Universidade Federal do Cear

Instituto de Cultura e Artes ICA

Programa de Ps-graduao em Comunicao PPGCOM/UFC
Fotografia e Arte Contempornea
Prof. Silas de Paula
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Reading the Surface:
The Creative Voice in the Art Criticism of Stuart Morgan
James A. Brown, Plymouth College of Art, UK

This paper proposes a shift in the nature of art criticism.

Although my aim here is not to provide a model for criticism, I shall
be putting the case forward for a critical practice that allows more
latitude - in terms of how interpretation is reached in the face of the
unavoidable problem of subjectivity. What I am arguing for here is a
reconsideration (or at least a recalibration), in the face of the
fragmentation of critical authority, of the nature of interpretation
within art critical writing and the way in which it addresses the
artwork.
The subject of this paper is the late critic, Stuart Morgan, a
prolific writer during the 1980s and 1990s, considered by many to be
a leading critic of mid- to late-postmodern art. I will argue that, in a
cultural condition within which meaning floats between object and
subject, the critic finds him/herself in a position in which s/he may
consider him/herself as much a creator of meaning as the artist
whose work is the subject of their writing. Morgan provides a strong
example of where the critic retains authority at the same time as
questioning the validity of the objectivist approach.
From some time in the mid- to late-1960s and into the 1970s, art
critics (not all, but many) in the West had either been lamenting the
shifts that had occurred in art and culture which meant that their
own models for describing art works to which they are/ were/ had
been adamant to stick, would no longer fit or attempting to
continue to apply models of interpretation which would appear to
have been rendered obsolete by such shifts.
The most prominent and dramatic of these falls was
Greenbergs, whose later essays find him bemoaning inter-media
art (Greenberg, 1981), and its move away from Modernist concerns
with form and the aesthetic. However, arguably more interesting in
these terms is Peter Fullers later writings, including his essay on
Richard Hamilton (Fuller, 1983). He accuses Hamilton of referring to
the mega-visual tradition rather than to true artistic expression.
Expression, in Fullers terms, being the transformation of materials

by an imaginative human subject, the artist into a new aesthetic

whole in order to create another reality within the existing one
providing an alternative vision of experience and the world to that
spewed out within the mega-visual tradition of advertising. What
Fuller recognises (but is unwilling to countenance) here is the early
stages of the shift away from the idea of fixed, manifest meaning
(through the expression of the artist-subject) toward meaning that
floats on the surface of the text, between images whose relationship
to one another is purely contingent.
What the critic was facing here was the shift toward an art after
Modernism, which speaks, as Craig Owens (1980) put it, of its own
contingency, insufficiency, lack of transcendence. And thus the new
post - Modern art spoke as a collection of fragments, rather than a
collective whole. Where Modernism presented its own inherent logic,
post-Modernism faced the critic with its absolute (and purely
contingent)
illogic,
wherein
clearly
defined but
mutually
incomprehensible readings are engaged in a blind confrontation in
such a way that it is impossible to choose between them. Each
clearly defined reading exists in isolation from all others, with the
critic (at each approach) setting forth his/her interpretation. The
choice between these depends upon the readers own preference as
subject.
The critic as interpreter, then, must relinquish the Modernist
quest for (the mythical) objective interpretation and acknowledge the
absolute contingency of meaning in the post-Modern image.
Multivalent meaning is the only possible conclusion, and a more
subjective (and creative) position a relevant and useful contributor to
the meaning of the work.
What we are left with is a culture of the depthless image. By
depthless, I mean not that these images are lacking in meaning
beyond what is seen, but that meaning proliferates endlessly on the
surface. No reading between the lines will tell us anything more
about what we see. As Baudrillard (1976) put it, everything is right
on the surface, absolutely superficial. So in the 1980s and 1990s,
the culture within which meaning was exchanged, responded
to and celebrated the surface as the site of manifest meanings,
and the detachment of signified from signifier meant that the
objective interpretation (and evaluation) of images became
explicitly problematic. Meaning here becomes contingent, dependent
upon the context within which the message is being communicated
(and received).
So the critic who aims at objective interpretation can only be
speaking to one defined community at any one time. There were,

however, those writers who, through the process of writing itself,

questioned and addressed their own previous positions and moved
forward into the post-Modern condition accepting (if not embracing)
the problematics of contingency. The most striking of these is Michael
Fried, whose Art and Objecthood (Fried, 1967) was one of those
texts which attacked the movement away from (or rather against)
formal idealism and the theatricality of the new Minimalist aesthetic.
In his review of Frieds 1990 book on Courbet, however, Stephen
Melville (1996) finds in the text a writerly presence that recognises
its interpretations as interpretations and is willing to be responsible
to and for what may be forced or excessive in them. Here Fried
considers himself or at least his writing considers itself to be
accountable for his interpretations.
What is interesting here is that Melville considers Frieds
interpretations recurrently extreme and excessive, almost as if
going too far were itself some kind of criterion. He gives an
example of this excessive interpretation in Frieds reading of
Courbets The Stone Breakers.
We are asked to believe he
suggests, that the two figures are both the painters hands and his
initials, that all sorts of objects either long or thin or in some sense
hairy are brushes and that others flat or colourful are pallettes.
As Melville puts it, Fried mixes overt speculation and fierce
conviction, resulting in something of a theatricality in his writing,
which is ironic when one considers that it is against theatricality that
Fried was so strongly arguing in Art and Objecthood. This
speculation makes explicit the difficulties presented by even the
historical image when addressed from the contemporary perspective,
and sees the writer releasing his own subjectivity upon the artworks
text, transgressing the disciplinary boundary that exists (or, perhaps,
existed) between art history and art criticism. Whereas Melvilles
characterisation of Frieds writing in this case as excessive implies a
criticism, I would offer that, because of Frieds allowing his creative
(writerly) voice to flourish, the discourse around the works is
enlivened. Perhaps going too far is a perfect criterion for the
interpretation of the excessive proliferation of meaning facing the
critic of the contemporary.
Where this may become problematic for those who retain fealty
to the Modernist (or at least objectivist) model, so it allows latitude to
those who would embrace the surface as a site for the playing out of
the critics/viewers own imagination as part of the creative process
and, therefore, of the meaning of the work.
In his lecture Homage to the Half Truth, Stuart Morgan (1991)
argues the case for an art criticism which, although adhering to

certain historical precedents with regard to objectivity, also allows for

the creativity of the critic as writer (as subject and expert) to
supplement and add perspective to the critical task of interpretation.
The assault on the barrier between the traditional notions of
artist and writer is not new, with the Conceptual artists proposal that
art practice and art theory are equivalent and that language is a
legitimate form of art. However, where these practices saw a
transformation of language into art (and, therefore, away from
literature), Morgan deliberately blurs the line between art, criticism
and literature.
Morgans writing provides interpretation, backed up by informed
argument, explaining the interpretation in relation to his position as
viewer/ reader. He acknowledges the radically relativistic situation
within which he writes (and with which others have seemed to
struggle), and recognises the contingent nature of his interpretations
in relation to the unique historical moment within which the artwork
exists (at each moment of its existence) and is viewed.
Robert Stecker (1995) describes the situation thus:
If an interpretation aims at understanding a work as
the product of the intentional activity of the
historically situated artist, then it had better get right
both the intentional activity and the historical situation
of the artist. An interpreter that is merely trying to
achieve an understanding of the work does not have
to meet this standard but had better offer an
interpretation that renders the work coherent in a way
that promotes appreciation.
The relativist interpretation (all interpretations) can be valid,
indeed valuable, to the extent that it can be carefully argued within
the conceptual scheme of the interpretive community. So long as the
interpretation and its context/aims are explained, then the
interpretation can be convincing relative to its context.
Morgans criticism presents an interpretation in the sense that
each is supported through his knowledge of the artist and their
oeuvre, and his careful arguing through of his interpretations in
relation to the context within which he is offering them, whilst
acknowledging the possibility of multiple interpretations.
Moreover, it is not only that multivalence is a constituent
characteristic of the contemporary cultural condition, but also,
Morgan suggests, indicative of quality in art. He provides the example
of the literary criticism of William Empson who, in his book Seven
Types of Ambiguity, presents multiple interpretations of a single

Shakespeare sonnet, suggesting an equation between greatness and

multivalence
The most striking aspect of Morgans writing is the
creative element. In Homage he argues that to gain full impact
criticism has to display qualities of creative thinking. And no definition
of criticism should omit this element of artistic inspiration. Although
it is difficult to agree with the absolutism of the latter part of this
statement, Morgans proposition of the critic as collaborator with the
artist in terms of who creates meaning seems closer to the
contemporary cultural (and theoretical) condition which no longer
allows for the supposition that the artwork exists as separate from the
subjectivity of the artist and, especially, from the viewer and critic.
The critic and the artist (or, rather, the critic and the work) find
themselves, then, in a Hegelian 1 face-off, the subjectivities of each
fighting for mastery over the other. This, then, provides the backdrop
to Morgans metaphoric confrontation between artist and critic.
Where, for the Modernist, the artwork was read within a (mythically)
fixed value system that allowed for the critics interpretation to claim
mastery over meaning, the unfixedness of the postmodern text forces
an impasse where meaning floats somewhere between artist, artwork
and viewer.
Stuart Morgan accepts this, indeed embraces it, describing art
and criticism as rivals, not allies, since under the guise of critics lurk
potential usurpers. Morgans criticism can be read as the playing out
of this battle of subjectivities, and, often, Morgan appears to win
because his subjective voice is supported by an underlying
knowledge of the oeuvre of the artist in question.
It is in the interview mode that this is most evident. In an
interview with Morgan, Christian Boltanski (Morgan, 1988) offers that
a piece of art is always made by the person looking at that art. I send
a stimulus so that each person sees something different. I try to
send a message so that anyone can construct a private story.
Because of that I say that the artist is someone who disappears.
In a sense, Boltanski is removing his subjectivity from the
equation. The critic, in this case, is freed by the artist to bring his
subjectivity into play, and this is exactly what Morgan does. As the
interview progresses, we see Morgan gradually pushing his story onto
Boltanski who is (or at least seems to be) in agreement. So in the first
1 In Phenomenology of Spirit , Hegel (Findlay & Miller 1979) perceived the ego as only possessing an
independent self-existence through its dependence on another ego. Two self-consciences face each other,
each thinking of the other in terms of him/herself. In the other, I see myself reflected, and the only way
to break the mirroring cycle is to fight, the winner the master, the loser the slave. Morgan places the
critic and the artist into this very conflict, where understanding (interpretation) is reached only when one
subject claims mastery over the other and, therefore, over meaning.

part of the interview, Morgan asks open questions, allowing the

artists interpretation to prosper, and Boltanski weaves his story
around the objects in question. But there is then a moment when the
critic offers an interpretation, and from hereon, his questioning
becomes more didactic, closed, and Boltanski is given the option of
agreeing, or not.
When this happens in the interview model of criticism, it is rare
to find the artist contradicting the critic (for what reason it is not
presently my intention to speculate). Towards the end of the interview
with Boltanski, Morgan offers his own summary of the meanings in
the artists work, but as gleaned through his own interpretations
presented to the artist through the course of the conversation.
So after that early tactile stage you shut up the objects
you made so that no one could see them, as in the
piece where small handmade sculptures are supposed
to suggest to the viewer what your mood was on the
successive days when you made them. But you put
them all into biscuit tins. The conclusion must be that
youre an expressionist who hates himself for it.
Although it would appear that the artist has been, mostly, in
agreement with the critic, it is Morgan who has been in control of any
interpretation taking place here. His interpretation is subjective to an
extent (albeit based on his knowledge of the artists oeuvre), but he
wins the agreement (or at least the surrender) of the artist. In a
sense, as far as Morgan is concerned, it matters little which of these
is the case, as he is claiming the creation of meaning, at least in part,
for the critic. The interpretation or, perhaps, understanding, is
arrived at somewhere between the interpretations (understandings)
of both artist and critic.
Morgan allows for the nature of the postmodern text, by
accepting the fact that his interpretations can only be partial at best.
This is what he celebrates in Homage to the Half - truth, and he
provides an example in his interpretation of a piece by Louise
Bourgeois (Morgan, 1991). He tells a story of how, when he asked to
buy a wooden sculpture which vaguely represented a figure, and she
told him that he couldnt have it because it has been broken many
times, he offers that, since the work is a portrait of her son, my
suspicion is that when he was a child, she kept it lying around the
house and if he was naughty, instead of losing her temper and hitting
him, she reached for the sculpture and broke it over a boiler or a
table.2
2 My emphasis

So Morgan addresses the Barthesian text, the space of endlessly

proliferating meanings (Burgin, 1986) between the work and the
viewer/ reader. Morgans interpretations rely, often, on his own dejalu, as we see in the Bourgeois example. In spite of the depth of his
knowledge of the artist (she and he had become close friends by this
time), in this case, this would not be enough. So Morgan uses his own
experience and knowledge of Bourgeois as a starting point for his
reading, which is then furnished by all that he has already read. If
the critic can explain how he has arrived at his interpretation, the
subjective interpretation is both useful and interesting. Although, as
Burgin puts it, there can be no final closure of meaning, the reader is
at least provided with one carefully argued, but not didactic,
interpretation which may then form the starting point of that readers
(and potential viewers) experience of the work. By using terms like
my suspicion is, Morgan is making explicit the provisional nature of
his interpretation.
What Morgan delivers as a result of this mix of objective
knowledge and subjective reading is a kind of poetics of art
criticism. The truth of meaning floats somewhere between Morgans
words and the artwork, but in the process of interpretation another
work (of writing) is produced which both supplements and
compliments the artwork in question. Morgans articles themselves,
then, become objects for (aesthetic) contemplation, working
language around and through the work of art (sometimes via the
artist), but utilising his own creative voice to engage with and
respond to what the surface of the work reveals to him (at that
particular moment in time).
So, in this sense, perhaps the critic and artist are not so much
enemies as collaborators, the critic not a usurper, but an ally.
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Fonte: https://www.academia.edu/7045251/ 17/05/2014