HAZID Worksheet FORM Rev 25 May 2012 Timas Premier Oil Indonesia

HAZID WORKSHEET
Project
: ANOA PHASE 4 - AGX COMPRESSION RECONFIGURATION PROJECT
Node Description
Date of HAZID Study
: DLB Activities in the vicinity and moored alongside AGX Platform

: 25 May 2012
No
Type of Event
Potential Hazards
Initial Risk
Consequences
Anchor Handling Work Boat collision with Boat damage / lost boat
the platform / AHT
Personnel injury
(Running
Messanger Line
Under the
Bridge) using
Work Boat
S
2
R
HR
3
Running Anchor Lost control of wire due Damage to redundant
umbilical / subsea structure
/ Anchor Wire to failure of
comunication or control
system
AHT collision with the

platform / complex
Damage to vessel or
complex (damage to riser)
Personnel injury
Schedule delay
HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project
Safeguards
(Existing and Recommended Control
Measures)
Residual Risk
1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure

2. Reliable / maintained work boat
3. Weather limit
4. Adequate illumination of work area
5. Trained work boat operation
6. Maintain good communication
7. JSA for work boat operation
8. FRC/MOB Boat ready at all time
9. Suitable PPE: include work vest
R
LR
MR

2. DP Vessel as AHT
3. Reliable and well maintained vessel (with
MWS approval)
4. Competence Vessel Captain
5. Maintain good communication between
Anchor Tower and AHT
LR
HR

2. JSA for Anchor Handling
3. Weather limit for Anchor Handling
4. Parachute Buoy
5. DP Vessel as AHT
6. Reliable and well maintained vessel (with
MWS approval)
7. Competence Vessel Captain
8. Maintain good communication between
Anchor Tower and AHT
9. Weather limit
10. Briefing about the facility for all Vessel
Captain including the location of risers
11. Secondary AHT standby in the field at all
time
LR
N1
REC #
Recommendation
Action Party
Page 1 of 15
HAZID WORKSHEET
No
Type of Event
Potential Hazards
Initial Risk
Consequences
DLB Approach /
Final Departure
of AGX
Drop/Drag Anchor on
Subsea Facility
Damage Subsea Facility

Environmental HC
Discharge
Potential fire/explosion
Company reputation
R
HR
DLB colission with

platform and riser
Damage to both DLB and

5
Platform
Personnel injury / Lost of life
Schedule delay
Environmental impact
HR
Safeguards
Measures)
Residual Risk
S
1. Subsea / Seabed Survey DONE

3
2. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure and
Approved Anchor Pattern
3. Anchor on Deck of AHT
4. Mooring Analysis
5. BMS/Survey Equipment Calibration
6. Pull test the anchors
7. Continue anchor wire tension monitoring by
Anchor Tower
8. Shut Down & Depressurize West Lobe line
9. Compliance with POI Marine Procedure
R
LR

3
(Step by Step DLB Approach to AGX)
2. Weather limit
3. Maintain good communication with all
parties
4. Final approach only after all anchors are
installed / laid and DAY Light only.
5. Shut Down the platform and Depressurize
West Lobe line during Final Approach
6. AGX Riser is inside the Jacket
7. Responsible person on DLB monitoring the
gangway tip during final approach
8. Minimize personnel on AGX during DLB
final approach
9. Complete GO and No GO Checklist for the
DLB Final Approach to AGX
LR
REC #
Recommendation
Action Party
10. Anchor removal for final departure is

the reverse of anchor installation. (Meeting
will be performed with relevant parties
including MWS for removal anchors).
N1
Page 2 of 15
HAZID WORKSHEET
No
Type of Event
Potential Hazards
Initial Risk
Consequences
S
4
DLB Crane
Operation
Dropped loads / objects Damage asset causing HC

on Topside of AGX /
leak
Subsea Facilities
Personnel injury
Schedule delay
Environmental delay
R
HR
Crane Boom collision

Damage asset causing HC
with the AGX Topside
leak
and/or with Other Crane Personnel injury
Schedule delay
Damage asset causing HC 3

leak / Environmental impact
Personnel injury
Schedule delay
Crawler Crane fall over

the side due to bad
weather related during
lifting (overloaded /
dynamic load)
Safeguards
Measures)
Residual Risk
1. Approved Lifting Procedure

4
2. Certified and good condition Crane (include
MWS inspection/approval)
3. Certified and good condition Rigging
4. Certified and experienced Crane Operator
and Rigging Personnel
5. Maintain good communication among
parties involved
6. All lift within the SWL of the crane / rigging
7. Weather limit
8. Stay clear from load
9. Suitable PPE
R
MR
HR
1. All Cranes will be under the control of the 3

Project (CTR).
2. Designated Person In Charge for Every Lift
3. Good illumincation
4. Procedure control for Cranes Operations
(SIMOPS)
5. Detail planning meeting for Crane
Operations
6. Trained and experienced Crane Operator
7. Maintain good communication among all
involved parties
LR
MR
1. Weather limit
2. Barge rails in place
3. Certified and good condition crane
4. Certified and good condition rigging
equipment
5. Certified and experienced Crane Operator
6. Operate cranes within the design limit
LR
N1
REC #
Recommendation
Action Party
1. Risk Assessment to be
Timas/POI
performed for using the
Crawler Crane for Personnel
Transfer related to the
visibility (ability of the Crane
Operator to see the FROG)
2. Review Crawler Crane

Operation Procedure
Timas
Page 3 of 15
HAZID WORKSHEET
No
Type of Event
Potential Hazards
Initial Risk
Consequences
S
5
Ignition Source DLB Exhaust

on DLB
- Gas Release
(10mm hole on
Gas-Gas
Exchanger) with
20knots wind
speed toward
the DLB
Increase risk of
Fire/Explosion in the event
of HC release
L
1
R
LR
Safeguards
Measures)
Residual Risk
1. DLB Exhausts are located on the STBD

1
Forward.
2. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger
is +16 elevation)
3. F&G and ESD System on AGX
4. ERP Procedures
5. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G
detection system on platform is activated
6. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention
7. Portable Multi-Gas Detector on Stern of
DLB
L
1
R
LR
LR
REC #
Recommendation
Action Party
NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study,

the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud
would NOT reach the DLB.
Electrical Equipment on Increase risk of

DLB (Lights, Etc)
of HC release
LR
1. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger 1

is +16 elevation)
3. ERP Procedures
6. Switch off the light on Crane Boom during
the Day Light
7. Weather proof lighting/electrical system on
the barge deck and crane boom
8. DLB can be pulled / winched away (winch
speed approx 60m per minute)
9. Construction activities around process area
controlled by PTW asper integrated project
plan
DLB
Explore the possibility to

Timas
switch off the lights and other
ignition source on crane

N1
Page 4 of 15
HAZID WORKSHEET
No
Type of Event
Potential Hazards
Initial Risk
Consequences
S
Crawler Crane Exhaust
Increase risk of
of HC release
L
1
R
LR
Safeguards
Measures)
Residual Risk
1. Crawler Crane is located more than 60

1
meters away
2. Crawler Crane Exchaust is fitted with Spark
Arrestor
is +16 elevation)
5. ERP Procedures
L
1
R
LR
LR
REC #
Recommendation
Action Party

Welding Machines on
DLB
Increase risk of
of HC release
LR
1. During SIMOPS, Welding Machines are

1
located on DLB are 60m away from the
platform.
2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding
leads to Platform and shut down (turn off) the
welding machines on DLB.
is +16 elevation)
5. ERP Procedures
DLB
N1
Page 5 of 15
HAZID WORKSHEET
No
Type of Event
Potential Hazards
Initial Risk
Consequences
S
Hot Works on DLB
Increase risk of
of HC release
L
1
R
LR
Safeguards
Measures)
Residual Risk
1. All Hot Works on DLB Deck will be covered 1

by PTW
2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding
lead to Platform and shut down (turn off) the
welding machines on DLB.
is +16 elevation)
. ERP Procedures
DLB
L
1
REC #
Recommendation
Action Party
R
LR

COMMENT: The probability (frequency) of having leaks will be further elaborated (POI)
N1
Page 6 of 15
HAZID WORKSHEET
No
Type of Event
Potential Hazards
Initial Risk
Consequences
S
6
Ignition Source DLB Exhaust

on DLB
- Gas Release
(100mm hole on
Gas-Gas
Exchanger) with
20knots wind
speed toward
the DLB
Increase risk of
of HC release
L
1
R
LR
Safeguards
Measures)
Residual Risk
The release of HC with 100mm hole is

1
demonstrated to unlikely because:
1. As per QRA
2. Process Integrity Management e.g. FLIR
Camera, rectification of significant TSS Matrix
Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check
and improvement are included on the GO and NO
GO Process.
3. No break of containment the process system
during SIMOPS
4. No Heavy Lifting over the process during
SIMOPS (Most construction activities involved
small weights - structure lifted in around the
platform edges west and south
5. Drop Object Protection is in place for Gas Gas
Exchanger
L
1
REC #
Recommendation
Action Party
R
LR
The risk of release of gas has been reduced to

ALARP, if it would occur the severity would be less.
Additional Safeguards:
1. DLB Exhausts are located on the STBD
Forward.
2. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger is
+16 elevation)
4. ERP Procedures
7. Portable Multi-Gas Detector on Stern of DLB
NOTE: based on 100mm hole during the study, the
dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT
reach the DLB Exhaust.
N1
Page 7 of 15
HAZID WORKSHEET
No
Type of Event
Potential Hazards
Initial Risk
Consequences
S
Electrical Equipment on Increase risk of
STERN of DLB (Lights, Fire/Explosion in the event
Etc)
of HC release
L
1
R
HR
Safeguards
Measures)
Residual Risk

4
1. As per QRA
GO Process.
during SIMOPS
Exchanger
L
1
R
MR
REC #
4
Recommendation
Action Party
Requirement of Multi Gas

Timas
Detector on the STERN of
DLB to be captured in Project
Procedure

ALARP, if it would aoccur the severity would be
less.
Additional Safguards are:
2. ERP Procedures
4. Close water tight doors on the crane tub
5. Portable Multi Gas Detector on the Stern of
DLB.
6. Any lifting over the process during the SIMOPS
shall be covered by PTW, Risk Assessment.
N1
Page 8 of 15
HAZID WORKSHEET
No
Type of Event
Potential Hazards
Initial Risk
Consequences
S
Crawler Crane Exhaust
Increase risk of
of HC release
L
1
R
HR
Safeguards
Measures)
Residual Risk

4
1. As per QRA
GO Process.
during SIMOPS
Exchanger
L
1
REC #
Recommendation
Action Party
R
MR

less.
1. Crawler Crane is located more than 60 meters
away
3. ERP Procedures
6. Crane Crawler will be shut down upon the
detection of Gas Release after operation is
secured.
N1
Page 9 of 15
HAZID WORKSHEET
No
Type of Event
Potential Hazards
Initial Risk
Consequences
S
Welding Machines on
DLB
Increase risk of
of HC release resulting:
- Personnel injury
- Asset damage
L
1
R
HR
Safeguards
Measures)
Residual Risk

4
1. As per QRA
GO Process.
during SIMOPS
Exchanger
L
1
REC #
Recommendation
Action Party
R
MR

less.
1. During SIMOPS, Welding Machines are located
on DLB are 60m away from the platform.
2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding lead
to Platform and shut down (turn off) the welding
machines on DLB.
4. ERP Procedures
7. Refer to Technical Note for Control of Welding
Machines Isolation
8. Portable Gas Detector on the STERN of the
DLB.
N1
Page 10 of 15
HAZID WORKSHEET
No
Type of Event
Potential Hazards
Initial Risk
Consequences
S
Hot Works on DLB
Increase risk of
of HC release resulting:
- Personnel Injury
- Asset Damage
L
1
R
HR
Safeguards
Measures)
Residual Risk

4
1. As per QRA
GO Process.
during SIMOPS
Exchanger
L
1
R
MR
LR
REC #
Recommendation
Action Party

less.
1. All Hot Works on DLB Deck will be covered by
PTW
2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding lead
to Platform and shut down (turn off) the welding
machines on DLB.
4 ERP Procedures
7. Portable Gas Detector on STERN of DLB
Emergency (Fire) Fire as Ignition Source

and its Impact to the
on DLB
Safety of the Platform
Complex
Increase Risk of Fire on

Platform (AGX) if there is
concurrent HC Release
LR
1. DLB can be pulled / winched away from the 1

Platform (winch speed is approx 60m per
minute).
2. F&G System and Fire Fighting System on
the DLB
3. ERP
4. Portable Gas Detector on the STERN of
the DLB.
N1
Page 11 of 15
Emergency (Fire)
on DLB
HAZID WORKSHEET
No
Type of Event
Potential Hazards
Initial Risk
Consequences
S
Helicopter Emergency
on DLB
Increase Risk of Fire on

Platform (AGX) if there is
concurrent HC Release
L
2
R
LR
Safeguards
Measures)
Residual Risk
S
1. DLB can be pulled / winched away from the 1

Platform (winch speed is approx 60m per
minute).
2. F&G System and Fire Fighting System on
the DLB
3. ERP
4. Portable Gas Detector on the STERN of
the DLB.
L
1
REC #
Recommendation
Action Party
R
LR

Failure of Main
Generator / Black Out
on DLB
Process Upset
on AGX
DLB cannot pull away in

case required
LR
1. Redundancy of Generators
2. Emergency Power Generator
3. Fail Safe Brake on the anchor winches
4. AHT / Tow Tug standby in the field at all
time
5. PM System on DLB
Increasing Flaring Rate Increase Radiant Heat in the 2

due to Blow Down Event vicinity of AGX Crane
LR
1. Radiant Heat Study for AGX shows that it 1

is safe for the Crane Operator to be inside the
Crane Cabin during Full Process Blow Down.
2. Proximity of DLB Crane Operator is farther
from the Flare Tip therefore impact of Radiant
Heat is minimal.
LR
LR
1. Process System is designed to fail safe

1
2. Process is continuosly monitored from
CCR
3. Process System will be maintained and
functional with no significant case to operate
in place during SIMOPS
4. Contingency Plan in place such that AGX
Project Team will be asked to leave AGX until
ESD event has been rectified
5. COntingency Plan in place such that HOFO
will communicate potential for escalation to
DLB such that preparation may made for DLB
withdrawl from AGX vicinity.
LR
NOTE: No Effect anticipated

to the DLB based on Flare
Radiation Study
ESD Event Causing

Creates changes in Process 2
AGX Process Instability System Pressure,
Temperature, and Liquid
Inventory which could lead
to an increase potential for
HC release
N1
Page 12 of 15
HAZID WORKSHEET
No
Type of Event
Potential Hazards
Initial Risk
Consequences
S
5
R
HR
Interference with Crane Helicopter collision with

4
Operation
Cranes / Crash
10 Vessel
Movement /
alongside on
DLB
Collision with the DLB /

Platform / Material
Barge / Anchor Buoy /
Anchor Wire
Asset damage
4
Schedule delay
11 SIMOPS
Operation
Between DLB
Crane and AGX
Crane
DLB Crane Boom

collision with the AGX
Crane
Damage asset
Personnel injury
Schedule delay
Gas Release Anoa

Riser
Helicopter
Operation on
DLB
Fire / Explosion
Personnel Injury
Safeguards
Measures)
Residual Risk
1. Mitigation as per CTO Procedure

5
2. F&G System on AGX
3. ERP Procedures
5. DLB can be pulled / winched away to clear
from platform (winch speed approx 60m per
minute)
R
HR
HR
1. Crane Operations on DLB will be shut

down and/or crane boom would be clear for
Helicopter Operations
2. Trained and experienced HLO
3. Inform Crane Operators of Incoming
Helicopters
4. ERP
LR
HR
1. Suitable Vessels (Include MWS

2
inspection/approval)
2. Competent Vessel Captain
3. Slack Anchor Wires if required
4. Good communication between paties
involved
5. Weather limit
6. Adequate fendering on DLB and vessels
7. Briefing to all Vessel Captain prior to
entering 500m zone
8. High Vis painted Anchor Buoys
9. Comply with POI Marine Operation
Procedure
10. Establish communication with HOFO prior
to entering 500m Zone and/or Marine
Supertindent prior to approaching DLB
LR
HR
1. All Cranes will be under the control of the 3

Project (CTR).
2. Designated Person In Charge for Every Lift
3. Good illumincation
4. Procedure control for Cranes Operations
(SIMOPS)
5. Detail planning meeting for Crane
Operations
LR
N1
REC #
Recommendation
Action Party
Page 13 of 15
HAZID WORKSHEET
No
Type of Event
Potential Hazards
Initial Risk
Consequences
Safeguards
Measures)
Residual Risk
S
12 Personnel
Transfer
Personnel being
Transferred Fall from
Height
Personnel injury / Lost of life 5
HR
1. Certified and good condition Crane

2. Certified and good condition FROG
3. Certified and good condition rigging
4. Provision of safety sling
5. No personnel transfer untill the Vessel will
be securely moored
6. Distance of free board between DLB and
vessel is small
7. Provision of tag lines
8. Familiarization for transfer using FROG
9. Maintain good communicaton among
parties involved (CO, Bunksman, and
Riggers).
10. Weather limit defined for personnel
transferring using FROG and Crawler Crane
LR
13 MAE on
AGX/ANOA
Pool Fire on ANOA

coming from ANOA 8"
Riser Pipeline
Personnel injury / Lost of life 5

Impair both ANOA and AGX
Muster Area
HR
1. All personnel shall muster to DLB including 5

POI Personnel
2. Corrosion Monitoring and Pigging Pipeline
covered by FIMS
3. PSLL on the pipeline
4. Daily surface inspection
5. DLB will be pull / winched away
HR
14 N2 Operation
Condensate on the sea Personnel Injury / Lost of

due SKIM pile overfilled Life
MR
1. Level Management
2. Daily surface inspection
3. DLB will be pull / winched away
LR
Extreme Temperature
Personnel injury
(minus 160 - minus 200 Cryogenic
C)
Embrittlement
MR
1. Engineered and certified ISO Storage

Tanks
2. Scaffold and bunded area
3. Use of planks and tarpaulin
MR
N2 Spill
Personnel Injury
Cryogenic
Embrittlement
MR
1. Engineered and certified ISO Storage

Tanks
2. Scaffold and bunded area
3. Use of planks and tarpaulin
N1
REC #
Recommendation
Action Party
Verify the certification of the

storage tank and inspection
prior to mobilization offshore
Timas / PNS
Review the N2 handling and

storage procedure
Timas / PNS
MR
Page 14 of 15
HAZID WORKSHEET
No
Type of Event
Potential Hazards
Initial Risk
Consequences
S
15 3rd Party Vessel Collision with the
Anchor Buoy / Anchor
/ Security
Wire
Personnel Injury
Asset Damage
Schedule Delay
R
MR
Safeguards
Measures)
Residual Risk
S
1. High Vis Anchor Buoy

2. Standy By Vessels
3. Radar Watch
4. Intensity of Marine Activities would deter
the 3rd Party Vessel to stay away
5. Liaison Officer onboard of DLB
R
LR
REC #
Recommendation
Action Party
16 Sabotage
Construction Crew
Increase risk of incident
tempering with Platform
and DLB system
MR
1. Socialization of work to the offshore

construction team in advance
2. PTW, JSA, and workpacks
3. Involve operation team during work pack
review and execution of the works
4. Maintain positive working environment,
provide motivation
5. Restriction to sensitve areas (security
measures) e.g. safety / warning signs,
socialize restricted areas during
meeting/awareness, Access Control
6. Maintain adequate supervision / QC
7. Reward program
LR
Operation to review the

existing "security measures"
and improve as required
POI
17 Communication
between DLB
and its Support
Vessels and
between DLB
and AGX/ANOA
Clear Communication
Method NOT
established
MR
1. ANOA HSE Induction / Awareness

3
2. Various coordination meeting e.g. daily
planning meeting
3. Provision of radio communication
4. English speaking key personnel
5. Permission to be obtained from HOFO prior
to entering 500m zone
6. Permission to be obtained from Marine
Superintendent for approaching DLB or
entering the Anchor Pattern
7. Competent Vessel Captain
8. Briefing of all support vessels include
socialization of procedures
9. Complete GO and No GO Checklist.
LR
Establish radio
communication channel for
all parties to minimize
interference
Timas/POI
Increase risk of
miscommunication /
interference leading to
incident resulting to:
- Personnel injury
- Asset damage
N1
Page 15 of 15

HAZID Worksheet FORM Rev 25 May 2012 Timas Premier Oil Indonesia

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HAZID Worksheet FORM Rev 25 May 2012 Timas Premier Oil Indonesia

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HAZID WORKSHEET

: ANOA PHASE 4 - AGX COMPRESSION RECONFIGURATION PROJECT

: DLB Activities in the vicinity and moored alongside AGX Platform

AHT collision with the

1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure

1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure

1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure

Damage Subsea Facility

DLB colission with

Damage to both DLB and

1. Subsea / Seabed Survey DONE

1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure

10. Anchor removal for final departure is

Dropped loads / objects Damage asset causing HC

Crane Boom collision

Damage asset causing HC 3

Crawler Crane fall over

1. Approved Lifting Procedure

1. All Cranes will be under the control of the 3

2. Review Crawler Crane

Ignition Source DLB Exhaust

1. DLB Exhausts are located on the STBD

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study,

Electrical Equipment on Increase risk of

1. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger 1

Explore the possibility to

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study,

1. Crawler Crane is located more than 60

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study,

1. During SIMOPS, Welding Machines are

1. All Hot Works on DLB Deck will be covered 1

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study,

Ignition Source DLB Exhaust

The release of HC with 100mm hole is

The risk of release of gas has been reduced to

The release of HC with 100mm hole is

Requirement of Multi Gas

The risk of release of gas has been reduced to

The release of HC with 100mm hole is

The risk of release of gas has been reduced to

The release of HC with 100mm hole is

The risk of release of gas has been reduced to

The release of HC with 100mm hole is

The risk of release of gas has been reduced to

Emergency (Fire) Fire as Ignition Source

Increase Risk of Fire on

1. DLB can be pulled / winched away from the 1

Increase Risk of Fire on

1. DLB can be pulled / winched away from the 1

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study,

DLB cannot pull away in

Increasing Flaring Rate Increase Radiant Heat in the 2

1. Radiant Heat Study for AGX shows that it 1

1. Process System is designed to fail safe

NOTE: No Effect anticipated

ESD Event Causing

Interference with Crane Helicopter collision with

Collision with the DLB /

DLB Crane Boom

Gas Release Anoa

1. Mitigation as per CTO Procedure

1. Crane Operations on DLB will be shut

1. Suitable Vessels (Include MWS