, and even correct,
said statement before signing it, which he did voluntarily before Fiscal
Solano who also asked Dejungco before the latter affixed his signature, to
read again his statement and to sign it if the same was true.
The statement of Jose de los Santos alias 'Pepeng Komang' (Exhibit K)
was taken before Pat. Marcos Vias on the same morning of his
apprehension, February 7, 1967, at about 6:30 a.m. In its most important
part his confession reads as follows:
04. T: Anong pagkakasala ang ibig mong sabihin?
S: Pagpatay sa isang tao.
05. T: Ano ang pangalan ng taong napatay na iyong
sinasabi?
S: Mariano daw po.
06. T: Papaano mo nalaman na Mariano ang pangalan ng
napatay na tao?
S: Sinabi ho sa akin ni Gerry.

07. T: Sino ba itong si Gerry?

S: Siya po. (Affiant pointing to the person of ROQUE
DEJUNGCO Y CHAN, alias Gerry, 25 yrs. old, single, native
of Manila and residing at 235 Miguelin St., Sampaloc,
Manila).
08. T: Ano ang kaugnayan nitong si Gerry o Roque Dejungco
sa pagkamatay ni Mariano?
S: Kasama po siya sa pagpatay bilang pangalawang
mastermind, Siya ang bilang boss namin sapagkat siya ang
naguutos.
09. T: Ano ang ibig mong sabihin ng salitang 'namin'?
S: Ang ibig ko pong sabihin ay ako. si Omeng na ang tunay
na pangalan ay Romeo Carreon at Juanito Ang.
10. T: Ano naman ang kaugnayan mo sa pagkamatay
Mariano?
S: Kasama po ako sa pagpatay kay Mariano.
11. T: Bakit nasabi mo na pangalawang mastermind si Gerry
o Roque Dejungco, sa pagpatay kay Mariano. Mayroon pa
bang pangunahing mastermind?
S: Dahil po ang pangunahing mastermind bale ay si VIC.
12. T: Sino itong Vic na sinasabi mo?
S: Siya po. (Affiant pointing to the person of VICTOR NG
alias Victor Ty with Chinese name of Ty Sing Ling).
13. T: Kaylan ka nakasama sa pagpatay kay Mariano?
S: Bago po magpasko ng Deciembre 1966 hinde ko po
natandaan ang petsa.
14. T: Saan ninyo pinatay si Mariano?

S: Sa Paraaque, Rizal po.

15: T: Sino-sino ang kasama mo ng patayin ninyo si
Mariano?
S: Si Gerry, si Juanito Ang, si Jose de los Santos at Omeng
o Romeo Carreon.
16. T: Isalaysay mo nga ang buong pangyayari sa
pagkapatay ninyo kay Mariano?
S: Ganito po ang pangyayari niyan. Nuon pong Nobiembre
1966 ay nasabi sa akin ni Gerry na may bibirahin tao kami.
Sabi niya ay ipinapapatay ni Vic na kaibigan ni Gerry, Sabi ni
Gerry sa akin ay sumama daw ako. Sabi niya ay
magbabayad daw si Vic ng halagang limang libo para
mapatay si Mariano. Pumayag naman ako dahil sa
nademonyo na ako sa sinabi ng aking kumpare.
17. T: Sinong kumpare ito.?
S: Gerry po, iyong anak ko ay inaanak niya.
18. T: Ituloy mo ang salaysay mo?
S: Nasabi din niya sa akin kung sino-sino ang kasama namin
Sabi niya ay si Omeng at Juanito pati siya ay kasama.
Pagkatapos ng mga tatlong araw pagkasabi sa akin ni Gerry
ang balak na pagpatay kay Mariano ay nagkita-kita kaming
apat sa bahay ni Omeng. Kaming apat ngayon ay nagpunta
sa Quiapo sa Villalobos sa glass store na pinagtatrabahuhan
ni Mariano. Kaya kami ay nagpunta doon ay
pinamumukhaan sa amin ni Gerry itong si Mariano. Nuong
araw na iyon una kong nakita si Mariano.
19. T: Anong oras mo unang nakita si Mariano?
S: Mga alas 8:30 ng gabi po.
20. T: Ituloy mo ang salaysay mo?

S: Matapos naming makita at mamukhaan si Mariano ay

naghiwalay na kami.
21. T: Kailan uli kayo nagkita tungkol sa bagay na
isinasalaysay mo?
S: Sila Vic po at Gerry ay madalas magkita pa pero ako ay
nito na lang na gabi ng kunin na si Mariano sa bahay niya sa
Quezon City uli nakasama.
22. T: Ituloy mo ang iyong salaysay?
S: Sumakay nga po ako ng jeep at sa unahan ako umupo
duon sa kanan. Napagusapan namin kung saan bibirahin o
papatayin si Mariano at sabi ni Juanito ay alam niya kung
saan. Nagpaikot-ikot muna kami sa bandang Pasay at
Dewey Blvd. Matapos ang isang oras humigit-kumulang ay
nakarating kami ng Paraaque at sa isang kalye sa may
gawaan ng Canada Dry ay kumanan kami. Hindi ko lang
alam ang kalye. Mga isang daan metro buhat sa pinaglikuan
namin ay inihinto ni Juanito ang jeep. Bumaba si Omeng at
inilipat namin si Mariano sa harap na upuan tapos
pinagitnaan namin ni Juanito at ako. Ang ginawa ni Omeng
ay tinalian ang bibig ng isang panyo na galing kay Juanito si
Mariano. Matapos talian sa bibig ay hinawakan ni Omeng at
Gerry ang dalawang kamay ni Mariano buhat sa likuran.
Nuon po ay nasa loob pa ng jeep si Mariano. Ang ginawa ko
ay tinanong ko kung saan ang puso ni Mariano at sumagot
ang isa sa amin na sa kaliwa aniya. Ang ginawa ko ay
iniakbay ko ang kaliwang kamay ko kay Mariano at sinaksak
ko ng minsan sa bandang kaliwang dibdib.
23. T: Nasaang gawi mo si Mariano ng saksakin siya?
S: Nasa kaliwa ko siya. Nakaupo kaming pareho sa unahang
upuan ng jeep. Si Juanita naman ay nasa kaliwa ni Mariano.
24. T: Ano pa ang nangyari?
S: Ang ginawa namin ni Omeng ay binuhat namin si Mariano
at itinapon namin sa tabi ng daan mga dalawang metro ang

law sa daan. Nagpaandar uli si Juanito ng jeep at

nagmaneobra para bumalik kami sa aming pinasukan.
Tumuloy kaming pabalik sa Pasay at pagdating sa Pasay ay
bumaba na ako pero bago ako bumaba ay binigyan niya ako
ng sampung piso ni Gerry. Balak ni Juanito ay ibenta ang
jeep at sabi ko ay sa parteng iyon ay ayaw ko na kaya
bumaba na ako. Sila naman ay tumuloy na patungong
Maynila. Mga alas-3 o alas-2:30 ng umaga nuon din ay
sumakay ako sa isang jeep pabalik sa Quiapo at umuwi na
ako sa amin.
Pagkatapos ng dalawang araw ay nagkita kami ni Gerry,
Omeng at Juanito sa aming lugar sa Miguelin sa bahay nila
Omeng at mapagusapan namin ang tungkol sa ibibigay sa
amin. Nabanggit duon ni Gerry na limang libo ang ibibigay ni
Victor Ng sa amin pero ang naibigay lang nito ng
magbigayan na ay umabot lang sa dalawang libong piso.
Wala pa aniya ni Gerry si Victor Ng at nasa Cebu City pa
kaya naghintay kami. Pagkatapos ng isang linggo ay
nagpunta si Gerry sa bahay namin at dala niya ang otso
sientos sinkuenta pesos bilang bayad daw ni Victor sa amin.
Ang limang daan ay ibinigay sa akin. Ang natira ay napunta
sa kanila nila Omeng at Juanita. Pagkatapos ng limang araw
ay nagkita uli kami ni Gerry at sabi niya ay binigyan daw siya
uling tres sientos pesos ni Victor. Napunta sa akin duon ay
isang daan at ang iba ay sa kanila. Pagkatapos ng siyam na
araw buhat nuong pangalawang pagbibigay ng pera ay
binigyan uli ni Vic ng tres sientos pero wala nang napunta sa
akin duon. Bali ang napaghatian namin ay umaabot sa
kulang na dalawang libo at sabi ni Gerry ay tumatawad daw
si Victor sa usapang limang libo. Iyon namang kakulangan
sa dalawang libo ay napunta na siguro kay Gerry.
Also before Pat. Marcos Vias, Juanito Ang gave his statement (Exhibit L)
at about 1:20 p.m. of the same day of his arrest on February 7, 1967, the
most revealing part of which reads:
11. T: Isalaysay mo nga ang buong pangyayari sa
pagkapatay ninyo sa isang lalaki na iyong sinasabi?

S: Ako po ay umiskapo buhat sa Welfareville nuong ika-13

ng Disyembre 1966 at umuwi ako sa amin sa Miguelin. Mga
dalawang araw pa lang na ako ay nakalabas ay naikuwento
sa akin ni Gerry na aking pinsan na may papatayin daw siya
na isang intsik na may atraso sa kay Gerry. Nuong a-19 ng
Disyembre gabi nuon mga alas-7 pasado ay sinabi sa akin ni
Romeo Carreon na itutuloy na ang balak nila. Sila ay ang
tatlo nina Gerry, Jose de los Santos at Romeo Carreon.
Kinaumagahan ay pumunta ako sa bahay nina Romeo sa
Arevalo at sinabi niya sa akin na pumaltos daw ang lakad
nila. Ang ibig sabihin niya ay sila nina Jose de los Santos,
Gerry Dejungco at Romeo. Nuong a-21 ng Disyembre gabi
rin mga alas-9 ay kagagaling ko lang sa inuman sa may
Constancia. Pauwi na ako noon ng dumaan ako kina Romeo
uli para makipagusap. Nadatnan ko sina Romeo, Jose at
Gerry na naguusap. Ang paksa ng usapan ay tungkol sa
papatayin nilang intsik. Dahil po sa kalasingan ko ay
nakisabat na ako sa usapan. Sinabi ko na sasama na rin ako
sa lakad nila. Pagkatapos ng mga 20 minutos na kami ay
naguusap ay napagkayarian na si Jose ang papatay sa
intsik at ako ang magmamaneho ng jeep. Sinabi sa akin na
ang intsik na papatayin ay may jeep at ako nga ang
magmamaneho ng jeep. ... Sumakay siya sa jeep. Lumabas
na uli kami pabalik sa gawing Maynila. Hindi pa kami
masyadong nakalalayo ay tinanong ko si Romeo, Gerry at
Jose kung may nakuha silang pera. Sabi sa akin ay mayroon
nubenta pesos na nasa kay Gerry na. Nuong malapit na
kami sa gawaan ng Darigold ay iniabot sa akin ni Gerry ang
bente pesos. Tumuloy na kami ng rotonda ng Baclaran.
Pagdating duon ay sabi nila Gerry at si Jose at Romeo na
lilipat na sila ng jeep na de pasahero kaya bumaba na sila,
at nasabi ko pa na akin na lang ang jeep. Ang sagot nila ay
sa akin ng buong buo ang jeep. Kumaliwa na akong
patungong Dewey at tumuloy ako ng Maynila. Nagdaan ako
ng may Ayala. Tumuloy sa amin sa di kalayuan sa amin sa
Miguelin. Ipinarada ko doon ang jeep na may mga
kalahating oras at umuwi ako para magpalit ng damit dahil
sa may dugo ang manggas ng aking polo. Naglibot-libot ako
sa may lugar namin at naalala ko na ang ipinanaksak ni
Jose sa intsik ay nasa compartment ng jeep. Ang ginawa ko
ay kinuha ko at inihagis ko sa may kanto ng Arevalo at M. de

la Fuente. Tumuloy pa ako ng Sta. Mesa at sa kanto ng Sta.

Mesa at De la Fuente ay ipinarada ko ang jeep sa may
restaurant at nagalmusal na ako. Mag-aalas 5:30 media na
nuon ng umaga. Pagkaalmusal ko ay umikot uli ako dala ang
jeep at may nasalubong akong isang batang nagtitinda ng
diaryo at bumili ako ng Manila Times. Pagtingin ko ay nakita
ko ang balita na: 'Chinese Trader Kidnapped'. Binasa ko at
nalaman ko na alarmado na ang jeep. Natakot ako ngayon.
Dineretso ko ang Economia patungong Espaa at tumawid
ako ng Espaa. Kinaliwa ko sa P. Florentino ang jeep at di
kalayuan sa sine Trabaho ay ipinara ko ang jeep paharap sa
UST sa kaliwa ng P Florentino. Pinunasan ko ng basahan na
nakuha ko sa jeep ang talsik ng dugo sa salamin at itinapon
ko ang basahan sa di kalayuan ng jeep. Naglakad na lang
akong patungong Espaa at umuwi na ako sa Miguelin. Mga
alas 10 ng umaga ding iyon ay pumunta ako sa bahay ni
Romeo at ipinakita ko ang diaryo na may balita. Nagtawa
lang si Romeo tapos ay bumalik na ako sa amin at natulog
na ako. Nuong bisperas ng pasko ay nagkita kami ni Gerry
sa tapat ng bahay namin at tinanong niya ako kung ako ay
may pera at sabi ko wala at binigyan niya ako ng limang
piso. Bukod duon ay wala na akong naging pera buhat sa
kanila at pagkalipas ng dalawang araw ay nabasa ko sa
Manila Times na nakuha na ang jeep ng mga pulis. Ibinalita
ko uli kay Romeo at sabi niya hindi bale. Nuong 27 ng
Disyembre umaga ay ipinahuli ako ng aking Tatay sa Manila
Police at dinala ako sa Precinto 2 at nuong 29 ng Disyembre
1966 ay ibinalik ako sa Welfareville.
In the case of Romualdo Carreon, his statement exhibit J) was given
before Det. Pablo C. Pascual on the same day he presented himself on
February 13, 1967, at the QCPD headquarters quoted in its more
significant parts as follows:
15. T: Paano mo nakilala si Mariano Lim at ang kanyang
jeep?
S: Itinuro po sa akin ni Gerry noong Disyembre 10, 1966, ng
magkasama kami sa Maynila at makita niya na magdaan sa
Avenida Rizal.

16. T: Ano ang kulay ng jeep ni Mariano Lim?

S: Kulay pula po, pero hindi ko matandaan ang numero ng
plaka.
17 T: Ng magdaan ba ang jeep sa Avenida Rizal at ituro sa
iyo ni Gerry ay sino ang may data ng jeep?
S: Ang nagmamaneho po ay isang lalaki at kasama sa jeep
si Mariano Lim.
18. T: Bukod sa sampong piso na naibigay sa iyo ni Gerry
ikaw ba ay nakatanggap ng salapi o ano mang gantimpala
sa ginawa ninyong pagpatay na ito?
S: Noon pong Disyembre 22, 1966, ay binigyan ako ni Gerry
ng dalawang daang piso (P200.00).
19. T: Matapos na maibigay sa iyo ni Gerry ang dalawang
daang piso, ano ang sinabi sa iyo?
S: Ang sabi niya ay iyon ang aking kaparte sa pagkakapatay
namin kay Mariano Lim, at si Jose raw ay binigyan na niya
ng limang daang piso (P500.00) at si Juanito ay hindi pa
kundi iyon lang biente pesos (P20.00). Makalipas ang
bagong taon ay binigayan pa ako uli ng isang daang piso ni
Gerry.
20. T: Sinabi ba sa iyo ni Gerry kung sino ang nagbigay ng
pera?
S: Sinabi po at ang sabi ay si Victor Ng.
21. T: Ang mga kasama mong pumatay kay Mariano Lim,
nasaan ngayon?
S: Ayan po sila (Affiant pointing to the persons of ROQUE
DEJUNGCO y CHAN alias 'GERRY', JOSE DE LOS
SANTOS alias 'PEPE', and JUANITO ANG y DEJUNGCO,
who were all inside the Bureau).

2. T: Nasaan ngayon si Victor Ng na iyong sinasabi na

siyang nagbigay ng pera?
S: Siya po. (Affiant pointing to the person of VICTOR NG
alias TY SING LING who is inside the Bureau).
xxx xxx xxx
Pagdating namin sa Mayon ay nakita ko sina Gerry at Jose na nakatayo
sa Mayon sa pagitan ng Dapitan at Piy Margal. Tinigilan ni Juanito ang
dalawa at sumakay naman ang dalawa sa likod ng jeep. Kami ay
nagpatuloy nang pagtakbo at duon kami dumaan sa Mayon, dumaan kami
sa Espaa, pagdating sa Rotonda at patungo kaming Maynila. Nakarating
kami sa Roxas Boulevard, tapos hanggang sa may Stonehill sa Pasay
City. Pagdating sa isang kanto na malapit sa Stonehill ay bumaba kaming
dalawa ni Gerry at sina Juanito at Jose ay pumasok sa nasabing kanto na
kasama si Mariano Lim. Nang makababa na kami ni Gerry ay sinabi sa
akin ni Gerry na 'YAYARIIN NATIN IYANG SI MARIANO', Kami ay
naghanap muna ni Gerry ng mabibilihan ng sigarilyo. Samantalang kami
ay naghahanap ay dumating sina Juanito at Jose na kasama si Mariano
Lim na sakay din ng Jeep. Sumakay uli kami ni Gerry sa likod ng jeep
dahil sa si Jose na ang nakaupo sa harapan ng dati kong inuupuan. Kami
ay nagtuloy sa Paraaque. Samantalang kami ay nasa daan pa ay
nagtanong si Jose sa amin kung nasaan ang tusok. Ang sagot ni Juanito
ay wala sa akin. Sabi ni Jose sa akin, 'NASA IYO BA' ang sagot ko
'WALA. Nang makarating kami sa may tapat ng opisina ng MERALCO sa
Paraaque, ipinahinto ni Gerry ang jeep kay Juanito at siya ay bumaba.
Sabi ni Gerry ay 'SANDALI LANG AT MANGHIHIRAM AKO NG TUSOK
SA AKING KUMPARE'. Makalipas ang sinco minutos ay bumalik si Gerry
at sabi sa amin ay wala pa ang kanyang kumpare. Kami ay nagbalik sa
may Roxas Blvd. at nagpaikot-ikot muna. Nang makalipas ang mga trenta
minutos ay bumalik na kami sa may opisina ng Meralco sa Paraaque.
Bumaba uli si Gerry at nagpunta sa bahay ng kanyang kumpare. Nang
bumalik si Gerry ay dala na niya ang isang kutsilyo at ibinigay kay Jose.
Tapos ay nagpatuloy kami sa pagtakbo na patungong kabayanan ng
Paraaque. Sa isang kalye roon na hindi ko alam ang pangalan ay iniliko
ni Juanito ang jeep. Tapos ay itinigil ang jeep sa pagdating sa dulo pagkat
Dead End na. Sabi sa akin ni Juanito ay talian ko na ang bibig. Ang
ginawa ko ay kinuha ko ang panyo ni Gerry at tinalian ang bibig ni
Mariano. Tapos ay hinawakan ko ang kanang kamay ni Mariano. Tapos ay
tinanong ni Jose kay Juanito kung saan ang puso. Ang sagot ni Juanito ay

'AYWAN HINDI KO ALAM'. Tapos ay iniakbay ni Jose ang kanyang

kaliwang balikat ni Mariano Lim at biglang sinaksak sa dibdib. Makalipas
ang dalawang minuto ay inilagay o itinapat ni Juanito ang kanyang isang
daliri sa ilong ni Mariano Lim at pagkatapos ay sinabi niyang "PATAY NA'.
Tapos ay bumaba na si Jose at binuhat niya ang intsik o si Mariano Lim at
ibinaba sa tabi ng kalye na may damo. Tapos ay sumakay siya uli at
umalis na kami sa lugar na iyon. (CFI Rollo, pp. 578-590).
The foregoing facts were established by the testimonial evidence of the prosecution
through the testimonies of Quirino Acido, Patrolman Lorenzo Gabriel, Angelita Faylona,
Lim Cho Beng, Chua Yem, Dr. Ernesto G. Brion, Chief of NBI Medico-Legal Office, Lim
Hoc, Sgt. Ricardo Santos, QCPD, Pat. Pablo Pascual QCPD, Det. Godofredo Ruiz,
QCPD, and by the documentary evidence of the prosecution. Exhibits "A" to "P" and "P1", inclusive.
Both Victor Ng and Jose de los Santos interposed the defense of alibi. Victor Ng stated
that he was in Zamboanga on the night of the killing, having left Manila on December
15, 1966, returning only on December 22, 1966, or the day following the incident in
question. Appellant Jose de los Santos also claimed that at about 8:00 o'clock p.m. of
December 21, 1966, he went directly to his home after his work as a driver of a
passenger jeepney plying the Balic-Balic-Quiapo Line; that he had supper with his
father, Roman Santos, while his wife. Amelia Santos, took care of their son who was
then sick: that after supper, he took care of his son and put him to sleep; that he read
some comic magazines and then went to sleep at about 9:00 p.m.; that at about 4:30
a.m., of December 22, 1966, he was awakened by his wife and he immediately left for
work. He stated that from December 21, 1966 up to February 7, 1967, he had been
driving his passenger jeepney along the afore-mentioned line.
In impugning his extrajudicial confession, Victor Ng testified that he was arrested in the
afternoon of February 6, 1967 at Barrio Kangkong, Quezon City, and brought to the hills
near the Capitol Golf Club, Quezon City, where he was allegedly asked to confess to
the killing of Mariano Lim, and when he refused to do so, two of the officers maltreated
him by boxing him on his stomach, after which he was brought to Precinct 5, of the
Quezon City Police Department at Project 4, Quirino District, and latter to the police
headquarters; that he was brought again to the Capitol Golf Club where he was
maltreated when he refuse to admit that he ordered the killing of Mariano Lim; that they
also stripped him of his clothes and put ice on his body and then put him in a jeep which
they drove around the golf club, and in spite of the maltreatment he refused to admit
that he ordered the killing; that at about 11:00 p.m. of February 6, 1967, he was brought
to the Quezon City Police Department Detective Bureau where reporters took his
pictures. Later, he was brought inside a room where he was again stripped of his

clothes, made to lie down on a bench with his face upward, and tied thereto; that they
put pepper in his eyes and nose, covered his face with a rug and poured water into his
nose and mouth. He admitted that he did not recognize the persons who maltreated him
because his face was covered. Afterwards, he was brought to the office of Major
Ernesto San Diego who told him that if he made the desired admission he will be
released and used as a state witness. In view of this assurance to him and allegedly
because of the beatings which he could no longer endure, he decided to make the
admission they wanted him to make.
At about 2:30 a.m. on February 7, 1967, he signed a statement marked Exhibit "M",
although he never read the statement, and without having been investigated or
questioned by Det. Ruiz of the Detective Bureau.
Appellant Jose de los Santos also claimed that he signed Exhibit "K" under duress.
Thus, he testified that after his arrest at 3:00 am. on February 7, 1967 by the police
authorities, he was boxed and kicked inside the police headquarters when he refused to
acknowledge that he knew Victor Ng as wen as Gerry Dejungco. When he denied killing
Mariano Lim, a policeman hit his legs, thighs and chest until he became dizzy.
Thereafter, he was placed inside a room where he was asked if he admits having killed
Mariano Lim. and told: "Hindi ka pala tatagal, dito sa amin hindi maaaring hindi aamin",
to which statement he kept silent. Afterwards, he was asked his name, age, date of
birth, occupation and the names of his wife and parents. Thereafter, he was returned to
his detention cell. In the morning of February 7, 1967, he was brought into room and
was presented with a typewritten statement which contained his admission that he was
the one who killed Mariano Lim. When he refused to sign it he was boxed on the mouth
and then the man sitting beside him held his right hand and forced him to sign the
statement. After signing the statement, Exhibit "K" he and his co-accused, Roque
Dejungco, were taken to Kanlaon St., Quezon City, by several policemen where the two
of them, as well as their co-accused Juanito Ang, were told to re-enact the crime from
its inception at Kanlaon St. to its consummation at Paraaque. In the process, pictures
were taken.
On cross-examination, he admitted making corrections on his statement and signing the
same twice after reading it, once before the police investigators and again before Fiscal
Solano, in the presence of three policemen; and that even before December 21, 1966,
he already knew Romualdo Carreon and Juanito Ang. He alleged that before he and his
co-accused signed their respective statements, they never spoke with each other
regarding this case.
It is worthy to note that any doubt whatsoever as to the guilt of appellants' co-accuse
had already been dispelled by the fact that, as heretofore stated, Juanito Ang did not

appeal. Roque Dejungco withdrew his appeal. and Romualdo Carreon abandoned his
appeal from the judgment of conviction meted against them by the trial court. They are
currently serving their corresponding sentences. Hence, the present appeal concerns
only the cases of the accused Victor Ng and Jose de los Santos.
In his brief, counsel for appellant Victor Ng contends that the lower court erred:
(1) In not finding that the alleged confession of herein defendant-appellant. Victor Ng is
inadmissible for having been secured through promise of immunity aside from the use
of force, threat and intimidation;
(2) In considering the alleged confession of Roque Dejungco as having interlock with
the alleged confession of defendant-appellant Victor Ng:
(3) In finding that defendant-appellant Victor Ng induced his co-accused, for a reward,
to commit the crime;
(4) In finding that defendant-appellant Victor Ng was motivated by jealousy and intense
hate in inducing the commission of the crime; and
(5) In not acquiting defendant-appellant Victor Ng at least on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
Likewise, in his brief, counsel for appellant Jose de los Santos contends that the lower
court erred:
(1) In finding that the confession the sole and evidence here of appellant was
given voluntarily;
(2) In discarding the alibi of herein appellant; and
(3) In convicting appellant.
To begin with, the police investigators would not have known of the participation of
Gerry Dejungco in the crime, were this fact not revealed for the first time to them by
appellant Victor Ng when he was investigated by Det. Godofredo Ruiz on the night of
February 6, 1967, In turn, it was Gerry Dejungco who revealed to the police authorities
on the early morning of February 7, 1961 the role played in the commission if the crime
by appellant Jose de los Santos and Juanito Ang. Finally, it was Jose de los Santos
who, when interrogated by he police. also revealed in detail the participation of this
accused, including Romualdo Carreon, in the commission of tile crime. Indeed, while
Juanito Ang and Romualdo Carreon were positively identified by the mother, brother

and maid of the victim as the persons whom they saw taking away forcibly Mariano Lim
on the night of December 21, 1966, these witnesses did not know of the names of the
kidnappers or their whereabouts. The solution of the case were supplied principally by
the confession of Victor Ng. And it is only from the narration of facts contained in their
interlocking confessions that the Court could piece together the various pieces that
make up the whole fabric of the criminal conspiracy and its cold-blooded execution.
From the interlocking confessions of the accused, it appears that Victor Ng harbored
such bitter hatred against the victim, Mariano Lim, whom he considered as his rival for
the affections of Ruby Ng. Not only was Mariano Lim preferred for outings and picnics
by Ruby Ng, but he had also become the business associate of Ruby's father. This turn
of events generated not only jealousy but spawned the subsequent incidents of
violence. Thus, prior to the incident of December 21, 1966, Victor Ng had at least two
violent encounters with Mariano Lim. The first was in September, 1966 and the second
was in October of the same year. As testified to by the victim's mother, Chua Yam, his
father, Lim Hok, and their housemaid, Victor Ng, his father, Ty Sui Wong, two brothers
and two other companions who were then armed, proceeded to the residence of
Mariano Lim at Kanlaon St. in September, 1966 looking for Mariano. They only left the
place when they found that Mariano was out. The incident was repeated in October,
1966 when Victor Ng and his companions, who were again armed, went to Lim's
residence looking for Mariano. Unable to find Mariano who was then out, Victor Ng's
group left, but not before they told the father of Mariano to tell his son to stay away from
Ruby Ng, otherwise, he will be liquidated. Victor Ng related this October, 1966 incident,
thus:
9. T: Kailan mo huling nakita si Mariano Lim Cho Kuan?
S: Nuong Octubre 1966 nuong kami ay nagaway.
10. T: Saan?
S: Sa Villalobos St., Quiapo, Manila.
11. T: Bakit kayo nagaway?
S: Kasi si Ruby Ng, anak nang mayari ng Tong's Glassware
sa Villalobos, ay tumawag sa akin at sabi niya ay magsini
kami . . niyaya ako maglabas, kung meron akong panahon.
Sabi ko meron akong panahon . . tapos si Mariano Lim ay
tawag sa akin sa telepono dahil sa narinig niya ang usapan
namin tungkol sa date . . sabi niya sa telepono. . ginalit niya

ako. . minura ako marami siya sabi sa akin. 'Kailan kasal

ninyo ni Ruby,' sagot ko 'Ano ang pakialam mo . . Sabi niya
para handa ako pambili regalo. Kami away sa telepono. Sabi
ko sa kanya babae ayaw sa akin ano gawa ko. Hanggang sa
kaming dalawa ay away sa telepono. Tapos nuon ang tatay
ko ay again sa telepono at nakipagusap kay Mariano . .
nagaway din sila para naghamon si Mariano sa Tatay ko.
Punta kayo dito sa Quiapo. . sabi ni Mariano, kung hindi
kayo punta dito ako punta diyan. Kaya gawa namin ng ama
ko at kapatid ko si Jaime Ng ay punta kami sa Villalobos
pero wala na si Mariano. . sabi nanay ni Ruby wala na si
Mariano uwi na. Kaya kami magaama paalam na ..
12. T: Pagkagaling ninyo sa Villalobos. . saan kayo
nagtuloy?
S: Nagtuloy kaming magaama sa No. 36 Kanlaon St. Q.C.,
sa bahay nila Mariano. Pagdating doon kami katok. . labas
ang Tatay ni Mariano at usap sila ng tatay ko. Ang dinig ko
sa usap nila sabi Tatay ko, 'Ako si TY SUI WONG sagot
Tatay ni Mariano sino Ty Sui Wong, sagot Tatay ko. Kapatid
ako ni Ty Liong Kue. Tapos usap sila uli Sabi tatay ko. . bakit
pati matanda na ako. . bakit hamon ang anak mong away..
Ikaw alaga sa anak mong mabuti sabi Tatay ko sa Tatay ni
Mariano. Tapos alis na kami.
13. T: Saan kayo nagtuloy pagkagaling ninyo sa Kanlaon,
Q.C.?
S: Tuloy kami uli sa Villalobos, dahil galit ang tatay ko.
Nakita ko si Mariano nakasakay sa taxi merong siyang
kasama nuong aalis na ang taxi. . hinarang ko ang taxi
binuksan ko ang pinto. . pinababa ko si Mariano, ...pero
bunot siya baril ang akin ginawa ay hawak ko siya. . tapos
suntok ko siya, . . nagkasa siya sa baril niya dito sa kasama
niya. . tapos alis kasama niya . . Suntukan kami . . napunit
ang damit niya. Iyon mga tao sa Villalobos hinila kami para
pumasok sa Tong's Enterprises. Pinaayos kami ng magulang
ni Ruby .. si Mariano hingi patawad sa amin. Tapos shake
hands kami. Exhibit ("M").

It was only the timely arrival of Dr. Agustin Ng, the brother of Ruby Ng, which prevented
further harm on Mariano Lim.
It was precisely on the basis of these prior incidents that Det. Ruiz started his inquiries
about Victor Ng. This culminated, as stated theretofore in the solution of the murder
case. For it has been shown that after those violent encounters with the victim, Victor
Ng contacted his former classmate, Roque "Gerry" Dejungco to whom he offered
P5,000.00 provided he and his men could maul Mariano Lim and prevent him from
visiting Ruby Ng. Victor Ng told Dejungco that he Ng was leaving for Zamboanga and
Cebu City on December 15, 1966, and in the words of Dejungco: ... if he (Victor Ng) will
arrive on the 23rd of December 1966, he doesn't want to see Mariano Lim alive."
(Exhibit "N"). Dejungco contacted his cousin, Juanita Ang, his "compadre" looked,
Santos and Romualdo Carreon, all neighbor of in Sampaloc, Manila. The plot was first
conceived in November, 1966 (see Exhibits "K" and "N") and the first attempt to kill the
victim was made on December 19, 1966, but something went wrong and the
conspirators were not able to realize their plan (Exhibit "L"). But on the night of
December 21, 1966, on the very natal day of Mariano Lim, Ang and Carreon were able
to grab Mariano Lim from his jeep and forced him to go with them. They fled with their
victim towards Mayon Street where they picked up De los Santos and Dejungco who
had been waiting for them. The five proceeded to Paraaque, Rizal passing Quezon
Blvd. Extension, then turning left at Manuel de la Fuente Street. Manila, turning right on
Sta. Mesa Blvd., then to Nagtahan bridge and continuing towards Paraaque, In the
process of snatching Mariano Lim, Ang must have lost the sharp pointed instrument
which he used in intimidating the victim (Exhibit "0-5 "), compelling Dejungco to go to
the house of his "compadre" to borrow a sharp pointed weapon. It was the wife of his
"compadre", Teodora Maravilla, who, apparently ignorant of Dejungco's real purpose,
gave him a knife on the latter's pretext that they needed the knife to repair their jeep.
Returning to his companions, the four with their victim proceeded towards the Factor
Compound at the entrance of which Dejungco alighted, leaving his three companions to
finish the job. At the end of the street inside the compound, Juanito Ang stopped the
vehicle. Carreon then gagged the victim with handkerchief and held him by his hands. It
was at that instance when De los Santos pulled out the knife given to him earlier by
Dejungco and after asking his companions where the heart of the victim was located,
placed his left arm around Mariano's shoulder and plunged the knife on the left chest of
the victim. Afterwards, he (De los Santos) and Carreon lifted the body from the jeep and
drop it on the ground. Carreon, Ang and De los Santos left the compound and after
picking up Dejungco proceeded on their separate ways. They met several times
afterwards to share and divide the money given by Victor Ng. Of the P12,000.00
actually paid by Victor Ng, De Los Santos got P600.00 (Exhibit "K"), Carreon P200.00
(Exhibit "J") and Ang a measly sum of P25.00 (Exhibit "K") with balance presumably
kept by Gerry Dejungco.

As heretofore stated, appellants Victor Ng and Jose de los Santos now attempt to
impugn those facts. The main thrust of their strategy is to undermine the probative force
of their extrajudicial confessions. We find their arguments unpersuasive.
Apart from the presumption of law which favors the spontaneity and voluntariness of a
statement given by the defendant in a criminal case, which the appellants have not
been able to overcome, 9 the record convincingly shows that the extrajudicial confessions of
appellants Victor Ng (Exhibit "M") and Jose de los Santos (Exhibit "K") were given voluntarily and that
they reflected the truth.

One as stated heretofore, the confessions of Jose de los Santos and Victor Ng, as well
as those of their co-accused Juanito Ang and Roque Dejungco, are replete with small
and intimate details that only the appellants and their co-accused could have known of.
For instance, the police could not have known that Victor Ng came to know the
deceased Mariano Lim when they were schoolmates at the Chiang Kai Shek High
School, or that this appellant and Roque Dejungco were also classmates at the
Philippines Chin Hua School. As a matter of fact, the police investigators would not have
known of the participation of Roque Dejungco had this fact not been revealed by Victor
Ng, much less could they have been aware of the names of Juanito Ang, Romualdo
Carreon and Jose de los Santos, since it was Roque Dejungco who revealed the role of
these persons in the commission of the crime. Neither could the police been aware that
Juanito Ang is a first cousin of Roque Dejungco, nor of the fact that appellant De los
Santos is Dejungco's "compadre"; or that Juanito Ang was an escaped from the
Welfareville institution in Mandaluyong, Rizal and that he had since been recommitted
to the same institution, Would the police have known that De los Santos and Dejungco
went to a bordello at Pasay City right after the killing had this had not been related to
them? Roque Dejungco withdrawing his appeal, confirmed his guilt and the recital of
facts contained in his confession (Exhibit "N"). It could not be contended therefore, that
Dejungco's narration therein of the participation of his first cousin, Juanito Ang, and his
"compadre", Jose de los Santos, in the Commission of the crime was due to duress or
maltreatment. While Victor Ng. Carreon and Ang denied on the witness stand that they
ever read their respective statements even up to the time they testified in court, yet no
explanation had been given why the same declarants could Identify Exhibits "J", "I", and
"M" as their very statements which they were allegedly forced to sign on the basis of the
recitals of facts written therein. This Court has held in various decisions that when the
confessions of the accused contained details that the police could not have possibly
supplied or invented and which facts only the declarant could have known, such would
be a strong indication that those confessions were freely made and not due to duress
and intimidation. 10

Two. The two appellants and their three co-accused admitted that they made certain
corrections and/or additions in their respective extrajudicial statements. For instance,
Victor Ng made corrections on the second and third pages of his statement. On the
second page of Exhibit "M", he admitted having pointed to Roque, alias Gerry
Dejungco, as the person to whom he induced, for the sum of P2,000.00, to get some
men to maul Mariano Lim and to prevent him from going to Quiapo or to see Ruby Ng.
He even wrote the words "siya si Jerry" referring to Roque Dejungco's and the date
when he supposedly left for Cebu, Davao and Zamboanga City in 1966. On the third
page, he corrected the name of the street of the building where he gave money to Gerry
Dejungco. These corrections were all initialed by him. All the pages were signed by him
both in Chinese characters and in the ordinary manner. The three-page statement of
Jose de los Santos also contains his corrections. Thus, on the first page, he corrected
the written therein by inserting the phrase "De los" so that the name therein would read
"Jose de los Santos y Casire" that in his answer to the question as to who were his
companions in killing Mariano Lim, he crossed out the name of Victor Ng, leaving only
the names of Gerry, Juanito Ang, and Omeng or Romeo Carreon; that in connection
with the amount which was promised by Victor Ng for the purpose of liquidating Mariano
Lim, he crossed out the words "dalawang libo" ang wrote therein the words "limang
libo"; and that when asked who was his "kumpadre", he mentioned "Gerry po" and
added in his handwriting the following words: "iyong anak ay inaanak niya".
Three. Both Victor Ng and Roque Dejungco signed their confessions both in English
and Chinese characters on each and every page of their statements.
Four. Not one of the appellants or their co-accused had himself examined medically
much less requested for such medical examination. 11 At the trial, not one of the five accused
could indicate which part of his body had been injured. The circumstance that they were under detention
is no impediment to such examination, since long before the trial, they were already represented by their
respective counsels to whom they could freely communicate such alleged maltreatment. It must be noted
that the present counsel of the appellants appeared in behalf of said accused as early as February 20,
1967, the date when they presented a motion for the release of Victor Ng on bail.

On this matter, the Solicitor General made the following observations:

It should be noted that Victor Ng was arrested by the police while he was
in the company of some friends. Thus, his family immediate came to know
of his apprehension. When we consider that this appellant comes from
moneyed family, we can safely assume that his parents immediately took
steps, including the hiring of a competent lawyer, to see to it that nothing
untoward happened to him. In fact, they did retain the services of Atty.
Crispulo Ilumen who eventually became one of his defense counsel. This
fact alone should militate against, any claim that he was maltreated and

we reject any contention that Atty. Ilumen made no efforts to visit him in his
cell for such is not the behavior of a lawyer hired to protect the interest of
his client surely among the first steps Atty. Ilumen took was to arrange a
meeting with his client. We also reject any claim that the police would
have dared refuse this privilege and right of a lawyer; otherwise, Atty.
Ilumen would have raised Cain. The fact that Atty. Ilumen in the course of
the long trial of this case never mentioned such a rude treatment on the
part of the police only means that he was really allowed to see Victor Ng.
Ang having conferred with the latter, Atty. Ilumen could not have failed to
notice the condition of his client or, Victor Ng himself would have revealed
the injuries resulting from his maltreatment to his lawyer, Yet, up to now,
no criminal and or administrative charges have been lodged against the
police who had a hand in the solution of this crime.
In the case of Romualdo Carreon, his personal safety and interest were
amply protected from the very start by two uncles, Ernesto Lorenzo and
Benjamin Cardiola, the latter a law clerk in the office of Atty. Jaime
Nuevas, his counsel at the trial, Certainly, Gardiola knew the rights of his
nephew. The fact that no claims of maltreatment were ever raised before
the trial should be significant when we take note of the aggressive nature
of Atty. Nuevas as borne out by the records of this case.
The above discussion likewise disposes of Victor Ng's claim that he could
not get a medical certificate because he was not allowed visitors Lo his
cell. This is to naive and absurd for even a gullible mind to accept. It is
clearly an afterthought designed, although feebly, to place his
investigators in a bad light.
This appellant further claims that a medical examination would have been
useless, arguing that 'it has been physically and scientifically recognized
that certain forms of maltreatment or torture. such as use. of electric
shock, setting or hitting the stomach, water cure, etc., do not usually
manifest external injury on the body of the person maltreated ... . This
argument is misleading. Victor Ng testified that part of his alleged
maltreatment consisted of being hit in the stomach, chest and back and
pepper being poured in his eyes and nose ... . 'Mercilessly mauled' is the
term he uses in his brief. Considering the length of time he claims he was
given he was the third degree from the time of his arrest which he says
was at 1:30 p.m. up to 11:00 p.m. of February 6, 1967, if he was
'mercilessly mauled', surely even a cursory examination by a physician
would have revealed the injuries he suffered, particularly, those on his

chest and back. Moreover, it is likewise not true that all injuries on the
stomach cannot be detected. The slightest of pressure made on the
abdomen of a person severely maltreated will cause that person to shout
in pain. Again, the pouring of pepper in the eyes of the accused would
have caused not only the reddening but also swelling of the eyes. All these
could have been discovered by a competent physician. (pp. 32-34).
Five.- It is important to note that up to the present time, no formal charges of any nature
whatsoever had been instituted against those who allegedly maltreated them. Indeed,
there appears to be no serious and sustained effort to even Identify their alleged
tormentors, and such failure further shows that their claims of maltreatment which were
first made by them sometime in January, 1968, were a mere afterthought. 12 Appellants
have shown no plausible reason why the investigators should have maltreated them and falsely
implicated them in the crime, considering that the police investigators did not know the victim or any of the
appellants or any members of 'heir families before this case was instituted. As pointed out by the Solicitor
General Victor Ng was arrested by the police while he was in company of his friends, and as a matter of
fact he immediately secured the services of one Atty, Crispulo Ilumen to defend him. He has never
claimed that he was not able to confer with either Atty. Ilumen or Atty. Dakila Castro.

Six. The presence of statements in the declarations of Victor Ng minimizing his role
in the commission of the crime is another indication that his afore-mentioned
extrajudicial statement was rendered of his free accord. For it is precisely this attempt to
minimize his criminal responsibility, among others, which has been considered by the
trial court as a potent circumstance which demonstrates the voluntariness of the
confession. 13 This Court has observed that "those parts of the confession which would avoid or lessen
the declarant's criminal liability could have come only from the mouth of one who stood to benefit from the
qualifications or avoidance of the admission. 14

Seven. When Victor Ng and Roque Dejungco were made to confront each other, each
pointed to the other as his confederate. No gesture of any protest, much less any word
or denial emanated from the lips of either of the two, which would have been the natural
and instinctive reaction of an innocent man. Where an accused made an extrajudicial
confession implicating his co-defendant, who was present when the said confession
was being taken and who did not protest or demonstrate, the said confession may be
given in evidence against the said co-defendant. 15
Eight. -The re-enactment of the crime by appellant Jose de los Santos, together with
Juanita Ang and Roque Dejungco, tallies exactly with the manner the killing was
performed, as described, among others, in the statement of De Los Santos. 16
While it is true that De los Santos attempted to impugn the spontaneity or the
voluntariness of his Statement, the same is unworthy of credence since it would have

been highly improbable for the police to have forced him to do so in the presence of
several reporters. Victor Ng admits that the reporters were around and as a matter of
fact the police allowed the reporters to take his pictures after he had come for the
second time from the Capitol Golf Club. De los Santos admitted the presence of the
reporters during the investigation. The presence, during the entire interrogation and at
the re-enactment of the crime by the said accused, of several newspapermen
representing the Manila Times. the Great Asia Newspaper and the Fookien Times,
renders it highly improbable that the investigation, as well as the re-enactment by the
afore-mentioned accused were done under duress. A careful examination of the facial
expressions of the accused appearing on the photographs of the re-enactment (exhibits
"0-9" to "0-17") indicate that they were acting voluntarily.
Nine. The post-mortem findings of Dr. Ernesto Brion of the National Bureau of
Investigation regarding the location and direction of the wounds of the deceased, as
well as the probable position of the killer at the time of the infliction of the injuries,
coincide with the description of the actual killing, as related in the, extrajudicial
confessions of Carreon, Ang and appellant De los Santos.
Ten. Juanita Ang did not appeal from this judgment, while Roque Dejungco and
Romualdo Carreon withdrew their appeals, a fact which is indicative of the correctness
of the finding of guilt with respect to said accused. While this circumstance alone would
have no bearing on the guilt or innocence of the herein appellants, taken in conjunction
with the other circumstances already enumerated it assumes importance. It indicates
that the confessions of guilt of Ang, Dejungco and Carreon were, therefore, given freely
and voluntarily. Such circumstances further render unworthy of credence the claims of
Victor Ng and Jose de los Santos that their declarations were secured through duress
or violence.
In this regard, the trial judge (now Justice Pacifico P. de Castro of the Court of Appeals
made the following important:
The background of the killing as just depicted through the testimony of
eye-witnesses provides the solid foundation upon which the confessions
of the accused could be made to stand firm, with a convincing ring of truth,
even as against the allegation of maltreatment and intimidation
supposedly administered to the accused to extract their confessions' and
in the case of Victor Ng, also a promise of immunity, to which claim of
maltreatment and promise of immunity, however, the Court finds itself
unable to give credence.

A thorough examination of the records yielded no evidence of the alleged

maltreatment other than the self-serving and naturally biased testimony of
the accused themselves. As against the presumption that of regularity in
the performance of voluntariness of a confession, as well as the
performance of official duties, no more than having the accused's own
words to back up such claim of violence can induce the Court to discard
their confessions as involuntary. The alleged circumstance that quite a
long period of time expired from their apprehension to their making
admission of their participation in the commission of the crime which the
defense has tried to seize upon as indicating the employment of pressure
to extract the confession, seems to the Court as indicating more the
contrary, for if the police investigators were sent on using force to obtain at
all cost, a confession from each of the accused, it would not take them
long to attain this end.
On the other hand, certain circumstances, constantly recognized as
indicative of voluntariness of the confession have been duly stablished by
the evidence. Thus, the confessions are remarkably abundant with details
which the declarants alone could have supplied willingly out of a desire to
make a client breast of the offense imputed to them. ...
Likewise, not only were the accused asked to read their confessions
before signing before the subscribing officer, Assistant Fiscal Antonio
Solano, which they did, but they also made some corrections therein The
act of making corrections, specially when same refer to intimate details of
which the declarant alone has knowledge can only mean that the
decedent had given his full volition to the making of the confession.
In the case of Victor Ng, he admitted to having proposed, with a promise
of reward only the mauling of the victim not his liquidation just to
discourage him from continuing with his courtship or intimate association
with Ruby Ng. If the investigators were hell- bent in extracting a
confession that would suit their purpose, they would not have been
content with less than an admission of an intent to kill the victim. That Ng's
confession was only for inflicting harm, short of death itself is a strong,
convincing proof that he was allowed to make his statement free from
undue pressure or intimidation ... . Indeed, Victor Ng appears to come
from a moneyed family which is engaged in business and therefore with
sufficient resources to retain a lawyer whose legal services could be made
available at any time in case of need. That need arose when Ng was
allegedly tortured for then a complaint should have been filed in Court or

registered with higher police authorities if Victor Ng had really undergone

account ordeal in the hands of the police investigators. That there was no
such complaint of any sort nor a medical certificate to show infliction of
violence if it was true that account alleged had actually occurred specially
against one who, in fits claim of innocence, would feel undeservedly
punished and thus seriously aggrieved. The failure to reveal to
responsible officials, such as Fiscal Solano before whom he was brought
for account verification of his statement that he was maltreated is a
circumstance tending to disprove the alleged maltreatment.
... A confession that Ng never intended, much less plotted, account
victim's liquidation, but only his being mauled, would not produce the
desired solution of account crime. Hence, account confession of Victor Ng
could not have been account result of violence or maltreatment, but of his
own free will and volition. The absence of a confession of Ty Sui Wong,
father of Victor Ng, account first one to be named as accused in the,
information attests also to account non-use of violence, else Ty Sui Wong
who could even be the more logical suspect as account mastermind for
being the one, rather than his son Victor, who was in a better position to
make account monetary reward in such amount as to afford greater
inducement to commit account killing, would have also, perhaps with more
reason, been forced to confess. The evidence, however, is bereft of any
intimation that he made any confession ... .(Emphasis supplied.)
Besides, how could this claim of appellant Victor Ng that his alleged confession was
secured through force and violence square with his claim that his confession was
obtained under promise of immunity. Even in account latter case, it does not clearly
appear from account evidence that Victor Ng was ever promised immunity. Det. Ruiz, to
whom account case was assigned, testified that he was not sure if account Chief of
account Detective Bureau, Major Ernesto San Diego, ever promised to Victor Ng that he
will be utilized as a state witness if he would "tell the whole truth" that Major San Diego
made such a promise, account promise of immunity by one who is not a prosecuting
officer and who is in no position to comply with such promise, is not a ground for
objecting to account admissibility of account confession made under such
circumstances. A man as intelligent and as educated as appellant Victor Ng was
obviously aware that only account prosecuting officer and not account police can decide
definitely who win be utilized as a state witness. As this Court observed in People v. de
Torres: 17 If the Idea was to condone the murder, what was account reason for taking a confession of the
killing or any confession at all? Promise of immunity by one who is not prosecuting offier who could honor
or comply with his promise, " (the promise was made by a PC investigator) "is no ground for objecting

account admissibility of account confession. Appellant cannot plausibly pretend immaturity to be so easily
duped by his investigators.

In resume, account presence of details in account confession which only account

declarant could have known, coupled with account circumstance that account
appellants even corrected and added some details in their respective statements; the
presence of corrections or notations made by account declarants themselves on their
respective confessions; their failure to complain of their alleged maltreatment to account
fiscal before whom they swore under oath their declarations, or to any other competent
governmental authority; or account fact that they did not file many criminal or
administrative charges against their alleged torturers; the circumstance that when they
were made to confront each other, each pointed to the other as his companion in the
crime, without any protest or denial of the person indicated; the absence of any evil
motive on the part of the investigators, considering that some of the suspects, including
the father of Victor Ng. were never made to execute any confession; their inability,
during the trial, to indicate any mark of violence on their bodies or to request for a
medical examination of their bodies, muchless produce any medical testimony to
corroborate their claims of maltreatment: their re-enactment of the crime in the presence
of reporters: and the circumstance what many of the statements in said confessions are
confirmed by the indisputable facts, render the claim of appellants of duress in the
execution of their confessions as totally unworthy of credence.
A careful perusal of the statements of Victor Ng, Roque Dejungco, Jose de los Santos,
Romualdo Carreon and Juanita Ang shows that they interlock in most material points.
As between Victor Ng and Roque Dejungco (Exhibits "M" and "N"), there is harmony in
most material points, to wit; account plot to harm the victim; the suggestion by Victor Ng
that Dejungco contact his goons in Sampaloc to do account job; the inducement by
Victor Ng to Roque Dejungco and his co-accused, through price or reward, for the
elimination of Mariano Lim, which was the primary consideration for Dejungco and his
companions to commit the crime, the plan of Victor Ng to establish an alibi by going to
Cebu and Zamboanga City and staying there for several days while the crime is being
committed in Manila; the telephone call of Dejungco to Victor Ng upon his return,
informing him that the job was already done; and the delivery to Dejungco by Victor Ng
of account total sum of P2,000.00 at the Gocheco Bldg. C. M. Recto St., Manila. While
Victor Ng says that the price money of P2,000.00 was paid before account killing or
prior to his departure for Zamboanga City on December 15, 1966, Dejungco states that
account payment was made upon Victor's return. However, both coincide on the amount
actually paid. In account cases of Carreon, De los Santos, Ang and Dejungco (Exhibit
"J", "K", "L" and "N", respectively), there is also no question that they synchronize or
interlock in various material points. They all agree on the ghastly details of account
crime thus account fact that they were contacted by Roque Dejungco, alias "Gerry",

upon account instigation of Victor Ng who promised that he will pay them if they kill
Mariano Lim, their meeting in preparation for account job which included their trip to
Villalobos, Quiapo to familiarize themselves with the face of their intended victim; the
killing itself which began with the forcible taking of Mariano Lim from Kanlaon Street by
Ang and Carreon the trip to Mayon Street where the two confederates picked up De los
Santos and Dejungco; their bringing of the victim to Paraaque where he was stabbed
to death by De los Santos; the dumping of the body of the deceased on the road; and,
finally, their subsequent meeting to divide the money given them by Victor Ng.
Since People v. Badilla, 18 account rule which has been reiterated by the Court in various cases is
that extrajudicial confessions, independently made without collusion, which are identical with each other
in their essential details and are corroborated by other evidence on record, are admissible as trial
evidence against account person implicated to show account probability of account latter's actual
participation in account commission of account crime. 19

Inasmuch as there is no proof of collusion among account declarants, their confessions

should, therefore, be read together to form a complete picture of account commission of
account crime and considered collectively as corroborative or confirmatory of account
evidence apart from account confessions themselves.
On the basis thereof, it is, therefore, evident that only appellant Victor Ng knew the
victim, with a motive, strong and co enough to warrant the latter's elimination and that it
was he who induced his co-accused to commit the crime in question because of the
said accuse admit that they killed account deceased in consideration of the sum of
money promised them by Victor Ng. There can be no doubt, also, that it was appellant
Jose de los Santos who inflicted the fatal blow upon the victim. Hence, both are liable
for the crime commit the first, as a principal by inducement, and the second, as one by
the participation
The court a quo found that accused-appellant Victor Ng did not intend to commit so
grave a wrong as that actually committed. Thus, it said:
... The Court considers important account fact that his confession was not
for account killing of account deceased but only for his mauling or acts
short of doing away with him, his purpose being merely to stop him from or
purpose his courtship of the object of his own suit, Ruby Ng. For it is
precisely this virtual exculpatory tenor, or at least minimizing effect on his
liability among others. that has induced account Court to give full credence
to his confession. 20
We are incline to disagree with the aforestated finding of the trial court. The confession
of Victor Ng should not be taken independently of those of his co-accused, as it is

natural and to be expected that he would make therein statements and denials tending
to minimize his participation in the crime. In order to get a clear picture of the events
that led to the murder of the victim, it is necessary that the statements and admissions
made by all the accused be taken together. The fact that not one of the other coaccused of appellant Victor Ng made mention of, or even intimated the fact that the
agreement or intent was merely to frighten Mariano Lim in order to force him to desist
from his suit of Ruby Ng, strikes Us as significant. On the contrary, all their statements
point to the fact that the original intent was to kill, and not merely to maul or threaten
Mariano Lim. The detailed narration of the incident leading to the death of the victim
given by each of the other accused reveals that the original purpose was to kill, that
there was never any disagreement among them with respect to this matter, and thus,
their movements toward the fulfillment of such purpose were smooth and concerted.
Thus, Roque Dejungco gave the following statements:
11. Q: Do you know personally account cause of his death?
A: Yes, sir ... This is account story ... On November 1966, I
met Mr. Victor Ng at a Chinese Club somewhere at Pasay
City. He informed (me) that he had again a quarrel with
Mariano Lim Cho Kuan. I told him if I could do any help to
him. He told me 'You see Gerry, I know you from childhood
and I am cognizant that you know hoodlums at Sampaloc...
You make a preparation to contact two people who can
liquidate Mariano ... and I'll answer for account expenses.
After five days, I met him again in the same place, and told
me that, he will be leaving for Zamboanga and Cebu City,
and further told me that if he will leave by the 15th of
December 1966, and that if he will arrive on the 23rd of
December 1966, he don't (sic) want to see Mariano alive
(contacted two people by the name of JUANITO ANG alias
Johnny he is my cousin and one Pepeng Komang, alias
JOSE DELOS SANTOS, alias JOSE VILLANUEVA, I told
these two people about the plan of Victor Ng, and they told
me that they are ready at my disposal.
12. Q: When Victor Ng arrived from Zamboanga City, did you
inform Victor Ng about the killing of Mariano Lim Cho Kuan?
A: I called up Victor Ng by phone and informed him that
Mariano was already finished. Victor Ng told me that I should
wait at the ground floor of the Gocheco Bldg. at Magdalena

St., so I proceeded to the said place, and he handed to me

an amount of P1,000.00. I received this amount before
Christmas, and I received again from him P500.00 before
New Year. . . and on mid-January 1967 I again received from
Victor Ng another P500.00 ... 21
Similarly, Romualdo Carreon declared that Roque Dejungco Chan, alias Gerry, told him
that "Yayariin natin iyang si Mariano, 22 Likewise accused-appellant Jose de los Santos made
substantially similar statements, thus:

16. T: Isalaysay mo nga ang buong pangyayari sa

pagkapatay ninyo kay Mariano?
S: Ganito po ang pangyayari niyan. Nuon pong Nobiembre
1966 ay nasabi sa akin ni Gerry na may bibirahin tao
kami. Sabi niya ay ipinapapatay ni Vic na kaibigan ni Gerry.
Sabi ni Gerry sa akin ay sumama daw ako. Sabi niya ay
magbabayad daw si Vic ng halagang limang libong piso para
mapatay si Mariano. Pumayag naman ako dahil sa nademyo
na ako sa sinabi ng aking kumpare. 23
In addition, an examination of the statement given by Juanito Ang reveals that the
groups was made to understand from the beginning by Roque Dejungco, alias Gerry,
who was acting for Victor Ng, that Mariano Lim was to be killed.
In the face of the foregoing declarations made by account other accused, which
harmonize on all material aspects, it is difficult to perceive how the lone allegation of
accuse Victor Ng, the mastermind of the crime, that he did not intend to have the victim
killed, but merely "frightened", can be given credence.
The court a quo was convinced of Victor Ng's lack of intent to kill Mariano by the facts
that they did not have a ready weapon and had to borrow one from Dejungco's
"compadre" and the smallness of the amount actually received as consideration for the
crime which was only P2,000.00, as compared to that promised, which was P5,000.00
These in themselves are not convincing factors. Had account intent been merely to
frighten the victim no weapon, and a deadly one at that, would have been necessary.
The direct participants in the crime, by means of their superiority in strength and
number, could have effectively frightened Mariano Lim from pursuing his suit of Ruby
Ng. The fact that a pointed knife about eight (8) inches in length and one-half (1/2) inch
in width, was obtained and actually used, indicates a contrary intent. Moreover, the
manner in which the weapon was wielded clearly shows that there was no doubt at all in

the minds of the assailants that they were to slay Mariano Lim. Thus, it required only a
single stab wound, purposely intended to be fatal to kill him. This was testified to by
Romualdo Carreon in the following manner:
... Sabi sa akin ni Juanita ay talian ko na ang bibig. Ang ginawa ko ay
kinuha ko ang panyo ni Gerry at tinalian ang bibig ni Mariano. Tapos ay
hinawakan ko ang kanang kamay ni Mariano. Tapos ay tinanong ni Jose
kay Juanita kung saan ang puso. Ang sagot ni Juanita ay "AYWAN HINDI
KO ALAM." Tapos ay iniakbay ni Jose and kanyang kaliwang kamay sa
balikat ni Mariano Lim at biglang sinaksak sa dibdib. Makalipas ang
dalawang minuto ay inilagay o itinapat ni Juanito ang kanyang isang daliri
sa ilong ni Mariano Lim at pagkatapos ay sinabi niyang "PATAY NA".
Tapos ay bumaba na si Jose at binuhat niya ang intsik o si Mariano Lim at
ibinaba sa tabi ng kalye na may damo. Tapos ay sumakay siya uli at
umalis na kami sa lugar na iyon. ... 24
Had account intent been merely to scare Lim, the accused could have merely mauled or
beaten him up, but this they did not do. The intention to kill a mental process, may be
inferred from the nature of the weapon used, the place of the wound, seriousness
thereof, and the persistence to kill the victim. 25
The fact that the amount actually paid was merely P2,000.00 and not P5,000.00, as
promised, does not at all prove that there was no intent to kill. The records disclose that
Victor Ng was paying in installments, and there is no indication that he did not intend to
pay the full amount agreed upon. Furthermore if the agreement was merely to scare
Mariano Lim off his suit of Ruby Ng, it is doubtful if the direct participants would have
committed the capital crime of murder, with its graver consequences, if they thought the
price was incommensurate.
All the foregoing factors, in addition to the fact that none of the other accused claimed a
lesser intent, convince Us that Victor Ng, contrary to his claim intended Mariano Lim to
be killed. Courts need not believe confessions in their entirety. 26 There is absolutely nothing
in the records to support his allegation except his own statements, which are self-serving and cannot be
given credence in the face of all the overwhelming evidence, primarily the confessions of the other accuse
pointing to the true nature of his guilt. While We are cognizant of the rule that an extra-judicial confession
is, generally, evidence only against the person making it, it is nevertheless true that the same may serve
as corroborative evidence when it is clear from the other facts and circumstances that other persons had
participated in the perpetration of the cime. 27 Moreover, in the absence of collusion among the declarants
their confessions should be read together in order to form a complete picture of the whole situation and
considered as corroborative of what evidence there is apart from the confessions themselves. 28

The foregoing considerations likewise indicate that the mitigating circumstance of lack
of intent to commit so grave a wrong cannot be appreciated in favor of appellant Jose
de los Santos.
It is contended by the Solicitor General that appellants should be convicted of the
complex crime of kidnapping with murder. It is smarted that when a person kidnaps the
victim for no other purpose than to kill him but only after he detains him for a
considerable length of time, taking him from one city or town to another city or town, and
finally to a deserted place in still another town where he kills him, as in the case at bar,
the offense committed is serious illegal detention with murder punishable either under
Article 248 or Article 267, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article
48 thereof. There is no question, however, that the clear manifest intention of the
appellants was to kill the victim the kidnapping of the victim merely incidental to the
principal purpose. It seems evident that the weight of authority is in favor of the
proposition that where a victim was taken from one place to another solely for the
purpose of killing him and not for detaining him for a length of time or for the purpose of
obtaining a ransom for his release, the crime committed is murder, and not the complex
crime of kidnapping with murder. 29 We find that such principle is applicable to this case.
The circumstance of treachery cannot be applied to victor Ng since he was not actually
present when the crime was committed, having actually left to his co-accused the
means or methods for the commission of the crime. Since the evidence, however,
disclose that he induced the others to commit the crime for a price or promise of reward,
he is a principal by induction. As observed by the trial , the circumstance of evident
premeditation is absorbed by the circumstance of reward or promise which qualifies the
crime as murder. He should therefore, suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Considering that the penalty imposed upon Roque Dejungco y Chan which
is reclusion perpetua is now final it would seem but fair that Jose de los Santos be
meted the same penalty, considering that the latter was a mere follower of the former.
WHEREFORE, with the foregoing modification, the judgment of the court a quo is
hereby AFFIRMED.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring.:

I concur in account finding that Victor Ng, as account mastermind, and Jose de los
Santos, as the executioner, are guilty of murder only. But I dissent as to the imposable
penalty which should be death, because evident premeditation can be appreciated as to
both appellants (U.S. vs. Manalinde, 14 Phil. 77; U.S. vs. Alim, 38 Phil. 1)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 140074

February 27, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSEPHINE "JOSIE" SANTOS, MANNY BALTAZAR, JOHN DOE, PETER DOE AND
ROGER DOE, accused-appellants.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
It is not unknown that a debtor occasionally would suffer from the malady of selective
amnesia. The case is a tale of one unfortunate creditor who might have sought to rouse
her absent-minded debtor from the haze of forgetfulness.
On 10 December 1996, at six o'clock in the morning, Leonida de la Pea was at home
in Barangay Resurreccion, Umingan, Pangasinan, with her eight-year old niece,
Christine Lovely Mae Delanos, when a passenger jeepney arrived. Five decently
dressed men stepped down from the vehicle and entered the house. The first, who was
attired in a business suit, introduced himself as Rocky Alberto and his companions as
agents of the Criminal Investigation Service ("CIS"). 1 Alberto asked Leonida about her
unpaid obligation to Josephine Santos. Leonida answered that she had already paid the
debt before the barangay captain of Umingan. Moments later, another vehicle, a brown
colored car, stopped in front of the house. Henry Salimbay (the barangay captain of
Umingan), Josephine Santos, Manny Baltazar and two unidentified males and one
unidentified female, alighted. Leonida rushed to confront Salimbay, telling him that
Josephine had sent the CIS agents to demand payment of her debt and that it was
Josephine who should instead be accosted. Sensing an escalating tension between the
two women, the barangay captain decided to leave, telling the parties that it was best
for both of them to just amicably settle their differences.
It would seem that the association between Leonida de la Pea and Josephine Santos
was one of friendship turned awry. On 22 March 1992, Josephine appeared to have
given a one-year loan to Leonida but the latter was unable to timely pay the debt. For
the next four years, Josephine would be unsuccessful in securing payment from her

delinquent debtor. Josephine and Manny Baltazar, both residents of Baguio City, would
travel all the way to Resurreccion, Pangasinan, to seek payment from Leonida but, in all
these instances, Leonida would refuse to see Josephine and ignore the summons
issued by the barangay captain. This unease between the two women was further
heightened when Leonida subsequently filed a case for estafa against Josephine.
The eventful 10th of December 1996 was the scheduled conference between debtor
and creditor before Henry Salimbay, the barangay captain, and the already irate
Josephine, anticipating another rebuff from Leonida, decided to personally go to her
house with Salimbay in tow. Leonida stubbornly maintained her having already settled
the account. At this obstinate insistence, an enraged Josephine Santos shouted
invectives at Leonida and began hurling things inside the house, scattering the palay
and hitting, in the process, Felizarda Saturnino, an aunt of Leonida with a woodcarving.
Josephine and Baltazar held Leonida, handcuffed her and, with the help of their
companions, dragged her towards the parked passenger jeepney and forced her to
board it. She described the passenger jeepney as having a locked door at its passenger
rear-end portion and two doors on either side at the drivers seat, with side glass
windows which were about foot high and 1 foot wide, too small for a person her size
to pass through. Leonida was flanked by Rocky Alberto and one unidentified male in the
passenger seat of the vehicle. On the front seat of the passenger jeepney were three
other men. Josephine, along with Baltazar and three other companions, rode in the car.
The two vehicles traveled, the brown car leading the way and the passenger jeepney
closely following behind. The convoy first made a stopover at the house of barangay
captain Salimbay where Leonida heard Josephine and Baltazar call out, "Captain, we
already got Nida." The group proceeded towards the direction of Carmen, Pangasinan,
passing through San Leon, and finally progressing towards Kennon Road. Somewhere
in the long stretch of the Kennon Road, the group stopped at the Twin Peaks, a hub of
commercial establishments where Baguio-bound passengers would casually stop for
refreshments. Leonida, from her seat at the passenger side of the jeepney, heard
Josephine and Baltazar telling the men from the jeepney to step down from the vehicle
and to partake of some refreshments. Josephine and one unidentified companion came
up to her and tried to force her to sign a document forfeiting her property in favor of
Josephine in satisfaction of the unpaid loan. Leonida balked at the suggestion. Failing to
convince Leonida to sign the document, the group decided to continue with their
journey.
In Baguio City, the group proceeded to a building along the Naguillan Road which
Leonida recognized to be Precinct I of the Baguio City police. She saw Josephine and
Baltazar enter the police precinct. Later emerging from the police station, the duo told
their companions to alight from the jeepney. Baltazar then took over the wheel of the

passenger jeepney while Josephine seated herself beside Leonida in the passenger
seat of the vehicle. The latter had no idea where they were heading. It was only much
later, upon seeing several tombs within the vicinity, when she realized that they had
taken her to the local cemetery. Leonida overheard Josephine and her companions,
while they were alighting from the vehicle, say that they were "going to kill her at 8:00
(that) evening." Rocky Alberto then showed up, and he was ordered to watch Leonida
while Josephine and Baltazar said they would go elsewhere to take something to eat.
Left alone with Alberto, Leonida begged for mercy. Alberto proved to be a good
Samaritan and helpfully handed over to her a steel pipe from a narrow opening in the
rear door of the jeepney. Armed with the steel pipe, Leonida hit the glass front window
of the passenger vehicle and made her exit. She and Alberto then flagged down a
taxicab, which took them to the Dagupan bus station where, after relating her harrowing
experience to the bus personnel, she and Alberto were able to hitch a ride on a Manilabound passenger bus. Alighting at the Carmen junction, they took a tricycle for the
remaining leg of their journey home.
The next day, accompanied by Rocky Alberto, Leonida filed a complaint before the
Umingan Police Station. Alberto, upon giving his official statement before the Umingan
authorities, was unable to produce any document to prove his being a CIS agent.
Felizarda Saturnino, an aunt of Leonida, sought to corroborate the statement of her
niece. According to Felizarda, the common-law husband of Leonida, a certain "Itong,"
arrived shortly after the group had left. Upon learning what had happened to Leonida,
Itong made inquiries. Barangay captain Salimbay informed him that a warrant of arrest
had been issued against Leonida. Later, when she and Itong went to the Umingan
police station, to report the abduction, they were instructed to first ascertain whether a
warrant of arrest was indeed issued against Leonida.
A subsequent examination by Dr. Maria L. Chan showed that Leonida had sustained
multiple abrasions and hematoma in both upper extremities secondary to mauling.
On 19 March 1997, an accusatory information for the crime of Kidnapping was filed
against Josephine Santos, Manny Baltazar and three other unidentified persons "That on or about the 10th day of December, 1996, in the morning, at Bgy.
Resurreccion, municipality of Umingan, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, including three (3)
Does whose identities have not yet been established, being a private individual and
without any legal justification and simulating public authority, and by means of force,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and there willfully,

unlawfully and feloniously take and handcuff both hands of one LEONIDA DE LA PEA,
then load her to a passenger jeepney and brought her to a public cemetery at Naguillan
Road, Baguio City, thereby depriving her of her liberty by detaining inside a passenger
jeepney and threatening her with death but was able to escape, to the damage and
prejudice of said LEONIDA DELA PEA.
"Contrary to Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code." 2
The accused pled "not guilty" to the offense charged.
Josephine Santos and Manny Baltazar have vehemently denied the accusation. The
defense version is narrated by the Public Attorney's Office in its brief for accusedappellant Josephine Santos.
"Manny Baltazar, testified that in the early morning of December 10, 1996 he together
with his co-accused Josie Santos, Ester Dino, Leo Badecao and Sheriff William Baden,
left Baguio City on board a Toyota Crown car on their way to Caranglaan, Nueva Ecija
to pick-up fifty (50) cavans of rice and visit his 31/2 hectare land. Since they were
passing by Umingan, Pangasinan, accused Josie Santos suggested that they dropped
by Resurreccion, Umingan, Pangasinan to collect unpaid debts of Leonida dela Pea.
Before proceeding to the house of Leonida, they sought the help of Resurreccion
Barangay Captain Henry Salimbay. Captain Salimbay accompanied them to the house
of Leonida. They reached Leonida's house at around 6:00 o'clock in the morning.
"He parked the car near the yard of Kagawad Dumaguing as the vehicle could not get
through the alley leading to the house of Leonida because a passenger jeepney blocked
the way, while Josie and Captain Salimbay proceeded to the house of Leonida. After
five (5) minutes Captain Salimbay left the place. Thereafter, he heard Leonida and Josie
quarreling inside the house. He immediately proceeded to Leonida's house, pulled Josie
and brought her to the parked car. Then, he returned to Leonida's house and plead to
the latter to settle their differences between themselves to avoid trouble but she
(Leonida) denied that she was indebted. Then, the four (4) men inside the house
handcuffed Nida and left.
"He informed Josie that Leonida could not pay. Thus, they left the place and dropped by
at Captain Salimbay's place and informed the latter's wife that they were leaving.
"On their way to Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan, they took the national highway in
Balungao where they saw Leonida's father-in-law, Leoncio dela Pea. They offered a
ride to Leoncio and dropped him at Balungao district jail. Since it was already late, they

cancelled their plan to go to Nueva Ecija and drank tuba at a nearby store. Thereafter,
they proceeded to Baguio City.
"Along the highway at Binalonan, Pangasinan, somebody flagged them down. He pulled
over beside the passenger jeepney which was previously parked in front of Leonida's
house. A man from the jeepney approached them and invited Josie for a conversation in
the jeepney. After 20 minutes, Josie returned and told them to go back to Resurreccion
because Leonida would give them the palay. They returned to Resurreccion.
Unfortunately, they were not able to get the palay because Leonida's husband was not
around, so they left the place and proceeded to Baguio City via the Kennon Road.
"While they were approaching Twin Peaks at Kennon Road, the man who flagged them
down in Binalonan signaled again. He parked the car near the passenger jeepney.
Josie, Leonida and the alleged CIS agent took their snacks in the canteen while he
remained in the car. After 30 minutes, Josie returned and instructed him to proceed to a
police station near the city hall for she was going to file a complaint for estafa against
Leonida. However, a policeman instructed them to proceed to Precinct No. 1 at
Naguillan Road. He accompanied Josie to the precinct but the policemen also told them
that since the transaction was consummated in Resurreccion, the case should be filed
in Pangasinan. Incidentally, when accused-appellants were inside the precinct, Leonida
was inside the parked passenger jeepney. When they were about to go home, Rocky
Alberto approached Josie. After few minutes of conversation, they agreed to go home,
leaving behind Leonida and the alleged CIS agent.
"Furthermore, he denied all the allegations made by Leonida and branded them as pure
lies. (TSN pp. 4-12; June 9, 1998; TSN pp. 2-15; July 14, 1998).
"Josephine `Josie' Santos, testified that in the early morning of December 10, 1996,
she together with her driver, accused Manny Baltazar, Ester Dino, Leo Badecao and
William Baden were on their way to Caranglaan, Nueva Ecija. Upon her insistence, they
dropped by at Resurreccion, Umingan, Pangasinan to collect the debt of Leonida `Nida'
dela Pea amounting to P87,000.00. Before they proceeded to Leonida's house they
sought the assistance of Barangay captain Henry Salimbay who previously summoned
Leonida before his office to settle her indebtedness.
"Josie Santos and Captain Salimbay entered the house of Leonida while her
companions were left in the parked car. When they entered the house, she noticed the
presence of five (5) alleged CIS members, one of whom was Rocky Alberto talking to
Leonida. She informed Leonida that she was collecting her indebtedness to which the
latter replied, `I already paid my indebtedness on you. Vulva of your mother. I will have a
warrant against you'. She also replied, `You did not pay even a cent'. Thereafter, an

altercation ensued between them. The barangay captain left them arguing. While they
were altercating, Manny Baltazar arrived and pulled her to the parked car. When they
were leaving, Leonida and the five (5) men also left on board the passenger jeepney.
"On their way to Nueva Ecija, they dropped by at Captain Salimbay's house informing
the latter's wife that they were not able to collect Leonida's debt. The passenger
jeepney overtook them infront of Salimbay's house. While they were cruising towards
the national highway, they chanced upon Leonida's father-in-law, Leoncio. They offered
him a ride and dropped him at the highway going to Balungao. Along the highway, they
passed upon a tuba vendor and they drank. After drinking, they decided to cancel their
trip to Nueva Ecija and returned to Baguio City.
"In the highway between Urdaneta and Binalonan, one of the CIS companions (Rocky
Alberto) of Leonida flagged them down. She alighted and talked to Rocky Alberto who
informed her that Leonida was willing to deliver fifty (50) cavans of palay in payment of
her obligation. They returned to Resurreccion but Leonida's husband refused to give the
palay. Unable to get the palay, they proceeded to Baguio City via Kennon Road. At Twin
Peaks along Kennon Road, Rocky Alberto flagged them down again. Rocky asked why
they did not have the palay to which she replied that Leonida's husband refused to give.
Rocky suggested that they proceed to his house in Baguio City to settle the problem,
but she insisted that they should instead proceed to the police. Rocky agreed. While
she and Rocky were talking, Leonida was eating inside the canteen at Twin Peaks.
"From Twin Peaks, they proceeded to the Central Police Station of Baguio City to file an
estafa case against Leonida but they were referred to a sub-station in Naguillan Road.
They were not able to settle their differences nor filed a complaint for estafa because
Nida and the five (5) alleged CIS men hurriedly left the police sub-station.
"She denied all the criminal imputations made by Leonida against her. The private
complainant visited her in jail and made a proposal for her to pay the former
P500,000.00 as a settlement. (TSN pp. 3-12; December 7, 1998; pp. 3-13; February 22,
1999; p. 11 April 12, 1999)."3
The defense failed to convince the court a quo; on 09 July 1999, the court convicted the
accused on the ground that the deprivation of private complainant Leonida de la Pea
of her liberty, regardless of its purpose and although lasting for less than twenty-four
hours, was sufficient to support the charge of kidnapping. Finding then Josephine
Santos and Manny Baltazar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping,
the trial court imposed the extreme penalty of death

"WHEREFORE, as mandated by law, and having found the accused Josephine Santos
@ `Josie' of Irisan, Baguio City and the accused Manny Baltazar @ `Candro' of 197
Marcos Highway, Baguio City GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping Leonida de la Pea, a female, on December 10, 1996, attended with a host
of aggravating circumstances with none to mitigate as above noted, the Court hereby
sentences them to each suffer the penalty of DEATH, aside from the accessory
penalties imposed under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code.
"Additionally, the subject accused are hereby ordered to indemnify Leonida de la Pea,
her heirs, assigns or successors-in-interest for moral damages in the sum of
P30,000.00 and to pay the costs." 4
Hence, the automatic appeal, and central to it is the staunch denial made by appellants
of any responsibility for the alleged kidnapping incident.
While appellants admitted having gone to the house of Leonida on 10 December 1996,
they, however, strongly denied having abducted her. It was true, according to them, that
they did chance upon the CIS agents two times on their way to Baguio - the first at a
point between Urdaneta and Binalonan and the second time at the Twin Peaks by the
Kennon Road but that these encounters were "purely accidental."
The trial court had well-founded reasons to conclude that the so-called "encounters"
between the CIS agents and Josephine Santos and company were indeed far from
being "purely accidental." The time of arrival of the two groups at the residence of
Leonida de la Pea on the early morning of 10 December 1996 was only a matter of
minutes of each other. The CIS agents evidently knew and, in fact, inquired about
Leonida's existing account with Josephine Santos. At least twice later on the same day,
the CIS agents and the group of Josephine Santos met at stopovers on the way to
Baguio City. Appellant Josephine Santos even said that, at a point between Urdaneta
City and Binalonan, they were flagged down by the CIS agents in order to tell her that
Leonida de la Pea had finally consented to allow Josephine to get the palay in
payment of Leonida's debt.
But that is just about all. Nothing else can be gathered to support the charge of
kidnapping.
That there was an existing debt, and that the same remained unpaid as of 10 December
1996, would seem certain. Leonida de la Pea herself acknowledged that no less than
Henry Salimbay, the barangay captain, accompanied appellants to her residence for the
purpose of collecting payment. The complainant claimed that appellants had dragged
and forced her to board the passenger jeepney but, strangely enough, the incident had

failed to attract the attention of neighbors, among whom was a kagawad, who could
have somehow lent a helping hand to the hapless hostage. The group was then said to
have made a stopover at the house of barangay captain Salimbay and later at the police
station at the Baguio City Hall and subsequently at a police station along Naguillan. It
was rather unusual for would-be kidnappers to request the intervention of the local
barangay captain, and then, with their hostage in tow, to brazenly stop at a police
station not just once but twice; the first at the police station at the Baguio City Hall and
the second at a police station by the Naguillan Road. The complainant was neither
bound nor gagged and the jeepney where she allegedly was being held hostage had
been parked just meters away from the police station.
The testimony given by Baltazar and Santos would seem to be more plausible than
what Leonida asseverated. Josephine Santos and her group, with the assistance of CIS
agents, brought complainant to Baguio City in order to surrender her to the custody of
Baguio City authorities where Josephine Santos thought she could rightly seek redress.
She was advised, however, that it was in the province of Pangasinan, not Baguio City,
where a case could be lodged. According to Manny Baltazar "Q. Where in Baguio did you proceed?
"A. At the police department of the city hall.
"Q. Do you know the reason why you went to the police station of Baguio?
"A. Josie said that it is better to file an estafa case against Nida.
"Q. Did she actually go to the police station against Nida?
"A. I accompanied Nida at precinct 7, sir.
"Q. Is that the police station near the city hall?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. What happened?
"A. When she went to precinct 7 the officer said that the case is in the jurisdiction of
station 1.
"Q. Where is this station 1?
"A. Naguillan Road, sir.

"Q. What did you do when they told [you] that it was station 1 of Baguio police which
has jurisdiction over the case of Josie?
"A. We went to station 1, sir.
"COURT:
"Q. Is this station 1 located beside the cemetery?
"A. It is far, sir.
"Q. How far, if you know?
"A. About 200 meters, sir.
"x x x x x x x x x
"Q. What happened then at police station no. 1?
"A. I parked my car in front of the station 1 and I accompanied Josie to the station, sir.
"Q. What happened when you were inside the station with Josie?
"A. When we went inside station 1 a companion of Nida who has an amputated hand
told us that this is the place where you can file your complaint and I will leave you.
"ATTY. GUILLERMO:
"Q. Up to now, do you know the name of this man with an amputated arm who told you
that [he] will leave you?
"A. What I know, sir, is Rocky.
"Q. Do you know this Rocky Alberto?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Is he one of the men who rode in that jeepney with Nida according to you?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. How about Nida de la Pea, did you see her while you were in the police station?

"A. She was inside the jeep, sir.

"x x x x x x x x x
"Q. What happened when Rocky Alberto left you at precinct no. 1 of the Baguio police
with Josie Santos?
"A. I talked to the police that Josie will be going to file a case.
"Q. And what happened after that?
"A. When Josie was about to file a case, they were talking to each other and they found
out that the money which was given to Nida was received at Resurreccion and therefore
the station has no jurisdiction.
"Q. What happened after that?
"A. When the station did not accept the complaint, I advised her that we must have to go
home."5
Similarly, Josephine Santos declared thusly:
"A. After that he told me that we will just proceed to my house in Baguio and we would
talk the matter over.
"Q. What did you do when you were told that you were going to Baguio?
"A. I questioned him why in my house why not at the police station so that things would
be legal because my claim consist of her account and I do not know about your claim,
anyway she was with you.
"x x x

xxx

xxx

"ATTY. GUILLERMO
"Q. What happened next after that?
"A. We went to the Baguio police station to wait for them.
"Q. Were you able to reach Baguio City?
"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. You said you were supposed to go to the police station were you able to reach the
police station?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Where in Baguio is that police station?
"A. We first went to the main police headquarters but the main office advised us to
report to sub-station I which had jurisdiction.
"Q. Where was this police station?
"A. Naguillan Road, sir.
"COURT
"Q. Is that near the cemetery?
"A. Yes, sir.
"ATTY. GUILLERMO
"Q. When you were told to go to the police sub-station, did you go?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Who were your companions?
"A. Manny, sir."6
Rocky Alberto, in his own sworn statement before the Umingan authorities a day after
the incident, corroborated the version of appellants "Q. Ano pa ang sumunod na pangyayari, noong hindi pumayag na pumirma si De la
Pea?
"A. Kami po ay nagtuloy sa Baguio City at tumuloy kami sa Precinct I ng PNP sa
Naguillan Road, at noong huminto ang sasakyan nina Josie ay bumaba siya (Josie) at
si Manny Baltazar at umalis na ang sasakyan nina Josie at pumasok sina Manny at
Josie sa loob ng prisinto kung kaya sumunod ako sa loob at doon ay nalaman ko na
gustong mag-file ng estafa case laban kay Leonida de la Pea at doon ko pa lang
nalaman na walang kasong nakafile at wala ring warrant of arrest laban kay Leonida de

la Pea. At dahil ayaw naman pumayag ang mga pulis doon na gawin ang gusto nina
Josie Santos ay lumabas na kaming tatlo nina Josie, at doon ay kinausap ko sina Josie
Santos na ako ay pupunta sa aming opisina at pagkatapos ay babalik ako at iuuwi ko si
De la Pea dahil wala naman pala siyang kaso, kung kaya umalis na ako at iniwan ko si
Leonida de la Pea sa aming sasakyan." 7
On the witness stand, complainant herself identified Rocky Alberto as being one of the
cohorts in her abduction; yet, she categorically denied that Alberto had kidnapped her.
She testified:
"Q. Did you also tell the barangay captain that Rocky Alberto was one of the CIS people
who helped kidnap you?
"A. I just told him that he is the one who accompanied me home, sir.
"Q. You did not answer my question. My question was did you tell the barangay captain
that Rocky Alberto your companion was one of those who kidnapped you earlier on
December 10, 1996, please answer the question.
"A. I did not tell that anymore, sir.
"x x x

xxx

xxx

"COURT
"Q. You did not tell the barangay captain that Rocky Alberto was one of those who
kidnapped you because as a matter of fact Rocky Alberto did not kidnap you?
"A. I was not able to tell that, sir.
"Q. Answer the question. You did not tell the barangay captain that your companion
Rocky Alberto was one of those who earlier kidnapped you because in point of fact you
were never kidnapped by Rocky Alberto - that is the question, do you understand?
"A. That is true, sir.
"Q. So it is clear that Rocky Alberto never kidnapped you?
"A. No, sir."8
The circumstances that have surfaced instead warrant a conviction for grave
coercion.9 Grave coercion is committed when a person prevents another from

doing something not prohibited by law or compelling him to do something

against his will, whether it be right or wrong, and without any authority of law, by
means of violence, threats or intimidation. Its elements are - First, that the offender
has prevented another from doing something not prohibited by law, or that he has
compelled him to do something against his will, be it right or wrong; second, that the
prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such display
of force as would produce intimidation and control over the will of the offended party;
and, third, that the offender who has restrained the will and liberty of another did so
without any right or authority of law. Where there is a variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information and that proved and the offense charged
necessarily includes the lesser offense established in evidence, the accused can be
convicted of the offense proved.10 Grave coercion carries the penalty of prision
correccional and a fine not exceeding P6,000.00. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium term. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law the minimum that can be imposed is anywhere from one
(1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and from
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction under review is MODIFIED. Appellants
Josephine Santos and Manny Baltazar are ACQUITTED of the crime of Kidnapping;
instead, said appellants are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave
coercion, and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from six (6) months
ofarresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years and six (6) months of prision
correccional medium, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,000.00. Costs de oficio.
1wphi1

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-67610 July 31, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ANGELINA MENDOZA Y RAMOS, accused-appellant.
FERNAN, C.J.:
To a parent, the anguish of losing a child under any circumstance is indescribable. If
death, or any other disastrous event which a parent cannot foresee or control be the
cause of such loss, the pain may be assuaged by the thought that fate's overpowering
hand intervened.
But if such loss be brought about by anyone with the sinister intent of taking away the
child from his or her parents against the latter's will to derive personal gain by selling the
child like a commodity in callous disregard of the child's well-being, it is not the parents
alone but society as a whole that bears the anguish and the outrage caused by such
evil deed. The perpetration of this evil deserves severe punishment.
Angelina Mendoza y Ramos alias "Rosalinda Quintos' was convicted of the crime of
kidnapping a minor as defined in Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code, and meted the
penalty of reclusion perpetua by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XVI. 1 She
now appeals from said conviction on a lone assignment of error, to wit:

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR
UNDER ARTICLE 270 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE. 2
The information dated October 19, 1982 charged Angelina Mendoza y Ramos with the
crime of Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about September 28, 1982, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, being a private individual and without authority of law
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and illegally kidnap and
carry away EDWARD POLICARPIO, a one year and three months old
baby boy, for the purpose of selling him and separating him from his

mother, Mrs. EUGENIA T. POLICARPIO, by then and there, befriending

the said child and his parents at the Luneta Park, this City, carrying him
away without the knowledge and consent of his said parents, and
deliberately failing to return him to said Eugenia T. Policarpio, his
mother . 3
A plea of "not guilty" having been entered by accused-appellant on arraignment , 4 trial
ensued.

The prosecution version is summarized in the appealed decision, thus:

... At 8:00 o'clock in the morning of September 28, 1982 spouses Ernesto
and Eugenia Policarpio along with their two children, Ferdinand and
Edward, seven years old and one year and three months old respectively,
were at the Luneta Park. near the Rizal Monument in Manila. Having just
arrived from Nueva Ecija, the family was resting at the park. Then and
there, a woman who turned out to be accused Angelina Mendoza, but who
had introduced herself as 'Rosalinda Quintos' accosted them. She struck a
conversation with the spouses and even offered them food particularly to
Edward. Mr. Policarpio, a Pampango, recognized the accused. He recalled
having seen her at a club in Angeles City. During their conversation, the
accused gave the spouses her address at 2526 Dallas Street, Makati,
Metro Manila. At one point, she even half-seriously asked the spouses to
give the boy Edward to her. They of course did not take the request
seriously. Then while Mr. Policarpio had apparently gone somewhere
away from the group and while Mrs. Policarpio was not looking the
accused began playing with Edward and, offering him food, lured him
away from his mother. Shortly, the accused carried Edward and took him
away with her.
The spouses lost no time in reporting the incident to the police at the
station in Luneta Park. The police officers there showed them photographs
from among which they were able to identify the accused. Police records
also disclose that the accused had been arrested a number of times for
vagrancy and that her occupation appeared to be that of a hooker.
It developed that from the Luneta the accused brought the child to Tramo
Street, Pasay City where she claimed before some residents that the child
was that of a hostess friend of hers who being gravely ill of leprosy was in
dire need of money, and that she was asked to sell the child for P 250.00.
This unusual sales offer happened to take place in front of the house of

Mrs. Delia Navarette, a barangay councilwoman whose attention was

attracted by the number of people who had gathered outside her house.
The accused offered to sell the child to Mrs. Navarette. The latter felt the
proposition distasteful, saying that it was not right that a child should be
sold and that what accused was doing was illegal. Nonetheless, the
accused insisted on momentarily leaving the child with Mrs. Navarette.
Intending to have the child returned to his mother, Mrs. Navarette asked
her sister to go with the accused to the National Orthopedic Hospital
where according to the accused the boy's mother was confined. But when
Mrs. Navarette's sister and the accused were on their way to the hospital,
the latter changed her story. She said that the boy's mother was at the
Philippine General Hospital instead. So they proceeded to the PGH and
went up to the third floor where the accused said the boy's mother was.
But it turned out that all the patients on that floor were males. To make the
long story short, the accused had given Mrs. Navarette's sister the run
around. And when the latter finally got fed up she phoned Mrs. Navarette
to report what had happened. Mrs. Navarette instructed her sister to bring
the accused to her as she had now decided to report the matter to the
police. While the accused and Mrs. Navarette's sister were waiting for a
taxi at PGH, the former disappeared. Since the child had been left with
her, Mrs. Navarette felt obliged to take care of him. She also made it a
point to report the incident to the police to alert them in case there should
be reports of a missing child.
Sometime later, the accused reappeared at the Luneta Police Station
obstensibly to visit a detainee thereat. It was then that the police officer on
duty recognized her. She was questioned regarding the whereabouts of
the boy. Threatened with arrest, she revealed that she had left the boy
with Mrs. Navarette in Pasay City. That led to the recovery of Edward
Policarpio and his eventual return to his parents twenty days after the
accused took him away. 5
The defense version, on the other hand, is capsulized in the Brief for the AccusedAppellant as follows:
The defense presented the accused, ANGELINA MENDOZA, 36 years
old. single, store keeper, and residing at 2526 Dalin, Makati, Metro Manila,
who testified that she did not kidnap a minor named Edward and failed to
return (sic) to his parents. After arriving from Angeles City, she went to
Luneta to eat and rest. She was approached by the couple and asked if
they could share in her food. She asked them where they come from and

the couple replied that they slept there at Luneta because they have been
robbed. She also gave P 54.00 to the husband who told her that he was
hungry. Subsequently, she was told by the man to take care of the child
considering that said child is sickly and it is drizzling. She then went to her
aunt's place in Pulang Lupa. Finding no persons, she went to the place of
a friend in Tramo and left the child. She told her friend that she will come
back after her operation. Later she found herself confined at San Lazaro
Hospital for at least two months. While in the hospital she was informed by
a friend who visited her that she is wanted by the police. She escaped
from the hospital and went to Precinct 5 and two policemen arrested her.
She was informed of having kidnapped a child but she denied (sic). She
informed Pat. Bacobo where to get the child and the latter said that she
will be charged only for vagrancy. When the child was recovered, she was
instead jailed. (TSN, pp. 1 to 8, August 17, 1983, TSN, pp. 2 to 4,
September 7, 1983). 6
Giving full credence to the prosecution version and rejecting as incredible and
unacceptable the defense of accused-appellant that the minor child Edward was
voluntarily given to her by his parents to take care of, the trial court, as earlier stated,
convicted accused-appellant of the crime of kidnapping of a Minor in violation of Article
270 of the Revised Penal Code. The dispositive portion of the decision reads thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding that the prosecution
has established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of kidnapping of a minor in violation of Article 270 of the Revised
Penal Code. Accordingly, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
ofreclusion perpetua as well as to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 7
Hence, this appeal.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting her of the crime of
Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor as defined and penalized under Article 270 of
the Revised Penal Code, as it was not proven that the custody of the minor victim
Edward Policarpio had been entrusted to her and that she deliberately failed to return or
restor said minor to his parents or guardians. 8 She alleges that on the contrary, based on the
Information, sworn statement and testimony of the complainant-witness, Mrs. Eugenia Policarpio, the
crime committed was kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention under par. 4 of Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code. She, however, argued that she cannot be convicted of kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention under Article 267 because said crime is not included in the crime charged (Art. 270). She cites
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court in support of her contention, to wit:

Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved, the defendant shall be convicted of the offense proved included in
that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is
proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.- An offense
charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the
essential element or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients
of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.
She further invokes Section 19, Article IV 9 of the 1973 Constitution which gives an accused the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him as barring her conviction under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused-appellant would likewise insist on her innocence, arguing
that it was highly improbable that she could have taken the child without the knowledge and consent of
the father, Ernesto Policarpio, who was then taking care of the child.

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we are convinced beyond reasonable
doubt that accused-appellant is guilty of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention as
defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. It has been
established by the clear, strong and positive evidence of the prosecution that the taking
of the minor child Edward was without the knowledge and consent of his parents. Said
criminal act was perpetrated while Mrs. Policarpio had her back turned to the child and
accused-appellant and while Mr. Policarpio was temporarily away from the group. The
contention of the defense that the child was taken with the consent of the father is
unworthy of belief for the same is inconsistent with the immediate reaction of Mr. and
Mrs. Policarpio of reporting the incident to the police as soon as they realized that
Edward was missing. Furthermore, it is incredible that a parent would entrust his child to
a person not very well known to him and with no visible means of livelihood. The
seeming lack of protest from Mr. Policarpio did not signify consent to the taking of the
child but was due to the lack of opportunity to do so. As testified to by Mrs. Policarpio:
Q When you first noticed that you ---when you were informed
by your other son that Edward was no longer there did you
notice where your husband was at that time?
A I did not notice my husband suddenly disappeared and
afterwards I asked him where my son was.

Q And what did he say?

A My husband informed me that he saw the woman took
(sic) my son and that he said also that the woman rode in a
jeepney going towards Mabini. I asked him why he was not
able to ran after her, he said the woman boarded the
jeepney already. 10
Indeed, the factual findings of the trial court is that "(T)hen while Mr. Policarpio had
apparently gone somewhere away from the group and while Mrs. Policarpio was not
looking, the accused began playing with Edward and, offering him food, lured him away
from his mother. Shortly, the accused carried Edward and took him away with her." 11
Finally, the trial court concluded that whatever doubt as to the culpability of the accused
is dissipated by her sworn statement, Exhibit "D", wherein she confessed having taken
Edward away from his parents without their knowledge and consent . 12
We see no cogent reason to deviate from the well-settled rule that appellate courts will
generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court considering that it is in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 13
Counsel for accused-appellant laid stress on the fact that the latter cannot be convicted
of "Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor" under Aarticle -270 of the Revised Penal
Code, there being no allegations to that effect in the information much less evidence to
support the conclusion that the elements of said crime are present.
While the Information against accused-appellant is captioned "Kidnapping and Failure to
Return a Minor", the allegations in the body thereof properly constitute the crime of
kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention. Thus, instead of alleging the elements of
kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor that the offender had been entrusted with the
custody of a minor person and that said offender had deliberately failed to restore the
latter to his parents or guardians, the text of the Information alleged the elements of the
crime of kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit:
...did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and illegally kidnap and
carry away EDWARD POLICARPIO, a one year and three months old
baby boy, for the purpose of selling him and separating him from his
mother, Mrs. EUGENIA T. POLICARPIO, ... carrying him away without the

knowledge and consent of his said parents and deliberately failing to

return him... 14 (Italics supplied).
It is well-settled that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of
facts in the complaint or information. 15 Only recently, this principle was reiterated inPeople v.
Torres & Salas, G.R. No. 76711, September 26, 1988, wherein this Court again held that it is not the
technical name given by the Fiscal appearing in the title of the Information that determines the character
of the crime but the facts alleged in the body of the Information.

Based on the foregoing, it is evident that accused-appellant can be convicted of

Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention instead of "kidnapping and Failure to Return a
Minor", and that there is no variance between the crime charged and the crime proven,
which would fall under Sections 4 and 5 Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. Stated
differently, said provisions relied upon by accused-appellant have no application to the
case at bar.
Finally, as to the contention of the accused-appellant that she has been deprived of her
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her,
we re-emphasize the doctrine that where the information clearly sets forth the essential
elements of the crime charged as in the instant case, the constitutional right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of his accusation is not violated. 16
WHEREFORE, the accused-appellant Angelina Mendoza is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 121175 November 4, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARILYN RAFAEL VILLAMAR, accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:
Marilyn Villamar was charged with the crime of illegal detention and frustrated murder in
an information dated November 9, 1993, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That in or about and during the period beginning 7:00 a.m. of June 5, 1993
to 9:00 a.m. of the same day, in Barangay Cabalantian, Municipality of
Bacolor, Province of Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, MARILYN RAFAELVILLAMAR, suspecting that Maria Luz Cortez would not return her
daughter Jonalyn Villamar whom she entrusted to said Maria Luz Cortez,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously surreptitiously enter
the house of Maria Luz Cortez and by means of force and intimidation and
with threats to kill take said Maria Luz Cortez, a woman of 20 years old as
the latter entered her house whom said accused detained and kept locked
inside the house from 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. of June 5, 1993 or a period of
two (2) hours, more or less, under restraint and against the will of the said
Maria Luz Cortez and said accused during the period of detention
maltreated and refused to release said Maria Luz Cortez until her demand
for a sum of money and a getaway vehicle was given to her and on the
occasion thereof, accused with evident premeditation and with intent to
kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack
and strike with a deadly weapon to wit: a knife and a chisel, one Maria Luz
Cortez who as a result thereof, suffered various lacerated wounds on the
head which ordinarily would cause the death of the said Maria Luz Cortez,

thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the
crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of her will, that is, by the timely arrival of
the authorities who rescued Maria Luz Cortez which prevented her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On November 23, 1993, the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Thereafter, trial on the merits proceeded.
The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:
On February 11, 1993, Villamar went to the house of the private offended party Cortez
and inquired if the latter was interested in adopting her daughter, explaining that her
offer was due her husband's hasty departure. Unable to refuse, Cortez accepted the
offer and immediately prepared a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to formalize the adoption.
Unfortunately, on June 5, 1993, Villamar, apparently regretting her decision, went to the
house of Cortez and decided to take her daughter back. This sudden reversal was, of
course, not taken lightly by Cortez, who vehemently refused to relinquish custody of the
girl to Villamar.
Thereupon, a scuffle ensued between the two, during which Villamar managed to hit
Cortez with a chisel on the head rendering the latter weak and immobilized, after which
she threatened her with a pair of scissors. Villamar was demanding that Cortez reveal
where the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was located. Meanwhile, attracted by the
commotion, a curious crowd was already gathering outside the Cortez residence.
Sensing imminent danger, Villamar demanded money and a get-away vehicle to
extricate herself from her predicament. However, on her way to the car, a melee ensued
resulting in her immediate arrest by the responding policemen.
The defense, on the other hand, narrates a different scenario.
Villamar admits that a struggle did occur between her and Cortez, after the latter
refused her request for the return of her child. However, while she acknowledged that
she brandished a pair of scissors before Cortez, this was motivated more out of fear of
the crowd assembled outside the house which might harm her. In other words, in order
to protect herself, she had to use Cortez as a "human shield" to keep the crowd at bay.
The trial court, not having been convinced with Villamar's version of the incident,
convicted her for serious illegal detention and less serious physical injuries, but at the

same time acquitted her on the charge of frustrated murder. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads as follows:
Accordingly, finding the accused Marilyn Rafael Villamar to be guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Serious Illegal Detention and
Less Serious Physical Injuries, the Court hereby sentences her as follows:
1) On the Serious Illegal Detention for the accused to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and all the accessory penalties as provided by law;
2) On the Less Serious Physical Injuries for the accused to suffer a four
(4) months imprisonment and any accessory penalty as maybe provided
by law.
The accused is entitled to credit of her preventive imprisonment in
accordance with the law.
SO ORDERED. 1
Insisting on her innocence, Villamar has interposed the instant appeal.
The focal point of Villamar's thesis is that she cannot be guilty of serious illegal
detention since she had no intention to deprive or detain Cortez of her liberty. 2
Before a conviction for kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code can be sustained, the following elements must concur, namely: (a)
the offender is a private individual, (b) kidnaps or detains another that will deprive the
victim of his liberty, (c) the act of detention is illegal and (d) in the commission of the
offense any of the following circumstances are present the detention lasts for more
than five (5) days; it is committed by simulating a public authority, serious physical
injuries are inflicted or threats to kill are made and the person kidnapped is a minor,
female or public officer. 3 It is important that indubitable proof be presented that the actual intent of
the malefactor was to deprive the offended party of his/her liberty, 4 and not when such restraint of liberty
was merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the offender. 5

Contrary therefore to the prosecution's assertions, we are of the opinion that Villamar
had no intention to kidnap or deprive Cortez of her personal liberty. This is clearly
demonstrated in the tesimony of Villamar herself:
Q Were you able to reach at their house, the spouses
Maria Luz Cortez?

A Only the wife, sir.

Q Upon reaching Maria Luz Cortez at their house, what
happened next?
A I talked to her, sir.
Q When you talked to her what did you talk about?
A I told her again that I wanted to regain custody of my
daughter, sir.
Q What did she tell you when you told her about that?
A She told me again that I don't have to go back to their
place because there was no more baby that I could get, sir.
Q Upon hearing that, what did you do?
A I still pleaded to (sic) her, sir. 6
The actuations of Villamar appear to be more of a product of a mother's desperation
and distraught mind when her plea for the return of her child was refused by Cortez,
unmindful of the consequences which her reckless outburst would cause to the latter. In
a celebrated case, this Court rejected the kidnapping charge where there was not the
slightest hint of a motive for the crime. 7 In other words, what actually transpired was the rage of a
woman scorned. The undeniable fact that the purpose of Villamar was to seek the return of her child was
never assailed by the prosecution. Until the defendant's purpose to detain the offended party is shown, a
prosecution for illegal detention will not prosper.

Still, the prosecution insists that assuming that Villamar had no intention to deprive
Cortez of her liberty, the fact that she demanded and received One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00) from Cortez constitutes a ransom within the contemplation of Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code. 8 Again, we cannot agree with the prosecution's theory.
Under the law, as presently worded, it is essential that the kidnapping or detention was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom. 9 In the instant case, there is no showing
whatsoever that Villamar wanted to extort money from Cortez prior to their confrontation.

When accused-appellant coerced Cortez to reveal the whereabouts of the "Sinampaang

Salaysay" for the purpose of destroying the same, the act merely constituted grave
coercion, as provided in Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime of grave
coercion has three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by another from doing

something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be
it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by
material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently,
control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will
and liberty of another has no right to do so; in other words, that the restraint is not made
under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right. 10
While Villamar did compel Cortez to do something against the latter's will, it must be
stressed that the same cannot be categorized as an act of illegal detention. Still, when
Villamar was erroneously charged for illegal detention, such oversight will not preclude
a guilty verdict for the crime of grave coercion. In the early case of U.S. v.
Quevengco, 11 and, recently, in People v. Astorga, 12 we ruled that the offense of grave coercion is
necessarily included in illegal detention; as such, an information for illegal detention will not bar the
accused from being convicted of grave coercion, instead of the original charge. 13

Regarding the imposable penalty, while we are aware that on February 20, 1995,
Republic Act No. 7890 14 was passed increasing the penalty for crimes involving grave coercion
from arresto mayor to prision correccional, such amendatory law will not be applicable in the instant case,
for the simple reason that the offense was committed on June 5, 1993 two years before the said law was
enacted. Villamar should not, therefore, be unduly prejudiced by the imposition of a more severe penalty
than that provided in the law then in
force. 15

Hence, we hold that the penalty of arresto mayor, which is from one month and one day
to six months, is the proper penalty imposable for the offense of grave coercion.
Considering that Villamar has been in detention since July 1995 to the present a
period of three years and three months which is well beyond the six-month maximum
period provided for in the old law, there is no more legal justification for her continued
confinement. She has served for a longer period than she should.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Appellant
is convicted only of grave coercion and is sentenced to six (6) months of arresto mayor.
Unless she is being held for some other lawful cause, her immediate RELEASE is
hereby ordered, considering that she has served beyond the maximum penalty imposed
by law. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Kapunan, Purisima and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 110097 December 22, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ARNULFO ASTORGA, accused-appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Actual detention or "locking up" is the primary element of kidnapping. If the evidence
does not adequately prove this element, the accused cannot be held liable for
kidnapping. In the present case, the prosecution merely proved that appellant forcibly
dragged the victim toward a place only he knew. There being no actual detention or
confinement, the appellant may be convicted only of grave coercion.
The Case
The foregoing principle is used by this Court in resolving the appeal of Arnulfo Astorga
challenging the March 31, 1993 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao convicting
him of kidnapping.

In an Information 2 dated March 24, 1992 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 8243, Appellant Arnulfo
Astorga was charged with violation of Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly
committed as follows:

That on or about December 29, 1991 in the Municipality of Tagum, Province of

Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with deliberate intent and by means of force, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Yvonne Traya, a minor, 8 years of age,
thereby depriving her of her liberty against her will, to the damage and prejudice
of said offended party.

Arraigned on February 24, 1993, Appellant Astorga, duly assisted by his

counsel, 3 pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits ensued. The dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision 4 reads as follows: 5
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the guilt of accused ARNULFO ASTORGA having been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, pursuant to Article 267 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, [he] is hereby sentenced toReclusion Perpetua to be served at the National Penitentiary,
[Muntinlupa].

This appeal was filed directly with this Court in view of the penalty imposed. 6
The Facts
Evidence for the Prosecution
The evidence for the prosecution was narrated in the Decision of the trial court, as
follows: 7
Prosecution witnesses extant from their testimonies categorically assert that around 6:30 P.M.
children of neighbors were near the store of the grandparents of Yvonne Traya.

Incidentally, there was a brown out that evening hence candle was used. The
daughter and nephew of her aunt Bebeth were quarelling [sic] about the
possession of a flashlight until the glass got lost. Accused or "Boy" Astorga, went
near and asked her daughter Jane what happened. Glenda or Bebeth grabbed
her baby and went home.
Accused told Yvonne to go with him to buy candy. She did not answer and
accused immediately grabbed and hold [sic] her hand. Accused placed his hand
on her shoulder and covered his [sic] mouth.
Yvonne was only eight (8) years old on 29 December 1991 when she was
brought by the accused allegedly to buy candy. Some stores were closed; others
were opened. Accused never went inside the store to buy candy. Instead she
[sic] held and dragged Yvonne until they went inside the compound of Maco
Elementary School. They were walking inside the perimeter fence, [while the
accused was] holding closely the child. Later, there being no person around the
gate, accused brought her out to the highway and walked towards the direction of
Tagum.
Yvonne stays with her grandparents and so with her parents at Sitio Binuangan,
Maco. She asked him where they were going and accused answered that they
were going home. She told him that they were already on the opposite direction

because her grandparent's house is at Binuangan, while their route was going
towards Tagum. Indeed, it was an opposite direction. Notwithstanding the
assertion of Yvonne that they were on the wrong direction, accused placed his
hands on her shoulder and dragged her. She cried and protested that she must
go home. Accused did not heed her plea and while she was forced to walk she
continued crying.
While accused and Yvonne were walking in the situation as described,
somewhere near the Luponlupon bridge they met some group of men. Having
met on their opposite direction, the two, were noticed by the group of youngsters.
The group were bound to Maco Catholic Church to see a drama. Having met the
two and as noticed by the group accused keep [sic] on looking back at them. The
group were suspicious about the man who was bringing a child. The group
decided to follow them. Accused hurriedly walked fast with Yvonne, and to
prevent from being overtaken, he carried the victim and ran. They were chased.
After a distance of half a kilometer they were overtaken.
Edwin Fabila declared that Jonathan, one of his companions with others in
chasing, asked the accused where they were bound. He answered towards
Binuangan. The group noticed something suspicious because their destination
was already towards Tagum which is an opposite direction to Binuangan.
When asked who is the child, accused answered Traya. Jonathan one of those
who chased knew the family. He got from the accused Yvonne who showed
some resistance. Nevertheless, the group brought her home at Binuangan.
Likewise, accused was also brought by them to Yvonne's home. The house of
accused and Yvonne were five (5) meters away. Accused wanted to talk to the
parents of the victim, but he was driven by her aunt and adviced [sic] to leave
otherwise he will be stabbed by Yvonne's father. He left and never talked with the
family.
Evidence for the Defense
The facts as viewed by the defense are presented in the Appellant's Brief, 8 dated
December 10, 1993:

The defense consisted of the testimonies of Arbeth Nalcot and the accusedappellant himself.
Arbeth Nalcot, a resident of Tagum, Davao, testified tht [sic] in the afternoon of
December 29, 1991, she was at the Municipal Hall of Maco, Davao. She saw
Astorga with two (2) companions. They were drinking Red Horse and were

already drunk. When they finished drinking, she went with Astorga to the latter's
house. (TSN, pp. 7-8 and 18, March 23, 1993). The house of Astorga is about 5
meters away from the house of the complainant[.] Yvonne came and asked
money from the accused to buy candy. The two went together and she was left
behind. She told them to hurry up. When they failed to return, she looked for
them, but because it was already dark. She did not find them. She went back to
the house of the accused. (Ibid., pp. 10-11).
Arnulfo Astorga, a resident of Maco, Davao and a gold panner testified that "at
around 1:00 P.M. of December 29, 1991, he arrived at Maco from Tagum. Upon
arrival his two friends, Vicvic and Anding were already at his home. They decided
to drink, hence they proceeded to Adecor Cottage and drank two gallons of Tuba.
At around 2:00 P.M., they were at the market place and drink beer grande. At
5:00 P.M. on the same day, the three proceeded near the municipal hall and with
some persons, they again continued their drinking spree taking up Red Horse
wine". (Decision, p. 3).
At about 6:00 P.M., he was already drunk and he went home. Yvonne
approached him and asked him money to buy candy. He told her that they will
buy. They were not able to buy because the two stores where they went were
already closed. (TSN, pp. 12 and 13, March 24, 1993). He took her for a stroll for
his drunkeness [sic] to subside. They walked inside the school premises which
was about 20 meters away from the second store. They went out of the school
compound going towards Lupon-lupon because due to his drunkneness [sic], he
thought it was the way towards their house. (Ibid, pp. 14-15) They reached
Lupon-lupon bridge, crossed it twice thinking that it was the bridge near the
municipal hall. After reaching Purok, they met several persons, he was asked
were (sic) they were heading, and he answered to Tagumpay, but he was told
that they [sic] way was already going to Tagum. He requested those persons to
guide them to Tagumpay. They asked him who was the child he was carrying. He
answered that it was Traya's child, (Ibid, pp. 16-17). He was carrying the child
because he was already crying she already wanted to go home. The group of
persons, men and women, guided them. Yvonne was being held by the women.
They arrived at Yvonne's house. He talked to the auntie of the child and told her
that he would converse with her but he was advised to go away because the
father of Yvonne might hack him. So he went home. (Ibid, pp. 18-19)
The Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court justified its finding of guilt with the following discussion: 9

Accused insisted [that] he was already drunk hence when he took Yvonne
to buy candy, he strolled with her so that his drunkenness be subsided.
All these defense version was rebutted by Yvonne when she categorically
declared that she did not smell liquor on the accused.
His defense of intoxication has no leg to stand [on].
Consider these facts.
Never did he present Vicvic and Anding to corroborate that he was
intoxicated that afternoon and at dusk because of their drinking spree from
1:00 P.M. until 5:00 P.M.
He did not rebut the testimonies of Fabila that when they noticed his
actions suspicious bringing with him a child, he walked fast dragging
Yvonne. When he noticed that the group of youngsters were chasing him,
he carried Yvonne and ran until they covered a distance of half a kilometer
in chasing them, until they had overtaken him.
If he was that intoxicated, being under stupor and weakened by liquor, he
could not ran that fast carrying Yvonne for half a kilometer.
Moreover, Yvonne categorically in straight forward testimony asserted that
she did not smell liquor on the accused.
Accused, naivety [sic], that because of his intoxication, he got lost and
was not able to proceed with Yvonne to Binuangan was a shallow
afterthought.
It must be recalled that Yvonne told him they were already going at
opposite direction from home. Instead they were heeding towards Tagum.
Accused did not change course.
xxx xxx xxx
Again, not only force was employed in having Yvonne as captive by
dragging, slapping her mouth and was holding her tight, but accused also
used psychological means of scaring her about a red eyed ghost.
Through this means and efforts, Yvonne was deprived of her liberty and
was by force prevented to go home to her parents.

On rebuttal, Yvonne denied that she asked money from accused to buy
candy. She also denied as testified by defense witness Arbeth Nalcot that
she went to the house of the accused on 29 December 1991 or on any
other dates to ask money from Astorga for candy.
Defense evidence are [sic] punctured with unbelievability in his off tangent
and incredible theory of drunkardness. His alleged being lost in the
direction of Binuangan in spite of Yvonne's insistence and that of the
person they met that he was on the wrong way considering that there are
no criss crossing roads except the highway is preposterous.
The Issues
Appellant imputes the following errors to the trial court: 10
I

The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the

prosecution's witnesses which were replete with inconsistencies and
contradictions.
II
The trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that
Yvonne Traya was not detained, locked-up or deprived of her liberty.
III
The trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that
appellant had no motive to kidnap Yvonne Traya.
In the main, appellant challenges the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and
the legal characterization of the acts imputed to him.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be convicted only of grave
coercion, not kidnapping.
First Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses

Appellant contends that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are not
worthy of credence because they were inconsistent and improbable. He cites the
following:
Glenda Chavez testified that she was present when the accused told
Yvonne that they will buy candy. She sensed that the accused was drunk.
(TSN, pp. 10-11, March 10, 1993). These testimonies were contradicted
by Yvonne Traya when she declared that Glenda Chavez had already
went [sic] inside their house when [the] accused told her that they will buy
candy (TSN, pp. 10, March 16, 1993). She testified that she did not smell
liquor on the accused. (Decision, pp. 3-4)
Edwin Fabila testified that their group was able to overtake the accused at
a distance of 2 fathoms and they [sic] him about 15 to 20 meters (TSN, p.
35, March 10, 1993) Arnel Fabila, on the other hand, testified that they
overtook the accused after chasing him at a distance of half kilometer
(TSN, p. 10, March 11, 1993).
Yvonne Traya testified that the accused could not ran fast carrying her
because she was heavy. (TSN, p. 19, March 16, 1993). However, Arnel
Fabila declared that they were able to overtake the accused only after
chasing him at a distance of half kilometer (TSN, p. 10, March 11, 1993)
meaning accused was running fast. 11
We hold, however, that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses
concerning minor details and collateral matters, like the examples cited by
appellant, do not affect the substance, veracity or weight of their declarations.
These inconsistencies reinforce, rather than weaken, their credibility, for different
witnesses of startling events usually perceive things differently. 12 Indeed, the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses cannot be expected to be uniform to the last detail.

The testimony of Glenda Chavez that the accused was drunk at that time
allegedly contradicted Yvonne's statement that the accused did not smell of
liquor. This does not detract from the credibility of either witness. Yvonne, then an
eight-year-old child, 13 and her Aunt Glenda, then twenty-seven years old, 14 do not have the
same experiences or level of maturity; hence, their perceptions of events differ. More important,
whether the accused was drunk or not is an insignificant detail that does not substantially affect
the testimonies of these witnesses.

Further, the discrepancy in the witnesses' estimate of the distance covered by the
men who chased appellant does not render their testimonies incredible. 15 Quite the
contrary, such discrepancy shows their candor and sincerity, demonstrating that their testimonies

were unrehearsed. 16 Yvonne testified that when appellant noticed the group of men following
them, he carried her and ran. Yvonne's testimony is in accord with that of Arnel Fabila a
member of the group who chased appellant that they were able to overtake appellant after
chasing him half a kilometer. 17

Appellant's challenge to the credibility of the prosecution account is also

premised on the alleged failure of the trial court to consider the following
points: 18
a) that the alleged victim admitted that she and the accused casually moved around the
school premises, as if they were strolling; That when they were already in the highway,
they were also walking openly and casually until they were met by a group of
youngster[s].

Edwin Fabila, one of the prosecution's witnesses, corroborated the fact

that the two were walking casually along the highway when he first saw
them;
b) That it is highly incredible that accused and the alleged victim will not
be seen or noticed by the people travelling or those persons residing
along the highway if it was true that the accused was dragging her and
she was continuously crying from her residence up to a distance of more
than one kilometer;
c) That the accused and the alleged victim were travelling at a very slow
pace; a distance of barely a kilometer for a period of more than two hours;
d) That the accused was very drunk, having been drinking different kinds
of intoxicating liquors from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., causing him to be
confused on which way they should take in going home.
e) That the accused was not hurt by the group of youngsters who
allegedly rescued the child, nor was immediately brought to the municipal
hall which was just near the house of the victim for the filing of the
necessary charge; this [sic] actuations only confirm the fact that the
accused merely sought their help in guiding them home, and
f) That it took more than one week for the complainant and her parents to
file the case at the Fiscal's Office.
We cannot sustain these contentions. The charge is not belied by the one-week
delay in the filing of the complaint. It has been held that delay or vacillation in
making a criminal accusation does not necessarily weaken the credibility of a

witness where such delay is satisfactorily explained. 19 In the present case, one week
was reasonable, considering that the victim was a resident of Binuangan and that the case was
filed in Tagum, Davao.

Furthermore, the group whom appellant met did not hurt or bring him to the
municipal hall, because they deemed it more urgent at the time to rescue Yvonne
and to bring her home, which they actually did. 20There is no settled rule on how a group
of young men should react upon seeing a young girl snatched by an older man. Verily, violence is
not the only normal reaction of young men who see a girl being forcibly taken.

Appellant's claim that he and Yvonne were merely strolling and walking casually
does not negate the fact that Yvonne was deprived of her will. As noted by the
trial court, appellant used physical force and psychological means in restraining
her. 21 Despite her young age, Yvonne was able to clearly recount the events that transpired on
that fateful night.

Moreover, there is no merit in the argument that the people travelling or living
along the highway should have noticed appellant and Yvonne. The fact is that a
group of men actually noticed and ultimately chased them.
All in all, appellant utterly fails to justify a departure from the long settled rule that
the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses should be accorded
great respect on appeal. 22
Second Issue: No Motive to "Kidnap"
Petitioner contends that "[t]here was no evidence presented to prove why the
accused should kidnap Yvonne Traya." He submits that "the prosecution had
failed to prove [any] motive to support the alleged kidnapping incident, thus,
making the theory of the defense more credible and believable." 23
The contention is insignificant. Motive is not an element of the crime.
Furthermore, motive becomes material only when the evidence is circumstantial
or inconclusive, and there is some doubt on whether a crime has been committed
or whether the accused has committed it. Indeed, motive is totally irrelevant
when ample direct evidence sustains the culpability of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. 24 In this case, the identity of appellant is not in question. He himself
admitted having taken Yvonne to Maco Central Elementary School.

Third Issue: Kidnapping or Coercion?

Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove one essential element of
kidnapping the fact of detention or the deprivation of liberty. The solicitor

general counters that deprivation of liberty is not limited to imprisoning or placing

the victim in an enclosure. Citing People vs. Crisostomo, 25 he argues:
(T)he act proven in the record constitutes (kidnapping). It is no argument
against this conclusion that the accused deprived the offended party of her
liberty without placing her in an inclosure; because illegal detention, as
defined and punished in our Code, may consist not only in imprisoning a
person but also in detaining her or depriving her in any manner of her
liberty. 26
We agree with appellant's contention this time.
Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, 27 the elements of kidnapping are as
follows:

1. That the offender is a private individual.

2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the
latter of his liberty.
3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.
4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances is present:
5. That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than five (5) days; or
6. That it committed simulating public authority; or
7. That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or
8. That the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public
officer.
The Spanish version of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code uses the terms
"lockup" (encerrar) rather than "kidnap" (secuestrar or raptar). Lockup is included
in the broader term of "detention," which refers not only to the placing of a person
in an enclosure which he cannot leave, but also to any other deprivation of liberty
which does not necessarily involve locking up. 28 Likewise, the Revised Penal Code was
originally approved and enacted in Spanish. Consequently, the Spanish text is controlling in
cases of conflict with the English version, as provided in Section 15 of the Revised Administrative
Code. 29

A review of the events as narrated by the prosecution witnesses ineluctably

shows the absence of "locking up." Victim Yvonne Traya testified: 30
Q And after that what happened next?
A When Auntie Bebeth went inside her house she was
already bringing her child and bringing with her candle. And
Arnulfo Astorga told me that we will buy candy, sir.
Q And after that?
A And while I was not answering the question he
immediately grabbed me.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And after that, after he held your hand, what did he do
next?
A He placed his hands on my shoulder and also covering
[sic] my mouth.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And after that what did he do next?
A He brought me to the school.
Q What school did Boy Astorga bring you? What is the name
of the school?
A Maco Central Elementary School.
Q How far is Maco Central Elementary School from your
house?
A A little bit near.
Q When Boy Astorga brought you to school, was it dark?
A Yes, sir.

Q Exactly where in Maco Elementary School did Boy

Astorga bring you?
A Inside the gate, sir.
Q And once inside the gate what did he do to you?
A We were going around the school?
xxx xxx xxx
Q Do you know why you were going around the school?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why, what did he do?
A We were going around and when he saw that there is no
person in the gate we passed at that gate.
Q And where did he go after passing that gate?
A Towards Lupon-lupon, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about you, did you talk to him?
A I asked him where we were going and he told me that we
are going home and I told him that this is not the way to our
house, and we did not pass this way. (Witness gesturing a
certain direction).
Q And so when you said that that is not the way, when you
said that is not the way because our house is towards
Binuangan. . .
By the way, you said you were going to Lupon-lupon, do you
know to what direction is going to Lupon-lupon, to what
place is Lupon-lupon going to?
A Yes, sir.

Q Where?
A Going to my place.
Q Do you know the place where it was going? What is that
place?
A On the road going to Tagum.
Q Now, what, about your house, where is it going?
A To Binuangan.
Q And so when you . . . what did he do next when you said
that is not the place going to your house?
A We continued walking and he also placed his hands on my
shoulder and dragged me, sir.
Q What about you, what did you do when he was dragging
you?
A I was crying, sir.
Q Did you say any word to him when you were crying?
A Yes, I told him that we are going home.
Q And what did Boy Astorga say?
A He told me that we will be going home, and told me not to
make any noise because if I will make any noise we will be
lost on our way.
Q And so, what did you do?
A I continued crying, sir.
Q And after that, what happened?
A We continued walking and we met a person and he asked
Boy Astorga where we are going, sir.

Q What did that man ask Boy Astorga?

A The man asked Boy Astorga where are you going, and Boy
Astorga answered, to Binuangan, but the man continued to
say that this way is going to Tagum and not to Binuangan
any more.
Q What else did the man ask, if any?
A I further said that we will already leave, and we will be the
ones to go to Binuangan, and after that, Boy Astorga put me
down because he urinated. So, at that instance, I ran, but,
after he urinated, he already took hold of me not to run any
more because there is a ghost.
Q When you said you ran away after Boy Astorga left you
when he urinated, where did you run?
A Towards Binuangan, sir.
Q Towards the direction of your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you were overtaken again by Boy Astorga?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did he do to you when you were overtaken by Boy
Astorga?
A He took hold of me again and he told me, he threatened
me that there is [sic] a red eyes but I answered him that is
[sic] not a red eyes of the ghost but that is a light coming
from the vehicle.
Q Now, what happened next?
A He placed a necklace on me, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

A He was dragging me and I was crying when he was

dragging me.
Q While you were being dragged did you make any plea to
him?
A Yes, I told him that I will go home.
Q And what did he say?
A He said that we will go home but I know [sic] that place we
are [sic] heading to is [sic] not a way to our home but it is
[sic] the opposite.
Q So, what happened next?
A He continued dragging me and after that we met plenty of
persons and I shouted for help and at that instance, he
slapped my mouth and after a few steps he already carried
me.
xxx xxx xxx
A He continued walking and I also continued crying and I told
him that I want to go home and he told me that we are
heading towards home, but I told him that the way we are
going to is not the way to our house.
Q By the way, when you shouted [for] help, was it loud?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, what happened next?
A He continued running and he stopped several vehicles but
they did not stop, so, we just continued walking.
Q After that, what happened next?
A He moved closer to the banana plants. He looked back
and he saw that persons were already chasing him and after
that he carried me and ran.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the appellant and the victim were constantly on
the move. They went to Maco Elementary School and strolled on the school
grounds. When nobody was at the Luponlupon bridge, appellant took the victim
to the highway leading to Tagum, Davao. At that time, Yvonne pleaded with
appellant that she really wanted to go home to Binuangan, but appellant ignored
her pleas and continued walking her toward the wrong direction. Later on, the
group of Witness Arnel Fabila spotted them. Appellant Astorga carried the victim
and ran, but Fabila's group chased and caught up with them.
This narration does not adequately establish actual confinement or restraint of
the victim, which is the primary element of kidnapping. 31 Appellant's apparent intention
was to take Yvonne against her will towards the direction of Tagum. Appellant's plan did not
materialize, however, because Fabila's group chanced upon them. The evidence does not show
that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her. Appellant's
forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an actual confinement
or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no "lockup." Accordingly, appellant cannot be
convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.

Rather, the felony committed in this case is grave coercion under Article 286 of
the same code. Grave coercion or coaccion grave has three elements: (a) that
any person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law,
or compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that
the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or
such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over
the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and
liberty of another has no right to do so or, in other words, that the restraint is not
made under authority of a law or in the exercise of any lawful right. 32 When
appellant forcibly dragged and slapped Yvonne, he took away her right to go home to Binuangan.
Appellant presented no justification for preventing Yvonne from going home, and we cannot find
any.

The present case should be distinguished from People vs. Rosemarie de la

Cruz. 33 Here, Appellant Astorga tricked Yvonne to go with him by telling her that they were going
to buy candy. When Yvonne recognized the deception, she demanded that she be brought home,
but appellant refused and instead dragged her toward the opposite direction against her will.
While it is unclear whether Appellant Astorga intended to detain or "lock up" Yvonne, there is no
question that he forced her to go with him against her will. In Rosemarie de la Cruz, Victim
Whiazel voluntarily went with accused. Furthermore, the accused in that case failed to
consummate the crime of kidnapping because of the timely intervention of the victim's neighbor.
Thus, the Court held in that case: 34
In a prosecution for kidnapping, the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of the
latter's liberty, in any manner, needs to be established by indubitable proof (People vs.
Puno, 219 SCRA 85 [1993]). The acts held by the trial court, and maintained by the

People, as consummating the crime of kidnapping in this case are those when accusedappellant held the victim's hand and refused to let go when the victim asked to go over to
her neighbor, who by then already saw what was happening. This happened for only a
very brief span of time and the evidentiary record shows that there were a good number
of people present at that time, that a guard was stationed at the gate, and that there was
at least a teacher nearby. The child could have just as easily shouted for help. While it
does not take much to scare the wits out of a small child like Whiazel, under the
attendant circumstances, we cannot say with certainty that she was indeed deprived of
her liberty. It must further be noted that up to that brief moment when Cecilia saw them,
and the child asked to be let go, the victim had gone with accused-appellant voluntarily.
Without any further act reinforcing the inference that the victim may have been denied
her liberty, even taking cognizance of her minority, the Court hesitates to find that
kidnapping in the case at bar was consummated. While it is a well-entrenched rule that
factual findings of trial courts, especially when they concern the appreciation of testimony
of witnesses, are accorded great respect, by exception, when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts, as we perceive in the case at bar, the Court may choose to
substitute its own findings (People vs. Padua, 215 SCRA 266 [1992]).

The Information, dated March 24, 1992, filed against Astorga contains sufficient
allegations constituting grave coercion, the elements of which were sufficiently
proved by the prosecution. Hence, a conviction for said crime is appropriate
under Section 4, Rule 120 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof
When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the
offenses as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in
that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is
proved.
At the time the felony was committed on December 29, 1991, the penalty
imposed by law for grave coercion was arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding
five hundred pesos. 35 The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply here because the
maximum penalty does not exceed one year. 36 However, appellant has been imprisoned for more
than six (6) months. He has more than served the penalty imposable for such an offense. 37

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Appellant is

CONVICTED only of grave coercion and is sentenced to six (6) months
of arresto mayor. Unless he is being detained for any other valid cause, his
IMMEDIATE RELEASE is herewith ordered, considering that he has more than
served the maximum penalty imposable upon him. That director of prisons is
DIRECTED to inform this Court, within five days from receipt of this Decision, of
the actual date the appellant is released. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 138033

February 22, 2006

RENATO BALEROS, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. assails and seeks
the reversal of the January 13, 1999 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 17271 as reiterated in its March 31, 1999 resolution 2 denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration.
The assailed decision affirmed an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 91-101642 finding petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr.
y David (CHITO) guilty of attempted rape.3
The accusatory portion of the information4 dated December 17, 1991 charging petitioner
with attempted rape reads as follow:
That about 1:50 in the morning or sometime thereafter of 13 December 1991 in Manila
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by
forcefully covering the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in
chemical with dizzying effects, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commenced the commission of rape by lying on top of her with the intention to have
carnal knowledge with her but was unable to perform all the acts of execution by reason
of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, said acts being
committed against her will and consent to her damage and prejudice.
Upon arraignment on February 5, 1992, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded "Not
Guilty."5 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
To prove its case, the prosecution presented thirteen (13) witnesses. Among them were
private complainant Martina Lourdes Albano (Malou), and her classmates, Joseph
Bernard Africa, Rommel Montes, Renato Alagadan and Christian Alcala. Their
testimonies, as narrated in some detail in the decision of the CA, established the
following facts:

Like most of the tenants of the Celestial Marie Building (hereafter "Building", ) along
A.H. Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila, MALOU, occupying Room 307 with her maid,
Marvilou Bebania (Marvilou), was a medical student of the University of Sto. Tomas
[UST] in 1991.
In the evening of December 12, inside Unit 307, MALOU retired at around 10:30.
Outside, right in front of her bedroom door, her maid, Marvilou, slept on a folding bed.
Early morning of the following day, MALOU was awakened by the smell of chemical on
a piece of cloth pressed on her face. She struggled but could not move. Somebody was
pinning her down on the bed, holding her tightly. She wanted to scream for help but the
hands covering her mouth with cloth wet with chemicals were very tight (TSN, July 5,
1993, p. 33). Still, MALOU continued fighting off her attacker by kicking him until at last
her right hand got free. With this the opportunity presented itself when she was able
to grab hold of his sex organ which she then squeezed.
The man let her go and MALOU went straight to the bedroom door and roused
Marvilou. xxx. Over the intercom, MALOU told S/G Ferolin that: "may pumasok sa
kuarto ko pinagtangkaan ako" (Ibid., p. 8). Who it was she did not, however, know. The
only thing she had made out during their struggle was the feel of her attackers clothes
and weight. His upper garment was of cotton material while that at the lower portion felt
smooth and satin-like (Ibid, p. 17). He was wearing a t-shirt and shorts Original
Records, p. 355).
To Room 310 of the Building where her classmates Christian Alcala, Bernard Baptista,
Lutgardo Acosta and Rommel Montes were staying, MALOU then proceeded to seek
help. xxx.
It was then when MALOU saw her bed topsy-turvy. Her nightdress was stained with
blue (TSN, July 5, 1993, pp. 13-14). Aside from the window with grills which she had
originally left opened, another window inside her bedroom was now open. Her attacker
had fled from her room going through the left bedroom window (Ibid, Answers to
Question number 5; Id), the one without iron grills which leads to Room 306 of the
Building (TSN, July 5, 1993, p.6).
xxx xxx xxx
Further, MALOU testified that her relation with CHITO, who was her classmate , was
friendly until a week prior to the attack. CHITO confided his feelings for her, telling her:
"Gusto kita, mahal kita" (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22) and she rejected him. . (TSN, July
5, 1993, p. 22).
Meanwhile, according to S/G Ferolin, while he was on duty, CHITO arrived at the
Building at 1:30 in the early morning of December 13, 1991, wearing a white t-shirt with
a marking on the front of the T-shirt T M and a Greek letter (sic) and below the
quoted letters the word 1946 UST Medicine and Surgery (TSN, October 9, 1992, p.

9) and black shorts with the brand name Adidas (TSN, October 16, 1992, p.7) and
requested permission to go up to Room 306. This Unit was being leased by Ansbert Co
and at that time when CHITO was asking permission to enter, only Joseph Bernard
Africa was in the room.
He asked CHITO to produce the required written authorization and when CHITO could
not, S/G Ferolin initially refused [but later, relented] . S/G Ferolin made the following
entry in the security guards logbook :
"0130H Baleros Renato Jr. is a visitor of Ansbert Co who has not have (sic) a Request
letter from our tenant of Unit #-306 Ansbert, but still I let him inter (sic) for the reason
that he will be our tenant this coming summer break as he said so I let him sign it here
(Sgd.) Baleros Renato Jr."
(Exhibit "A-2")
That CHITO arrived at Room 306 at 1:30 A.M. of December 13, 1991 was corroborated
by Joseph Bernard Africa (Joseph), .
xxx xxx xxx
Joseph was already inside Room 306 at 9 oclock in the evening of December 12, 1991.
xxx by the time CHITOs knocking on the door woke him up, . He was able to fix the
time of CHITOs arrival at 1:30 A.M. because he glanced at the alarm clock beside the
bed when he was awakened by the knock at the door .
Joseph noticed that CHITO was wearing dark-colored shorts and white T-shirt (Ibid., p.
23) when he let the latter in. . It was at around 3 oclock in the morning of December
13, 1991 when he woke up again later to the sound of knocking at the door, this time, by
Bernard Baptista (Bernard), .
xxx. With Bernard, Joseph then went to MALOUs room and thereat was shown by
Bernard the open window through which the intruder supposedly passed.
xxx xxx xxx
Later, at about 6 to 6:30 in the morning of December 13, 1991, Joseph was finally able
to talk to CHITO . He mentioned to the latter that something had happened and that
they were not being allowed to get out of the building. Joseph also told CHITO to follow
him to Room 310.
CHITO did just that. He followed after Joseph to Unit 310, carrying his gray bag. xxx.
None was in Room 310 so Joseph went to their yet another classmate, Renato
Alagadan at Room 401 to see if the others were there. xxx.

People from the CIS came by before 8 oclock that same morning . They likewise
invited CHITO and Joseph to go with them to Camp Crame where the two (2) were
questioned .
An occupant of Room 310 Christian Alcala (Christian) recalled in Court that in the
afternoon of December 13, 1991, after their 3:30 class, he and his roommates, Bernard
Baptista and Lutgardo Acosta (Gary) were called to the Building and were asked by the
CIS people to look for anything not belonging to them in their Unit. While they were
outside Room 310 talking with the authorities, Rommel Montes (Loyloy), another
roommate of his, went inside to search the Unit. Loyloy found (TSN, January 12, 1993,
p. 6) a gray "Khumbella" bag cloth type (Ibid, pp. 44-45) from inside their unit which they
did not know was there and surrender the same to the investigators. When he saw the
gray bag, Christian knew right away that it belonged to CHITO (Ibid, p. 55) as he had
seen the latter usually bringing it to school inside the classroom (Ibid, p. 45).
In their presence, the CIS opened the bag and pulled out its contents, among others, a
white t-shirt with a Taunu (sic) Sigma Phi sign (Ibid, p. 7), a Black Adidas short pants, a
handkerchief , three (3) white T-shirts, an underwear, and socks (Ibid).
Christian recognized the t-shirt (Exhibit "D-4"), the Adidas short pants (Exhibit "D-5"),
and the handkerchief (Exhibit "D-3) to be CHITOs because CHITO had lent the very
same one to him . The t-shirt with CHITOs fraternity symbol, CHITO used to wear on
weekends, and the handkerchief he saw CHITO used at least once in December.
That CHITO left his bag inside Room 310 in the morning of December 13, 1991, was
what consisted mainly of Renato R. Alagadans testimony.
xxx xxx xxx.
The colored gray bag had a handle and a strap, was elongated to about 11/4 feet and
appeared to be full but was closed with a zipper when Renato saw it then (Ibid, pp. 1920). At that time Christian, Gary, Bernard, and Renato went back to Room 310 at
around 3 to 4 oclock that afternoon along with some CIS agents, they saw the bag at
the same place inside the bedroom where Renato had seen CHITO leave it. Not until
later that night at past 9 oclock in Camp Crame, however, did Renato know what the
contents of the bag were.
xxx xxx xxx.
The forensic Chemist, Leslie Chambers, of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory in Camp Crame, having acted in response to the written request of PNP
Superintendent Lucas M. Managuelod dated December 13, 1991, (Exhibit "C"; Original
Records, p. 109.) conducted laboratory examination on the specimen collated and
submitted. Her Chemistry Report No. C-487-91 (Exhibit "E"; Ibid., p. 112) reads in
part, thus:

"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
xxx xxx xxx:
1) One (1) small white plastic bag marked UNIMART with the following:
xxx xxx xxx
Exh C One (1) night dress colored salmon pink.
2) One (1) small white pl astic bag marked JONAS with the following:
Exh. D One (1) printed handkerchief.
Exh. E One (1) white T-shirt marked TMZI.
Exh. F One (1) black short (sic) marked ADIDAS.
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of volatime (sic), non-volatile and/or metallic poison on the
above stated specimens.
FINDINGS:
Toxicological examination conducted on the above stated specimens gave the following
results:
Exhs. C and D POSITIVE to the test for chloroform, a volatile poison.
Exhs. A, B, E and F are insufficient for further analysis.
CONCLUSION:
Exhs. C and D contain chloroform, a volatile poison." 6 (Words in bracket added)
For its part, the defense presented, as its main witness, the petitioner himself. He
denied committing the crime imputed to him or making at any time amorous advances
on Malou. Unfolding a different version of the incident, the defense sought to establish
the following, as culled from the same decision of the appellate court:
In December of 1991, CHITO was a medical student of (UST). With Robert Chan and
Alberto Leonardo, he was likewise a member of the Tau Sigma Phi Fraternity .
MALOU, , was known to him being also a medical student at the UST at the time.

From Room 306 of the Celestial Marie Building , CHITO, wearing the prescribed
barong tagalog over dark pants and leather shoes, arrived at their Fraternity house
located at Dos Castillas, Sampaloc, Manila at about 7 oclock in the evening of
December 12, 1991. He was included in the entourage of some fifty (50) fraternity
members scheduled for a Christmas gathering at the house of their senior fraternity
brother, Dr. Jose Duran, at No. 3 John Street, North Greenhills, San Juan. xxx.
The party was conducted at the garden beside [the] swimming pool . Soon after,
the four (4) presidential nominees of the Fraternity, CHITO included, were being dunked
one by one into the pool. xxx.
xxx CHITO had anticipated his turn and was thus wearing his t-shirt and long pants
when he was dunked. Perla Duran, , offered each dry clothes to change into and
CHITO put on the white t-shirt with the Fraternitys symbol and a pair of black shorts
with stripes. xxx .
Again riding on Albertos car and wearing "barong tagalog over a white t-shirt with the
symbol TAU Sigma Phi, black short pants with stripe, socks and shoes" (TSN, April 25,
1994, p. 15), CHITO left the party with Robert Chan and Alberto at more or less past 1
A.M. of December 13, 1991 and proceeded to the Building which they reached at about
1:30 A.M. (Ibid., p. 19). He had left his gray traveling bag containing "white t-shirt,
sando, underwear, socks, and toothbrush (Ibid., pp. 17-18) at room 306 in the afternoon
of the previous day .
At the gate of the Building, CHITO knocked and , S/G Ferolin, looking at his watch,
approached. Because of this, CHITO also looked at his own watch and saw that the
time was 1:30 (Ibid., p. 26). S/G Ferolin initially refused CHITO entry . xxx.
S/G Ferolin called Unit 306 . xxx. When S/G Ferolin finally let him in, already about
ten (10) minutes had lapsed since CHITO first arrived (Ibid., p. 25).
CHITO went up the floor, found the key left for him by Joseph behind the opened
jalousie window and for five (5) minutes vainly tried to open the door until Rommel
Montes, approached him and even commented: "Okey ang suot mo ha, di mo
mabuksan ang pinto (Ibid., pp. 26-29). Rommel tried to open the door of Unit 306 but
was likewise unsuccessful. CHITO then decided to just call out to Joseph while
knocking at the door.
It took another (5) minutes of calling out and knocking before Joseph, , at last
answered the door. Telling him, "Ikaw na ang bahala diyan" Joseph immediately turned
his back on CHITO and went inside the bedroom. CHITO , changed to a thinner shirt
and went to bed. He still had on the same short pants given by Perla Duran from the
fraternity party (TSN, June 16, 1994, p. 20).
At 6 oclock in the morning of December 13, 1991, CHITO woke up . He was already
in his school uniform when, around 6:30 A.M, Joseph came to the room not yet dressed

up. He asked the latter why this was so and, without elaborating on it, Joseph told him
that something had happened and to just go to Room 310 which CHITO did.
At Room 310, CHITO was told by Rommel Montes that somebody, whom MALOU was
not able to identify, went to the room of MALOU and tried to rape her (TSN, April 25,
1994, p. 36). xxx.
Joseph told him that the security guard was not letting anybody out of the Building .
When two (2) CIS men came to the unit asking for Renato Baleros, CHITO presented
himself. Congressman Rodolfo B. Albano, father of MALOU, then asked him for the key
to Room 306.
xxx xxx xxx
The CIS men looked inside the bedroom and on the windows. Joseph was told to dress
up and the two (2) of them, CHITO and Joseph, were brought to Camp Crame.
When they arrived at Camp Crame , Col. Managuelod asked Joseph inside his room
and talked to him for 30 minutes. xxx. No one interviewed CHITO to ask his side.
xxx xxx xxx
Both CHITO and Joseph were taken to Prosecutor Abesamis who later instructed them
to undergo physical examination at the Camp Crame Hospital .. At the hospital,
CHITO and Joseph were physically examined by a certain Dr. de Guzman who told
them to strip .
xxx xxx xxx
CHITO had left his gray bag containing, among others, the black striped short pants lent
to him by Perla Duran (Exhibit "8-A", Original Records, p. 345), inside Room 310 at
more/less 6:30 to 7 oclock in the morning of December 13, 1991. The next time that he
saw it was between 8 to 9 P.M. when he and Joseph were brought before Fiscal
Abesamis for inquest. One of the CIS agents had taken it there and it was not opened
up in his presence but the contents of the bag were already laid out on the table of
Fiscal Abesamis who, however, made no effort to ask CHITO if the items thereat were
his.
The black Adidas short pants purportedly found in the bag, CHITO denied putting in his
gray bag which he had left at Room 306 in the early evening of December 12, 1991
before going to the fraternity house. He likewise disavowed placing said black Adidas
short pants in his gray bag when he returned to the apartment at past 1:00 oclock in the
early morning of December 13, 1991 (TSN, June 16, 1994, p. 24), nor when he dressed
up at about 6 oclock in the morning to go to school and brought his gray bag to Room
310 (Ibid. 25). In fact, at any time on December 13, 1991, he was not aware that his
gray bag ever contained any black short Adidas pants (Ibid). He only found out for the

first time that the black Adidas short pants was alluded to be among the items inside his
gray bag late in the afternoon, when he was in Camp Crame.
Also taking the witness stand for the defense were petitioners fraternity brothers,
Alberto Leonardo and Robert Chan, who both testified being with CHITO in the
December 12, 1991 party held in Dr. Durans place at Greenhills, riding on the same car
going to and coming from the party and dropping the petitioner off the Celestial Marie
building after the party. Both were one in saying that CHITO was wearing a barong
tagalog, with t-shirt inside, with short pants and leather shoes at the time they parted
after the party.7 Rommel Montes, a tenant of Room 310 of the said building, also
testified seeing CHITO between the hours of 1:30 and 2:00 A.M. of December 13, 1991
trying to open the door of Room 306 while clad in dark short pants and white barong
tagalog.
On the other hand, Perla Duran confirmed lending the petitioner the pair of short pants
with stripes after the dunking party held in her fathers house. 8 Presented as defense
expert witness was Carmelita Vargas, a forensic chemistry instructor whose actual
demonstration in open court showed that chloroform, being volatile, evaporates in thirty
(30) seconds without tearing nor staining the cloth on which it is applied. 9
On December 14, 1994, the trial court rendered its decision 10 convicting petitioner of
attempted rape and accordingly sentencing him, thus:
WHEREFORE, under cool reflection and prescinding from the foregoing, the Court finds
the accused Renato D. Baleros, Jr., alias "Chito", guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of attempted rape as principal and as charged in the information and hereby
sentences him to suffer an imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2)
MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correctional, as Minimum to TEN (10) YEARS
of Prision Mayor as Maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and for
the accused to pay the offended party Martina Lourdes T. Albano, the sum of
P50,000.00 by way of Moral and exemplary damages, plus reasonable Attorneys fees
of P30,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA whereat his appellate recourse was docketed as
CA-G.R. CR No. 17271.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its assailed Decision dated January 13,
1999, affirmed the trial courts judgment of conviction, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding no basis in fact and in law to deviate from the findings of the
court a quo, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against
appellant.

SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in its equally
assailed resolution of March 31, 1999.12
Petitioner is now with this Court, on the contention that the CA erred 1. In not finding that it is improbable for petitioner to have committed the
attempted rape imputed to him, absent sufficient, competent and convincing
evidence to prove the offense charged.
2. In convicting petitioner of attempted rape on the basis merely of circumstantial
evidence since the prosecution failed to satisfy all the requisites for conviction
based thereon.
3. In not finding that the circumstances it relied on to convict the petitioner are
unreliable, inconclusive and contradictory.
4. In not finding that proof of motive is miserably wanting in his case.
5. In awarding damages in favor of the complainant despite the fact that the
award was improper and unjustified absent any evidence to prove the same.
6. In failing to appreciate in his favor the constitutional presumption of innocence
and that moral certainty has not been met, hence, he should be acquitted on the
ground that the offense charged against him has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
Otherwise stated, the basic issue in this case turns on the question on whether or not
the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape.
After a careful review of the facts and evidence on record in the light of applicable
jurisprudence, the Court is disposed to rule for petitioners acquittal, but not necessarily
because there is no direct evidence pointing to him as the intruder holding a chemicalsoaked cloth who pinned Malou down on the bed in the early morning of December 13,
1991.
Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of
being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of
positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused as the offender as an
eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct
evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have
actually witnessed the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to
positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as when, for
instance, the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim

immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type
of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence. 13 In the absence of
direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to
discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under condition where
concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted under all circumstances,
the prosecution of vicious felons who committed heinous crimes in secret or secluded
places will be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to prove. 14
Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the conditions when circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient for conviction. The provision reads:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient Circumstantial evidence is sufficient
for conviction if
a) There is more than one circumstance;
b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
In the present case, the positive identification of the petitioner forms part of
circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with the other pieces of evidence
constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is
that petitioner was the intruder in question.
We quote with approval the CAs finding of the circumstantial evidence that led to the
identity of the petitioner as such intruder:
Chito was in the Building when the attack on MALOU took place. He had access to the
room of MALOU as Room 307 where he slept the night over had a window which
allowed ingress and egress to Room 306 where MALOU stayed. Not only the Building
security guard, S/G Ferolin, but Joseph Bernard Africa as well confirmed that CHITO
was wearing a black "Adidas" shorts and fraternity T-shirt when he arrived at the
Building/Unit 307 at 1:30 in the morning of December 13, 1991. Though it was dark
during their struggle, MALOU had made out the feel of her intruders apparel to be
something made of cotton material on top and shorts that felt satin-smooth on the
bottom.
From CHITOs bag which was found inside Room 310 at the very spot where witness
Renato Alagadan saw CHITO leave it, were discovered the most incriminating evidence:
the handkerchief stained with blue and wet with some kind of chemicals; a black
"Adidas" satin short pants; and a white fraternity T-shirt, also stained with blue. A
different witness, this time, Christian Alcala, identified these garments as belonging to
CHITO. As it turned out, laboratory examination on these items and on the beddings
and clothes worn by MALOU during the incident revealed that the handkerchief and

MALOUs night dress both contained chloroform, a volatile poison which causes first
degree burn exactly like what MALOU sustained on that part of her face where the
chemical-soaked cloth had been pressed.
This brings the Court to the issue on whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution
has established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioner for the crime of
attempted rape.
The Solicitor General maintained that petitioner, by pressing on Malous face the piece
of cloth soaked in chemical while holding her body tightly under the weight of his own,
had commenced the performance of an act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape the
victim. It is argued that petitioners actuation thus described is an overt act
contemplated under the law, for there can not be any other logical conclusion other than
that the petitioner intended to ravish Malou after he attempted to put her to an induced
sleep. The Solicitor General, echoing what the CA said, adds that if petitioners intention
was otherwise, he would not have lain on top of the victim. 15
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man who has
carnal knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the following
circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under twelve years of
age or is demented. Under Article 6, in relation to the aforementioned article of the
same code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape
directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.16
Expounding on the nature of an attempted felony, the Court, speaking thru Justice Claro
M. Recto in People vs. Lamahang,17 stated that "the attempt which the Penal Code
punishes is that which has a logical connection to a particular, concrete offense; that
which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator,
leading directly to its realization and consummation." Absent the unavoidable
connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, as where the
purpose of the offender in performing an act is not certain, meaning the nature of the act
in relation to its objective is ambiguous, then what obtains is an attempt to commit an
indeterminate offense, which is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal
Code.18
There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal
knowledge in the present case. The next question that thus comes to the fore is whether
or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top
of Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape.
1avvphil.net

Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which
if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being

frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will
logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. 19
Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would be too strained to
construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou
which would induce her to sleep as an overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen
into rape. As it were, petitioner did not commence at all the performance of any act
indicative of an intent or attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that
petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou,
let alone touch her private part. For what reason petitioner wanted the complainant
unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is anybodys guess. The CA
maintained that if the petitioner had no intention to rape, he would not have lain on top
of the complainant. Plodding on, the appellate court even anticipated the next step that
the petitioner would have taken if the victim had been rendered unconscious. Wrote the
CA:
The shedding of the clothes, both of the attacker and his victim, will have to come later.
His sexual organ is not yet exposed because his intended victim is still struggling.
Where the intended victim is an educated woman already mature in age, it is very
unlikely that a rapist would be in his naked glory before even starting his attack on her.
He has to make her lose her guard first, or as in this case, her unconsciousness. 20
At bottom then, the appellate court indulges in plain speculation, a practice disfavored
under the rule on evidence in criminal cases. For, mere speculations and probabilities
cannot substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond
reasonable doubt.21
In Perez vs. Court of Appeals,22 the Court acquitted therein petitioner of the crime of
attempted rape, pointing out that:
xxx. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the
felony. Thus, for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the
act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however, slight, is
not completed.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners act of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and kissing her, mashing
her breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty and touching her sexual organ, while
admittedly obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute attempted rape absent any
showing that petitioner actually commenced to force his penis into the complainants
sexual organ. xxx.
Likewise in People vs. Pancho,23 the Court held:

xxx, appellant was merely holding complainants feet when his Tito Onio arrived at the
alleged locus criminis. Thus, it would be stretching to the extreme our credulity if we
were to conclude that mere holding of the feet is attempted rape.
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not saying that petitioner is innocent, under the
premises, of any wrongdoing whatsoever. The information filed against petitioner
contained an allegation that he forcefully covered the face of Malou with a piece of cloth
soaked in chemical. And during the trial, Malou testified about the pressing against her
face of the chemical-soaked cloth and having struggled after petitioner held her tightly
and pinned her down. Verily, while the series of acts committed by the petitioner do not
determine attempted rape, as earlier discussed, they constitute unjust vexation
punishable as light coercion under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised
Penal Code. In the context of the constitutional provision assuring an accused of a
crime the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, 24 it cannot be
said that petitioner was kept in the dark of the inculpatory acts for which he was
proceeded against. To be sure, the information against petitioner contains sufficient
details to enable him to make his defense. As aptly observed by then Justice Ramon C.
Aquino, there is no need to allege malice, restraint or compulsion in an information for
unjust vexation. As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint
or compulsion for the reason that this term is broad enough to include any human
conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, would
unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person.25 The paramount question is whether the
offenders act causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind
of the person to whom it is directed.26 That Malou, after the incident in question, cried
while relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact
that she filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if
not distressed by the acts of petitioner.
The penalty for coercion falling under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the
Revised Penal Code is arresto menor or a fine ranging from P5.00 to P200.00 or both.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
entered ACQUITTING petitioner Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the charge for attempted
rape. Petitioner, however, is adjudged GUILTY of light coercion and is accordingly
sentenced to 30 days of arresto menor and to pay a fine of P200.00, with the accessory
penalties thereof and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
( On Leave )
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ*
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Asscociate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
AT T E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S .PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 113006

November 23, 2000

ONG CHIU KWAN, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
What is before the Court for consideration is the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the conviction of accused Ong Chiu Kwan, for unjust vexation. 1
On January 31, 1991, Assistant City Prosecutor Andres M. Bayona of Bacolod filed with
the Municipal Trial Court, Bacolod City an information charging petitioner with unjust
vexation for cutting the electric wires, water pipes and telephone lines of "Crazy Feet," a
business establishment owned and operated by Mildred Ong. 2
On April 24, 1990, at around 10:00 in the morning, Ong Chiu Kwan ordered Wilfredo
Infante to "relocate" the telephone, electric and water lines of "Crazy Feet," because
said lines posed as a disturbance.3 However, Ong Chiu Kwan failed to present a permit
from appropriate authorities allowing him to cut the electric wires, water pipe and
telephone lines of the business establishment. 4
After due trial, on September 1, 1992, the Municipal Trial Court found Ong Chiu Kwan
guilty of unjust vexation,5and sentenced him to "imprisonment for twenty days." 6 The
court also ordered him to pay moral damages, finding that the wrongful act of abruptly
cutting off the electric, water pipe and telephone lines of "Crazy Feet" caused the
interruption of its business operations during peak hours, to the detriment of its owner,
Mildred Ong. The trial court also awarded exemplary damages to complainant "as a
deterrent to the accused not to follow similar act in the future and to pay attorneys
fees."7 The trial court disposed of the case as follows:
"IN VIEW THEREOF, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of unjust vexation provided under Article 287 par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code

and sentences him to suffer a penalty of imprisonment of twenty (20) days and to pay
private complainant the following:
P10,000.00 - moral damages
P 5,000.00 - exemplary damages
P 5,000.00 - attorneys fees and to pay the cost of this suit."
"SO ORDERED.
"Bacolod City, Philippines, September 1, 1992.
"(SGD.)RAFAEL O. PENUELA
Judge"8
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, Bacolod City, the latter court in a decision dated
December 8, 1992, simplistically adopted the decision of the lower court in toto, without
stating the reasons for doing so.9
On April 22, 1993, by petition for review, Ong Chiu Kwan elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals.10 On August 16, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
dismissing the appeal,11 agreeing with the lower courts finding that petitioner was guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of unjust vexation.
Hence, this petition for review.12
The Court notes that in the decision of the Regional Trial Court which the Court of
Appeals affirmed peremptorily without noticing its nullity, the Regional Trial Court merely
quoted the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in full and added two paragraphs, thus:
"This Court, in accordance with the rules, required the parties to submit their
corresponding memorandum or brief. The prosecution filed its memorandum, and also
with the defense.
"After a careful perusal of the record of the case and evaluating the evidence thereto
and exhibits thereof, this Court finds no ground to modify, reverse or alter the abovestated decision and hereby affirms the decision of the lower court in toto."13
The Constitution requires that "[N]o decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based."14 The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that "[T]he

judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by
the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the
facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is
based."15
Although a memorandum decision is permitted under certain conditions, it cannot
merely refer to the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court. The
court must make a full findings of fact and conclusions of law of its own. 16
Consequently, the decision of the regional trial court is a nullity. Very recently, speaking
of a similarly worded decision of a regional trial court, we said:
"[I]t is starkly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in its form. It
achieved nothing and attempted at nothing, not even at a simple summation of facts
which could easily be done. Its inadequacy speaks for itself." 17
Judges similarly disposed to pay lip service to their work must rethink their place in the
judiciary or seriously take refresher courses on decision writing. We warn them of stiff
sanctions for such lackadaisical performance.
Consequently, the case may be remanded to the lower court for compliance with the
constitutional requirement of contents of a decision. However, considering that this case
has been pending for sometime, the ends of justice will be fully served if we review the
evidence and decide the case.
Petitioner admitted having ordered the cutting of the electric, water and telephone lines
of complainants business establishment because these lines crossed his property line.
He failed, however, to show evidence that he had the necessary permit or authorization
to relocate the lines. Also, he timed the interruption of electric, water and telephone
services during peak hours of the operation of business of the complainant. Thus,
petitioners act unjustly annoyed or vexed the complainant. Consequently, petitioner
Ong Chiu Kwan is liable for unjust vexation.
Regarding damages, we find the award of moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees to be without basis. Moral damages may be recovered if they were the
proximate result of defendants wrongful act or omission. 18 An award of exemplary
damages is justified if the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.19 There is no evidence to support such award. Hence, we delete the
award of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the lower courts are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In
lieu thereof, accused Ong Chiu Kwan is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00, and
the costs. The award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees is hereby
deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.