IN THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT

_______________________________________________________________________
STATE OF MISSOURI EX REL.
GOTNEWS, LLC AND
CHARLES C. JOHNSON,

)
) Supreme Court Case No. ___________
)
) Missouri Court of Appeals E.D. ) Case No. ED102306
Relators,
)
) St. Louis County Circuit Court
) Case No. 14SL-JU00861
) (Family/Juvenile Court)
vs.
)
)
HON. ELLEN SIWAK,
)
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE, DIVISION 11, )
MISSOURI CIRCUIT COURT,
)
TWENTY-FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
)
COUNTY OF ST. LOUIS,
)
)
Respondent.
)
________________________________________________________________________
PETITION AND SUGGESTIONS IN SUPPORT
OF A WRIT OF PROHIBITION AND/OR MANDAMUS
________________________________________________________________________
John C. Burns, #66462
David Nowakowski #66481
The Burns Law Firm, LLC
1717 Park Avenue
St. Louis, Missouri 63104
314-932-2356- Telephone
314-932-2171- Facsimile
john@burns-law-firm.com
david@burns-law-firm.com
Attorneys for Relators
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COME NOW Relators GotNews, LLC (GotNews.Com), a California limited

liability company and owner of GotNews.Com, an Internet-based newspaper, and Charles
C. Johnson (Johnson), a professional journalist and president of GotNews.Com, and for
their Petition and suggestions in support of a writ of prohibition and/or mandamus, state:

RELIEF SOUGHT
Relators hereby seek preliminary and permanent writs of prohibition and/or
mandamus to vacate Respondents September 9, 2014 Order denying Relators request
for Michael Brown Jr.s complete juvenile records, and to compel Respondent to release
the complete juvenile records of Michael Brown Jr., date of birth May 20, 1996, and any
and all further relief deemed just and proper by This Court.

INTRODUCTION
This Court has previously held in a landmark public access to information case
that there is a presumptive right of access to court records, and that an abuse of discretion
is present when trial court orders do not articulate specific reasons for the closure of
records. Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. Transit Casualty Co., 43 S.W.3d 293, 300 (Mo. banc
2001). Although the rule imposes a presumption that records are open to the pubic, there
is an express exception for records that are confidential pursuant to court order.
Nevertheless, the presumption of openness is intended to inform the decision of whether
to seal the records in the first place, or to unseal the records if the justification for
sealing the records abates. The policy supporting the presumption as reflected in the
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rule merits repeating: Justice is best served when it is done within full view of those to
whom all courts are responsible the public. On the basis of that policy, and considering
the substantial authority from other courts this Court affirms, subject to the exceptions
of Court Operating Rule 2, that there is a presumption in favor of the publics right of
access to court records and that the presumption cannot be overcome absent a
compelling justification that the records should be closed. Id., at 301. (collecting cases)
(emphasis added). There are important exceptions that limit the presumption of open
records when sufficiently important interests outweigh the publics right of access
Where there are higher interests favoring nondisclosure, courts and the legislature have
routinely seen fit to close some public records In order to close court or other public
records, however, a court in its order must identify specific and tangible threats to
important values in order to override the importance of the public right of access
Vague or uncertain threats claimed by one party normally would not justify closure. Id.,
at 302. (emphasis added).
In the present case, Respondent failed to present any justification, let alone a
compelling justification for denying Relators request for Michael Browns juvenile
records. Even if Michael Browns juvenile records were once properly withheld from the
Public while he lived, the justification for sealing his records abate[d] upon his death.
Relators agree with This Court that justice is indeed best served when it is done within
full view of those to whom all courts are responsible - the Public. For this reason,
Respondent must be compelled to turn over Michael Browns juvenile records, redacting
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the records as necessary to protect the identities of any living children.

The privacy protections afforded to juveniles in V.A.M.S. Chapter 211 are

exclusive, non-transferable privileges, which exist solely to protect living juveniles from
having their records used against them in civil or criminal prosecutions, to promote a
candid and effective relationship between the juvenile and juvenile officer, and to prevent
the records from needlessly stunting the juveniles prospects of becoming a productive
member of society. The privilege is not absolute, and a variety of state and private
interests can remove the privilege. The privilege can also be voluntarily waived.
Michael Brown, Jr. can never be prosecuted in any court of law. He cannot be
subject to civil suit. He cannot speak with his juvenile officer. He can never be
rehabilitated. He will never go to technical school or apply for a job. His future prospects
were eliminated. In short, the purpose of the statutory privacy protections is completely
impracticable and utterly moot. But it is not simply that the purpose of the statute cannot
ever be achieved. The statute is inapplicable to the juvenile records of deceased adults
who were for a discrete period during their lifetimes under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court.
Disclosing Michael Browns records poses no risk to the other living juveniles,
considered as a vague group in the abstract. To the extent any specific children could be
harmed, the juvenile court could easily review the records in-camera, and redact as
necessary. However, Respondent did not even attempt to do this. Respondent summarily
denied Relators request for Browns records without any explanation at all.
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It is hard to imagine what interest Respondent could possibly be defending or

advancing through denying Relators request for the Brown records - a request made on
behalf of the Public. The juvenile court is not now and never was intended to referee the
legacies of deceased individuals. Nor is the juvenile court permitted to arbitrarily censor
information from the public, tossing it down the memory hole.
On the contrary, upon Michael Browns death, the juvenile courts role
transformed from a judicial function to that of a ministerial or administrative capacity.
Because judicial entities when operating in an administrative capacity, are public
governmental bod[ies] under V.A.M.S. Section 610.010, and because under V.A.M.S.
Section 610.011.2 all public records of public governmental bodies shall be open to the
public for public inspection and copying, the records of the deceased Michael Brown are
subject to the Missouri Sunshine Law, Chapter 610, R.S.Mo. Accordingly, Respondent
must be compelled to turn over the records to Relators.
V.A.M.S. Section 211.321 requires those requesting the records to demonstrate a
legitimate interest in the records. However, the records revert to public records, as there
exists no reason under Missouri Law to keep them secret and out of the reach of the
Public. Thus, any interest is legitimate. Even were a showing of a legitimate interest
still somehow required, there presently exist real and compelling interests which display
a worthy and legitimate need for information: such as when the very subject of the
juvenile records was killed by a state actor under suspicious circumstances, when a whole
region erupts in riots leveling a city as a result, and when the President of the United
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States, US Attorney General, national leaders, and indeed the entire nation, have
demanded answers.1 Indeed, its hard to imagine any more legitimate interest than
Relators Public Interest. Because the records are public records, and because Respondent
had no discretion to deny Relators request for such records, there is no possible reason
which could overcome the Common Law Presumption of the openness of records.
Prohibition is appropriate in this instance because This Court has previously held
it to be an appropriate remedy where there exists a clear excess of jurisdiction or abuse of
discretion such that the lower court lacks the power to act as contemplated, or where
there is no adequate remedy by appeal. In the present case, Respondent lacked any
discretion to withhold the Brown records from Relators. Whats more, because there was
no final judgment, appeal was not possible and Prohibition is an appropriate remedy.
Alternatively, Mandamus is also appropriate for similar reasons. When a court
undertakes a non-discretionary act contrary to the directions of the law and was without
jurisdiction to do the non-discretionary act, mandamus is the proper remedy. State ex rel.
M.B. v. Brown, 532 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). [Mandamus will issue] where
the administrative board (or court) has acted unlawfully or wholly outside its jurisdiction,
and also where it has abused whatever discretion may have been vested in it. State ex

1 A Google

search for news articles using the keyword Ferguson returns 14,500,000 results.
(Last accessed April 29, 2015). According to Google Trends (www.google.com/trends), Googles
search analysis site, Ferguson was the 8th most searched topic in all of 2014. Google uses a
scale of 1-100 to judge interest in a topic, with 100 representing maximum interest. Interest in
Ferguson easily achieved a rating of 100. Dozens of news institutes and outlets included it
among the top 10 stories of 2014.
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rel. Keystone Laundry & Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. McDonnell, 426 S.W.2d 11, 14 (Mo.
1968). [E]xtraordinary writs are issued when necessary to prevent an excess of
jurisdiction, as well as to prevent or stop action where no jurisdiction exists. State ex rel.
Knight Oil Co. v. Vardeman, 409 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Mo. 1966). Mandamus is appropriate
to compel the commission of ministerial acts. State ex rel. R. Newton McDowell, Inc. v.
Smith, 67 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. 1933). And the discretion of the court with regard to the
issuance of the writ is sometimes influenced by the "public importance" of the matter.
State ex rel. Keystone Laundry & Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. McDonnell, 426 S.W.2d at 15.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 9, 2014, Michael Brown, Jr., an unarmed, 64 tall, 300 pound, 18
year-old African-American adult male was shot by Ferguson, Missouri Police Officer
Darren Wilson. Immediately following the shooting, the Saint Louis Region exploded in
protests, riots, looting, widespread property damage, physical violence, and chaos. The
chaos that followed the shooting pushed the narrative to become one of the biggest
news stories of 2014, not only in the United States, but worldwide.
The momentum of the issue was primarily fueled by the assertion of several
supposed witnesses, who claimed not only that Brown was unarmed, but that he had been
attempting to surrender at the time he was shot by Wilson. The issue was further fueled
by local and national political and social leaders who seized upon the shooting as the
quintessential example of racial inequality in the American Justice System. Browns
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death has become a rallying cry and casus belli for those who believe the American
Justice System is irredeemably racist, and a movement, the Mike Brown Movement for
lack of a better name for it, thriving on the outrage at Browns death, has coalesced, with
Ferguson, Missouri as ground zero.
Brown himself has become a martyr. It is that martyr status that serves as the
foundation for the entire movement. Scores of media outlets have assisted the Mike
Brown Movement, leveraging the purported legitimacy of the anger at Browns death,
the righteous moral indignation, through human interest pieces, which have painted a
particular popular portrait of Brown as a fun-loving, poetic, up-and-coming young man,
with a bright future and a tranquil past. The pieces have been extremely unbalanced and
one-sided, portraying Brown, almost without exception, in the most positive light
possible, without examining any troubling elements in the young mans life (See e.g.,
Ex.s J-M). For example: his stepfathers long-standing status as a key lieutenant in the
Bloods gang organization, or Browns history of violence as a juvenile delinquent. The
latter two facts have been given to Relators by a series of whistleblowers.
On August 19, 2014, Relator Charles Johnson sent an open records (Sunshine)
request to the Circuit Court of Saint Louis County (SEE EXHIBIT A), requesting the
juvenile delinquency records of Michael Brown, Jr. About an hour after sending it, he
received a denial of this request from Director of Judicial Administration, Paul Fox, who
redirected Relator Johnson, per Court Operating Rule 2, to seek the records from from the
State Judicial Records Committee. (SEE EXHIBIT B).
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On August 25, 2014, Relators filed a motion for records request per V.A.M.S.
211.321 in the 22nd Circuit, City of St. Louis Family Court, Division 30. That same day,
the motion was heard before the Honorable David Mason, who informed Relators that no
such records existed for Michael Brown Jr., date of birth May 20, 1996 in the City of
St. Louis. (SEE EXHIBIT C).
On August 26, 2014, Relators filed an open records request per V.A.M.S.
211.321 and Rule 122.02 with the 21st Circuit, Saint Louis County Circuit Family/
Juvenile Court seeking access to the juvenile delinquency records of Michael Orlandus
Darrion Brown, Jr. (AKA Michael Brown, Jr. or Michael Brown), date of birth May,
20, 1996. (SEE EXHIBIT D). That same day, a hearing was set for September 3, 2014.
(SEE EXHIBIT E). On September 2, 2014, Relators filed their First Amended Petition.
(SEE EXHIBIT F).
On September 3, 2014, a joint, full hearing on the record was held to hear the
requests of both Relators as well as The Saint Louis Post-Dispatch, which had filed a
similar petition. The court took both petitions under consideration.
On September 9, 2014, Respondent, the Honorable Ellen Siwak, issued an order in
both matters, denying the requests, but also failing to give any specific reason for the
denial. (SEE EXHIBIT G). The Court having called and heard Petitioners Charles C.
Johnson and Got News, LLCs First Amended Petition, and having considered the

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relevant statutes, case law, and arguments of counsel, denies the petition. Id.2
Shortly after receiving the courts order, Relators sent a records request to the State
Judicial Records Committee. Relators followed up via telephone conversations on
September 19, 2014 with various agents of the Office of State Courts Administration to
confirm that the letter had been received. (SEE EXHIBIT H). On October 31, 2014, the
State Judicial Records Committee denied Relators request. (SEE EXHIBIT I). The
committee denied the release of Michael Brown Jr. juvenile records, if any, by the St.
Louis County Clerks Office, in that the records are confidential pursuant to section 211.
321, RSMo. 3
On November 24, 2014, Saint Louis County Prosecutor Robert McCullough
announced that the Grand Jury, after reviewing the Michael Brown shooting and actions
of Police Officer Darren Wilson, had returned a no true bill, and that no indictment would
issue against Wilson for the death of Brown. Prosecutor McCullough further announced
that he would be making available most or all of the evidence (most or all, depending
on which news outlet was reporting, so it is unclear) reviewed by the grand jury open to
the broader public, in an effort to promote complete and total governmental transparency
regarding the shooting and the subsequent investigation.
After careful inspection of the records that McCullough released, Relators have

This one sentence statement constitutes the courts full reasoning given on the matter. See Ex.
G.
3

The denial letter goes on to quote from V.A.M.S. Section 211.321.1. See Ex. I.
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not uncovered any of Browns juvenile records and are left to conclude that the Grand
Jury did not consider such evidence.
It should be noted that in the weeks and months leading up to and after the
announcement of the Grand Jury decision, the Saint Louis Region existed in a state of
high concern in some areas, panic. In the wake of the announcement, the City of
Fergusons business district was destroyed, and rioting, looting, shootings, and violence
spread to nearby villages and towns. Protestors and rioters shut down roads, courthouses,
government buildings, interstate highways, and threatened to overrun police
headquarters. Dozens of schools temporarily shuttered. Hundreds, if not thousands of
businesses closed out of fear. The Governor of Missouri declared a state of emergency
and deployed thousands of troops to restore order.
On December 4, 2014, Relators filed their Petition for Writ of Prohibition and/or
Mandamus with the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri. (SEE
EXHIBITS N - O).
On December 18, 2014, the Missouri Court of Appeals denied Relators petition.
(SEE EXHIBIT P).
On March 4, 2015, the US Department of Justice issued its report on its
investigation into the death of Michael Brown, Jr. The 86-page report contained an
exhaustive factual analysis and concluded that the matter lacks prosecutive merit and
should be closed. (SEE EXHIBIT Q, p. 198). The report found that the Brown shooting
was not an objectively unreasonable use of force (see analysis within EXHIBIT Q, p.
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122-23), and that Darren Wilson did not violate Browns Constitutional right to be free
from unreasonable force. Id., at p. 123-24.
Also on March 4, 2015, the US Department of Justice issued its report regarding
its investigation of the Ferguson Police Department. The report found evidence of racial
bias in the Ferguson Police Department (FPD) and the report offered twenty-six
different areas in which the FPD should improve. (SEE EXHIBIT R).
On April 23, 2014, the biological parents of Michael Brown, Jr. (Lesley
McSpadden and Michael Brown, Sr.) filed a seven (7) count wrongful death lawsuit
(wrongful death suit) in St. Louis County Circuit Court (15SL-CC01367) against
Darren Wilson, Former FPD Police Chief Thomas Jackson, and the City of Ferguson.
(SEE EXHIBIT S). The suit alleges, inter alia, violations of the First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution. The suit directly places at issue Browns
character and conduct on the date of his death, and alleges that Wilson used excessive
force, lacked probable cause, and unreasonably detained Brown, Jr., and that Wilsons
conduct was influenced by a racial animus, rather than any appropriate influence.
The wrongful death suit alleges that Brown, Jr.s death was directly caused by
Wilsons provocation. (SEE EXHIBIT S, p. 308) (Without the use of such unnecessary
and unwarranted profane language by Defendant Wilson, the initial encounter with
[Brown, Jr.] and [Brown, Jr. companion at the scene, Dorian Johnson] would have been
uneventful But instead, Defendant Wilsons aggressive, disrespectful, and profane
language escalated this encounter into an event that has garnered worldwide attention).
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The suit makes absolutely no mention of the robbery that Brown, Jr. had committed only
minutes before his death (see EXHIBIT Q at p. 118, 122-23, 133-34), that Wilson had
been responding to a sick infant police call but left upon hearing about the robbery on the
police radio, (see EXHIBIT Q at p. 133-34), or that the dispatcher had specifically given
a description of two robbers which matched the dress and physical appearance of Brown,
Jr. and companion Dorian Johnson. See Exhibit Q at p. 118, 133-34. Instead, the suit
alleges that Brown, Jr.s death was a direct result of Wilsons verbal choices, which
indicated that he perceived Brown, Jr., as some thing and less than human. See
EXHIBIT S, at p. 312-14.
Importantly, the wrongful death suit alleges a variety of damages, including loss
Brown, Jr.s comfort (Ex. S, at p. 335, 342, 345), guidance (Ex. S, at p. 335), support (p.
335, 342, 345), care, (p. 335, 343, 345), sustenance (p. 343, 345), society (p. 343, 345),
and services (p. 335). These damages place Browns past activity directly at issue in the
suit, because it is only through an analysis of his past activities that an economic
projection regarding his future earnings capacity, can be performed.
At this point, the Brown Movement has, to a degree, transcended its iconic
progenitor, Brown. However, the legitimacy of the movement is still largely rooted in the
belief that the shooting of Brown was not only unjustified, but that Brown himself was
essentially an innocent youth killed by a vicious, racist police officer. The effects of the
movement are still being felt as they serve as part of the moral foundation of the current
rioting in Baltimore, Maryland, and elsewhere.
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Now that Relators have exhausted every legal alternative in seeking the Brown
juvenile records, Relators have turned to This Court for relief.

ARGUMENT
I.

RESPONDENT LACKS AUTHORITY TO KEEP THE JUVENILE

RECORDS OF DECEASED ADULTS CONFIDENTIAL; THE PEOPLE OF
MISSOURI HAVE A RIGHT TO KNOW THE CONTENTS OF MICHAEL
BROWNS JUVENILE RECORDS.
A.

Respondent Lacks Any Authority To Deprive Relators Of Michael

Browns Juvenile Records And Must Be Compelled To Produce The
Records For Relators.

Respondents general authority over juvenile records is found in V.A.M.S. Chapter

211, specifically sections 211.271.3, 211.321.1 and 211.321.2:
After a child is taken into custody as provided in section
211.131, all admissions, confessions, and statements by the
child to the juvenile officer and juvenile court personnel and
all evidence given in cases under this chapter, as well as all
reports and records of the juvenile court, are not lawful or
proper evidence against the child and shall not be used for
any purpose whatsoever in any proceeding, civil or criminal,
other than proceedings under this chapter.
V.A.M.S. 211.271.3 (emphasis added).

Records of juvenile court proceedings as well as all

information obtained and social records prepared in the
discharge of official duty for the court shall not be open to
inspection or their contents disclosed, except by order of the
court to persons having a legitimate interest therein, unless a
petition or motion to modify is sustained which charges the
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child with an offense which, if committed by an adult, would

be a class A felony under the criminal code of Missouri, or
capital murder, first degree murder, or second degree murder
or except as provided in subsection 2 of this section.
V.A.M.S. 211.321.1 (emphasis added).
In all proceedings under subdivision (2) of subsection 1 of
section 211.031, the records of the juvenile court as well as
all information obtained and social records prepared in the
discharge of official duty for the court shall be kept
confidential and shall be open to inspection only by order of
the judge of the juvenile court or as otherwise provided by
statute. In all proceedings under subdivision (3) of subsection
1 of section 211.031 the records of the juvenile court as well
as all information obtained and social records prepared in the
discharge of official duty for the court shall be kept
confidential and may be open to inspection without court
order only as follows:
(1) The juvenile officer is authorized at any time:
(a) To provide information to or discuss matters concerning the
child, the violation of law or the case with the victim, witnesses,
officials at the child's school, law enforcement officials,
prosecuting attorneys, any person or agency having or proposed to
have legal or actual care, custody or control of the child, or any
person or agency providing or proposed to provide treatment of the
child. Information received pursuant to this paragraph shall not be
released to the general public, but shall be released only to the
persons or agencies listed in this paragraph;
(b) To make public information concerning the offense, the
substance of the petition, the status of proceedings in the juvenile
court and any other information which does not specifically identify
the child or the child's family;
(2) After a child has been adjudicated delinquent pursuant to
subdivision (3) of subsection 1 of section 211.031, for an offense
which would be a felony if committed by an adult, the records of the
dispositional hearing and proceedings related thereto shall be open to
the public to the same extent that records of criminal proceedings are
open to the public. However, the social summaries, investigations or
updates in the nature of presentence investigations, and status reports
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submitted to the court by any treating agency or individual after the

dispositional order is entered shall be kept confidential and shall be
opened to inspection only by order of the judge of the juvenile court;
(3) As otherwise provided by statute;
(4) In all other instances, only by order of the judge of the juvenile
court.
V.A.M.S. 211.321.2.

Additional guidance is supplied by Rule 122.02c-d (emphasis added):

c. Confidential files, as defined in section 211.319.3, RSMo,
and files and records specifically ordered closed by the court
shall be accessible only to persons the court has determined to
have a legitimate interest in such files and records.
d. In determining whether a person has a legitimate interest,
the court shall consider the nature of the proceedings, the
welfare and safety of the public, and the interest of the
juvenile and any other juvenile identified in the file or
records.
In addition to the limits placed on the court by the statutes and Rules cited, supra,
and the accompanying body of caselaw described, infra, such courts authority is also
limited by V.A.M.S. 211.011, entitled Purpose of law how construed, and which
opens V.A.M.S. Chapter 211. Thus, the language of Sections 211.011, 211.271.3,
211.321.1, and Rule 122.02c-d, as well as the case law interpreting these laws and rules,
form the boundaries of the Respondents general authority over juvenile records.
Importantly, the [statutes of the juvenile code have] been described as a complete
code, with each section to be construed in relation to the other. In Interest of A.D.R.,
603 S.W.2d 575, 580 (Mo. banc 1980) (emphasis added) (citing to State v. Williams, 473
S.W.2d 382, 383 (Mo. 1971), accord Smith v. Harolds Supermarket, 685 S.W.2d 859, 863
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(Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1984). Thus, sections of the code cannot be construed piecemeal and
independent from one another.
The crux of the issue before the Court is whether or not Respondent had
jurisdiction to deny Relators request for the records. Missouri Courts are a direct creation
of the People of Missouri. Mo. Const. Art. V, Sec. 1. The Missouri Supreme Court may
establish rules relating to practice and procedure, but such rules cannot change
substantive rights. Mo. Const. Art. V, Sec. 5. Respondents general jurisdiction over
juvenile records has limits, and Respondent cannot simply manufacture authority out of
thin air. Thus, the discretionary authority of Respondents denial of Relators request for
Browns juvenile records must have its source in enumerated law. As Relators shall
demonstrate, however, Respondent exceeded her authority.
1.

The Purpose of V.A.M.S. Chapter 211 Is To Protect The Interests

And Welfare Of Living Juveniles.

The purpose of V.A.M.S. Chapter 211 is set out in V.A.M.S. 211.011:

The purpose of this chapter is to facilitate the care,
protection and discipline of children who come within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. This chapter shall be
liberally construed, therefore, to the end that each child
coming within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court shall
receive such care, guidance and control as will conduce to
the childs welfare and the best interests of the state, and
that when such child is removed from the control of his
parents the court shall secure for him care as nearly as
possible equivalent to that which should have been given him
by them. The child welfare policy of this state is what is in the
best interests of the child.

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Id. (emphasis added).

Chapter 211 is designed to instruct the juvenile court on how to deal with
the children falling under its jurisdiction in a plethora of different contexts. Critically it
only addresses and contemplates living children.
Family/juvenile courts cover a lot of ground. They can determine custody,
seize children from abusive parents and guardians and, of course, they work to discipline/
rehabilitate delinquent children, among other related charges. Unquestionably, part of the
rehabilitative effort of the state is to spare the emerging adult the embarrassment, shame
and missed opportunities that general public knowledge of the negative conduct record,
broken home, or abuse, which was perpetrated, endured or suffered by the adult when
they were a child. Such stigma can radically stunt ones future.
Clearly, this is what the Missouri Legislature had in mind when it wrote in
V.A.M.S. 211.271.1, that [n]o adjudication by the juvenile court upon the status of a
child shall be a conviction, nor shall the adjudication operate to impose any of the civil
disabilities ordinarily resulting from conviction nor shall the child be found guilty or be
deemed a criminal by reason of the adjudication. Or, in V.A.M.S. 211.271.4, that
[t]he disposition made of a child and the evidence given in the court does not operate to
disqualify the child in any future civil or military service application or appointment.
Plainly, the state has an interest in giving kids an opportunity for a clean slate - a second
chance, rather than damning them at the very start of their adult life.
While the welfare of a juvenile is a highly placed priority for the state, it is
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not the states sole objective or concern. In addition to the responsibilities the state has to
protect juveniles, the state also has an obligation to protect the public and promote peace,
prosperity, and democracy, among other duties. This is precisely what the Missouri
Legislature was referring to when it juxtaposed its promise to juveniles before the
juvenile/family court, and also its responsibilities to the general public: each child
coming within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court shall receive such care, guidance and
control as will conduce to the childs welfare and the best interests of the state
V.A.M.S. 211.011. Sometimes the interests of the state and the protection of the public
are best served by removing a proven criminal threat from the general public and placing
them in a detention center. In other various instances, rehabilitative efforts accomplish the
states interest. As described, infra, the state also has an interest in carefully balancing the
rights of others, vis--vis the limited records privacy privilege of juveniles.
However, the state has no interest in or ability to rehabilitate the dead. The
state cannot protect the dead, nor preserve their opportunity for a second chance. Whats
more, setting aside the interpretation of wills or survival actions, the dead have no legally
significant interests, whatsoever, to preserve, protect, or advance. See Holmes v.
Arbeitman, 857 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993) (an attorney's representation of
his or her client terminates upon the client's death).
The purpose of V.A.M.S. Chapter 211 cannot be achieved by denying
Relators access to Michael Browns juvenile records, because the juvenile subject no
longer lives. Maintaining the privacy of Michael Browns records may well serve a
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purpose, but it is not a purpose recognized under Missouri Law.

2.

The Confidentiality Afforded To Living Juveniles in V.A.M.S.

Chapter 211 Is A Limited Privilege, And Not An Absolute Right,
And May Be Abrogated And Waived.

V.A.M.S. 211.271.3 explains:

After a child is taken into custody as provided in section
211.131, all admissions, confessions, and statements by the
child to the juvenile officer and juvenile court personnel and
all evidence given in cases under this chapter, as well as all
reports and records of the juvenile court, are not lawful or
proper evidence against the child and shall not be used for
any purpose whatsoever in any proceeding, civil or criminal,
other than proceedings under this chapter.
Id. (emphasis added).
The records privacy protections offered to living juveniles in Chapter 211 is
a limited privilege, with a very narrow purpose. Thus, it is misreading the statute to
suggest that the privacy protections are absolute or without exception.
First, the limited records privacy rights afforded to living juveniles are
non-transferable. It is evident to this court that the prohibition against the use of
juvenile court reports and records is for the exclusive protection of the juvenile, and
does not extend to any other person or proceeding which is neither occasioned by or
brought against the juvenile. Smith v. Harolds Supermarket, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 859, 863
(Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1985) (emphasis added). Thus, it is clear the privilege is that of the

!20

juvenile and not of the [juveniles] parents. State ex rel. Rowland v. OToole, 884
S.W.2d 100, 102 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1994).
In Smith, an 18 year-old white male (Halstead) was killed after being
apprehended and beaten by a supermarket manager, who had caught Halstead stealing a
package of cigarettes. Id. at 861. Halsteads mother filed a wrongful death suit against the
supermarket and manager. Id. During the trial, and after extraordinary writs, the
defendants successfully sought the introduction of Halsteads juvenile record, against the
strenuous wishes of Halsteads mother, and the mother ultimately appealed. Id. The Court
of Appeals held in favor of the defendants, and found that the purpose of V.A.M.S.
Chapter 211 was to protect and safeguard the best interests of the juvenile. Id., at 863.
Further, the court found that the prohibition against the use of juvenile court reports and
records is for the exclusive protection of the juvenile and does not extend to any other
person or proceeding which is neither occasioned by nor brought against the juvenile. Id.
The court explained that its rationale in refusing to censor information was all the
stronger since that case involved the juvenile records of a deceased juvenile. Id. Thus,
the privilege does not survive a deceased juvenile.
Second, the limited privacy offered by V.A.M.S. Chapter 211 to living
juveniles is not an all-encompassing or blanket prohibition against the use of all juvenile
records and related evidentiary matters in all cases not otherwise involving the
juvenile... Smith v. Harolds Supermarket, Inc., 685 S.W.2d at 863, accord State v.
Mahurin, 799 S.W.2d 840, 843 (Mo. banc 1990) (rejecting an absolute prohibition
!21

on the use of juvenile records; 211.271.3 only applies to use of childs statement
against the child). V.A.M.S. 211.271.3.
One of the principal purposes of keeping the records private is to protect
the child in the event civil or criminal proceedings are later brought against the child. Id.
A juveniles right of confidentiality as to juvenile records is a qualified and not an
absolute privilege. State ex rel. Rowland v. OToole, 884 S.W.2d at 103. [Regarding
V.A.M.S. 211.271.3] However, statements made by others in a juvenile court
proceeding and court records and reports may be used against others. Thus, those juvenile
court records and reports which do not relate to the juveniles own statements against
himself are not subject to the privilege. Id., at 102-03. (internal citations omitted).
Moreover, living juveniles qualified privilege of confidentiality can be
abrogated when certain other rights or needs are affected. For example, crime victims of
juveniles are entitled to general information regarding the informal adjustment or formal
adjudication of the disposition of a childs case V.A.M.S. 211.321.6. Juvenile
Officers are also permitted - at any time - to provide information to or discuss matters
concerning the child, violation of law, or the case with the victim, witnesses, officials at
the childs school, law enforcement officials, prosecuting attorneys [and those providing

!22

care and/or treatment of the child]. V.A.M.S. 211.321.2.4

As another example, a juveniles admissions and statements have also been used to
preserve another individuals Sixth Amendment rights. [W]e conclude that the right of
confrontation is paramount to the states policy of protecting a juvenile offender.
Whatever temporary embarrassment might result to [the juvenile] or his family by
disclosure of his juvenile record if the prosecution insisted on using him to make its
case is outweighed by petitioners right to probe into the influence of possible bias in
the testimony of a crucial identification witness. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319
(1974). As in Alford, we conclude that the States desire that [the juvenile] fulfill his
public duty to testify free from embarrassment and with his reputation unblemished must
fall before the right of the petitioner to seek out the truth in the process of defending
himself. Id., at 320. Davis has been adopted in Missouri in State v. Russell, 625 S.W.2d
138 (Mo. banc 1981).
Additionally, a living juvenile may waive his limited privilege of
confidentiality by placing his juvenile arrest and juvenile court proceedings in issue by
voluntarily filing suit OToole, at 103. The rationale is that permitting a plaintiff
[juvenile] to use the privilege to conceal trial facts relating to the very issue the plaintiff

Hundreds, if not thousands of people in the St. Louis Region have had property destroyed, been
attacked, or had their lives disrupted by any one of dozens of major riots in the aftermath of the
Brown shooting. As parallel riots took place in California, New York, Chicago, and elsewhere,
there have likewise been throngs of victims in those areas as well. Are all of these victims not
entitled to the Brown records by virtue of their victimhood? What further bona fides must the
public demonstrate in order to know the truth about Michael Brown, Jr.?
!23

[juvenile] had originated for submission to judicial inquiry would permit the plaintiff to
use the privilege as a shield and a dagger at one and the same time (which we do not
believe the legislature intended). Id. (internal quotes and citations omitted). Compare
OToole with Smith v. Harolds Supermarket. In the latter case, where the deceased
juveniles mother had brought a wrongful death claim against the supermarket, the
mother placed the issue of the deceased juveniles future earning potential at issue, by
seeking recovery, in part, for his lost services (financial earning potential). Smith, at
861-62. She had also called an economist witness at trial to testify to establish lost
earnings. Id. The defense had sought the release of the juvenile records to challenge the
issue of the value of the deceased juveniles future services. Id., at 862. The Court of
Appeals held that the mothers challenge of the defendants use of the juvenile records
failed not only because (1) the statutory confidentiality privilege did not belong to her,
but also because she had (2) pleaded and (3) put on evidence placing the records directly
at issue. Smith, at 865.5
In sum, the privacy protections afforded to juveniles in V.A.M.S. Chapter
211 are exclusive, non-transferable privileges, which exist solely to protect living
juveniles from having their records used against them in civil or criminal prosecutions,
to promote a candid and effective relationship between the juvenile and juvenile officer,
5

Similarly, even if Michael Browns limited privacy privilege survived him - which it does not the wrongful death suit as brought by Browns biological parents would waive the privilege, as
Browns parents have squarely placed the issue of his pecuniary value at issue in the suit. (e.g.,
allegations of damages such as loss of comfort, guidance, support, care, sustenance,
society, and services). See discussion, supra, at p. 11-13.
!24

and to prevent the records from needlessly stunting the juveniles prospects of becoming
a productive member of society. The privilege is not absolute, and a variety of state and
private interests can remove the privilege. The privilege can also be voluntarily waived.
Michael Brown, Jr. will never be prosecuted or sued in any court. There is
nothing any earthly being can do to him that would ever cause him harm. Accordingly,
there is no use of his juvenile records which could possibly harm him in any way, let
alone be used against him in a court of law. As a result there is no legal basis in denying
Relators access to his records.
3.

The States Public Policy Interest In Protecting Browns Records

Has Been Mooted By Browns Death.

Upon lengthy review of Missouri case law, Relators have discovered

several decisions which collectively stand for the proposition that the juvenile court can
be stripped of its discretion as to the confidentiality of juvenile records and its jurisdiction
over juveniles in general. The purpose of analyzing these cases is to establish the
boundaries of the juvenile courts discretion and jurisdiction, boundaries which shift
based on the metamorphosis of the juvenile from childhood to adulthood, or beyond.
a.

Critical changes in circumstances can strip juvenile courts

of discretionary authority, transforming its role from a
judicial to a ministerial/ administrative capacity.

In a number of situations, critical changes in the circumstances

surrounding the individual juvenile can work to strip the juvenile court of its
discretionary authority to make substantive decisions regarding the juvenile. Such
!25

changes can transform the role of the juvenile court judge from a judicial to a ministerial/
administrative capacity. The destruction of juvenile records, per V.A.M.S. 211.321.5
provides an excellent example.
The authority vested in the juvenile court in V.A.M.S. 211.321,
which places that court as the gatekeeper to juvenile records, is limited by V.A.M.S.
211.011, which as has been shown, explains the essential purpose of Chapter 211: the
protection of living children. V.A.M.S. 211.321.5 governs the Respondents authority to
destroy or seal juvenile records. Respondent or any juvenile court may only order the
destruction or sealing of such records after the juvenile has reached the age of seventeen
(17), and upon a finding that to destroy the records would be in the best interest of the
child. Here again, given Michael Browns death, Brown has no cognizable legal
interest, let alone a best interest. Thus, the Respondent cannot order the destruction or
sealing of the records.
This is pertinent because it demonstrates that changing
circumstances can completely change the status of the documents and the role of the
juvenile court. Whereas, while Brown lived, the disposition of the records was left to the
discretion of the Respondent, Browns death has transformed Respondents role into a
ministerial one, akin to a custodian of records. And there are other examples of this
which are relevant to a discussion of impracticability and mootness.
For example, generally, the juvenile court only has jurisdiction over
juveniles who violate state or municipal law prior to the age of seventeen. V.A.M.S.
!26

211.031; J.O.N. v. Juvenile Officer, 777 S.W.2d 633 (Mo Ct. App. W.D. 1989). Such
jurisdiction can be extended, at maximum, to the age of twenty-one. V.A.M.S. 211.041.
However, in the latter example, once a juvenile turns twenty-one, the juvenile court only
retains nominal jurisdiction, for the sole and exclusive purpose of certifying the juvenile
as an adult. [A] juvenile court may retain jurisdiction until the juvenile is twenty-one
[A]ttaining the age of twenty-one does not destroy jurisdiction altogether. Instead,
because the individual is over the age of 21 and there can be no reasonable prospect
of rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system, [ 211.041] mandates that the
juvenile court may no longer retain jurisdiction and must certify the juvenile as an adult
to be tried by the court of general jurisdiction. State v. Larson, 79 S.W.3d 891, 895 (Mo.
2002) (emphasis added). Said another way, the statutes purpose of rehabilitating the
child becomes impracticable and moot when the child outgrows the statutory
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. And yet, the court still retains nominal jurisdiction, if
only to certify the child as an adult. Asserting any further authority, the juvenile court
would be acting ultra vires. Similarly in the present case, the purpose of the the limited
juvenile document privacy privilege (as more fully described, supra) became
impracticable and moot when Michael Brown, Jr. departed the earth. Again, changing
conditions can automatically work to strip Respondent of discretion, and transform her
role into a non-discretionary, ministerial/ administrative capacity.

!27

b.

Upon Browns death, Respondents role transformed from

a judicial to a ministerial capacity, and the Missouri
Sunshine Law applies.

As discussed, supra, as a subject juveniles critical circumstances

permanently change, the purpose of the juvenile is rendered impracticable and moot,
and a juvenile court can be stripped of its discretionary authority. It is this loss of
discretion that transforms the role and function of the juvenile court from a judicial to a
ministerial/ administrative capacity. In the context of juvenile records the juvenile courts
statutory discretion is the only thing that stands between the Public and a subject
juveniles records. When that discretion is eliminated, the records must, of necessity,
revert back to the public domain, where they may be requested by any member of the
Public under Chapter 610 R.S.Mo, the Missouri Sunshine Law.
Per V.A.M.S. 211.011, Smith, OToole, and State v. Mahurin, et al,
cited supra, the state only has an interest in any juveniles records so long as the subject
juvenile maintains an interest in those records, or so long as the juveniles interest in
those records does not materially conflict with other critical public policy interests (e.g.,
individuals Sixth Amendment rights in Davis v. Alaska, discussed supra). When the
subject juvenile loses or waives its interest in its own juvenile records, the source of the
states interest has been extinguished. The sole raison d'tre for the discretion to deny the
public access to the records ceases to exist. When Michael Brown died, his interest in the
records was eliminated and, so too was the states. The states interest in his records
became moot, as the purpose of the Chapter 211, that is, actualizing the juveniles best
!28

interest and welfare, became impossible to achieve. It is self-evident that as applied to

the deceased Michael Brown, Jr., the terms best interest and welfare are rendered
meaningless.
Because the juvenile code does not apply to Michael Browns
juvenile records for reasons discussed, supra, Respondents function, relative to the
records, is ministerial/administrative - a custodian of records. As a result, Respondent is a
public governmental body per V.A.M.S. 610.010. (judicial entities when operating
in an administrative capacity). While during the course of deciding live controversies
a court acts in a judicial capacity, once the controversy has been decided, the records of
those decisions are simply records that must be maintained. The maintenance of those
records is an administrative duty.
With no legally cognizable interest left to defend or advance,
Respondent simply lost discretion to deny Relators request for the Brown juvenile
records. Lacking discretion to deny the records, Respondents role transformed from a
judicial, to a ministerial/administrative capacity. Thus because no state agent has any
legal authority to deny Relators request for the records, or that of anyone else, the
juvenile records, by default, reverted to the public domain. Respondents proper
function was simply that of a custodian of records: to preserve the records for the benefit
of the People of the State of Missouri. Respondent has no choice and no statutory
authority to do anything other than to turn over the records upon the request of any
member of the Public per Missouri Sunshine Law. As a result, Respondents denial of
!29

Relators request for the records is unlawful. State ex rel. Keystone Laundry & Dry
Cleaners, Inc. v. McDonnell, 426 S.W.2d 11, 14 (Mo. 1968) ([Mandamus will issue]
where the administrative board (or court) has acted unlawfully or wholly outside its
jurisdiction, and also where it has abused whatever discretion may have been vested in
it.)

4.

Respondent Has Unlawfully Failed To Recognize Relators

Public Right Of Access To Browns Juvenile Record.

Aside from the Missouri Sunshine Law, Missouri recognizes a common

law right of public access to court and other public records. Pulitzer Publishing Co. v.
Transit Casualty Co., 43 S.W.3d 293, 300 (Mo. banc 2001). Given the presumption in
favor of open records, an abuse of discretion is present when trial court orders
inexplicably seal court records, do not articulate specific reasons for closure, or do not
otherwise demonstrate a recognition of the presumptive right of access. Id. (emphasis
added). Citizens of Missouri have the right to inspect and copy any public record even if
there is no apparent legal interest to be subserved Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. Transit
Casualty Co., 43 S.W.3d at 300 (quoting to State ex rel. Gray v. Brigham, 622 S.W.2d
734, 735 (Mo. App. 1981). Although the rule imposes a presumption that records are
open to the pubic, there is an express exception for records that are confidential
pursuant to court order. Nevertheless, the presumption of openness is intended to inform
the decision of whether to seal the records in the first place, or to unseal the records if
the justification for sealing the records abates. The policy supporting the presumption
!30

as reflected in the rule merits repeating: Justice is best served when it is done within full
view of those to whom all courts are responsible the public. On the basis of that policy,
and considering the substantial authority from other courts this Court affirms, subject
to the exceptions of Court Operating Rule 2, that there is a presumption in favor of the
publics right of access to court records and that the presumption cannot be overcome
absent a compelling justification that the records should be closed. Id., at 301.
(collecting cases) (emphasis added). There are important exceptions that limit the
presumption of open records when sufficiently important interests outweigh the publics
right of access Where there are higher interests favoring nondisclosure, courts and the
legislature have routinely seen fit to close some public records In order to close court
or other public records, however, a court in its order must identify specific and
tangible threats to important values in order to override the importance of the
public right of access Vague or uncertain threats claimed by one party normally
would not justify closure. Id., at 302. (emphasis added).
In her denial of Relators request for Browns juvenile records, Respondent
failed to articulate any specific reason for refusing to provide the records. See Exhibit G
(The Court having called and heard Petitioners Charles C. Johnson and Got News,
LLCs First Amended Petition, and having considered the relevant statutes, case law, and
arguments of counsel, denies the petition.). Respondent summarily denied Relators
request without identifying any specific and tangible threats important enough to override
the importance of the public right of access. As discussed in Pulitzer, supra, the
!31

presumption of public access requires the court to provide records if the justification for
the sealing the records abates. Here, any theoretical justification for keeping Browns
juvenile records confidential has abated Brown is deceased. As a result, Respondent
acted unlawfully and must be compelled to produce Browns juvenile records to Relators.

B.

Even if the State Must Balance The Competing Interests Of The

Publics Right Of Access And The Juvenile Courts Need To
Safeguard The Welfare Of Juveniles, Respondent Still Acted
Without Authority And Unlawfully And Must Be Compelled To
Turn Over Browns Records.
1.

In weighing the competing interests, the scale tips in favor

of access to the records.

Even if this Court finds that the juvenile court must balance the interests of
the publics right of access with the juvenile courts need to safeguard the welfare of
juveniles, the scale clearly tips in favor of the Publics right of access. Therefore,
Respondent must be compelled to turn over Browns records. Given the rarity of the
central focus of this case, it is again useful to observe how other courts have handled
similar situations.
In re Richmond Newspapers, Inc., is a Virginia case in which various
newspapers sought access to the records of a juvenile delinquent who had been found
murdered. 14 Va. Cir. 227 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1988). The trial court denied the newspapers
request for access to the records, reasoning that (1) the disclosure of the records would
cause damage to the family of the deceased juvenile; (2) that the juvenile had a right to
privacy even in death; and (3) that the records must be held in confidence in order to
!32

protect the courts ability to obtain confidential information.

In finding for the newspapers, the Court of Appeals noted that, in general, a
juvenile courts determination of whether or not to turn over juvenile records involves
striking a balance between the publics right of access and the potential harm which such
access might cause. Id., at 231. In an unbroken line of cases starting in 1980, the
Supreme Courts of the United States and Virginia have recognized that one of the
demands of a democratic society is that the pubic should know what goes on in the courts
by being told by the press what happens there Id. (collecting cases and quoting
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 n.9 (1980)). On the other
hand, it is also clear that society has a legitimate interest in shielding juveniles from the
same level of scrutiny which sometimes attaches to adults. With reference to juvenile
offenders, that shield is legitimately designed to facilitate rehabilitation and, assuming
such rehabilitation has occurred, to allow such offenders to take their place in society as
law-abiding adult citizens unfettered by the stigma of childhood indiscretions [T]his
interest of society, to protect juveniles from the types of consequences which would result
from their acts if such acts were committed by adults, is just as compelling as societys
interest in gaining access to court records. Only by balancing these seemingly competing
interests, then, can [the court properly interpret the privacy interest assigned by Virginia
juvenile laws]. Id. at 233.
Having weighed these two competing interests, the court concluded that a
blanket prohibition against disclosure of juvenile records was inappropriate, and that the
!33

trial court failed to strike the required balancing of interests. Id., at 233-34, compare with
Smith v. Harolds Supermarket, Inc. 685 S.W.2d at 863 (privacy offered by V.A.M.S.
Chapter 211 to living juveniles is not an all-encompassing or blanket prohibition against
the use of all juvenile records and related evidentiary matters in all cases not otherwise
involving the juvenile).
Specifically, the appellate court found that (1) any privacy interest of a
juvenile does not similarly attach or transfer to families; (2) deceased juveniles have no
privacy rights; (3) deceased juveniles cannot be rehabilitated ([m]oreover, as morbid as
it may sound, the goals of rehabilitating and shielding [the subject juvenile], who is now
deceased, can no longer be met. Thus, whatever interests society in general and [the
subject juvenile] in particular may have had in resisting disclosure so as to facilitate
his rehabilitation and to shield him from the consequences of his juvenile acts no
longer exist, and they may not be properly relied upon now to deny access); and that
(4) while information that is obtained on the promise that it will not be disclosed should
not be disclosed, the trial court could not summarily refuse to disclose every part of the
deceased juveniles record. Id., at 234-35.6
Similar to In re Richmond, here, even if interests are to be weighed, the
6

Compare with State ex rel. Rowland v. OToole, 884 S.W.2d 100 at 102, (Thus, it is clear the
privilege is that of the juvenile and not of the [juveniles] parents.), also see State v. Larson
79 S.W.3d 891 at 895, (because the individual is over the age of 21 and there can be no
reasonable prospect of rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system, [ 211.041] mandates
that the juvenile court may no longer retain jurisdiction and must certify the juvenile as an adult
to be tried by the court of general jurisdiction).
!34

scale clearly tips in favor of public access for almost exactly the same reasons as in In re
Richmond. Here, as there, whatever privacy interest held by Brown died with him and is
non-transferable. Further, the objectives of Chapter 211, namely Browns rehabilitation
and well-being, cannot be achieved, given his death. In fact, the analysis articulated by
the Virginia Court is strikingly similar to that used by Missouri courts in Smith and
O'Toole. In the Virginia case, as in the Missouri cases, the Courts concluded that the
privilege of sealed juvenile records belongs exclusively to the subject of those records
and that, morbid as it may sound, the goal of shielding the juvenile is subverted and
rendered inert by the death of the juvenile.
Relators do not object to any in camera review of the records to redact the
records to safeguard any other living juvenile, and Relators support the preservation of
confidentiality for any living confidential informants used in deriving or generating any
of the Brown juvenile records. However, Respondents categorical denial of Browns
juvenile records is, at a minimum, too sweeping of a result, in that it seals all of the
information not just information gathered upon a promise of nondisclosure. For these
reasons, Respondents denial was unlawful and beyond her authority, and Respondent
must be compelled to produce the records for Relators.
2.

The Publics interests of Democracy and government

accountability tip the scales in favor of granting Relators
access to Browns records; the Public relies and depends
upon the press to accurately inform them about matters
involving the judicial branch and government accountability.

!35

In a society in which each individual has but limited time

and resources with which to observe at first hand the
operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon the
press to bring to him in convenient form the facts of those
operations . . . . With respect to judicial proceedings in
particular, the function of the press serves to guarantee the
fairness of trials and to bring to bear the beneficial effects of
public scrutiny upon the administration of justice . . . .The
commission of crime, prosecutions resulting from it, and
judicial proceedings arising from the prosecution . . . are
without question events of legitimate concern to the public
and consequently fall within the responsibility of the press to
report the operations of government. 420 U.S. at 491-92
(citation omitted).
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975).
Tens of thousands of people, in Missouri and across the US, have marched,
protested, shut-down interstates, schools and businesses, rioted, looted, pillaged, burned,
and/or engaged in violence. A city has been burned to the ground. A region has been held
hostage. These actions have been taken based upon a widespread belief that Michael
Brown was murdered in cold blood by Police Officer Darren Wilson, and that the Brown
murder is the quintessential, microcosmic example of a pervasive crisis in Missouri and
nationwide.
A movement has formed, advocating change, and constantly pointing to the
Brown murder as the example of the problem the change is designed to address. The
Brown murder has become an emotionally charged super-Meme. In dozens of cities,
protesters have staged die-ins, laying on streets, pretending to be dead in reference to
Michael Browns lifeless body laying on the warm pavement. Hands-up, Dont Shoot!
!36

has become a nationally recognized slogan and rally cry employed by protesters and
professional athletes across the nation. Nationally and locally, social and political leaders
have seized upon the super-Meme in order to leverage it for various socio-political
agendas and propaganda.
The President of the United States has met with a large number of groups
who comprise the Michael Brown Movement, and he has also encouraged them to keep
protesting and fighting for change, and he has specifically encouraged school children to
build classroom memorials to honor the memory of Michael Brown, as well as other
victims of police violence. On the basis of the Brown SuperMeme, The U.S. Attorney
General has repeatedly accused large swaths of Americans, generally, and scores of
police officers and the justice system, specifically, of being racists. On the basis of the
Brown SuperMeme, hundreds of mainstream media outlets from The Atlantic, The New
York Times, CNN, and others, have labeled Ferguson and the Greater Saint Louis Region
a hotbed of racism. Ferguson itself has been repeatedly dubbed a mini Apartheid state.
Perhaps the single most important and frightening allegation that the
Michael Brown Movement continues to make is that the justice system within Saint
Louis County conspired to deliberately scuttle any potential indictment of Officer Darren
Wilson
The duty of the press, as outlined in the Cox Broadcasting quote, supra, is
to provide accurate information to the Public, so that it may make informed, reasoned
decisions regarding matters of serious public importance. The Brown incident is such a
!37

matter of serious public importance literally millions of people have been impacted, and
cities have burned, lives have been changed. A shadow has been cast over the system of
justice. It is imperative that the Public be provided with information so that it may
properly hold its justice system and government, accountable.
In general, the public policy behind open records and the public right of
access is well established in Missouri. Pulitzer, at 300. In all instances where, by law
or regulation, a document is required to be filed in a public office, it is a public record
and the pubic has a right to inspect it. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Kavanaugh v.
Henderson, 169 S.W.2d 389, 392 (Mo. 1943)). The publics right to inspect court and
other public records stems from the publics presumed interest in the integrity and
impartiality of its government [O]pen records do not simply accommodate the publics
amusement, curiosity, or convenience. Instead, it is simply beyond dispute that public
records are freely accessible to ensure confidence in the impartiality and fairness of the
judicial system, and generally to discourage bias and corruption in public service.
Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient. Id., at 300-01 (quoting 1 J.
Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 524 (1827)).
Normally, in the context of living juveniles, the public enjoys no intrinsic
compelling interest in the records of a subject juvenile. However, in the present case, not
only is the subject of the juvenile records deceased, but within significant portions of the
population, a suspicion has arisen that Brown was gunned down in cold blood, and that
the justice system has essentially obstructed the investigation in order to protect the
!38

killer police officer. Thus, not only has any justification for sealing the records
abate[ed], but even if it hadnt, there are higher interests that favor disclosure. If there
exist records which would could help confirm or disconfirm such shocking allegations,
the Public must see them.
Relators have received multiple communications from state and federal
confidential law enforcement sources which have emphatically and repeatedly claimed to
Relators that Michael Brown had an extensive and serious juvenile record, and that he
was implicated and involved in murdering another person. Relators have invested an
enormous amount of time and resources into trying to determine the validity of these
claims, and it thus goes without saying that Relators have found the confidential sources
to be entirely credible. If Browns juvenile record contains evidence of a serious criminal
history, then such evidence radically alters the current narratives that are being laid out in
newspapers, in online blogs, and on television. Michael Brown has been portrayed by the
media as an average teen-aged young man, with a bright future and a relatively nonviolent past. See Exhibit J, (where Browns familys assertion that he had no juvenile
record goes completely unchallenged by the New York Times: He did not have a
criminal record as an adult, and his family said he never got in trouble with the law as a
juvenile, either.), as well as Exhibits K, L, and M. This has only served to enhance the
outrage at his death, as it makes the possibility that he would attack a police officer in a
police SUV seem far more remote, and nefarious, conspiratorial action by police or
public officers seem more likely. Whatever the case, Relators and the Public have a right
!39

to this information.
II.

A Writ of Prohibition and/or Mandamus is Appropriate in this Case

The Courts power to issue a writ of Prohibition derives from Article V, section 4.1

of the Missouri Constitution. According to State ex rel. Noranda Aluminum, Inc v. Rains,
Situations where this Court has issued writs of prohibition generally fall within one of
three categories; 1) where there is a usurpation of judicial power because the trial court
lacks either personal or subject matter jurisdiction; 2) where there exists a clear excess of
jurisdiction or abuse of discretion such that the lower court lacks the power to act as
contemplated; or 3) where there is no adequate remedy by appeal. State ex rel. Noranda
Aluminum, Inc v. Rains, 706 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Mo. banc 1986).
The instant case falls into both the second and third categories. Respondent
exceeded her jurisdiction and abused her discretion in issuing her September 9, 2014
Order denying Relators access to Michael Browns juvenile records because the death of
Michael Brown rendered the purpose of Chapter 211 moot and brought him outside of the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court, since its purpose is to serve to protect the interests of
living juveniles, as argued supra. Further, in the instant case, there is no adequate remedy
by appeal because Respondent issued an order denying Relators access to Browns
juvenile records. The trial court never had personal jurisdiction, nor did the juvenile court
have standing to withhold the juvenile records of Michael Brown. His status as a
deceased adult, according to Smith v. Harolds Super Market and OToole, as well as
V.A.M.S. 211.321 and 211.041, cited supra, brought him outside of the juvenile
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courts jurisdiction, since the Juvenile court no longer had the duty protect Brown from
future lawsuits. Prohibition is therefore appropriate.
In the alternative, Relators seek Mandamus. As a general rule, mandamus will not
lie where there is another plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law, but it is well settled
that this other remedy must be equally as convenient, beneficial and effective as
mandamus. State ex rel. M.B. v. Brown, 532 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). When
a court undertakes a non-discretionary act contrary to the directions of the law and was
without jurisdiction to do the non-discretionary act, mandamus is the proper remedy. Id.
[Mandamus will issue] where the administrative board (or court) has acted unlawfully or
wholly outside its jurisdiction, and also where it has abused whatever discretion may
have been vested in it. State ex rel. Keystone Laundry & Dry Cleaners, Inc. v.
McDonnell, 426 S.W.2d 11, 14 (Mo. 1968). [E]xtraordinary writs are issued when
necessary to prevent an excess of jurisdiction, as well as to prevent or stop action where
no jurisdiction exists. State ex rel. Knight Oil Co. v. Vardeman, 409 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Mo.
1966). Mandamus is appropriate to compel the commission of ministerial acts. State ex
rel. R. Newton McDowell, Inc. v. Smith, 67 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. 1933). And the discretion of
the court with regard to the issuance of the writ is sometimes influenced by the "public
importance" of the matter.

State ex rel. Keystone Laundry & Dry Cleaners, Inc. v.

McDonnell, 426 S.W.2d at 15.

In the present case, Respondent lacked any authority to deny Relators request for
Michael Browns juvenile records. Upon the death of Brown, the nature of Respondents
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role changed to a ministerial capacity, akin to a custodian of records. Mandamus is

appropriate because Respondent exceeded her authority and there is no other remedy
equally as beneficial, efficient or effective. Further, the subject matter of this case
involves the releasing of records for the purpose of informing the Public of critical
information the Public will need in order to better evaluate the propriety of government
actions. The Public has an immediate need for Michael Browns juvenile records and the
matter is an issue of public importance.

CONCLUSION
Unless this Court issues a preliminary and permanent writ of prohibition and/or
mandamus, Relators and the Public will be deprived of their right of access to public
information necessary to evaluate the propriety of government actions which have
subsequently sparked riots and protests. Relators respectfully request that the Court issue
a preliminary writ of prohibition and/or mandamus, as well as a permanent writ of
prohibition and/or mandamus vacating or otherwise reversing Respondents order
denying Relators the records they have sought, and compelling Respondent to produce
Michael Browns juvenile records.

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Respectfully submitted,
__/s/ John C. Burns____
John C. Burns, #66462
The Burns Law Firm, LLC
1717 Park Avenue
St. Louis, Missouri 63104
314-275-0326 Telephone & Facsimile
john@burns-law-firm.com
__/s/ David Nowakowski____
David Nowakowski, #66481
1717 Park Avenue
St. Louis, Missouri 63104
314-275-0326 Telephone & Facsimile
david@burns-law-firm.com
Attorneys for Relators GotNews, LLC
(GotNews.Com) and Charles C. Johnson.

fortis cadere cedere non potest

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