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A review of anti bribery and anti corruption laws in Germany highlighting a series of high profile cases.
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29 January 2013
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Sascha Kuhn
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Contents
I Introduction
In recent years, several major corruption scandals in Germany have caught both national and international media attention, for example,
the scandal involving German multinational conglomerate company Siemens and, most recently, a corruption scandal involving the
former chief risk officer of state-owned BayernLB who was sentenced to more than eight years in prison for accepting bribes during the
sale of the banks stake in the Formula One business.
Understandably, the severe legal consequences and the detrimental effect on the reputation of companies involved, have sparked an
increased demand for effective compliance mechanisms in the German private sector. It is striking, however, that there has been a
substantial increase in the number of cases of corruption in the private sector, which have in 2010 for the first time surpassed the
number of cases in the area of public administration1.
With a general election looming, however, the focus of public interest in Germany has most recently shifted back towards the political
arena. Peer Steinbrck, the challenger to acting Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel, for example, found himself under fire after his
supplementary income outside the Bundestag (lower house) from lectures and his allegedly close relationship with parts of the financial
industry were put under scrutiny. Steinbrck fended off criticism by disclosing more details about his additional earnings and suggested
that he would back tougher earnings reporting rules for members of parliament.
While such news and recent scandals may paint a somewhat bleak picture of current anti corruption efforts, Germany is in fact a
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country with a high overall level of business integrity and fairly effective systems for preventing corruption .
Taking and giving bribes in commercial practice (Sec. 299 et seq. StGB)
The central Anti Bribery provision for the private sector is Sec. 299 StGB which covers both the active and the passive side of bribery.
Sec. 299 (1) StGB makes it a criminal offence for an employee or agent of a business to demand, allow himself to be promised or
accept a benefit for himself or another in a business transaction as consideration for according an unfair preference to another in the
competitive purchase of goods or commercial services. Vice versa, Sec. 299 (2) StGB covers offering, promising or granting a benefit
for the aforementioned purposes.
While a retroactive reward for past performance is permissible, a reward that is at the same time given as an incentive for future
preferences is illegal under this provision4.
Moreover, the fact that "facilitation payments" are a common practice in a specific industry is irrelevant and does not constitute a valid
defence. Minor customary advantages (eg low value gifts, promotional giveaways, an invitation for a non lavish lunch), however, that are
objectively unlikely to influence the decision making process, are not deemed to be a "benefit" within the meaning of Sec. 299 StGB.5
Unlike the bribery offences involving public officials, the offence of taking and giving bribes in commercial practice may only be
prosecuted upon request by an affected party or certain associations (see below), unless the prosecuting authority considers at its own
instigation that prosecution is required because of special public interest. Such interest can, for example, be assumed, when the victim
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does not file a request in fear of detriment to his business or other economic disadvantages. Pursuant to Sec. 301 (2) StGB, the
request for prosecution can not only be filed by the victim but also, inter alia, by competitors or competent associations such as the
German Agency to Combat Unfair Competition (Wettbewerbszentrale).
German courts, however, recognise the need for legislative action. The German Federal Court of Justice has criticised the fact that
certain manipulative conduct in regard to elections and ballots that it deemed worthy of punishment cannot be prosecuted. While the
court sees the social harmfulness of corruption widely acknowledged in all areas of public and private life, along with the expansion of
the scope of potential culpability, it has raised the question of why developments in the anti corruption sphere have left the offence of
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Penalties
The penalties for the aforementioned offences range from fines to imprisonment and vary substantially depending on the nature and
seriousness of the offence.
Individuals
The offence of bribing a public official is punishable with a fine or a prison term of up to three years. In its aggravated form (Sec. 334
StGB), the minimum prison sentence for bribing a public official is three months, while the maximum sentence is five years. Bribing
judges or arbitrators is, under certain circumstances, punishable with higher prison sentences (see Sec. 333 (2), Sec. 334 (2) StGB).
In especially serious cases, the prison sentence for bribing a public official is between one year and ten years (Sec. 335 (1) StGB). An
especially serious case within the meaning of this provision typically occurs, inter alia, when the offence relates to a major benefit
(starting at around 10,000 Euros).
Bribing in commercial practice is punishable with fines or imprisonment of up to three years. In especially serious cases, the sentencing
range is from three months to five years in prison (Sec. 300 StGB).
The punishment for bribing delegates is imprisonment not exceeding five years or a fine. In addition to a sentence of imprisonment of at
least six months the court may order the loss of the ability to hold public office, to vote and to be elected in public elections (Sec. 108e
(2) StGB).
Companies
As stated above, the fact that only individuals are criminally liable under German law, does not mean that companies involved in
corruption will go unpunished. If the individual acted on behalf of a corporate body, the corporation can be punished with severe financial
sanctions of up to 1m in fines (Sec. 30 (2) OWiG). Additionally, the offence can be punished with the forfeiture of a sum up to the
amount of the pecuniary advantage gained (Sec. 29a OWiG). In addition, the owner of an undertaking can be fined for intentionally or
negligently omitting necessary supervisory measures designed to help prevent criminal offences within his undertaking (Sec. 130
OWiG). As recent cases have shown, fines against companies can be substantial. The German MAN group, for example, had to pay
150m in fines, while Siemens had to pay 395m.
In the eyes of the court, the relevant question was whether the benefactor acted with the intent to
influence the public officials future performance of their duties and/or to reward such performances in the past. The court developed
criteria which can, to some extent, give guidance for answering this question:
1. Is a different (non criminal) motive for giving the benefit also plausible?
2. Which position does the public official hold?
3. What is, if any, the relation between the benefactor and the beneficiary?
4. In what fashion was the benefit given (secretively or transparently)?
5. What was the nature or value of the benefit?
Based on these criteria, the Federal Court of Justice upheld the acquittal of the chairman by the Regional Court in Karlsruhe, making
clear, however, that the Regional Court could have just as easily arrived at a different judgement.
In addition, the IntBestG imposes penalties on bribing foreign delegates in the course of international trade.
EUBestG
Similar to the IntBestG, the EUBestG equates public officials of the EU und those of EU Member States with their counterparts in
Germany within the meaning of Sec. 332, 334 et seq. StGB.
Sec. 299 (3) StGB
With regard to the private sector, the above mentioned provision penalising taking and giving bribes in commercial practice also applies
to conduct in foreign trade (Sec. 299 (3) StGB).
prides itself on supporting developing countries in the implementation of the UNCAC , Germany itself has not (yet) ratified the
Convention. It would require Germany to enact tougher Anti Bribery legislation in relation to delegates (see above).
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC)
Unlike the UNCAC, the CTOC, also known as the Palermo Convention, has been ratified by Germany, in 2003. Parties to the
Convention commit themselves to taking a series of measures against transnational organized crime, including the creation of domestic
criminal offences (participation in an organized criminal group, money laundering, corruption and obstruction of justice); the adoption of
new and sweeping frameworks for extradition, mutual legal assistance and law enforcement cooperation; and the promotion of training
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and technical assistance for the building or upgrading the necessary capacity of national authorities.
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption
The Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, which has been ratified by 43 countries, aims to promote international
cooperation in the prosecution of bribery offences. The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), established in 1999 by the Council
of Europe to monitor States compliance with the organisations anti corruption standards, has criticised Germany for having so far failed
to ratify the Convention. GRECO has also urged Germany in particular to substantially broaden the scope of what constitutes criminal
conduct in the active and passive bribery of delegates under Sec. 108e StGB.15
offence "bribing of delegates" . It remains to be seen, whether these efforts will bear fruit in the near future. The bills are currently
pending in the Legal Committee of the Bundestag.
X Compliance
There is a general trend among German companies to place greater value on the implementation of effective compliance mechanisms.
While some companies assign the respective responsibilities to their legal department, others prefer to establish an independent
compliance office. In addition to anti corruption measures, these departments usually deal with the entire spectrum of compliance. anti
corruption measures that are now common and have proved effective include whistleblowing hotlines and ombudsman systems.
One of the challenges of the future will be to set up adequate compliance structures in small and medium sized businesses. The legal
requirements applying to these companies are just as strict as the ones applying to international companies but obviously their financial
and human resources are much more limited.
As the recent data protection scandal involving German national railway company Deutsche Bahn has demonstrated, the subject of
compliance cannot be considered purely from the perspective of anti corruption efforts, without regard to data protection laws as well.
In 2009, Deutsche Bahn admitted to have undertaken extensive data screenings among some 173,000 of its employees in an effort to
detect illicit transactions and corruption. The company compared names, addresses and bank details of suppliers with those of their
employees, without having concrete suspicion of unlawful conduct.
As a reaction to this and similar scandals involving other major German companies the German Federal Data Protection Law
(Bundesdatenschutzgesetz) was amended. The reform, however, proved insufficient and had the effect of making internal investigations
by companies aimed at identifying illegal conduct much more difficult. Discussions on whether (and if so, how) employee data
protection provisions will have to be amended have been going on for quite some time now. Against the background of the new plans for
a revised European data protection system it remains to be seen, however, when the German legislator will take the necessary steps.
The existing conflict between anti corruption legislation and data protection law looks likely to dominate the anti corruption debate in
Germany in the short and medium term.
Meanwhile, the number of bribery cases being prosecuted is not likely to decline.
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