You are on page 1of 15

Philhellenism and Greek Independence: the Frustration and Successes of Western

Romanticism

Lindsay Young

George Finlay's works on the Greeck struggle for independence have helped formed a
critical foundation for the historiography not only of Greece itself but Balkan independence
movements as a whole. His History of the Greek Revolution Volume II offers not only a suface
account of the war itself, but also a rare look into the vast differences in perception among
Europeans to the Greek cause.
Throughout the text, Finlay exhibits a fairness of judgment often absent from the later
historiography of the Greek War of Independence. He gives particular care in honestly assessing
Ottoman actions, with the capabilities of their leadership being fully recognized where
appropriate. Sultan Mahmud receives careful attention in his role as figurehead of the empire,
posited by Finlay as perhaps being the only man capable of handling the crises of the time.
Mahmud's abolishment of the infamous Janissary corp, where failure would surely be met with
deposal or execution, is described as being handled with little difficulty. Cruel in action by all
accounts, his steadfast resolve none the less stabilized the empire during one of its most
tumultuous eras.1 Finlay makes no attempt to twist explanation of Ottoman victories away from
their military and political prowess, with the exception of blaming the Greeks' own shortcomings
in the same fields. While such deflections would have easily fit into Western rhetoric of the
savage Turk so prominent at the time, Finlay avoids this revisionist approach.
The importance of this balance in representation cannot be understated. Too often do
European histories of the Balkans follow the old cliche of the Ottoman Empire as the sick man
of Europe. Finlay by no means escapes the prejudice of his peers entirely, but still offers a far
more even account than most.
In line with this, the disorganization and general inadequacy observed among the Greeks

comes under full scrutiny. Like many Philhellenes, Finlay traveled to Greece under the pretext of
supporting the ancestors of his beloved classical philosophers. Upon reaching the region,
confrontation with actuality forced him to quickly come to terms with the massive gap between
romantic fantasy and reality. The severity of this disillusionment affected each traveler to a
varying degree, going so far as driving Finlay's contemporary Thomas Gordon to quit the cause
entirely.2 Even Lord Byron, exalted hero of Greek Romanticism, fell victim to such melancholy.3
Greek failures, in both military and government, are given no reprieve. However, moments and
characters of true patriotism, those which kept the seemingly fruitless struggle alive, are justly
praised.
Finlay's importance in the history of the Greek War of Independence cannot be denied.
So many later works present a wholly Euro-centric view of the war, glossing over Ottoman
accomplishments either unconsciously or purposefully. Without the accounts of Finlay and his
contemporaries, a very different understanding of the war would emerge. Subsequent Greek
histories, following the trend of nearly every newly independent Balkan state, were highly
influenced by nationalistic undertones. Even modern historical texts on the subject commonly
take on a decidedly Euro-centric tone.4 Changes to the history of an event can be subtle; the
omission of certain facts or a shift in focus towards the favored narrative can drastically alter the
reader's perception. It remains unclear whether this trend shows a continued ethnocentric or
religious bias against the Ottomans. It may very well be a natural consequence of so many works
with decidedly anti-Ottoman views being written shortly after Greece's independence.
Regardless of cause, the existence alone of such thinking necessitates the continued study of
Finlay's work as a means to temper any possible bias among the greater historiography.

Despite his merited balance of stance, Finlay's account is far from flawless. Like with so
many Philhellenes, the shock of reality in Greece created a marked change in attitude, which
becomes readily apparent in his writings. Rather than the Greeks of antiquity, European travelers
found people not unlike the very Turks to which they were opposed. As William St Clair would
later record, the local Greek fighting forces were almost indistinguishable from Ottoman troops
in dress and military tactics.5
The cause of disillusionment among Europeans requires further analysis to completely
understand. Acceptance of romanticism's falsehood in Greece, if occurring at all, understandably
lead to frustration. At times Finlay's accounts of the Greeks seems to go beyond mere fairness of
portrayal, appearing to hint at open resentment. In previous works, he claims modern Greeks to
be Christian Turks6, that they had somehow been altered not just in outward appearance but on
some fundamental level of being. This Turkification serves as an explanation for the vast gap
between romanticized classical Greeks and the inhabitants that Philhellenes actually encountered
in the region. Disunity between expectation and reality became defined as yet another symptom
of Ottoman influence. The fantasized Greeks of antiquity were also victims, suffering the
indignity of their genealogical legacy becoming tainted by Eastern cultures.
In actuality, blame fell more on Westerners themselves, not Eastern corruption. Their
own countrymen had for years proclaimed the Balkans nothing more than a backwater of farmers
and bandits, a place changed little since Biblical days.7 That popular opinion of Greece
changed so drastically prior to the rise of Philhellenic ideals merits further inquiry. Travel
writings, dispensaries of knowledge for European populations concerning exotic locations,
began a considerable change in ideology during the late 18th century. Accounts of primitive

savages being justly conquered by intrinsically superior Europeans slowly morphed into tales of
reciprocal curiosity by both parties. Ethnocentrism still pervaded the works as a whole, but the
role of conqueror turned to that of the romantic explorer, wishing not to strike down natives but
raise them up to European ideals.8 Truth rarely served as the basis for either form of such
travelogues, yet both found ready acceptance as fact among Europe. The shift in narrative,
however, played a crucial role in foreign reactions to Greece's struggle against continued
Ottoman control.
Classicism's surge in popularity coincided nearly perfectly with this ideological shift.
Political enemies or populations without intrinsic value received little support from the emerging
romantics, but in peoples with which elevation promised some positive return, opinion seemed to
change overnight. Classicism traced European enlightenment in the realms of politics, art, and
education back to the ancient Greeks. The movement became especially strong within secular
Russian culture, though conservative politics initially hampered its effect.9
Forming Western culture around classical Greece introduced the issue of its current state.
To give such rhetoric legitimacy, modern Greeks needed to match the stature of their
predecessors. Greeks of typically Balkan appearance would taint such a narrative, and through
it European superiority itself. With this, romantics found a tangible return worthy of their
supposed elevation. Thus the Ottoman Empire largely retained its place as the savage Turk,
while the Greeks suddenly found themselves as the focus of Philhellenic beneficence.
These romantic re-imaginings of 19th century Greece, or perhaps of what it should
become, shared little resemblance with the reality of the region's mainland. While certainly less
offensive in portrayal than that of earlier travel writings, romantic travelogues still did little to

accurately depict truth. Populations of what would become the newly independent Greek state
remained largely agrarian. Poor management by the increasingly corrupt Ottoman government
allowed quality of life for the majority of peasants to fall far below Western standards10, with the
military unable to restore general order.
Stratification of Greek peoples and their geographical dispersion also played a central
role in the issue. Phanariotes, forming the Greek upper class, were far removed from the physical
region of Greece. Often claiming a lineage back to Byzantium, the class as a whole had for
generations been concentrated within Istanbul. Even the growing middle class merchants saw
little reason to establish themselves within mainland Greece; operation from cities outside
Ottoman control offers greater freedoms and safety. Thus the men most closely resembling what
Philhellenes expected to find far removed themselves from Greece itself.
Support for independence ran counter to the well being of the upper class. Phanariote
wealth, derived from positions within the upper echelons of Ottoman society and government,
necessitated allegiance to Mahmud. Greek primates, the aristocratic leadership within the
mainland, were directly accountable to the Porte and faced execution should they openly support
the revolt. Even following increased reprisals against Greeks for the war, few were willing to risk
their livelihoods. Despite this, some among the upper class found in them a nationalistic pride
and openly assisted both during and after the struggle for independence. Greek merchants living
abroad, inspired by life within the West, created the secret Philike Hetairia society which would
spark the revolution.11 Yet these men were the exception among Greeks.
Revolution held little appeal for the peasantry either. Already subjected to brigandry and
increased corruption within Ottoman governance, open warfare offered little to ease their

suffering. These fears would prove true, as mass starvation became widespread throughout the
country both during and after the war. Incompetence of the new Greek government only
complicated the matter, as newly unemployed or unpaid soldiers now viewed the peasantry as a
source of income or supplies. Thus brigands were replaced by rapacious irregular forces, with the
lot of the peasants worsening for a time following independence.12
This unfortunate convergence of factors gave rise to the divergence of realities for
arriving Philhellenes. That frustration characterized the European experience in Greece now
comes as no surprise. Explanations for the disparity, as previously mentioned, took many forms
as the romantics grasped for reason. British scholar Romilly James posited that regional
influences had installed in the Greeks a supposed conscious duality of truth:
...the level of factual, observed truth, on which he had to conduct
his everyday life. And there was the upper level of ideal truth, on
which he claimed to appear in the eyes of the outside world. These
levels of truth seldom approached one another, and were often
sharply divergent.13
Ironically, a form of James's claim could be leveled against the Philhellenes themselves.
Westerners had held staunchly negative views of the Balkans for centuries prior to the revival of
classicism. Historical knowledge of the region alone should have dispersed romantic claims of a
landscape inhabited by modern Platos. Ottoman control of Byzantium, ancient Greece's true
legacy, seems to have been largely ignored outside of the Greeks themselves. Philhellenic ideals
gained fervent followings among educated Westerners, which by their very nature likely had a
functional knowledge of the region's history. James's theoretical duality of truth thus appears
betters suited to explaining Philhellenic detachment from reality. They must, on some level, have

known that what awaited them in Greece could not possibly match romantic fantasy. Only a
mental disconnect, of simultaneously living by two opposing truths, makes sense of their actions.
Western approach to the formation of independent Greece's new government support this
mental state of dichotomous truths. Greece had been under Ottoman influence, both politically
and culturally, for nearly 400 years. The government forced upon it by France, Britain, and
Russia seemed entirely ignorant of this. European governments based on Western cultural trends
function precisely because the populations governed are members of such cultures. Installation
of a European government on a population far removed from European culture would be
described as ill-fitting at best. Monarchical rule of a Bavarian king with the framework proper
for wealthier and more advanced states14 caused immediate social upheaval.
The Greek people, by Finlay's account, were more more liberal in governmental policy
than Western leaders. Wishing for themselves a constitutional government with limited executive
power, they were forced to forgo such dreams for the European-controlled monarchy. It had been
known since 1823 that Russia in particular directly objected to Greek independence. A rebellious
state gaining freedom from its imperial masters would set a dangerous precedence against the
Russian Empire. Emperor Alexander wished not for an independent Greece, but one under
continued Ottoman control, permanently reliant on Russia for protection.15
Members of the Quintuple Alliance (Russia, Britian, France, and Austria) were
unilaterally against active support of the Greek cause for much of the war. Emperor Alexander's
aforementioned goals in the region distressed other leaders, who feared action on the part of
Greece would only further solidify Russian control of the Balkans. With Russia already able to
exert control over Ottoman affairs following the 1774 Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji,

establishment of Russian influence in an autonomous Greece benefitted no other member of the


alliance. Britain further worried over its position as a neutral party, which military support
without sufficient justification would ruin. That all Western powers also held ethnocentric bias
against the Greek people as a whole should be kept in mind; Canning is marked as referring to
them as the most rascally set.16 It is clear that to European leaders, the Greek struggle for selfagency held no intrinsic value. Beyond its status as the epicenter of international politics, Greek
independence either mattered little to or actively worked against the agendas of Western
politicians. Few if any among these men shared the Philhellene's love of Greece itself and its
people.
In marked contrast to these Western leaders, Finlay's outlook of the Greek people as a
whole continues to adopt more positive tones following independence. Criticism of Greek
failures shifts away from examples among the common people to focusing on the immediate
post-war government. His opinion of these men leaves no uncertainty; he describes Kolettes as
having climbed to the elevation of a Cromwell or a Washington, and he stood in his high
position utterly incompetent to act with decision.17
Of King Otto's government Finlay is especially critical, marking another split with the
current historiography. While more recent works have described Otto as having at least some
core desire for the success of Greece, Finlay firmly places him in the position of tyrant.18 One
could hardly argue that Finlay's position on these governments is baseless. While the extent of
their shortcomings is greatly debated among historians, most agree that they performed
inadequately at best and outright tyrannically at worst. Finlay's earlier accounts likewise harbor
little generosity towards wartime Greek politics, bearing strong resemblance to European

descriptions of Ottoman corruption.19 Harsh criticism of these governments within History of the
Greek Revolution is by no means rhetorical conjecture. Finlay appeared earnestly invested in the
betterment of Greece as a whole, and political action counterproductive to this goal is shown
throughout his works to infuriate him.
Otto may even have provided Finlay with the means of reconciling the disparate truths
of Greece. Blame for its current state lay not on the Greek peoples, but instead on their corrupt
representatives in government. The tale of Ottoman Greece transforms from one of slow
degradation of being to that of suffering under oppressive politics. Erosion of a peoples' culture
is not an issue easily reversed, but matters of governance can be directly confronted. While
expulsion of the Ottomans did little to solve the problem, it gave credence to the theory of
abusive government being the true cause of Greece's plight.
Hindrances to intellectual growth instituted through Otto are sharply criticized, with
special attention being given to censure of written work: Starving the mind and stuffing the
body is a favourite with tyrants. The Bavarians, however, only stuffed the Greeks with printed
paper.20 Finlay had by this time recounted numerous grievances committed by Otto against the
Greek people. Their own desire for a fair, constitutional government mattered little to the
Bavarians, with Western monarchs making attempts at change impossible. The censure of press
now added further legitimacy to Finlay's claims against a monarchy comfortable in its support by
the European great powers.21
As an educated romantic, Finlay would naturally be opposed to such tyrannical actions.
However, the resentment with which he focuses on such oppression, under both the Bavarians
and wartime Greek politicians, suggests a deeper reasoning. Finlay's fervent criticism seems

10

spawned from this concept of intellectual repression hindering Greece's rightful ascendancy. This
concept serves dual purposes: criticism of intellectual repression meshes perfectly with
romantic/classical doctrine, and remove's blame for the current state of Greece from the majority
of the population.
While Finlay's tone towards the Greek people shifts greatly over the course of History of
the Greek Revolution Volume II, he maintains an undercurrent of fascination appropriate to a
Philhellene. The resentment and disgust characterizing the wartime portion of the account seem
to come not from actual contempt, but more from his own frustration. Finlay was far from
entirely benevolent with his feelings towards the Greeks; in previous accounts he described their
Easter rituals as an unseemly tumult with which the Greeks desecrate their ceremonies in
commemoration of our Saviour's death and resurrection.22 Yet his dedication to raising the
newborn country to the heights he felt appropriate cannot be questioned.
Philhellenes themselves often became the subject of Finlay's critiques. Their disconnect
from reality, both within Greece and abroad, caused numerous troubles to the war effort.
Mismanagement of funds, of which they so often accused the Greeks, became a common
occurrence among Philhellenes charged with procurement of war materiels.23
Many Westerners were shocked upon arrival in Greece, but very few gave up the cause
without great effort. Though arguably undertaking their mission under the misguidance of
romantic ideals, the majority of these adventuring Europeans earnestly believed in the cause to
better Greece through foreign aid. As mentioned, most who quit the cause like Gordon did so
only in the face of continuous hardship. Finlay spent the rest of his life helping independent
Greece through its difficult growing pains.

11

These men, judgment of action aside, held true beliefs of a greater Greece. Unprepared
for the disunity symptomatic with a region suffering generations of foreign mismanagement,
their frustration naturally turned outward towards the Greeks themselves. Finlay cannot be
exempted from this, in addition to holding the typical bias of a Western romantic against
Orthodox populations of the Balkans. These factors must be understood to extract the truth of
History of the Greek Revolution. Independence for Greece validated every claim, every belief, of
Philhellenism. Success against the Ottomans meant legitimacy not only of Greece, but of
Western romanticism. Mounting failures greatly impacted European observers, and their
historical accounts reflected this.
Ignorance of such effects on primary sources of the war has undoubtebly marred the
accuracy of the historiography. With it in mind, however, Finlay's true character can be easily
determined. He wholly embraced the idea of an independent Greece, a revival of that beacon of
classical enlightenment. Though this love for the idea often eclipsed reality, his work stands as an
example of balance in historical accounts. Once his biases are identified and filtered from the
writing, the work simultaneously shows the true nature of both Greek and Ottoman actions
throughout the war and after.

12

Brewer, David. The Greek War of Independence. Woodstock, N.Y.: The Overlook Press,
2001.
Finlay, George. History of the Greek Revolution Volume II. Edinburgh: William
Blackwood & Sons, 1861. Facsimile printed by Elibron Classics, 2005.
_____. History of the Greek Revolution Volume I. Edinburgh: William Blackwood &
Sons, 1861. Facsimile printed by Elibron Classics, 2005.
Gerolymatos, Andre. The Balkan Wars. New York: Basic Books, 2002.
Glenny, Misha. The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-2011. New
York: Penguin Books, 2012.
Jelavich, Charles and Barbara. The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 18041920. Seattle: University of Washing Press, 2000.
Mazower, Mark. The Balkans: A Short History. New York: Random House, 2000.
Pratt, Mary Louise. Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation. New York:
Routledge, 2008.
Prousis, Theophilus C. Russian Society and the Greek Revolution. DeKalb, I.L.: Northern
Illinois University Press, 1994.
St Clair, William. That Greece Might Still Be Free. Cambridge: Open Book Publishers,
2008.
Stavrianos, L.S. The Balkans Since 1453. New York: New York University Press, 2000.

13

1 George Finlay, The History of the Greek Revolution Volume 1I (Edinburgh: William Blackwood &
Sons, 1861. Facsimile printed by Elibron Classics, 2005), 173. Ibid., 2-3.
2 Ibid., 147.
3 Ibid., 23-25.
4 For a comparison of Euro-centrism between primary and secondary sources on the execution of
Patriarch Gregorios, see George Finlay, The History of the Greek Revolution Volume 1 (Edinburgh:
William Blackwood & Sons, 1861. Facsimile printed by Elibron Classics, 2005), 226-233 and Misha
Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-2011 (New York: Penguin
Books, 2012), 28.
5 William St Clair, That Greece Might Still Be Free (Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2008) 37-40.
6 Finlay, The History of the Greek Revolution Volume I, 235.
7 Mark Mazower, The Balkans (New York: Random House, 2000) 14-15.
8 Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (New York: Routledge,
2008) 67-83.
9 For greater background on secular Russian attitude towards Philhellenism, see Theophilus Prousis,
Russian Society and the Greek Revolution (DeKalb, I.L.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994)
84-104. For a primary account of political intervention against such movements, see Finlay, The
History of the Greek Revolution Volume II, 160-161.
10 Finlay, The History of the Greek Revolution Volume II, 284-285.
11 L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York: New York University Press, 2000) 269-282.
12 Finlay, The History of the Greek Revolution Volume II, 265-268.
13 Andre Gerolymatos, The Balkan Wars (New York: Basic Books, 2002) 90-91.
14 Charles and Barbara Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920 (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 2000) 69.
15 For criticism of Otto's continued denial of the Greek population's wishes, see Finlay, The History of

the Greek Revolution Volume II, 300-308. For details concerning Emperor Alexander's plans for
Greece during the war, see Ibid., 163-168.
16 David Brewer, The Greek War of Independence (Woodstock, N.Y.: The Overlook Press, 2001) 247257.
17 Ibid., 263.
18 For differences in description of Otto's government, see Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan
National States, 1804-1920, 69-83 and Finlay, The History of the Greek Revolution Volume II, 362380.
19 Finlay, The History of the Greek Revolution Volume II, 99-101.
20 Ibid., 322.
21 Ibid., 337-342.
22 Finlay, The History of the Greek Revolution Volume I, 229.
23 Finlay, The History of the Greek Revolution Volume II, 154-158.

You might also like