_7_NASA

SPACE
VEHICLE
DESIGN
CRITERIA
(STRUCTURES)

_Si_J
NASASP-8095

CASE
FILE
cOPY

PRELIMINARY
CRITERIA
FORTHE

FRACTURE
CONTROL
OF
SPACESHUTTLESTRUCTURES

JUNE1971

NATIONAL

AERONAUTICS

AND

SPACE

ADMINISTRATION

PREFACE

Space vehicle

structures

are vulnerable

to the initiation

and propagation
of cracks or crack-like defects during
their service life, which may lead to structural failure.
Although
individual
causative factors and preventive
measures have been known for some time, and have been
accounted
advent

for in the design of aerospace

of the Space Shuttle

structures,

has emphasized

due to extreme criticality

of structural
requirement for reuse of the vehicle.

the

the problem

weight and the

Structural
Design Criteria Applicable to a Space Shuttle
(NASA
S1'-8057) and Fracture Control
of Metallic
Pressure Vessels (NASA SP-8040).
Preliminary

criteria

requirements

or specifications

point
or check
requirements
or
fracture

control

herein

list
for

to describe the
prevent structural
defects.

control"

has recently

come into use

approach to design which seeks to

failure due to cracks or crack-like

of

approach

to provide a basic understanding

and magnitude
as_mble

in

of the subject,
one

conci_

of the nature

it was felt desirable to

volume

the

complex

and

mt,ltidiseiplinary
factors that bear on the subject. It
should be noted that the elements of the subject are not
new-only
manner.

the

consideration

of

them

in an overall

NASA

work

subject

it

was

the

belief
would

that

the

most

be by means

effective
of succinct

form

of

fracture

of

have been used extensively

interpretive

Design Panel

Materials

and

reviewing

was performed

were

Technology

and

the

on very short

other

7 aerospace

technical
notice

by

working group comstructures,

materials,
related

technologies.

companies,

of the NASA Langley Research

list of participants

NASA

Center.

is given on page iv.

criteria

the

in medium

and

Centers.
NASA Headquarters,
and the USAF Flight
Dynamics
Laboratory.
This meeting
was chaired by

statements.

Where appropriate,

preparing

mechanics,

Participating

Compiling,

been added

fracture
control
desirability
of a

by the Structural

an ad hoc government/industry
posed of specialists in design,

statements
of what has to be done to assure adequate
fracture control. Most of the document consists of such
has also

be

to design.

Structures

material

R. W. Leonard

presentation

to

Working Group.

The
In order

the

intended

but to serve as a beginning

for generating
evaluating
the

The effort was sponsored

The term "fracture

are not

information

integrating,

were performed
McDonnell

type.

Two references

the direction

in preparing

this document:

tural Systems

and

editing

by the Design Criteria

Douglas

Astronautics

of the Langley
Office (SSO).

Re,arch

of

the document

Program Office of
Company

under

Center's

Struc-

Organizations

and

development

individuals

who

of this document

participated

in the

include:

U. S. AIR

FORCE

LA BORA

7"OR Y

FLIGttT

DYNAMICS

T. L. Haglage

NAA_4

LANGI,

EY

RESEARCH

CENTER

94. Elber
GENERA

L D YNA 311(S

C. Dale

CORPORA

TION

J. R. Hall

Little

H. F. Hardrath

W. Witzell

R. R. Heldenfels
R 94. Leonard

GR UMMA

N A ER OSPA ('k' CORPORA

TION

C. C. Poe

A. Alberi
A. Gomza

NASA

LI:WIS

RESEARCIt

CENTER

W. F. Brown

A. I'erigard

G. '1. Smith
LOCKttEED

AIRCRAFT

CORPORA

TION

J. E. Srawley

J. C. Ekvall
NASA
MA R TIN-MA

R1ETTA

CORPORA

MANNED

SPA CECRA

P. E. Fitzgerald

TION

L. Loechel

R. E. Johnson

F. R. Schwartzberg

R. E. Lindemann
1.. G. St.

McDONNEEL

DOUGLAS

CORf'ORA

Leger

TION
NASA

H. W. Babel

MARSItALL

SPACE"

PZIGHT

CENTER

H. R. Coldwater

R. H. Christensen
M. B. Harmon

C. D. Crockett

J. F. Schier

G. A. Deuel

F. R. Smith

FT CENTER

M. C. Mcilwain

(Editorl

E. C. McKannan
NOR

TH A MEN I('AN

CORPORA

R O('K WI:L L
NAX40Fb7CE

TION

et ND

R. W. Westrup

OF ADVANCkD

7'/:( 7tNOLOG

RESEARCH

D. A. Gilstad
THE" BOEING

COMPA

N Y
NASA

B. E. Landry

sale by the

National

OF MANNED

SPACE"

FLIGHT

N. G. Peil

J. N. Masters

For

OFbT(E"

Technical

Information

Service,

Springfield,

Virginia

22151

Price

$3.00

CONTENTS

I.

OBJECTIVE

2.

SCOPE

3.

MANAGEMENT

4.

DESIGN

,,)

4.1

4.2

Service Life Philosophy

4.1.1
Safe-Life

4. 1.2

Fail-Safe

4.1.3

Residual

Strength

Fracture

Control

Precautions

5.

LOADS AND ENVIRONMENTS

6.

MATERIALS

6.1

Material Selection

6.2

Material Characterization

7.

ANALYSIS

8.

FABRICATION

9.

QUALITY

10.

11.

5
PROCESS

CONTROL

ASSURANCE

6
6

TESTS
10.1

Design-Development

10.2

Acceptance

OPERATIONS

and Qualification

Tests

6
7

and Proof Tests

AND MAINTENANCE

ili

11

PRELIMINARY

CRITERIA

FOR THE FRACTURE

OF SPACE SHUTTLE

1.

OBJECTIVE

STRUCTURES

failure.

The

covering
The objective
criteria

for

structures.
procedures
the

of this document
the

fracture

is to provide preliminary

control

of

Space

Shuttle

Fracture control is a set of policies and

intended to prevent structural failure due to

initiation

or propagation

of

cracks

or crack-like

the vehicle,
tion

criteria

define

the entire

and

assurance

including engineering
procurement,

procedures,

All disciplines necessary

treated herein:

Space Shuttle.
define

failures

the

To accomplish

design,

due to crack-initiated

during the service life of the

this objective,

fabrication,

fracture

Space

control

Shuttle

engineering

criteria

components

are applicable

which

cracking or fracture on the basis of anticipated

The

failure

fracture

growth
to
following:

modes

control
the

which

criteria
point

of

for

or

to

rupture

or

in the

as a minimum

leakage

by

loads and

crew safety

are accounted
include

the

of

the

In

Cracks initiated at existing flaws

Cracks due to stress corrosion

Cracks caused by material contamination

by fatigue

3.

mishandling

to apply to accidental

which

in itself

to effective

Design

Loads and environments

Materials

Analyses

Fabrication

proof

tests.
fracture control

are

Quality assurance

Tests

Operations and maintenance

the

process control

remainder
type

of

this

are design

document,
criteria

medium type provide guidance

criteria.

Cracks initiated

inadvertent

and qualification

Management

boldface

The criteria are not intended

quality

to those

are determined,

to either

processes,

proce-

analysis and tests, to be (1) susceptible

environment,
and (2) critical
system performance.

life of

material selec-

and/or periodic

control,

SCOPE

The

design,

the criteria

environmental

inspection, maintenance, repair, and verification

dures required for adequate fracture control.

2.

measures

tests, flight tests, and operational service usage. Fracture

control measures also apply to non-flight articles under-

unacceptable

structural

control

of operational

fabrication
acceptance

going development

will not occur

fracture

development

defects during fabrication, testing, and service life. The

basic objective of the proposed criteria is to ensure that
fractures

CONTROL

would

or

cause

and

statements

in

statements

in

for interpretation

of the

MANAGEMENT

A fracture
mented

by

control
the

plan

shall be developed

contractor.

The

plan

and docu-

shall

include

provisions
for the

following:

4.

Identification

of components

selected

ture

on

of

control

the

basis

structural flightworthiness

for frac-

criticality

to

and susceptibility

to

cracking or fracture
Definition

of organization

Appropriate

responsibilities

multidisciplinary,

Establishment
that

and

review

of a fracture-control

is accessible

interested

and readily

data bank

available

quality assurance

plan

which affect

The evaluation

enough

degrade

shall

shall treat

fracture

appraisal,

Management

Design

Loads and environments

Materials

Analyses

Fabrication

all subjects

control,

as a minimum:

and

including

(TBI))

the next

percent

for that
for

_tructural

and stress
considered

concepts,

Operations

load

at the

Analysis

properties

design

of flaw growth
and

and operating

their

varia-

environments

equal to or greater than the allowable

For

selected

and
the

components

for

fracture

safe-life,

as determined

by conventional

and test

and assuming

an initially

control,

selected

for

designed so that verification

unsubstantiated

the

fatigue analysis

unflawed

shall be at least (-I BD) times the specified

structure,

service life or

interval.
fracture

control

shall

be

of safe-life is not dependent

projected

improvement

in

NDE

capabilities.
4.1.2

Tests

to

all flaws or defects

sizes,

on

of limit

condition.
material

inspection

below that required

levels. The inspection

procedures
shall be
adequate
only when they can readily detect

Components

Quality

design
extent

for the require-

scheduled

of the structure

(TBD) times the inspection

shall account

is

a safe-life design, such as metallic

before

the strength

accoun_

bility,

control

to deter-

pressure vessels or landing gears, any flaws that cannot

be detected in a regularly scheduled inspection shall not

temperature

review, performance

be evaluated

Safe-Life

to sustain

components,

control by management

following

4.1.1

and

structural

shall

or a fail-safe design approach

ments of safety, structural weight, inspectability,

maintainability, and replaceability
as well as the cost and the
influence of environmental
factors.

visibility to management
of the perand effectiveness
of fracture control

procedures.

disciplines

practicable,

resistance

The fracture

component
a _fe-life

more
appropriate.
In general,
the fail-safe
approach
shall be employed
to the maximum

grow

Appropriate

Philosophy

For structure requiring

of a continuing

of

Life

Each selected

activity directed toward identifying and reporting conditions

which could affect the fracture
providing
formance

Service

to all

personnel

Maintenance

4.1

mine whether

procedures
for communicating
and taking
action on matters relevant to fracture control

DESIGN

process control

assurance

Fail-safe

Fail-Safe

designs shall be developed

fracture-arrest capability
damaged condition.

to provide adequate

and residual

strength

in the

All fail-safe structure

shall be accessible for periodic
inspection.
Fail-sale design shall account for the followand maintenance

ing factors:

Size, type, and source of flaws

Effects

of processes,

and manufacturing

Critical loading conditions

levels

and associated

stress

Material properties

and operation

Critical structural components

Stress-corrosion

Extent
of
withstand

Applicable

and propagation

damage

which

the structure

Strain

concentrations

Residual
modes

of failure

accounted
processes

The
dynamic
elements, and

effect

The concentration

of

suddenly

configurations,
on flaw initiation

shall be accounted

for

under fabrication,

conditions

test,

shall be minimized

cracking shall be prevented

material selection,
mental control

can

geometric
tolerance

temper selection,

stresses

shall

be

for in selection

by

or environ-

evaluated

and

of manufacturing

and determination

of assembly

fit-up

failing
The capabilities
of applicable NDE techniques
for detection of critical structural defects shall
be utilized

of load or stress on elements

adjacent to the failed element

4.1.3

Adequate

Residual Strength

The

residual

strength

of

fail-safe

structure

shall

be

adequate to withstand (TBD) percent of limit design

conditions. The residual strength of fail-safe structure is
defined as the strength
single structural element.

remaining

after failure

of any

5.

LOADS

residual

adequate

strength

of

to withstand

life. The

growth

of

safe-life

design

original

flaws

properties
environments.

or

due

provisions

shall be incor-

and chemical

ENVIRONMENTS

static and dynamic

environments

loading

anticipated

and thermal

in the various

phases of the service life shall be defined for all major

structure

limit conditions

shall

be

through-

out its operational

life. The residual strength of safe-life
structure
is the strength remaining at any time during its
service

AND

The cumulative

structural
The

accessibility

porated in the design

strength

by

may

degradation

to

be reduced
of

temperature

and

by

include

components

all

flight

and

or systems.
ground

Section 2. The load spectrum

system selected

The spectra

phases

shall

as indicated

in

for each component

or

for fracture control shall be determined

by rational analysis that accounts for

factors and their statistical variations:

the

following

mechanical
The explicitly defined model
upon which the life spectrum

corrosive

of vehicle usage
is based, includ-

ing as a minimum conditions such as are cited

in Section 5 of NASA S1'-8057 and NASA
4.2

Fracture

Components

Control

selected

Precautions
for

fracture

Environmental
control

designed

to the general criteria and guidelines

SP-8057.

Fracture control precautions

be

The frequency
of application of the various
types of loads and load levels and environments

The environmentally

The environments

in NASA

shall be incorpor-

ated into the detail design configuration.

tions shall include,

shall

Specification

These precau-

induced

loads

but are not limited to, the following:

Eccentricities

and

stress

could act as fatigue-crack

be minimized

concentrations
nucleation

that

acting

loads with their proper

simultaneously

phase relationships

sites shall

The prescribed service-life

requirements

with

The references

cited in Section

4.8.4

of NASA SP-8057

give recommended

practices

The design spectra

shall be used for both design analysis

and

testing.

revised

The

load-temperature

as the structural

design

dynamic,

thermodynamic,

accuracy

and completeness.

In

many

cases

for defining

it

data,

temperatures,

and

loads

be

necessary

shall

be

improve

as

to

in

An evaluation

out

predic-

accelerations,

strains,

shall be performed at the time of material

or product

for each

contractor's

fracture

control

plan shall specify the frequency

The

with which such

data shall be used to reassess the remaining service life.

production

Specific
fracture

leclmiques;

material
control

expressed
tions.

properties

which

material

selection

include:

by existing
minimum
properties

to initiation

shall

be accounted

(1) fracture

for in

6.2

Material

of fatigue

Materials

shall be selected,

(6) crack

propagation

characteristics,

when possible,

listed
include

and the Aerospace

materials

stored
high-strength

materials,

are especially

or accidental

susceptible

deviation
They

of

their

low

to serious

damage

from the specified

fabrica-

are also highly

effects of apparently
minor
design stress level, therefore,
greater
strength

because

sensitive

to the

damage. For a particular

it is often better to use a

portion
of the strength
potential
of
material rather than a smaller portion

a lowof the

Structural

Metals Handb,)ok.
Preference shall be given to sources
which provide data on a statistical basis. Material sources

Fracture
process

low-toughness

on the basis of

in reliable sources.
Widely
M1L-HDBK-5, ASTM Stand-

conditions.
Wherever possible,
shall be avoided.

procedures.

specifica-

shall incorporate

toughness;

and propagation

shall be approved by NASA.

tion

or industry

Characterization

including real-time effects (e.g., time at peak load); and

(7) effects
of temperature
and other environmental

from

shall be prepared when

are not
adequately

special NDE requirements.

ards, MIL Specifications,

toughness,

for

values for fracture toughness or other

under prescribed test conditions, and

loading; (4)the
effect of fabrication and joining processes; (5) the effects of cleaning agents, dye penetrants,

Many

requirement

that may be obscured

specifications

fracture
properties
recognized sources

coatings;

defects

government

and environmentally
induced cracking; (3) threshold
values of stress intensity under sustained
and cyclic

and

(I) the

Selection

Fracture

(2) resistance

include:

(2)the

specifications
requirements

also shall incorporate

Material

Examples

and

Where practical,

required
fracture

MATERIALS

6.1

form.

material's lack of fracture toughness, or its susceptibility

to stress-corrosion
cracking or to variations in material

and

and recorded

mission

by proof

selection to determine whether any unique problems or

requirements
related to fracture control exist for the

in-process NDE to detect

in the final product tbrm.

shall be measured
operation.

carry

a more reliable

vehicle

6.

so that the required life for a given component

can be evaluated by available NDE techniques,

test, or by a combination
of the two.

and the aero-

data

selected

material

may

such

spectra

develops

additional
analyses to establish
tion of useful service life.
Structural

load spectra.

properties
and their

used
sources

in a materials

properties
inspection

data

in the materials
selection
shall be documented
and
bank.

Pertinent

fracture

measured as a part of a standardized

receiving
shall be compiled in the materials data bank.

When fracture properties

shall include

data are missing, the contractor

in his fracture

control

plan

a list of the

sources examined and shall propose a program to obtain

the missing infornmtion.

strength of a high-strength
material due to the greater
tolerance for flaws in the lower-strength
material.

When data sources define potential

with the application
of a material,

Materials and their design operating

include in his fracture control plan an assessment of each

problem and a proposed method to overcome it.

stress levels shall be

problems associated
the contractor
shall

Test programs
materials

to determine

shall employ

the need for subsequent

For

example,

promising

of candidate
terization
Uniform
mination

of

due to the maximum

accounted for

tests

can

conditions,

materials

identify

the

and fabrication

before

in-depth

size

processes

materials

shall be employed

of material fracture properties.

shall conform

Acceptable
standards
the American Society

charac-

Materials
Documents.

utilized

shall provide

application.
NASA.

Test

of Automotive

and

The test specimens

valid

test

data

procedures

shall

shall

adequacy

of all components

be performed

at

and procedures

be

approved

by

to verify
selected

and

con-

by tests.

as applicable:

dynamic

as specified

8.

tests,

loads

in Section

for unflawed

characteristics

of flaw growth

tional load environment

Residual strength

structural

of

and

and

responsibilities

and

critical

CONTROL
procedures

That

pertinent

fracture

control

be

requirements

and
precautions
are defined
in
drawings and process specifications

identified

applicable

for fracture control

throughout

the

are

fabrication

cycle

structural

That

of occur-

implemented

the fracture control

and

precautions

under predicted

shall

detail

fabrication

special

opera-

damage

instructions
and
or

properly

requirements
guard

other

against
structural

degradation

spectra

analyses

of fail-safe structure

That quality assurmlce procedures

are defined
to validate in-process controls and the integrity
of the finished

The

to be
should

release

development

to ensure the following:

after the failure of a single principal element.

dynamic

of

of text requirements
results. This includes

PROCESS

processing
Analyses

probabilities

7.2 of

structure

defects at the most likely locations

rence and at other critical sections.

dispersed

tests, and proof tests

FABRICATION

clearly

Predicted

and resulting

That all parts selected

Fatigue-life analyses

the

the structural

for fracture

analyses shall be performed,

static

along

flight

Analyses and definition

and evaluation
of test

Functional

of

1.0 shall be

d'y'namic pressure

in-flight failure

established

thermal stresses
NASA SP-8057

point

of

single

(fail-safe

for the intended

quate, the analyses shall be supplemented

any

load occurrence,

Aeronautical

trol. Where adequate theoretical

techniques do not exist
or where experimental
correlation
with theory is inade-

Analyses

margin

expected

the

failed

Risk assessment analyses to quantify the probabilities of crack occurrence, crack detection,

Aero-

ANALYSES

The following

A flutter

on the maximum

qualification

Analyses

or with

element

provided

atmospheric

standards.

Engineers,

structures)

structural

materials
7.

load shall be

ascent and entry design traject .oxies and during

Where possible,

to recognized

Specifications,

Material

for deter-

include the test specifications

of
for Testing and Materials, specifi-

of the Society

(safe-life

principal
structures).

test procedures

nautical

spectrum

Dynamic analyses to verify that the structure is

flutter free with the maximum tolerable crack

most

tests are begun.

these procedures

cations

properties

tests to minimize

detailed tests.

screening

tempers,

the fracture

initial screening

of

energy

during

the

failure of the single principal structural element

part.

implemented
account for

Fracture control

practices

in the preceding
steps
mechanical
and fracture

properties
andphysicalconditions
thatcould
contribute
tocrackinitiationorgrowth.

10.

TESTS

10.1

Procurement
requirements
andcontrolsshallbe
mented

to

employ

fracture

consistent

ensure

that

suppliers

control

with internal

and

procedures

fabrication

Design-Development
Tests

imple-

subcontractors
and

process

precautions

Design-development

practices.

the feasibility
process

9.

QUALITY

ASSURANCE

The quality assurance system applied to components

selected for fracture control shall insure that materials
and parts conform to specification requirements; that no
damage or degradation has occurred during manufacture,
and operational

fidence exists
cause failure.

that

usage;

no defects

and

that high con-

are present

which

adequacy

approach

control.

on flight-quality

Maximum
test

tests shall be performed

of a design

for fracture

conducted
structural

processing,

and Qualification

Qualification
hardware

tests shall be

to demonstrate

the

of the same hardware

for

of the design.

use shall be made

purposes.

to confirm

or manufacturing

For

example,

consideration

should

be

given to use of the same hardware for fatigue tests and

fail-safe (residual

strength)

tests.

could
In

the

planning

and

implementation

of

structural

development
tests, fracture
control measures shall be
accounted
for. Sufficient
tests shall be performed
to
Appropriate

inspection

be selected

for inspection

fracture
and

control

with

control.

points and NDE techniques

to verify

other

of components
compliance

specifications

In choosing

selected

points

to

fracture

and techniques,

consideration

should

configuration,
size, location,

accessibility
for inspection, and predicted
and characteristics
of critical initial flaws.

The capability
production

be given

for

of the selected
or

operational

to material,

structural

NDE techniques,

inspection

under

conditions,

reliably detect critical flaws in fracture control

nents
shall
be
determined
experimentally.
techniques,

which

permit

tion to be expressed
are desired.

tile confidence

quantitatively,

provide

high

satisfactory

confidence

that

the

design

service life and good fracture

will exhibit

characteristics.

with the above,

pertinent

inspection

shall

to

compoNDE

of flaw detec-

on a statistical

For safe-life structures,

tests shall be conducted
demonstrate
that undetected
flaws in the structure
not propagate
confirm

to a critical size during

this demonstration,

conducted

at intervals

periodic

specified

to
will

the service life. To

inspections

shall be

in the fracture

control

plan. Static structure

qualification
tests shall be performed as described in Section 7.6.1 of NASA SP-8057
using the highest practicable
Special

attention

shall

structural
tests.

elements

Safe-life

tests

level of structural
be

given

to

assembly.

fracture-critical

in the planning

and conduct

flight-quality

hardware

of these

basis,
on

performed

as

described

SP-8057.

Load

and

resistance

events
to simulate
the operational
service
loading
environment.
Appropriate
proof loads shall be included

of components

selected

are reported and dispositioned

formal material review system.

for fracture

through

control

the contractor's

to provide

in their proper
the structure

Inspection

data shall

control

material

central

of

be
and

collected

regarding

components

data bank. The contractor's

fracture

in an accessible

fracture control

plan

shall specify the frequency with which these data are

assessed to evaluate trends and anomalies and to define
any required

corrective

action.

environment
proper

sequence.

of

be

Procedures shall be established to ensure that unplanned

events which could
be detrimental
to the fracture

established

in Section7.6.7.1

shall

spectra

be

loads and sequencing

of

Fracture-critical

shall be identified

NASA

shall

locations

prior to start

in

of fatigue

testing. During the test, the time of any crack initiation

in these locations shall be identified and the crack
propagation

Fail-safe
formed

characteristics

and rates shall be recorded.

tests on flight-quality
hardware
as described
in Section7.6.7.2

shall be perof NASA

SP-8057.

The

as to verify
as well

shall

be planned

the effectiveness

as

damaged

tests

the

residual

and implemented

of "crack-arrest"

strength

of

so

proof-test

service-life

provisions

the structure

valid

For

integral

(i.e.,

pressure

tankage,

flight-load

As

Acceptance

and

minimum,

all

compartments
includes
storage

be

All

reviewed

to

determine

specified

and

at what

in the

fabrication

given

to

pressurized

proof

test.

compartment,

structural

a proof

testing

Particular

components

test

should

This
gas

should

be

should

be

be performed

emphasis

designed

on

be

safe-life

design,

shall

with

provide

greater

positive

than

critical

in accordance
then

NDE

with

but
in

SP-8040

not

is not proof-tested

of NASA

assurance
size.
tile

structure

principles
flaws

accordance

For

with

is inappropriate,

the

but

NASA

the

before

leakage"

the
on

critical

size is

design,

proof

principles

past

been

The

effects

the

assessment

The

generation

of

detect

For

NASA
flaws

those

test

and

conditions

present

which

during

its

performed

These

factors

Ioadings,

life.

could

is

include,

and

atmospheric

When

theory

is invalid

yield),

appropriate

pre-flawed
(e.g.,

the
(i.e.,

laboratory
thickness

or

the

chemical

elastic
thin gages

tanks

coupons
and

heat

shall
which

shall
life

flaw

of proof

testing

mechanics
of

theory

high-pressure

be accounted
of

shuttle

data

due

for in

structure.

leakage

to

thernlal

mode

at

(i.e.,

most

areas

of

proof

test

shall

be

break"

tanks),

the

levels

failure

exceeding

the

operational

of TBD.

analytical

this

considerable

the predicted

before

propellant

under

growth

for tile life analysis.

at pressure

procedures

failure

mode

experimental
coupled

work

with

for

are

assuring

not

to sludy

improved

NDE

yet

safe

available,

flaw growth

to

capat:ilities

is

necessary.

structurat

selected

for

would

normally

fracture

components

control
involve

where

smaller

defect
inspection

In general,

the maximum

allowable

be.

to

have

be proof-tested.

components

allowable

than

which

shall

the

expected

effects,

cycles,

of

sizes

are

been
This

structural
estimated

techniques

to

can

be

to detect.

thermal

mechanics
close

be performed

equal

to

permanent

on

apply

the structo

proce-

tanks.

service

in which

adequate

life

to, combined

simulate

"failure
the

control

environmental

treatment)

Since

assemblies

or stresses

as

tanks

clearly

integrity

cycling

the

is "ie',ak

by a factor

be

fracture

factors

shuttle

be followed.

fracture

the

be required

main

performance.

acceleration

for

tests

be

for all significant

thermal

shall

propellant

of

Unpressurized

limited

linear

service

shall

defects.

service-life

cycles,

are

or leakage

in the fracture

but are not

proof-

defects

inspections

temperatures,

effects.

no
failure

shall account

load

be used,

establish

that

of such

influence

repeated

stresses,

verify

specified

conditions

loadings,

data shall
to

Periodic

the absence

sustained

ture

will

at intervals

which

test

cause catastrophic

service

proof-test

factors

and

appropriate,

which
could

plan to confirm

The

theory

practicable

of

stress

levels

mechanics

where

is

external

be demon-

stresses,

concept

of

to verify

of thermal

may

proof

desirable.

Fracture

those

mode

SP-8040

and

of such

For

the

all critical

it can

basis

pressure

decade,

and pressurized

performed
highly

proof

application

used

the

failure

at

proof-testing

include

pressure

schedule.

in NASA

the

not

unless

on

and

predicted

dures set forth

based

be conducted

weight,

where

cycling

SP-8040,

than

to

of

of flaws

faiN-safe

NDE

prediction

in
NDE

is proof-tested

of

greater

mandatory.

SP-8040,

of the absence

If the

to determine

desirable
testing

if the structure

the principles

shall

does

a combined

to be inadvisable
cost,

bottles

For safe-life

conditions,

strated

has

approach.

accordance

permit

conventional

only)

test

During

should

where

loading

loading

risk,

and

components

when
point

and

to

crew

cycle.

those

vessels

subjected

tanks,

receivers.

Tests

pressure

shall

propellant

Proof

which

in the

condition.

10.2

conditions

characteristics.

establish

loading
proof

the

strain.

pressures
in

yield
As

and/or

critical

stress

level

a mininmm,
stresses

sections

test is conducted

proof-test

which
of

the

stress

producing

the

proof

exceed
test

at a temperature

shall
0.2%

test

shall

design

limit

article.
different

When
from

thecritical
made

design

in structural
two

suitable

loading

to account

strength

temperatures.

fracture

and

with

the

Post-proof-test

initial

inspection

exhibit

The
critical

for

for

periodic

be

based

be mandatory

test

proof

proof

tests

described

complete

in

Section

4.6

teclmiques

should

that

all

have

defects

failure

during

When

critical

proof

does

of

been

life.

SP-8040.

Multiple

test or operational

inspection

after

structure

shall

are not

could

complete

assembly,

be proof-tested

prior

detect

and

proof-testing

11.

removable

flaw

for post-test

and

size

portions

of

control

portions

may

no

safe life

defects

and

scheduled
should

gamed

including

over

data

the

derived

development,

and

tests

The

be

the
NDE

inspection

techniques

structural

under

contractor's

the

defects

to

conditions

scheduled

for

reliably

and determine
of

use

periodic

for

fracture

inspection

the

to assembly.

fixturing

life;

be

definition

structural

of

critical

requirements

tioning
Temporary

This

progress,

capability

procedures

cause

service.

accessible

service
shall

of

experience

qualification

components
components

total

all

which

the predicted

character

inspection.

control

total

interval

for all components

fabrication,

The

confidence

that

sizes

on

slructural

the

times

and

flaw

frmn

Multiple

ITBD)

location

fracture

than

for

control

situations

to improve

detected

by

of satisfactory

the special

NASA

be used

those

safe-life

provide,

service
for

not

assurance

specified

shall be conducted

NDE

for

intervals

for fracture

inspection

than

structure.

shall

the

required

of

the

over

life less

a safe

the

shall be performed

approach

demonstration,

have

greater

the

inspection
,selected

inspection

designed

performance

at the

a decreasing

required

components

condition

structures

direct

The

temperature.

fracture-critical
where

shall be

for the difference

characteristics

often

decreasing

pre-proof-test

establish

correction

fracture

Materials

resistance

A complete
to

condition,

to the proof

used

for

or control

for

environmental

needed

tion

during

turn-around

The

repair

techniques

that

will

for

condi-

corrosion

or storage

protec-

cycles

of tile structure.

OPERATIONS

AND

MAINTENANCE

restore

for

fail-safe

their

structures

ultimate

strength

capability
The

contractor's

fracture

control

plan

shall

define

the

following:

The

operational

analyzed

The

required

components

inspection

selected

basis of crack-growth
structural

development

intervals

for fracture
analyses
and

and

control

for

all

on the

the results

qualification

of

tests

information

experience

data

as it is accumulated
and

corrective

action.

remaining
intervals.

life

and

to

determine

Analysis

shall

be recorded

to update

shall

reassessment

any

fracture

areas

include
of

required

and
control

that

require

prediction
inspection

of

NASA SPACE VEHICLE DESIGN CRITERIA

MONOGRAPHS ISSUED TO DATE

SP-8001

(Strttctures)

Buffeting

During

Revised
SP-8002

(Structures)

Flight-Loads
Exit,

Atmospheric

November
Measurements
1964

Buzz,

Divergence.

(Structures)

Flutter,

SP-8004

(Structures)

Panel

Flutter,

SP-8005

t Environment)

Solar

Electromagnetic

SP-8006

tStructures)

Local

SP-8007

(Structures)

Buckling

and
July

Steady

SP-8008

(Structures)

Prelaunch

SP-8009

I Structures)

Propellant

SP-8010

t Environment)

Models

SP-8011

(Environment)

Models

Radiation,

and

JLme

1965

During

Launch

1965
Circular

1965

Revised

Ground

Wind

Slosh

of

Launc.h

1964

Loads

Thin-Walled

Sep-

1968
November

August

Atmosphere

Venus

Cylinders,

August
Loads,

Loads,

of Mars

1964

1964

May

of

tember

July

Aerodynamic

Exit,

Ma'y

During

December

SP-8003

and

Ascent,

1970

1965

1968

(1967),

Atmosphere

May

(1968),

1968
December

1968
SP-8012

(Structures)

Natural

SP-8013

(Environment)

Meteoroid

Vibration

Earth

to Lunar

SP-8014

(Structures)

Entry

SP-8015

(Guidance

Guidance

and
SP-8016

(Guidance
and

SP-8017

Control)

Control)

(Environment)

Thermal

(Guidance
and

SP-8019

Analysis,

September

1968

Model

1969

[Near

and

Effects

Surface],

March

Protection,

November

1969

August

1968

for

Entry

Navigation

Vehicles,

1968

of

Structural

Control

Systems,

Magnetic

Flexibility
April

Fields

March
SP-8018

Modal

Environment

on

Spacecraft

1969

Earth

and

Extraterrestrial,

1969

Spacecraft

Magnetic

Torques,

March

1969

Control)

(Structures)

Buckling

of

tember
SP-8020

(Environment)

Mars

SP-8021

(Environment)

Models

SP-8022

i Structures)

Staging

SP-8023

(Environment)

Lunar

Surface

May

Thin-Walled

Truncated

('ones,

Sep-

1968
Models

of Earth's

(1968),

May

Atmosphere

(120

1969
Loads,
Surface
9

February
Models,

1969
May

1969

1969

to

t000

kin),

SP-8024

(Guidance
and

Spacecraft

ioriul

(havitat

[orques,

May

1969

April

1970

('on troll

SP-8025

t('hcndcal

SP-802(_

((;uidance

Prolmlsion

Solid

Motor

Rocket

Metal

("ascs,

)
Spacecrafl

Sl'dr "1racket ,. July

Spacecraft

Radiation

1970

and ('ontrol)

SP-S027

(( ] tlitl;.lllCC

[orqu0s.()ctobcr

1969

i.tlid ('ontrol)

SP-8028

((;uidtmcc

Entry

Vehicle

('<mtrol_

November

1969

and Control)

SP-8029

(Strttctures)

SP-_030

(SlrtlclUlCS)

AcrodynaniJc
Latillch

alld

]'ransicul
1969

SP-8031
SP-8032

Slosh

of

tlealing

l)uring

1969

May

lr(>lll

Suppre,><,ion.

Buckling

f Guidance

/\',col'it.

Loads

At.lgtlS[

SP-8033

'and Rockct-t_ixhaust

] hrusl

]'_xcihttion.

l:ebruary

1969

5+1_

'lhin-\t,'allcd

l)oubiy

Curved

Silells.

])cceml-_er

1969

lc)(_c)

Sp:.icccralt

Faitli

tt<qi/on

Sensors,

and ('on trol )

SP-S034

((;uidancc

Spacecraft

and ('on trol)

SP-8035
SP-8036

(Structtircs)

Wind

((Juictunoe

Effects

and ('entre])

SP-8037

Loads

SP-8039

('ontrol

( t{ rivi rollnlen

t)

( ]mviroi_,<nen

t)

(('heroical

Duri_lg

As,:cnt,

Torques,

and

l)ecember

of

ta D , and Pianclarvl.

()ctober

Fracture

b,,loi_r
May

('ontrol

Vehicle

Spacecraft

Magnetic

1970
l Model

Rockci

Launch

1970

t{nvirollincr,

Prcctiction.

I Structures)

('onlrol

1970
on

l:et_ruary

September

Meteoroid

Junc

Flexibility

Systems.

Assessnlcnt

Solid

Pn)pulsion)

SP-8040

1 xpcitsion

of Structural

Fields,

,SP-8038

lt<lz,ss

1969

1970 (Intcrplane1970

Ik'rfornlance

i\nalvsis

and

i tJ71
of

Met:lille

Pressure

Vessc,

is.

May

1970
SP-S()41

f('hcmicat

S1_-8042

( St rtiCtllres

SP-_';043

(Structurcst

Oesign-l)evclopnwni

SP-8044

(Structuics)

Qualification

SP-,%145

(Struclul'c_)

SP-S046

( Strucltlrcs

('aptivc-l:ired
March

Pioplilsion)
)

Meteoroid

( (;u id ap.ce

1)amage

,\ssc_,snlcni,
leMing,
May

rI'OMiHg.

Landing
Planing

SP-8(147

Solid

Rocket

Motors,

1971

Acceptance
)

of

lc_lil_g

Spacecraft

alld ('ontroi)

10

l'csting.

/\pril

May

1970

1<)70

1970
1970

Impact

Attenuation

Lindcrs.

April

Still Sen:,,ol:,,

May

for

1970
June

] 970

Non-Surface-

SP-8048
SP-8049
SP-8050
SP-8051
SP-8052
SP-8053

(Chemical
Propulsion)
(Environment)
tStructures)
{Chemical
Propulsion)
(Chemical
Propulsion)
{Structures)

Liquid RocketEngineTurbopump
The

Earth's

Ionosphere,

Structural
Solid

Rocket

Liquid

Space

SP-8056
SP-8057

(Structures)
{Structures)

Flight

SP-8058

(Guidance
andControl)
(Guidance
andControl)
{Structures
(Structures

Prevention

SP-8071
SP-8072

{Environment)
{Structures)
{Environment)
(Guidance
andControl)
((;uidance
andControl)
{Structures)
(Guidance
andControl)

1971

Turbopump

Radiation

Coupled

IPogo),

Inducers,

Structural

Spacecraft

May

on

Materials,

January

1971

Aerodynamic

Entry

to

a Space

January

1971

During

Thrusting

1971

Venting,
with

1970

Applicable

Control

February

Interaction

October

Torques.

Attitude

Compartment

Insta-

1970

Mechanisms,
Criteria

Maneuvers,

1970

Structure-Propulsion

Design

Spacecraft

November

Umbilicals

1970

and

Launch

Stand,

1970

Gasdynamic

Lubrication,
Solid

Effects

June

October

Separation

Heating,

Friction,

Propellant

January

and

Wear,

Selection

and

1971

June

107 I

Characteristics,

June

(Extendable,

Reel

1971
Tubular

Spacecraft

Stored),

1971

Aerodynamic

Deceleration

Systems,

1971

Earth

Albedo

Buckling
The

Booms

February

Deployable

and

Emitted

Strength

Planet

of

Jupiter

Spaceborne

Radiation,

Structural

(1970),

Digital

July

Plates.

December

Computer

Ig7l

June

1971

1971
Systems.

March

1971
Passive

Gravity-Gradient

ruary

Libration

Dampers,

|:eb-

by

Propulsion

Sys-

197 I

Acoustic

Loads

tem.

SP-8074

1970

March

Protection,

of

June

SP-8067
SP-8068
SP-gO69
SP-8070

Space

Radiation

August

SP-8066

Igniters.

Engine

and

Shuttle,

SP-8065

June

1970

bility

(Structures
(Structures
l ('heroical
Propulsion)
((',uidance
andControl)
{Structures)

1971

Prediction,

Motor

Rocket

Nuclear

(Structures)
(Structures)

SP-8062
SP-8063
SP-80_4

March

1971

SP-8054
SP-8055

SP-8060
SP-8061

March

Vibration

June

SP-8059

Bearings,

1971

June

Spacecraft

11

Generated

the

1971
Solar

Cell

Arrays,

May

_971

SP-8077

(Structures)

SP-8078

(Guidance
and('ontrol)
tStructures

SP-807
t)

Transporta
tion and ttctndlmg
Loads,
September
1971
SpaceborneElcclronic. lmagil'lg Systcms.
June
1971
Structural I ntcr'<iClilm
wilh
Control
Systems.
Novcnlber

SP-8082
SP-8083

(Structures)
(Structures)

Stress-Corrosiola
l)iscontinuiiy
November

SP-8085

([invironmcnt)

1_?71

The Planet

12

('l_ickiHg
Strcsw_

in Metals,

August

in Metallic

Pressure

t771 I, March

1972

1971
Vessels.

1_,_7I
Ml't_'tIt'?

(l

NASA-Langley,

1972

--

32