Notas sobre a ideia de um consenso por justaposio

Nestas notas pretendo examinar esquematicamente a ideia de um consenso

por justaposio e seu papel na resoluo do problema central de PL: tornar
a estabilidade compatvel com o fato do pluralismo razovel.
0. In a free society citizens will have disparate worldviews. They will believe in

different religions or none at all; they will have differing conceptions of right and
wrong; they will value various pursuits and forms of interpersonal relations. Democratic
citizens will have contrary commitments, yet in any country there can only be one law.
The law must either establish a national church, or not; women must either have equal
rights, or not; abortion and gay marriage must either be permissible under the
constitution, or not; the economy must be set up in one way or another.
Rawls holds that the need to impose a unified law on a diverse citizenry raises two
fundamental issues. The first is the issue of legitimacy: the legitimate use of coercive
political power. In a democracy political power is always the power of the people as a
collective body. How can it be legitimate for a democratic people to coerce all citizens
to follow just one law, given that citizens will inevitably hold to different worldviews?
The second issue is the issue of stability, which looks at political power from the
receiving end. Why would a citizen willingly obey the law if it is imposed on her by a
collective body many of whose members have beliefs and values quite dissimilar to her
own? Yet unless most citizens willingly obey the law, no social order can be stable for
long.
Political liberalism is not yet Rawls's theory of justice (justice as fairness). Political
liberalism answers the conceptually prior questions of legitimacy and stability, so fixing
the context and starting points for justice as fairness.

1. Na dcada de 80, numa srie de artigos, Rawls revisa as bases de sua

teoria da justia a partir de uma srie de crticas que lhe foram
endereadas a partir de mltiplas frentes. Rawls admite ter sido afetado
especialmente por uma delas: a que afirma que sua teoria da justia no
como ele pretendia uma concepo neutra perante as diferentes
concepes abrangentes de bem.
Segundo Rawls, em LP tenta resolver um srio problema interno ideia de
justia como equidade, como o fato de a noo de estabilidade,
includa na parte III de Teoria, no ser coerente com a viso
completa [dela]

1.1. Que no seja neutra implica que trata-se de uma teoria incapaz de
garantir as bases de sua prpria estabilidade.

1.2 Para que uma certa concepo de justia seja estvel, necessria a
presena das motivaes apropriadas para realizar aquilo que a justia
requer. No pode estar baseada apenas no modus vivendi
In large part, this reinterpretation stems from a new understanding
of the problem of stability, one that is sociological rather
than psychological. In reinterpreting the problem of stability
Rawls fundamentally alters the rational psychology presented in A
Theory of Justice. Because of the deep pluralism that exists in
society, personal autonomy ceases to be intrinsic to the construction
of political principles but is expressed only in the content of
those principles. Instead of the motivation to endorse and act
upon principles of justice flowing from the comprehensive standpoint
of autonomous choice, motivation has two sources: each
persons comprehensive doctrine and the political conception. It
is, in Rawlss view, unreasonable to expect that everybody be
motivated to accept the principles of justice from the standpoint
of the comprehensive value of autonomy

1.3 qual o problema com a concepo de justia como equidade em TJ? Ela
pressupe um ideal iluminista, que a torna ambiciosa e pouco realista.
Como chega a essa concluso?
Reconhecendo fatos gerais que no se pode deixar de considerar na hora de
construir uma concepo de justia adequada para uma democracia
constitucional: o multiculturalismo, etc.

The challenge for Rawls

is to explain how human beings reconcile reasons derived from

these different sources.

One way of reconciling these reasons would be to accept that
there exist separate spheres of validity, such as a sphere of secular,
political values and a sphere of spiritual, theological values.Even if
we accept that religious toleration grew out of the fact of pluralism,
its moralization depended on a conception of rationality
which both institutionalized the spheres of validity and transcended
them. Institutionalization would entail developing a set
of political principles, such as rights to freedom of worship and
open access to public office. Transcendence is a corresponding
explanation of how theological principles can be dominant within
their own sphere, but subordinate to secular principles in the
political sphere. In short, we need an account of how the secular
and the theological fit together.

1.4 O que o fato do pluralismo razovel?

As sociedades democrticas modernas caracterizam-se (um trao
permanente da cultura poltica na democracia:
a) pela diversidade de teorias abrangentes razoveis
b) pela imcompatibilidade dessas teorias razoveis

Political pluralism, which, like moral pluralism, is often called value pluralism, is a
view associated with political liberalism. Political pluralism usually starts with the
observation that there are different value systems in use in the world, and there are
various positions that arise out of that observation. Political pluralism is concerned with
the question of what sort of restrictions governments can put on people's freedom to act
according to their value systems. The strongest version of political pluralism claims that
all these value systems are equally true (and thus presumably all ought to be tolerated),
a weaker view is that these value systems all ought to be tolerated, and probably the
most common version of the view is that some of these systems (the reasonable ones)
ought to be tolerated.

The difficulty with ignoring the

question of how the spheres of validity fit together is that we have
no explanation for how a simple modus vivendi became moralized,
or even whether it is coherent to talk of a moralized modus
vivendi.Rawls does argue that this pluralism is not seen as a disaster
but rather as the natural outcome of the activities of human
reason under enduring free institutions. To see reasonable
pluralism as a disaster is to see the exercise of reason under the
conditions of freedom itself as a disaster (Rawls 1996: xxvixxvii).

Esse fato deriva dos limites naturais da razo. A tese: a razo pratica
atuando sob as condies favorveis fornecidas pelas liberdades bsicas,
no podruz uma convergncia nas conepes avaliadoras das diferentes
pessoas.

2. a principal inteno de PL mostrar que, mesmo nesse contexto,

possvel construir uma concepo de justia compartilhada e que funcione:

2.1 Uma concepo poltica de justia

Rawls's solution to the problem of legitimacy in a liberal society is for political power to
be exercised in accordance with a political conception of justice. A political conception
of justice is a moral conception generated from the fundamental ideas implicit in that
society's public political culture. A political conception is not derived from any
particular comprehensive doctrine, nor is it a compromise among the worldviews that
happen to exist in society at the moment. Rather a political conception is freestanding:
its content is set out independently of the comprehensive doctrines that citizens affirm.
Reasonable citizens, who want to cooperate with one another on mutually acceptable
terms, will see that a freestanding political conception generated from ideas in the
public political culture is the only basis for cooperation that all citizens can reasonably
be expected to endorse. The use of coercive political power guided by the principles of a
political conception of justice will therefore be legitimate coercion.
The three most fundamental ideas that Rawls finds in the public political culture of a
democratic society are that citizens are free and equal, and that society should be a fair
system of cooperation. All liberal political conceptions of justice will therefore be

centered on interpretations of these three fundamental ideas. As there are many

reasonable interpretations of free, equal and fair, there are many liberal political
conceptions of justice. Since all the members of this family interpret the same
fundamental ideas, however, all liberal political conceptions of justice will share certain
basic features:
1. A liberal political conception of justice will ascribe to all citizens familiar
individual rights and liberties, such as rights of free expression, liberty of
conscience, and free choice of occupation;
2. A political conception will give special priority to these rights and liberties,
especially over demands to further the general good (e.g., greater national
wealth) or perfectionist values (e.g., the values of cultural flourishing);
3. A political conception will assure for all citizens sufficient all-purpose means to
make effective use of their freedoms.
These abstract features must, Rawls says, have concrete institutional realizations. He
mentions several institutional features that all liberal political conceptions will share:
fair opportunities for all citizens (especially in education and training); a decent
distribution of income and wealth; government as the employer of last resort; basic
health care for all citizens; and public financing of elections.

2.1.1 concepo poltica no porque se opem a moral

A central point of Political Liberalism, as indicated by its title, is
that a theory of justice must be political, meaning that its motivational
force must derive from a particular, circumscribed,
sphere of life, and not from a comprehensivemoral standpoint.
the claim
is that the basis of justification is itself limited to the political

2.2.2 concepo poltica moral

The distinction between a political and a comprehensive
conception of the good in turn affects how we understand the
motivational basis of Rawlss theory. It is important that this distinction
is not defined in terms of the political as opposed to the
moral, for the political conception is itself a moral conception,
but a special one.
the agent must accept the principles
of justice but for the right reasons, and that means as principles
with independent moral force.

2,2,3. Elaborada em relao a um objeto especfiico: as instituies polticas,

sociasi e econmmicas (a estrutura bsica da sociedade)
2.3.4 No se estende a normas sobre nossa conduta pessoasl ou ideiais de
vida.

2.3.5 independente de qualquer doutrina abrangente particular

2.2 Rawls recorre ao consenso sobreposto

Destinado a tornar possvel que concepes abrangentes razoveis
(justificao) e opostas convirjam (legitimidade) em certos acordos bsicos

Political power is legitimately used in a liberal society when it is used in accordance

with a political conception of justice. This still leaves undecided the problem of
stability: why citizens would willingly obey the law as specified by a liberal political
conception. Legitimacy means that the law may permissibly be enforced; Rawls needs
another account of why citizens have reasons from within their own points of view to
abide by such a law.
Rawls's hopes for a stable liberal society rest on an overlapping consensus. In an
overlapping consensus, citizens support the same basic laws for different reasons. In
Rawlsian terms, each citizen supports a political conception of justice for reasons
internal to her own comprehensive doctrine. A political conception is freestanding: it is
a module that can fit into any number of worldviews that citizens might have. In an
overlapping consensus each reasonable citizen affirms this common module from
within her own perspective.

2.2.3 O que o consenso sobreposto

Rawls sees an overlapping consensus as the feasible basis of democratic stability that is
the most desirable. Stability in an overlapping consensus is superior to a mere balance
of power among citizens who hold contending worldviews. Any balance of power (or
modus vivendi) might shift, and social stability then be lost. In an overlapping consensus
citizens affirm a political conception wholeheartedly from within their own
perspectives, and so will continue to do so even should their group gain or lose political
power. Rawls says that an overlapping consensus is stable for the right reasons: each
citizen affirms a moral doctrine (a liberal conception of justice) for moral reasons (as
given by their comprehensive doctrine). Abiding by liberal basic laws is not a citizen's
second-best compromise in the face of the power of others, but each citizen's first-best
option given their own beliefs.

The overlapping consensus assumes there are two motivational

bases for the principles of justice. The political the great values of
liberalism is free standing (Rawls 1996: 10), meaning the political
should directly motivate the individual. But it is left to citizens
as part of their liberty of conscience individually to work out how
those values relate to their own comprehensive conceptions. The
idea is that reasonable comprehensive doctrines endorse the political
conception, each from its own point of view.

The overlapping consensus can be interpreted either as beginning

with political values, and then the individual attempts to fit
Political Liberalism
135
those values into his comprehensive conception of the good,or the
individual moves towards the political values from his own comprehensive
conception of the good.Of course it may be argued that
we do both: we move, as it were, back and forth between the political
and comprehensive conceptions. But the stability of Rawlss
theory of justice depends upon there being an affinity between the
political and the comprehensive. The overlap cannot be contingent.

Acordo entre pessoas razoveis que so aceitam dooutrinas abrangentes

razoveis
2.2.4.

4 objees possvies:

1. uma viso ctica

2. Implica viso abrangente
3. apoia-se num modus vivendi
4. constitui uma ideia utpica

2.2.5 o consenso sobreposto surge como expresso do que ele demomina

razo pblica compartilhada pelo conjunto da sociedade

2.3 Razes pblicas

The idea of public reason appears to inhabit a middle ground between two more familiar
standards of evaluation in moral and political philosophy. On the one hand, there is
consent. Some political philosophers, for example, argue that political legitimacy
requires the actual or implied consent of the governed (Otsuka 2003, 89113; Simmons
1999). On the other hand, there is truth: we can simply ask whether any alleged moral
or political principle is true. Public reason does not aim either at consent or truth. Public
reason instead requires that our moral or political principles be justifiable to, or
reasonably acceptable to, all those persons to whom the principles are meant to apply.
To take a straightforward example: a Supreme Court justice deciding on a gay marriage
law would violate public reason were she to base her opinion on God's forbidding gay

sex in the book of Leviticus, or on a presentiment that upholding such a law would
hasten the end of days. Not all members of society can reasonably be expected to accept
Leviticus as stating an authoritative set of political values, nor can a religious
premonition be a common standard for evaluating public policy. These values and
standards are not public.

On one common view, public reason is a distinctively political idea: it paradigmatically

applies to the laws and other political institutions of our society. One way to explain its
distinctively political nature is to ground the idea of public reason in the value of justice.
Rawls's doctrine of public reason can be summarized as follows:
Citizens engaged in certain political activities have a duty of civility to be able to
justify their decisions on fundamental political issues by reference only to public
values and public standards.
Each of the highlighted terms in this doctrine can be further elucidated as follows:

The public values that citizens must be able to appeal to are the values of a
political conception of justice: those related to the freedom and equality of
citizens and the fairness of ongoing social cooperation. Among public values are
the freedom of religious practice, the political equality of women and racial
minorities, the efficiency of the economy, the preservation of a healthy
environment, and the integrity of the family as securing the orderly reproduction
of society from one generation to the next. Nonpublic values are the values
internal to associations like churches (e.g., that women may not hold the highest
offices) or private clubs (e.g., that racial minorities are rightly excluded) which
cannot be squared with public values such as these.

Similarly, citizens should be able to justify their political decisions by public

standards of inquiry. Public standards are principles of reasoning and rules of
evidence that all citizens could reasonably endorse. So citizens are not to justify
their political decisions by appeal to divination, or to complex and disputed
economic or psychological theories. Rather, publicly acceptable standards are
those that rely on common sense, on facts generally known, and on the
conclusions of science that are well established and not controversial.

The duty to abide by public reason applies when the most fundamental
political issues are at stake: issues such as who has the right to vote, which
religions are to be tolerated, who will be eligible to own property, and what are
suspect categories for making employment decisions. These are what Rawls
calls constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. Public reason applies
more weakly, if at all, to less momentous political questions, for example to
most laws that change the rate of tax, or that put aside public money to maintain
national parks.

Citizens have a duty to constrain their decisions by public reason only when they
engage in certain political activities, usually when exercising powers of public
office. So judges are bound by public reason when they issue their rulings,
legislators should abide by public reason when speaking and voting in the
legislature, and the executive and candidates for high office should respect
public reason in their public pronouncements. Significantly, Rawls says that
voters should also heed public reason when they vote. All of these activities are
or support exercises of political power, so all must be justifiable in terms that all
citizens might reasonably endorse. However, citizens are not bound by duties of
public reason when engaged in other activities, for example when they worship
in church, perform on stage, pursue scientific research, send letters to the editor,
or talk politics around the dinner table.

The duty to be able to justify one's political decisions with public reasons is a
moral, not a legal, duty: it is a duty of civility. All citizens have full legal rights
to free expression, and overstepping the bounds of public reason is never itself a
crime. Rather citizens have a moral duty of mutual respect and civic friendship
not to justify political decisions on fundamental issues with partisan values or
controversial standards of reasoning that could not be publicly redeemed.

Public reason, on this view, is the only way to achieve justice given certain assumptions
about the nature of well-ordered liberal democratic societies.

What is the scope of public reason? To which topics or domains of moral and political
life does the idea of public reason apply? On Rawls's influential account, the idea of
public reason applies to what he calls the constitutional essentials and matters of basic
justice within a liberal democratic society, but not in general for all the questions for all
the questions to be settled by the legislature within a constitutional framework

Constitutional essentials, for Rawls, include:

On Rawls's influential account, reasonable persons represent the constituency of public

reason. Reasonable persons are defined by their acceptance of two main ideas. First,
reasonable persons are, when among equals, ready to propose principles and standards
as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that
others will likewise do so. Those norms they view as reasonable for everyone to accept
and therefore as justifiable to them; and they are ready to discuss the fair terms that
others propose (Rawls 1996, 49). Second, reasonable persons accept what Rawls calls
the burdens of judgment and accept their consequences for the use of public reason in
directing the legitimate exercise of political power in a constitutional regime (Rawls
1996, 54). The burdens of judgment are the many hazards involved in the correct (and

conscientious) exercise of our powers of reason and judgment in the ordinary course of
political life, (Rawls 1996, 5556) which explain how reasonable and rational people
will permanently disagree about many matters of value and ethics.