International Phenomenological Society

Vedanta as Transcendental Phenomenology

Author(s): Pravas Jivan Chaudhury
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Dec., 1959), pp. 252-263
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2104362
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VEDANTA AS TRANSCENDENTALPHENOMENOLOGY
"What is that which being known everythingis known?" This is the
metaphysicalquestion asked in Vedanta which clearly distinguishesit
from an empiricalquestion.1The question implies that, first, we have a
notionof an absolute origin and explanationof all things or Being, and
second,we have the capacityto knowimmediatelyor unitively this metaphysicalobject. In other words,we have such a kind of knowledgeof this
object, Brahmanor ultimate Being, that it cannot be said to be known
by us nor to be unknowneither. It is vaguely thought to be the ground
of every empiricalknowledgeof ours.2The metaphysicalquest is made
possibleby the paradoxicalstate of our knowledgeabout Brahman,for
it couldnot have arisen,if we had eitherno notion whatsoeverof Brahman
or a perfect knowledgeof It, as Sankara points out.3 Now this metaphysical quest presupposesa faith in man, in his essentialunity with the
core of Being. Metaphysicalknowledgeis conceivedas a realizationof this
unity which is somehowforgotten.All true metaphysicianshad this idea
of their task. Socrateswas feeling his way to a concept of man such that
men could know the abstract universalsbehind the sensible particulars,
and, so, have knowledgeinstead of mere opinion. Only thus could he
really answerthe Sophists.Plato believedthe soul of man to be possessed
of knowledgeof the eternal Ideas as it lived in the world of Ideas from
which it fell and was imprisonedin the body after drinkingthe waters of
Lethe. So for Plato "Ourbirth is but a sleep and a forgetting"(Wordsworth) and our knowledge is awakening and recollection. Aristotle's
'active reason'is the richest and the immortalpart of the universalMind,
Nous. Thus metaphysical cognition is a simple exercise of a function
inherent in human existence by virtue of which man feels with total
certitudeand securityhis onenesswith the whole of Being. It is no dark
gropingof a logico-empiricalor speculativekind and so there is no scope
for profundityhere which, accordingto Husserl, is a sign of chaos and
not of clearknowledgeor science.Theutterancesof the Vedanticseersand
other metaphysicalmasters are made in a simple languageof discovery.
They do not argue nor do they take recourseto inference,analogy, and
postulation:"Listen, 0 the devas, I, througha disciplineof the mind am
getting into communionwith Brahmanthat has revealed you," says a
1 MundakaUpanishad, 1, 1. 3-4.
2

Kena Up., 1, 4, 2.2-4.

3 In his commentary on Brahkmutra, Introduction.

252
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Vedantic seer.4 Sankera declares that in metaphysical inquiry argumentation has no real force or foundation and revelation is the only
source of our knowledge.5Argumentsare used only to make revelation
intelligibleor plausibleto the ordinaryintellectualsor rationalmindswho
do not have any intuitive knowledgeso far of the metaphysicalobject
and want it in termsof their empiricalexperience.
The positive and self-confidentattitude toward man and metaphysics
was abandonedin Westernphilosophyby Descartesand the rationalists
who regardedman in his cognitive activity as an isolated Ego using his
cognitionas a tool to know Being as an outwardlygiven object. Naturally
the whole of Being could not be graspedwith the whole of his self. This
meanta breakdownof both metaphysicsand humanexistencein Western
culture.6The rift betweenfaith and reason,whichappearedwith Aquinas,
became wide and permanent. Germanidealism sought to rehabilitate
metaphysicsas a rational science. Kant showed that metaphysicsis impossibleas an empiricalscience,that the idea of causalityoperativein the
universecannot be employedto yield us the explanationof the Universe
itself, which as a whole cannot be explainedin terms of one of its components. Thus metaphysicscannot be a matter of "telling stories," as
Plato wouldsay. Hegel recognizedthe essentialunity of man in his metaphysicalenterpriseand Being; the formeris the self-manifestationof the
latter. However,all such effortsat reinstatingmetaphysicsand man were
not effective against the growing positivism of the Western mind that
endedin a total surrenderof all metaphysicsand, so, all bonds that unite
man with the supremeBeing or Brahman.
The modernpositivist has entered the scene with an orthodoxy of an
opposite kind. He cannot make any sense of the metaphysical object
which is said to be a self-sufficient explanation of the universe. For he
feels that the whole of the universe is an open system and not a closed

book and, then, he cannotthink of an explanatoryprinciplethat does not

itself stand in need of an explanation,but appearsto be a necessaryfact.
If the supremeexplanatoryprinciple appears to be necessary then the
universeitself that follows from it would so appear. But how it could
happenthe positivist cannot imagine for he has before him the type of
knowledge that empirical science represents and that is nothing but a
progresssive mapping of the sensible world, enumerating the items we

have there and tentatively establishingcertain regularitiesobserved in

4 gvet~vatara Up., 2.5. See how the various levels of reality are gradually revealed
in Bhrguvalliof Taittirya Up., in BrhadaranyakaUp. (III, 6), and inChhandyogya Up.
(VII, 1).
5 See his commentaryon Brahmasutra(1. 1. 2; 2.1.6.).
6 See Ludwig Landgrebe: "Phenomenology and Metaphysics," Philosophy and
PhenmologicalResearch,Dec. 1949.

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their dispositions.The positivist also fails to make sense of the first cause
or ultimategroundof the worldfor similarreasons.And he suspectsthat
the metaphysicianmerely quibbles with words and indulges in picturethinkingand emotivegratification.The positivist does not find any cognitive significancein the discussionsof metaphysics.Thisis understandable,
for somepeoplemay not see as far as othersdo, but the attitude that some
positivists have adopted is quite unreasonable.For they insist that the
metaphysicalstatements must be nonsensicaland that the only sensible
ones are those that belongto empiricalsciencewhich dealswith the senseverifiablethings. They maintain that a sensible idea must have senseverifiableconsequencesby means of whichit may be definedand verified
either directly or indirectly. But this is rather dogmatic, for how can
anybodyknowthe wholerealmof objectsthat man is capableof knowing
and, so, determinethe meaningof meaning?The positivist's criterionof
meaningis thus to be taken as a stipulation instead of an established
truth. It merely expressesa particularattitude, one that helps science,
and so, our practice. It expressesour biophysicalnature. But we may
have a metaphysicalnature too. Theremay be dimensionsof our human
personalityand the positivisthas seen only one of them.
But the positivist's criticismof metaphysicshas done one good to the
latter. It has taught metaphysicsto followits own methodand not try to
imitate science and tell stories. The scientific method in metaphysics
would yield what is known as an inductive metaphysicswhich will offer
us indirectly verifiable results bearing some analogy with sensible experienceand possessingthat public characterwhich metaphysicsas an
esoteric disciplinelacks. But such a scientificmetaphysicscannot deliver
us the goods, for it cannot arrive at the ultimate explanationof things;
the most generalhypothesisor formulathat it can offerus will always be
open to further questions, and, moreover, cannot claim certitude. So
that if metaphysicsremainsloyal to its originaland fundamentalobjective
and means business,it must not flirt wich the scientific method. If one
seeksto presentor developmetaphysicaltruths in the mannerof scientific
concepts then one must submit one's accounts to the scrutiny of the
logical empiricists who will then not allow any concept which is not
verifiableeither directly or indirectly,and certainlynot any claim to an
ultimateexplanationand certitude.Thereforethe allianceof metaphysics
with science,thoughit can succeedto some degreeand help one in understandingin logico-empiricalterms some of the concepts of metaphysics,
cannotgo far enoughand after a point becomesa positive dangerto our
intellect that must seize the fundamentaldistinctionbetween the metaphysicalquest and the scientificone. As regardsthe esotericor subjective
nature of metaphysicsand its incommunicability,this is not an insuperable difficulty,for it only needs on our part as initial faith in metaphysics

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VEDANTA AS TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY

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and ourselveswhich will lead us to take up the metaphysicalquest in its

true form in right earnestand in good numbers.A communityof experience will then be discoveredand so, a languagewill evolve. After all, even
our sense experiencesare subjective in one sense, but become objective
because we universally are concerned about them, and compare them

with those of otherpersons,and thus developa publicscienceout of them.

Metaphysicsmay as well be developedas a rationalscienceprovidedour
philosophers,instead of talking aboutmetaphysicsinterminably,do it and
talk it.
What, then, is the metaphysicalmethod per se which we must adopt
to do justice to our tradition of metaphysicsand to ourselvesas human
beings, both of which are in utter chaos in this age of positive sciences?
Ouransweris that it is the phenomenologicalmethodthat Husserlintroducedus to, particularlyin the last phase of his intellectualdevelopment.
The method followed in his transcendental phenomenologywill not
appear strange to a student of Vedanta who finds in his disciplinethe
same transcendentalanalysis of experienceleading to the discovery of
layersof subjectivityand their correspondingobjectiveworldsconstituted
by the former'sprojectiveactivity. This followingof experiencesback to
their originor home, stage by stage, endingin the all-importantand overwhelming result that the inquirer's self or his transcendental subjectivity
is the metaphysical object he in his ignorance was searching for as an
object apart from him and, as such, never amounting to that true metaphysical object 'that being known everything is known.' The greatest discovery
of Vedanta was the principle of identity of the self with Brahman or ultimate
Being and the inquirer has to realize this identity in order really to find an
answer to his metaphysical query.7 Thus metaphysics is a personal adventure with one's very being and not with ideas. A student of Vedanta
is required by the orthodox tradition of learning this system to, first,
listen to the Vedantic texts that contain the reports of the metaphysical
experiences of great seers, second,understand the reports through intel-

lectual exercise,and third,realizethe experiencesso reportedthroughhis

own meditative search. Thus there is a place for discursive intellection in
Vedanta, but this is to be employed in drawing an analogical knowledge

about the metaphysicalobject which must be afterwardsknownper se in

direct experience. The speculative knowledgeabout Brahman must be
imperfectand mediate and only serves to draw the mind to the metaphysical truth which is presented first as a plausible hypotheses. It is
only becauseof the logico-empiricalbent of our mindsthat this procedure
is required, but this is only a stage in the progress of the mind in its search
7 "That Thou Art" (ChhAndyogyaUp.), the prayer to the Sun to show its real form
and let the devotee see the Person in it as his own self (I9d Up.); "He who knows
Brahman becomes Brahman" (MundakaUp.).

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for the metaphysicalobject. The mind has a notion of the object and,
therefore, it poses the metaphysical question and will not rest satisfied
with such answers as are given from its logico-empirical framework. Metaphysics is thus a serious business and not an intellectual pastime. The
metaphysician knows the stake involved in his nature. Either he recovers
his inherent bond with the ultimate Being and is firmly established in the
universe or he is doomed to be a stranger in the world, "a guilty thing

surprised."To philosophizewas for the Vedanticsages to satisfy at once

the urge for a final explanationof the world and the yearningto feel at
home in it. And they realizedthat such a philosophicaldisciplinecannot
succeedunless it adopts the method of direct self-discoveryand finds the
whole universe as a manifestationof his essential self, unless, in other
words,the whole universeis seen as "failingsfrom us, vanishings,"or as
Husserlmight say, as constitutedby our 'intentions'or acts of objectification.

Let us now apply the phenomenologicalmethod and see what follows.

The later Vedantistsmade the analysis of errorand dreamtheir starting
point. In such experienceswe come across an apparentlygiven object
which yet demandsto be explainedin terms of the mind's own original
power of projectionand retraction.This is superimposition(adhydsa)of
what is not on what is and also subsequentwithdrawalof it when the
illusionis said to be over. This performanceof the mindis said to be indefor there is no empiricalanalogy of it in ordinary
scribable(aniirvdchya)
experiencewhere a judgment like "That snake in erroneousperception
is but rope" or "The man in the dreamwas nothing"is nonsensical.The
subjectterm here is not on a par with the predicateterm, which therefore
does not qualify it and the judgment appears to be self-contradictory.
The judgment amounts to a declarationthat the subject is unreal, but
this is informationabout somethingthat happenedto the judgingsubject
and not anything about the judged object. If "S is unreal"is conceived
as an ordinaryjudgment,then S must somehowbe in orderto be unreal
or non-existentand this will lead to the postulationof subsistentobjects
and so, to all the problemswhich are pretty insoluble. So that illusory
objectivityis no empiricalfact to be describedor explainedin the usualway.
It is to be recognizedas an original function of the mind that freely
projectsobjects beforeit and adopts a mode of being such that it forgets
for the time beingtheirhavingbeen thus createdand takes them for given
objects. That which is immanent appears as transcendent;this is the
principleof error, illusion, and of dreams. Now this principlemust be
securelygraspedand bornein mind in our metaphysicalquest where our
task will be to realize as immanentand self-projectedor intended what
appearsas transcendentor given. In Vedantic terminologyour task in
metaphysicsis to see throughthe illusoryobjectivity (avidyi) at various

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stages of the self. Whilethe self as an individualego projectsillusionsand

dreams, it knows, as cosmic self, the empirical world which is thus illusory
from the standpoint of this cosmic consciousness. The illusory objectivity
at this universal plane is known as maya. Sankara, like Kant and later

Husserl,is a transcendentalidealist and an empiricalrealist and we can

appreciatethese thinkersonly if we think in terms of phenomenological
analysis of experienceand, so, of levels or orders of subjectivity and
objectivity.
Now the cancellationof the illusion or dream reveals the empirical
reality which is taken as given by the second order subjectivity that
emerges from under the first that took the illusion or dream for reality. In
fact, the second order subjectivity, S2, projected the first order objects, O1,
and adopteda lowerself-delusivemode,S1, to take them for given objects.

Thebreakingofillusionsanddreamsis ultimatelythe resultof the awakening

of S2 sleepingin S1. We know how our mind works duringour sleep. It
orders the dreams which are wish fulfillmentsin a profoundsense, as
modernpsychologistshave shown, and it rouses us from them or deep
sleep at an appointed time when we wish to get up. Thus S2 does not
totally lapse but goes into a state of torpor,so to speak,and holdingitself
in abeyance,assumesa pose of S1. It enjoysthe experiencesof S1, its play
acting self, and we are said to enjoy our dreams, both good and bad,
which, as the psychoanalystshave established, express our own inner
desires (such as sexual urge, love of position and power, and sometimes
even of sufferingand death). Thus dreamsare created by S2 for a fuller
andricherlife of experienceas a supplementto its own wakingexperiences
that leave many desiresunfulfilled.
Now this S2 that takes the waking world for a given reality is in its
turn an assumedpose of a third ordersubjectivity,S3, whichlies dormant
in S2 and creates and enjoys the objects of so-calledwakingreality. This
S3 has been realizedby the mystics of all times and placesas their reports
show. The Vedic seers speak of a stage of self-realizationwhen they are
liberatedthough continuinga bodily existence(jivan-mukta).In this stage
one feels the worldto be a shadow-showor a dreamthat is freelyprojected
by one's higher orderself just as we enjoy our daydreams.One lives his
worldly life only for the sake of play acting, so to speak. One literally
realizesthe world to be a stage where men play their various parts accordingto the sweet will of the author-directorof the play with whomthe
liberatedone is identifiedin spirit. The mindat this stage of inwardization
enjoys its worldlyjoys and sorrowsjust as we ordinarilyenjoy those of
charactersin a novel or dramaor of our own imagination.Thisthird order
subjectivity or self is the God of religion,for it is the universalcreator
and correlatorof images who appearsto the individual,S2, to be a real
object forminga system or cosmos with rigid rules of coexistence and

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succession. Now, we have evidence for this stage of the self from the
testimony of the mystics including the Vedic seers. We, as Vedanta also

directsus, have to listen to their reports,and to understandtheir message

through analogy with ordinary experience by means of critical and
speculative thinking, and lastly, we have to verify in experience or realize

the content so far known in an analogicalmanneras a possible entity.

But even beforethis firsthandknowledgeof Godis achievedin us, we can
have someassuranceof it fromcertainmorereadilyavailableexperiences.
First, as Kant pointed out, the categorialformsof the empiricalworld,
such as space, time, substance,accident, causality reciprocityand some
others, belong to the empiricalego-mindsuniformlyand are read into
the worldwhich, therefore,as it appearsto us, is not ultimatelyreal but
mind-dependent. Now Kant's thesis is to be taken neither as a logical
derivation from empirical observation, nor as a psychological analysis of
our attitude toward the world. He explicitly forbids these interpretations.
In the former version of his thesis the categories lose their a prior character, their necessity and universality, and become mere empirical generalizations, while in the latter version they become descriptive of man's

temporarymental behaviour.Kant's intentionwas to offerthe categories

as a prior principles of our empirical knowledge, as 'transcendental'
presuppositions.We can understandKant only when we take his analysis
as a phenomenologicalone of discoveringwhat is necessarilyimplied in
ourempiricalknowledge,this implicationbeingneitherlogicalnor psychological. Kant's own justification for the categoriesin his 'Deduction'is
very confusingand unconvincing.Yet his thesis may readily be accepted
as correct.His realjustificationseemsto be a phenomenologicalone, only
he did not realizethis. He simply 'saw' or intuited the formsof empirical
knowledgeas being in the mind; being ordinarilyunaware of this, he
takes them to be given fromthe outsideworld,and, so, to be contingent,
and thus falls into skepticism.Now Kant's thesis means, in the context
of our phenomenologicalscheme,that the categoriesare fashionedby the
third order subjectivity, S3 or God in us, who enjoys them from behind
its assumed self, S2, which takes them for given empiricallaws. The
individualand isolatedmindsor egos cannotconstitutetheir own common
natureaccordingto a singleuniformplan. Thisrequiressomepowerabove
them. A phenomenologicaland transcendentalanalysis,however,reveals
to the analyst the categoriesas formswhichhe himselfhas fashionedand,
so, he declaresthem to be a prior principlesof empiricalknowledge.In
other words the analyst feels himself at one with God. Kant surely felt
this when he said that our understandingdoes not created but makes
nature. One who offers this doctrine, "the Copernicanrevolution,"as a
discoveryand not merelyas a speculativetheory, must feel withinhimself
the silent workingof a higher self. This signalizeshis faint rousing from

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the sleep and dreamof life. Theologicallyspeaking,this marksthe advent

of graceand salvationin his life. Now, Kant felt that our understanding
could not create nature, for the matter or contents of our empirical
knowledge,the sense-data,appearedto him transcendentor given from
outside. But further meditation might show him that even they are

ultimatelymind-made.This realizationwould be sharingGod'svision of

things. Thereforephilosophy,if it is a seriousdiscoveryof what is really
behind appearancesand not mere speculation on the analogy of appearances,is identical with active self-knowledgeand salvation. Kant,
however, stopped at a halfway house, and so, was skeptical of metaphysics.He was not awareof the phenomenologicalmethodhe implicitly
adopted in his 'transcendentalanalytic.' But he could have at least
thoughtof ourdoctrinewhichalonecouldsolve the problemhis philosophy
raised and left unanswered. How could it happen, he might ask himself,
that the sensible manifold said to be impressed upon the mind by a

foreignrealm of things in themselvesfall in with the mind'slaws? There

must be some affinity between the matter and form of knowledge,and
how else and more simply may this affinity be explained than by the
hypothesisthat both are the creationsof the same mind? So, we see that
both what Kant positively offeredus, and what he failed to offer but is
demandedby his completethesis for its roundingoff, point to our contention that we have a higher-ordersubjectivityimplicitin our empirical
wakingone.
Second,this idea of a higher-ordercommonmentality, S3, workingfrom
behind the individual mind, S2, is further made plausible as a metaphysicalhypothesisby the results of researchwork on the psychologyof
speechand mental developmentof children.These show that there is no
one single fixed and determinate world for all minds, but there are
'worlds'correspondingto the performancesof language and of naming
things. Languageand the world of facts are not as opposedas they are
thought to be. Languageis the means of comprehending
and categorizing
our experience,and describingis not just reproducingin words what is
apartfromthem, it is morelike seeingfaces in the clouds.In other words,
it is constitutive of the world said to be describedby it. Researchesin
animal psychology and speech also confirmthis thesis of relativity and
subjectivityof worlds.Some modernphysicistslike PoincareandEinstein
and some philosopherslike C. I. Lewis and others arrive at this thesis
fromgeneralconsiderationsand speakof creativityof the mindin science.
A continual process of redefining the basic categories of empirical
knowledgeis going on in science. The concepts of space, time substance,
and causalityin modernphysics are differentfrom their classicalforms.
Now, all this tends to show that the higher-ordersubjectivity,S3, devises
various systems of experiencesand correspondingforms of speech, and

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takes them respectively for given worlds and their reproductive expressions.Kant noticed only the formsof experienceand languageof the
highly developedconsciousnessof the enlightenedhuman society of his
time and took it to be fixed for all minds for all times and places. His
insight revealedthe mind-dependenceof a particularform of world experience.This form being found commonto a large section of individual
minds,a commonbase for them had to be imagined.The a prior character
of the categoriespointed to the hypothesis of a commonmind working
behind the individual ones. But the insight of the psychologists and
philosophershas relativizedthe categorialfeature of our experienceand
has made the hypothesis more plausible. In Vedantic terminologythis
insightmay be expressedby saying that the warp and woof of this world
are but namesand forms(ndmaand ro4a). Thisidentificationof the world
with the formof languageor speechhas a parallelin the Westerntradition
in the Greekconcept of Logos as the originand foundationof the world,
and also the Biblical concept of the 'Word'which is said to have been
originallywith God and then becameincarnatedin the world. All these
ancientinsights with variousdegreesof clarity and adequacycan be best
understoodin the light of our phenomenologicalfindingswhich may thus
gain some initial trust from the speculative thinkers, who may then
adopt the right method, the phenomenological,to know the truth about
these matters.
Third,our thesis regardinghigher-ordermentality behindthe ordinary
one is further supported by certain extraordinarymental phenomena
observedfrom the very ancient times and more or less made plausiblein
the light of modern researchesin parapsychology.Extrasensory perception,precognition,thought reading,and thought transference,hypnotism, and telekinesis are now recognized phenomena. Also prophetic
and telepathicdreamshave come to be acknowledgedby moderninvestigatorslike Myers,Dunne, and Tyrrell.8C. G. Jung believes that some of
our dreamsexpress our experiencesof the forgottenpast of the race and
prove the existence of a 'collective Unconscious'or "a sediment of our
experiencesof the universe for all times."9 These phenomenahave led
the parapsychologiststo recognize a common substratum of our apparently isolated minds. However, this postulate of a universal higherordermind on the analogyof our individualone is always a puzzleto our
understandingfor the analogy is never complete. One cannot imagine
how a single mind can workin so many ways throughso many empirical
minds and take up so many attitudes or statuses at once. Only a direct
8 F. W. H. Myers: Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death (1903).
J. W. Dunne: An Experimentwith Time (1937). G. N. M. Tyrrell: The Personality of
Man (1947).
9 See his CollectedPaper8 on Analytical Psychology(1917).

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experienceof this mind by becomingor realizingwhat is thus analogically

thought of by scientificspeculationcan deliverthe requiredgoods to the
serious-enquirerwho, therefore, must take the all-importantplunge in
meditative search.
Fourth, the disinterestednessof the mind with regardto the egotistic
attachments and a dawning of a universal outlook marks our intellectual,

religious, moral, and aesthetic attitudes. An impersonal search after

reasonor powerbehind things and a realizationof it as not alien or transcendent to our mind is the ideal of knowledge.Scientific knowledgeis
only a first step toward this ideal and the scientist who speaks of the
impossibilityof any furtherknowledgebeyond the scientificis a prey to
despair and dogmatism. Our intellectual quest is after "that, knowing
which everything is known," and we cannot possibly stop short of this
goal. But this shows that our intellectual adventure is an expression of
and a pointer to a higher self that we possess. The fact of our meta-

physical quest, as we have already explainedciting Sankara,proves the

ideal of knowledgewe tacitly hold in our mind. The quest only makes
explicit what is implicit and vague. Our religious efforts too reveal the
same story. We want to be at home in this worldwhich seems to surprise
and terrorizeus. We want to fraternizewith the world and its creator.
We wish to be worthy and welcomeinmates in this wonderfuluniverse.
We want to feel it to be our Father's house. And we also want to own
other personsas our brothers.But all this wishing signifiesthe existence
of the wished for object as our thirst does that of water. The world must
be our home, only we have to realizethis and for this we have to rise to
the third order subjectivity or God-consciousnessthat is sleeping in us.
The moral attitude is also an emancipationfrom the egotistic one and an
identification through sympathy with other selves. It is self-universalization and self-sublimation. Therefore our moral culture also signifies the
working in us of a higher self as many moral philosophers have recognized.

Ourartistic activities too are similarlysignificantfor the key principleof

art or of the production and appreciation of beauty is disinterested
contemplation and imaginative sympathy. Beauty is said to be a bridge

between man and nature. The object of beauty becomesan extension of

our consciousness,an embodimentof our feelings and ideas which it is
said to express.And the universalityof art or beauty points to a common
mentality behind our apparentlydiverseones and so, appreciationof art
or beauty, as Tolstoy observed,socializesthe self. Art thus emancipates
man fromhis ego and bringshim close to recognitionof a higheruniversal
self workingin him from behind.
The third order subjectivity, S3, above (or behind) the second order,
S2, may be establishedby phenomenologicalprobing into our mind and
it can also be presentedas a probablemetaphysicalpostulate to those

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who are not initiated in this directmethod of discovery,but would follow

the hypothetico-deductivemethod of science to obtain explanationsof
phenomena.Thenext step in phenomenologyis to discovera fourthgrade
of subjectivity, S4, behind the third, S3. In this too we may follow the
Vedicseersin theirrelentlessself-analysisand arriveat what they have describedas Brahmanwithoutdifferentiation,indescribablein empiricalterms
except by negation(neti). This S4 iS pure subject-objectlessconsciousness
which is implied by our conceptionof a creative mind, S3, that dreams
this dreamof life as so many egos, S2. To S3 the world is a dreamwork
againstwhich it is a creative and real entity. It cancelsthe reality of the
individual objects throwing them as illusorily projected, but feels the
necessity of creation or projection, and so, is faced with objectivity,
without any objects, or in other words, with the possibility of objects.
Thereis thus subject-objectduality in S3 which knowsitself as a subject
against the form of objectivity or 'objectsin general.'When the stage S4
is reached all this necessity or urge for creation appears self-projected
and illusoryand, so, all objectivityvanishes.The self at this stage appears
to be absolutely free. Brahmanof Vedanta is best understoodas pure
consciousness,absolutelyunconditioned,and free, and so, full of bliss and
beatitude. God (Iswara)is Brahmanin the self-posedmode of creativity,
that is, He is Brahmanas standingover againstthe formof objectivityor
mdyd. God is called in one Upanishad10 the lord of mdyd (mdyddhis)
who, having created this world by His magical power, enters it and becomes bound by it. The statement implies a threefold gradation of
consciousness,one S2 that takes the world as reality, another S3 that
createsit and takes it as a make believe affair,and anotherS4 that takes
this creation itself in the same manner.For that which is said to create
the world by its magicalpower (whichis interpretedby us as the power
of projection we meet in dreams and vivid imagination)must be considered apart from the exercise of this power. The poet or the musician
is essentially a human being not to be defined by his artistic capability.
This stage of subjectivity, S4, where all sense of subject-objectduality
vanishes and to which nothing is given but everythingis freely created
in a sportive mood and posited on lower grades of reality, is the goal
toward which a phenomenologicalanalyst is led. The latter cannot rest
satisfied with any stage below this final one for he is then faced with an
object or element of giveness which puzzles him. Since there is no sense
of the object at the highest stage, there is nothing that transcendsit or
lurks behindit and everythingis immanentin it and perfectlyclear to it
as are those objects to us which we freely imagine. So there are no unanswerable questions or puzzles for the enquirer at this stage where he is
10

Ivetdgvatara,IV, 9-10.

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VEDANTA AS TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY

263

perfectly satisfied and quiet in his mind. Brahman knows the empirical
world of our common experience as a dream within a dream,a dreamthat
is fully understood as a work of fancy. Therefore to know Brahman or S4
as a stage of subjectivity is to know that which being known everything
is known, and to be identical with this ultimate cause and explanation of
things. The Vedantic seers have repeatedly told us of the identity of the
ultimate metaphysical knowledge with the ultimate self-realization on
the part of the enquirer as we have already mentioned before. The
enquirer knows his own self to be the ultimate basis of all being he has
been searching after, his real self behind his many assumed selves with
which it had allowed itself to be covered up and concealed to itself as we
do in dreams or fantasy. How this could be is a lazy question asked by the
scientific intellect which assumes that everything must follow the pattern
of its empirical experience and that inference from and analogy to this
experience are the only ways of knowing the mysteries behind nature.
The scientific mind must be told that we have more things in the world
than are dreamt of by it and the only way to know them is to listen to the
words of the ancient seers, ponder on them, and then delve deep into
ourselves to verify and possibly improve upon them by actual experience.
We must not merely sit on the shore of the ocean and speculate on the
things that may lie at its bottom, we must take the plunge. If we take
this all-important step in philosophy then we will naturally have scope
for collaboration of efforts and mutual checking of results, and so, will
be able to develop metaphysics as an interpersonal body of knowledge
like science. To doubt the possibility of such a science and condemn all
meditative researches in metaphysics as subjective illusions on abstract
and antecedent grounds is idle and dogmatic. The idle man is the greatest
prophet, goes the proverb and, of course, he has to be dogmatic too. To
the true aspirants after metaphysical knowledge the Vedic Seer urges,
"Arise, awake and stop not till the goal is reached, the path to the self is
as difficult to pass over as the sharp edge of a razor." 11
PRAVAS JIVAN CHAUDHURY.
PRESIDENCY COLLEGE,
CALCUTTA, INDIA.

11

Katha Upanishad. (1, 3.14).

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