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Cause No.

2014-CI-112 99
ELIA MENDOZA and ROSA ROSALES,
Individually and as members of the League
of United Latin American Citizens
(LULAC),
Plaintiffs,

v.

EDUARDO LAGUERRE, MAGDALENA


RIVERA, RALINA CARDONA,

ENRIQUE RICK DOVALINA,

BALDOMERO GARZA, RAY MANCERA


and other un-named Defendants, Jointly

and Severally,

Defendants.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

131ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS

PLAINTIFFS (AMENDED) MEMORANDUM OF LAW and ARGUMENTS to


DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS, SPECIAL APPEARANCE and
MOTION TO DISSOLVE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
I. MOTION TO DISMISS
The Defendants have waived and abandoned their Motion to Dismiss not only in their
Memorandum of Law to the Court but also as a matter of law. Defendants, by their continued
frivolous filing of Motions and requesting from the Court further delay to submit a Memorandum
have allowed more than 45 days to pass since they filed their Motion to Dismiss therefore is
Denied as a matter of law. See below, Rule 91a.3(c) T.R.C.P.
Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on March 12, 2015. The 45 day period ended
on April 26, 2015. Therefore pursuant to Rule 91a.3(c) and due solely to the Defendants own
delay the Motion is Denied as a matter of law.
Even if it were somehow possible to circumvent Rule 91a.3(c) Defendants arguments
that this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs civil conspiracy claims and tortious interference are also
wrong as a matter of law. Plaintiffs response to Defendants Motion is attached hereto and fully
incorporated in this memorandum.
Defendants reliance on Rule 65 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure for Dismissal are
misplaced as the Amended Complaints by Plaintiffs did not change or affect Plaintiffs claims of
civil conspiracy and tortious interference by defendants, therefore does not apply. The
defendants have not argued nor could they argue that the claims for which they now complain
were not served on them in August and September 2014 together with the same claims in the
Second, Third and Fourth Amended Complaints. The business records affidavits of service on
Defendants is a part of the record in this case. Defendants cannot now attempt to offer any
evidence in the contrary. See, Rule 91a.6 below. The Motion to Dismiss, Defendants wish to
advance is governed by Rule 91a.3(a) below.
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RULE 91a. DISMISSAL OF BASELESS CAUSES OF ACTION


91a.1 Motion and Grounds. Except in a case brought under the Family Code or a case governed
by Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, a party may move to dismiss
a cause of action on the grounds that it has no basis in law or fact. A cause of action has no
basis in law if the allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from
them do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought. A cause of action has no basis in fact
if no reasonable person could believe the facts pleaded.
91a.2 Contents of Motion. A motion to dismiss must state that it is made pursuant to this rule,
must identify each cause of action to which it is addressed, and must state specifically the
reasons the cause of action has no basis in law, no basis in fact, or both.
91a.3 Time for Motion and Ruling. A motion to dismiss must be:
(a) filed within 60 days after the first pleading containing the challenged cause of action
is served on the movant;
(b) filed at least 21 days before the motion is heard; and
(c) granted or denied within 45 days after the motion is filed.
91a.4 Time for Response. Any response to the motion must be filed no later than 7 days before
the date of the hearing.
91a.5 Effect of Nonsuit or Amendment; Withdrawal of Motion.
(a) The court may not rule on a motion to dismiss if, at least 3 days before the date of
the hearing, the respondent files a nonsuit of the challenged cause of action, or the
movant files a withdrawal of the motion.
(b) If the respondent amends the challenged cause of action at least 3 days before the date
of the hearing, the movant may, before the date of the hearing, file a withdrawal of
the motion or an amended motion directed to the amended cause of action.
(c) Except by agreement of the parties, the court must rule on a motion unless it has been
withdrawn or the cause of action has been nonsuited in accordance with (a) or (b).
In ruling on the motion, the court must not consider a nonsuit or amendment not filed
as permitted by paragraphs (a) or (b).
(d) An amended motion filed in accordance with (b) restarts the time periods in this rule.
91a.6 Hearing; No Evidence Considered. Each party is entitled to at least 14 days notice of
the hearing on the motion to dismiss. The court may, but is not required to, conduct an oral
hearing on the motion. Except as required by 91a.7, the court may not consider evidence in
ruling on the motion and must decide the motion based solely on the pleading of the cause
of action, together with any pleading exhibits permitted by Rule 59.
91a.7 Award of Costs and Attorney Fees Required. Except in an action by or against a
governmental entity or a public official acting in his or her official capacity or under color
of law, the court must award the prevailing party on the motion all costs and reasonable and
necessary attorney fees incurred with respect to the challenged cause of action in the trial
court. The court must consider evidence regarding costs and fees in determining the award.
Pleading further, the law of the case has been established in Defendant Baldomero
Garzas (now acting as attorney for remaining Defendants) Plea to the Jurisdiction, wherein
Garza advanced the same arguments in that Plaintiffs pleadings did not establish civil conspiracy
and tortious interference and must be dismissed as a matter of law. Garza filed his pleadings on
11/24/2014, five days after the defendants herein filed their Plea to the Jurisdiction and yet never
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set for hearing by Garza. After a full hearing on these issues presented, as presented by Garza,
the Honorable Judge Barbara Nellemoe, Denied defendant Garzas plea to the jurisdiction and
Ordered that jurisdiction on these issues remain in the 131st District Court of Bexar County,
Texas. See, attached Motion by Garza and Order.
Garzas frivolous attempt in arguing these same claims in a Motion to Dismiss for the
remaining defendants cannot be accepted or allowed by this court and should be considered
sanction able conduct.
Wherefore premises Considered, Defendants Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs civil
conspiracy and tortious interference claims is Denied as a matter of law.
Court Must Award Attorney Fees
Plaintiffs further assert that pursuant to Rule 91a.7 the Court is required to take evidence
and award attorney fees to the Plaintiffs attorney for defense of this Motion.
II. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
The affidavits, pleadings and memorandum filed in this case and for this Motion establish
that;
1. At least part of the conspiracy alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint occurred here in Bexar
County, Texas.
2. The law of the case, as argued above, established that the complaint and affidavits
established sufficient facts to deny Defendants Garza Plea to the Jurisdiction as to the
Civil Conspiracy and Tortious Interference claims and his Motion to Transfer Venue.
3. The Defendants have completely failed to deny the minimum contact requirements in
their evidence regarding personal jurisdiction in their Special Appearance. This is the
threshold issue on the jurisdiction of a Texas Court. See ,Rule 120a 3 of T.R.C.P. This is
fatal to the Defendants Special appearance as the Rule 120a states below.
4. The Defendants subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the Texas courts by conspiring
together to sue a Texas not-for profit corporation and caused it harm.
RULE 120a. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Rules 121, 122 and 123, a special appearance may be
made by any party either in person or by attorney for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person or property of the defendant on the ground that such
party or property is not amenable to process issued by the courts of this State. [Emphasis added]
A special appearance may be made as to an entire proceeding or as to any severable claim
involved therein. Such special appearance shall be made by sworn motion filed prior to motion to
transfer venue or any other plea, pleading or motion; provided however, that a motion to
transfer venue and any other plea, pleading, or motion may be contained in the same
instrument or filed subsequent thereto without waiver of such special appearance; and may
be amended to cure defects. The issuance of process for witnesses, the taking of depositions,
the serving of requests for admissions, and the use of discovery processes, shall not
constitute a waiver of such special appearance. Every appearance, prior to judgment, not in
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compliance with this rule is a general appearance.


2. Any motion to challenge the jurisdiction provided for herein shall be heard and determined
before a motion to transfer venue or any other plea or pleading may be heard. No
determination of any issue of fact in connection with the objection to jurisdiction is a
determination of the merits of the case or any aspect thereof.
3. The court shall determine the special appearance on the basis of the pleadings, any
stipulations made by and between the parties, such affidavits and attachments as may be filed
by the parties, the results of discovery processes, and any oral testimony. The affidavits, if
any, shall be served at least seven days before the hearing, shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth specific facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify. Should it appear from the affidavits of a
party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to
justify his opposition, the court may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or
depositions to be taken or discovery to be
had or may make such other order as is just. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at
any time that any of such affidavits are presented in violation of Rule 13, the court shall impose
sanctions in accordance with that rule.
4. If the court sustains the objection to jurisdiction, an appropriate order shall be entered. If the
objection to jurisdiction is overruled, the objecting party may thereafter appear generally for
any purpose. Any such special appearance or such general appearance shall not be deemed
a waiver of the objection to jurisdiction when the objecting party or subject matter is not
amenable to process issued by the courts of this State.
Defendnts Offer No Evidence to Negate minimal Contacts
The Defendants only evidence, by way of affidavit, argue only that they are not residents
of Texas and allege they do not have the funds to defend themselves in Texas and finally that the
acts plaintiffs complain of occurred in New York City. The defendants arguments are more in
line to a Motion to Transfer Venue or a Forum non Convenience plea. As argued above, the law
of the case established proper venue is in the 131st district court of Bexar County. Defendants
failure to argue or claim that the defendants are not amenable to process by the Texas Courts is
fatal to their motion and must be denied, as well as defendants failure to submit evidence, [that]
shall set forth specific facts as would be admissible in evidence to negate the presumption of
minimum contacts. See, Rule 120a.3, id.
The defendants no minimum contacts argument comes in the boiler plate language in
their Special Appearance and through their Memorandum. This is not evidence as would be
admissible in evidence. It is pure hearsay. As there is no evidence to negate minimum contacts
The Special Appearance should be denied.
In addition, the plaintiffs pleadings and affidavit set forth, that defendants contacts with
Texas spans over many years, that defendants were not here on official business for LULAC but
here on personal political campaigns, that they purposely availed themselves to Texas
jurisdiction by coming to Texas for personal political gain and political funding. [affidavit]

A.

Defendants Eduardo LaGuerre, Ralina Cardona, Aureo Cardona and Rey


Mancera do not reside in Bexar County, Texas.

In their memorandum of law and arguments relating to their special appearance,


Defendants attempt, in part to mislead the court. They state,
"...Eduardo LaGuerre, Ralina Cardona and Aureo Cardona reside in New York State.
Ray Mancera resides in El Paso, Texas." (emphasis added)
Defendant BALDOMERO GARZA is not mentioned as one of the Defendants on whose
behalf the special appearance is pursued. However, just as Defendant MANCERA, Defendant
GARZA is also a resident of the State of Texas. As such, any special appearance on behalf of
Defendants MANCERA and GARZA are disingenuous, at best.
A party may challenge a court's jurisdiction over that person on the ground that such
party is not amenable to process issued by the courts of this State. See, Rule 120a.1., Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure. By their own admission, Defendants MANCERA and GARZA are
residents of the State of Texas, and are thus amenable to process issued by the courts of Texas.
Simply stated, as residents of Texas, Defendants may not challenge that they do not come within
the provisions of the Texas long-arm statute. McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1965);
Kawaski Steel Corp. v. Middleton, 699 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. 1985). Any special appearance as to
Defendants MANCERA and GARZA must be denied. In fact, Plaintiffs would assert that any
special appearance by those parties is brought in bad faith, and is frivolous, both in fact and in
law. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that the Court sanction Defendants MANCERA and
GARZA for filing a baseless pleading, and bringing before the Court claims which have no
business before the Court.
To the extent Defendant MANCERA may take the position that he intended to pursue a
motion to transfer venue to the county of his Texas residence, Plaintiffs would show that
Defendant GARZA has pursued a motion to transfer venue before the Court. Defendant
GARZA alleged in that motion that the proper county for venue in this matter was the county of
his Texas residence. In GARZAs Motion, Defendant MANCERA filed an affidavit in support
of GARZA motion o transfer to Ft. Bend County. GARZAs motion to transfer venue was
previously denied by the Honorable Barbara Nellermoe, Senior District Judge on January 23,
2015.
In pursuing a motion to transfer venue, Defendant MANCERA would of necessity have
to rely on the same arguments raised by Defendant GARZA when he pursued his motion to
transfer venue and used MANCERAs affidavit to pursue a transfer to Ft. Bend County. As he
sets out in the subject pleading, Defendant MANCERA is represented by Mr. Garza who is the
Defendant GARZA whose motion to transfer venue was denied by Judge Nellermoe. Any claim
by Defendant MANCERA that he has pursued his baseless special appearance believing that he
intended to pursue a motion to transfer venue is further evidence of his attempts to mislead this
Court. Both Defendant MANCERA and Defendant GARZA are fully aware of the Court's prior
order denying Defendant GARZA's motion to transfer venue. Accordingly, Defendant
MANCERA's, and to the extend he is pursuing a special appearance, Defendant GARZA's
special appearance should be in all things denied.
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B.

Defendants LaGuerre, Ralina Cardona and Aureo Cardona's special


appearance should be denied

A Texas court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant under the
Texas long-arm statute, which extends personal jurisdiction as far as the due process protections
in the United States Constitution permit See, Stull v. LaPlaint, 411 S.W.3d 129, 133 (Tex. App,
[Dallas], 2013). Defendants LAGUERRE, RALINA CARDONA and AUREO CARCONA
contend that as nonresident defendants, they do not have sufficient minimum contacts with the
State of Texas such as not to offend the due process protections of the United States
Constitution. See, Defendants' Memorandum of Law and Arguments at Page 10. They make no
further argument nor contention that the due process protections of the United States
Constitution are otherwise offended.
A defendant's contacts with a forum state can give rise to either specific or general
jurisdiction under the Texas long arm statute. BMC Software Belguium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83
S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002). "Specific jurisdiction is established if the defendant's alleged
liability arises from or is related to an activity conducted within the forum...In contrast, general
jurisdiction is present when a defendant's contacts in a forum are continuous and systematic so
that the forum may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant even if the cause of action
did not arise from or relate to activities conducted within the forum state. BMC Software
Belgium, N.V. v. Marchard, 83 S.W.rd 789, 796; Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance, Ltd. v.
English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 226-228, Stull v. LaPlant, 411 S.W.3d at 134.
Nonetheless, the exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper when the nonresident defendant's
contacts proximately result from actions of the nonresident defendant which create a substantial
connection with the forum state. Such connection should not be "random", "fortuitous" or
"attenuated". Guardian Royal Exhange Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815
S.W.2d at 226-227.
The Defendants EDUARDO LAGUERRE, RALINA CARDONA, AUREO CARDONA,
RAY MANCERA, and others not before the Court, individually, together and with others
conspired to interfere with the LULAC national elections at the LULAC National Convention
which were to be held on July 12, 2014 in New York City, New York. The conspiracy to
interfere with the elections was borne through and at various meetings held by the Defendants
and others. Said meetings occurred, in part, in San Antonio, Texas and at other places in the
State of Texas. One of those San Antonio meetings occurred in January 2014 when the
Defendant RALINA CARDONA, AUREO CARDONA, GARZA and others met to discuss the
candidate they would support and actions they planned to take through their conspiracy.
Thereafter the Defendants, whether one or more met, in Houston, Texas in June 2014 in
furtherance of the conspiracy. At their meetings, Defendants discussed and planned their actions
to be carried out up to and leading up to the National Convention as well as the actions they
would carry out at the National Convention and thereafter.
The Defendants' conspiracy was born in Texas. Plaintiffs allege in their petitions that the
Defendants RALINA CARDONA, AUREO CARDONA, RAY MANCERA and GARZA met to
plan what actions they would carry out up to and leading to the LULAC National Convention as
well as the actions they would carry out at the LULAC National Convention. Defendants
EDUARDO LAGUERRE, RALINA CARDONA RAY MANCERA and AUREO CARDONA
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admit by their own pleadings that they supported a candidate for national office which the
Plaintiffs did not support.
Defendants further admit that they met as early as September 2013 to discuss who they
would support for National Office in LULAC. Thereafter, they had further discussion of that
issue at a "National Board Meeting in Washington, DC in October 2013" at which the "historic
rift and division between the two major power factions with Texas LULAC was raging."
Thereafter, the Defendants themselves describe meetings held in San Antonio, Texas in
November 2013; meetings attended by Defendant AUREO CARDONA, "his daughter,
[Defendant] RALINA CARDONA...and Elsie Valdez, the leader of Puerto Rico LULAC...to
discuss the future leadership of LULAC." (emphasis added). On the second day of the trip to
San Antonio, Texas, Defendant BALDOMERO GARZA drove from Houston, Texas to meet
with his co-conspirators. Thereafter, the Defendants continued their conspiracy when they met
in Houston, Texas in June 2014 prior to the LULAC National Convention.
The Defendants EDUARDO LAGUERRE, RALINA CARDONA, RAY MANCERA,
BALDOMERO GARZA and AUREO CARDONA admit they obtained an Ex Parte Temporary
Restraining Order from a New York court on the Friday before the Saturday 2014 LULAC
National Convention Elections. As part and parcel of their conspiracy, the Defendants obtained
the Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order from a New York court on Friday, July 11, 2014.
They did not notify the Plaintiffs nor the parties they sought to enjoin of their intention to obtain
the Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order irrespective of the fact that the LULAC National
Convention was on-going during the entire week leading up to their obtaining the Ex Parte
Temporary Restraining Order, and further irrespective of the fact that almost two thousand
(2,000) LULAC members, including the Plaintiffs had traveled to the LULAC National
Convention to participate in the elections. Plaintiffs have alleged that the Ex Parte Temporary
Restraining Order obtained was a sham intended to interfere with the election of National
Officers at the LULAC National Convention.
After interfering with the LULAC National Convention and elections through their sham
temporary restraining order, the Defendants proceeded to assert the provisions of the LULAC
Constitution, Bylaws and Protocol. The Ex Parte Temporary Restraining order not only enjoined
National President Margaret Moran and National Legal Advisor Manuel G. Escobar, Jr. from
taking actions in connection with the elections, it also enjoined LULAC from taking any
necessary actions relating to the rules, elections or credentialing of delegates to the National
Convention. Thereafter, continuing their conspiracy, the Defendants proceeded to conduct an
illegitimate election pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution, Bylaws and Protocol of this
Texas Corporation. The Constitution, Bylaws and Protocol of LULAC having been adopted in
accordance with the laws of the State of Texas. Defendants continue to assert that they availed
themselves of the same Constitution, Bylaws and Protocol. All having the power and authority
granted by Texas law.
The Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order was obtained by Defendants EDUARDO
LAGUERRE, AURELIO CARDONA and BALDOMERO GARZA, all of whom were involved
in a civil conspiracy with Defendants RALINA CARDONA, RAY MANCERA and others to
interfere with and tortuously deny the Plaintiffs and others similarly situated, the right to vote for
candidates of their choice. Plaintiffs would show that there are ample pleadings to support their
allegations that Defendants engaged in a civil conspiracy. Interestingly, Defendants do not
contend that they did not engage in discussions and formed a group whose sole purpose was to
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take control of LULAC. Instead, Defendants contend that they formed a "coalition" to carry out
their goal of taking control of LULAC.
Contrary to their assertions, Defendants have availed themselves of Texas law. The very
basis of their illegitimate election is grounded in Texas law. They assert that all of their actions
are clothed in a constitution and bylaws whose very existence derives from Texas law. In
addition, their actions were purposeful. They were not a mistake nor without purpose. Those
actions derived from their intent to take control of LULAC through a process based entirely on
Texas law. How they can now claim otherwise is beyond logic.
Defendants' actions establish both this Court's specific and general jurisdiction. First, and
has been argued above, Defendants' conduct in Texas was both purposeful and directed. The
conspiracy at issue was born in Texas, and the Defendants took additional actions in furtherance
of the conspiracy within the State of Texas. The Defendants' activities were not "random",
"fortuitous" or "attenuated". The activities were part and parcel of a plan. A plan having total
relation to Texas through a lawfully existing Texas corporation. Defendants' conduct establishes
a "substantial connection" between the nonresident Defendants and Texas arising from action or
conduct of the nonresident Defendants purposefully directed at Texas. As the Courts have held,
"[s]o long as it creates a 'substantial connection' with the forum, even a single act can support
jurisdiction." Guardian Roay Exchange Assurance, Ltd v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815
S.W.2d at 230, citing, Burger King Corp v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 464, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85
L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). (emphasis added). Accordingly, this Court has specific jurisdiction over
the nonresident Defendants.
Second, this Court has general jurisdiction over the Defendants as their activities
conducted in Texas were not minor nor insignificant. The conduct of the nonresident Defendants
was substantial. The conduct formed the very backbone of a conspiracy which was to have had
its logical conclusion with the illegitimate elections conducted by the Defendants. Surely the
Defendants reasonably anticipated that their conduct was substantial, and more than isolated
events. The activities of the nonresident Defendants in relation to Texas were continuous and
systematic such that this Court may assert general jurisdiction.
In addition, not only was the Defendants frivolous Ex Parte Restraining Order dissolved
when their case was transferred to the Federal District Court in the Southern District of
Manhattan, the federal Court has placed LaGuerres case for dismissal and ordered that
arguments be briefed under Texas law. Defendant GARZA as attorney for Defendant LaGuerre
in Manhattan was admonished by the Court twice, to re-plead and use Texas law.
C.

Defendants did not attend any meetings in Texas or otherwise avail


themselves of Texas law on behalf of LULAC

The nonresident Defendants' reliance on the fiduciary-shield doctrine is totally misplaced.


The nonresident Defendants did not take any actions in furtherance of their conspiracy on behalf
of their employer or in connection with their service as officers in LULAC. None of the
Defendants worked for LULAC nor were they in Texas on behalf of or members of LULAC,
nor on official LULAC business, nor were they required to be in Texas over the many years they
have been voluntary members of LULAC. To state otherwise would be a complete fabrication,
and thus their argument that they are LULAC employees fails.
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Of the nonresident Defendants before the Court, only Defendant RALINA CARDONA
served as a corporate officer of LULAC. Defendant RALINA CARDONA and the other
nonresident Defendants did not attend meetings in furtherance of their conspiracy with their coconspirators at which they planned and carried out their illegitimate attempt to take control of
LULAC in connection with any duty or obligation owed the corporation. Defendant CARDONA
attendance at the meetings in issue had nothing to do with her service as a corporate officer of
LULAC. The meetings were private in every regard. The meetings of the conspirators were not
called by LULAC. Further to the extent any of the meetings coincided with any meetings of a
LULAC subunit such as Texas LULAC or a local LULAC district, Defendant CARDONA was
not a part of those events. She attended on her own, and thereafter met in furtherance of the
conspiracy with her co-conspirators. Those latter meetings had noting to do with any LULAC
meeting, and everything to do with carrying out activities leading to the illegitimate elections
Defendants intended to conduct. Accordingly, the nonresident Defendants contention that they
are shielded by the fiduciary-shield doctrine fails.
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DENY TRO IS MOOT
The only Motion before the Court regarding a TRO is a moot TRO issued by Judge Larry
Noll on July 18 and 31, 2014. This fact was established at the hearing before this court on April
12, 2015. The live Order in this case is a Temporary Injunction agreed to by attorney / defendant
Garza and against all defendants who failed to appear after proper Notice. See, attached
affidavits of service and email notice of hearings. There is also a legally binding and enforceable
Rule 11 Agreement allowing the Plaintiffs to proceed wih their hearing on the Temporary
Injunction when defendants set their hearing on Special appearance.
The defendants attempt to argue for the dissolution of the Temporary Injunction in their
memorandum does not put the issue properly before the Court. The defendants have had ample
time to amend their Motion and have failed to do so. The defendants did file a Motion arguing
against a new hearing on a Temporary Injunction that should be Denied on the basis that
defendants had notice of the original hearing on the Temporary Injunction and chose not to
appear. Attorney / defendant Garza together with defendant Rivera were represented by counsel
who entered into an Agreed Temporary Injunction binding all the defendants on August 14,
2014. This Order was signed by the Honorable Judge Gloria Saldana. The Temporary
Injunction hearing was set for a full evidentiary hearing by Plaintiffs on September 18, 2014 and
was reset to September 29, 2014. The parties, on September 17, 2014 then entered into a legally
binding and enforceable Rule 11 Agreement that all terms of the Temporary Restraining Order
would remain in full force and effect until such time as a Special Appearance would be heard by
the Court on defendants Special Appearance. [attach Rule 11] The September 29, 2014 hearing
was cancelled by agreement and a second Rule 11 agreement was signed. No hearing was
scheduled by anyone until April 2015 (almost seven months later). All the defendants were
noticed with respect to this Temporary Injunction and the Rule 11 Agreement. Thereafter, on
September 26, 2015, an additional Rule 11 Agreement was entered into by attorney for attorney
/defendant Garza cancelling its hearing on Special Appearance and Temporary Injunction until
such time as mediation could take place in this case. [attach Rule 11] Again, the parties agreed
to continue the terms of the Temporary Restraining Order as a binding and enforceable
agreement.
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For all the above, the court should continue with the hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for
Temporary Injunction as set out in the Rule 11 Agreements.
STANDARD FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
Standard for Temporary injunction: A temporary injunctions purpose is to preserve the
status quo of the litigations subject matter pending a trial on the merits. Butnaru v. Ford Motor
Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex.2002). To obtain a temporary injunction, the applicant must
plead and prove three specific elements: (1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a
probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the
interim. Id. Additionally, a request for injunctive relief invokes a courts equity jurisdiction.
As is evident, the Legislature has specifically called upon the courts to exercise their equitable
powers to resolve election code violations. And when exercising such jurisdiction, a court must,
among other things, balance competing equities.
The Plaintiffs incorporate the Fourth Amended complaint as if fully reiterated herein.
As did the three prior complaints, Plaintiffs plead for both the Ex Parte Temporary Restraining
Order and Temporary Injunction starting at paragraph 44.
Request for Temporary Restraining Order and Temporary Injunction
The Plaintiffs are entitled to a hearing on their Motion for temporary injuction pursuant to
the Rule 11 agreements argued above. In addition the Plaintiffs pleadings have properly
requested such hearing as outline below in Plaintiffs Fourth Amended Petitions and prior
petitions. The numbered paragraphs coincide with the petition.
44.
The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 43 are incorporated by reference
as if fully set forth herein.
45.
Plaintiffs request the Court to dispense with the issuance of a bond, and the
Plaintiffs request that Defendants, the LULAC officers, agents, employees, attorneys,
corporations, or companies under the control of Defendants, and all other persons in active
concert and/or participation with Defendants be temporarily restrained immediately, without
hearing, and after notice and hearing be temporarily enjoined, pending the further order of the
Court from:
a.
acting as officers or agents of LULAC in offices to which they believe they were
elected on July 12, 2014.
b.
failing to abide by the LULAC Constitution, By-laws and Protocol, specifically
Article VIII, Section 6 Paragraph b.
Plaintiffs further request an order of the Court that all LULAC national officers holding
office prior to July 12, 2014 will remain status quo pursuant to the LULAC Constitution until
further order of the Court.
The defendants were served with the original order, the first extension of that order and
the last agreed order hearing attended only by defendants Garza and Rivera, and the Rule 11
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agreements. As the attorney for the defendants in this case together with lead counsel for
LaGuerre in the New York case, attorney Defendant GARZA is aware of all pleadings, Orders,
Rule 11 agreements and all Memorandum in both the Texas and New York case. Claiming he is
unaware of any of these would be incompetence and could subject GARZA to disciplinary
actions by his own clients.
The pleadings together with supporting affidavits and testimony at this hearing, establish
all the elements for a Temporary Injunction and should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

______________________________
Luis Roberto Vera, Jr.
1325 Riverview Towers
111 Soledad
San Antonio, Texas 78205-2260
210-225-3300 office
lrvlaw@sbcglobal.net
Attorney for Plaintiffs Mendoza, Rosales
And LULAC
ATTACHMENTS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This certifies that a copy of the foregoing was delivered to Defendants attorney
Baldomero Garza by electronic mail on this 4th day of May 2015.

________________________________
Luis Roberto Vera, Jr.

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