LEGAL ETHICS

Abuse of court

The successive filings of a petition for certiorari, petition

processes and legal

for annulment of judgment, two petitions for annulment of

procedure; forum
shopping

the complainants certificate of title, and a petition for

declaratory relief, all containing a prayer for injunctive
relief, reveal the respondents persistence in preventing
and avoiding the execution of the final decisions of the
lower courts against his client. Under the circumstances,
the respondent lawyers repeated attempts go beyond the
legitimate means allowed by professional ethical rules in
defending the interests of his client. These are already
uncalled for measures to avoid the enforcement of the final
judgment of the lower courts. The respondent violated
Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The respondent also violated Rule 12.02
and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as well as the rule against forum shopping,
both of which are directed against the filing of multiple
actions to attain the same objective. Conrado Que v. Atty.
Anastacio Revilla, Jr., A.C. No. 7054,December 4, 2009

Gross negligence

A lawyer, when he undertakes a clients cause, makes a

covenant that he will exert all
efforts for its prosecution until its final conclusion. He
should undertake the task with dedication and
care, and he should do no less, otherwise, he is not true to
his lawyers oath. Respondent was woefully
remiss in his duty to display utmost diligence and
competence in protecting the interests of his clients.
Petitioners lost the civil case in the trial court because
they were barred from presenting their evidence as
a result of their being declared in default as a consequence
of respondents failure to submit a pre-trial
brief and to attend the pre-trial conference. Petitioners
appeal to the Court of Appeals from the adverse
default judgment of the trial court was dismissed on
account of respondents failure to file an appeal

brief. Respondent is guilty of gross negligence and

misconduct in violation of Canon 17, and Rules 18.02
and 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Cesar Talento and Modesta
Herrera Talento v. Atty. Agustin Paneda, A.C. No. 7433,
Lawyers; disbarment

December 23, 2009

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or

case; unavailability of

with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and

procedural defenses

prejudicial questions, or in this case,

prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of
desistance by the complainant do not apply in the
determination of a lawyers qualifications and fitness for
membership in the Bar. First, admission to the
practice of law is a component of the administration of
justice and is a matter of public interest because it
involves service to the public. The admission qualifications
are also qualifications for the continued
enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of
qualifications or the violation of the standards
for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of
public concern that the State may inquire into
through the Court. In this sense, the complainant in a
disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest
in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own;
effectively, his or her participation is that of a
witness who brought the matter to the attention of the
Court. Maelotisea S. Garrido vs. Atty. Angel
E. Garrido and Romana P. Valencia, A.C. No. 6593,

Lawyers; disbarment;

February 4, 2010
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or

gross immorality

shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the

opinion of the upright and respectable members of
the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or
when committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys
sense of decency. We make these distinctions as the

supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct

requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral,
conduct.
By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations
relating to the legal profession, specifically,
violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyers oath,
and of the ethical rules of the profession. He
did not possess the good moral character required of a
lawyer at the time of his admission to the Bar. As
a lawyer, he violated his lawyers oath, Section 20(a) of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, all of which
commonly require him to obey the laws of the land.
In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy,
as he entered this second marriage while his
first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly
admitted his bigamy when he filed his
petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.
He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically,
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which commands that he shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that
[a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession; Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides that, [a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.
Moral character is not a subjective term but one that
corresponds to objective reality. To have good moral
character, a person must have the personal characteristics
of being good. It is not enough that he or she
has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally
entertained about a person or the estimate in which he
or she is held by the public in the place where she is

known. The requirement of good moral character

has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the
public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3)
to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant
lawyers from themselves. Each purpose is as
important as the other. Maelotisea S. Garrido vs. Atty.
Angel E. Garrido and Romana P. Valencia, A.C. No.
Lawyers fees

6593, February 4, 2010

A client has an undoubted right to settle a suit without
the intervention of his lawyer, for
he is generally conceded to have the exclusive control over
the subject-matter of the litigation and may,
at any time before judgment, if acting in good faith,
compromise, settle, and adjust his cause of action
out of court without his attorneys intervention,
knowledge, or consent, even though he has agreed with
his attorney not to do so. Hence, a claim for attorneys fees
does not void the compromise agreement
and is no obstacle to a court approval.
However, counsel is not without remedy. As the validity of
a compromise agreement cannot be
prejudiced, so should not be the payment of a lawyers
adequate and reasonable compensation for his
services should the suit end by reason of the settlement.
The terms of the compromise subscribed to by
the client should not be such that will amount to an entire
deprivation of his lawyers fees, especially
when the contract is on a contingent fee basis. In this
sense, the compromise settlement cannot bind the
lawyer as a third party. A lawyer is as much entitled to
judicial protection against injustice or imposition
of fraud on the part of his client as the client is against
abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of the
court is not only to ensure that a lawyer acts in a proper
and lawful manner, but also to see to it that a
lawyer is paid his just fees.
Even if the compensation of a counsel is dependent only
upon winning a case he himself secured for his

client, the subsequent withdrawal of the case on the

clients own volition should never completely
deprive counsel of any legitimate compensation for his
professional services. In all cases, a client is
bound to pay his lawyer for his services. The
determination of bad faith only becomes significant and
relevant if the adverse party will likewise be held liable in
shouldering the attorneys
fees. Atty. Mangontawar M. Gubat vs. National Power
Lawyers; negligence

Corporation, G.R. No. 167415. February 26, 2010

Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides for the
rule on negligence and states:
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
The Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule,
that the mere failure of the lawyer to perform
the obligations due to the client is considered per se a
violation. The circumstance that the client was also
at fault does not exonerate a lawyer from liability for his
negligence in handling a case.
All court rulings drive home the fiduciary nature of a
lawyers duty to his client once an engagement for
legal services is accepted. A lawyer so engaged to represent
a client bears the responsibility of protecting
the latters interest with utmost diligence. The lawyer
bears the duty to serve his client with competence
and diligence, and to exert his best efforts to protect,
within the bounds of the law, the interest of his or
her client. Accordingly, competence, not only in the
knowledge of law, but also in the management of the
cases by giving these cases appropriate attention and due
preparation, is expected from a lawyer.
In addition to the above finding of negligence, the Court
also finds Atty. Macalalad guilty of violating
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which requires a lawyer to account for all the

money received from the client. In this case, Atty.

Macalalad did not immediately account for and
promptly return the money he received from Atty. Solidon
even after he failed to render any legal service
within the contracted time of the engagement. Atty. Elmer
C. Solidon vs. Atty. Ramil E. Macalalad, A.C. No.
Lawyers liability for

8158, February 24, 2010

In our view, the complainants errors do not

filing complaint with

belong to the genre of plain and simple errors that lawyers

Ombudsman

commit in the practice of their profession.

Their plain disregard, misuse and misrepresentation of
constitutional provisions constitute serious
misconduct that reflects on their fitness for continued
membership in the Philippine Bar. At the very
least, their transgressions are blatant violations of Rule
10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides: Rule 10.02. A lawyer shall not knowingly
misquote or misrepresent the contents of a
paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel,
or the text of a decision or authority, or
knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a
fact that which has not been proved.
To emphasize the importance of requiring lawyers to act
candidly and in good faith, an identical
provision is found in Cannon 22 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics. Moreover, lawyers are sworn to
do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court before they are even admitted to the Bar.
All these the complainants appear to have seriously
violated.
In the interest of due process and fair play, the
complainants Lozano should be heard, in relation to their
criminal complaint before the Ombudsman against retired
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and retired
Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, on why they
should not be penalized as members of the
Bar and as officers of this Court, for their open disregard

of the plain terms of the Constitution and the

applicable laws and jurisprudence, and their misuse and
misrepresentation of constitutional provisions
in their criminal complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Re: Subpoena Duces Tecum dated January
11, 2010 of Acting Director Aleu A. Amante, PIAB-C Office of
the Ombudsman, A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC, March 2,
2010
Lawyers; deceitful

The overt act in arranging the meeting between Judge

conduct

Dizon and
complainants-litigants in the Coffee Shop of the East Royal
Hotel made it clear that Respondent
consented to Judge Dizons desire to ask money from the
complainants-litigants for a favorable decision
of their case which was pending before the sala of Judge
Dizon. The admission proved that the
respondent had known all along of the illegal transaction
between the judge and the complainants, and
belied his feigned lack of knowledge of the delivery of the
money to the judge.
The Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins an
attorney from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, or
deceitful conduct. Corollary to this injunction is the rule
that an attorney shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the Legal Profession and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar. The
respondent did not measure up to the exacting standards
of the Law Profession, which demanded of him
as an attorney the absolute abdication of any personal
advantage that conflicted in any way, directly or
indirectly, with the interest of his clients. For monetary
gain, he disregarded the vow to delay no man
for money or malice and to conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
my clients that he made when he took the
Lawyers Oath. He also disobeyed the explicit command to

him as an attorney to accept no

compensation in connection with his clients business
except from him or with his knowledge and
approval. He conveniently ignored that the relation
between him and his clients was highly fiduciary in
nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential
character.
Verily, the respondent was guilty of gross misconduct,
which is improper or wrong conduct, the
transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful
in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere
error of judgment. Any gross misconduct of an
attorney in his professional or private capacity shows him
unfit to manage the affairs of others, and is a
ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or
disbarment, because good moral character is
an essential qualification for the admission of an attorney
and for the continuance of such
privilege. Spouses Manuel C. Rafols, Jr., et al. vs. Atty.
Lawyers; lifting order

Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr., A.C. No. 4973, March 15, 2010

The following guidelines are to be observed in the

of suspension;

matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from

guidelines

the practice of law: (1) After a finding that

respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of
law, the Court shall render a decision
imposing the penalty; (2) Unless the Court explicitly states
that the decision is immediately executory
upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which
to file a motion for reconsideration thereof.
The denial of said motion shall render the decision final
and executory; (3) Upon the expiration of the
period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn
Statement with the Court, through the Office of the
Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted
from the practice of law and has not appeared
in any court during the period of his or her suspension; (4)
Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be

furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the

Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has
pending cases handled by him or her, and/or where he or
she has appeared as counsel; (5) The Sworn
Statement shall be considered as proof of respondents
compliance with the order of suspension; and (6)
Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by
the lawyer under oath shall be a ground for
the imposition of a more severe punishment, or
disbarment, as may be warranted. Ligaya Maniago vs.
Lawyers; misconduct

Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472, March 30, 2010

The Court finds that by conniving with Gerangco in taking
over the Board of
Directors and the GEMASCO facilities, respondent violated
the provisions of the Cooperative Code of
the Philippines and the GEMASCO By-Laws. He also
violated the Lawyers Oath, which provides that a
lawyer shall support the Constitution and obey the laws.
When respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal
complaints against complainant, he violated the
Lawyers Oath that a lawyer shall not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same. When,
after obtaining an extension of time to file
comment on the complaint, respondent failed to file any
and ignored this Courts subsequent show cause
order, he violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which states that A lawyer shall
not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse
without submitting the same or offering an explanation for
his failure to do so.
The Court notes that respondent had previously been
suspended from the practice of law for six months
for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he
having been found to have received an
acceptance fee and misled the client into believing that he
had filed a case for her when he had not. It

appears, however, that respondent has not reformed his

ways. A more severe penalty this time is thus
called for. Iluminada M. Vaflor-Fabroa Vs. Atty. Oscar
Paguinto, A.C. No. 6273, March 15, 2010
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides, A lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct. Conduct, as used in the Rule, is
not confined to the performance of a lawyers professional
duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for
misconduct committed either in his professional or private
capacity. The test is whether his conduct
shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders
him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
In the present case, respondent acted in his private
capacity. He misrepresented that he owned the lot he
sold to complainant. He refused to return the amount paid
by complainant. His refusal to return the
money paid for the lot is unbecoming a member of the bar
and an officer of the court. By his conduct,
respondent failed to live up to the strict standard of
professionalism required by the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Respondents acts violated the trust and
respect complainant reposed in him as a member
of the Bar and an officer of the court. As a final blow, he
denied having any transaction with
complainant. It is crystal-clear in the mind of the Court
that he fell short of his duty under Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We
cannot, and we should not, let respondents
dishonest and deceitful conduct go unpunished. We
consider a penalty of two-year suspension more
appropriate considering the circumstances of this case.
Alfredo Roa vs. Atty. Juan Moreno, A.C. No. 8382,
Lawyers; gross

April 21, 2010

A lawyer who obtains possession of the funds and

misconduct

properties of his client in

the course of his professional employment shall deliver the
same to his client (a) when they become due,
or (b) upon demand. In the instant case, respondent failed
to account for and return the P300,000.00
despite complainants repeated demands.
Atty. Alvero cannot take refuge in his claim that there
existed no attorney-client relationship between
him and Barcenas. Even if it were true that no attorneyclient relationship existed between them, case
law has it that an attorney may be removed, or otherwise
disciplined, not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in the profession, but also for gross
misconduct not connected with his professional duties,
making him unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law confer upon
him.
Atty. Alveros failure to immediately account for and return
the money when due and upon demand
violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of
integrity and moral soundness, and
warranted the imposition of disciplinary action. It gave rise
to the presumption that he converted the
money for his own use, and this act constituted a gross
violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of
public confidence in the legal profession. They constitute
gross misconduct and gross unethical behavior
for which he may be suspended. Reynaria Barcenas vs.
Atty. Anorlito A. Alvero, A.C. No. 8159, April 23,

Attorneys fees;

2010
The principle of quantum meruit (as much as he deserves)

quantum meruit

may be a basis
for determining the reasonable amount of attorneys fees.
Quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue
enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is
unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying
for it. It is applicable even if there was a formal written
contract for attorneys fees as long as the agreed

fee was found by the court to be unconscionable. In fixing

a reasonable compensation for the services
rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit,
factors such as the time spent, and extent of services
rendered; novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
importance of the subject matter; skill
demanded; probability of losing other employment as a
result of acceptance of the proffered case;
customary charges for similar services; amount involved in
the controversy and the benefits resulting to
the client; certainty of compensation; character of
employment; and professional standing of the lawyer,
may be considered [Orocio v. Anguluan, G.R. Nos. 17989293, January 30, 2009]. Indubitably entwined
with a lawyers duty to charge only reasonable fee is the
power of the Court to reduce the amount of
attorneys fees if the same is excessive and unconscionable
in relation to Sec. 24, Rule 138 of the Rules.
Attorneys fees are unconscionable if they affront ones
sense of justice, decency or unreasonableness.
Verily, the determination of the amount of reasonable
attorneys fees requires the presentation of
evidence and a full-blown trial. It would be only after due
hearing and evaluation of the evidence
presented by the parties that the trial court can render
judgment as to the propriety of the amount to be
awarded. Hicoblino M. Catly (Deceased), Substituted by his
wife, Lourdes A. Catly vs. William Navarro, et al.,
Attoney; grossly

G.R. No. 167239, May 5, 2010

Respondent acts of converting his secretary into a

immoral act

mistress; contracting
two marriages with Shirley and Leny, are grossly immoral
which no civilized society in the world can
countenance. The subsequent detention and torture of the
complainant is gross misconduct which only a
beast may be able to do. In fine, by engaging himself in
acts which are grossly immoral and acts which
constitute gross misconduct, respondent has ceased to

possess the qualifications of a lawyer. Rosario T.

Mecaral vs. Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez, A.C. No. 8392, June
Attorney;

29, 2010
Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall

representation within

represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.

bounds of the law

For this reason, Rule 15.07 of the Code

requires a lawyer to impress upon his client compliance
with the law and principles of fairness. A lawyer
must employ only fair and honest means to attain the
lawful objectives of his client. It is his duty to
counsel his clients to use peaceful and lawful methods in
seeking justice and refrain from doing an
intentional wrong to their adversaries. Rural Bank of
Calape, Inc. (RBCI), Bohol vs. Atty. James Benedict

Attorney; attorneys

Florido, A.C. No. 5736, June 18, 2010

The issue of the reasonable legal fees due to respondent

fees

still needs to be
resolved in a trial on the merits with the following integral
sub-issues: (1) the reasonableness of the 10%
contingent fee given that the recovery of Tiwis share [in
unpaid realty taxes] was not solely attributable
to the legal services rendered by respondent, (2) the
nature, extent of legal work, and significance of the
cases allegedly handled by respondent which reasonably
contributed, directly or indirectly, to the
recovery of Tiwis share, and (3) the relative benefit derived
by Tiwi from the services rendered by
respondent. The amount of reasonable attorneys fees
finally determined by the trial court should be
without legal interest in line with well-settled
jurisprudence. Municipality of Tiwi, represented by Hon.
Mayor Jaime C. Villanueva and Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi
Vs. Antonio B. Betito, G.R. No. 171873, July 9, 2010
It is settled that a claim for attorneys fees may be asserted
either in the very action in
which a lawyer rendered his services or in a separate
action. But enforcing it in the main case bodes well

as it forestalls multiplicity of suits. The intestate court in

this case, therefore, correctly allowed Atty.
Siapian to interject his claim for attorneys fees in the
estate proceedings against some of the heirs and,
after hearing, adjudicate the same on April 3, 1997 with
an order for Arturo, et al to pay Atty. Siapian the
fees of P3 million due him. Since the award of P3 million in
attorneys fees in favor of Atty. Siapian had
already become final and executory, the intestate court
was within its powers to order the Register of
Deeds to annotate his lien on the Estates titles to its
properties. The Estate has no cause for complaint
since the lien was neither a claim nor a burden against the
Estate itself. It was not enforceable against the
Estate but only against Arturo, et al, who constituted the
majority of the heirs. Heirs and/or Estate of Atty.
Rolando P. Siapian, represented by Susan S. Mendoza vs.
Intestate Estate of the Late Eufrocina G. Mackay as
represented by Dr. Roderick Mackay, et al., G.R. No.
Attorney; engagement

184799, September 1, 2010

In Phividec Industrial Authority v. Capitol Steel

of private counsel by

Corporation, we listed three (3) indispensable conditions

GOCC

before a GOCC can hire a private lawyer: (1)

private counsel can only be hired in exceptional cases; (2)
the GOCC must first secure the written
conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or
the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case
may be; and (3) the written concurrence of the COA must
also be secured. Failure to comply with all
three conditions would constitute appearance without
authority. A lawyer appearing after his authority
as counsel had expired is also appearance without
authority. Rey Vargas, et al. vs. Atty. Michael Ignes, et

Attorney; engagement

al., A.C. No. 8096, July 5, 2010

Pursuant to this provision [Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the

of private counsel by

LGC], the municipal mayor is required to secure the prior

LGU

authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan before

entering into a contract on behalf of the municipality. In

the instant case, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi

unanimously passed Resolution No. 15-92 authorizing
Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer of her choice to
represent the interest of Tiwi in the execution of this
Courts Decision in National Power Corporation v.
Province of Albay. The above-quoted authority necessarily
carried with it the power to negotiate, execute
and sign on behalf of Tiwi the Contract of Legal Services.
Municipality of Tiwi, represented by Hon. Mayor
Jaime C. Villanueva and Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi Vs.
Attorney; gross

Antonio B. Betito, G.R. No. 171873, July 9, 2010

In Lao v. Medel, we held that the deliberate failure to pay

misconduct

just debts and the

issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct
for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
one-year suspension from the practice of law. However, in
this case, we deem it reasonable to affirm the
sanction imposed by the IBP-CBD, i.e., Atty. Valerio was
ordered suspended from the practice of law for
two (2) years, because, aside from issuing worthless
checks and failing to pay her debts, she has also
shown wanton disregard of the IBPs and Court Orders in
the course of the proceedings. A-1 Financial
Services, Inc. vs. Atty. Laarni N. Valerio, A.C. No. 8390, July
2, 2010
Deliberate failure to pay just debts constitute gross
misconduct, for which a
lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the
practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the
administration of justice and vanguards of our legal
system. They must, at all times, faithfully perform
their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their
clients, which include prompt payment of
financial obligations. Manuel C. Yuhico vs. Atty. Fred L.
Gutierrez, A.C. No. 8391, November 23, 2010
There is nothing ethically remiss in a lawyer who files

numerous cases in
different fora, as long as he does so in good faith, in
accordance with the Rules, and without any illmotive
or purpose other than to achieve justice and fairness. In
the present case, however, we find that
the barrage of cases filed by the respondent against his
former client and others close to her was meant to
overwhelm said client and to show her that the respondent
does not fold easily after he was meted a
penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law.
Atty. Carmen Leonor M. Alcantara, et al. vs. Atty.
Eduardo C. de Vera, A.C. No. 5859, November 23, 2010
While respondents five-year suspension from the practice
of law on
account of an earlier administrative case was still in effect,
she appeared and actively participated in at
least three cases where she misrepresented herself as
Atty. Leizl Tanglao when in fact her name is Luna
B. Avance. She then refused to heed two orders from the
SC for her to answer the new charge against her
for which she was found guilty of indirect contempt and
fined in the amount of P30,000. However, the
respondent failed to pay the fine imposed. In view of the
foregoing, the Court found the respondent
unfit to continue as a member of the bar. As an officer of
the court, it is a lawyers duty to uphold the
dignity and authority of the court. The highest form of
respect for judicial authority is shown by a
lawyers obedience to court orders and processes. Here,
respondents conduct evidently fell short of
what is expected of her as an officer of the court as she
obviously possesses a habit of defying the Courts
orders. Failure to comply with Court directives constitutes
gross misconduct, insubordination or
disrespect which merits a lawyers suspension or even
disbarment. Teresita D. Santeco v. Atty. Luna B.
Avance, A.C. No. 5834. February 22, 2011

Attorney; violation of

We find no merit in petitioners assertion that Atty.

attorney-client

Binamira gravely breached and abused the rule on

relationship

privileged communication under the Rules of Court

and the Code of Professional Responsibility of Lawyers
when he represented [respondent] Helen in the
present case. Notably, this issue was never raised before
the labor tribunals and was raised for the first
time only on appeal. Moreover, records show that although
petitioners previously employed Atty.
Binamira to manage several businesses, there is no
showing that they likewise engaged his professional
services as a lawyer. Likewise, at the time the instant
complaint was filed, Atty. Binamira was no longer
under the employ of petitioners. Lambert Pawnbrokers and
Jewelry Corporation and Lambert Lim vs. Helen

Attorney; gross

Binamira, G.R. No. 170464. July 12, 2010

When Milagros finally met respondent on September 30,

discourtesy

2008 [in order to

collect on his debt to her], respondent, in the presence of
several others, told her Eh kung sabihin ko na
sugar mommy kita, adding that Nagpapakantot ka
naman sa akin. The Court finds that respondent is
indeed guilty of gross discourtesy amounting to conduct
unbecoming of a court employee. By such
violation, respondent failed to live up to his oath of office
as member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and violated Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Court has consistently
been reminding officials and employees of the Judiciary
that their conduct or behavior is circumscribed
with a heavy burden of responsibility which, at all times,
should be characterized by, among other
things, strict propriety and decorum. As such, they should
not use abusive, offensive, scandalous,
menacing and improper language. Their every act or word
should be marked by prudence, restraint,
courtesy and dignity. Aside from violating Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility,

respondent appears to have also violated Rule 8.01 of the

same Code. Complaints of Mrs. Milagros Lee &
Samantha Lee against Atty. Gil Luisito R. Capito, A.M. No.
Attorney; mistake

2008-19-SC. August 18, 2010

A client is generally bound by the mistakes of his lawyer;

binding on client

otherwise,
there would never be an end to a litigation as long as a
new counsel could be employed, and who could
then allege and show that the preceding counsel had not
been sufficiently diligent or experienced or
learned. The legal profession demands of a lawyer that
degree of vigilance and attention expected of a
good father of a family; such lawyer should adopt the
norm of practice expected of men of good
intentions. Moreover, a lawyer owes it to himself and to his
clients to adopt an efficient and orderly
system of keeping track of the developments in his cases,
and should be knowledgeable of the remedies
appropriate to his cases. National Tobacco Administration
vs. Daniel Castillo, G.R. No. 154124,August 13,
2010
Petitioner cannot simply harp on the mistakes and
negligence of his
lawyer allegedly beset with personal problems and
emotional depression. The negligence and mistakes
of counsel are binding on the client. There are exceptions
to this rule, such as when the reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of
law, or when the application of the general
rule results in the outright deprivation of ones property or
liberty through a technicality. However, in
this case, we find no reason to exempt petitioner from the
general rule. The admitted inability of his
counsel to attend fully and ably to the prosecution of his
appeal and other sorts of excuses should have
prompted petitioner to be more vigilant in protecting his
rights and replace said counsel with a more

competent lawyer. Instead, petitioner continued to allow

his counsel to represent him on appeal and
even up to this Court, apparently in the hope of moving
this Court with a fervent plea for relaxation of
the rules for reason of petitioners age and medical
condition. Verily, diligence is required not only from
lawyers but also from their clients. Gregorio Dimarucot y
Garcia vs.. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
183975,September 20, 2010
Considering the initial 15-day extension granted by the CA
and the
injunction under Sec. 4, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure against further extensions except for
the most compelling reason, it was clearly inexcusable for
petitioner to expediently plead its counsels
heavy workload as ground for seeking an additional
extension of 10 days within which to file its petition
for review. To our mind, petitioner would do well to
remember that, rather than the low gate to which
parties are unreasonably required to stoop, procedural
rules are designed for the orderly conduct of
proceedings and expeditious settlement of cases in the
courts of law. Like all rules, they are required to
be followed and utter disregard of the same cannot be
expediently rationalized by harping on the policy
of liberal construction which was never intended as an
unfettered license to disregard the letter of the
law or, for that matter, a convenient excuse to substitute
substantial compliance for regular adherence
thereto. When it comes to compliance with time rules, the
Court cannot afford inexcusable delay. J.
Tiosejo Investment Corporation vs.. Sps. Benjamin and
Attorney; mistake of

Eleanor Ang, G.R. No. 174149, September 8, 2010

Granting that their counsel made a mistake in entering

counsel

into such
stipulations, such procedural error unfortunately bound
them. The Court has consistently held that the

mistake or negligence of a counsel in the area of

procedural technique binds the client unless such
mistake or negligence of counsel is so gross or palpable
that would require the courts to step in and
accord relief to the client who suffered thereby. Without
this doctrinal rule, there would never be an end
to a suit so long as a new counsel could be employed to
allege and show that the prior counsel had not
been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or learned. Gilbert
Urma, et al. vs. Hon. Orlando Beltran, et al., G.R.
Attorney; notarization

No. 180836, August 8, 2010

We cannot overemphasize the important role a notary

of falsified deed

public
performs. In Gonzales v. Ramos, we stressed that
notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act
but one invested with substantive public interest. The
notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document, making it admissible in
evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarized document is, by law, entitled to
full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this
reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care
the basic requirements in the performance of
his duties; otherwise, the publics confidence in the
integrity of a notarized document would be
undermined. The records undeniably show the gross
negligence exhibited by the respondent in
discharging his duties as a notary public. He failed to
ascertain the identities of the affiants before him
and failed to comply with the most basic function that a
notary public must do, i.e., to require the parties
presentation of their residence certificates or any other
document to prove their identities. Given the
respondents admission in his pleading that the donors
were already dead when he notarized the Deed
of Donation, we have no doubt that he failed in his duty to
ascertain the identities of the persons who
appeared before him as donors in the Deed of Donation.

Under the circumstances, we find that the

respondent should be made liable not only as a notary
public but also as a lawyer. He not only violated
the Notarial Law (Public Act No. 2103), but also Canon 1
and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Luzviminda R. Lustestica vs. Atty. Sergio E.
Attorney;

Bernabe, A.C. No. 6258. August 24, 2010

The Court, in the recent case of Ligaya Maniago v. Atty.

reinstatement

Lourdes I. De Dios,
issued the guidelines on the lifting of orders of
suspension, and has advised strict observance thereof.
However, the Court will not hesitate to withhold the
privilege of the practice of law if it is shown that
respondent, as an officer of the Court, is still not worthy of
the trust and confidence of his clients and of
the public. Thus, applying the guidelines in Maniago, the
Court Resolved to GRANT Respondents
Petition for Reinstatement, effective upon his submission
to the Court of a Sworn Statement attesting to
the fact: 1) that he has completely served the four (4)
suspensions imposed on him successively;2) that
he had desisted from the practice of law, and has not
appeared as counsel in any court during the
periods of suspension; and 3) that he has returned the
sums of money to the complainants as ordered by
the Court, attaching proofs thereof. Carlos Reyes vs. Atty.
Jeremias R. Vitan/Celia Arroyo-Posidio vs. Atty.
Jeremias R. Vitan/Violeta Tahaw vs. Atty. Jeremias R.
Vitan/Mark Yuson vs. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan, A.C. No.
5835/A.C. No. 6051/A.C. No. 6441/A.C. No. 6955, August

Attorney; violation of

18, 2010.
A lawyer owes fidelity to

rules on forum

the cause of his client, but not at the expense of truth and

shopping and abuse of

judicial processes

the administration of justice. The filing of

multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the courts
processes and improper conduct that tends to impede,
obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will
be punished as contempt of court. Needless

to state, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious

petitions (which obviously delays the
execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects
himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for
not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties
as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to
the courts, and to maintain only such actions as appear to
him to be just and are consistent with truth
and honor. The filing of another action concerning the
same subject matter, in violation of the doctrine of
res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer
to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of
justice. By his actuations, respondent also violated Rule
12.02 and Rule 12.04 of the Code, as well as a
lawyers mandate to delay no man for money or malice.
Atty. Josabeth V. Alonso, et al. vs. Atty. Ibaro B.
Attorney; misconduct

Relaminda, Jr., A.C. No. 8481, August 3, 2010.

Respondent (lawyer) was ordered to reimburse his client
Php16,300.00. Nine
years after the directive was made, he effected payment.
Respondents belated compliance with the
order glaringly speaks of his lack of candor, of his
dishonesty, if not defiance of Court orders, qualities
that do not endear him to the esteemed brotherhood of
lawyers. The lack of any sufficient justification or
explanation for the nine-year delay in complying with the
Resolutions betrays a clear and contumacious
disregard for the lawful orders of this Court. Such
disrespect constitutes a clear violation of the lawyers
Code of Professional Responsibility. Leonard W. Richards
vs. Patricio A. Asoy, A.C. No. 2655, October 12,
2010
With his admission that he drafted and notarized another
instrument that did not
state the true consideration of the sale so as to reduce the

capital gains and other taxes due on the

transaction, respondent cannot escape liability for making
an untruthful statement in a public document
for an unlawful purpose. As the second deed indicated an
amount much lower than the actual price
paid for the property sold, respondent abetted in depriving
the Government of the right to collect the
correct taxes due. Not only did respondent assist the
contracting parties in an activity aimed at defiance
of the law, he likewise displayed lack of respect for and
made a mockery of the solemnity of the oath in
an Acknowledgment. By notarizing such illegal and
fraudulent document, he is entitling it full faith and
credit upon its face, which it obviously does not deserve
considering its nature and purpose.
Respondents actions violated not only Rule 1.02, Canon 1
of the Code of Responsibility, but pertinent
sections of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice as well.
Thus, respondent is meted the penalty of
revocation of notarial commission and suspension from
the practice of law for a period of two years.
Pacita Caalim-Verzonilla v. Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua. A.C.
Attorney; negligence

No. 6655. October 11, 2011.

Respondent Atty. Elayda failed to inform his clients,
petitioners herein, of the dates
of hearing and the adverse decision against them, which
eventually became final and executory as no
appeal was filed therefrom, to the prejudice of his clients.
A lawyer is duty bound to uphold and
safeguard the interests of his clients. He should be
conscientious, competent and diligent in handling his
clients cases. Atty. Elayda should give adequate attention,
care, and time to all the cases he is handling.
As the petitioners counsel, Atty. Elayda is expected to
monitor the progress of said spouses case and is
obligated to exert all efforts to present every remedy or
defense authorized by law to protect the cause
espoused by the petitioners. Respondent is guilty of gross

negligence. Spouses Virgilio and Angelina

Aranda vs. Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda, A.C. No. 7907.
December 15, 2010
A complaint for disciplinary action was filed against Atty.
Macario Ga due to his
failure to reconstitute or turn over to his client the records
of the case in his possession. The Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to serve their
clients with competence and diligence. Rule
18.03 and Rule 18.04 state: Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable;
Rule 18.04. A lawyer shall keep the client
informed of the status of his case and shall respond within
a reasonable time to the clients request for
information. Respondent Atty. Ga breached these duties
when he failed to reconstitute or turn over the
records of the case to his client, herein complainant Gone.
His negligence manifests lack of competence
and diligence required of every lawyer. His failure to
comply with the request of his client was a gross
betrayal of his fiduciary duty and a breach of the trust
reposed upon him by his client. Respondents
sentiments against complainant Gone is not a valid reason
for him to renege on his obligation as a
lawyer. The moment he agreed to handle the case, he was
bound to give it his utmost attention, skill and
competence. Public interest requires that he exert his best
efforts and all his learning and ability in
defense of his clients cause. Those who perform that duty
with diligence and candor not only safeguard
the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of
justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain
the communitys respect for the legal profession. Patricio
Gone v. Atty. Macario Ga, A.C. No. 7771, April 6,
Government lawyers;

2011.
As a rule, government lawyers are not

prohibition against

allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession

private practice

during their incumbency. By way of

exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice
of his or her profession under the following
conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the
Constitution or by the law; and second, the
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her
official functions. The last paragraph of
Section 7 of RA 6713 provides an exception to the
exception. In case of lawyers separated from the
government service who are covered under subparagraph
(b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a oneyear
prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with
any matter before the office he used to be
with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes
this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after
leaving the government service, to accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in the said service. The
keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is the term intervene which we previously
interpreted to include an act of a person who
has the power to influence the proceedings. Otherwise
stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must
have accepted engagement or employment in a
matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had
previously exercised power to influence the outcome
of the proceedings.
As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the
respondent previously interfered with the sales
application covering Manuels land when the former was
still a member of the Committee on Awards.
The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that
the respondent was engaged in the practice of
law. At face value, the legal service rendered by the
respondent was limited only in the preparation of a

single document and private practice of law contemplates

a succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public
as a lawyer. Jovito S. Olazo vs. Justice Dante O.
Government lawyers;

Tinga (Ret.), A.M. No. 10-5-7-S

Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

promoting private

prohibits a lawyer in the government service from using

interests

his or her public position to: (1) promote private

interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private
interest to interfere with his or her public
duties. The restriction extends to all government lawyers
who use their public offices to promote their
private interests. Promotion of private interest includes
soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in
any transaction requiring the approval of his or her office,
or may be affected by the functions of his or
her office. Private interest is not limited to direct interest,
but extends to advancing the interest of
relatives. We also ruled that private interest interferes with
public duty when the respondent uses the
office and his or her knowledge of the intricacies of the law
to benefit relatives.
Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we
find the absence of any concrete proof that the
respondent (retired Supreme Court Associate Justice
Dante O. Tinga) abused his position as a
Congressman and as a member of the Committee on
Awards in the manner defined under Rule 6.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Jovito S. Olazo vs.

Attorney; dishonesty

Justice Dante O. Tinga (Ret.), A.M. No. 10-5-7-S

Respondent was accused of filing various pleadings on
behalf of parties who were
already deceased. To all attorneys, truthfulness and
honesty have the highest value, for, as the Court has
said in Young v. Batuegas: A lawyer must be a disciple of
truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar
that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of
any in court and he shall conduct himself as a

lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and

discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to his clients. He should bear in mind that as an officer
of the court his high vocation is to correctly
inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case
and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at
correct conclusion. The courts, on the other hand, are
entitled to expect only complete honesty from
lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a
lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his clients
rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in
defense of his clients cause, his conduct must never
be at the expense of truth. Respondent lawyer was found
not liable as he had disclosed in a pleading
the death of the deceased parties and the fact that he was
representing the successors in interest of the
deceased parties. Jessie R. De Leon vs. Atty. Eduardo G.
Castelo, A.C. No. 8620, January 12, 2011
It is clear from the records that respondent Atty. Ediza
deceived the Spouses
Floran when he asked them to unknowingly sign a deed of
sale transferring a portion of their land to
him. Respondent also made it appear that the original
owner of the land conveyed her rights therto to
respondent and not to the Spouses Floran. When the sale
of the Spouses Florans land pushed through,
respondent received half of the proceeds given by the
buyer and falsely misled the Spouses Floran into
thinking that he will register the remaining portion of the
land. Lamentably, Atty. Ediza played on the
navet of the Spouses Floran to deprive them of their
valued property. This is an unsavory behavior
from a member of the legal profession. Aside from giving
adequate attention, care and time to his
clients case, a lawyer is also expected to be truthful, fair
and honest in protecting his clients rights.
Once a lawyer fails in this duty, he is not true to his oath

as a lawyer. Respondent lawyer violated Rule

1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
which he is suspended from the practice of law for six
months. Nemesio Floran and Caridad Floran v. Atty.
Attorneys; plagiarism

Roy Prule Ediza. A.C. No. 5325. October 19, 2011.

The rule exonerating judges from charges of plagiarism
applies also to lawyers.
Although as a rule they receive compensation for every
pleading or paper they file in court or for every
opinion they render to clients, lawyers also need to strive
for technical accuracy in their writings. They
should not be exposed to charges of plagiarism in what
they write so long as they do not depart, as
officers of the court, from the objective of assisting the
Court in the administration of justice. In matter of
the charges of plagiarism, etc. against Associate Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillo, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC. February

Attorney; willful

8, 2011
Respondent willfully disobeyed the Court when

disobedience of lawful

she continued her law practice despite the five-year

orders of court

suspension order against her and even

misrepresented herself to be another person in order to
evade said penalty. Thereafter, when she was
twice ordered to comment on her continued law practice
while still suspended, nothing was heard from
her despite receipt of two Resolutions from this Court.
Neither did she pay the P30,000.00 fine imposed
in the September 29, 2009 Resolution. Under Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court a member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from office as an
attorney for gross misconduct and/or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court. In
repeatedly disobeying the Courts orders,
respondent proved herself unworthy of membership in the
Philippine Bar. Worse, she remains
indifferent to the need to reform herself. Clearly, she is
unfit to discharge the duties of an officer of the

court and deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment.

Teresita D. Santeco v. Atty. Luna B. Avance, A.C. No.
Attorney; breach of

5834. February 22, 2011

Atty. Ricaforts act of obtaining money from his clients

fiduciary duties

under the
respective pretexts that the amount would be deposited in
court and that he would prepare and file the
memorandum for them erected a responsibility to account
for and to use the amounts in accordance with
the particular purposes intended. For him to deposit the
amount in his personal account without the
consent of the clients and to fail to file the memorandum
and not return the money upon demand,
constituted a serious breach of his fiduciary duties as
their attorney. He reneged on his duty to render an
accounting to his clients showing that he had spent the
amounts for the particular purposes intended.
He was thereby presumed to have misappropriated the
moneys for his own use to the prejudice of his
clients and in violation of the clients trust reposed in him.
He could not escape liability, for upon failing
to use the moneys for the purposes intended, he should
have immediately returned the moneys to his
clients. Atty. Ricaforts plain abuse of the confidence
reposed in him by his clients rendered him liable
for violation of Canon 16, particularly Rule 16.01, supra,
and Canon 17, all of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. His acts and actuations constituted a gross
violation of general morality and of
professional ethics that impairs public confidence in the
legal profession and deserves punishment.
Erlinda R. Tarog v. Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort, A.C. No. 8253,

Law Professors;

March 15, 2011.

A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it

academic freedom;

has not been passed upon in any previous case before this

limitation

Court, is the question of whether lawyers who

are also law professors can invoke academic freedom as a
defense in an administrative proceeding for

intemperate statements tending to pressure the Court or

influence the outcome of a case or degrade the
courts. Applying by analogy the Courts past treatment of
the free speech defense in other bar
discipline cases, academic freedom cannot be successfully
invoked by respondents in this case. The
implicit ruling in jurisprudence is that the constitutional
right to freedom of expression of members of
the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as
lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to
uphold the publics faith in the legal profession and the
justice system. To our mind, the reason that
freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of
lawyers applies with greater force to the
academic freedom of law professors. It is not contested
that respondent professors are, by law and
jurisprudence, guaranteed academic freedom and
undisputably, they are free to determine what they
will teach their students and how they will teach. We must
point out that there is nothing in the Show
Cause Resolution that dictates upon respondents the
subject matter they can teach and the manner of
their instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the
principle of academic freedom for this Court
to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for
contumacious conduct and speech, coupled
with undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending
case, without observing proper procedure, even
if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers. Re: Letter
of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring
Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the University of the
Philippines College of Law on the allegations of
plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court,
Law Professors;

A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011.

It would do well for the Court to remind respondent law

engaged in practice of

professors that, in view of the broad definition in Cayetano

law

v. Monsod, lawyers when they teach law are

considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike

professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers

who do not teach law, respondents are bound by their oath
to uphold the ethical standards of the legal
profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be
measured against the same canons of
professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of
the Bar as the fact of their being law
professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they
are lawyers. Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty
entitled Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of
the University of the Philippines College of Law on
the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the
Law Professors;

Supreme Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011.

Respondent law professors claim that the

freedom of expression

Court, upon its issuance of the Show Cause Resolution,

and speech; limitation

has interfered with their constitutionally

mandated right to free speech and expression. In a long
line of cases, this Court has held that the right to
criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced
against the equally primordial concern that the
independence of the Judiciary be protected from due
influence or interference. In cases where the critics
are not only citizens but members of the Bar,
jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of
this
Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding
the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial
or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment
and common decency. Verily, the accusatory
and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement
exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot
be deemed as protected free speech. Re: Letter of the UP
Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A
statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law on the allegations of plagiarism and
misrepresentation in the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4-

Law Professors;

SC, March 8, 2011.

For the disposition of the Court are the submissions of 37

respect for courts

respondent
law professors in response to the Resolution directing
them to show cause why they should not be
disciplined as members of the Bar for issuing a statement
which alleged acts of plagiarism and
misrepresentation in the Supreme Court. Even as lawyers
passionately and vigorously propound their
points of view they are bound by certain rules of conduct
for the legal profession. This Court is certainly
not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All
the Court demands is the same respect and
courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under
established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they
are judges, court employees, professors or private
practitioners, are officers of the Court and have
voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable
qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct
themselves with good fidelity towards the courts. There is
no exemption from this sworn duty for law
professors, regardless of their status in the academic
community or the law school to which they belong.
Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring
Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the University of the
Philippines College of Law on the allegations of plagiarism
and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court, A.M.

Lawyers;

No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011.

When the Court initiates contempt

administrative

proceedings and/or disciplinary proceedings against

proceedings vis--vis
contempt proceedings

lawyers for intemperate and discourteous

language and behavior directed at the courts, the evil
sought to be prevented is the same the
degradation of the courts and the loss of trust in the
administration of justice. For this reason, it is not
unusual for the Court to cite authorities on bar discipline
(involving the duty to give due respect to the
courts) in contempt cases against lawyers and vice versa.
When the Court chooses to institute an
administrative case against a respondent lawyer, the mere

citation or discussion in the orders or decision

in the administrative case of jurisprudence involving
contempt proceedings does not transform the
action from a disciplinary proceeding to one for contempt.
Re: Letter of UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring
Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the University of the
Philippines College of Law etc., A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, June
7, 2011
Attorney; filing of

Respondents cannot be held liable for judiciously

baseless complaint

performing
their sworn duty to observe and follow court proceedings
as provided by the Rules. Complainant
apparently filed this complaint primarily to divert the
attention of his client from his shortcomings as its
counsel, if not to simply harass the respondents. A lawyer
who files an unfounded complaint must be
sanctioned because, as an officer of the court, he does not
discharge his duty by filing frivolous petitions
that only add to the workload of the judiciary.
Such filing of baseless complaints is contemptuous of the
courts. Complainant was ordered to show
cause why he should not be subjected to disciplinary
action for filing a frivolous and baseless complaint.
Atty. Emmanuel R. Andamo v. Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr.,
Clerk of Court Stanlee D. Calma and Legal Researcher
Diana G. Ruiz, all of Regional Trial Court, Branch 18

Attorney; grave

Tagytay City. A.M. No. RTJ-11-2265. September 21, 2011

Respondent attorney was found to have violated Rule 1.01

misconduct

of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondents
actions clearly show that she deceived
complainant into lending money to her through the use of
documents and false representations and by
taking advantage of her education and complainants
ignorance in legal matters. As manifested by
complainant, he would have never granted the loan to
respondent were it not for respondents

misrepresentation that she was authorized to sell the

property and that complainant could register the
open deed of sale if respondent fails to pay the loan. By
her misdeed, respondent has eroded not only
complainants perception of the legal profession but the
publics perception as well. Her actions
constitute gross misconduct for which she may be
disciplined. Tomas P. Tan, Jr. v. Atty. Haide V. Gumba.
Attorney; notarization

A.C. No. 9000. October 5, 2011.

A notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a

of illegal document

marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of

the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the
conjugal partnership, which is exactly what respondent
did in this case. In preparing and notarizing an
agreement for extrajudicial dissolution of marriage a
void document respondent violated Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Respondent knew fully well that the Kasunduan Ng
Paghihiwalay has no legal effect and is against public
policy. Therefore, respondent may be suspended
from office as an attorney for breach of the ethics of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Rodolfo A. Espinosa and
Maximo A. Glindo v. Atty. Julieta A. Omaa. A.C. No.

Attorney; gross

9081. October 12, 2011.

Possession of good moral character is not only a condition

immorality

for admission to
the Bar but is a continuing requirement to maintain ones
good standing in the legal profession. It is the
bounden duty of law practitioners to observe the highest
degree of morality in order to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar. Consequently, any errant behavior on
the part of a lawyer, be it in his public or
private activities, which tends to show him deficient in
moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor, is sufficient to warrant his suspension or

disbarment. Respondents act of having an affair

with his clients wife manifested his disrespect for the laws
on the sanctity of marriage and his own
marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral
depravity and low regard for his profession. He also
violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by the
complainant, which in itself is prohibited under
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Elpidio P. Tiong vs. Atty. George M. Florendo. A.C. No.
Attorney; gross

4428. December 12, 2011

The

misconduct;

respondent, while an MTC judge, accepted a petition for

inexcusable ignorance
of well-established
rules of procedures

declaratory relief filed by the Municipal

Council of San Fernando, Pampanga, assigned it to
himself, and acted on it, all on the same day and
without issuing summons or giving notice to the
complainant who was the part adversely affected by
the resolution subject of the Municipal Councils petition.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only
maintain their independence, integrity and
impartiality but they must also avoid any appearance of
impropriety or partiality, which may erode the
peoples faith in the judiciary. Integrity and impartiality, as
well as the appearance thereof, are deemed
essential not just in the proper discharge of judicial office,
but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
This standard applies not only to the decision itself, but
also to the process by which the decision is
made. As a member of the bar and former judge,
respondent is expected to be well-versed in the Rules of
Procedure. This is expected upon members of the legal
profession because membership in the bar is in
the category of a mandate for public service of the highest
order. Lawyers are oath-bound servants of
society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by
inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary
duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice,

for which they have sworn to be fearless

crusaders. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Atty.
Daniel B. Liangco A.C. No. 5355. December 13,
Attorney; accounting

2011
When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client

of funds

for a particular
purpose, he should promptly account to the client how the
money was spent. If he does not use the
money for its intended purpose, he must immediately
return it to the client. His failure either to render
an accounting or to return the money (if the intended
purpose of the money does not materialize)
constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Moreover, a
lawyer has the duty to deliver his clients funds or
properties as they fall due or upon demand. His
failure to return the clients money upon demand gives
rise to the presumption that he has
misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and
in violation of the trust reposed in him by the
client. The issuance of checks which were later dishonored
for having been drawn against a closed
account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on him, shows lack of
personal honesty and good moral character as to render
him unworthy of public confidence, and
constitutes a ground for disciplinary action. Hector Trenas
vs. People of the Philippines. G.R. No. 195002.

Attorney; mistake of

January 25, 2012

The general rule is that the mistake of a counsel binds the

counsel

client, and it is
only in instances wherein the negligence is so gross or
palpable that courts must step in to grant relief to
the aggrieved client. It can be gleaned from the
circumstances that petitioner was given opportunities to
defend his case and was granted concomitant reliefs by
the court. Thus, it cannot be said that the mistake
and negligence of his former counsel were so gross and

palpable to have deprived him of due process.

Cresencio C. Milla vs. People of the Philippines and Carlo V.
Administrative cases

Lopez. G.R. No. 188726. January 25, 2012

The two-year prescriptive period for

against lawyers;

initiating a complaint against a lawyer for disbarment or

prescriptive period

suspension provided under Section 1, Rule VIII

of the Rules of Procedure of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline should be construed to mean two
years from the date of discovery of the professional
misconduct. Nesa Isenhardt vs. Atty. Leonardo M.

Attorney;

Real, A.C. No. 8254, February 15, 2012.

A notary public should not notarize a document unless

disqualification as

the

notary public

person who signs it is the same person who executed it,

personally appearing before him to attest to the
contents and the truth of what are stated therein. This is
to enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party
and to ascertain that the document is the
partys free act. The duties of a notary public is dictated by
public policy and impressed with public
interest. It is not a meaningless ministerial act of
acknowledging documents executed by parties who are
willing to pay the fees for notarization. It is of no moment
that the subject SPA was not utilized by the
grantee for the purpose it was intended because the
property was allegedly transferred from
complainant to her brother by virtue of a deed of sale
consummated between them. What is being
penalized is respondents act of notarizing a document
despite the absence of one of the parties. A
notarized document is by law entitled to full credit upon
its face and it is for this reason that notaries
public must observe the basic requirements in notarizing
documents. Otherwise, the confidence of the
public in notarized documents will be undermined. Nesa
Isenhardt vs. Atty. Leonardo M. Real, A.C. No.
8254, February 15, 2012

Attorney; government

The Code of

service; applicability

Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a

of Code of Professional
Responsibility

lawyer simply because he has joined the

government service. Where a lawyers misconduct as a
government official is of such nature as to affect
his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency,
then he may be disciplined as a member of
the bar on such grounds. Martin Lahn III and James P.
Concepcion vs. Labor Arbiter Jovencio Li. Mayor, Jr.,

Attorney; gross

A.C. No. 7430, February 15, 2012.

The respondent labor arbiter, being part of the quasi-

ignorance of the law

judicial
system of our government, performs official functions that
are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the
present controversy may be approximated to
administrative cases of judges whose decisions, including
the manner of rendering the same, were made subject of
administrative cases. While a judge may not
always be held liable for ignorance of the law for every
erroneous order that he renders, it is also
axiomatic that when the legal principle involved is
sufficiently basic, lack of conversance with it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. The unfounded
insistence of the respondent on his supposed
authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order, taken together
with the delay in the resolution of the said motion for
reconsideration, would clearly show that the
respondent deliberately intended to cause prejudice to the
complainants. Martin Lahn III and James P.
Concepcion vs. Labor Arbiter Jovencio Li. Mayor, Jr., A.C.

Attorney; lifting of

No. 7430, February 15, 2012

Professional misconduct involving the misuse of

indefinite suspension

constitutional
provisions for the purpose of insulting Members of the
Supreme Court is a serious breach of the rigid
standards that a member of good standing of the legal
profession must faithfully comply with. Thus, the

penalty of indefinite suspension was imposed. However, in

the past two years during which Atty.
Lozano has been suspended, he has repeatedly expressed
his willingness to admit his error, to observe
the rules and standards in the practice of law, and to
serve the ends of justice if he should be reinstated.
And in these two years, this Court has not been informed
of any act that would indicate that Atty.
Lozano had acted in any unscrupulous practices
unsuitable to a member of the bar. While the Court will
not hesitate to discipline its erring officers, it will not
prolong a penalty after it has been shown that the
purpose for imposing it had already been served. Re:
subpoena Duces Tecum dated January 11, 2010 of
Acting Director Aleu A. Amante, PIAB-C, Office of the
Ombudsman/Re: Order of the Office of the Ombudsman
referring the complaint of Attys. Oliver O. Lozano &
Evangeline J. Lozano-Endriano against Chief Justice
Reynato
S. Puno(ret.). A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC & A.M. NO. 10-9-9-SC,
Attorney; falsification

March 20, 2012.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer
may be removed or
suspended on the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly
immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath;
(7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing
as a lawyer for a party to a case without authority so to
do.
The crime of falsification of public document is contrary to
justice, honesty, and good morals and,
therefore, involves moral turpitude. Moral turpitude
includes everything which is done contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an
act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to

society in general, contrary to the accepted and

customary rule of right and duty between man and
woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.
Disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by
final judgment for a crime involving moral
turpitude. Re: SC Decision date May 20, 2008 in G.R. No.
161455 under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court vs.
Attorney; groundless

Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin. A.C. No. 7940, April 24, 2012.

As officers of the court, lawyers are duty-bound to observe

imputation of bribery

and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial

officers. They are to abstain from offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the court and must
refrain from attributing to a judge motives
that are not supported by the record or have no materiality
to the case.
Atty. Pea cannot be excused for uttering snide and
accusatory remarks at the expense of the reputation
and integrity of members of this Court, and for using
those unsubstantiated claims as basis for the
subject Motion for Inhibition.
Not only has respondent Pea failed to show sincere
remorse for his malicious insinuations of bribery
and wrongdoing against Justice Carpio, he in fact
continually availed of such unethical tactics in moving
for the inhibition of eleven Justices of the Court. Indeed,
his pattern of behavior can no longer be seen as
isolated incidents that the Court can pardon given certain
mitigating circumstances. Respondent Pea
has blatantly and consistently cast unfounded aspersions
against judicial officers in utter disregard of his
duties and responsibilities to the Court.
Respondent Peas actions betray a similar disrespectful
attitude towards the Court that cannot be
countenanced especially for those privileged enough to
practice law in the country. In re: Supreme Court
Resolution dated 28 April 2003 in G.R. Nos. 145817 and
145822. A.C. No. 6332, April 17, 2012.

Attorney; lack of

When a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he

diligence

will exercise due

diligence in protecting the latters rights. Failure to
exercise that degree of vigilance and attention
expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer
unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his
client and makes him answerable not just to his client but
also to the legal profession, the courts and
society. His workload does not justify neglect in handling
ones case because it is settled that a lawyer
must only accept cases as much as he can efficiently
handle. Suzette Del Mundo vs. Atty. Arnel C.

Attorney; obligation to

Capistrano. A.C. No. 6903, April 16, 2012.

A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of his

hold in trust money of

client that may come to his possession. As trustee of such

his client

funds, he is bound to keep them separate and

apart from his own. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a
specific purpose such as for the filing and
processing of a case if not utilized, must be returned
immediately upon demand. Failure to return gives
rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated it in
violation of the trust reposed on him. And the
conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes gross
violation of professional ethics and betrayal of
public confidence in the legal profession. Suzette Del
Mundo vs. Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano. A.C. No. 6903,

Attorney;

April 16, 2012.

The proscription against representation of conflicting

representation of

interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties

conflicting interests

are present clients in the same action or in an

unrelated action. The prohibition also applies even if the
lawyer would not be called upon to contend
for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the
other client, or that there would be no occasion
to use the confidential information acquired from one to
the disadvantage of the other as the two actions
are wholly unrelated. To be held accountable under this
rule, it is enough that the opposing parties in

one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present
clients and the nature or conditions of the
lawyers respective retainers with each of them would
affect the performance of the duty of undivided
fidelity to both clients. Anion vs. Sabistsana. A.C. No.
5098, April 11, 2012
Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. Rule 15.03 also provides
that A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of facts. in Hilado v. David, the
Court held that an attorney is employed that
is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or
counselor when he is listening to his
clients preliminary statement of his case, or when he is
giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is
drawing his clients pleadings, or advocating his clients
pleadings, or advocating his clients cause in
open court. Hence the necessity of setting down the
existence of the bare relationship of attorney and
client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of
interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to
prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent
conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer
from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is
founded on principles of public policy, on
good taste. The question is not necessarily one of the
rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney
has adhered to proper professional standard. With these
thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like
Caesars wife, not only to keep inviolate the clients
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice. The prohibition against
representation of conflicting interests applies although the
attorneys intentions were honest and he

acted in good faith. Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. vs. Atty.

Attorney; submission

Joselito M. Silvosa. A.C. No. 7360, July 24, 2012.

The falsification, subject of the instant

of falsified internal

administrative case, lies in the fact that respondent Pea

court documents

submitted to the Court a document he was

absolutely certain, at the time of such submission, was a
copy of the Agenda of the then ponente.
Candor and truthfulness are some of the qualities exacted
and expected from members of the legal
profession. Thus, lawyers shall commit no falsehood, nor
shall they mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice. As disciples of truth, their lofty
vocation is to correctly inform the court of the law
and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and
arriving at correct conclusions. Courts are
entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers
appearing and pleading before them. In the
instant case, the submission of a document purporting to
be a copy of the Agenda of a member of this
Court is an act of dishonesty that puts into doubt the
ability of respondent to uphold his duty as a
disciple of truth.
Respondent led the Court to believe that what he
submitted was a faithful reproduction of the ponentes
Agenda, just to support the subject Motion to Inhibit. The
original of the purported copy was later found
to have been inexistent in the courts records.
The Court noted that respondent Pea has not
explained, to the Courts satisfaction, how he managed
to obtain internal and confidential documents.
Respondent Pea is sanctioned for knowingly using
confidential and internal court records and
documents, which he suspiciously obtained in bolstering
his case. His unbridled access to internal court
documents has not been properly explained. The cavalier
explanation of respondent Pea that this
Courts confidential documents would simply find
themselves conveniently falling into respondents lap

through registered mail and that the envelopes containing

them could no longer be traced is unworthy
of belief. This gives the Court reason to infer that laws and
its own internal rules have been violated over
and over again by some court personnel, whom
respondent Pea now aids and abets by feigning
ignorance of how the internal documents could have
reached him. It is not unreasonable to even
conclude that criminal liabilities have been incurred in
relation to the Revised Penal Code and the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, with Atty. Pea
benefitting from the same. Respondents actions clearly
merit no other penalty than disbarment. In re: Supreme
Court Resolution dated 28 April 2003 in G.R. Nos.
Attorneys; disbarment

145817 and 145822. A.C. No. 6332, April 17, 2012.

The defense of prescription is untenable. The Court has

cases imprescriptible

held that administrative cases against lawyers do not

prescribe. The lapse of considerable time from the
commission of the offending act to the institution of the
administrative complaint will not erase the
administrative culpability of a lawyer. Otherwise, members
of the bar would only be emboldened to
disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding
from the fact that as long as no private
complainant would immediately come forward, they stand
a chance of being completely exonerated
from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer
for. Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco vs. Atty.

Attorney; False and

Pablo Bernardo, A.C. No. 6368, June 13, 2012

The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on

untruthful statements

those who show that they possess and continue to possess

in pleadings

the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers are

expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency and morality, including honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the
courts and their clients, in accordance with the values
and norms of the legal profession as embodied in

the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Atty. Magats act clearly falls short of the standards set by
the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly Rule 10.01, which provides:
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall
he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
The Court ruled that there was a deliberate intent on the
part of Atty. Magat to mislead the court when
he filed the motion to dismiss the criminal charges on the
basis of double jeopardy. Atty. Magat should
not make any false and untruthful statements in his
pleadings. If it were true that there was a similar
case for slight physical injuries that was really filed in
court, all he had to do was to secure a certification
from that court that, indeed, a case was filed. Rodrigo
Molina vs. Atty. Ceferino Magat A.C. No. 1900. June
Attorney; Neglect etc

13, 2012
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorneyclient relationship and
gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause. Once
a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that
lawyers duty to serve the client with competence and
diligence. Respondent has failed to fulfill this
duty. When the RTC ruled against complainant and her
husband, they filed a Notice of Appeal.
Consequently, what should apply is the rule on ordinary
appealed cases or Rule 44 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure. Rule 44 requires that the appellants brief be
filed after the records of the case have been
elevated to the CA. Respondent, as a litigator, was
expected to know this procedure. Canon 5 of the Code
reads:
CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal
developments, participate in continuing legal
education programs, support efforts to achieve high
standards in law schools as well as in the
practical training of law students and assist in

disseminating information regarding the law and

jurisprudence.
The supposed lack of time given to respondent to acquaint
himself with the facts of the case does not
excuse his negligence. Rule 18.02 of the Code provides
that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter
without adequate preparation. While it is true that
respondent was not complainants lawyer from the
trial to the appellate court stage, this fact did not excuse
him from his duty to diligently study a case he
had agreed to handle. If he felt he did not have enough
time to study the pertinent matters involved, as
he was approached by complainants husband only two
days before the expiration of the period for
filing the Appellants Brief, respondent should have filed a
motion for extension of time to file the proper
pleading instead of whatever pleading he could come up
with, just to beat the deadline set by the Court
of Appeals.
Also, as counsel, he had the duty to inform his clients of
the status of their case. His failure to do so
amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code, which
reads:
18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the
status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the clients request for information.
If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved
futile, the least respondent could have done
was to inform the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawal of
Appearance as counsel. He could have thus
explained why he was no longer the counsel of
complainant and her husband in the case and informed
the court that he could no longer contact them. His failure
to take this measure proves his negligence.
The failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a
comment on Duigans Motion to Dismiss is
negligence on his part. Under 18.03 of the Code, a lawyer
is liable for negligence in handling the clients

case, viz:
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to
them, otherwise their negligence in fulfilling their
duty would render them liable for disciplinary action.
Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a
lawyer. When a lawyer violates his duties to his client, he
engages in unethical and unprofessional
conduct for which he should be held accountable. Emilia
R. Hernandez vs. Atty. Venancio B. Padilla, A.C.
Contempt;

No. 9387, June 20, 2012

In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court ruled that practice of

unauthorized practice

law

of law

means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the

application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is
to perform acts which are usually performed
by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice
law is to render any kind of service which
requires the use of legal knowledge or skill. The OCA was
able to establish the pattern in Karaans
unauthorized practice of law. He would require the parties
to execute a special power of attorney in his
favor to allow him to join them as one of the plaintiffs as
their attorney-in-fact. Then, he would file the
necessary complaint and other pleadings acting for and in
his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact, agent
or representative of the parties. The fact that Karaan did
not indicate in the pleadings that he was a
member of the Bar, or any PTR, Attorneys Roll, or MCLE
Compliance Number does not detract from the
fact that, by his actions, he was actually engaged in the
practice of law.
Under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, a person assuming to be an attorney or
an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority,

is liable for indirect contempt of court. Under

Section 7 of the same rules, a respondent adjudged guilty
of indirect contempt committed against a
Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher
rank may be punished by a fine not exceeding
thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six
(6) months, or both. If a respondent is
adjudged guilty of contempt committed against a lower
court, he may be punished by a fine not
exceeding five thousand pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding one (1) month, or both. Juvy P. CioconReer, et al., vs. Judge Antonio C. Lubao, RTC Br. 22,
General Santos City, A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3210-RTJ, June
Attorney; bigamy;

20, 2012
A disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the

gross immorality

qualification and
fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and
not the procedural technicalities in filing the
case.Respondents regard for marriage contracts as
ordinary agreements indicates either his wanton
disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his gross
ignorance of the law on what course of action to take to
annul a marriage under the old Civil Code provisions.
Respondent entered into marriage twice while his
first marriage was still subsisting. He exhibited a
deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of
him as a member of the bar. He made a mockery of
marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity.His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted
grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for
disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Manuel G. Villatuya vs. Atty. Bede S.

Attorney; conviction of

Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012.

Conviction of a

a crime involving

crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for

moral turpitude is a
ground for disbarment

disbarment. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of

baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which
a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in

general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good

morals.Section 27, Rule 138 provides that a
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In a disbarment case, the Court will no longer review a
final judgment of conviction. The crime of direct
bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. The lawyers
final conviction of the crime of direct bribery
clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment
under Section 27 of Rule 138. Disbarment follows
as a consequence of the lawyers conviction of the crime.
Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. vs. Atty. Joselito M.
Attorney; inexcusable

Silvosa. A.C. No. 7360, July 24, 2012.

The failure of counsel to file the requisite appellants brief

negligence

amounted
to inexcusable negligence in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. In Perla Compania de
Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilabon, it was held that an attorney is
bound to protect his clients interest to the best
of his ability and with utmost diligence. On account of
respondents failure to protect the interest of
complainant, respondent indeed violated Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The practice of law is a special privilege bestowed only
upon those who are competent intellectually,
academically and morally. This Court has been exacting in

its expectations for the members of the Bar to

always uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and refrain from any act or omission
which might lessen the trust and confidence of the public.
Isaac C. Basilio, Perlita Pedrozo and Jun Basilio vs.
Attorney; sharing of

Atty. Virgil R. Castro A.C. No. 6910. July 11, 2012

A lawyer is proscribed by Rule 9.02 of the Code of

fees

Professional Responsibility
to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services
rendered with a person not licensed to practice law.
In Tan Tek Beng v. David , it was rule that an agreement
between a lawyer and a layperson to share the
fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null
and void, and that the lawyer involved may
be disciplined for unethical conduct. Manuel G. Villatuya
vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622, July

Attorney; solicitation

10, 2012.
Based on the facts of the case, respondent violated Rule

of clients

2.03 of the Code,

which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the
purpose of profit. A lawyer is not prohibited from
engaging in business or other lawful occupation.
Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of
such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be
inconsistent with the lawyers duties as a
member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the
business is one that can readily lend itself to the
procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or
that can be used as a cloak for indirect
solicitation on the lawyers behalf; or is of a nature that, if
handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the
practice of law
Rule 15.08 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is
mandated to inform the client whether the former is
acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a
must in those occupations related to the practice
of law. The reason is that certain ethical considerations
governing the attorney-client relationship may be

operative in one and not in the other. Manuel G. Villatuya

vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622, July
Attorney; failure to

10, 2012.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

account for money

Canon 16-A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and

properties of his client that may come into his
possession.
Rule 16.01-A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the
client.
Rule 16.02-A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client
separate and apart from his own and those of
others kept by him.
Rule 16.03-A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property
of his client when due or upon demand.
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not
used for the purpose, should be immediately
returned. A lawyers failure to return upon demand the
funds held by him on behalf of his client gives
rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same
for his own use in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation
of general morality as well as of professional
ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession
and deserves punishment. Emilia O. Dhaliwal
vs. Atty. Abelardo B. Dumaguing. A.C. No. 9390, August 1,

Attorney; grave

2012.
The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the

misconduct and

public from the misconduct of the officers of the court and

dishonesty

to ensure the administration of justice by

requiring that those who exercise this important function
shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy
men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.
The Court cited the case of In Re: Sotto and
ruled that One of the qualifications required of a
candidate for admission to the bar is the possession of
good moral character, and, when one who has already
been admitted to the bar clearly shows, by a series

of acts, that he does not follow such moral principles as

should govern the conduct of an upright person,
and that, in his dealings with his clients and with the
courts, he disregards the rule of professional ethics
required to be observed by every attorney, it is the duty of
the court, as guardian of the interests of
society, as well as of the preservation of the ideal standard
of professional conduct, to make use of its
powers to deprive him of his professional attributes which
he so unworthily abused.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states
that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The Code exacts
from lawyers not only a firm respect for law,
legal processes but also mandates the utmost degree of
fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients and
the moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary
relationship.
Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
respondent may either be disbarred or suspended
for committing deceitful and dishonest acts. This rule
provides that in any of the following
circumstances, to wit: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
misconduct; (4) grossly immoral conduct;(5)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation
of the lawyers oath; (7) wilful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court; or (8) corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so; the Court is vested with the authority
and discretion to impose either the extreme
penalty of disbarment or mere suspension. Grace M.
Anacta vs. Atty. Eduardo D. Resurrecction. A.C. No.
Attorney; immorality

9074, August 14, 2012.

The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by
the State on those who
show that they possess and continue to possess the legal
qualifications for the profession. As such,
lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high

standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty,

integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold
duty to society, the legal profession, the
courts and their clients, in accordance with the values
and norms embodied in the Code. Lawyers may,
thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the
above standards whether in their professional
or in their private capacity.
The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of
fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage is
considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and
the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws. Respondent violated the
Lawyers Oath14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Engr.Gilbert Tumbokon vs. Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco.
Attorney; representing

A.C. No. 6116, August 1, 2012

Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional

conflicting interest

Responsibility provides that a lawyer cannot represent

conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because
of the highly fiduciary nature of their
relationship, sound public policy dictates that he be
prohibited from representing conflicting interests or
discharging inconsistent duties. An attorney may not,
without being guilty of professional misconduct,
act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with
that of his present or former client. This rule is so
absolute that good faith and honest intention on the
erring lawyers part does not make it inoperative.
The reason for this is that a lawyer acquires knowledge of
his former clients doings, whether
documented or not, that he would ordinarily not have
acquired were it not for the trust and confidence
that his client placed on him in the light of their

relationship. It would simply be impossible for the

lawyer to identify and erase such entrusted knowledge
with faultless precision or lock the same into an
iron box when suing the former client on behalf of a new
one. Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc.,
represented by Gabriel H. Abad vs. Atty. Richard V. Funk.
Attorney; sharing of

A.C. No. 9094, August 15, 2012

Respondents defense that forgery had attended the

fees with non- lawyers

execution of the August 11, 1995 letter was belied by his

July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have
undertaken the payment of complainants commission but
passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap.
Clearly, respondent has violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the
Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing
or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with persons
not licensed to practice law, except in certain
cases which do not obtain in the case at bar. Engr. Gilbert
Tumbokon vs. Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco. A.C. No.

Attorney;

6116, August 1, 2012

Atty. Espejos claim that he drafted and signed the

representation of non-

pleading just

client

to extend assistance to Rodica deserves scant

consideration. It is true that under Rules 2.01and 2.02,
Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the
cause of the defenseless or the oppressed, and in such
cases, even if he does not accept a case, shall not
refuse to render legal advise to the person concerned if
only to the extent necessary to safeguard the
latters right. However, in this case, Rodica cannot be
considered as defenseless or oppressed considering
that she is properly represented by counsel in the RTC
case. Needless to state, her rights are amply
safeguarded. It would have been different had Rodica not
been represented by any lawyer, which,
however, is not the case.
The Court wonders why Atty. Espejo, knowing fully well
that Rodica is not their law firms client and

without the knowledge and consent of his

superiors, gave in to Rodicas request for him to indicate in
the said motion the names of his law firm,
Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle for the purpose of giving
more weight and credit to the pleading. As a
member of the bar, Atty. Espejo ought to know that
motions and pleadings filed in courts are acted upon
in accordance with their merit or lack of it, and not on the
reputation of the law firm or the lawyer filing
the same. More importantly, he should have thought that
in so doing, he was actually assisting Rodica in
misrepresenting before the RTC that she was being
represented by the said law firm and lawyers, when
in truth she was not.
It is well to remind Atty. Espejo that before being a friend
to Rodica, he is first and foremost an officer of
the court. Hence, he is expected to maintain a high
standard of honesty and fair dealings and must
conduct himself beyond reproach at all times. He must
likewise ensure that he acts within the bounds of
reason and common sense, always aware that he is an
instrument of truth and justice. Jasper Junno F.
Rodica vs. Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro, et al. A.C. No. 9259,
Attorney; forum

August 23, 2012

A disbarment complaint against Atty. Gonzales was

shopping as contempt

filed for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility

of court

for the forum shopping he allegedly

committed. The court held that the respondent was guilty
of forum shopping. Lawyers should be
reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in
the administration of justice. Any conduct that
tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of
justice contravenes this obligation. The Court
has repeatedly warned lawyers against resorting to forum
shopping since the practice clogs the Court
dockets and can lead to conflicting rulings. Willful and
deliberate forum shopping has been made
punishable either as direct or indirect contempt of court.

In engaging in forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales

violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which directs lawyers to obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
He also disregarded his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice, and the
prohibition against unduly delaying a case by
misusing court processes. Thus, the court subjected Atty.
Gonzales to censure. Anastacio N. Teodoro III vs.
Attorney; neglect

Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales. A.C. No. 6760. January 30, 2013

Complainant filed a disbarment complaint against Atty.
Gacott who allegedly
deceived the complainant and her husband into signing a
preparatory Deed of Sale that respondent
converted into a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his
relatives.
The respondent is reminded that his duty under Canon 16
is to hold in trust all moneys and properties
of his client that may come into his possession. Allowing a
party to take the original TCTs of properties
owned by another an act that could result in damage
should merit a finding of legal malpractice.
While it was his legal staff who allowed the complainant to
borrow the TCTs and it does not appear that
the respondent was aware or present when the
complainant borrowed the TCTs, the court still held the
respondent liable, as the TCTs were entrusted to his care
and custody; he failed to exercise due diligence
in caring for his clients properties that were in his
custody.
Moreover, Canon 18, Rule 18.03 requires that a lawyer
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable. What amounts to carelessness or
negligence in a lawyers discharge of his duty to his client
is incapable of an exact formulation, but the
Court has consistently held that the mere failure of a
lawyer to perform the obligations due his client is

per se a violation. In Canoy v. Ortiz, the court held that a

lawyers failure to file a position paper was per se
a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Similar to Canoy, the respondent
clearly failed in his duty to his client when, without any
explanation, he failed to file the Motion for
Leave to Intervene on behalf of the spouses Ylaya. Fe A.
Ylaya vs. Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott. A.C. No. 6475.
Attorney; lack of

January 30, 2013

Complainant filed a case for disbarment against Atty. Cefra

diligence

for violating
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Rules 138 and139 of the Rules of Court. The
court held that Atty. Cefra was guilty of negligence in
handling the complainants case. His acts in the
present administrative case also reveal his lack of diligence
in performing his duties as an officer of the
Court. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates
that a lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence. It further states that a lawyer
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable. In addition, a lawyer has the
duty to keep the client informed of the status of his case.
Atty. Cefra failed to live up to these standards
as shown by the following: (1) Atty. Cefra failed to submit a
formal offer of documentary evidence
within the period given by the RTC; (2) He failed to comply
with the two orders of the RTC directing
him to submit a formal offer of documentary evidence; (3)
Atty. Cefra failed to file an appropriate motion
or appeal, or avail of any remedial measure to contest the
RTCs decision; (4) He failed to file an
appropriate motion or appeal, or avail of any remedial
measure to contest the RTCs decision which was
adverse to complainants.
Thus, the above acts showing Atty. Cefras lack of diligence
and inattention to his duties as a lawyer

warrant disciplinary sanction. The court has repeatedly

held that [t]he practice of law is a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers are
expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency and morality, including honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold
duty to society, the legal profession, the
courts and their clients, in accordance with the values
and norms of the legal profession as embodied in
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Sps. Arcing and
Cresing Bautista, et al. vs. Atty. Arturo Cefra A.C.
Attorney;

No. 5530. January 28, 2013

In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial

reinstatement in the

Court of

Roll of Attorneys;
guidelines in resolving
requests for judicial
clemency;
good moral character
requirement

Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency, the Court

laid down the following guidelines in resolving
requests for judicial clemency, to wit:
(a) There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These
shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s)
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges
or judges associations and prominent members of the
community with proven integrity and probity. A
subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for
the same or similar misconduct will give rise to
a strong presumption of non-reformation.
(b) Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of
the penalty to ensure a period of reform.
(c) The age of the person asking for clemency must show
that he still has productive years ahead of him
that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to
redeem himself.
(d) There must be a showing of promise (such as
intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development of
the legal system or administrative and other
relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.

(e) There must be other relevant factors and circumstances

that may justify clemency.
Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the
applicant must, like any other candidate for
admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person
of good moral character.
In a previous Decision, the Court disbarred respondent
from the practice of law for having contracted a
bigamous marriage with complainant Teves and a third
marriage with one Constantino while his first
marriage to Esparza was still subsisting. These acts,
according to the court, constituted gross immoral
conduct.
In this case, the court held that Respondent has
sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his
indiscretion in the legal profession and in his personal life.
He has asked forgiveness from his children
by complainant Teves and maintained a cordial
relationship with them as shown by the herein attached
pictures. After his disbarment, respondent returned to his
hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and devoted his
time tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing
mother until her death in 2008. In 2009, he was
appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor of Enrile,
Cagayan and thereafter, assumed the position of
Local Assessment Operations Officer II/Office-In-Charge
in the Assessors Office, which office he
continues to serve to date. Moreover, he is a part-time
instructor at the University of Cagayan Valley and
F.L. Vargas College during the School Year 2011-2012.
Respondent likewise took an active part in sociocivic
activities by helping his neighbors and friends who are in
dire need.
Certain documents also attest to Respondents reformed
ways such as: (1) Affidavit of Candida P.
Mabborang; (2) Affidavit of Reymar P. Ramirez; (3) Affidavit
of Roberto D. Tallud; (4) Certification from
the Municipal Local Government Office.

Furthermore, respondents plea for reinstatement is duly

supported by the IBP- Cagayan Chapter and by
his former and present colleagues. His parish priest
certified that he is faithful to and puts to actual
practice the doctrines of the Catholic Church. He is also
observed to be a regular churchgoer. Respondent
has already settled his previous marital squabbles, as in
fact, no opposition to the instant suit was
tendered by complainant Teves. He sends regular support
to his children in compliance with the
Decision dated February 27, 2004.
The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had elapsed
from the time respondent was disbarred and
recognizes his achievement as the first lawyer product of
Lemu National High School, and his fourteen
(14) years of dedicated government service from 1986 to
July 2000 as Legal Officer of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports; Supervising Civil Service
Attorney of the Civil Service Commission;
Ombudsman Graft Investigation Officer; and State
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice. From the
attestations and certifications presented, the Court finds
that respondent has sufficiently atoned for his
transgressions. At 58 years of age, he still has productive
years ahead of him that could significantly
contribute to the upliftment of the law profession and the
betterment of society. While the Court is ever
mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant
officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show
compassion to those who have reformed their ways as in
this case.
Thus, the court reinstated respondent to the practice of
law. He was, however, reminded that such
privilege is burdened with conditions whereby adherence
to the rigid standards of intellect, moral
uprightness, and strict compliance with the rules and the
law are continuing requirements. Florence Teves
Macarubbo vs. Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo; Re: Petition

(for Extraordinary Mercy) of Edmundo L. Macarubbo.

A.C. No. 6148. January 22, 2013
Attorney;

Atty. Fortun filed a petition for

confidentiality of

contempt against respondents for publicizing the

proceedings against
attorneys; exception

disbarment case against him in media.

Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that
proceedings against attorneys shall be private
and confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme
Court shall be published like its decisions in
other cases. The purpose of the rule is not only to enable
the Court to make its investigations free from
any extraneous influence or interference, but also to
protect the personal and professional reputation of
attorneys and judges from the baseless charges of
disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible clients and
litigants; it is also to deter the press from publishing
administrative cases or portions thereto without
authority. Malicious and unauthorized publication or
verbatim reproduction of administrative
complaints against lawyers in newspapers by editors
and/or reporters may be actionable. Such
premature publication constitutes a contempt of court,
punishable by either a fine or imprisonment or
both at the discretion of the Court. However, Section 18,
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court is not a
restriction on the freedom of the press. If there is a
legitimate public interest, media is not prohibited
from making a fair, true, and accurate news report of a
disbarment complaint. In the absence of a
legitimate public interest in a disbarment complaint,
members of the media must preserve the
confidentiality of disbarment proceedings during its
pendency.
In this case, the filing of a disbarment complaint against
Atty. Fortun is itself a matter of public concern
considering that it arose from the Maguindanao Massacre
case. The interest of the public is not on Atty.

Fortun himself but primarily on his involvement and

participation as defense counsel in the
Maguindanao Massacre case. Thus, since the disbarment
complaint is a matter of public interest, media
had a right to publish such fact under freedom of the
press. Philip Sigrid A. Fortun vs. Prima Jesusa B.
Attorney; full

Quinsayas, et al., G.R. No. 194578. February 13, 2013

Atty. Villarin is expected to champion the cause of

discharge of duties to

his client with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion.

client; limitations

This simply means that his client is entitled to

the benefit of any and every remedy and defense
including the institution of an ejectment case that is
recognized by our property laws. In Legarda v. Court of
Appeals, the court held that in the full discharge of
their duties to the client, lawyers shall not be afraid of the
possibility that they may displease the general
public.
Nevertheless, the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides the limitation that lawyers shall perform
their duty to the client within the bounds of law. They
should only make such defense when they believe
it to be honestly debatable under the law. In this case,
Atty. Villarins act of issuing demand letters,
moved by the understanding of a void HLURB Decision, is
legally sanctioned. If his theory holds water,
the notice to vacate becomes necessary in order to file an
action for ejectment. Hence, he did not resort to
any fraud or chicanery prohibited by the Code just to
maintain his clients disputed ownership over the
subdivision lots.
However, the facts show that Atty. Villarin brazenly typified
one of the complainants as an illegal
occupant when the final and executory HLURB Decision
had already recognized her as a subdivision lot
buyer. Given that he knew such falsity, he thus advances
the interest of his client through means that are
not in keeping with fairness and honesty. This is
proscribed by Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, which requires that a lawyer shall employ

only fair and honest means to attain lawful
objectives. Lawyers must not present and offer in evidence
any document that they know is false. Verleen
Trinidad, Florentina Lander, Wally Casubuan, Minerva
Mendoza, Celedonio Alojado, et al. vs. Atty. Angelito
Attorney; notarial

Villarin, A.C. No. 9310. February 27, 2013

A notary public should not notarize a document

practice; necessity of

unless the person who signed the same is the very same

affiants personal
appearance; nature of
notarization; penalties
when a notary public
fails to discharge his
duties

person who executed and personally appeared

before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what
are stated therein. Without the personal
appearance of the person who actually executed the
document, the notary public would be unable to
verify the genuineness of the signature of the
acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document
is
the partys free act or deed.
The notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document, making it
admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarized document is, by law, entitled
to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason
that a notary public must observe with utmost
care the basic requirements in the performance of his
duties; otherwise, the publics confidence in the
integrity of a notarized document would be undermined
Respondents failure to perform his duty as a notary
public resulted not only damage to those directly
affected by the notarized document but also in
undermining the integrity of a notary public and in
degrading the function of notarization. He should, thus, be
held liable for such negligence not only as a
notary public but also as a lawyer. The responsibility to
faithfully observe and respect the legal solemnity
of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is more
pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer
because of his solemn oath under the Code of Professional

Responsibility to obey the laws and to do no

falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Lawyers
commissioned as notaries public are mandated to
discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such
duties being dictated by public policy and
impressed with public interest.
Based on existing jurisprudence, when a lawyer
commissioned as a notary public fails to discharge his
duties as such, he is meted the penalties of revocation of
his notarial commission, disqualification from
being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two
years, and suspension from the practice of
law for one year. Patrocinio V. Agbulos vs. Atty. Roseller A.
Viray, A.C. No. 7350. February 18, 2013

Attorney; a lawyer

Atty. Bancolo admitted that the

shall not assist in the

Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of

unauthorized practice
of law

the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a

secretary of his law office. He likewise categorically stated
that because of some minor lapses, the
communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and
Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with
his tolerance. Clearly, he violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR),
which provides:
CANON 9 A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified
person the performance of any task which
by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in
good standing.
Atty. Bancolos authority and duty to sign a pleading are
personal to him. Although he may delegate the
signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not

delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules

of Court, a counsels signature serves as a certification
that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of
his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground
to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for
delay. Thus, by affixing ones signature to a pleading, it is
counsel alone who has the responsibility to
certify to these matters and give legal effect to the
document. For violating rule 9.01 of the CPR, Atty.
Bacolo was meted with the penalty the suspension from
the practice of law for one year. Rodrigo E. Tapay
and Anthony J. Rustia v. Attys. Charlie Bancolo and Janus
Attorney; disbarment

Jarder; A.C. No. 9604. March 20, 2013

For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by

complaint; outright

the complainant upon the dismissal of

dismissal is warranted
if the complaint, on its
face, lacks
merit

the Complaint for disbarment he instituted against the

respondent lawyers. Complainant claims he was
denied due process because (1) she was not allowed to file
a Reply and (2) the Court deviated from usual
procedure when it resolved the disbarment Complaint
without first declaring the case to have been
submitted for resolution.
The Supreme Court has the power to outrightly dismiss a
Complaint for disbarment when on its face, it
is clearly wanting in merit. Thus, in International Militia of
People against Corruption & Terrorism v. Chief
Justice Davide, Jr. (Ret.), the Court, after finding the
Complaint insufficient in form and substance,
dismissed the same outright for utter lack of merit. In the
instant case, the Court did not dismiss
outright the disbarment Complaint. In fact, it even
required the respondents to file their respective
Answers. Then, after a judicious study of the records, it
proceeded to resolve the same although not in
complainants favor. Based on the Complaint and the
supporting affidavits attached thereto, and the
respective Comments of the respondents, the Court found
that the presumption of innocence accorded to

respondents was not overcome. Moreover, the Court no

longer required complainant to file a Reply since
it has the discretion not to require the filing of the same
when it can already judiciously resolve the case
based on the pleadings thus far submitted. And contrary
to complainants mistaken notion, not all
petitions or complaints reach the reply or memorandum
stage. Depending on the merits of the case, the
Court has the discretion either to proceed with the case by
first requiring the parties to file their
respective responsive pleadings or to dismiss the same
outright. Likewise, the Court can proceed to
resolve the case without need of informing the parties that
the case is already submitted for resolution.
Jasper Junno F. Rodica v. Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro, et al.;
Attorney; duty to

A.C. No. 9259. March 12, 2013

The Court reiterated its ruling in Del Mundo v. Capistrano

exercise due diligence

that
when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that
he will exercise due diligence in protecting the
latters rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance
and attention expected of a good father of a
family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on
him by his client and makes him answerable
not just to client but also to the legal profession, the court
and society.
Respondents infractions were aggravated by his failure to
comply with CBDs directives for him to file
his pleadings on time and to religiously attend hearings,
demonstrating not only his irresponsibility but
also his disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers.
Such conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer
who is called upon to obey court orders and processes and
is expected to stand foremost in complying
with court directives as an officer of the court. As a
member of the bar, he ought to have known that the
orders of the CBD as the investigating arm of the Court in
administrative cases against lawyers were not

mere requests but directives which should have been

complied with promptly and completely. Gloria P.
Attorney; duty to hold

Jinon v. Atty. Leonardo E. Jiz; A.C. No. 9615. March 5, 2013

Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific

in trust money

purpose, such as for the processing of transfer of land

received from client

title, but not used for the purpose, should be

returned to the client immediately. The Court held in
Dhaliwal v. Dumaguing that a lawyers failure to
return the funds he holds on behalf of a client, despite
latters demand, gives rise to the presumption
that he has appropriated the same for his own use and
constitutes a gross violation of general morality
and professional ethics. Gloria P. Jinon v. Atty. Leonardo E.
Jiz; A.C. No. 9615. March 5, 2013
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/march20
13/9615.pdf).
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty; failure of branch
clerk of court to keep and maintain a general
docket. Branch clerk of court Mr. Teves admitted that he
failed to keep and maintain a general docket of
cases assigned to their branch. As such, he failed to
comply with his duty under Section 8, Rule 136 of
the Rules of Court, thus:
Sec. 8. General docket. The clerk shall keep a general
docket, each page of which shall be numbered
and prepared for receiving all the entries in a single case,
and shall enter therein all cases, numbered
consecutively in the order in which they were received, and
under the heading of each case, a
complete title thereof, the date of each paper filed or
issued, of each order or judgment entered, and
of each other step taken in the case so that by reference a
single page the history of the case may be
seen.
With this infraction, Mr. Teves was held liable for simple
neglect of duty. Office of the Court
Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing
Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4,

Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of

Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12,
Attorney; practice of

2013
The practice of law is imbued with public interest

law; notary

and a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his

client, but also to his brethren
in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and
takes part in one of the
most important functions of the State the administration
of justice as an officer
of the court. Accordingly, lawyers are bound to maintain
not only a high standard
of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity
and fair dealing.
Similarly, the duties of notaries public are dictated by
public policy and impressed
with public interest. Notarization is not a routinary,
meaningless act, for
notarization converts a private document to a public
instrument, making it
admissible in evidence without the necessity of
preliminary proof of its authenticity
and due execution.
In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent
exposed party-litigants,
courts, other lawyers and the general public to the perils
of ordinary documents
posing as public instruments. Respondent committed acts
of deceit and falsehood
in open violation of the explicit pronouncements of the
Code of Professional
Responsibility. Evidently, respondents conduct falls
miserably short of the high
standards of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing
required from lawyers.
Thus, he should be sanctioned. Efigenia M. Tenoso vs.
Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez. A.C.
No. 8384. April 11, 2013

Attorney; the failure to

In Dalisay Capili v. Atty. Alfredo L. Bentulan, the Court

file a brief resulting in

held that the failure to file a brief

the dismissal of an
appeal constitutes
inexcusable
negligence

resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes

inexcusable negligence. In this case, the Court cannot
accept as an excuse the alleged lapse committed by his
client in failing to provide him a copy of the case
records.
In the first place, securing a copy of the case records was
within Atty. San Juans control and is a task that
the lawyer undertakes.
Second, Atty. San Juan, unlike his client, knows or should
have known, that filing an appellants brief
within the reglementary period is critical in the perfection
of an appeal. The preparation and the filing of
the appellants brief are matters of procedure that fully fell
within the exclusive control and
responsibility of Atty. San Juan. It was incumbent upon
him to execute all acts and procedures necessary
and incidental to the perfection of his clients appeal.
Third, Atty. San Juan lacked candor in dealing with his
client. He omitted to inform Tomas of the
progress of his appeal with the Court of Appeals. Worse,
he did not disclose to Tomas the real reason for
the Court of Appeals dismissal of the appeal. Neither did
Atty. San Juan file a motion for
reconsideration, or otherwise resort to available legal
remedies that might have protected his clients
interest.
Atty. San Juans negligence undoubtedly violates the
Lawyers Oath that requires him to conduct
[himself] as a lawyer according to the best of (his)
knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to (his) clients[.] He also violated
Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Rex Polinar Dagohoy v. Atty.
Artemio V. San Juan. A.C. No. 7944, June 3,

Attorney; IBP findings

2013.
IBPs recommended penalty of three (3) months

and recommended

suspension from the practice of law is

penalties in

not commensurate to the gravity of the infractions

administrative cases
against lawyers are
only
recommendatory

committed. These infractions warrant the imposition

of a stiffer sanction. The following acts and omissions of
Atty. San Juan were considered: first, the
negligence in handling his clients appeal; second, his
failure to act candidly and effectively in
communicating information to his client; and more
importantly, third, the serious and irreparable
consequence of his admitted negligence which deprived his
client of legal remedies in addressing his
conviction.
In Pineda v. Atty. Macapagal, the Court imposed a one (1)
year suspension from the practice of law on a
lawyer who, like Atty. San Juan, had been found guilty of
gross negligence in handling his clients case.
With this case as the norm, Atty. San Juan should be
meted a suspension of one (1) year from the practice
of law for his negligence and inadequacies in handling his
clients case.
Moreover, IBPs findings and stated penalty are merely
recommendatory; only the Supreme Court has
the power to discipline erring lawyers and to impose
against them penalties for unethical conduct. Until
finally acted upon by the Supreme Court, the IBP findings
and the recommended penalty imposed
cannot attain finality until adopted by the Court as its
own. Thus, the IBP findings, by themselves,
cannot be a proper subject of implementation or
compliance. Rex Polinar Dagohoy v. Atty. Artemio V. San
Juan. A.C. No. 7944, June 3, 2013.

Attorney; Attorneys

The case initially concerned the execution of a final

Fees

decision with the Court of

Appeals in a labor litigation. Petitioner Malvar, however,
entered into a compromise agreement with the
respondents pending appeal without informing her

counsel. Malvars counsel filed a Motion to

Intervene to Protect Attorneys Rights.
The Supreme Court, on considerations of equity and
fairness, disapproved of the tendencies of clients
compromising their cases behind the backs of their
attorneys for the purpose of unreasonably reducing
or completely setting to naught the stipulated contingent
fees. Thus, the Court granted the Motion for
Intervention to Protect Attorneys Rights as a measure of
protecting the Intervenors right to his
stipulated professional fees. The Court did so in the
interest of protecting the rights of the practicing Bar
rendering professional services on contingent fee basis.
Although the compromise agreement was still approved by
the Court, the payment of the counsels
adequate and reasonable compensation could not be
annulled by the settlement of the litigation without
the counsels participation and conformity. He remains
entitled to the compensation, and his rights are
safeguarded by the Court because its members are officers
of the Court who are as entitled to judicial
protection against injustice or imposition of fraud
committed by the client as much as the client is against
their abuses as her counsel. In other words, the duty of
the Court is not only to ensure that the attorney
acts in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see to it
that the attorney is paid his just fees. Even if the
compensation of the attorney is dependent only on
winning the litigation, the subsequent withdrawal of
the case upon the clients initiative would not deprive the
attorney of the legitimate compensation for
professional services rendered. Czarina T. Malvar v. Kraft
Foods Phils., Inc., et al., G.R. No. 183952, September
Attorney; Attorney-

9, 2013
A disbarment complaint was filed against respondent Atty.

Client Relationship

Ramos for representing conflicting interests in the same

case. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Ramos
violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility. Under the afore-cited rule, it

is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing
new clients whose interests oppose those of a
former client in any manner, whether or not they are
parties in the same action or on totally unrelated
cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of
public policy and good taste. It behooves lawyers
not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also
to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is
of paramount interest in the administration of justice.
Atty. Ramos justification that no confidential
information was relayed to him is not an excuse since the
rule on conflict of interests provides an
absolute prohibition from representation with respect to
opposing parties in the same case. Thus, a
lawyer cannot change his representation from one party to
the latters opponent in the same case. Joseph
L. Orola, et al. v. Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos, A.C. No. 9860,
Attorney; Gross

September 11, 2013

The Supreme Court held that Atty. Alcid, Jr. violated

Misconduct

Canon 18 and Rules

18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Alcid, Jr. violated his oath under Canon
18 to serve his client with competence and diligence
when he filed a criminal case for estafa when the
facts of the case would have warranted the filing of a civil
case for breach of contract. To be sure, after the
complaint for estafa was dismissed, Atty. Alcid, Jr.
committed another similar blunder by filing a civil
case for specific performance and damages before the
RTC, when he should have filed it with the MTC
due to the amount involved. Atty. Alcid, Jr. did not also
apprise complainant of the status of the cases.
Atty. Alcid, Jr. is not only guilty of incompetence in
handling the cases. His lack of professionalism in
dealing with complainant is gross and inexcusable. The

legal profession dictates that it is not a mere

duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to accord the highest
degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the
protection of the clients interest. The most thorough
groundwork and study must be undertaken in
order to safeguard the interest of the client. Atty. Alcid, Jr.
has defied and failed to perform such duty
and his omission is tantamount to a desecration of the
Lawyers Oath. Julian Penilla v. Atty. Quintin P.
Alcid, Jr., A.C. No. 9149, September 4, 2013
A complaint for disbarment was filed against Assistant
Provincial
Prosecutor Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr. for falsifying an
inexistent decision of the RTC. The Supreme Court
held that the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct
for having authored the falsification of the
decision in a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility demands
that all lawyers should uphold at all times the dignity and
integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a
lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether
in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage in
any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or
deceitful conduct. Gross immorality, conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent
transactions can justify a lawyers disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law. Specifically, the
deliberate falsification of the court decision by the
respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of
moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a
mockery of the administration of justice in this
country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was

to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal

status of a person. Thus, the Court disbarred the
respondent. Atty. Oscar L. Embido, etc. v. Atty. Salvador
N. Pe, Jr., etc., A.M. No. 6732, October 22, 2013.
Heenan filed a complaint against Atty. Espejo for violation
of the Lawyers
Oath due to the latters failure to pay a loan. The Supreme
Court found Atty. Espejo guilty of gross
misconduct. The deliberate failure to pay just debts and
the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned. Verily,
lawyers must at all times faithfully perform
their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their
clients. The prompt payment of financial
obligations is one of the duties of a lawyer. The fact that
Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and issued the
worthless checks in her private capacity and not as an
attorney of Heenan is of no moment. A lawyer
may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty
in his profession but also for gross
misconduct outside of his professional capacity. While the
Court may not ordinarily discipline a lawyer
for misconduct committed in his non-professional or
private capacity, the Court may be justified in
suspending or removing him as an attorney where his
misconduct outside of the lawyer professional
dealings is so gross in character as to show him morally
unfit and unworthy of the privilege which his
licenses and the law confer. Thus, Atty. Espejo was
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.
Victoria C. Heenan v. Atty. Erlinda Espejo, A.C. No. 10050,
Attorney; Practice of

December 3, 2013.
Petitioner Medado passed the bar examinations in 1979.

Law

He took the
Attorneys Oath thereafter, and was scheduled to sign the
Roll of Attorneys, but failed to do so because
he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys.

Several years later, he found such Notice and

realized he never signed the Roll of Attorneys. Medado filed
this Petition to allow him to sign in the Roll
of Attorneys. The Supreme Court held that while an
honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a
person from the legal consequences of his acts as it
negates malice or evil motive, a mistake of law
cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because
everyone is presumed to know the law and its
consequences. Knowingly engaging in unauthorized
practice of law transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Such Canon also applies to
law students and Bar candidates. Medado was
imposed a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to
sign one (1) year after receipt of the Courts
Resolution. In Re: Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys,
Attorney; Gross

B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013

Respondent Pedrea, a Public Attorney, was charged for

Immoral Conduct

sexual
harassment. The Supreme Court held that the records
show that the respondent rubbed the
complainants right leg with his hand; tried to insert his
finger into her firmly closed hand; grabbed her
hand and forcibly placed it on his crotch area; and pressed
his finger against her private part. Given the
circumstances in which he committed them, his acts were
not merely offensive and undesirable but
repulsive, disgraceful and grossly immoral. They
constituted misconduct on the part of any lawyer. In
this regard, immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt
as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or
when committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys
sense of decency. Atty. Pedreas misconduct was
aggravated by the fact that he was then a Public Attorney
mandated to provide free legal service to
indigent litigants, and by the fact that complainant was

then such a client. He also disregarded his oath

as a public officer to serve others and to be accountable at
all times, because he thereby took advantage
of her vulnerability as a client then in desperate need of
his legal assistance. Thus, respondent was meted
out the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
two (2) years. Jocelyn De Leon v. Atty. Tyrone
Attorney; Gross

Pedrena, A.C. No. 9401, October 22, 2013

Respondent Villaseca was charged for gross and

Negligence

inexcusable negligence in
handling a criminal case, as a consequence of which the
complainants were convicted. The Supreme
Court held that Atty. Villasecas failure to submit a
demurrer to evidence constitutes inexcusable
negligence; it showed his lack of devotion and zeal in
preserving his clients cause. Furthermore, Atty.
Villasecas failure to present any testimonial, object or
documentary evidence for the defense reveals his
lack of diligence in performing his duties as an officer of
the Court; it showed his indifference towards
the cause of his clients. Considering that the liberty and
livelihood of his clients were at stake, Atty.
Villaseca should have exerted efforts to rebut the
presented prosecution evidence. The Court emphasized
that while a lawyer has complete discretion on what legal
strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him,
he must present every remedy or defense within the
authority of the law to support his clients cause.
Mary Ann T. Mattus v. Albert T. Villaseca, A.C. No. 7922,

Attorney; Lawyer-

October 1, 2013
Respondent Gagate was accused of gross ignorance of the

Client Relationship

law
and unethical practice of law. The Supreme Court
emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer
and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and
confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect
that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and
accordingly exercise the required degree of

diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer

is expected to maintain at all times a high
standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full
attention, skill, and competence to the case,
regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for
a fee or for free. To this end, he is enjoined to
employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful
objectives. These principles are embodied in Canon
17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19
of the Code. Thus, the Court found that the
respondent failed to exercise the required diligence in
handling complainants cause since he: (1) failed
to represent her competently and diligently by acting and
proffering professional advice beyond the
proper bounds of law; and, (2) abandoned his clients
cause while the grave coercion case against them
was pending. Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui Pitcher v. Atty.
Rustico B. Gagate, A.C. No. 9532, October 8, 2013.
Respondent Obias was charged for grave misconduct
and/or
gross malpractice. The Supreme Court held that since
respondent publicly held herself out as lawyer, the
mere fact that she also acted as a real estate broker did
not divest her of the responsibilities attendant to
the legal profession. In this regard, the legal advice and/or
legal documentation that she offered and/or
rendered regarding the real estate transaction subject of
this case should not be deemed removed from
the category of legal services. Case law instructs that if a
person, in respect to business affairs or troubles
of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining
professional advice or assistance, and the
attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the
consultation, then the professional employment is
established.
Moreover, according to the Court, respondent grossly
violated the trust and confidence reposed in her by

her clients, in contravention of Canons 17 and 18 of the

Code. Records disclose that instead of delivering
the deed of sale covering the subject property to her
clients, she wilfully notarized a deed of sale over the
same property in favor of another person. It is a core
ethical principle that lawyers owe fidelity to their
clients cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in them. Thus, respondent
was disbarred by the Court. Ma. Jennifer Tria-Samonte v.
Epifania Fanny Obias, A.C. No. 4945, October 8,
Attorney; Applicability

2013.
Private respondents were charged before the Court of Tax

of the Code of

Appeals

Professional
Responsibility to
lawyers in government
service in
the discharge of their
official tasks

for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code of the

Philippines, as amended. However, the CTA
dismissed the case since the prosecution failed to present
certified true copies of the documentary
evidence submitted contrary to Section 7, Rule 130 and
Section 127, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The
Run After the Smugglers (RATS) Group, Revenue
Collection Monitoring Group (RCMG), as counsel for
the BOC, filed a petition for certiorari but the petition was
filed beyond the reglementary period.
The Supreme Court held that the display of patent
violations of even the elementary rules shows that the
case against respondents was doomed by design from the
start. This stance taken by the lawyers in
government service rouses the Courts vigilance against
inefficiency in the administration of justice.
Verily, the lawyers representing the offices under the
executive branch should be reminded that they still
remain as officers of the court from whom a high sense of
competence and fervor is expected. The Court
will not close its eyes to this sense of apathy in RATS
lawyers, lest the governments goal of revenue
enhancement continues to suffer the blows of smuggling
and similar activities. The Court reminded the
lawyers in the BOC that the canons embodied in the Code

of Professional Responsibility equally apply to

lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official tasks. Thus, RATS lawyers should exert
every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice. People
of the Philippines v. The Hon. Juanito C. Castaneda, Jr., et
Attorney;

al., G.R. No. 208290, December 11, 2013

Complainants engaged the legal services of Atty. Baez, Jr.

Champertous contract

in
connection with the recovery of their properties from
Fevidal. Complainants signed a contract of legal
services, where they would not pay acceptance and
appearance fees to Atty. Baez Jr., but that the docket
fees would instead be shared by the parties. Under the
contract, complainants would pay him 50% of
whatever would be recovered of the properties. Later,
however, complainants terminated his services
and entered into an amicable settlement with Fevidal. Atty.
Baez, Jr. opposed the withdrawal of their
complaint in court. Thus, complainants filed a case
against him alleging that the motion of Atty. Baez, Jr.
for the recording of his attorneys charging lien was the
legal problem preventing them from enjoying
the fruits of their property.
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows an
attorney to intervene in a case to protect his rights
concerning the payment of his compensation. According to
the discretion of the court, the attorney shall
have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money
rendered in a case in which his services have
been retained by the client. In this case, however, the
contract for legal services is in the nature of a
champertous contract an agreement whereby an
attorney undertakes to pay the expenses of the
proceedings to enforce the clients rights in exchange for
some bargain to have a part of the thing in
dispute. Such contracts are contrary to public policy and
are thus void or inexistent. They are also

contrary to Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, which states that lawyers shall not
lend money to a client, except when in the interest of
justice, they have to advance necessary expenses in
a legal matter they are handling for the client. Thus, the
Court held that Atty. Baez, Jr. violated Canon
16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Conchita
Baltazar,et al. v. Atty. Juan B. Baez, Jr., A.C. No.
Attorney; Disbarment

9091, December 11, 2013.

A disbarment case was filed against Atty. Macapagal. He

proceedings

was
charged with dishonesty (1) when he stated in the
defendants Answer in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 that
the parties therein are strangers to each other; (2) when he
introduced a falsified Certificate of Marriage
as part of his evidence in Civil Case No. A-95-22906; and
(3) when he knowingly filed a totally baseless
pleading captioned as Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of
Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in
the same case. The Supreme Court held that these issues
are proper subjects of and must be threshed out
in a judicial action. However, since Atty. Macapagal failed
to file a comment and his position paper
despite his receipt of Notice, he was reprimanded for
failing to give due respect to the Court and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Nestor V. Felipe, et al. v.
Atty. Ciriaco A. Macapagal, A.C. No. 4549,

Attorney; Disobedience

December 2, 2013
Complainant Sy charged Respondent Esponilla, Legal

to court directives

Researcher and then Officer-In-Charge of Br. 54 of RTC

Manila, and Atty. Buendia, clerk of court and exofficio
sheriff of RTC Manila with Gross Misconduct, Negligence
and Dishonesty. The complaint was in
connection with the irregular withdrawal of deposits for
monthly rentals in a civil case based on a
purported Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Rental Deposits
filed by Atty. Bayhon in the civil case. The
Supreme Court held that Atty. Bayhon violated the

Lawyers Oath and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code

of Professional Responsibility for failing to explain, in good
faith the circumstances surrounding the
filing of the Ex-Parte Motion which he himself filed, for
proffering misleading claims in the course of the
subject administrative investigation, and for not having
shown and proved that he exerted his best
efforts to secure and submit a copy of the Ex-Parte Motion
all in violation of the resolutions issued by
the Court. Atty. Bayhon was suspended for six (6) months
from the practice of law. Elpidio Sy, President,
Systems Realty Development Corporation v. Edgar
Esponilla, Legal Researcher and Officer-in-Charge, et al.,
A.M.
Attorney; Due

No. P-06-2261, December 11, 2013

Respondents were charged for gross negligence in

diligence in handling

handling the labor complaints of complainant. The

clients case

Supreme Court held that the relationship between a

lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and
confidence. In this regard, clients are led to
expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause
and accordingly exercise the required degree of
diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer
is required to maintain at all times a high
standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full
attention, skill, and competence to the case,
regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for
a fee or for free. He is likewise expected to act
with honesty in all his dealings, especially with the courts.
These principles are embodied in Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, Canon 17 and Rule
18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In this case, Atty. Quesadas failure to
attend the scheduled conference hearings, despite
due notice and without any proper justification, exhibits
his inexcusable lack of care and diligence in
managing his clients cause in violation of Canon 17 and
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code. Felipe C.

Dagala v. Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. and Atty. Amado T.

Attorney; Duty to

Adquilen, A.C. No. 5044, December 2, 2013

The Supreme Court issued a

represent a client

Resolution dismissing the administrative complaint of

must be within the

bounds of law

Tomas Merdegia against Court of Appeals Justice

Veloso. The Resolution directed Atty. Adaza II, Merdegias
counsel, to show cause why he should not be
cited for contempt. The Supreme Court held Atty. Adaza II
guilty of indirect contempt. Atty. Adaza
prepared the administrative complaint after Justice Veloso
refused to inhibit himself from a case he was
handling. The complaint and the motion for inhibition
were both based on the same main cause: the
alleged partiality of Justice Veloso during the oral
arguments of Merdegias case. The resolution
dismissing the motion for inhibition should have disposed
of the issue of Justice Velosos bias. If they
doubted the legality of the Resolution, they could have
filed a petition for certiorari.
Administrative complaints against justices cannot and
should not substitute for appeal and other judicial
remedies against an assailed decision or ruling. While a
lawyer has a duty to represent his client with
zeal, he must do so within the bounds provided by law. He
is also duty-bound to impress upon his client
the propriety of the legal action the latter wants to
undertake, and to encourage compliance with the law
and legal processes. Atty. Adaza failed to impress upon his
client the features of the Philippine
adversarial system, the substance of the law on ethics and
respect for the judicial system, and his own
failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an
officer of the Court demand of him in acting
for his client before the courts. Re: Verified Complaint of
Tomas S. Merdegia against Hon. Vicente S.E. Veloso,
etc./Re: Resolution dated October 8, 2013 in OCA IPI No.
12-205-CA-J against Atty. Homobono Adaza II, IPI No.
12-205-CA-J/A.C. No. 10300, December 10, 2013

JUDICIAL ETHICS
Grave misconduct and

A court employee is not prohibited from helping

dishonesty; court

individuals in the course of performing her official duties,

personnel

but her actions cannot be left unchecked when

the help extended puts under suspicion the integrity of
the Judiciary. Indeed, she is strictly instructed
not to use her official position to secure unwarranted
benefits, privileges, or exemptions for herself or for
others. The evident purpose of the instruction is precisely
to free the court employees from suspicion of
misconduct.
The respondent did not comply with the instruction.
Instead, she used her official position as an
employee of the Judiciary to attempt to influence Judge
Guerrero to rule in favor of litigant Garcia, her
landlord. She was thereby guilty of misconduct, defined as
a transgression of some established or
definite rule of action; or, more particularly, an unlawful
behavior on the part of a public officer or
employee. Her misconduct is grave misconduct
warranting dismissal from the service. The
respondent was also liable for dishonesty when she
attended the proceedings in the case involving her
landlord but did not file applications for leave and did not
reflect her absence in her daily time
records. Judge Juanita V. Guerrero v. Juanita V. Ong, G.R.
No. 182336, December 23, 2009
Saddis failure to turn over up to this time the full amount
of his

collections and to adequately explain and present evidence

thereon constitute gross dishonesty, grave
misconduct, and even malversation of public funds. The
delayed remittance of his cash collections and
failure to submit monthly reports of court funds he
received constitute gross neglect of duty. Dishonesty
alone, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the
extreme penalty of dismissal from the service
with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave
credits, and perpetual disqualification for
reemployment in the government service. Office of the
Court Administrator vs. Gregorio B. Saddi, A.M. No.
Gross ignorance of the

P-10-2818, November 15, 2010

Two Regional Trial Court Judges were

law; interference with

found administratively liable for gross ignorance of the

co-equal court

law in issuing a Temporary Restraining Order

against the execution of a demolition order issued by
another Regional Trial Court. The Supreme Court
held that when the respondent judges acted on the
application for TRO, they were clearly aware that
they were being asked to act on matters already before
another RTC a co-equal court, which was
already exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the petition brought before them. They
nonetheless opted to interfere with the [demolition] order
of a co-equal and coordinate court of
concurrent jurisdiction, in blatant disregard of the
doctrine of judicial stability, a well-established axiom
in adjective law. Heirs of Simeon Piedad v. Executive Judge
Cesar Estrena and
Judge Gaudiso Villarin, A.M. RTJ-09-2170, December 16,

Gross neglect of duty;

2009
A clerk of court who issued a certificate of finality of a

clerk of court

purported
decision which, however, turned out to be spurious and
non-existent as it cannot be found in the courts
records and solely on the basis of her familiarity with the
signature of the presiding judge as appearing

in the purported decision was found administratively liable

for gross neglect of duty.
Citing the high degree of responsibility, integrity, efficiency
and ethics required of public officers by the
Constitution, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees (R.A. No.
6713), and the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, the
Supreme Court stated that conduct and
behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with
the dispensation of justice from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, is circumscribed with
the heavy burden of responsibility.
The Court rejected the respondent clerk of courts defense
that she acted with diligence and in good faith
when she issued the certification based on her familiarity
with the presiding judges signature. The
Court ruled that, in the absence of the record showing the
genuineness of the purported decision, no
certification should have been issued and that, at the very
least, the respondent should have informed
the presiding judge about the request for certification and
the fact that there exist no records to support
the certification. Atty. Eduardo E. Francisco v. Liza O.
Delay; transmitting

Galvez, A.M. No. P-09-2636, December 4, 2009

As for Clerk of Court Gundran, Section 10, Rule 141

case record to Court of

of the Rules of court states that it his duty to verify the

Appeals

correctness and completeness of the records of the

case. However, in this case, he relegated the performance
of his job to another court employee without any justifiable
reason. Difficulty in completing the records of the case is
also not a justifiable ground for non-transmittal of the
records. Under the rules, when the records cannot be
completed, respondent
should indicate in his letter of transmittal the exhibits or
transcripts not included in the records being
transmitted to the appellate court, the reasons for their
non-transmittal, and the steps taken or that could
be taken to have them available.

Clerks of Court are essential judicial officers who perform

delicate administrative functions vital to the
prompt and proper administration of justice. Their duty is,
inter alia, to assist in the management of the
calendar of the court and in all matters that do not involve
discretion or judgment properly belonging to
the judge. They play a key role in the complement of the
court, as their office is the hub of adjudicative
and administrative orders, processes and concerns. As
such, they are required to be persons of
competence, honesty, and probity, they cannot be
permitted to slacken on their jobs. Luminza Delos Reyes
vs. Judge Danilo S. Cruz and Clerk of Court V Godolfo R.
Grave misconduct and

Gundaran, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2152, January 18, 2010

Respondents act of taking off the shock absorbert of

dishonesty; court

a motorcycle which forms part of the prosecutions

personnel

evidence in a criminal case without the knowledge of

the evidence custodian or the owner, for personal gain,
and thereafter replacing it with a damaged one to
prevent detection constitutes dishonesty and grave
misconduct.
Misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct on the part
of a person concerned in the administration
of justice prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the
right determination of the cause. It generally
means wrongful, improper, or unlawful conduct motivated
by a premeditated, obstinate, and intentional
purpose. The term, however, does not necessarily imply
corruption or criminal intent. On the other
hand, the term gross connotes something out of all
measure; beyond allowance; not to be excused;
flagrant; shameful.
Dishonesty has been defined as intentionally making a
false statement in any material fact, or practicing
or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in
securing his examination, registration, appointment
or promotion. It is also understood to imply a disposition
to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;

untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty,

probity, or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray.
A public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees are duty-bound to serve with the highest
degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency
and shall remain accountable to the people.
Persons involved in the administration of justice ought to
live up to the strictest standard of honesty and
integrity in the public service. The conduct of personnel
connected with the courts should, at all times,
be circumspect to preserve the integrity and dignity of our
courts of justice. As forerunners in the
administration of justice, they ought to live up to the
strictest standards of honesty and integrity,
considering that their positions primarily involve service to
the public. Gerardo Q. Ferreras vs. Rudy P.
Grave misconduct;

Eclipse, A.M. No. P-05-2085, January 20, 2010

Respondent sheriffs were found guilty of grave misconduct

court personnel

in
demanding and collecting sums for the implementation of
a Writ of Demolition without providing
corresponding official receipts therefor, and subsequently
not implementing the writ.
Under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the
sheriff is required to secure the courts prior
approval of the estimated expenses and fees needed to
implement the court process.
Following the above mentioned rule, a sheriff is guilty of
violating the Rules if he fails to observe the
following: (1) prepare an estimate of expenses to be
incurred in executing the writ, for which he must
seek the courts approval; (2) render an accounting; and
(3) issue an official receipt for the total amount
he received from the judgment debtor. The rule requires
that the sheriff execute writs and processes to
estimate the expenses to be incurred. Upon approval of the

estimated expenses, the interested party has

to deposit the amount with the Clerk of Court and ExOfficio Sheriff. The expenses shall then be
disbursed to the executing Sheriff, subject to his
liquidation, within the same period for rendering a
return on the process or writ. Any unspent amount shall
be refunded to the party who made the deposit.
Sheriffs are not allowed to receive any voluntary payments
from parties in the course of the performance
of their duties. To do so would be inimical to the best
interests of the service, because even
assuming arguendo that the payments were indeed given
and received in good faith, this fact alone
would not dispel any suspicion that such payments were
made for less than noble purposes. Corollary to
this point, a sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand sums
of money from a party-litigant without
observing the proper procedural steps; otherwise, such act
would amount to dishonesty and extortion.
A sheriff is an officer of the court. As such, he performs
integral part of the administration of justice,
since he is called upon to serve the orders and writs and
execute all processes of the court. As such, he is
required to live up to the strict standards of honesty and
integrity in public service. His conduct must at
all times be characterized by honesty and openness and
must constantly be above suspicion. Benjamin E.
Sanga vs. Sheriffs Florencio SJ. Alcantara and Sales T.
Court personnel;

Bisnar, A,M. No. P-09-2657. January 25, 2010

Respondent Nuez has filed his

administrative

resignation on September 5, 2008, which was

complaint; effect of
resignation

subsequently accepted by the Court, subject to the usual

clearance requirements and without prejudice to the
continuation of the proceedings in the instant
administrative case. Nonetheless, the fact of his
resignation and our approval thereof does not render
moot the complaint against him. Our jurisdiction over him
is not lost by the mere fact that he resigned

during the pendency of the case. To deprive the Court of

authority to pronounce his innocence or guilt
of the charges is undoubtedly fraught with injustices and
pregnant with dreadful and dangerous
implications. What would prevent a corrupt and
unscrupulous government employee from committing
abuses and other condemnable acts knowing fully well
that he would soon be beyond the pale of the law
and immune to all administrative penalties? Resignation
should be used neither as an escape nor as an
easy way out to evade administrative liability by court
personnel facing administrative sanction. If only
for reasons of public policy, the Court must assert and
maintain its jurisdiction over members of the
judiciary and other officials under its supervision and
control for acts performed in office which are
inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of
litigants and the general public. If innocent,
respondent official merits vindication of his name and
integrity as he leaves the government which he
served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive
the corresponding censure and a penalty
proper and imposable under the situation. Judge Delia P.
Noel-Bertulfo, Municipal Trial
Court, Palompon, Leyte vs. Fyndee P. Nuez, Court Aide,
Municipal Trial Court, Palompon, Leyte, A.M. No. P10-2758, February 2, 2010
Court personnel;

Sheriffs are officers of the court who

conduct prejudicial to

serve and execute writs addressed to them by the court,

best interest of service

and who prepare and submit returns on their

proceedings. As officers of the court, they must discharge
their duties with great care and diligence. They
have to perform faithfully and accurately what is
incumbent upon them and show at all times a high
degree of professionalism in the performance of their
duties. Despite being exposed to hazards that come
with the implementation of the judgment, sheriffs must

perform their duties by the book.

When the judgment obligee is not present at the time the
judgment obligor makes the payment, the
sheriff is authorized to receive it. However, the money
received must be remitted to the clerk of court
within the same day or, if not practicable, deposited in a
fiduciary account with the nearest government
depository bank. Evidently, sheriffs are not permitted to
retain the money in their possession beyond the
day when the payment was made or to deliver the money
collected directly to the judgment obligee.
Good faith on the part of respondent, or lack of it, in
proceeding to properly execute his mandate would
be of no moment, for he is chargeable with the knowledge
that being an officer of the court tasked
thereto, it behooves him to make due compliance. As
implementing officers of the court, sheriffs should
set the example by faithfully observing and not brazenly
disregarding the Rules of Court. Incredibly,
respondent even blatantly admitted that he followed the
same procedure in some of the other writs of
execution that he enforced. Domingo Pea, Jr. vs. Achilles
Andrew V. Ragalado II, etc., A.M. No. P-10-2772,
Court personnel;

February 16, 2010.

Respondents are indeed guilty of dishonesty, defined as

dishonesty

the disposition to
lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness;
disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
Dishonesty, which is a grave offense, is punishable by
dismissal even for the first offense.
Respondents are guilty too of violation of reasonable office
rules and procedures. In Estardo-Teodoro
v. Segismundo where the therein respondent court
personnel failed to secure permission for his travel to
Manila to obtain summons in a civil case in a court and
visited the residence of the defendants in that

civil case, in violation of an office memorandum issued by

the clerk of court and noted by the executive
judge, the Court held that the therein respondent violated
reasonable office rules and procedures. Such
violation is classified as a light offense.
While respondents committed two offenses leaving the
court premises without any travel order,
which is a light offense, and dishonesty for fraudulently
punching in their bundy cards, which is a grave
offense the mitigating circumstances considered by the
OCA (affliction of Stage 2 Breast Cancer and
first time offenders) justify the imposition of the
recommended penalty of six-month suspension for each
respondent. Re: Irregularity in the use of bundy clock by
Sophia M. Castro and Babylin V. Tayag, Social Welfare
Officers II, both the Regional Trial Court, Office of the Clerk
of Court, Angeles City, A.M. No. P-10-2763,
February 10, 2010
Respondent Nuez is charged with Gross Dishonesty for
allegedly taking
money from the complainant. Based on the evidence
submitted, the Court finds that there is more than
substantial evidence to prove that respondent Nuez is
guilty of dishonesty. Ma. Irene
R. Legaspi narrated that respondent admitted his
culpability. The NBI agent, Allan Tubi, likewise
testified that respondent admitted stealing the money of
Judge Bertulfo.
Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service
Rules and Regulations, dishonesty is
considered a grave offense for which the penalty of
dismissal is prescribed even at the first instance. In
this case, dismissal can no longer be imposed in view of
respondents resignation. Thus, in lieu thereof,
we hereby order the forfeiture of whatever benefits still due
him from the government, except for the
accrued leave credits, if any, that he had earned, and his

disqualification from further employment in any

branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled
corporations. Judge Delia P. Noel-Bertulfo, Municipal Trial
Court, Palompon, Leyte vs. Fyndee P. Nuez, Court
Aide, Municipal Trial Court, Palompon, Leyte, A.M. No. P-102758, February 2, 2010
Complainant stated that respondent Atty. Cario may not
have disclosed to
the Supreme Court, in the course of her application as
Clerk of Court, her pending administrative and
criminal cases before the Ombudsman. Respondent Atty.
Cario vehemently denied the allegations
against her. She claimed that she was just being truthful
when she answered No to item number 37(a)
of her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) which states: Have you
ever been formally charged? She admitted
that she was aware of the two (2) complaints filed against
her and her former Regional Election Director
before the Ombudsman. She, however, pointed out that
these cases are still in the preliminary
investigation and pre-charge stages, since probable cause
has yet to be determined by the investigating
officers and as such, should not be considered as formal
charges yet.
If we but look at the attachments to the complaint itself, it
is evident that at the time respondent Atty.
Cario was applying for the position of Clerk of Court, she
had not yet been formally charged
administratively or criminally. Clearly, there were no final
dispositions of the cases yet. In fact, the
complainant even stated in his Complaint that those cases
were not yet resolved by the Ombudsman.
Thus, it is only after the issuance of the resolution finding
probable cause and filing of the information in
court that she can be considered formally charged. In fact,
the reckoning point is the filing of the

information with the written authority or approval of the

Ombudsman. To rule otherwise would subject
herein respondent, or any civil servant for that matter, to
extreme hardships considering that a
government official or employee formally charged is
deprived of some rights/privileges, i.e., obtaining
loans from the Government Service Insurance System or
other government-lending institutions, delay in
the release of retirement benefits, disqualification from
being nominated or appointed to any judicial
post and, in some instances, prohibition to travel.
Crisostomo M. Plopinio vs. Atty. Liza Zabala-Cario, etc.,
A.M. No. P-08-2458, March 22, 2010
Clerks of court, in particular, are the chief administrative
officers of their
respective courts. They must show competence, honesty
and probity, having been charged with
safeguarding the integrity of the court and its proceedings.
Furthermore, they are judicial officers
entrusted with the role of performing delicate functions
with regard to the collection of legal fees, and
are expected to correctly and effectively implement
regulations. Hence, as custodians of court funds and
revenues, they have always been reminded of their duty to
immediately deposit the various funds
received by them to the authorized government
depositories for they are not supposed to keep funds in
their custody.
The clerk of court is primarily accountable for all funds
that are collected for the court, whether
personally received by him or by a duly appointed cashier
who is under his supervision and control. As
the custodian of court funds, revenues, records, properties
and premises, he is liable for any loss,
shortage, destruction or impairment of said funds and
properties. A clerk of court found short of money
accountabilities may be dismissed from the service.

In this case, the financial audit conducted in the MTC of

Bongabon, Nueva Ecija showed that respondent
incurred cash shortages. While he was able to reduce his
accountability by producing the required
documents, he could not account for the balance. This
indicated two things: (1) respondents gross
negligence and very poor management of the records of
collected fees and (2) his failure to account for
the remainder which gave rise to the presumption that he
misappropriated the same for his personal use.
He failed to fully account for the funds despite the ample
time he was given to do so. His continued
failure to remit court funds and to give a satisfactory
explanation for such failure constitutes grave
misconduct, dishonesty and even malversation. These, as
well as his gross negligence, are all grave
offenses that merit the supreme penalty of dismissal even
for the first offense. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Macario C. Villanueva, etc., A.M. No. P-041819, March 22, 2010
Section 22(a), (b) and (c) of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, and
Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws, classifies
Gross Neglect of Duty, Dishonesty, and Grave Misconduct
as grave offenses. The penalty for each of
these offenses is dismissal even for the first offense.
The long delay in the remittance of the courts funds, as
well as the unexplained shortages that remained
unaccounted for, raises grave doubts regarding the
trustworthiness and integrity of Atty. Caballero. Her
failure to remit the funds in due time constitutes gross
dishonesty and gross misconduct. It diminishes
the faith of the people in the Judiciary. Dishonesty, being
in the nature of a grave offense, carries the
extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even if
committed for the first time. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Jocelyn G. Caballero, Clerk of Court,

Regional Trial Court, Kidapawan, North Cotabato, A.M.

No. P-05-2064, March 2, 2010
Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false
statement in any
material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any
deception of fraud in securing his examination,
registration, appointment or promotion. Chulyao
employed her sister, Pangowon, to take the July 31,
1988 CSPE conducted in Baguio City for her and in her
behalf and claimed the result thereof as her own
in her personal data sheet accomplished on April 23,
2007. Dishonesty and falsification are malevolent
acts that have no place in the Judiciary. Re: Complaint of
the Civil Service Commission vs. Rita S. Chulyao,
A.M. No. P-07-2292, September 28, 2010
Azurins act of deliberately not registering in the CTRM to
hide his
habitual tardiness for the third time, which is punishable
by dismissal, constitutes dishonesty.
Dishonesty refers to a persons disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle;
lack of fairness and straightforwardness;
disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. By repeatedly
making it appear that he has consistently
rendered a full days service, when he had actually been
tardy, Azurin defrauded the public and
betrayed the trust reposed in him as an employee of the
highest Court. Azurins dishonesty definitely
falls short of the strict standards required of every court
employee, that is, to be an example of integrity,
uprightness and honesty. Re: failure of various employees
to register their time of arrival and/or departure from
office in the chronolog machine, A.M. No. 2005-21-SC,
September 28, 2010

Respondent (clerk of court) failed to regularly submit

monthly reports of
collections and deposits, as required by SC Circular No.
32-93, and official receipts and other documents,
despite the Courts repeated orders. The failure to remit
the funds in due time amounts to dishonesty
and grave misconduct, which the Court cannot tolerate for
they diminish the peoples faith in the
judiciary. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Marcela V.
Santos, Clerk of Court II etc., A.M. No. P-06-2287,
October 12, 2010
Fernandez deserves to be sanctioned. Her habitual
tardiness and
absenteeism, coupled with her submission of a falsified
document to cover up some of her absences, do
not speak well of her fitness for employment in the public
service, especially in the judiciary. We cannot
ignore the gross dishonesty involved in her submission of
a falsified document to cover up several
unauthorized absences. Isabel D. Marquez vs. Jocelyn C.
Fernandez, A.M. No. P-07-2358, October 19, 2010
Respondent Genabe, a court staff, continued to render
service despite her
30-day suspension and has quarrelsome deportment.
Respondent is guilty of conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service and conduct unbecoming of a
court employee. The conduct and behavior of
everyone connected with the dispensation of justice, from
the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk must
be characterized with propriety and decorum. Also, every
official and employee of an agency involved
in the administration of justice, like the Court of Appeals,
from the Presiding Justice to the most junior
clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. Atty. Jonna M. Escabarte, et al. vs.
Ms. Loida Marcelina J. Genabe / Ms. Loida Marcelina J.

Genabe vs. Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, et al., A.M. No.

P-09-2602, December 1, 2010
Respondent Manubag falsified her Personal Data Sheet
(PDS) in connection
with her application for the position of clerk of court by
stating therein that she was a Bachelor of Science
in Commerce graduate when in fact she was not.
Dishonesty means a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or
defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of
honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud,
deceive or betray. The significance of
accomplishing PDS with utmost honesty cannot be
overemphasized. It is a requirement under Civil
Service Rules and Regulations in connection with ones
employment in the government. Thus, the
making of false statements in completing the PDS is
intimately connected with such employment.
Making erroneous entries to accomplish the PDS amounts
to dishonesty and falsification of an official
document. Dishonesty and falsification are considered
grave offenses for which the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service of employees found guilty of
such offenses is prescribed even for the first
offense. Retired employee, MTC, Sibonga, Cebu vs. Merlyn
G. Manubag, Clerk of Court II, MTC, A.M. No. P10-2833. December 14, 2010
Respondent failed to (1) immediately account for and
return the excess in
the cash bond she received; (2) issue appropriate receipts;
(3) safekeep monies received; and, (4)
remit/deposit cash bonds in the government depository
upon receipt. The Court ruled that these
constituted dishonesty and grave misconduct for which
she deserves to be dismissed from the service.
Dishonesty is any act which shows lack of integrity or a

disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive or betray.

It consists of an intent to violate the truth, in a matter of
fact relevant to ones office or connected with
the performance of his duties. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Marissa U. Angeles, etc./ Judge Analie C.
Aldea-Arocena vs. Marissa U. Angeles, etc., A.M. No. P-112887/A.M. No. P-10-2880, January 18, 2011
The OCA audit team found that there were shortages in
the Judiciary
Development Fund and Fiduciary Fund. Respondents
admitted making false entries in the receipts but
justify their actions by saying that they were just following
the orders of their superior. The Court found
them guilty of dishonesty. A cash clerk is an accountable
officer entrusted with the great responsibility of
collecting money belonging to the funds of the court and,
thus, considered as public funds. It was
incumbent upon them to be more circumspect and
discerning in performing their assigned tasks, even in
the seemingly inconsequential details such as making
sure that there was a carbon paper to make
duplicate and triplicate copies when issuing receipts.
Moreover, restitution of the missing amount does
not erase their liability. A public servant is expected to
exhibit, at all times, the highest degree of honesty
and integrity, and should be made accountable to all those
whom he serves. There is no place in the
judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting
standards of judicial conduct and integrity. Report of the
Financial Audit Conducted on the Books of Account of Sonia
L. Dy and Atty. Graciano D. Cuanico, Jr., RTC,
Catarman Northern Samar/Virgilio O. Gallano vs. Atty.
Graciano D. Cuanico, Jr., Clerk of Court and Sonia L. Dy,
Social Welfare Officer II etc., A.M. No. P-07-2364/A.M. No. P11-2902. January 25, 2011.
The OCA audit team discovered unreported and

unremitted collections
that respondent made in connection with his duties. The
Court found him guilty for dishonesty and
grave misconduct. He violated OCA Circular 50-95, which
states that all collections from bail bonds,
rental deposits, and other fiduciary collections shall be
deposited within 24 hours by the Clerk of Court
concerned, upon receipt thereof, with the Land Bank of
the Philippines. Likewise, he violated OCA
Circular 26-97, which directed judges and clerks of court
to compel collecting officials to strictly comply
with the provisions of the Auditing and Accounting
Manual citing Article VI, Sections 61 and 113 which
required collecting officers to promptly issue official
receipts for all money received by them. Office of the
Court Administrator vs. Victorio A. Dion, Former Clerk of
Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Fabian-San
Jacinto, Pangasinan, A.M. No. P-10-2799, January 18,
2011.
In her Personal Data Sheet, Bayani stated that she was
never convicted of
any administrative offense, when in fact in 1995, she was
admonished, in a Memorandum issued by the
Office of Administrative Services Office of the Court
Administrator (OAS-OCA) but signed by then
Chief Justice Narvasa, for being remiss in the performance
of her duties. Bayani explained that it was
due to her understanding that there was no conviction on
the administrative case against her, because
she was merely admonished and warned therein. The
Court ruled that Bayani is not guilty of dishonesty.
Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false
statement in any material fact, or practicing or
attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing
his examination, registration, appointment or
promotion. Thus, dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply
bad judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a

question of intention. In ascertaining the intention of a

person accused of dishonesty, consideration must
be taken not only of the facts and circumstances which
gave rise to the act committed by the respondent,
but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was
committed, the time he might have had at his
disposal for the purpose of meditating on the
consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he
could have had at that moment. While Bayani made an
erroneous judgment in choosing not to disclose
her previous infraction, she cannot be blamed for believing
that such was irrelevant to: (1) question no.
25 for this incident had long been resolved and is no
longer pending; and (2) question no. 27 for
clearly being admonished and warned for being remiss in
the performance of her duties do not
necessarily equate to conviction as question no. 27 seeks
to determine. Re: Anonymous Complaint against
Ms. Hermogena F. Bayani for Dishonesty, A.M. No. 2007-22Court personnel;

SC. February 1, 2011

The attachment to the journal entry voucher of what

simple neglect of duty

to Ilagan was an unfamiliar remittance voucher, as well

as his awareness of previous series of
experiences of the Accounting Division regarding
misdelivered zero-balance vouchers, should have
put him on guard in processing Judge Tans remittance
voucher. He should not have merely assumed,
to use his word, that such unfamiliar voucher was a mere
duplicate.
Given Judge Tans contributory negligence, the Court sees
it fit to only obligate Ilagan to reimburse the
amount paid by Judge Tan for the interest and surcharges
on the unremitted P88,666.00 as of October 8,
2002, or the date the GSIS actually informed Judge Tan of
her outstanding obligation.
Ilagan is thus administratively liable for simple neglect of
duty, defined as failure to give proper attention
to a task expected of an employee resulting from either

carelessness or indifference. Re: Complaint of Judge

Rowena Nieves A. Tan for late remittance by the Supreme
Court of her terminal leave pay to GSIS to apply for
payment of her salary load to said agency, A.M. No. 200702-SC, February 10, 2010
In Collado-Lacorte v. Rabena, Labis, Jr. v. Estaol, Reyes v.
Pablico,
and several other cases, the Court found process servers
liable for simple neglect of duty for failure to
serve court notices properly. Simple neglect of duty is
failure to give proper attention to a required task.
It signifies disregard of duty due to carelessness or
indifference. Marie Dinah S. Tolentino-Fuentes vs.
Michael Patrick A. Galindez, A.M. No. 07-2410, June 18,
2010
Respondent failed to reflect in the minutes of the hearing
the
correct documentary evidence marked. A court interpreter
is duty-bound to prepare and sign the
minutes of court sessions which is an important
document, for it gives a brief summary of the events that
take place thereat including a statement of the date and
time of the session; the name of the judge, clerk
of court, court stenographer, and court interpreter who are
present; the names of the counsel for the
parties who appear; the parties presenting evidence; the
names of the witnesses who testified; the
documentary evidence marked; and the date of the next
hearing. Failure to reflect in the minutes the
correct documentary evidence marked constitutes simple
neglect of duty, defined as the failure to give
attention to a task expected of him and signifies a
disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or
indifference. Freddy Reyes vs. Vivian Pabilane, Court
Interpreter, MTC, Tagkawayan, Quezon, A.M. No. P-092696, January 12, 2011.

Respondent clerk of court failed to detect the irregularities

committed by the court employees in handling the court
funds. The Clerk of Court is primarily
accountable for all funds that are collected for the court,
whether personally received by him or by a
duly appointed cashier who is under his supervision and
control. Being the custodian of the courts
funds, revenues, and records, the Clerk of Court is
likewise liable for any loss, shortage, destruction, or
impairment of said funds and property. The Court held
that his failure to properly supervise and
manage the financial transactions in his court constituted
simple neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty
is the failure to give attention to a task, or the disregard of
a duty due to carelessness or indifference. As
the Court has pronounced in the past, even simple neglect
of duty lessens the peoples confidence in the
judiciary and, ultimately, in the administration of justice.
Thus, the Court cannot allow those who
commit this offense to escape liability. Report of the
Financial Audit Conducted on the Books of Account of
Sonia L. Dy and Atty. Graciano D. Cuanico, Jr., RTC,
Catarman Northern Samar/Virgilio O. Gallano vs. Atty.
Graciano D. Cuanico, Jr., Clerk of Court and Sonia L. Dy,
Social Welfare Officer II etc., A.M. No. P-07-2364/A.M.
No. P-11-2902. January 25, 2011.
Respondent sheriff enforced the writ of execution and
evicted
the complainant without the required prior notice to
vacate. The requirement of a notice to vacate is
based on the rudiments of justice and fair play. A notice be
served on the person against whom the
judgment for the delivery or restitution of real property is
rendered and all persons claiming rights
under him. It is only when such persons resist after
service of notice and demand to vacate that the

sheriff can forcibly enforce the writ by bodily removing

them from the premises. Failure to observe the
requirements of Section 10(c), Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court constitutes simple neglect of duty, which is a
less grave offense punishable by one (1) month and one (1)
day to six (6) months suspension. Manuel P.
Calaunan v. Reynaldo B. Madolaria, Sheriff IV, RTC,
Branch 217, Quezon City, A.M. No. P-10-2810. February 8,
Court personnel;

2011
Complainant Plaza manifested before the

administrative

Court his intention to desist from pursuing the case.

proceedings;
desistance

However, we remind complainant that the

discretion whether to continue with the proceedings rests
exclusively with the Court, notwithstanding
the complainants intention to desist. This Court looks
with disfavor at affidavits of desistance filed by
complainants, especially if done as an afterthought.
Contrary to what the parties might have believed,
withdrawal of the complaint does not have the legal effect
of exonerating respondent from any
administrative disciplinary sanction. It does not operate to
divest this Court of jurisdiction to determine
the truth behind the matter stated in the complaint. The
Courts disciplinary authority cannot be
dependent on or frustrated by private arrangements
between parties. An administrative complaint
against an official or employee of the judiciary cannot
simply be withdrawn by a complainant who
suddenly claims a change of mind. Otherwise, the prompt
and fair administration of justice, as well as
the discipline of court personnel, would be undermined.
Ryan S. Plaza, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial
Court, Argao, Cebu vs. Atty. Marcelina R. Amamio, Clerk of
Court, Genoveva R. Vasquez, Legal Researcher and
Floramay Patalinhug, Court Stenographer, all of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Argao, Cebu, A.M. No. P-

Court personnel; duty

08-2559, March 19, 2010

Time and again, we

to deposit authorized

have reminded court personnel tasked with collections of

government

court funds, such as Clerks of Courts and cash

depositories
immediately

clerks, to deposit immediately with authorized government

depositories the various funds they have
collected, because they are not authorized to keep funds in
their custody. In this case, respondents
violated Supreme Court (SC) Circular No. 50-95, which
commands that all fiduciary collections shall be
deposited immediately by the Clerk of Court concerned,
upon receipt thereof, with an authorized
government depositary bank. Section B (4) of SC Circular
No. 50-95, on the collection and deposit of
court fiduciary funds, mandates that all collections from
bail bonds, rental deposits, and other fiduciary
funds shall be deposited within twenty-four (24) hours by
the Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt
thereof with the Land Bank of the Philippines. Along the
same vein, SC Circular Nos. 13-92 and 5-93
provide the guidelines for the proper administration of
court funds. SC Circular No. 13-92 commands
that all fiduciary collections shall be deposited
immediately by the Clerk of Court concerned, upon
receipt thereof, with an authorized government depositary
bank. Office of the Court Administrator vs.
Atty. Mary Ann Paduganan-Pearanda, Office of the Clerk
of Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cagayan de
Oro City, Misamis Oriental and Ms. Jocelyn Mediante, A.M.

Court personnel; duty

No. P-07-2355, March 19, 2010

Atty. Caballeros

to deposit funds;

belated turnover of cash deposited with her is inexcusable

belated compliance
cannot erase liability

and will not exonerate her from liability.

Clerks of Court are presumed to know their duty to
immediately deposit with the authorized
government depositories the various funds they receive,
for they are not supposed to keep funds in their
personal possession. Even undue delay in the remittances
of the amounts that they collect at the very
least constitutes misfeasance. Although Atty. Caballero

subsequently deposited her other cash

accountabilities with respect to the Fiduciary Fund, she
was nevertheless liable for failing to immediately
deposit the said collections into the courts funds. Her
belated remittance will not free her from
punishment. Even restitution of the whole amount cannot
erase her administrative liability. More so, in
the instant case, she failed to fully comply with all the
Courts directives. Clearly, her failure to deposit
the said amount upon collection was prejudicial to the
court, which did not earn interest income on the
said amount or was not able to otherwise use the said
funds. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Jocelyn
G. Caballero, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court,
Kidapawan, North Cotabato, A.M. No. P-05-2064, March 2,
Court personnel; grave

2010
Noel and Amelia are liable for violation of Sec. 1, Canon I

misconduct

of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, which pertinently
provides that court personnel shall not use their
official position to secure unwarranted benefits, privileges,
or exemption for themselves or for others. By
misrepresenting they could help influence either the
outcome of a case or set a case for agenda by the
Court En Banc for which they demanded and received
payment, Noel and Amelia committed grave
misconduct. It shows the corruption of Noel and Amelia,
who used their station or character as Court
employees in misrepresenting they could set a case for
agenda by the Court En Banc and procuring
financial benefits for that vicious act. Re: Complaints of
Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and
Amelia Serafico, A.M. No. 2008-20-SC, March 15, 2010
There is no doubt that Padillo received from Escalona
P20,000
purportedly for fiscal & judge and for warrant officer
and this amount was intended to facilitate

the case against Dalit. Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of

Conduct of Court Personnel provides that
(C)ourt personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor
or benefit based on any explicit or implicit
understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall
influence their official actions. Lourdes S. Escalona vs.
Consolacion S. Padilla, A.M. No. P-10-2785, September 21,
2010
In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple
misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or
flagrant disregard of established rule must be
manifest. Corruption as an element of grave misconduct
consists in the act of an official or employee
who unlawfully or wrongfully uses his station or character
to procure some benefit for himself or for
another, contrary to the rights of others.
Medrano knowingly and corruptly submitted spurious or
irregular bail bonds for the approval of the
judge. He categorically admitted his offense, giving the
simple explanation of having thereby
accommodated ill-intentioned people. His anomalies for a
consideration appeared to be not isolated, but
repeated many times. He thereby converted his
employment in the court into an income-generating
activity. His grave misconduct was, therefore, a grave
offense that deserved the penalty of dismissal for
the first offense pursuant to Sec. 52-A of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service. Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Hon.
Marilou Runes-Tamang, Presiding Judge, MeTC
Pateros, Manila and Presiding Judge, MeTC San Juan,
Metro Manila, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1558, April 7, 2010
No less than the Constitution mandates that public office
is a
public trust. Service with loyalty, integrity and efficiency

is required of all public officers and

employees, who must, at all times, be accountable to the
people.
The outright admission of Clerk IV Aranzazu Baltazar to
committing malversation of funds shows her
blatant disregard for these principles she had sworn to
uphold, thereby eroding public trust. When
asked to explain, Ms. Baltazar readily confessed her
shortage and willingly executed an affidavit, dated
April 5, 2004, wherein she admitted that she had
committed grave negligence and malversation of funds
when she allowed other court employees to borrow from
the court funds in her custody, causing the
shortage as discovered by the audit team.
Ms. Baltazar was grossly inefficient in handling the
finances of the court. Her bare admission that she
had indeed allowed other employees to borrow from the
court funds shows her extensive participation
in the irregularities reported by the audit team. There is
no doubt that these acts constitute a grave
offense. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Atty. Fermin
M. Ofilas, et al., A.M. No. P-05-1935, April 23, 2010
An Information was filed against respondent for possession
of
dangerous drugs. Consequently, an administrative
complaint was filed against him. The Court defines
misconduct as a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.
The misconduct is grave if it involves any of
the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to
violate the law, or to disregard established rules,
which must be established by substantial evidence. As
distinguished from simple misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or
flagrant disregard of established rule, must be
manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as

an element of grave misconduct, consists in the

act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and
wrongfully uses his station or character to
procure some benefit for himself or for another person,
contrary to duty and the rights of others. An act
need not be tantamount to a crime for it to be considered
as grave misconduct as in fact, crimes
involving moral turpitude are treated as a separate ground
for dismissal under the Administrative Code.
Respondent committed grave misconduct which, under
Section 52 (A)(3), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases, is a grave offense punishable by
dismissal even for the first offense. Office of the
Court Administrator vs. Claudio M. Lopez, Process Server,
MTC, Sudipen. La Union, A.M. No. P-10-2788,
January 18, 2011.
Respondent Sheriffs unilateral and repeated demands for
sums of
money from a party-litigant, purportedly to defray the
expenses of execution, without obtaining the
approval of the trial court for such purported expense and
without rendering to that court an accounting
thereof, in effect, constituted dishonesty and extortion.
That conduct, therefore, fell far too short of the
required standards of public service. Such conduct is
threatening to the very existence of the system of
the administration of justice. For grave misconduct,
dishonesty and neglect of duty, Archibald C. Verga,
Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Butuan City,
was suspended from office without pay for six
months. In Sanga v. Alcantara, the Court had another
occasion to remind sheriffs on the performance of
their duty: Under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, the sheriff is required to secure the courts
prior approval of the estimated expenses and fees needed
to implement the court process. A sheriff is
guilty of violating the Rules if he fails to observe the

following: (1) prepare an estimate of expenses to be

incurred in executing the writ, for which he must seek the
courts approval; (2) render an accounting;
and (3) issue an official receipt for the total amount he
received from the judgment debtor. The rule
requires that the sheriff execute writs or processes to
estimate the expenses to be incurred. Upon the
approval of the estimated expenses, the interested party
has to deposit the amount with the Clerk of
Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff. The expenses shall then be
disbursed to the executing Sheriff, subject to his
liquidation, within the same period for rendering a return
on the process or writ. Any unspent amount
shall be refunded to the party who made the deposit. A
sheriff is an officer of the court. As such, he
forms an integral part of the administration of justice,
since he is called upon to serve the orders and
writs and execute all processes of the court. As such, he is
required to live up to the strict standards of
honesty and integrity in public service. His conduct must
at all times be characterized by honesty and
openness and must constantly be above suspicion. Dy
Teban Trading Co., Inc. v. Archibald C. Verga, Sheriff
IV, RTC, Branch 33 Butuan City, A.M. No. P-11-2914, March
16, 2011.
Respondent Tagubas act of collecting or receiving money
from a
litigant constitutes grave misconduct in office. Grave
misconduct is a grave offense that carries the
extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even on a
first offense. Court personnel, from the lowliest
employee, are involved in the dispensation of justice;
parties seeking redress from the courts for
grievances look upon court personnel, irrespective of rank
or position, as part of the Judiciary. In
performing their duties and responsibilities, these court
personnel serve as sentinels of justice and any

act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the

honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the
peoples trust and confidence in this institution. Therefore,
they are expected to act and behave in a
manner that should uphold the honor and dignity of the
Judiciary, if only to maintain the peoples
confidence in the Judiciary. This expectation is enforced,
among others, by Section 2, Canon I of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which mandates that
[c]ourt personnel shall not solicit or accept
any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit
understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall
influence their official actions. Section 2(e), Canon III, on
the other hand, mandates that [c]ourt
personnel shall not x x x [s]olicit or accept any gift, loan,
gratuity, discount, favor, hospitality or service
under circumstances from which it could reasonably be
inferred that a major purpose of the donor is to
influence the court personnel in performing official
duties. The acts addressed are strictly prohibited to
avoid the perception that court personnel can be
influenced to act for or against a party or person in
exchange for favors. Milagros Villaceran and Omar T.
Miranda v. Judge Maxwel S. Rosete and Process Server
Eugenio Taguba, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2,
Santiago City, Isabela, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1727,
March 22, 2011.
Court personnel; gross

Shortages in the amounts to be remitted and the years of

neglect of duty

delay in
the actual remittances constitute neglect of duty, for which
Atty. Caballero should be administratively
liable more so, since she failed to give a satisfactory
explanation for said shortages.
Clerks of court perform a delicate function as designated
custodians of the courts funds, revenues,
records, properties, and premises. As such, they are
generally regarded as treasurers, accountants,

guards, and physical plant managers thereof. It is the

clerks of courts duty to faithfully perform their
duties and responsibilities as such, to the end that there
is full compliance with their function: that of
being the custodians of the courts funds and revenues,
records, properties, and premises. They are the
chief administrative officers of their respective courts. It is
also their duty to ensure that the proper
procedures are followed in the collection of cash bonds.
Clerks of court are officers of the law who
perform vital functions in the prompt and sound
administration of justice. Their office is the hub of
adjudicative and administrative orders, processes and
concerns. They are liable for any loss, shortage,
destruction, or impairment of such funds and property.
It is the duty of the clerks of court to perform their
responsibilities faithfully, so that they can fully
comply with the circulars on deposits of collections. They
are reminded to deposit immediately, with
authorized government depositaries, the various funds
they have collected, because they are not
authorized to keep those funds in their custody. The
unwarranted failure to fulfill these responsibilities
deserves administrative sanction, and not even the full
payment of the collection shortages will exempt
the accountable officer from liability.
These circulars are mandatory in nature and designed to
promote full accountability for government
funds; no protestation of good faith can override such
mandatory nature. By failing to properly remit
the cash collections constituting public funds, Atty.
Caballero violated the trust reposed in her as
disbursement officer of the judiciary. Her failure to explain
the fund shortage satisfactorily and to
restitute the shortage and fully comply with the Courts
directives leave us no choice but to hold her
liable for gross neglect of duty and gross dishonesty.
Hence, for the delay in the remittance of cash

collections in violation of Supreme Court Circulars No. 593 and No. 13-92, and for her failure to keep
proper records of all collections and remittances, Atty.
Caballero is found guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty
punishable, even for the first offense, by dismissal. Office
of the Court Administrator vs. Jocelyn G. Caballero,
clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Kidapawan, North
Cotabato, A.M. No. P-05-2064, March 2, 2010
The 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court requires that
all
applications for bail and judicial bonds shall be coursed,
before their approval by the Judge concerned,
through the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
personnel, who shall see to it that the bonds are in
order. As the Branch Clerk of Court of the MeTC in San
Juan, Sorio was the administrative officer of the
branch, who had the control and supervision of all court
records, properties and supplies. With her
responsibilities as such, Sorio should have ensured that
all bail bonds and their supporting documents
were in order before endorsing them to Judge Tamang for
approval. Sorio should have rejected the bail
bonds of Covenant due to the latters blacklisting and its
lack of clearance from the Supreme Court to
issue such bail bonds. She cannot now simply feign
ignorance and escape liability upon the implausible
pretext that some bail bonds did not pass through her.
Likewise, Sorio did not explain the non-transmittal of
some approved bail bonds and their supporting
documents to the courts, before which the criminal cases
of the accused concerned had been filed and
pending. Based on the record, Judge Tamang had given
instructions to Sorio and Medrano to
immediately release the bail bonds upon her approval of
them. However, during the hearing before the
Investigating Judge, Sorio admitted her failure to see to
their immediate release, although such was her

primary responsibility as the Branch Clerk of Court. It

must be remembered that her obligation does not
end with the initial verification and signing of the
documents, but extends until the bail bonds and their
supporting documents are transmitted to the courts
concerned for appropriate action.
Thus, Sorio was remiss in the performance of her duties.
She fell short of the task of effective supervision
of the court staff. The recommendation of the OCA that
Sorio be administratively sanctioned for gross
negligence of duty was, therefore, proper. Re: Anonymous
Letter-Complaint against Hon. Marilou RunesTamang, Presiding Judge, MeTC Pateros, Manila and
Presiding Judge, MeTC San Juan, Metro Manila, A.M. No.
MTJ-04-1558, April 7, 2010
The settled rule is that a clerk of court is grossly negligent
for his
or her failure to promptly remit or deposit cash collections
with the local or nearest Land Bank of the
Philippines Branch, in accordance with Court
administrative circulars and issuances. No protestation of
good faith can override the mandatory observance of court
circulars which are designed to promote full
accountability of government funds. Restitution of the
amount of the shortages does not erase
administrative liability. Office of the Court Administrator vs.
Merlinda T. Cuachon and Fe P. Alejano, Court
Stenographer, MCTC, Ilog-Candoni, Negros Occidental, A.M.
Court personnel; guilty

No. P-06-2179, January 12, 2011.

Grave

of two or more

misconduct is punishable with dismissal from the service

charges; Lesser offense

an aggravating
circumstance.

for the first offense under Sec. 52 (A)(3) of the

Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service. Moreover, under Sec. 55 of said
Rules, if the respondent is guilty of two (2) or more charges
or counts, the penalty to be imposed should
be the penalty for the most serious charge, and the rest

considered as aggravating. It is also worthy to

note that the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
provides that all provisions of law, Civil Service
rules, and issuances of the Supreme Court or regulating
the conduct of public officers and employees
applicable to the Judiciary are deemed incorporated into
this Code. Conformably, in the instant case,
the penalty for grave misconduct, which is the more
serious charge, must be applied, and the charge of
disgraceful and immoral conduct considered as merely an
aggravating circumstance. Re: Complaints of
Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and Amelia
Court personnel;

Serafico, A.M. No. 2008-20-SC, March 15, 2010

The investigation established that both Noel and Amelia

immorality

had subsisting
marriages when they got married. It is, thus, apparent
that both had legal impediments to marrying
when they married each other.
While the trial court is the proper forum to rule their
subsequent marriage as bigamous, from a criminal
point of view, Noel and Amelia are nonetheless liable for
immorality by the mere fact of living together
and contracting a subsequent marriage before their
respective first marriages were judicially dissolved.
In effect, Noel, who was still married to Rosemarie Jimeno,
and Amelia, who was still married to Marc
Michael A. Nacianceno, not only contracted an apparently
bigamous marriage, but also cohabited as
man and wife in violation of their prior marital status and
obligations solemnly assumed before God and
man. Indeed, we find that Noel and Amelia made a
mockery of marriage, which is a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. Their act of contracting a
second marriage while their respective first
marriages were still in place is contrary to honesty, justice,
decency, and morality.
For marrying each other despite their subsisting prior
marriages, Noel and Amelia acted reprehensibly

and are guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct. They

are, thus, liable to suspension for at least six
months under Section 52(A)(15) of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Re:
Complaints of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses
Noel and Amelia Serafico, A.M. No. 2008-20-SC, March
15, 2010
Immoral conduct is conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the
good and respectable members of the
community. Abandonment of ones wife and children, and
cohabitation with a woman not his wife,
constitutes immoral conduct that is subject to disciplinary
action. Thelma T. Babante-Caples vs. Philbert B.
Caples etc., A.M. No. HOJ-10-03, November 15, 2010
This is an administrative complaint for immorality filed
against
respondent Gibas and respondent Lintao who were
accused of having an illicit relationship. Court
employees should maintain moral righteousness and
uprightness in their professional and private
conduct to preserve the integrity and dignity of the courts
of justice. Court personnel should avoid any
act of impropriety which tarnishes the honor and dignity
of the Judiciary, thus: Every employee of the
judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness
and honesty. Like any public servant, he must
exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only
in the performance of his official duties but in
his personal and private dealings with other people, to
preserve the courts good name and standing. It
cannot be overstressed that the image of a court of justice
is mirrored in the conduct, official and
otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the
judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court

employees have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting

standards of morality and decency in their
professional and private conduct in order to preserve the
good name and integrity of courts of justice.
Emmanuel M. Gibas, Jr. v. Ma. Jesusa E. Gibas, Court
Stenographer I, Municipal Trial Court, Guiguinto, Bulacan,
and Franconello S. Lintao, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 83, Malolos City, Bulacan, A.M. No. P-092651, March 23, 2011.
Court personnel;

The contention of the Clerk of Court that there was no

misconduct

danger to the
building and the records since the raffle draw was merely
held at the ground floor lobby and that those
who attended the raffle draw were decent people, majority
of whom are women, is untenable. Time and
again, the Court has always stressed in pertinent
issuances and decisions that courts are temples of
justice, the honor and dignity of which must be upheld
and that their use shall not expose judicial
records to danger of loss or damage. So strict is the Court
about this that it has declared that the
prohibition against the use of Halls of Justice for purposes
other than that for which they have been built
extends to their immediate vicinity including their
grounds. If the building housing the Argao Hall of
Justice is such an important historical landmark, all the
more reason why activities, such as Sara Lee
raffle draw, should not be held within. At most, the said
Hall of Justice could have been made part of a
regular local tour, to be viewed at designated hours, which
viewing shall be confined to certain areas not
intrusive to court operations and records. Ryan S. Plaza,
Clerk of Court Municipal Trial Court, Argao, Cebu
vs. Atty. Marcelina R. Amamio, Clerk of Court, Genoveva R.
Vasquez, Legal Researcher and Floramay Patalinhug,
Court Stenographer, all of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
26, Argao, Cebu, A.M. No. P-08-2559, March 19,

2010
Marcelo deserves to be sanctioned for the grave
transgressions he
committed while in office. As clerk of court, he was in
charge of the courts funds and was responsible
for their collection and safekeeping. Marcelo made
collections for the courts several funds and never
bothered to deposit these collections in the official court
depository bank a violation of the rule that all
clerks of court are required to deposit all collections with
the LBP within twenty-four (24) hours upon
receipt of the collections. Marcelo also held on to his
collections, thus committing another violation.
Clerks of court may not keep funds in their custody. His
acts and omissions constitute a betrayal of the
trust and confidence the Court reposes on a senior officer.
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Rodelio E.
Marcelo and Ma. Corazon D. Espanola, MTCC, San Jose Del
Monte City, Bulacan, A.M. No. P-06-2221. October
5, 2010
Under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 1991,
an officer or
employee of the civil service is considered habitually tardy
if he incurs tardiness, regardless of the
number of minutes, ten (10) times a month for at least two
(2) months in a semester, or for at least two (2)
consecutive months. We consistently ruled that non-office
obligations, household chores, and domestic
concerns are not sufficient reasons to excuse or justify
habitual tardiness. Hence, Ms. Esellers reasons for
her tardiness her need to attend to her children and her
problems in the workplace cannot exculpate
her. By being habitually tardy, Ms. Eseller fell short of the
stringent standard of conduct demanded from
everyone connected with the administration of justice.
Leave Division-OAS, Office of the Court

Administrator vs. Bethel I. Eseller, Interpreter II, MTCC,

Branch 3, Bacolod City, A.M. No. P-10-2807, October 6,
2010
As a clerk of court, Sorio is specifically mandated to
safeguard the
integrity of the court and its proceedings, and to maintain
the authenticity and correctness of court
records. For the substantial alterations made on exhibits
12, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31; and for the loss of
the 17 February 1999 TSN in the records of Criminal Case
No. 44739, which significantly affected the
very integrity and authenticity of the court records, Sorio
does not deserve to remain clerk of court one
day longer. We have no choice but to dismiss her from the
service. Her failure to obey this mandate
constituted grave misconduct and conduct highly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service based on
our ruling in Almario v. Resus [318 SCRA 742 (1999)]. Had
Sorio performed her duty to properly
supervise the transmittal of all the records of Criminal
Case No. 44739 including the pagination,
marking, and indexing of the exhibits the alterations in
the exhibits and the loss of the 17 February 1999
TSN in the records of Criminal Case No. 44739 would not
have taken place. Rufina Chua vs. Eleanor A.
Sorio, et al., A.M. No. P-07-2409, April 7, 2010
The Court finds respondent guilty of violating Section 9
(b), Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, considered a less grave offense, when,
instead of faithfully implementing the alias writ
upon the properties subject of the writ therein defendant
Powroll and its stockholders, he arrogated
upon himself the authority to levy the three motorcycles
belonging to RUSI Marketing, which was not
even a party to the case. It may seem that the list of
stockholders of both companies are the same, but

such fact did not give respondent the blanket authority to

undertake the levy on the properties of RUSI
Marketing as the said company was not named as a
defendant in the civil case and there was no
judgment rendered against it. Moreover, RUSI Marketing is
a separate entity from that of its
stockholders and, therefore, its properties do not
necessarily include the properties of its
stockholders. Antonio T. Ramas-Uypitching vs. Vincent
Horace U. Magalona, A.M. No. P-07-2379, November
17, 2010
Fixing may range from the patently corrupt act of serving
as middleman
between a litigant and the decision maker, to rendering
illegal and out-of-the-way assistance such as
providing referral service to lawyers and other participants
in court cases, or providing information such
as the identity of the ponente, all for a fee, or, likewise for a
fee, intervening to facilitate court processes such
as the release of court papers or providing advance and
illegitimate copies of drafts or final but
unpromulgated decisions. Pastor C. Pinlac vs. Oscar T.
Llamas, etc., A.M. No. P-10-2781, November 24, 2010
Respondent sheriff levied on the trucks of the complainant
even if the
notice of levy was addressed to another person. The
complainant claimed ownership of the trucks but
the respondent sheriff went ahead with the levy without
taking steps to first ascertain the trucks
ownership. Well-settled is the rule that [t]he duty of a
sheriff in enforcing writs of execution is
ministerial and not discretionary. However, errors in the
levy of properties do not necessarily give rise
to liability if circumstances exist showing that the
erroneous levy was done in good faith. In the instant
case however, the conduct of respondent is inexcusable.

The facts clearly show that the two (2) trucks

seized by her did not belong to the addressee of the notice
but to herein complainant. What is more, she
could have acted in good faith and checked from the LTO
the identity of the registered owners of the
said vehicles before proceeding with their seizure.
Respondent is guilty of misconduct in the discharge
of her functions. Misconduct is a transgression of an
established rule of action. More particularly,
misconduct is the unlawful behavior of a public officer. It
means the intentional wrongdoing or
deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior,
especially by a government official. In
order for misconduct to constitute an administrative
offense, it should be related to or connected with
the performance of the official functions and duties of a
public officer. Corazon Tenorio, represented by
Imelda Tenorio-Ortiz vs. Alyn C. Perlas, Sheriff III, A.M. No.
P-10-2817, January 26, 2011.
Aromin actually interfered with the execution of a valid
certificate of
sheriffs sale in behalf of her friend without regard to the
impropriety of her acts considering that she is a
court employee. As a public servant, she should have
known that she is enjoined to uphold public
interest over and above personal interest at all times.
Employees of the judiciary should be living
examples of uprightness not only in the performance of
official duties but also in their personal and
private dealings with other people so as to preserve at all
times the good name and standing of the
courts in the community. The image of the court, as being
a true temple of justice, is aptly mirrored in the
conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who
work thereat, from the judge to the least and
lowliest of its personnel. Angelina C. Lim and Vivian M.
Gaduang v. Maribeth G. Aromin, Records Officer I,

OCC, MTC, Meycauayan, Bulacan, A.M. No. P-09-2677,

Court personnel;

March 9, 2011.
It is the duty of clerks of court to perform their

neglect of duty

responsibilities
faithfully, so that they can fully comply with the circulars
on deposits of collections. Delay in the
remittances of collections constitutes neglect of duty. The
failure to remit judiciary collections on time
deprives the court of the interest that may be earned if the
amounts are deposited in a bank. Under the
Civil Service Rules and the Omnibus Rules implementing
it, simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense
penalized with suspension for one month and one day to
six months for the first offense, and dismissal
for the second offense. Office of the Court Administrator vs.
Atty. Mary Ann Paduganan-Pearanda, Office of
the Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cagayan
de Oro City, Misamis Oriental and Ms. Jocelyn

Court personnel;

Mediante, A.M. No. P-07-2355, March 19, 2010

Bengsons act of dealing with Hernando, more particularly

simple misconduct

of
offering her services to facilitate the titling of Hernandos
property, whether directly or through another,
certainly fell short of the above yardstick or standard for
court employees and personnel. She definitely
had no business indulging, even indirectly, in the
processing or the titling of the property.
Now, in Dela Cruz v. Zapico, this Court reiterated that
misconduct generally means wrongful, unlawful
conduct, motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose. Thus, any transgression or
deviation from the established norm, whether it be workrelated or not, amounts to misconduct.
Undeniably, Bengsons solicitation and misrepresentation
amounted to Simple Misconduct. Priscilla L.
Hernando vs. Juliana Y Bengson, etc., A.M. No. P-09-2686,
March 10, 2010

The acts of Rantael in taunting and uttering invectives at

Caya and
causing the latter physical harm by pulling her hair within
the court premises, and during working
hours, exhibit discourtesy and disrespect not only to her
co-workers but also to the court. Such behavior
of letting personal hatred affect public performance falls
short of the standard laid down in A.M. No. 0316-13-SC or the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
which took effect on 1 June 2004. Without doubt,
Rantaels actuations failed to live up to the high standard
required of personnel in the judicial service.
Thus, she must be held administratively liable for simple
misconduct. Simple misconduct has been
defined as an unacceptable behavior that transgresses the
established rules of conduct for public officers.
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Cristita L. Caya and
Rhodora Atienza-Rantael, A.M. No. 09-2632, June 18,
2010
This Court cannot tolerate misconduct on the part of its
employees. The reported exchanges between Bunao and
Wee in the court premises, and in the presence
of Judge Mendrado V. Corpuz and Assistant Prosecutor
Alfredo A. Balajo, Jr., is disgraceful behavior.
Shouting at each other within the court premises exhibits
discourtesy and disrespect not only towards
co-workers but to the court as well. The conduct and
behavior of every official and employee of an
agency involved in the administration of justice, from the
presiding judge to the most junior clerk,
should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be
characterized by strict propriety and decorum so as to
earn and keep the publics respect for the
judiciary. This standard is applied with respect to a court
employees dealings not only with the public
but also with his or her co-workers in the service.

Tanching L. Wee, etc., et al. vs. Virgilio T. Bunao, Jr., etc /

Virgilio T. Bunao, Jr., etc. vs. Tanching L. Wee, etc., A.M. No.
P-08-2487/A.M. No. P-08-2493, September 29,
2010
Respondent sheriff levied upon a personal property not
belonging
to the judgment debtor. He was found guilty of simple
misconduct. The sheriff cannot and should not be
the one to determine which property to levy if the
judgment obligor cannot immediately pay because it
is the judgment obligor who is given the option to choose
which property or part thereof may be levied
upon to satisfy the judgment. It was improper for
respondent to have enforced the writ of execution on a
property that did not belong to the judgment
debtor/obligor. Respondent evidently failed to perform his
duty with utmost diligence. Misconduct is defined as any
unlawful conduct, on the part of a person
concerned in the administration of justice, prejudicial to
the rights of parties or to the right determination
of the cause. It generally means wrongful, improper,
unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated,
obstinate or intentional purpose. Crispin Sarmiento vs.
Luisito P. Mendiola, Sheriff III, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 20, Manila, A.M. No. P-07-2383. December
15, 2010
The salary check of the complainant was inadvertently
surrendered
to respondent. However, respondent failed to immediately
return the check to complainant.
Respondents failure to immediately return complaints
salary check was improper and constituted
misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some
established rule of action, an unlawful behavior, or
gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is
grave if it involves any of the additional elements

of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or disregard

of long-standing rules, which must be
established by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the
misconduct is only simple. That respondent did not
maliciously or deliberately take complainants salary check
rendered him liable only for simple
misconduct. Under Section 52 (B) (2), Rule IV, of the
Revised Uniform Rules On Administrative Cases
In the Civil Service, simple misconduct is a less grave
offense with a penalty ranging from suspension
for one month and one day to six months for the first
offense, and dismissal for the second offense.
Benigno B. Reas v. Carlos M. Relacion, A.M. No. P-05-2095.
Court personnel; gross

February 9, 2011
Contrary to the P400,000.00 assessment made by

dishonesty

respondent, the
complainant should have been assessed legal fees only
amounting to P75,525.00, based on SC Amended
Administrative Circular No. 35-2004, which was issued by
the Court to serve as reference for Clerks of
Court in the assessment of the legal fees to avoid any
confusion. Respondent also violated SC Circular
No. 26-97 dated May 5, 1997 for failing to issue the
original receipts and merely furnishing complainant
with photocopies of receipts.
Respondents case is not simply non-abidance with court
circulars and directives. Complainant in good
faith trusted respondents word when the latter made an
assessment of the fees he must pay.
Unfortunately, respondent abused this trust and
confidence reposed on her and used her position to
extract exorbitant amounts from complainant under the
guise of legal fees for her personal gain. A very
obvious indication of respondents dishonest motive is the
huge difference in the amounts, P324,475.00
to be exact, which eliminates any possibility that
respondent may have only made the wrong assessment
in good faith. Worse, respondent is nowhere to be found

and thus the amounts collected are still

unaccounted for.
Under the circumstances, respondent is clearly guilty of
gross dishonesty and grave misconduct which
the Court cannot countenance. The Court will not tolerate
any conduct, act or omission by any court
employee violating the norm of public accountability and
diminishing or tending to diminish the faith of
the people in the Judiciary. Jonathan A. Rebong vs.
Elizabeth R. Tengco, et al., A.M. No. P-07-2338, April 7,
Court personnel;

2010
It is clear that Velasco failed to exercise due diligence in

incompetence

the
performance of his duties. The writ of demolition covered
only Lot Nos. 80-A and 81-A. He was
informed beforehand that complainants house was
constructed on Lot No. 81-B. He relied on the
representative of the plaintiff in Spl. Civil Case No. 645
who told him that complainants house should
be included in the demolition instead of conducting a
relocation survey on the areas involved in the case.
We reiterate that sheriffs, as public officers, are
repositories of public trust and are under obligation to
perform the duties of their office honestly, faithfully, and
to the best of their abilities. Sheriffs are bound
to use reasonable skill and diligence in the performance of
their official duties, particularly where the
rights of individuals might be jeopardized by their neglect.
In this case, Velasco failed to act with caution
in the implementation of the writ of demolition, which
resulted to damage to complainant. Dalamacio Z.
Tomboc, et al. vs. Sheriff Liborio M. Velasco, Jr., et al., A.M.

Court personnel;

No. P-07-2322, April 23, 2010

A review of the records shows that no evidence was

usurpation of

presented

authority

during the investigation to prove that the acts of

respondents amounted to usurpation of authority. It is
apparent that the issuance of the Writ of Execution was

within the scope of duties of Jamora as Branch

Clerk of Court. It was also proven that the Writ of
Execution was indeed issued on June 29, 2005.
Significantly, Reyes failed to show proof that there was no
writ of execution yet at the time he filed his
petition for relief from judgment.
As to the liability of Alejo in the alleged hasty
implementation of the writ of execution, we find the same
to be unmeritorious. When a writ is placed in the hands of
a sheriff, it becomes his ministerial duty to
proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to
implement it in accordance with its mandate. This
duty, in the proper execution of a valid writ, is not just
directory, but mandatory. He has no discretion
whether to execute the writ or not. He is mandated to
uphold the majesty of the law as embodied in the
decision. In the instant case, respondent Sheriff was
merely performing his ministerial duty when he
implemented the writ of execution issued by the court.
Alejo, however, should be reminded that it is
required of him to pay the required fees before the
implementation of the writ of execution. Atty. Alberto
III Borbon Reyes vs. Clerk of Court V Richard C. Jamora, et
Court personnel;

al., A.M. No. P-06-2224, April 30, 2010

Dishonesty is defined as intentionally

dishonesty and

making a false statement on any material fact in securing

falsification of public
document

ones examination, appointment, or

registration. Dishonesty is a serious offense which reflects
a persons character and exposes the moral
decay which virtually destroys honor, virtue, and integrity.
It is a malevolent act that has no place in the
judiciary, as no other office in the government service
exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness
from an employee than a position in the judiciary. A birth
certificate, being a public document, serves as
prima facie evidence of filiation. The making of a false
statement therein constitutes dishonesty and
falsification of a public document. Anonymous vs. Emma

Court personnel; gross

B. Curamen, A.M. No. 08-2549. June 18, 2010

Pagulayan indeed committed the transgression Judge

misconduct

Beltran
charged. What Pagulayan did is the nightmare of every
decisionmaker and magistrate who is usually the
last to know that somebody has used his or her name to
ask for money para kay Fiscal o para kay
Judge as mulcters reputedly always say. Pagulayans
misconduct, it must be stressed, brought dishonor
to the administration of justice in particular and, to the
public service in general. Indeed, Pagulayan
failed to live up to the standards of honesty and integrity
required in the public service. In the words of
the Constitution, public office is a public trust and
Pagulayan betrayed this trust. Under Civil Service
rules, gross misconduct is a grave offense and punishable
by dismissal. Judge Orlando D. Beltran vs. Vilma
C. Pagulayan, Interpreter III, RTC, Branch 2, Tuguegarao
City, Cagayan, A.M. No. P-05-2014, June 29, 2010
Respondent sheriff refused to take any sincere effort to
implement
the Writ of Execution in order to compel the complainant
to agree to his demand for a 35% share in
whatever may be collected. The Court found the
respondent guilty of gross misconduct. Time and again,
the Court has pointed out the heavy burden and
responsibility which court personnel are saddled with
in view of their exalted positions as keepers of the public
faith. They should, therefore, be constantly
reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or
negligence in the performance of official
functions must be avoided. Those who work in the
judiciary must adhere to high ethical standards to
preserve the courts good name and standing. They should
be examples of responsibility, competence
and efficiency, and they must discharge their duties with
due care and utmost diligence, since they are

officers of the court and agents of the law. Indeed, any

conduct, act or omission on the part of those who
would violate the norm of public accountability and
diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of
the people in the judiciary shall not be countenanced.
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Jose M. Ramano,
Deputy Sheriff, Regional Trial Court, Branch 140, Makati
Court personnel; use

City, A.M. No. P-90-488. January 25, 2011.

As dispensers of justice, all members and employees of the

of prohibted drugs

Judiciary are expected to adhere strictly to the laws of the

land, one of which is Republic Act No. 9165
which prohibits the use of dangerous drugs. Likewise, we
can no longer countenance his manifestations
of queer behavior, bordering on absurd, irrational and
irresponsible, because it has greatly affected his
job performance and efficiency. By using prohibited drugs,
and being a front-line representative of the
Judiciary, De Guzman has exposed to risk the very
institution which he serves. It is only by weeding out
the likes of De Guzman from the ranks that we would be
able to preserve the integrity of this institution.
Office of the Court Administrator Vs. Florecio Reyes, Officerin-charge, and Rene De Guzman, Clerk, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 31, Guimba, Nueva Ecija, A.M. No. P-08-

Court personnel;

2535, June 23, 2010

Employees of the judiciary are subject to a higher

immoral conduct

standard than most

other civil servants. Immorality has been defined to
include not only sexual matters but also conduct
inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption,
indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is
willful, flagrant or shameless conduct showing moral
indifference to opinions of respectable members of
the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good
order and public welfare. There is no doubt
that engaging in sexual relations with a married man is
not only a violation of the moral standards
expected of employees of the judiciary but is also a

desecration of the sanctity of the institution of

marriage which this Court abhors and is, thus,
punishable. Julie Ann C. Dela Cruz vs. Selima B. Omaga,
A.M. No. P-08-2590, July 5, 2010.
The sole issue in this case is whether respondents
Halasan and
Largo, who admitted to having an illicit relationship with
each other, are guilty of disgraceful and
immoral conduct. The Court once again reminds its
employees that the image of a court of justice is
mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the
women and men who work in the judiciary, from
the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court employees
are enjoined to adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency in their professional
and private conduct in order to preserve the
good name and integrity of the court of justice. In this
case, we found respondents Halasan and Largo
guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct for which they
may be held administratively liable. Presiding
Judge Jeoffre W. Acebido, Regional Trial Court, Branch 41,
Cagayan de Oro City v. Ludycissa A. Halasan, Court
Stenographer III, and Joel A. Largo, Utility Worker I,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Cagayan de Oro City,
A.M. No. P-10-2803. March 30, 2011
Court personnel; grave

Respondent was found wanting, and her admission

misconduct and

to tampering the duplicate and triplicate copies of the

dishonesty

courts official receipts shows her blatant

disregard for her responsibilities as an officer of the court.
The fact that respondent is willing to pay her
shortages does not free her from the consequences of her
wrongdoing. As Clerk of Court, respondent is
entrusted with delicate functions in the collection of legal
fees. She acts as cashier and disbursement
officer of the court; and is tasked to collect and receive all
monies paid as legal fees, deposits, fines and

dues, and controls the disbursement of the same. She is

designated as custodian of the courts funds and
revenues, records, properties and premises, and shall be
liable for any loss or shortage thereof. Hence,
even when there is restitution of funds, unwarranted
failure to fulfill these responsibilities deserves
administrative sanction, and not even the full payment of
the collection shortages will exempt the
accountable officer from liability. Her failure to account for
the shortage in the funds she was handling,
to turn over money deposited with her, and to explain and
present evidence thereon constitute gross
neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct. Office of
the Court Administrator vs. Marina Garcia
Pacheco, COC, MCTC, Paete, Laguna, A.M. No. P-02-1625,
Court personnel;

August 4, 2010.
We find Judge Manalastas recommendation to be in

misconduct; lack of

order. Indeed, PO2 Gabriel failed to prove his complaint

evidence

against Sheriff Ramos. WHEREFORE, premises

considered, the Complaint for Grave Misconduct filed by
PO2 Patrick Mejia Gabriel against Sheriff IV
William Jose R. Ramos, RTC, Branch 166, Pasig City, is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence. PO2
Patrick Mejia Gabriel vs. William Jose R. Ramos, A.M. No.P-

Court personnel;

10-2837, August 25, 2010

Considering the various justifications proffered

violation of office rules

by respondent employees for failure to register their time of

and regulations

arrival and departure in the CTRM (for

example, [1] domestic and office concerns, [2] long travel
time, [3] forgetfulness, and [4] malfunctioning
CTRM), the Court finds no error in the recommendation of
the OAS finding them guilty of Violation of
Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations, more specifically
Administrative Circular No. 36-2001. As
stated by the OAS, rules and regulations are [issued] to
attain harmony, smooth operation, maximize
efficiency and productivity, with the ultimate objective of
realizing the functions of particular offices and

agencies of the government. Thus, any breach of such

rules and regulations cannot be countenanced.
Re: failure of various employees to register their time of
arrival and/or departure from office in the chronolog
Court personnel;

machine, A.M. No. 2005-21-SC, September 28, 2010

This case filed by Argoso against

conduct prejudicial to

Regalado involves money received by Regalado from an

best interest of the

service

interested party to implement a writ of

execution. Regalado should not have received money from
Argoso for his transportation to Daet,
without previously submitting his expenses for the courts
approval. Regalados admission that he
received money without complying with the proper
procedure in enforcing writs of execution, made him
guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. Levi M. Agroso vs. Achilles Andrew Regalado

Court personnel;

II, etc., A.M. No. P-09-2735, October 12, 2010

The Civil Service Commission Rules define loafing as

loafing

frequent
unauthorized absences from duty during regular office
hours. The word frequent connotes that the
employees absent themselves from duty more than once.
First, respondents claimed activities (smoking,
reading newspapers and discussing legal matters with the
police), even if true, would not consume as
much as 2 to 3 hours of his time. Second, any discussions
of legal matters with the police should be upon
the instructions of his judge. Finally, the respondent
should only read newspapers and smoke during
breaktime; these activities should never be done during
working hours. Exec. Judge Aurora Maqueda
Roman vs. Virgilio M. Fortaleza, A.M. No. P-10-2865,

Court personnel;

November 22, 2010

Respondent Olegario, a court process server,

conduct unbecoming

evaded the payment of his debt for seven (7) years.

of court employee.

Respondent Olegario is guilty of conduct

unbecoming of court employee. The Court stressed the
need for circumspect and proper behavior on the

part of court employees. While it may be just for an

individual to incur indebtedness unrestrained by the
fact that he is a public officer or employee, caution should
be taken to prevent the occurrence of dubious
circumstances that might inevitably impair the image of
the public office. Employees of the court should
always keep in mind that the court is regarded by the
public with respect. Certainly, to preserve decency
within the judiciary, court personnel must comply with
just contractual obligations, act fairly and adhere
to high ethical standards. Like all other court personnel,
Olegario is expected to be a paragon of
uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in all his
official conduct but also in his personal actuations,
including business and commercial transactions, so as to
avoid becoming his courts albatross of infamy.
The penalty imposed by the law is not directed at
Olegarios private life, but at his actuation unbecoming
a public official. Fernando P. Chan vs. Joven T. Olegario,
Process Server, Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Iligan
Court personnel;

City, A.M. No. P-09-27

Respondents, clerks of court, failed to deposit

dishonesty and gross

collections and tampered deposit slips. Respondents are

misconduct

guilty of dishonesty and gross misconduct,

which are grave offenses punishable by dismissal. The
Clerk of Court performs a very delicate function.
He or she is the custodian of the courts funds and
revenues, records, property and premises. Being the
custodian thereof, the Clerk of Court is liable for any loss,
shortage, destruction or impairment of said
funds and property. Hence, Clerks of Court have always
been reminded of their duty to immediately
deposit the various funds received by them to the
authorized government depositories, for they are not
supposed to keep the funds in their custody. The same
should be deposited immediately upon receipt
thereof with the City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer
where the court is located. Delayed remittance of

cash collections by Clerks of Court and cash clerks

constitutes gross neglect of duty. The failure of a
public officer to remit funds upon demand by an
authorized officer shall be prima facie evidence that the
public officer has put such missing funds or property to
personal use. Office of the Court Administrator vs.
Juliet C. Banag, Clerk of Court and Ms. Evelyn R. Galvez,
Court personnel;

Interpreter etc., A.M. No. P-09-2638, December 7, 2010

A sheriffs duty in the execution of a writ issued by a court

simple neglect

is purely
ministerial. When a writ is placed in the hands of a
sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of instructions, to
proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to
execute it according to its mandate. Sheriffs must
exert every effort to see to it that the final stage in the
litigation process the execution of a judgment is
carried out in order to ensure a speedy and efficient
administration of justice. A decision left unexecuted
or indefinitely delayed due to their inefficiency renders it
useless. Worse, parties prejudiced by the
inaction tend to condemn the entire judicial system for the
lapse.
Respondent Deputy Sheriff Velasco failed to implement the
writ of execution and submit period report
as required by Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
His acts show his lack of diligence and zeal in
the performance of his duties. By his actuations, he
displayed conduct short of the stringent standards
required of Court employees. The Court found him liable
for simple neglect of duty, which has been
defined as the failure of an employee to give ones attention
to a task expected of him, signifying a
disregard of duty resulting from carelessness or
indifference. German Agunday vs. Lemuel B. Velasco, A.M.

Court personnel;

No. P-05-2003, December 6, 2010

The respondents were accused of failing to serve a court

conduct prejudicial to

order and delaying the issuance and implementation of the

service

writ of execution. Due to this negligence, the

writs implementation was delayed for almost two years,

thereby gave the defendants sufficient time to
conceal and/or dissipate their assets to thwart plaintiffs
efforts to recover in full the judgment awarded
to them. Court employees bear the burden of observing
exacting standards of ethics and morality. This is
the price one pays for the honor of working in the
judiciary. Those who are part of the machinery
dispensing justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest
clerk, must conduct themselves with utmost
decorum and propriety to maintain the publics faith and
respect for the judiciary. Respondents were
held guilty of conduct prejudicial to the interest of the
service. Judge Philbert I. Iturralde, et al. vs. OIC
Branch Clerk of Court Babe SJ. Ramirez, et al., A.M. No. PCourt personnel;

03-1730, January 18, 2011.

Respondent received sheriffs fees without court approval,

dereliction of duty

accepted
monthly allowance in the course of the performance of his
duties and engaged in moonlighting activities
by assisting in the collection of rents for one of the parties.
Respondent is guilty of dereliction of duty. A
sheriff may collect fees for his expenses from the party
requesting the execution of a writ but only in
accordance with the procedure laid down Section 9, Rule
141 of the Rules of Court, i.e., subject to the
approval of the court. Moreover, sheriffs are not allowed to
receive any voluntary payments from parties
in the course of the performance of their duties. To do so
would be inimical to the best interest of the
service because even assuming arguendo such payments
were indeed given and received in good faith,
this fact alone would not dispel the suspicion that such
payments were made for less than noble
purposes. Sheriffs cannot receive gratuities or voluntary
payments from parties they are ordered to
assist. Court personnel shall not accept any fee or
remuneration beyond what they receive or are entitled

to in their official capacity. Furthermore, respondent

received money for extra work he rendered.
Respondents defense that he is not using government
time in doing his duties is not tenable considering
that there is a prohibition for all officials and employees of
the judiciary to engage directly in any private
business, vocation or profession even outside office hours.
Respondents acts can be considered as
moonlighting, which, though not normally considered as a
serious misconduct, amounts to malfeasance
in office. Reina Edenlyne Garcia vs. Robert V. Alejo, Sheriff
IV, RTC, Br. 142, Makati City, A.M. No. P-09-2627,
Court personnel;

January 26, 2011.

Respondent court personnel, in apparent collusion with

falsification

the presiding
judge of their court (who passed away before the case was
decided), falsified court records and made it
appear that a public prosecutor appeared during the
supposed hearings of a number of cases for
annulment of marriage, when, in truth, the prosecutors
who supposedly appeared were either on leave
or had already been re-assigned to another station.
Falsification of an official document such as court
records is considered a grave offense. It also amounts to
dishonesty. Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the
Administrative Code of 1987, dishonesty (par. a) and
falsification (par. f) are considered grave offenses
warranting the penalty of dismissal from service upon
commission of the first offense. Furthermore,
falsification of an official document is punishable as a
criminal offense under Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code and dishonesty is an impious act that has no
place in the judiciary. Respondents were found
guilty of falsification of official documents and dishonesty
and were dismissed from service. Vivian T.
Dabu, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor v. Eduardo Roden E.
Kapunan, Presiding Judge, Branch 51 and Acting Judge,
Branch 52, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1600. February 1, 2011

Clerk of Court; gross

Atty. Lometillo utterly failed to perform her duties with the

inefficiency

degree of
diligence and competence expected of a clerk of court. The
performance of ones duties in a perfunctory
manner is never justified especially when reliance on
employees of lower rank projects nothing else but
gross inefficiency and incompetence. Next to the judge, the
clerk of court is the chief administrative
officer charged with preserving the integrity of court
proceedings. A number of non-judicial concerns
connected with trial and adjudication of cases is handled
by the clerk of court, demanding a dynamic
performance of duties, with the prompt and proper
administration of justice as the constant objective.
The nature of the work and of the office mandates that the
clerk of court be an individual of competence,
honesty and integrity. The Clerks of Court perform a very
delicate function as custodian of the courts
funds, revenues, records, property and premises. They
wear many hats those of treasurer, accountant,
guard and physical plant manager of the court, hence,
they are entrusted with the primary
responsibility of correctly and effectively implementing
regulations regarding fiduciary funds and are
thus, liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or
impairment of such funds and property. Office of the
Court Administrator v. Atty. Magdalena L. Lometillo, Former
Clerk of Court VII, Victoria S. Patopaten, Cashier
II, Linda C. Guides, Administrative Officer I, Lenny Gemma
P. Castillo, Clerk III, and Brenda M. Linacero, Clerk
III, All of Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, A.M. No. P-09-

Clerk of Court; gross

2637. March 29, 2011.

Atty. Lometillos 42-year stint in office provides the Court a

neglect of duty

reasonable expectation that she was aware of the

consequences that delay in the remittances of
collections constitutes neglect of duty. Surely, her long
service to the judiciary must have made her
realize the effect of delayed deposit of collections: that the

court is deprived of the interest that may be

earned if the amounts are deposited in a bank. Office of
the Court Administrator v. Atty. Magdalena L.
Lometillo, Former Clerk of Court VII, Victoria S. Patopaten,
Cashier II, Linda C. Guides, Administrative Officer I,
Lenny Gemma P. Castillo, Clerk III, and Brenda M. Linacero,
Clerk III, All of Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City,
Court Personnel;

A.M. No. P-09-2637. March 29, 2011.

Bengson should be liable for

conduct prejudicial to

conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in

the best interest of the

service

view of her act of offering her services for

facilitation of the land transfer papers at the BIR and
representing that her half-sister and niece had the
power, influence and capacity to facilitate the titling of
subject property. Bengsons act begrimed both
the image and integrity of her office. At this point, the
Court would like to once again underscore that
the conduct of every court personnel must be beyond
reproach and free from suspicion that may cause
to sully the image of the judiciary. They must totally avoid
any impression of impropriety, misdeed or
misdemeanor not only in the performance of their official
duties but also in conducting themselves
outside or beyond the duties and functions of their office.
Every court personnel are enjoined to conduct
themselves toward maintaining the prestige and integrity
of the judiciary for the very image of the latter
is necessarily mirrored in their conduct, both official and
otherwise. They must not forget that they are
an integral part of that organ of the government sacredly
tasked in dispensing justice. Their conduct and
behavior, therefore, should not only be circumscribed with
the heavy burden of responsibility but at all
times be defined by propriety and decorum, and above all
else beyond any suspicion. Priscilla L.
Hernando v. Juliana Y. Bengson, Legal Researcher, RTC,
Branch 104, Quezon City, A.M. No. P-09-2686. March
28, 2011.

Court Personnel;

An administrative complaint was filed against a court

professionalism

employee for
using her position to assist a friend in stopping the
implementation of a courts judgment. In addition,
the court employee was absent from work to attend to this
and did not even file a leave. Time and again,
the Supreme Court has emphasized that court personnel
must devote every moment of official time to
public service. The conduct and behavior of court
personnel should be characterized by a high degree of
professionalism and responsibility, as they mirror the
image of the court. Specifically, court personnel
must strictly observe official time to inspire public respect
for the justice system. Section 1, Canon IV of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel mandates that
court personnel shall commit themselves
exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their
office during working hours. Angelina C. Lim and
Vivian M. Gaduang v. Maribeth G. Aromin, Records Officer I,
OCC, MTC, Meycauayan, Bulacan, A.M. No. P-

Court Personnel;

09-2677, March 9, 2011.

Administrative employees of the Court are being

punctuality

sanctioned herein for

their habitual tardiness. It is a canon under the
Constitution that a public office is a public trust. This
canon includes the mandate for the observance of
prescribed office hours and the efficient use of every
moment of such hours for the public service, because only
thereby may the public servants recompense
the Government and the people for shouldering the costs
of maintaining the Judiciary. Accordingly,
court officials and employees must at all times strictly
observe official hours to inspire the publics
respect for the justice system. Absenteeism and tardiness
are, therefore, impermissible. Re: Employees
Incurring Habitual Tardiness in the Second Semester of

Court Personnel;

2009, A.M. No. 2010-11-SC, March 15, 2011

Section 7, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for

reassignment by

Court Personnel expressly states that court personnel

executive judge

shall not be required to perform any work outside

the scope of their job description. While the executive
judge may not require court personnel to perform
work outside the scope of their job description, except
duties that are identical with or are subsumed
under their present functions, the executive judge may
reassign court personnel of multiple-branch
courts to another branch within the same area of
administrative supervision when there is a vacancy or
when the interest of the service requires, after
consultation with the presiding judges of the branches
concerned. The reassignment of court personnel in
multiple-branch courts to another branch within the
same area of the executive judges administrative
supervision must involve (1) work within the scope of
the court personnels job description or (2) duties that are
identical with or are subsumed under the court
personnels present functions. Executive Judge Leonilo B.
Apita, RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City v. Marissa M.
Estanislao, Court Legal Researcher II, RTC, Br. 34, Tacloban

Court Personnel;

City, A.M. No. P-06-2206, March 9, 2011.

This is an administrative complaint of first impression

temporary

involving the designation of court personnel, specifically a

designation.

legal researcher as court interpreter, by an

executive judge. While the Manual for Clerks of Court
provides that court personnel may perform other
duties the presiding judge may assign from time to time,
said additional duties must be directly related
to, and must not significantly vary from, the court
personnels job description. However, in case of a
sudden vacancy in a court position, the judge may
temporarily designate a court personnel with the
competence and skills for the position even if the duties for
such position are different from the
prescribed duties of the court personnel. The temporary
designation shall last only for such period as is
necessary to designate temporarily a court personnel with

the appropriate prescribed duties. Such

temporary designation cannot go on for an indefinite
period, or until the vacancy is filled up. Executive
Judge Leonilo B. Apita, RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City v. Marissa
M. Estanislao, Court Legal Researcher II, RTC, Br.
34, Tacloban City, A.M. No. P-06-2206, March 9, 2011.
Requiring a Legal Researcher to perform the work of a
Court
Interpreter is counter-productive and does not serve the
ends of justice. Not only will respondent
jeopardize her present position as Legal Researcher by
constantly shifting from one job to another, her
qualification as Court Interpreter will also be put in
question. This arrangement does nothing but
compromise court personnels professional responsibility
and optimum efficiency in the performance of
their respective roles in the dispensation of justice.
Executive Judge Leonilo B. Apita, RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City v. Marissa M. Estanislao, Court Legal Researcher II,
RTC, Br. 34, Tacloban City, A.M. No. P-06-2206, March
Court personnel;

9, 2011.
Respondent, a clerk of court of the RTC in Lucena City,

habitual tardiness

was found to
have been tardy in reporting for work more than ten times
each month from July to October 2010. Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 23, Series of 1998
provides that any employee shall be considered
habitually tardy if he incurs tardiness, regardless of the
number of minutes, ten (10) times a month for at
least two (2) months in a semester or at least two (2)
consecutive months during the year. Habitual
tardiness is an administrative offense that seriously
compromises work efficiency and hampers public
service. By being habitually tardy, respondent has fallen
short of the stringent standard of conduct
demanded from everyone connected with the
administration of justice. The Clerk of Court plays a vital

role in ensuring the prompt and sound administration of

justice. Moral obligations, performance of
household chores, traffic problems and health, domestic
and financial concerns are not sufficient reasons
to excuse habitual tardiness. Re: Leave Division, Office of
Administrative Services, OCA v. Francisco A. Pua,
Jr. Clerk of Court V, RTC, Br. 55, Lucena City. A.M. No. P-112945. July 13, 2011
The Leave Division of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA)
reported on the tardiness incurred by respondent court
stenographer. The OCA recommended that the
case be redocketed as a regular administrative matter and
that she be reprimanded for habitual tardiness
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
offense would warrant the imposition of a more
severe penalty. Moral obligations, performance of
household chores, traffic problems, health conditions,
domestic and financial concerns are not sufficient reasons
to excuse habitual tardiness. Respondent
submitted an answer to the complaint acknowledging her
infraction and begging the indulgence of the
Court. The Court found the penalty of severe reprimand to
be proper for her infraction. Office of the
Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator
vs. Leda O. Uri, etc. A.M. No. P-10-2852. July 27,
Court personnel;

2011
With respect to Sheriff Calsenia, the

sheriffs duty to give

Court finds that he failed to strictly comply with the

notice prior to
demolition

requirement of prior notice to vacate before

demolition as required by the rules. It is the duty of the
sheriff to give notice of such writ and demand
from the defendant to vacate the property within three
days. Only after such period can the sheriff
enforce the writ by the bodily removal of defendant and his
personal belongings. The law discourages
any form of arbitrary and oppressive conduct in the

execution of an otherwise legitimate act. Any act

deviating from the procedure prescribed by the Rules of
Court is tantamount to misconduct and
necessitates disciplinary action. Spouses Sur and Rita
Villa, et al. v. Presiding Judge Roberto L. Ayco, et al.
Court personnel;

A.M. No. RTJ-11-2284. July 13, 2011

It must be stressed that sheriffs are not allowed

dishonesty and gross

to receive any voluntary payments from parties in the

neglect of duty

course of the performance of their duties.

Corollary, a sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand sums
of money from a party-litigant without
observing the procedural steps under Section 9, Rule 141
of the Rules of Court: (1) prepare an estimate of
expenses to be incurred in executing the writ, for which he
must seek the courts approval; (2) render an
accounting; and (3) issue an official receipt for the total
amount he received from the judgment debtor.
Failure to observe these steps would amount to dishonesty
or extortion. Moreover, Section 14, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court clearly provides that it is mandatory for
sheriffs to execute and make a return on the
writ of execution within 30 days from receipt of the writ
and every 30 days thereafter until it is satisfied
in full or its effectivity expires. Even if the writs are
unsatisfied or only partially satisfied, sheriffs must
still file the reports so that the court, as well as the
litigants, may be informed of the proceedings
undertaken to implement the writ. Here, the long delay in
the execution of the judgments and the
failure to accomplish the required periodic reports
demonstrate respondent sheriffs gross neglect and
gross inefficiency in the performance of his official duties.
Likewise, respondent sheriffs receipt of
money in his official capacity and his failure to turn over
the amount to the clerk of court is an act of
misappropriation of funds amounting to dishonesty.
Proserpina V. Anico v. Emerson B. Pilipia, Sheriff IV,
Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Manila.

Court personnel;

A.M. No. P-11-2896. August 2, 2011.

The Court found

inefficiency and

Officer-in-Charge (OIC) Ester Asilo administratively liable

incompetence in the
performance of official
duties

for her inaccurate preparation of monthly

case reports, inept monitoring of case records, and
incompetent supervision of court personnel. A Clerk
of Court is an essential officer in any judicial system, her
office being the center of activities, both
adjudicative and administrative. Thus, OIC Asilo must
recognize that her administrative functions are
just as vital to the prompt and proper administration of
justice. She cannot proffer as an excuse that she
merely inherited and continued the procedure followed
prior to her designation. Upon acceptance of
her designation, her first concern was to know her
assumed duties and responsibilities especially when
administrative circulars, issuances and manual of clerks
of court are at hand. Nilda Verginesa-Suarez v.
Judge Renato J. Dilag and Court Stenographer III
Concepcion A. Pascua and Office of the Court Administrator
v.
Judge Renato J. Dilag. Ester A. Asilo, Officer-in-Charge,
Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 73,
Olongapo City, Zambales and Atty. Ronald D. Gavino,
Deputy Clerk of Court, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Regional trial Court, Olongapo City. A.M. No. RTJ-06-2014

Court personnel;

and A.M. No. RTJ-11-2293. August 16, 2011

Giganto and Valenzuela, co-workers in the Personnel

simple misconduct

Division of
OAS-OCA, got involved in a fistfight for which they were
found guilty of simple misconduct by the
Court. In computing their penalties, the Court considered
their length of service, satisfactory
performance ratings, and number of previous
administrative charges as mitigating, aggravating and
alternative circumstances, as the case may be. Time and
again, the Court has stressed the need for the
conduct and behavior of every person connected with the

dispensation of justice to be characterized by

propriety and decorum. This standard is applied, not only
with respect to a court employees dealings
with the public, but also with his or her co-workers in the
service. Conduct violative of this standard
quickly and surely erodes respect for the courts.
Misbehavior within and around the courts vicinity
diminishes the courts sanctity and dignity. Any fighting or
misunderstanding becomes a disgraceful
sight reflecting adversely on the good image of the
Judiciary. Re: Letter-Complaint of Mr. Recarredo S.
Valenzuela, Clerk IV, Personnel Division, OAS-OCA against
Mr. Ricardo R. Giganto, Utility Worker II,
Personnel Division, OAS-OCA. A.M. No. 2011-01-SC. August
23, 2011
Upon receipt of the process server fee, respondent issued
an
acknowledgment receipt instead of an official receipt. This
is in violation of the Supreme Court Circular
No. 26-97 which mandates the issuance of official receipts
for payments received. Her explanation that
the acknowledgment receipt was sufficient since the
process server fee she collected was not part of the
Judiciary Development Fund, Special Allowance for the
Judiciary or subjected to any fund allocation
was not a valid justification for her non-compliance with
the court circular. She violated the trust and
confidence reposed in her as cashier and disbursement
officer of the court. The Court will not tolerate
any conduct, act or omission by any court employee
violating the norm of public accountability and
diminishing or tending to diminish the faith of the people
in the Judiciary. Dolores C. Seliger v. Alma P.
Licay, Clerk of Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San
Juan, La Union. A.M. No. P-11-2970. September 14,
Court personnel;

2011.
The practice of respondent in offsetting her collection is

dishonesty

not allowed under

accounting and auditing rules and regulations. By failing
to properly remit the cash collections
constituting public funds, she violated the trust reposed in
her as disbursement officer of the Judiciary.
Likewise, her claim that she did not know that she is the
accountable officer for the court collections does
not convince the Court. Clerks of Court are presumed to
know their duty to immediately deposit with
the authorized government depositories the various funds
they receive, for they are not supposed to
keep funds in their personal possession. Her failure to
deposit the said amount upon collection was
prejudicial to the court, which did not earn interest
income on the said amount or was not able to
otherwise use the said funds. The Court found respondent
guilty of dishonesty and dismissed her from
the service. Office of the Court Administrator v. Evelyn
Elumbaring, Clerk of Court II, 1 Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Carmen-Sto. Tomas-Braulio E. Dujali, Davao del
Norte. A.M. No. P-10-2765. September 13, 2011.
The Court deems Benedictoss falsification of her bundy
cards tantamount
to dishonesty. This Court has defined dishonesty as the
(d)isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty,
probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a
grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal
from the service with forfeiture of retirement
benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification for reemployment in government
service. However, considering the presence of a mitigating
factor this being Benedictos first
administrative case in her nineteen years in government
service suspension for six months is already a

sufficient penalty. Falsification of daily time records of Ma.

Emcisa A. Benedictos, Administrative Officer I,
Regional Trial Court, Malolos City, Bulacan. A.M. No. P-10Court personnel;

2784. October 19, 2011.

Respondent admitted that he failed to serve the Notice of

failure to perform duty

PreTrial Conference and Pre-Trial to complainant, upon

instruction of the judge, since the complainant was
already informed of the scheduled hearing. Respondent, as
process server, is reminded to perform his
duty diligently for the orderly administration of justice.
There is a need to serve the notice on the
complainant not only to make the act official but also to
enable him to make the proper return to reflect
what transpired. The possibility that the complainant
might deny that he had been so informed by the
st Judge is not remote. Col. Mauricio A. Santiago, Jr. v.
Arthur M. Camangyan, Process Server, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 29, Toledo City. A.M. No. P-11-2977.

Sheriff; gross neglect

September 14, 2011

Respondent Sheriff was remiss in performing his

of duty

mandated duties: first, to

give notice of the writ and demand that the judgment
obligor and all persons claiming under him vacate
the property within three (3) days; second, to enforce the
writ by removing the judgment obligor and all
persons claiming under the latter; third, to remove the
latters personal belongings in the property as
well as destroy, demolish or remove the improvements
constructed thereon upon special court order;
and fourth, to execute and make a return on the writ
within 30 days from receipt of the writ and every 30
days thereafter until it is satisfied in full or until its
effectivity expires. The lapse of time almost two
years it took for the respondent to unsuccessfully
execute the writ demonstrates his utter lack of
diligence in performing his duties. Teresita GuerreroBoylon v. Aniceto Boyles, Sheriff III, Municipal Trial

Court in Cities, Branch 2, Cebu City. A.M. No. P-09-2716.

Court personnel; gross

October 11, 2011.

Respondent clerk of court assigned to a

negligence in the

cash clerk the collections, remittances, financial reports

performance of duty

and accountable forms. He later found out that

some are already missing. The clerk of court is the courts
accountable officer, not the cash clerk. He is
the courts chief administrative officer. No amount of good
faith can relieve him of his duty to properly
administer and safeguard the courts funds. Clerks of
court are officers of the law who perform vital
functions in the prompt and sound administration of
justice. They are designated custodians of the
courts funds, revenues, records, properties and premises.
They are liable for any loss, shortage,
destruction or impairment of such funds and
property.Respondent is liable for gross neglect of duty.
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Clerk of Court
Hermenegildo I. Marasigan, RTC Kabacan, North Cotabato

Court personnel;

A.M. No. P-05-2082. December 12, 2011

Respondents act of maintaining an illicit relationship with

immoral conduct

a
married man comes within the purview of disgraceful and
immoral conduct, which is classified as a
grave offense. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in
the conduct of the official and personnel who
work thereat. Court employees have been enjoined to
adhere to the exacting standards of morality and
decency in their professional and private conduct in order
to preserve the good name and integrity of
courts of justice. This Court has thus consistently
penalized court personnel who had been found
wanting of such standards, even if they have precipitately
resigned from their positions. Resignation
should not be used either as an escape or as an easy way
out to evade an administrative liability or an
administrative sanction. Evelina C. Banaag vs. Olivia C.
Espeleta, Interpreter III, Branch 82, RTC. Quezon

Court personnel; leave

City. A.M. No. P-11-3011. December 16, 2011

The exercise of ones right to travel or the

for foreign travel

freedom to move from one place to another is not absolute.

without authority

Section 5 (6), Article VIII of the 1987

Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall have
administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof. This provision empowers the Court to
oversee all matters relating to the effective
supervision and management of all courts and personnel
under it. Pursuant to this, the Court issued
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 to regulate their foreign travel
in an unofficial capacity. Such regulation is
necessary for the orderly administration of justice. If
judges and court personnel can go on leave and
travel abroad at will and without restrictions or
regulations, there could be a disruption in the
administration of justice. A situation where the employees
go on mass leave and travel together, despite
the fact that their invaluable services are urgently needed,
could possibly arise. Thus, judges and
personnel who shall leave the country without travel
authority issued by the Office of the Court
Administrator shall be subject to disciplinary action. A
judge or a member of the Judiciary, who is not
being restricted by a criminal court or any other agency
pursuant to any statutory limitation, can leave
for abroad without permission but he or she must be
prepared to face the consequences for his or her
violation of the Courts rules and regulations. OCA-OAS vs.
Wilma Salvacion P. Heusdens, etc. A.M. No. P-

Court personnel;

11-2927. December 13, 2011

As custodian of court funds and

unreasonable delay in

revenues, it is the duty of a clerk of court to immediately

remitting cash receipts

deposit the various funds received by them to

the authorized government depositories for they are not
supposed to keep funds in their custody. Atty.
Cruz belated turnover of cash deposited with him is
inexcusable and will not exonerate him from

liability. His failure to remit his cash collections on time is

violative of Administrative Circular No. 32000 which mandates that all fiduciary collections shall
be deposited immediately by the Clerk of Court
concerned, upon receipt thereof, with the Land Bank of
the Philippines, the authorized government
depository bank. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Atty.
Teotimo D. Cruz A.M. No. P-11-2988. December
Court personnel; grave

12, 2011
By the very nature of his duties, a sheriff performs a very

abuse of authority

sensitive function in the dispensation of justice. He is

duty-bound to know the basic rules relative to the
implementation of writs of execution, and should, at all
times show a high degree of professionalism in
the performance of his duties. Administrative Circular No.
12 was promulgated in order to streamline
the service and execution of court writs and processes in
courts and to better serve the public good and
facilitate the administration of justice. Paragraph 2 of
Administrative Circular No. 12 provides that All
Clerks of Court of the Metropolitan Trial Court and
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, and/or their deputy
sheriffs shall serve all court processes and execute all
writs of their respective courts within their
territorial jurisdiction. Furthermore, paragraph 5 of the
same circular provides that No sheriff or
deputy sheriff shall execute a court writ outside his
territorial jurisdiction without first notifying in
writing, and seeking the assistance of, the sheriff of the
place where the execution shall take place. It is
clear that respondents act of implementing the subject
writs in San Fernando City, when his territorial
jurisdiction is confined only to Angeles City, is a violation
of the Circular and tantamount to abuse of
authority. While respondent claimed that he personally
informed the OCC of San Fernando City, he,
however, failed to prove that he made written notice as
required by Administrative Circular No. 12. A

mere submission of the copies of the court processes to

the OCC will not suffice as to the written notice
requirement. The requirement of notice is based on the
rudiments of justice and fair play. It frowns
upon arbitrariness and oppressive conduct in the
execution of an otherwise legitimate act. Luis P. Pineda
vs. Neil T. torres, sheriff II, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 2, Angeles City. A.M. No. P-12-3027.
Court personnel; gross

January 30, 2012

A clerk of court performs a very delicate function as the

neglect of duty

custodian of the funds and revenues, records, property,

and premises of the court. He is liable for any
loss, shortage, destruction, or impairment of said funds
and property. Even the undue delay in the
remittance of amounts collected by them at the very least
constitutes misfeasance. The safekeeping of
funds and collections is essential to the goal of an orderly
administration of justice and no protestation of
good faith can override the mandatory nature of the
Circulars designed to promote full accountability
for government funds. Supreme Court Circular No. 13-92
mandates that all fiduciary collections shall be
deposited immediately by the Clerk of Court concerned,
upon receipt thereof, with an authorized
government depository bank which is the Land Bank of
the Philippines. The respondents failure to
remit their collection constitutes gross neglect of duty,
dishonesty, and grave misconduct. Moreover, the
failure of a public officer to remit funds upon demand by
an authorized officer shall be prima facie
evidence that the public officer has put such missing
funds or property to personal use. Re: Report on
Financial Audit Conducted at MCTC, Santiago-San Esteban,

Court personnel;

Ilocos Sur. A.M. No. P-11-2950. January 17, 2012

Every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of

dishonesty

integrity,
uprightness and honesty. Like any public servant, she
must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and

integrity not only in the performance of her official duties

but in her personal and private dealings with
other people, to preserve the courts good name and
standing. The image of a court of justice is mirrored
in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel
who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of
its personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to
adhere to the exacting standards of morality and
decency in their professional and private conduct in order
to preserve the good name and integrity of the
courts of justice. Under Section 52(A)(1) of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by
dismissal for the first offense. Under Section 58 of
the same rules, dismissal carries with it cancellation of
eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and
perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the
government service. Thus, the respondent is
dismissed for dishonesty when she made someone take
the Civil Service Sub-professional Examination
on her behalf. Concerned Citizen vs. Domingo Nawen Abad,
etc. A.M. No. P-11-2907. January 31, 2012
Dishonesty has been defined as the disposition to lie,
cheat, deceive, or
defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud,
deceive or betray. Dishonesty, being in the
nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service with forfeiture of
retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and
perpetual disqualification for reemployment in
government service. Given the total absence of evidence to
the contrary, the presumption that
respondent clerk of court punched his DTR to make it
appear he was at the office on February 26, 2010
when he was in fact absent still prevails. Dishonesty is a

malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary.

Public service requires utmost integrity and discipline. A
public servant must exhibit at all times the
highest sense of honesty and integrity, for no less than the
Constitution declares that a public office is a
public trust, and all public officers and employees must at
all times be accountable to the people, and
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency. Leave Division, Office of the
Adrministrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator
vs. Leoncio K. Gutierrez III, Clerk III, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 116, Pasay City. A.M. No. P-11-2951,
February 15, 2012.
Falsification of daily time record constitutes dishonesty.
Dishonesty is
defined as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or
defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty
probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray.
Section 52(A), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (MC No. 19,
dated September 14, 1999) classifies dishonesty as a grave
offense punishable by dismissal even for first
time offenses. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Araya.
A.M. No. P-12-3053, April 11, 2012
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and
Employees enunciates the States policy of promoting a
high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility
in the public service. And no other office in the
government service exacts a greater demand for moral
righteousness and uprightness from an employee than the
judiciary. Persons involved in the
dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the

lowest clerk, must live up to the strictest standards

of integrity, probity, uprightness and diligence in the
public service. As the assumption of public office is
impressed with paramount public interest, which requires
the highest standards of ethics, persons
aspiring for public office must observe honesty, candor
and faithful compliance with the law.
Respondent committed dishonesty by causing the
unauthorized insertion of an additional sentence in
the trial courts order. Dishonesty has been defined as a
disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud. It
implies untrustworthiness, lack of integrity, lack of
honesty, probity or integrity in principle on the part
of the individual who failed to exercise fairness and
straightforwardness in his or her dealings. By her
act, she has compromised and undermined the publics
faith in the records of the court below and,
ultimately, the integrity of the Judiciary. To tolerate such
act would open the floodgates to fraud by court
personnel.
The insertion of an additional sentence in an order of the
trial court, regardless of the reason is not
among respondents duties. A legal researchers duty
focuses mainly on verifying legal authorities,
drafting memoranda on evidence, outlining facts and
issues in cases set for pre-trial, and keeping track
of the status of cases. In Salvador v. Serrano, the Court
held that courts have the inherent power to amend
and control their process and orders to make them
conformable to law and justice. But such power rests
upon the judge and not to clerks of court who only
perform adjudicative support functions and
nonadjudicative
functions. In the same vein, the power to amend court
orders cannot be performed by a
legal researcher. It is well to remind that court personnel
are obliged to accord the integrity of court
records of paramount importance, as these are vital

instruments in the dispensation of justice. Judge

Amado Caguioa (ret.) vs. Elizabeth Aucena, Court Legal
Researcher II, Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Baguio
City. A.M. No. P-09-2646, June 18, 2012
Under Section 52 (A) (1), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
promulgated by the Civil Service Commission through
Resolution No. 99-1936 dated August 31, 1999
and implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 19, series
of 1999, dishonesty is a grave offense
punishable by dismissal from the service for the first
offense. However, the Court, in certain instances,
has not imposed the penalty of dismissal due to the
presence of mitigating factors such as the length of
service, being a first-time offender, acknowledgment of the
infractions, and remorse by the respondent.
The Court has also ruled that where a penalty less
punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be
committed by labor ought not to be visited with a
consequence so severe. It is not only for the laws
concern for the workingman; there is, in addition, his
family to consider. Unemployment brings untold
hardships and sorrows on those dependent on wage
earners.
Considering that this is respondents first offense in her
twenty-two (22) years of service in the Judiciary,
the admission of her act and her sincere apology for her
mistake, her firm resolve not to commit the same
mistake in the future, and taking into account that she is
a widow and the only one supporting her five
children, the recommended penalty of suspension for a
period of six (6) months is in order. Judge Amado
Caguioa (ret.) vs. Elizabeth Aucena, Court Legal Researcher
II, Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Baguio City. A.M.
No. P-09-2646, June 18, 2012
For Aguam to assert that she herself took and passed the

examination when
in fact somebody else took it for her constitutes
dishonesty. Every employee of the Judiciary should be an
example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any
public servant, she must exhibit the highest
sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance
of her official duties but also in her personal
and private dealings with other people, to preserve the
courts good name and standing. The image of a
court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and
otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat,
from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court
personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the
exacting standards of morality and decency in their
professional and private conduct in order to
preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of
justice. Here, Aguam failed to meet these stringent
standards set for a judicial employee and does not
therefore deserve to remain with the Judiciary.
In Cruz v. Civil Service Commission, Civil Service
Commission v. Sta. Ana, and Concerned Citizen v. Dominga
Nawen Abad, the Court dismissed the employees found
guilty of similar offenses. In Cruz, Zenaida
Paitim masqueraded as Gilda Cruz and took the Civil
Service examination in behalf of Cruz. The Court
said that both Paitim and Cruz merited the penalty of
dismissal. In Sta. Ana, somebody else took the
Civil Service examination for Sta. Ana. The Court
dismissed Sta. Ana for dishonesty. In Abad, the
evidence disproved Abads claim that she personally took
the examination. The Court held that for
Abad to assert that she herself took the examination when
in fact somebody else took it for her
constitutes dishonesty. Thus, Abad was for her offense.
The Court found no reason to deviate from these
consistent rulings. Under Section 52(A)(1) of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by

dismissal for the first offense. Under Section 58(a) of

the same rules, the penalty of dismissal carries with it
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment
in the government service. The OCA properly
excluded forfeiture of accrued leave credits, pursuant to
the Courts ruling in Sta. Ana and Abad. The
Court also consistently held that the proper penalty to be
imposed on employees found guilty of an
offense of this nature is dismissal from the service.
Lourdes Celavite-Vidal vs. Noraida A. Aguam, A.M. No.
Court personnel;

SCC-10-13-P, June 26, 2012

OCA Circular No. 49-2003 provides that court personnel

dishonesty,

who wish to travel abroad must secure a travel authority

misrepresentation

from the Office of the Court Administrator.

Section 67 of the Omnibus Rules on Leave provides that
any violation of the leave laws, rules or
regulations, or any misrepresentation or deception in
connection with an application for leave shall be a
ground for disciplinary action. The respondent court
stenographer traveled without securing a travel
authority and did not state her foreign travel in her leave
application. She is guilty of violating at least
two office rules and regulations. This shows deception
amounting to dishonesty.
Dishonesty means the concealment of truth in a matter of
fact relevant to ones office or connected with
the performance of his duties. It is an absence of integrity,
a disposition to betray, cheat, deceive or
defraud, bad faith. The discrepancy in the respondents
date of birth in her records does not amount to
dishonesty, as she made no false statement. No deliberate
intent to mislead, deceive or defraud appears
from the cited circumstances of this case. The
respondents date of birth is not a fact directly relevant to
her functions or qualification to office or connected with
the performance of her duties. Sheila G. Del
Rosario, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Br. 36, Santiago City,

Isabela vs. Mary Anne C. Pascua, Court

Stenographer III, same court. A.M. No. P-11-2999. February
Court personnel;

27, 2012
Administrative Circular No. 14-2002 provides that an

habitual absenteeism

employee
is considered habitually absent if the employee incurred
unauthorized absences exceeding the 2.5 days
allowed per month for three months in a semester or at
least three consecutive months during the year.
In imposing penalty of habitual absenteeism in
administrative cases, however, the court may take into
consideration mitigating circumstances. The presence of
factors such as length of service in the judiciary,
acknowledgment of infractions and feeling of remorse, and
family circumstances, among other things,
play an important role in the imposition of penalties.
Judge Lucina Alpez Dayaon, etc. vs. Jesusa V. De Leon.

Court personnel;

A.M. No. P-11-2926, February 1, 2012

The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases

administrative case;

in the Civil Service govern the conduct of disciplinary and

quantum of evidence.

non-disciplinary proceedings in
administrative cases. In Section 3, it provides that,
Administrative investigations shall be conducted
without necessarily adhering strictly to the technical rules
of procedure and evidence applicable to
judicial proceedings.
The weight of evidence required in administrative
investigations is substantial evidence. For these
reasons, only substantial evidence is required to find
Malunao guilty of the administrative offense
charged against her. In the hierarchy of evidentiary values,
substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable man might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion, is the lowest
standard of proof provided under the Rules of Court. In
assessing whether there is substantial evidence
in administrative investigations such as this case, the
Court is not bound by technical rules of procedure

and evidence. Dela Cruzs Sinumpaang Salaysay, the joint

affidavit of arrest executed by the NBI agents,
the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, photocopy of the
marked money, the Complaint Sheet, and the
photographs of Malunao entering Dela Cruzs house, and
the contents of Malunaos bag after receipt of
the money, all prove by subsantial evidence the guilt of
Malunao for the offense of grave misconduct.
Sheryll C. Dela Cruz vs. Pamela P. Malunao, Clerk III, RTC,
Branch 28, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. A.M. No. PCourt personnel; grave

11-2019, March 20, 2012.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and

misconduct

definite rule
of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by the public officer. The misconduct
is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to
disregard established rules. Corruption, as an element of
grave misconduct, consists in the act of an
official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully
uses his position or office to procure some
benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty
and the rights of others. Section 2, Canon 1 of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel states: Court
personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift,
favor or benefit based on any or explicit understanding
that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence
their official actions. Respondents use of her position as
Clerk III in Branch 28 to solicit money from
Dela Cruz with the promise of a favorable decision violates
Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel and constitutes the offense of grave
misconduct meriting the penalty of dismissal.
Sheryll C. Dela Cruz vs. Pamela P. Malunao, Clerk III, RTC,
Branch 28, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. A.M. No. P11-2019, March 20, 2012.
The behavior of all employees and officials involved in the

administration of justice, from judges to the most junior

clerks, is circumscribed with a heavy
responsibility. Their conduct must be guided by strict
propriety and decorum at all times in order to
merit and maintain the publics respect for and trust in
the judiciary. Needless to say, all court personnel
must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying
integrity, honesty and uprightness.
Respondents shouting at complainant within the court
premises, reporting complainant to the police
after she was reprimanded for her solicitation, and
refusing to talk with complainant judge are not only
acts of discourtesy and disrespect but likewise an
unethical conduct sanctioned by Republic Act No.
6713, otherwise known as The Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
High-strung and belligerent behavior has no place in
government service where the personnel are
enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times
even when confronted with rudeness and
insolence. Such conduct is exacted from them so that they
will earn and keep the publics respect for and
confidence in the judicial service. This standard is applied
with respect to a court employees dealings
not only with the public but also with his or her coworkers in the service. Conduct violative of this
standard quickly and surely erodes respect for the courts
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer; and the
misconduct is grave if it involves any of the
additional elements of corruption, such as willful intent to
violate the law or to disregard established
rules. Thus, considering respondents transgressions, i.e.,
disrespectful conduct, solicitation, and
influence peddling of bail bonds, there is no question that
respondent is guilty of grave misconduct.
Judge Salvador R. Santos, Jr. vs. Editha R. Mangahas. A.M.

Court personnel;

No. P-09-2720, April 17, 2012

Respondent is liable for conduct

conduct unbecoming

unbecoming a court employee for his continued refusal to

of a court personnel

coordinate with complainants in the

implementation of the writ of possession, despite
numerous attempts on their part to get in touch with
him. It may be recalled that complainants endeavored, no
less than four (4) times, to communicate with
respondent for the proper and expeditious execution of the
writ, but each time, respondent rebuffed
their efforts. Finally, on25 April 2011, the day respondent
finally implemented the writ, respondent
refused to allow Ms. De Jesus to inform complainants of
the intended implementation and opted to be
accompanied by an ordinary bank employee to witness the
enforcement of the writ.
The persistent refusal of respondent to cooperate with
complainants in the implementation of the writ
runs afoul of the exacting standards required of those in
the judiciary. Time and again, the Court has
emphasized the heavy burden of responsibility which court
officials and employees are mandated to
perform. They are constantly reminded that any
impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the
performance of official functions must be avoided. This is
so because the image of the court of justice is
necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise,
of the men and women who work there. The
conduct of even minor employees mirrors the image of the
courts they serve; thus, they are required to
preserve the judiciarys good name and standing as a true
temple of justice. Attys. Gonzalez, et al. vs. Calo.

Court personnel;

A.M. No. P-12-3028, April 11, 2012

Immorality has been defined to include not only

disgraceful and

sexual matters but also conduct inconsistent with

immoral conduct

rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity,

and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless
conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of

respectable
members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude
toward good order and public welfare. There is no
doubt that engaging in sexual relations with a married
man is not only a violation of the moral standards
expected of employees of the judiciary, but is also a
desecration of the sanctity of the institution of
marriage which this Court abhors and is, thus,
punishable. Evelyn J. Jailorina vs. Richelle Taneo-Regner,
Demo II, RTC, OCC, San Mateo, Rizal. A.M. No. P-11-2948,
Court personnel;

April 23, 2012

Under Sec. 52 (C) (4), Rule VI of CSC Memorandum

habitual tardiness

Circular No. 19,

Series of 1999, habitual tardiness is penalized as follows:
First offense Reprimand; Second offense
Suspension for 1-30 days; Third offense Dismissal from
the service. Since it was proven that the present
case is the second offense of Gareza for being habitually
tardy, the OCA correctly recommended for the
penalty of suspension for 30 days with warning that a
similar offense in the future would be meted a
more severe penalty. Office of the Court Administrator vs.

Court personnel;

Sheriff Gareza. A.M. No. P-12-3058, April 25, 2012.

Respondent took more than six years to pay their

official and personal

obligation to the complainant. Also, one of the land titles

conduct

that respondents gave as collateral turned out

to have been encumbered. While they have already paid
their obligation, such payment was conditioned
upon the complainants execution of an Affidavit of
Desistance.
All these facts constitute conduct that reflects badly on
the judiciary, diminishing the honor and integrity
of the offices they hold. This is especially true because
respondents were admittedly given the loans
because they were considered prominent persons in the
community; and that they were considered as
such, presumably because they worked in the judiciary.
In Villaseor v. De Leon, the Court emphasized that to

preserve decency within the judiciary, court

personnel must comply with just contractual obligations,
act fairly and adhere to high ethical standards.
In that case, the Court said that respondent was expected
to be a paragon of uprightness, fairness and
honesty not only in all her official conduct but also in her
personal actuations, including business and
commercial transactions, so as to avoid becoming her
courts albatross of infamy. Re: Complaint filed by
Paz De Vera Lazaro against Edna Magallanes and Bonifacio
Court personnel;

Magallanes. A.M. No. P-11-3003, April 25, 2012

Settled is the role of clerks of court as judicial officers

neglect of duty

entrusted with
the delicate function with regard to collection of legal fees.
They are expected to correctly and effectively
implement regulations relating to proper administration of
court funds. Delay in the remittance of
collection constitutes neglect of duty. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Nini. A.M. No. P-11-3002, April
11, 2012.
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/april2012
/P-11-3002.htm)
Court personnel; neglect of duty. The following are the
duties of a sheriff: first, to give notice of the writ
and demand that the judgment obligor and all persons
claiming under him vacate the property within
three (3) days; second, to enforce the writ by removing the
judgment obligor and all persons claiming
under the latter; third, to remove the latters personal
belongings in the property as well as destroy,
demolish or remove the improvements constructed thereon
upon special court order; and fourth, to
execute and make a return on the writ within 30 days
from receipt of the writ and every thirty (30) days
thereafter until it is satisfied in full or until its effectivity
expires.
Respondent was clearly remiss in the performance of his
mandated duties: he unilaterally gave the

occupants 3 months, instead of the three (3) days provided

by the Rules, to vacate the property; when he
did evict the occupants from the premises, a room
containing their personal effects was padlocked,
therefore delaying the demolition of the improvements
introduced on the property; finally, respondent
failed to make a return on the writ of possession after he
implemented the same. Attys. Gonzalez, et al. vs.
Calo. A.M. No. P-12-3028, April 11, 2012.
Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure to give
attention to a
task or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or
indifference. The Court ruled in Pilipina v. Roxas:
The Court cannot countenance neglect of duty for even
simple neglect of duty lessens the peoples
confidence in the judiciary and ultimately in the
administration of justice. By the very nature of their
duties and responsibilities, public servants must faithfully
adhere to, hold sacred and render inviolate
the constitutional principle that a public office is a public
trust; that all public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency. Memoranda of Judge Eliza B. Yu issued to
Legal Researcher Marie Joy P. Lagman and to Court
Stenographer Soledad J. Bassig, all of Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 47, Pasay City. A.M. No. P-12-3033,
Court personnel;

August 15, 2012.

Simple neglect of duty is the failure to give attention to a

simple neglect of duty

task,
or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or
indifference. Office of the Court Administrator vs.
Sarmiento, et al. A.M. No. P-11-2912, April 10, 2012.
Rule 39, Section 14 of the Rules of Court clearly mandates
the
sheriff or other proper officer to file a return and when

necessary, periodic reports, with the court which

issued the writ of execution. The writ of execution shall be
returned to the court immediately after the
judgment had been partially or fully satisfied. In case the
writ is still unsatisfied or only partially
satisfied 30 days after the officers receipt of the same,
said officer shall file a report with the court stating
the reasons therefor. Subsequently, the officer shall
periodically file with the court a report on the
proceedings taken to enforce the writ every 30 days until
said writ is fully satisfied or its effectivity
expires. The officer is further required to furnish the
parties with copies of the return and periodic
reports.
Difficulties or obstacles in the satisfaction of a final
judgment and execution of a writ do not excuse
respondents total inaction. Neither the Rules nor
jurisprudence recognizes any exception from the
periodic filing of reports by sheriffs It is almost trite to say
that execution is the fruit and end of the suit
and is the life of law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would
be nothing but an empty victory for the
prevailing party. Therefore, sheriffs ought to know that
they have a sworn responsibility to serve writs of
execution with utmost dispatch. When writs are placed in
their hands, it is their ministerial duty to
proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to
execute them in accordance with their mandate.
Unless restrained by a court order, they should see to it
that the execution of judgments is not unduly
delayed. Accordingly, they must comply with their
mandated ministerial duty as speedily as possible.
As agents of the law, high standards are expected of
sheriffs
Canon IV, Section 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel that reads, Court personnel shall at all
times perform official duties properly and with diligence.
Astorga and Repol Law Offices, represented by

Atty. Arnold B. Lugares vs. Leodel N. Roxas, Sheriff IV,

Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati City. A.M. No.
Court personnel;

P-12-3029, August 15, 2012.

Under the Civil Service rules, an employee should submit

unauthorized absences

in
advance, whenever possible, an application for a vacation
leave of absence for action by the proper chief
of agency prior to the effective date of the leave. It is clear
from the facts that Dacsig had failed to acquire
the necessary leave permits. He offers no excuse or
explanation for failing to obtain the necessary
authorization for his leaves. Thus, he is guilty of taking
unauthorized absences. Rule IV, Section 52 (A)
(17) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, provides that the penalty for
frequent unauthorized absences of a first offender is
suspension for six months and one day to one year.
Judge Andrew P. Dulnuan vs. Esteban D. Dacsig, Clerk of
Court II, MCTC, Magddela-Nagtipunan, Quirinio.

Court personnel;

A.M. No. P-11-3004, April 18, 2012.

Unless specifically provided by the rules, clerks of court

discourtesy

have no authority
to pass upon the substantive or formal correctness of
pleadings and motions that parties file with the
court. Compliance with the rules is the responsibility of
the parties and their counsels. And whether
these conform to the rules concerning substance and form
is an issue that only the judge of the court has
authority to determine. The duty of clerks of courts to
receive pleadings, motions, and other courtbound
papers is purely ministerial. Although they may on
inspection advise the parties or their
counsels of possible defects in the documents they want to
file, which may be regarded as part of public
service, they cannot upon insistence of the filing party
refuse to receive the same.
Canon IV, Section 2 of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel provides that court personnel shall carry

out their responsibilities as public servants in as

courteous a manner as possible. Atty. Ramos was
counsel in a case before Teves branch. He was an officer of
the court who expressed a desire to have the
presiding judge, to whom he addressed his motion, see
and consider the same. Teves arrogated onto
himself the power to decide with finality that the presiding
judge was not to be bothered with that
motion. He denied Atty. Ramos the courtesy of letting the
presiding judge decide the issue between him
and the lawyer. As held in Macalua v. Tiu, Jr., an employee
of the judiciary is expected to accord respect
for the person and right of others at all times, and his
every act and word should be characterized by
prudence, restraint, courtesy and dignity. These are
absent in this case.
Civil Service Resolution 99-1936 classifies discourtesy in
the course of official duties as a light offense, the
penalty for which is reprimand for the first offense,
suspension of 1-30 days for the second offense, and
dismissal for the third offense. In two consolidated
administrative cases, one for grave misconduct and
immorality and the other for insubordination, the Court
meted out on Teves the penalty of suspension
for six months in its resolution of October 5, 2011. The
Court of course decided these cases and warned
Teves to change his ways more than a year after the
September 8, 2008 incident with Atty. Ramos.
Consequently, it could not be said that he ignored with
respect to that incident the warnings given him
in the subsequently decided cases. Still those cases show
Teves propensity for misbehavior. Thus, the
Court imposed on Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of
Court of Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu
City, the penalty of 30 days suspension with warning that
a repetition of the same or a similar offense
will be dealt with more severely. Atty. Edward Anthony B.
Ramos vs. Reynaldo S. Teves, Clerk of Court III,

Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City. A.M.

Court personnel;

No. P-12-3061, June 27, 2012

The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the

disgraceful and

conduct, official or otherwise, of the women and men who

immoral conduct

work in the judiciary, from the judge to the

lowest of its personnel. Like the rest of the personnel of the
Court, the shuttle bus drivers are expected to
observe the norms and ethics of conduct of public officials
and employees. Judiciary employees should
be circumspect in how they conduct themselves inside and
outside the office. Any scandalous behavior
or any act that may erode the peoples esteem for the
judiciary is unbecoming of an employee. Court
employees are supposed to be well-mannered, civil and
considerate in their actuations.
Laribo Jr.s utterances, are by themselves, malicious and
cast aspersion upon Diomampos character. The
Court cannot countenance such behavior. The Court
sanctioned Laribo Jr. for his disgraceful and
immoral conduct. Since such conduct is classified as a
grave offense, the penalty for the first offense is
suspension from 6 months and 1 day to one year. But the
Court tempered OCAs recommended penalty
and imposed a penalty of one month suspension, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act shall be dealt with more severely, taking into account
that this is Laribos Jr. first infraction. Shirley D.
Diomampo, Records Officer II, Sandiganbayan vs. Felipe C.
Laribo Jr., Shuttle Bus Driver, Sandiganbayan. A.M.

Court personnel;

No. SB-12-18-P. June 13, 2012

Section 2, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court

Disrespectful behavior

Personnel, requires that court personnel shall carry out

their responsibilities as public servants in as
courteous a manner as possible. The image of a court of
justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct,
official or otherwise, of the men and women who work
there. Court personnel must at all times act with
strict propriety and proper decorum so as to earn and

rebuild the publics trust in the judiciary as an

institution. The Court would never countenance any
conduct, act or omission on the part of all those
involved in the administration of justice, which would
violate the norm of public accountability and
diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the
people in the judiciary.
Under Rule XIV, Section 23 of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292,
discourtesy in the course of official dutiesis classified as a
light offense. A first-time violation of this rule
warrants the penalty of reprimand. Considering a)
respondents apology and admission of his mistakes;
b) his retirement from service on 1 July 2011 after long
years of employment in the Judiciary; and c) this
case being the first complaint against him, he should be
held liable for discourtesy and be meted out the
penalty of reprimand.
Respondent committed other lapses in the performance of
his duties as Clerk of Court. Instead of strictly
observing the required number of working hours in the
civil service, he left his post in the middle of the
day to attend a social event. Worse, he chose to return to
the office and enter the judges chambers while
under the influence of alcohol. His behavior constitutes a
direct violation of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel, particularly Section 1, Canon IV on the
Performance of Duties, which states: Court
personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly
and with diligence. They shall commit
themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities
of their office during working hours. Judge
Ethelwolda Jaravata vs. Precioso Orencia, Clerk of Court,
MTC, Agoo, La Union A.M. No. P-12-3035, June 13,
Court personnel;

2012
Falsification of a DTR by a court personnel is a grave

falsification

offense. The act of

falsifying an official document is in itself grave because of

its possible deleterious effects on government

service. At the same time, it is also an act of dishonesty,
which violates fundamental principles of public
accountability and integrity. Under Civil Service
regulations, falsification of an official document and
dishonesty are distinct offenses, but both may be
committed in one act.
The constitutionalization of public accountabilityshows the
kind of standards of public officers that are
woven into the fabric of our legal system. Public office is a
public trust, which embodies a set of
standards such as responsibility, integrity and efficiency.
Reality may depart from these standards, but
our society has consciously embedded them in our laws,
so that they may be demanded and enforced as
legal principles. This Court, in the exercise of its
administrative jurisdiction, should articulate and apply
these principles to its own personnel, as a way of bridging
actual reality to the norms we envision for our
public service.
The Supreme Court exercised its administrative
jurisdiction despite respondent Kasilags resignation,
more than two years after he was directed to file his
Comment. The resignation of a public servant does
not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to
which he or she shall still be answerable. Even
if the most severe of administrative sanctions that of
separation from service may no longer be
imposed, there are other penalties which may be imposed
namely, the disqualification to hold any
government office and the forfeiture of benefits. There are
no mitigating circumstances for respondent
Kasilag. Dishonesty and the act of falsifying detract from
the notion of public accountability, as
implemented by our laws. We apply the law as it is written.
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Jaime
Kasilag, Sheriff IV, Regionatl Trial Court, Branch 27,
Manila. A.M. No. P-08-2573, June 19, 2012

Court Personnel; gross

Respondent failed to explain why, despite her receipt of the

insubordination

Notices, she did not comply with the directives of this

Court to submit her comment. The records show
that the OCA had sent notices to her at RTCBranch 93 of
San Pedro, Laguna, where she is the branch
sheriff. While she apologized to this Court for her failure to
submit her comment, she did not explain the
reasons for her non-submission thereof and only averred
that it was the first time she learned of the
Complaint against her. The OCA did not find her
explanation satisfactory, because she did submit her
Comment, but only after a Show-Cause Order had been
issued to her and almost a year after the first
directive requiring her to file the Comment. Respondents
prolonged and repeated refusal to comply
with the directives of the Supreme Court constituted
willful disrespect of its lawful orders, as well as
those of the OCA. Respondent committed the infraction
twice, yet failed to fully explain the
circumstances that led to the repeated omissions. Hence,
there no reason to overturn or mitigate the
penalty recommended by the OCA. Ricardo Dela Cruz et
al., vs. Ma.
Gross insubordination is the indifference of a respondent
to an administrative complaint and to
resolutions requiring a comment thereon. The offense is
deemed punishable, because every employee in
the judiciary should not only be an example of integrity,
uprightness, and honesty; more than anyone
else, they are bound to manifest utmost respect and
obedience to their superiors orders and
instructions.Ricardo Dela Cruz et al., vs. Ma. Consuelo Jole
A. Fajardo, Sheriff IV, RTC, Br. 93, San Pedro,

Court personnel; gross

Laguna. A.M. No. P-12-3064, June 18, 2012

The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel stresses

misconduct and

that employees of the judiciary serve as sentinels of

dishonesty

justice, and any act of impropriety on their part

immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the

Judiciary and the peoples confidence in it. No other

office in the government service exacts a greater demand
for moral righteousness and uprightness from
an employee than in the Judiciary. Thus, the failure of
judicial employees to live up to their avowed duty
constitutes a transgression of the trust reposed in them as
court officers and inevitably leads to the
exercise of disciplinary authority. By these standards,
respondent was found wanting, as she never
denied the allegations that she had stolen and encashed
the 30,000 check payable to Judge Rojas. She
did not even refute the allegations of Dauz and Corpuz
that she misrepresented to both of them that she
had authority to encash the check. Worse, neither did she
ever deny the allegations pertaining to her
previous acts of stealing from and paying off her
obligations to other trial court judges. She has virtually
admitted her wrongdoing.
Whether or not respondent has fully settled her obligation
to Judge Rojas, and to the other trial court
judges for that matter, will not exonerate her from any
administrative wrongdoing. This Court in
Villaseor v. De Leon has emphasized that full payment of
an obligation does not discharge the
administrative liability, because disciplinary actions
involve not purely private matters, but acts
unbecoming of a public employee. The Court ruled that
respondents admitted acts of pocketing checks
and later encashing them for her benefit constitute grave
misconduct. The Court has defined grave
misconduct as follows:
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer;
and the misconduct is grave if it involves
any of the additional elements of corruption, such as
willful intent to violate the law or to disregard
established rules, which must be established by

substantial evidence.
Furthermore, stealing the checks and encashing them are
considered acts of gross dishonesty
Dishonesty is defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive
or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle;
lack of fairness and straightforwardness;
disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct,
official or otherwise, of the personnel who
work therein. Court employees are enjoined to adhere to
the exacting standards of morality and decency
in their professional and private conduct in order to
preserve the good name and integrity of the court of
justice. Both gross misconduct and dishonesty are grave
offenses that are punishable by dismissal even
for the first offense. Penalties include forfeiture of
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and
perpetual disqualification from reemployment in
government service.
The mere expedient of resigning from the service will not
extricate a court employee from the
consequences of his or her acts. The Court has often ruled
that resignation should not be used either as
an escape or as an easy way out to evade an
administrative liability or an administrative sanction.
Thus,
respondent was still held administratively liable for gross
misconduct and dishonesty.Her resignation,
however, would affect the penalties the Court may impose.
The penalty of dismissal arising from the
offense was rendered moot by virtue of her resignation.
Thus, the recommendation of the OCA is
appropriate under the circumstances. The Court imposed
upon respondent the penalty of a fine in the
amount of 40,000 with forfeiture of all benefits due her,
except accrued leave credits, if any. The 40,000
fine shall be deducted from any such accrued leave

credits, with respondent to be personally held liable

for any deficiency that is directly payable to the Court. She
was further declared disqualified from any
future government service. The Court emphasized that all
court employees, being public servants in an
office dispensing justice, must always act with a high
degree of professionalism and responsibility. Their
conduct must not only be characterized by propriety and
decorum, but must also be in accordance with
the law and court regulations. To maintain the peoples
respect and faith in the judiciary, court
employees should be models of uprightness, fairness and
honesty. They should avoid any act or conduct that would
diminish public trust and confidence in the courts.
Executive Judge Melanio C. Rojas, Jr. RTC
Branch 25, Tagudin, Ilocos Sur vs. Ana Marivic L. Mina,
Clerk III, RTC, Bracnh 25, Tagudin Ilocos Sur. A.M.
Court personnel;

No. P-10-2867, June 19, 2012

In Arcenio v. Pagorogon, the Court defined misconduct as a

misconduct defined

transgression of some established and definite rule of

action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by the public officer. As differentiated
from simple misconduct, in grave misconduct
the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law
or flagrant disregard of established rule, must
be manifest. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of
the additional elements of corruption, willful
intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules,
which must be established by substantial
evidence. In this case, respondent was a mere Utility
Worker who had no authority to take custody of the
office attendance logbook, the DTRs of his office mates, let
alone case records. Yet, respondent, taking
advantage of his position as a Utility Worker and the
access to the court records and documents which
such position afforded him, repeatedly wrought havoc on
the proper administration of justice by taking
case records outside of the courts premises and

preoccupying his office mates with the time-consuming

task of locating documents. Without doubt his actions
constitute grave misconduct which merits the
penalty of dismissal. However, in view of his resignation,
the Court found it proper to instead impose
on respondent the penalty of fine in the amount of
P10,000 with forfeiture of benefits except accrued
leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in
any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. This of course is without
prejudice to any criminal liability he may have already
incurred.
As regards the 68 missing court records to date have not
yet been found, the Court deemed it proper to
order complainant to explain why she should not be
disciplinarily dealt with in view of the apparent
failure on her part to exercise due care in the custody of
the said case records. Our courts of justice,
regarded by the public as their haven for truth and justice,
cannot afford and does not have the luxury of
offering excuses to litigants for negligence in its role of
safekeeping and preserving the records of cases
pending before it. The consequences of such failure or
negligence, if there be any, are simply too
damaging not just for the parties involved but worse, for
our court system as a whole. Clerk of Court
Arlyn A. Hermano vs. Edwin D. Cardeno, Utility worker I,
Municipal Trial Court, Cabuyao, Laguna. A.M. No.
Court Personnel;

P-12-3036, June 20, 2012

There was a valid

Procedure in the

substituted service of summons in this case. As a rule,

service and execution

of court writs and
processes

personal service of summons is preferred as

against substituted service and substituted service can
only be resorted to by the process server if
personal service cannot be made promptly. Most
importantly, the proof of substituted service of
summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of

summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify

the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state
that the summons was served upon a person of
sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the
address, or who is in charge of the office or regular
place of business, of the defendant. It is likewise required
that the pertinent facts proving these
circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the
officers return.
Based on the records, Sheriff Villar exhausted efforts to
personally serve the summons to Spouses Tiu as
indicated in his Sheriffs Return of Summons. When it was
apparent that the summons could not be
served personally on the spouses, Sheriff Villar served the
summons through Bauco, their employee, at
the office address of the couples business. It was evident
that Bauco was competent and of sufficient
age to receive the summons on their behalf as she
represented herself to be their General Manager and
Caretaker.
The Sheriff also complied with the requirement of prior
coordination as mandated in Administrative
Circular No. 12 which lays down the guidelines and
procedure in the service and execution of court
writs and processes in the reorganized courts.
Documentary evidence indeed discloses that Sheriff
Villar of Pasay City coordinated with the Sheriff of Pasig
City before he implemented the writ of
preliminary attachment. In the Certification, the Clerk of
Court of Pasig City attested to the fact that
Sheriff Villar formally coordinated with their office in
connection with the implementation of the writ of
attachment. Attached to said certification is a certified
true copy of Sheriff Villars request for
coordination on which the word received was stamped by
the Office of the Clerk of Court and Exofficio
Sheriff, RTC Pasig City.
By law, sheriffs are obligated to maintain possession of the

seized properties absent any instruction to the

contrary. In this case, the writ of preliminary attachment
authorizing the trial court to legally hold the
attached items was set aside by the RTC Order dated July
8, 2010 specifically ordering Sheriff Villar to
immediately release the seized items to Spouses Tiu. The
instruction of the trial court was clear and
simple. Sheriff Villar was to return the seized properties to
Spouses Tiu. He should have followed the
courts order immediately. He had no discretion to wait for
the finality of the courts order of dismissal
before discharging the order of attachment. Nevertheless,
Sheriff Villar showed no deliberate defiance of,
or disobedience to, the courts order of release. Records
show that he took the proper step under the
circumstances and filed with the trial court his Sheriffs
Report with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a
Clarificatory Order. There was nothing amiss in consulting
the judge before taking action on a matter of
which he is not an expert. Spouses Rainier Tiu and
Jennifer Tiu vs. Virgilio Villar, Sheriff IV, RTC, OCC Pasay
Court Personnel;

City. A.M. No. P-11-2986, June 13, 2012

Conduct prejudicial to the best

conduct prejudicial to

interest of the service refers to acts or omissions that

the best interest of the

service

violate the norm of public accountability and

diminish or tend to diminish the peoples faith in the
Judiciary. If an employees questioned conduct
tarnished the image and integrity of his public office, he is
liable for conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. The basis for his liability is
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
The Code, particularly its Section 4(c),
commands that public officials and employees shall at all
times respect the rights of others, and shall
refrain from doing acts contrary to public safety and
public interest.
The strictest standards have always been valued in judicial

service. Everyone involved in the

dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk, is expected to live up to the
strictest norm of competence, honesty and integrity in the
public service. The conduct of every court
personnel must be beyond reproach and free from
suspicion that may cause to sully the image of the
Judiciary. They must totally avoid any impression of
impropriety, misdeed or misdemeanor not only in
the performance of their official duties but also in
conducting themselves outside or beyond the duties
and functions of their office. Court personnel are enjoined
to conduct themselves toward maintaining the
prestige and integrity of the Judiciary for the very image of
the latter is necessarily mirrored in their
conduct, both official and otherwise. They must not forget
that they are an integral part of that organ of
the government sacredly tasked in dispensing justice.
Their conduct and behavior, therefore, should not
only be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility but at all times be defined by propriety
and decorum, and above all else beyond any suspicion.
The Court does not hesitate to condemn and
sanction such improper conduct, act or omission of those
involved in the administration of justice that
violates the norm of public accountability and diminishes
or tends to diminish the faith of the public in
the Judiciary. Filomena B. Consolacion vs. Lydia S.
Gambito, Court Stenographer, MCTC, Binalonan,
Pangasinan/Judge Emma S. Ines-Parajas vs. Lydia S.
Gambito, Court Stenographer, MCTC, Binalonan,
Pangasinan A.M. No. P-06-2186 & A.M. No. P-12-3026. July
Court personnel;

3, 2012
In Alenio v. Cunting, the Court defined dishonesty

dishonesty and grave

and grave misconduct as the disposition to lie, cheat,

misconduct

deceive, defraud or betray; untrustworthiness;

lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in
principle; and lack of fairness and

straightforwardness. Misconduct, on the other hand, is a

transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant
dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave,
serious, important, weighty, momentous, and
not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention
and not a mere error of judgment. The
misconduct must also have a direct relation to and be
connected with the performance of the public
officers official duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure
to discharge the duties of the office.
Taking monetary evidence without proper authority
constitutes theft. In Judge San Jose, Jr. v. Camurongan,
the Court held that, The act of taking monetary exhibits
without authority from their custodian
constitutes theft. Thievery, no matter how petty, has no
place in the judiciary. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Ma. Irissa G. Musni, Court Legal
Researcher II RTC, Judicial Region III, Branch 36, Gapan
Court personnel;

City, Nueva Ecija A.M. No. P-11-3024, July 17, 2012.

Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution

dishonesty, gross

declares that a public office is a public trust, and all

neglect, grave
misconduct

public officers and employees must at all times be

accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. The
demand for moral uprightness is more
pronounced for the members and personnel of the
judiciary who are involved in the dispensation of
justice. The conduct of court members and personnel
must not only be characterized with propriety and
decorum but must also be above suspicion, for any act of
impropriety ca seriously erode or diminish the
peoples confidence in the judiciary. As frontliners in the
administration of justice, they should live up to
the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the

public service.
Clerks of Court act as custodians of the courts funds,
revenues, records, property and premises and are
thus, liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or
impairment of such funds and property. In Re: Report on
the Judicial and Financial Audit of RTC-Br. 4, Panabo,
Davao Del Norte, it was held that the failure of the
Clerk of Court to remit the court funds constitutes gross
neglect of duty, dishonesty, and grave
misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
In this case, Peradilla is guilty of dishonesty,
gross neglect of duty, and grave misconduct for her: (1)
non-remittance of collections of judiciary funds;
(2) non-issuance of official receipts and non reporting in
the Monthly Reports and Collections and
Deposits of some of the collections; and (3) erroneous
reporting in the Monthly Reports and
Collections and Deposits of some of the collections. Office
of the Court Administrator vs. Lunalinda M.
Peradilla, Clerk of Court II, MCTC, E1 Nido-Linapacan,
Court personnel;

Palawan A.M. No. P-09-2647, July 17, 2012.

The Sheriff disregarded the procedure for the execution of

simple misconduct

judgments as mandated by Section 10, Rule 141 of the

Rules of Court. A sheriff is mandated to make an
estimate of the expenses which shall be approved by the
court. It is only after the approval of the court
that an interested party shall deposit the amount with the
clerk of court. Upon the return of the writ, the
sheriff must submit a liquidation and return to the
interested party any unspent amount. The Sheriffs
act of receiving money from the party for the expenses to
be incurred in the execution of the writs,
without first making an estimate and securing prior
approval from the MTCC, as well as his failure to
render accounting after its execution, are clear violations
of the rule. Even if conceding that the sum
demanded by Sheriff is reasonable, this does not justify
his deviation from the procedure laid down by

the rule. Neither the acquiescence nor consent of the

complainant, before or after the implementation of
the writ will absolve him from liability. The mere act of
receiving the money without the prior approval
of the court and without him issuing a receipt therefor is
considered as a misconduct in office.
Sheriffs are reminded that they are not allowed to receive
any voluntary payments from parties in the
course of the performance of their duties. Corollarily, a
sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand sums of
money from a party-litigant without observing the proper
procedural steps. Even assuming that such
payments were indeed given and received in good faith,
such fact alone would not dispel the suspicion
that such payments were made for less than noble
purposes. Sheriffs and their deputies are the front-line
representatives of the justice system, and if, through their
lack of care and diligence in the
implementation of judicial writs, they lose the trust
reposed on them, they inevitably diminish the faith
of the people in the Judiciary. The image of a court of
justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and
otherwise, of the personnel who work there, from the
judge to the lowest employee. As such, the Court
will not tolerate or condone any conduct of judicial agents
or employees which would tend to or actually
diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.
Lambayong Teachers and Employees Cooperative,
represented
in this act by its Manager, Gudelio S. Valeroso vs. Carlos P.
Diaz, in his capacity as Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 20,
Court personnel;

Tacurong City A.M. No. P-06-2246, July 11, 2012.

The manner in which a writ of execution is to be returned

simple neglect of duty

to the
court, as well as the requisite reports to be made by the
sheriff or officer, is explicitly outlined in Section
14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In accordance with this
rule, periodic reporting must be done by the

sheriff regularly and consistently every thirty (30) days

until the judgment is fully satisfied. It is
mandatory for the sheriff to make a return of the writ of
execution, so that the court and the litigants
may be apprised of the proceedings undertaken in the
enforcement of the writ. The return will enable
the courts to take the necessary steps to ensure the
speedy execution of decisions. The failure of a sheriff
to make periodic reports on the status of a writ of
execution warrants administrative liability.
The Court faults respondent for not submitting his
periodic reports on the progress of his
implementation of the writ. He is guilty of simple neglect of
duty, defined as the failure of an employee
to give ones attention to a task expected of him, and
signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from
carelessness or indifference.As officers of the court,
sheriffs are charged with the knowledge of what
proper action to take in case there are questions on the
writ needing to be clarified; they are charged as
well with the knowledge of what they are bound to comply
with.Sheriffs are expected to know the rules
of procedure pertaining to their functions as officers of the
court,relative to the implementation of writs
of execution, and should at all times show a high degree of
professionalism in the performance of their
duties. Any act deviating from the procedure laid down by
the Rules of Court is misconduct that
warrants disciplinary action.
Rhea Airene P. Katague, et al. vs. Jerry A. Ledesma, Sheriff
IV, RTC, Br. 48, Bacolod City A.M. No. P-12-3067.
July 4, 2012.
The duty of a process server is vital to the administration
of
justice. A process servers primary duty is to serve court
notices which precisely requires utmost care on
his part by ensuring that all notices assigned to him are

duly served on the parties. Unjustified delay in

performing this task constitutes neglect of duty and
warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions.
All employees in the judiciary should be examples of
responsibility, competence and efficiency. It is
through the process server that defendants learn of the
action brought against them by the complainant.
It is also through the service of summons by the process
server that the trial court acquires jurisdiction
over the defendant. It is therefore important that
summonses, other writs and court processes be served
expeditiously.
Heavy workload is not an adequate excuse to be remiss in
the diligent performance of ones public
duties as a public servant. Otherwise, every government
employee charged with negligence and
dereliction of duty will always use this as a convenient
excuse to escape punishment to the great
prejudice of public service
The Court has defined dishonesty as the disposition to lie,
cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness;
lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray. Dishonesty is not simply bad judgment
or negligence. Dishonesty is a question of intention. In
ascertaining the intention of a person accused of
dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the
facts and circumstances which gave rise to the
act committed by the respondent, but also of his state of
mind at the time the offense was committed, the
time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of
meditating on the consequences of his act, and
the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment.
It was never alleged, much less established,
that Dela Cruz was impelled by some evil design or
corrupt motives to commit said errors or to favor
any party or litigant. Hence, he was found guilty only of

negligence in the performance of his tasks, and

not of dishonesty. Simple neglect of duty is defined as the
failure of an employee to give proper
attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to
carelessness or indifference. Judge Pelagia
Dalmacio-Joaquin vs. Nicomedes Dela Cruz, Process Server,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, San Jose del Monte,
Court personnel;

Bulacan. A.M. No. P-06-2241. July 10, 2012

Immorality has been defined to include not only

disgraceful and

sexual matters but also conduct inconsistent with

immoral conduct

rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency,

depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or
shameless conduct showing moral indifference to
opinions of respectable members of the community, and
an inconsiderate attitude toward good order
and public welfare. Respondent engaged in sexual
relations with a married man which not only violate
the moral standards expected of employees of the
Judiciary but is also a desecration of the sanctity of the
institution of marriage.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of
court personnel must be free from any whiff of
impropriety, not only with respect to his duties in the
judicial branch but also to his behavior outside the
court as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of
morality; a court employee is also judged by his
private morals. The exacting standards of morality and
decency have been strictly adhered to and laid
down by the Court to those in the service of the Judiciary.
Respondent, as a court stenographer, did not
live up to her commitment to lead a moral life.
Public office is a public trust. The good of the service and
the degree of morality, which every
official and employee in the public service must observe, if
respect and confidence are to be
maintained by the Government in the enforcement of the
law, demand that no untoward conduct
affecting morality, integrity, and efficiency while holding

office should be left without proper and

commensurate sanction, all attendant circumstances
taken into account. Judge Armando S. Adlawan,
Presiding Judge, 6th MCTC, Bonifacio-Don Mariano Marcos,
Misamis Occidental vs. Estrella P. Capilitan, 6th
MCTC, Bonifacio-Don Mariano Marcos, Misamis Occidental.
A.M. No. P-12-3080. August 29, 2012
Court personnel;

Willful concealment of facts in the

dishonesty and

Personal Data Sheet (PDS) constitutes mental dishonesty

falsification of public
document

amounting to misconduct. Likewise, making a

false statement in ones PDS amounts to dishonesty and
falsification of an official document. Dishonesty
has been defined as intentionally making a false statement
on any material fact. Dishonesty evinces a
disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of honesty,
probity
or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray.
Civil service rules mandate the accomplishment of the
PDS as a requirement for employment in the
government. Hence, making false statements in ones PDS
is ultimately connected with ones
employment in the government. The employee making false
statements in his or her PDS becomes liable
for falsification. Moreover, for respondent to be meted the
penalty of dismissal, her dishonesty need not
be committed in the performance of official duty.
As the Court has previously ruled: The rationale for the
rule is that if a government officer or employee
is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct,
even if said defects of character are not
connected with his office, they affect his right to continue
in office. The Government cannot tolerate in its
service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties
correctly and well, because by reason of his

government position, he is given more and ample

opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his
fellow men, even against offices and entities of the
government other than the office where he is
employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and
possesses a certain influence and power which
renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression
and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to
resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations.
When official documents are falsified, intent to injure a
third person is irrelevant because the principal
thing punished is the violation of public faith and the
destruction of the truth as claimed in that
document.The act undermines the integrity of government
records and therein lies the prejudice to
public service. The act need not result in disruption of
service or loss to the government. It is the act of
dishonesty itself that taints the integrity of government
service. A government officers dishonesty
affects the morale of the service, even when it stems from
the employees personal dealings. Such
conduct should not be tolerated from government officials,
even when official duties are performed well.
Employment in the judiciary demands the highest degree
of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency from its personnel. All judiciary employees are
expected to conduct themselves with propriety
and decorum at all times An act that falls short of the
exacting standards set for public officers,
especially those in the judiciary, shall not be
countenanced. Manolito C. Villordon vs. Marilyn C. Avila,
Court Interpreter I, Municipal Trial Court in Cities. Branch 3,
Court personnel;

Cebu City. A.M. No. P-10-2809, August 10, 2012

Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court

refusal to perform duty

Personnel enjoins court personnel to perform their official

duties properly and with diligence at all
times. Clerks of Court are primarily responsible for the
speedy and efficient service of all court processes

and writs. Hence, they cannot be allowed to slacken on

their work since they are charged with the duty
of keeping the records and the seal of the court, issuing
processes, entering judgments and orders, and
giving certified copies of records upon request. As such,
they are expected to possess a high degree of
discipline and efficiency in the performance of their
functions to help ensure that the cause of justice is
done without delay.
As an officer of the court, respondent Clerk of Court was
duty-bound to use reasonable skill and
diligence in the performance of her officially-designated
duties as clerk of court, failing which, warrants
the imposition of administrative sanctions. In this case,
respondent unjustifiably failed to issue the alias
writs of execution to implement the judgment in a Civil
Case, despite orders from the RTC. Moreover,
she failed to file the required comment in disregard of the
duty of every employee in the judiciary to
obey the orders and processes of the Court without delay.
Such act evinces lack of interest in clearing her
name, constituting an implied admission of the charges.
Mariano T. Ong vs. Eva G. Basiya-Saratan, Clerk of
Court, RTC, Br. 32, Iloilo City. A.M. No. P-12-3090. January
Court personnel;

7, 2013
Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution states that a

discourteous acts

public office is
a public trust. It enjoins public officers and employees to
serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency and to, at all times, remain
accountable to the people. As front liners of
the justice system, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs must
always strive to maintain public trust in the
performance of their duties. As agents of the law, they are
called upon to discharge their duties with
due care and utmost diligence because in serving the
courts writs and processes and implementing the
orders of the court, they cannot afford to err without

affecting the integrity of their office and the efficient

administration of justice.
Sheriff Gelbolingos failure to properly respond to the
letters is tantamount to discourtesy. A simple note
as to where their personal effects were temporarily stored
could have assured Sasing that their
belongings were not confiscated but merely stored for
safekeeping. The Court is fully aware that a
sheriffs schedule can be hectic, but she could have easily
relayed the information to the other court staff
to address Sasings concerns.
The administrative offense committed by Sheriff
Gelbolingo is discourtesy in the course of official duties
which, under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service, Rule IV, Section 52(C)(1),
is a light offense. The penalty imposable for such an
offense is either a reprimand for the first offense, a
suspension from 1 day to 30 days for the second offense,
and dismissal from public service for the third
offense. In this case, the court admonished Sheriff
Gelbolingo considering there was an effort on her part
to meet with Sasing twice, but the latter did not appear on
the second scheduled meeting. Ray Antonio C.
Sasing vs. Celestial Venus G. Gelbolingo, Sheriff IV, RTC,
Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, A.M. No. P-12-3032.
Court personnel;

February 20, 2013

No less than the Constitution itself

public office is a public

mandates that all public officers and employees should

trust; simple neglect of

duty.

serve with responsibility, integrity and efficiency,

for public office is a public trust. The Court has repeatedly
reminded those who work in the Judiciary to
be examples of responsibility, competence and efficiency;
they must discharge their duties with due care
and utmost diligence, since they are officers of the Court
and agents of the law. Indeed, any conduct, act
or omission on the part of those who would violate the
norm[s] of public accountability and diminish or
even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the

judiciary shall not be countenanced.

In this case, Mendoza charged Esguerra, a process server
in the RTC, with Negligence and Dereliction of
Duty. The court held that Esguerra was guilty of simple
neglect of duty. Esguerra cannot blame the Civil
Docket Clerk for the delay in the service of the July 7,
2008 Order. If indeed a copy of the July 7, 2008
Order had been handed to Esguerra only on August 8,
2008, a Friday, he should not have proceeded to
mail the same; but instead, should have served the Order
personally to the parties, particularly to the
herein complainant. Even the Notice of Dismissal dated
August 21, 2008 was mailed only on September
19, 2008, three (3) weeks after it was endorsed to him
sometime on August 22 or 25, 2008. These acts
clearly demonstrate lack of sufficient or reasonable
diligence on the part of the respondent. Section 1,
Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
mandates that Court personnel shall at all times
perform official duties properly and with diligence.
Clearly, Esguerra had been remiss in the
performance of his duties and has shown lack of
dedication to the functions of his office. Esguerras acts
displayed a conduct falling short of the stringent
standards required of court employees. Erlinda C.
Mendoza vs. Pedro S. Esguerra, Process Server, RTC, Br. 89,
Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, A.M. No. P-11-2967.
Court personnel;

February 13, 2013

In the Datan case, Mr. Teves, instead of scheduling the

simple neglect of duty;

case for promulgation, just gave the

failure of branch clerk

of court to schedule
the promulgation of
cases.

accused a copy of the unpromulgated decision at the time

when the presiding judge was serving her
suspension. Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court
states that:
Sec. 6. Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is
promulgated by reading it in the presence of the
accused and any judge of the court in which it was
rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light

offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence

of his counsel or representative. When the
judge is absent or outside the province or city, the
judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of
court x x x.
Clearly, as found by the OCA, Mr. Teves is guilty of simple
neglect of duty. It is his duty to calendar the
case for promulgation in accordance with the Rules of
Court. He did not only fail to do so. Rather, he, in
fact, served copies of the decision to the accused without
the judgment having been promulgated first.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M.
Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves,
Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12Court personnel;

1818. March 12, 2013

Simple neglect of duty is defined as the

simple neglect of duty;

failure of an employee to give ones attention to a task

imposable penalty

expected of him, and signifies a disregard of a

duty resulting from carelessness or indifference. Under
the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is a less
grave offense penalized with suspension for
one month and one day to six months for the first offense,
and dismissal for the second.
In the determination of the proper penalty, the Court
looked into Mr. Teves past administrative cases.
Considering his past infractions and having been warned
that a repetition of the same or similar act will
be dealt with more severely, Mr. Teves still has not
reformed. He has remained undeterred in
disregarding the law and he appears to be unfazed by the
previous penalties and warnings he received.
Mr. Teves repeated infractions seriously compromise
efficiency and hamper public service which the
Court can no longer tolerate. As such, he was meted with
the penalty of dismissal from service with
forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued

leave credits, if any, with prejudice to

reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Office of the Court Administrator v.
Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City
and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court,
Court personnel;

same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013

In Civil Service Commission v. Perocho, Jr., the Court

dishonesty

defined dishonesty as intentionally making a false

statement in any material fact,
or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or
fraud in securing his
examination, registration, appointment or promotion.
Thus, dishonesty, like bad
faith, is not simply bad judgment or negligence.
Dishonesty is a question of
intention. In ascertaining the intention of a person
accused of dishonesty,
consideration must be taken not only of the facts and
circumstances which gave
rise to the act committed by the respondent, but also of
his state of mind at the
time the offense was committed, the time he might have
had at his disposal for the
purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and
the degree of
reasoning he could have had at that moment. Evidence
showed that respondent
was not the one who took the Civil Service SubProfessional Examinations. The
Court, citing the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel,
stressed that its employees
should hold the highest standard of integrity for they are a
reflection of the
esteemed institution which they serve. It certainly cannot
countenance any form of
dishonesty perpetrated by its employees. Civil Service

Commission vs. Merle

Ramoneda-Pita. A.M. No. P-08-2531. April 11, 2013
Ismael Hadji Ali, a court stenographer I at the Sharia
Circuit Court,
represented that he took and passed the Civil Service
Professional Examination but evidence showed
that another person took the exam for him. Per CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 15, Series of 1991, the
use of spurious Civil Service eligibility constitutes
dishonesty, among others. Dishonesty is a malevolent
act that has no place in the judiciary. Hadji Ali failed to
observe the strict standards and behavior
required of an employee in the judiciary. He has shown
unfitness for public office. Pursuant to the Civil
Service Rules, Hadji Ali was dismissed from the service
with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits.
Civil Service Commission v. Ismael A. Hadji Ali, et al., A.M.
Court personnel;

No. SCC-08-11-P, June 18, 2013.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established

dishonesty and grave

and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful

misconduct

behavior as well as gross negligence by a public

officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct
must be grave, serious, important, weighty,
momentous and not trifling. The misconduct must imply
wrongful intention and not a mere error of
judgment. The misconduct must also have a direct relation
to and be connected with the performance of
the public officers official duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect,
or failure to discharge the duties of the office.
Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive,
defraud or betray; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle;
and lack of fairness and straightforwardness.
In this case, respondent deceived complainants family
who were led to believe that he is the legal
representative of the Hodges Estate. Boasting of his

position as a court officer, a City Sheriff at that,

complainants family completely relied on his repeated
assurance that they will not be ejected from the
premises.
In Re: Complaint Filed by Paz De Vera Lazaro Against Edna
Magallanes, Court Stenographer III, RTC Br. 28 and
Bonifacio G. Magallanes, Process Server, RTC Br. 30,
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, the Court stressed that to
preserve decency within the judiciary, court personnel
must comply with just contractual obligations, act
fairly and adhere to high ethical standards. In that case,
the court held that court employees are expected
to be paragons of uprightness, fairness and honesty not
only in their official conduct but also in their
personal dealings, including business and commercial
transactions to avoid becoming the courts
albatross of infamy.
More importantly, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 671350
or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees mandates that public
officials and employees shall remain true to the
people at all times. They must act with justness and
sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone,
especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at
all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain
from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, public
safety and public interest. Rodolfo C. Sabidong v. Nicolasito
Court Personnel;

S. Solas. A.M. No. P-01-1448, June 25, 2013

In this case, the personnel in charge of the

simple neglect of duty

court records failed to elevate the case records to the

Court of Appeals within the
prescribed period due to the alleged heavy workload. The
Court held that he was
guilty of simple neglect of duty. Section 1, Canon IV of the
Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel commands court personnel to perform
their duties properly and

with diligence at all times. The administration of justice is

an inviolable task and it
demands the highest degree of efficiency, dedication and
professionalism.
The Court is not unaware of the heavy workload of court
personnel, given the
number of cases filed and pending before it. However,
unless proven to exist in an
insurmountable degree, this circumstance cannot serve as
an excuse to evade
administrative liability; otherwise, every government
employee faced with
negligence and dereliction of duty would resort to that
excuse to evade
punishment, to the detriment of the public service.
Clearly, Salazar is guilty of simple neglect of duty, which is
defined as the failure to
give proper attention to a task expected of an employee,
thus signifying a
disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or
indifference.
In the determination of the penalties to be imposed,
mitigating, aggravating and
alternative circumstances attendant to the commission of
the crime shall be
considered. The Court has mitigated imposable penalties
for various special
reasons. It has considered length of service in the
judiciary, acknowledgement of
infractions, remorse and family circumstances, among
others, in determining the
applicable penalty. In this case, while Salazar is a second
time offender for simple
neglect of duty, her long years of service in the judiciary
and the admission of her
negligence are circumstances to mitigate her culpability.
Judge Renato A. Fuentes,
RTC, Br. 17, Davao City vs. Atty. Rogelio F. Fabro, etc., et al.

A.M. No. P-10-2791. April

Court personnel;

17, 2013
Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court

Prohibition in

officers such as clerks of court from

acquiring property
involved in litigation
within the jurisdiction
of their
courts.

acquiring property involved in litigation within the

jurisdiction or territory of their courts. The rationale
is that public policy disallows the transactions in view of
the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the
relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control
exercised by these persons. In so providing, the
Code tends to prevent fraud, or more precisely, tends not
to give occasion for fraud, which is what can
and must be done.
For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the
property must take place during the pendency
of the litigation involving the property. Where the property
is acquired after the termination of the case,
no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code
attaches.
In this case, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on
November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil Case No.
14706 which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long
become final. Be that as it may, it cannot be said
that the property is no longer in litigation at that time
considering that it was part of the Hodges Estate
then under settlement proceedings.
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some
contest or litigation over it in court, but also
from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial
action of the judge. A property forming part of
the estate under judicial settlement continues to be
subject of litigation until the probate court issues an
order declaring the estate proceedings closed and
terminated. The rule is that as long as the order for the
distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the
probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed
and terminated. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an
estate under administration only after the

payment of all the debts and the remaining estate

delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same.
Rodolfo C. Sabidong v. Nicolasito S. Solas. A.M. No. P-011448, June 25, 2013
Court Personnel; Gross

The audit team discovered cash shortages in the

Dishonesty; Gross

books of accounts of the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC,

Misconduct

Lipa City. As clerk of court, Atty. Apusen is

primarily accountable for all funds collected for the court,
whether personally received by him or by a
duly appointed cashier who is under his supervision and
control. As custodian of court funds, revenues,
records, properties and premises, he is liable for any loss,
shortage, destruction or impairment of said
funds and properties. Being a cash clerk, Savadera is an
accountable officer entrusted with the great
responsibility of collecting money belonging to the funds of
the court. Clearly, she miserably failed in
such responsibility upon the occurrence of the shortages.
The Supreme Court held that no position
demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness
from its holder than a judicial office. Those
connected with the dispensation of justice, from the
highest official to the lowliest clerk, carry a heavy
burden of responsibility. As frontliners in the
administration of justice, they should live up to the
strictest
standards of honesty and integrity. They must bear in
mind that the image of a court of justice is
necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise,
of the men and women who work there. Office
of the Court Administrator v. Donabel M. Savadera, et al.,
A.M. No. P-04-1903, September 10, 2013.

Impropriety; judge

Respondent Judge clearly fell short of the exacting

standards set by the New Code of

Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. His acts of

receiving lawbooks worth fifty thousand pesos,
cellular phones and monthly cellular phone prepaid cards
from the property guardians of the late Rev.
Fr. Aspiras, who was then the ward of the court,
constitute impropriety which the Supreme Court cannot
allow. Respondent Judges act of issuing Orders directing
the manager of the PNB, La Union Branch to
draw checks amounting to thousands of pesos from the
account of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras creates the
impression of impropriety and subjects the court to
suspicion of irregularities in the conduct of the
proceedings. Heirs of the Late Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras v.
Judge Clifton U. Ganay, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2055,
Bar discipline case;

December 17, 2009

Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC (Re: Automatic

cases against judge

Conversion of
Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court
of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, Judges of
Regular and Special Courts, and Court Officials Who Are
Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Them Both as Officials and as Members of the Philippine
Bar), this administrative case shall also be considered as a
disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the
bar. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Judge Harun B. Ismael, A.M. No. RTJ-07-

Delay; rendering an

2045, January 19, 2010

A delay of nearly three years of a Court of Appeals Justice

order

in resolving a
Motion for Inhibition directed against her constitutes
undue delay in rendering an order.
Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the Constitution directs that
All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of
this Constitution must be decided or resolved within
twenty-four months from the date of submission
for the Supreme Court, and unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate
courts, and three months for all other lower courts.

Respondents justification for the delay in resolving the

motion for inhibition in deference to the
authority of the SC to resolve the issues raised in the
petition for certiorari does not impress. Section 7 of
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for
certiorari shall not interrupt the course of the
principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction has been issued
against the public respondent from further proceeding
with the case. This rule must be strictly adhered
to by appellate and lower courts notwithstanding the
possibility that the proceedings undertaken by
them tend to or would render nugatory the pending
petition before the SC.
But even gratuitously crediting respondents justification
for the delay, since the Court resolved the
complainants petition for certiorari on April 7, 2007, still
given the nature and history of the cases,
respondent unduly delayed the resolution of a mere
motion for inhibition only on October 8, 2008, after
the Court referred the present complaint to the appellate
court and after complainant filed a reiterative
motion.
Under Section 9(1) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
undue delay in rendering a decision or order is a
less serious charge. Ramon C. Gonzales vs. Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, A.M. No.
Delay; resolution of

CA-10-49-J, January 28, 2010

Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the Constitution provides that

cases

lower courts have a

period of 90 days only within which to decide or resolve a
case from the time it is submitted for decision.
In this case, more than three years beyond the 90-day
reglementary period lapsed before the case was
decided by Judge Cruz.
The reasons proffered by the said judge failed to persuade
the Court. First, he claims that his illness
primarily caused the delay in the disposition of the case.

However, the case was submitted for decision

before he claimed to be indisposed. There was also no
showing that respondent judge was continually ill
from the time that the case was submitted for decision
until the promulgation of the judgment. Removal
of cataract from both eyes does not entail prolonged
confinement. Besides, granting that his illness
hindered the efficient performance of his functions, all
respondent judge had to do was request for an
extension of time within which to decide the case. Second,
he claims that the delay was partly due to
heavy pressure of work. Precisely, a judge is mandated to
resolve cases with dispatch. Section 5, Canon 6
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct categorically exhorts
all judges to perform all judicial duties,
including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently,
fairly and with reasonable promptness.
Delay in the disposition of cases not only deprives litigants
of their right to speedy disposition of their
cases, but also tarnishes the image of the judiciary.
Procrastination among members of the judiciary in
rendering decisions and taking appropriate actions on the
cases before them not only causes great
injustice to the parties involved but also invites suspicion
of ulterior motives on the part of the judge, in
addition to the fact that it erodes the faith and confidence
of our people in the judiciary, lowers its
standards and brings it into disrepute. Luminza Delos
Reyes vs. Judge Danilo S. Cruz and Clerk of Court vs.
Godolfo R. Gundran, Both of Reginal Trial Court, Branch
152, Pasig City, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2152, January 18,
2010
Failure to decide or resolve cases within the reglementary
period constitutes
gross inefficiency and is not excusable. It is a less serious
charge and is punishable by either suspension
from office without salaries and benefits for not less than

one month but not more than three months, or

a fine of more than Php 10,000 but not exceeding Php
20,000.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge
shall perform all judicial duties, including the
delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with
reasonable promptness. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of
the Code admonishes all judges to dispose of the courts
business promptly and decide cases within the
period specified in Section 15 (1) and (2), Article VIII of the
Constitution. Office of the Court Administrator
vs. Judge Harun B. Ismael, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2045, January
Judges; delay in

19, 2010
The Constitution provides that all lower courts must

rendering decisions

decide all
cases filed within three months. Further, the Code of
Judicial Conduct states that a judge shall dispose of
the courts business promptly and decide the cases within
the required periods.
Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and
confidence of the people in the judiciary, lowers its
standards, and brings it to disrepute. Judges should not
abuse the grant of an extension to decide a case,
and strive to decide the case within the extended period
granted by the Court.
Under Sec. 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay
in rendering a decision or order is classified as
a less serious charge punishable with suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for not
less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or a fine
of more than P10,000.00, but not
exceeding P20,000.00.
In this case, Judge Batingana decided Civil Case No. 2063
four years after the first extension granted to
him by the Court, and two years after the Court denied his
seventh request for extension and directed
him to submit a copy of his decision through the OCA, but
he failed to decide Civil Case No. 1759

despite the numerous extensions granted to him. Request

of Judge Nio A. Batingana Regional Trial
Court, Brach 6, Mati, Davao Oriental for extension of time to
decide Criminal Cases Nos. 2063 and 1756, A.M.
No. 05-8-463-RTC, February 17, 2010
Respondent Judge Asdala violated the 90-day
reglementary
period for rendering decisions. Respondent judge is guilty
of undue delay in rendering a decision.
Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution requires judges
to decide all cases within three (3) months
from the date of submission. This Constitutional policy is
reiterated in Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct which states that a judge should
administer justice impartially and without delay; and
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the same Code provides that a judge
shall dispose of the courts business promptly
and decide cases within the required periods. The 90-day
period is mandatory. Failure to decide cases
within the reglementary period constitutes a ground for
administrative liability except when there are
valid reasons for the delay. The raison detre behind the
rule on mandatory compliance with the
constitutionally prescribed periods is that the honor and
integrity of the judiciary is measured not only
by the fairness and correctness of the decisions rendered,
but also by the efficiency with which disputes
are resolved. Thus, judges must perform their official
duties with utmost diligence if public confidence in
the judiciary is to be preserved. There is no excuse for
mediocrity in the performance of judicial
functions. The position of judge exacts nothing less than
faithful observance of the law and the
Constitution in the discharge of official duties. Carmen
Edao vs. G. Asdala, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2007.
Judges; gross

December 6, 2010
With respect to cases reported by the OCA which remain

inefficiency

undecided even
beyond the reglementary period, it appears that in most of
these cases, thirty (30) days had elapsed from
the date of submission of the case for decision.
Respondent insists that the reckoning period should be
ninety (90) days as provided under the Constitution.
However, the cases enumerated by the OCA appear
to fall under the Rules on Summary Procedure, where the
required period to decide the same is thirty
(30) days. Otherwise, the OCA would not have reported
that the decisions in these cases are already
overdue.
In her desperate attempt to vindicate herself with respect
to supposed decisions of cases which were
found to have gone beyond the ninety (90) day
reglementary period, respondent tried to mislead the
Court in her Comment and Supplemental Comment by
arguing that since she has not yet issued an
Order declaring the cases as submitted for decision, the
same are not yet ready for judicial determination
such that the ninety (90) day reglementary period in
deciding the said cases does not yet run. She also
contended that in determining the period for the decision
in the subject cases to become due,
the OCA failed to show whether other pleadings have yet
to be filed by the parties after the cases were
deemed submitted for decision.
Respondents arguments have again exposed her gross
ignorance of the law and mires her even more
into a deeper hole from which there was neither reprieve
nor escape. Respondent should be aware of the
basic rule that once a case is submitted for decision, no
further pleadings are required to be filed.
Moreover, there is no need to issue an order declaring a
case to be submitted for decision in order that
the ninety (90) day period in deciding the same shall begin
to run.
Failure to promptly decide cases in accordance with the

Constitution or the Rules of Court constitutes

gross inefficiency. Judge Dolores L. Espaol, etc. vs. Judge
Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas, etc., A.M. No. MTJ-03Judges; undue delay in

1462, February 11, 2010

Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that

rendering decision

all lower courts must decide or resolve all cases or matters

filed within three months. Moreover, Rule
3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that a judge
shall dispose of the courts business promptly
and decide the cases within the required periods.
The Court granted Judge Batingana an extension of 90
days, or until February 11, 2008, to decide
Criminal Case No. 4645-05. However, he decided the case
only on July 8, 2009, or after one year and
almost five months from the extension granted.
As oft stated, justice delayed is justice denied. The honor
and integrity of the judiciary is measured not
only by the fairness and correctness of decisions rendered,
but also by the efficiency with which the
disputes are resolved. Judges are therefore mandated to
perform their duties with utmost diligence in
order to preserve the confidence of the public in the
judiciary.
Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue
delay in rendering a decision or order is classified
as a less serious charge punishable with suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for not
less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or a fine
of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding
P20,000.00. Request of Judge Nio A. Batingana Regional
Trial Court, Branch 6, Mati, Davao Oriental, for
extension of time to decide Criminal Case No. 4745-05, A.M.

Judges; gross

No. 08-2-107-RTC, February 1, 2010

Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates

inefficiency

lower courts to
decide or resolve cases or matters for decision or final
resolution within three (3) months from date of
submission. Failure to decide cases within the 90-day

reglementary period may warrant imposition of

administrative sanctions on the erring judge.
Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
enjoins judges to dispose of their business promptly
and to decide cases within the required period. Thus, all
cases or matters must be decided or resolved
by all lower courts within a period of three (3) months
from submission.
Furthermore, the Court, in Administrative Circular No. 399 dated January 15, 1999, requires all judges
to scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the
Constitution for deciding cases, because failure to
comply therewith violates the constitutional right of the
parties to speedy disposition of their cases.
Likewise, Administrative Circular No. 28, dated July 3,
1989, expressly provides that:
(3) x x x Lack of transcript of stenographic notes shall not
be a valid reason to interrupt or suspend the
period for deciding the case x x x.
Under Section 9(1), Rule 140, Revised Rules of Court,
undue delay in rendering a decision constitutes a
less serious charge punishable under Section 11(b) of the
same Rule by either suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1)
month but not more than three (3) months, or a
fine of more than Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) but
not exceeding Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00).
Because Judge Emuslan could not proffer any valid
excuse, his failure to decide the 43 cases translates to
gross inefficiency in the performance of his duties. He
should be held administratively liable. Re: Cases
Submitted for decision before Hon. Meliton G. Emuslan,
former Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Urdaneta
Judges; gross

City, Pangasinan, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2226, March 22, 2010

This is a case about the improper conduct of an MTC

misconduct

judge who kept

properties owned by the complainant while conducting a

preliminary investigation. During the ocular

inspection, Judge Ocampo allegedly took pieces of antique,
including a marble bust of Spelmans
mother, a flower pot, a statue, and a copper scale of
justice. A week later, Judge Ocampo went back and
further took six Oakwood chairs and its table, four gold
champagne glasses, and a deer horn chandelier.
Judge Ocampo denied the charge, pointing out that
Spelmans wife, Villan (the complainant in that theft
case), gave him certain household items for safekeeping
before she filed the case of theft against Rencio.
Respondent judge should be made accountable for gross
misconduct constituting violations of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Section 6 of Canon
1, Section 1 of Canon 2, and Section 1 of Canon
4. From the circumstances, his acts were motivated by
malice. He was not a warehouseman for personal
properties of litigants in his court. He certainly would have
kept Spelmans properties had the latter not
filed a complaint against him. He was guilty of
covetousness. It affected the performance of his duties
as an officer of the court and tainted the judiciarys
integrity. He should be punished accordingly. Roland
Ernest Marie Jose Spelmans vs. Judge Gaydifredo T.
Ocampo, Municipal Trial Court, Polomolok, South Cotabato,
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1663, March 26, 2010
When Judge Limbona was appointed as a judge, he took
an oath to uphold
the law, yet in filing a certificate of candidacy as a partylist representative without giving up his
judicial post, he violated not only the law, but the
constitutional mandate that no officer or employee in
the civil service shall engage directly or indirectly, in any
electioneering or partisan political campaign.
The NBI investigation on the authenticity of Judge
Limbonas signatures on the certificate of candidacy
unqualifiedly established that the judge signed the

certificate of candidacy, thus negating his claim that

his signatures were forged. The filing of a certificate of
candidacy is a partisan political activity as the
candidate thereby offers himself to the electorate for an
elective post. For his continued performance of
his judicial duties despite his candidacy for a political
post, Judge Limbona is guilty of grave misconduct
in office. While we cannot interfere with Judge Limbonas
political aspirations, we cannot allow him to pursue his
political goals while still on the bench. We cannot likewise
allow him to deceive the Judiciary.
In light of the gravity of Judge Limbonas infractions, we
find OCAs recommended penalty of
dismissal to be appropriate. Under the Rules of Court,
dishonesty and gross misconduct are punishable
by dismissal. Ashary M. Alauya, Clerk of Court, Sharia
District Court, Marawi City v. Judge Casan Ali M.
Limbona, Sharia Circuit Court, Lanao del Sur, A.M. No.
Judges; simple

SCC-98-4, March 22, 2011

There was no showing from Judge Barillo that he exerted

misconduct

any effort at all to

ascertain the correct rule or procedure regarding the
lifting of suspension of lawyers, or to determine if
the suspension of Atty. Paras had indeed already been
lifted before the said counsel was allowed to
resume his practice of law. Significantly, upon verification
by the Court of the status of the suspension of
Atty. Paras, it appeared that, based on the records of the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the suspension
imposed on Atty. Paras in A.C. No. 3066 was yet to be
lifted. In our opinion, Judge Barillo was negligent
in failing to confirm such fact.
Still, the Court is not convinced that Judge Barillo should
be held liable for gross misconduct and gross
ignorance of the law absent any evidence showing outright
bad faith. It may truly be said that the
various faux pas committed by Judge Barillo are examples
of poor judgment and negligence. However,

equally important to note is the fact that there is no

allegation, much less a genuine showing, that Judge
Barillo was impelled by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or
some other corrupt motive in committing the
acts for which he was charged. Neither were allegations of
corruption nor imputations of pecuniary
benefit ever asserted against him.
Thus, contrary to the findings of the OCA, the
transgressions committed by Judge Barillo in this case are
not flagrant enough or motivated by any ill motive so as to
be classified as grave misconduct or to
warrant a finding of gross ignorance of the law.
Nevertheless, the Court rules that Judge Barillo is guilty
of simple misconduct in view of the commission of acts
which subjected the MTC to distrust and
accusations of partiality. Hon. Hector B. Barillo, Acting
Presiding Judge, MTC, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental
vs. Hon. Ralph Lantion, et al./Walter J. Aragones vs. Hon.
Hector B. Barillo, Acting Presiding Judge, MTC,
Guihulngan, Negros, G.R. No. 159117/A.M. No. MTJ-101752, March 10, 2010
Judge Carbonell had no authority to render a decision on
the subject civil
case. As clearly laid down in Circular No. 19-98, the
pairing judge shall take cognizance of all cases until
the assumption to duty of the regular judge. Since Judge
Tabora was already present and performing her
functions in court, it was improper for Judge Carbonell to
have rendered a decision in Civil Case No.
6840 without the approval of the regular presiding judge.
For violating Section 2, Canon 3 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct [on Impartiality], we find Judge
Carbonell guilty of simple misconduct. Simple
misconduct has been defined as an unacceptable behavior
that transgresses the established rules of
conduct for public officers. Judge Mona Lisa T. Tabora,
Regional Trial Court, Br. 26 San Fernando City, La

union vs. Judge Antonio Carbonell, Regional Trial Court,

Branch 27 San Fernando City, La Union, A.M. No. 08Judges; gross

2145. June 18, 2010

Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross

ignorance of the law

ignorance of the
law for issuing a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) in favor
of petitioner Albert Chang Tan in SP Case
No. M-6373, since a TPO cannot be issued in favor of a
man against his wife under R.A. No. 9262, the
AntiViolence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004. Indeed, as a family court judge, Judge
Arcaya-Chua is expected to know the correct
implementation of R.A. No. 9262. Francisco P. Ocampo vs.
Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua/Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua/Office of
the
Court Administrator vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua, et
al./Sylvia Santos vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua,
A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ/A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049/A.M.
No. RTJ-08-2141/A.M. No. RTJ-2093, April 23,
2010
When the law or procedure is so elementary, such as the
provisions of
the Rules of Court, not to know, or to act as if one does not
know the same, constitutes gross ignorance of
the law, even without the complainant having to prove
malice or bad faith.
Section 7 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is plain and
simple: it limits the imposable penalty for
contempt committed against a lower court to a fine not
exceeding P5,000 or imprisonment of one month,
or both. In this case, respondent Judge issued an Order
finding complainants guilty of contempt
committed against the Municipal Trial Court and
sentencing them to suffer imprisonment of four
months to be served in the Municipal Jail of Himamaylan,
and issued on even date warrants for their

arrest. Respondent is thus liable for gross ignorance of the

law. Maria Panco, et al. vs. Judge Y Aguirre, et
al., A.M. No. RTJ-09-2196, April 7, 2010
While a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of
the law
for every erroneous order that he renders, it is also
axiomatic that when the legal principle involved is
sufficiently basic, lack of conversance with it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. Indeed, even though
a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action
for every erroneous order or decision he
renders, that relative immunity is not a license to be
negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his
adjudicatory prerogatives. It does not mean that a judge
need not observe propriety, discreetness and
due care in the performance of his official functions. This
is because if judges wantonly misuse the
powers vested on them by the law, there will not only be
confusion in the administration of justice but
also oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due
process.
The rule is very explicit as to when admission to bail is
discretionary on the part of the respondent
Judge. In offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or
death, the accused has no right to bail when the
evidence of guilt is strong. Thus, as the accused in
Criminal Case No. 3620-01 had been sentenced
to reclusion perpetua, the bail should have been cancelled,
instead of increasing it as respondent Judge
did.
Clearly, in the instant case, the act of Mangotara in
increasing the bail bond of the accused instead of
canceling it is not a mere deficiency in prudence,
discretion and judgment on the part of respondent
Judge, but a patent disregard of well-known rules. When
an error is so gross and patent, such error
produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable

for gross ignorance of the law. It is a pressing

responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the law and
changes therein, as well as with the latest
decisions of the Supreme Court. One cannot seek refuge in
a mere cursory acquaintance with the statute
and procedural rules. Ignorance of the law, which everyone
is bound to know, excuses no one not even
judges. Hadja Sohurah Dipatuan vs. Presiding Judge
Mamindiara P. Mangotara, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2190, April
23, 2010
With the numerous cases already decided on the matter of
bail, we
feel justified to expect judges to diligently discharge their
duties on the grant or denial of applications for
bail. Judge Buaya granted the ex-parte motion to grant
bail on the same day that it was filed by the
accused. He did this without the required notice and
hearing. He justified his action on the ex-parte
motion by arguing that the offense charged against the
accused was a bailable offense; a hearing was no
longer required since bail was a matter of right. Under the
present Rules of Court, however, notice and
hearing are required whether bail is a matter of right or
discretion. Lorna M. Villanueva vs. Judge
Apolinario M. Buaya, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2131, November 22,
2010
An administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law
was filed
against Judge De Vera for denying admission of a position
paper due to her mistaken belief that the
same was filed out of time. To constitute gross ignorance of
the law, it is not enough that the subject
decision, order or actuation of respondent judge in the
performance of her official duties is contrary to
existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, she
must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty

or corruption. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt

motives or improper considerations are
sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with
ignorance of the law can find refuge. The complaint is
dismissed. Atty. Rafael T. Matinez and Spouses Dan and
Edna Reyes v. Judge Grace Gliceria F. De Vera,
Presiding Judge, MTCC, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, A.M.
Judges; simple neglect

No. MTJ-08-1718, March 9, 2011.

Judge Tamang admittedly approved not only the bail

of duty

bonds issued by
Covenant, a blacklisted bonding company, but also the bail
bonds in some instances for accused persons
charged in criminal cases pending outside her territorial
jurisdiction. Yet, she insisted that she did not
thereby transgress the Code of Judicial Conduct, because
she had relied on the representation of her duly
authorized personnel that the bail bonds were in order.
Judge Tamangs excuse of simply relying on the
representation of the court personnel who unfortunately
took advantage of her leniency and kindness betrayed a
deficiency in that requisite degree of
circumspection demanded of all those who don the judicial
robe. She cannot now thereby exculpate
herself, for, in fact, such reliance was actually her
admission of being neglectful and of lacking the
diligent care in paying attention to the judicial matters
brought to her for signature. A carelessness of
that kind and degree ran contrary to the competence
expected of her as a dispenser of justice and as a
visible representation of the law.
She was thereby guilty of a neglect of duty, for, according
to Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of
Confiscated Cash, Surety and Property Bonds at RTC,
Tarlac City, Brs. 63, 64 & 65 (A.M. No. 04-7-358-RTC,
July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 21), the judge is still bound to
review the supporting documents before
approving the bail bonds, even if it is the Clerk of Court
who has the duty to ascertain that the bail bonds

are in order, and that all requisites for approval have been
complied with. We thus find her guilty of
simple neglect of duty, a light charge under Section 10,
Rule 140, Rules of Court, for we are all too aware
of the pitfalls that a judge like her frequently stumbles into
when detailed in another station. She became
an unwitting victim of the continuing illegal activities of
Medrano, who took advantage of her being too
busy with her judicial and administrative duties and tasks
to have noticed and prevented his illegal
activities. Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Hon.
Marilou Runes-Tamang, Presiding Judge, MeTC
Pateros, Manila and Presiding Judge, MeTC San Juan,
Judges; simple

Metro Manila, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1558, April 7, 2010

Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.

negligence

01-8-10-SC, which
pertains to the Discipline of Justices and Judges, does not
provide any penalty for simple negligence.
The Court, though, deems simple negligence as falling
within the ambit of simple misconduct.
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate
violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior, especially by a government official. To constitute
an administrative offense, misconduct should
relate to or be connected with the performance of the
official functions and duties of a public officer.
In this case, there was ostensible legal basis for Judge
Paderanga to dismiss an action for failure of the
plaintiff to attend the mediation conference. However,
Judge Paderangas Order dated November 9,
2005, dismissing Civil Case No. 2005-160, was improperly
and prematurely issued. Judge Paderanga
failed to take into consideration that Bacalzo, the plaintiff,
could not have attended the mediation
conference scheduled on November 4, 2005 because the
said date had been declared a regular holiday
under Presidential Proclamation No. 933. The declaration
of November 4, 2005 as a holiday was a

development totally outside Bacalzos control for which she

should not be sanctioned with the dismissal
of the case. Evidently, Judge Paderanga failed to exercise
the necessary diligence before issuing the
Order dismissing the case, to the prejudice of Bacalzo.
This, however, makes Judge Paderanga liable for
simple negligence, and not gross ignorance of the law and
grave abuse of authority, as charged by
Senarlo. Cecilia Gadrinab Senarlo vs. Judge Maximo G.W.
Paderanga, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-06-2025, April 5,
Judges; violation of

2010
Before this Court is the Motion For

Code of Judicial

Reconsideration, filed by respondent Judge, of the

Conduct; penalty

Decision finding him guilty of violating Rule 2.03 of

the Code of Judicial Conduct and ordering him to pay a
fine of P5,000.00. In his Motion, respondent
Judge alleged that the penalty of fine of P5,000.00 was too
severe, considering that he is a first-time
offender.
While this Court is duty-bound to sternly wield a
corrective hand to discipline its errant employees and
to weed out those who are undesirable, this Court also
has the discretion to temper the harshness of its
judgment with mercy. Thus, in the interest of fair play and
compassionate justice, considering that this
was respondent Judges first offense, we resolve to grant
the instant motion for reconsideration. In lieu
of fine, Judge Cesar O. Untalan of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 149, Makati City, is ADMONISHED
to be more circumspect in his official and personal
deportment, with a WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely. Alfredo Favor vs. Judge Cesar O.

Judges; gross

Untalan, et al, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2158, April 13, 2010

Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution

inefficiency

mandates lower court

judges to decide a case within the reglementary period of
90 days. The Code of Judicial Conduct under

Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 likewise enunciates that judges

should administer justice without delay and directs
every judge to dispose of the courts business promptly
within the period prescribed by law. Rules
prescribing the time within which certain acts must be
done are indispensable to prevent needless delays
in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the
90-day period is mandatory.
Judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Any
delay, no matter how short, in the disposition of
cases undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the
judiciary. It also deprives the parties of their
right to the speedy disposition of their cases. Failure to
decide a case within the reglementary period is
not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency
warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on
the defaulting judge.
The inefficiency of Judge Andoy is evident in his failure to
decide 139 cases within the mandatory
reglementary period for no apparent reason. Some of these
cases have been submitted for resolution as
early as 1997. Judge Andoy, upon finding himself unable
to comply with the 90-day period, could have
asked the Court for a reasonable period of extension to
dispose of the cases. The Court, mindful of the
heavy caseload of judges, generally grants such requests
for extension. Yet, Judge Andoy also failed to
make such a request. Re: Cases submitted for decision
before Hon. Teresito A. Andoy, former Judge, Municipal
Trial Court, Cainta, Rizal, A.M. No. 09-9-163-MTC. May 6,
Judge; abuse of

2010
In issuing the Direct Contempt Order without legal basis,

authority

Judge Francisco is
more appropriately guilty of the administrative offense of
grave abuse of authority, rather than gross
ignorance of the law and incompetence. Olivia Laurel Vs.
Judge Pablo B. Francisco/Judge Pablo B. Francisco
Vs. Olivia Laurel/Judge Pablo B. Francisco Vs. Olivia

Laurel/Judge Pablo B. Francisco Vs. Gerardo P. Hernandez,

et al./Judge Pablo B. Francisco Vs. Nicanor B. Alfonso, et
al./Judge Pablo B. Francisco Vs. Caridad D.
Cuevillas/Judge Pablo B. Francisco Vs. Hermina S. Javier,
et al./Judge Pablo B. Francisco Vs. Atty. Rowena A.
Malabanan-Galeon, et al./Judge Pablo B. Francisco Vs.
Atty. Rowena A. Malabanan-Galeon//Judge Pablo B.
Francisco Vs. Atty. Rowena A. Malabanan-Galeon, et
al./Joel O. Arellano and Arnel M. Magat Vs. Judge Pablo B.
Francisco, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1992/A.M. No. P-10-2745/A.M.
No. RTJ-00-1992/A.M. No. P-10-2746/A.M. No. P102747/A.M. No. P-10-2748/A.M. No. P-10-2749/A.M. No.
P-10-2750/A.M. No. P-10-2751/A.M. No. P-03Judge; bias and

1706/A.M. No. RTJ-10-2214, July 6, 2010

Established is the norm that judges should not only be

partiality

impartial but should

also appear impartial. Judges must not only render just,
correct and impartial decisions, but must do so
in a manner free from any suspicion as to their fairness,
impartiality and integrity. This reminder applies
even more to lower court judges like herein respondent
because they are judicial front-liners who have
direct contact with litigants. Atty. Jose A. Bernas vs. Judge
Julia A. Reyes, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 69,

Judge; gross ignorance

Pasig City, A.M. No. MTJ-09-1728, July 21, 2010

To be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge

of the law

must be
shown to have committed an error that was gross or
patent, deliberate or malicious. Also
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law is a
judge who shown to have been motivated by
bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption ignored,
contradicted or failed to apply settled law and
jurisprudence. As a matter of public policy though, the
acts of a judge in his official capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are
erroneous. Good faith and absence of malice,
corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient

defenses in which a judge charged with

ignorance of the law can find refuge. Rolando E. Marcos vs.
Judge Ofelia T. Pinto, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2180, July
26, 2010
A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known
rules
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We find that the
respondent judges error does not rise to the level
of gross ignorance of the law that is defined by
jurisprudence. We take judicial notice of the fact that at
the time he issued the Writ of Amparo on January 23,
2008, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo has been
effective for barely three months. At that time, the
respondent judge cannot be said to have been fully
educated and informed on the novel aspects of the Writ of
Amparo. More importantly, for full liability to
attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision
or actuation of the judge in the performance
of official duties must not only be found to be erroneous; it
must be established that he was motivated by
bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar motive.
Ruben Salcedo vs. Judge Gil Bollozos, A.M. No.
RTJ-10-2236, July 5, 2010
Respondent was charged with gross ignorance of the law
for reversing
motu proprio a final and executory order rendered by
another court ten years earlier. The Court ruled that
the respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He
failed to conform to the high standards of
competence required of judges under the Code of Judicial
Conduct. Competence is a mark of a good
judge. When a judge exhibits an utter lack of know-how
with the rules or with settled jurisprudence, he
erodes the publics confidence in the competence of our
courts. It is highly crucial that judges be
acquainted with the law and basic legal principles.

Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to

know, excuses no one not even judges. Imelda R. Marcos
vs. Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan, A.M. No. RTJ07-2062. January 18, 2011.
Respondent judge failed to cause the raffle of an
injunction case and
failed to follow the procedural requirements in issuing a
TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction as he
issued them without prior notice to the defendant and
without a hearing. The Court found respondent
judge liable for gross ignorance of the law and procedure.
Though not every judicial error bespeaks
ignorance of the law or of the rules, and that, when
committed in good faith, does not warrant
administrative sanction, the rule applies only in cases
within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment.
When the law or the rule is so elementary, not to be aware
of it or to act as if one does not know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. A judge is expected
to keep abreast of the developments and
amendments thereto, as well as of prevailing
jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily
be
the mainspring of injustice. In the absence of fraud,
dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a judge in his
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action.
However, the assailed judicial acts must not be in
gross violation of clearly established law or procedure,
which every judge must be familiar with. Spouses
Democrito and Olivia Lago vs. Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr.,
RTC, Br. 43. Gingoog City, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2255,
January 17, 2011
Respondent judges, without authority, took cognizance of
cases
pending before another court in the absence of a presiding
judge for that court. The Court held that they

were guilty of gross ignorance of the law. While they might

have been motivated by noble intentions in
taking cognizance of the pending cases because they
wanted to uphold the accuseds right to liberty, they
still cannot escape liability. However well-intentioned they
might have been, they still did not have the
authority to act on the cases as these were not pending
before their respective salas. Their lack of
authority was so patent and so self-evident; to disregard it
would itself be ignorance of the law. Office of
the Court Administrator vs. Judge Benjamin P. Estrada,
RTC, Br. 9, Malaybalay, Bukidnon and Judge Josefina
Gentiles-Bacal, RTC, Br 10, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, A.M.
No. RTJ-09-2173, January 18, 2011.
Respondent, a MTC judge, conducted a preliminary
investigation and
found probable cause to hold the complainant for trial for
the crime of direct assault. The conduct of
preliminary investigation by respondent judge was in
direct contravention of A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC,
which took effect on 3 October 2005, amending Rules 112
and 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure by removing the authority to conduct
preliminary investigations from judges of the first level
courts. Thus, under Section 2 of Rule 112, only the
following officers are authorized to conduct
preliminary investigations: (a) Provincial or City
Prosecutors and their assistants; (b) National and
Regional State Prosecutors; and (c) Other officers as may
be authorized by law. Clearly, MTC judges are
no longer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation.
The complainant is charged with direct
assault with an imposable penalty of 2 years, 4 months
and 1 day to 6 years. It was therefore incumbent
upon respondent judge to forward the records of the case
to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for
preliminary investigation, instead of conducting the

preliminary investigation himself. When a law or a

rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply
the law. Anything less is gross ignorance of the
law. Judges should exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules,
and should be diligent in keeping abreast with
developments in law and jurisprudence. Respondent
judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Lydelle L.
Conquilla v. Judge Lauro G. Bernardo, MTC, Bocaue,
Bulacan, A.M. No. MTJ-09-1737. February 9, 2011
Complainant filed a Motion for Inhibition against
respondent judge.
Complainant alleged that during the hearing of the Motion
for Inhibition, respondent became very
emotional, coerced her to testify without the assistance of
counsel and demanded a public apology from
her; and that while she requested to refer the motion to
the Executive Judge, respondent interrogated her
relentlessly following which he issued an Order finding her
guilty of Direct Contempt and was detained
for 19 days. Respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance
of the law. The penalty for direct contempt if
imprisonment is imposed should not, as Section 1 of Rule
71 provides, exceed 10 days. In this case,
Complainant was detained for 19 days or 9 days more
than the limit imposed by the Rules. Moreover,
Respondent judge did not fix the bond, in violation of the
same Section 2 of Rule 71, which complainant
could have posted had she desired to challenge the order.
And on the same day the Order was issued,
respondent ordered the confinement of complainant to the
provincial jail. Josephine Jazmines Tan v. Judge
Sibanah E. Usman, RTC, Branch 29, Catbalogan, Samar,
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2666. February 15, 2011
Respondent judge, acting as an investigating judge, issued
orders

archiving several criminal cases instead of forwarding

them to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for
review and appropriate action (this rule is prior to the
amendments introduced by A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC
removing from judges of first level courts the authority to
conduct preliminary investigations). The
Court found the respondent judge liable for gross
ignorance of the law. A judge owes it to himself and
his office to know basic legal principles by heart and to
harness that knowledge correctly and justly,
failing which publics confidence in the courts is eroded. In
issuing the orders archiving the criminal
cases, respondent judge failed to consider that he was
acting not as a trial judge but an investigating
judge of an MTC whose actions were thus governed by
Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure on preliminary investigations. He ought to have
known that after conducting preliminary
investigation on the criminal cases, it was his duty to
transmit his resolution thereon to the provincial or
city prosecutor for appropriate action. His failure to do so
betrays an utter lack of familiarity with the
Rules. The complaint against respondent is for gross
ignorance of the law in which the acts complained
of must not only be contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence; it must have been motivated by bad
faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption the presence of
which in the present case is not clear. Be that as it
may, such leeway afforded a judge does not mean that he
should not evince due care in the performance
of his adjudicatory functions. Sanctions are still in order
as such lapses in judgment cannot be
countenanced. As the Court has repeatedly stressed, a
judge, having applied for the position and
appointed as such, is presumed to know the law. Thus,
when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of
it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Rene C.
Ricablanca v. Judge Hector B. Barillo, A.M. No. MTJ-08-

1710. February 15, 2011

Considering that complainant had already manifested in
court, albeit
belatedly, the presence of what it considered to be a valid
Certification to File Action in court due to
unsuccessful conciliation, respondent judges act of
referring the case to barangay conciliation rendered
its purpose moot and academic. The rules of procedure are
clear and unambiguous, leaving no room for
interpretation. The failure to apply elementary rules of
procedure constitutes gross ignorance of the law
and procedure. Neither good faith nor lack of malice will
exonerate respondent because the rules
violated were basic procedural rules. All that was needed
for respondent to do was to apply them. Diaz
vs. Gestopa, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1786. June 22, 2011
Respondent Judge failed to conduct a pre-trial conference
contrary to
elementary rules of procedure which he should have
known all too well considering his long years of
service in the bench. Such ignorance of a basic rule in
court procedure, as failing to conduct pre-trial,
sadly amounts to gross ignorance and warrants a
corresponding penalty. As to the allegations of poor
judgment and gross ignorance of basic legal principles in
granting the motions for execution pending
appeal for flimsy and unsupported reasons, the particular
reasons relied upon by respondent judge for
issuing the writ of execution pending appeal are so
unreliably weak and feeble that it highlights the lack
of knowledge of respondent judge with regard to the proper
appreciation of arguments. Dire financial
conditions of the plaintiffs supported by mere self-serving
statements as good reason for the issuance
of a writ of execution pending appeal does not stand on
solid footing. It does not even stand on its own.

National Power Corporation, represented its President Cyril

Del Callar vs. Judge Santos B. Adiong, Regional Trial
Court, BR. 8, Marawi City, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2060. July 27,
2011
The failure of Judge Infante to conduct a hearing prior to
the grant of
bail in a criminal case involving a crime punishable by a
capital offense, and his mere reliance on the
recommendation for bail by the public prosecutor, was
inexcusable and reflected gross ignorance of the
law and the rules as well as a cavalier disregard of its
requirement. He well knew that the determination
of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong was a
matter of judicial discretion, and that the
discretion lay not in the determination of whether or not a
hearing should be held, but in the
appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the
Prosecutions evidence of guilt against the accused. His
fault was made worse by his granting bail despite the
absence of a petition for bail from the accused.
Consequently, any order he issued in the absence of the
requisite evidence was not a product of sound
judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright
arbitrariness. Atty. Franklin G. Gacal v. Judge
Jaime I. Infante, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, in Alabel,
Sarangani. A.M. No. RTJ-04-1845. October 5,
Judge; simple

2011.
The Judges act of solemnizing the marriage of accuseds

misconduct

son in the residence

of the accused speaks for itself. It is improper and highly
unethical for a judge to actively participate in
such social affairs, considering that the accused is a party
in a case pending before her own sala. In
pending or prospective litigations before them, judges
should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything
that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal,
social or sundry relations could influence

their objectivity. Considering the above findings, it is

apparent that respondent judges actuations
constitute simple misconduct. Rolando E. Marcos vs.
Judge Ofelia T. Pinto, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2180, July 26,
Judge; conduct

2010
Verily, we hold that respondent Judge Belen should be

unbecoming

more circumspect in
his language in the discharge of his duties. A judge is the
visible representation of the law. Thus, he
must behave, at all times, in such a manner that his
conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand the
most searching public scrutiny. The ethical principles and
sense of propriety of a judge are essential to
the preservation of the peoples faith in the judicial
system. A judge must consistently be temperate in
words and in actions. Respondent Judge Belens insulting
statements, tending to project complainants
ignorance of the laws and procedure, coming from his
inconsiderate belief that the latter mishandled the
cause of his client is obviously and clearly insensitive,
distasteful, and inexcusable. Such abuse of power
and authority could only invite disrespect from counsels
and from the public. Patience is one virtue that
members of the bench should practice at all times, and
courtesy to everyone is always called for. Atty.
Raul L. Correa vs. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 36 Calamba City, A.M. No. RTJ-

Judge; delay in

10-2242, August 6, 2010.

To ensure the strict observance of the constitutional

rendering decision

mandate for all

lower courts to decide or resolve cases or matters within
the reglementary period, the Court issued
Administrative Circular No. 13-87. And the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which
took effect on June 1, 2004 expressly requires judges to
perform all judicial duties, including the
delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with
reasonable promptness. Rule 3.05 of the Code

of Judicial Conduct also echoes the mandate to decide or

resolve cases or matters within the
reglementary period by requiring judges to dispose of the
courts business promptly and decide or
resolve cases or matters within the required periods.
Heavy workload per se is not an excuse in not
observing the reglementary period of deciding cases. An
appointment to the Judiciary is an honor
burdened with a heavy responsibility. When respondent
accepted the appointment, he also accepted the
heavy workload that comes with it. Re: Request of Judge
Salvador Ibarreta, Jr., RTC, Br. 8, Davao City, for
extension of time to decide, A.M. No. 07-1-05-RTC, August
Judges; inhibition

23, 2010.
The rule on compulsory disqualification and voluntary
inhibition of judges is
provided under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.
While the second paragraph does not expressly
enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition and leaves it
to the sound discretion of the judge, such
should be based on just or valid reasons. The import of the
rule on the voluntary inhibition of judges is
that the decision on whether to inhibit is left to the sound
discretion and conscience of the judge based
on his rational and logical assessment of the
circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him. It
makes clear to the occupants of the Bench that outside of
pecuniary interest, relationship or previous
participation in the matter that calls for adjudication,
there might be other causes that could conceivably
erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition.
That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors
that lead to preferences and predilections are many and
varied. The issue of voluntary inhibition is
primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion
on the part of the judge. It is a subjective test,
the result of which the reviewing tribunal will not disturb
in the absence of any manifest finding of

arbitrariness and whimsicality. The discretion given to trial

judges is an acknowledgment of the fact that
they are in a better position to determine the issue of
inhibition, as they are the ones who directly deal
with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms. Inhibition is
not allowed at every instance that a
schoolmate or classmate appears before the judge as
counsel for one of the parties, however. In one case,
the Court ruled that organizational affiliation per se is not
a ground for inhibition. Kilosbayan Foundation,
et al. vs. Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr., etc., et al., G.R. No. 180543,
Judge; simple

August 18, 2010

Respondent Justices cannot lightly regard the legal

misconduct, etc

requirement for all of

them to sit together as members of the Fourth Division in
the trial and determination of a case or cases
assigned thereto. It is simply not enough that the three
members of the Fourth Division were within
hearing and communicating distance of one another at the
hearings in question, as they explained in
hindsight, because even in those circumstances not all of
them sat together in session. It is of no
consequence, then, that no malice or corrupt motive
impelled respondent Justices into adopting the
flawed procedure. As responsible judicial officers, they
ought to have been well aware of the
indispensability of collegiality to the valid conduct of their
trial proceedings. For this reason alone,
respondent Justices adoption of the irregular procedure
cannot be dismissed as a mere deficiency in
prudence or as a lapse in judgment on their part, but
should be treated as simple misconduct, which is to
be distinguished from either gross misconduct or gross
ignorance of the law. Justice Ong and Justice
Hernandez admitted randomly asking the counsels
appearing before them from which law schools they
had graduated, and their engaging during the hearings in
casual conversation about their respective law

schools. They thereby publicized their professional

qualifications and manifested a lack of the requisite
humility demanded of public magistrates. Their doing so
reflected a vice of self-conceit. We point out
that publicizing professional qualifications or boasting of
having studied in and graduated from certain
law schools, no matter how prestigious, might have even
revealed, on the part of Justice Ong and Justice
Hernandez, their bias for or against some lawyers. Their
conduct was impermissible, consequently, for
Section 3, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary, demands that judges
avoid situations that may reasonably give rise to the
suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality
in their personal relations with individual members of the
legal profession who practice regularly in
their courts. In this regard, Section 3, Canon 5 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, mandates judges to carry out judicial duties
with appropriate consideration for all persons,
such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, and
judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any
irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of
such duties. Assistant Special Prosecutor III
Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez vs. Justice Gregory S. Ong,
Judge; undue delay in

et al., A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J, August 24, 2010

It bears stressing that ejectment cases must be resolved

rendering decision

with
great dispatch. Their nature calls for it. That explains why
Section 10 of the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure which applies to an ejectment complaint, among
others, directs that within 30 days after the
receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the
expiration of the period for filing the same, the
trial court should render judgment on the case. Without
any order of extension granted by this Court,
the failure to decide even a single case within the required
period constitutes gross inefficiency. Rule 3.08

of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge

should be diligent in discharging administrative
responsibilities and should maintain professional
competence in court management, hence, it is
incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and
filing system so that no disorderliness can
affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition.
Josephine Sarmiento, et al. vs. Hon. Aznar D. Lindayag,
Judge; violation of

et al., A.M. No. MTJ-09-1743, August 3, 2010.

In Ladignon v. Garong, respondent judges act of using the

Code of Judicial

official letterhead of his court and signing the same using

Conduct

the word judge in his letter-complaint to the

First United Methodist Church in Michigan, USA, was held
to be violative of Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Ethics and Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. In view of the foregoing, we find
respondent judge guilty of violation of Section 4 of Canon
1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary [for
committing a similar act]. Michael B. Belen vs. Judge
Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Regional Trial Court, Branch 36
Calamba City, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2139, August 6, 2010.

Judge; grave

No judge has a right to solicit sexual favors from a party

misconduct

litigant even from a

woman of loose morals. In Tan v. Pacuribot, this Court
further stressed: We have repeatedly reminded
members of the Judiciary to so conduct themselves as to
be beyond reproach and suspicion, and to be
free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal
behavior, not only in the discharge of their
official duties but also in their everyday lives. For no
position exacts a greater demand on the moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a
seat in the Judiciary. Judges are mandated to
maintain good moral character and are at all times
expected to observe irreproachable behavior so as not
to outrage public decency. Susan O. Reyes vs. Judge

Manuel N. Duque, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2136,September 21,

Judges; inhibition

2010
The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough
ground for inhibition,
especially when the charge is without basis. Extrinsic
evidence must further be presented to establish
bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to
palpable error which may be inferred from the
decision or order itself. This Court has to be shown acts or
conduct of the judge clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded
the stigma of being biased or partial. BGen.
(Ret.) Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. vs. Hon. Jose R. Hernandez,

Judge; undue delay in

G.R. Nos. 173057-74, September 20, 2010

Respondent indeed gave the defense ten (10) days to

rendering decision

submit
its reply to the prosecutions comment on the motion for
reconsideration and, thereafter, she would
resolve all pending incidents in said consolidated cases.
The reglementary period to resolve the motion
in question began to run from February 8, 2009 or after
the lapse of ten days from January 29, 2009.
Respondent, however, did not act on the matter and
allowed a hiatus in the consolidated criminal cases.
A judge cannot choose to prolong the period for resolving
pending incidents and deciding cases beyond
the period authorized by law. Let it be underscored that it
is the sworn duty of judges to administer
justice without undue delay under the time-honored
precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Judges
should act with dispatch in resolving pending incidents, so
as not to frustrate and delay the satisfaction
of a judgment. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles vs. Judge Maria
Elisa Sempio Diy, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2248,

Motion for

September 29, 2010

While as a general rule the Court does

reconsideration;

not give due course to second motions for reconsideration,

second motion for

this is not without exceptions, as when there

reconsideration

is an extraordinarily persuasive reason and after an

express leave has been obtained, both of which are
present in this case. In denying respondents first motion
for partial reconsideration, the Court applied
the ruling in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Delia H. Panganiban where it was held that a Judges
unblemished record will not justify her lapses. However, as
correctly pointed out by respondent in her
second motion for partial reconsideration, said case
should not have been applied, as it presupposes that
respondent indeed committed lapses which her long
service and unblemished reputation would not
justify while she has always maintained that she had not
committed the act complained of, that is, the
non-filing of the leaves of absence for May 3 and August 3,
2005 because she did not have to. Indeed, if
respondent committed no lapse or violation, then the
Courts denial of her first motion for partial
reconsideration on the basis of the Panganiban decision
deserves to be reviewed. Sr. State Prosecutor
Emmanuel Velasco vs. Hon. Adoracion G. Angeles, A.M.

Judge; ignorance of

OCA IPI No. 05-2353-RTJ, September 6, 2010

Respondent Judge should have granted the plaintiffs

the law

motion for immediate

execution considering that the defendant did not file the
sufficient supersedeas bond despite having
appealed. Respondent Judges excuse, that he had lost
jurisdiction over the case by virtue of the
defendants appeal, was unacceptable in light of the clear
and explicit text of Section 19 of Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court. He could not credibly justify his omission
to act according to the provision by claiming
good faith or honest belief, or by asserting lack of malice
or bad faith. These justify non-compliance only
when there is an as-yet unsettled doubt on the meaning or
applicability of a rule or legal provision.
Lourdes B. Ferrer and Prosperidad M. Arandez vs. Judge
Romeo A. Rabaca, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 25,

Judge; release of

Manila, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1580, October 6, 2010

Judge Luczon averred that Trinidad Irorita filed a

retirement benefits

disbarment case
against his father, Atty. Jimmy Luczon. He maintained
that he is not the Atty. Jimmy Luczon referred to as
respondent in the instant case. He retired from the service
as Presiding Judge of RTC Tuguegarao Branch
1. His retirement benefits, however, have yet to be released
since the necessary clearances cannot be
issued due to the pendency of the instant case. The Court
orders the Office of the Bar Confidant to make
the necessary correction in the records of both Atty.
Jimmy C. Luczon and Judge Jimmy Henry F. Luczon,
Jr., in order to facilitate the release of the retirement
benefits of Judge Luczon. Trinidad Irorita vs. Atty.

Judge; undue delay

Jimmy Lucson, A.C. No. 3872, October 4, 2010

Section 15(1), Article VIII, of the Constitution requires a
trial judge to dispose of all
cases or matters within three months from the time of
their submission for decision. Rule 3.05, Canon 3
of the Code of Judicial Conduct admonishes all judges to
dispose of their courts business promptly and to
decide cases within the required period. Judge Herrera
was guilty of undue delay in the disposition of
the cases pending him his court. His failure to decide his
cases with dispatch constituted gross
inefficiency. His plea of heavy workload, lack of sufficient
time, poor health, and physical impossibility
could not excuse him. Without an order of extension
granted by the Court, a failure to decide even a
single case within the required period rightly constitutes
gross inefficiency that merits administrative
sanction. Re: Cases submitted for decision before Judge
Damaso A. Herrera, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24,
Bian, Laguna A.M. No. RTJ-08-1924, October 13, 2010
Any delay in the determination or resolution of a case, no
matter how insignificant

the case may seem to a judge, is delay in the

administration of justice in general. Respondent Judge
Montojos delay in acting on pending cases clearly
demonstrated his inefficiency. He failed to control the
proceedings or course of the cases; to impose deadlines in
the submission of documents or performance
of acts incident to the disposition of cases; and to resolve
pending incidents on time, and take
appropriate action on incidents arising in the course of
proceedings. A judge should at all times remain
in full control of the proceedings in his sala. Narciso
Bernando, Jr. vs. Judge Peter M. Montojo, A.M. No.
MTJ-10-1754, October 20, 2010
Complainant filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal
before the sala of the
respondent judge. From the filing of the Motion, a period
of more than five (5) months had to pass before
the respondent judge finally directed a writ of execution be
issued. However, the Court ruled that
respondent judge is not administratively liable due to the
defective notice of hearing in complainants
motion. First. Rather than being addressed to the adverse
party, the notice of hearing in complainants
motion was directed to the Branch Clerk of Court. Such
gaffe actually contradicts a basic purpose of the
notice requirementi.e., to inform an adverse party of the
date and time of the proposed hearing.
Second. The notice of hearing did not specify a date and
time of hearing. The notice is merely an
instruction for the clerk of court to submit the motion for
the consideration and approval of the trial court
immediately upon receipt or at any time convenient with
the said court. Jurisprudence had been
categorical in treating a litigious motion without a valid
notice of hearing as a mere scrap of paper. An
important aspect of the above judicial pronouncement is
the absence of any duty on the part of the court

to take action on a motion wanting a valid notice of

hearing. Accordingly, a judge may not be held
administratively accountable for not acting upon a mere
scrap of paper. To impose upon judges a
positive duty to recognize and resolve motions with
defective notices of hearing would encourage
litigants to an unbridled disregard of a simple but
necessary rule of a fair judicial proceeding. Marciano
Alcaraz v. Judge Fatima Gonzales-Asdala, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 87, Quezon City, A.M. No. RTJ-112272. February 16, 2011
During a judicial audit, it was discovered that there were
many pending cases
before the sala of the respondent judge which were
awaiting resolution but were already beyond the
reglementary period. The Supreme Court is aware of the
heavy caseloads heaped on the shoulders of
every trial judge. But such cannot excuse him from doing
his mandated duty to resolve cases with
diligence and dispatch. Judges burdened with heavy
caseloads should request the Court for an
extension of the reglementary period within which to
decide their cases if they think they cannot comply
with their judicial duty. Corollarily, a heavy caseload may
excuse a judges failure to decide cases within
the reglementary period but not their failure to request an
extension of time within which to decide the
case on time. Hence, all that respondent judge needs to do
is request for an extension of time over which
the Court has, almost customarily, been considerate.
Moreover, it is not enough that he pens his decision;
it is imperative to promulgate the same within the
mandated period. The lack of staff that will prepare
and type the decision is equally inexcusable to justify the
delay in the promulgation of the cases. Failure
to render decisions and orders within the mandated period
constitutes a violation of Rule 3.05, Canon 3,

of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which then makes

respondent judge liable administratively. Section 9,
Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court classifies undue
delay in rendering a decision or order as a less
serious charge punishable under Section 11 (B) of the
same Rule. Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted
in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, Mandaue City,
Cebu, A.M. No. 09-7-284-RTC. February 16, 2011
As early as February 27, 2002, the case had been
submitted for decision, but
respondent judge had yet to render a decision by the time
the administrative complaint against him was
filed on November 6, 2009. Judges should meticulously
observe the periods prescribed by the
Constitution for deciding cases because failure to comply
with the said period transgresses the parties
constitutional right to speedy disposition of their cases.
Thus, failure to decide cases within the ninety
(90)-day reglementary period may warrant imposition of
administrative sanctions on the erring judge.
However, the Court is not unmindful of circumstances that
justify the delay in the disposition of the
cases assigned to judges. When a judge sees such
circumstances before the reglementary period ends, all
that is needed is to simply ask the Court, with the
appropriate justification, for an extension of time
within which to decide the case. Evidently, respondent
Judge failed to do any of these options. Antonio
Y. Cabasares v. Judge Filemon A. Tandinco, Jr. Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, 8 Judicial Region, Calbayog City,
Western Samar. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1793. October 19, 2011.
Judge; undue delay in

The subject criminal cases violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are

rendering decision

covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure pursuant to

A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC. Section 17 of this Rule
requires the court to promulgate a judgment not later than
thirty (30) days after termination of trial.

Judge Andoy should have rendered a decision within 30

days from the termination of trial. Even
assuming that the subsequent resettings of the cases for
trial were valid, he should have rendered a
decision within 30 days from the date the cases were
finally considered submitted for decision. His
failure to meet this deadline is a patent indication that he
did not take into account and had disregarded
the Rule on Summary Procedure. Cirila S. Raymund vs.
Judge Teresito A. Andoy, A.M. No. MTJ-09-1738,
October 6, 2010
Respondent Judge failed in his duty to promptly and
expeditiously dispose of the subject civil case. In so failing,
he ran afoul of Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 28 dated July 3, 1989, whose
paragraph three provides: The ninety (90) day
period for deciding the case shall commence to run from
submission of the case for decision without
memoranda; in case the court requires or allows its filing,
the case shall be considered submitted for
decision upon the filing of the last memorandum or upon
the expiration. The respondent should have
issued the order directing the stenographers to submit the
TSNs after the complainant had manifested
that the defendants had not filed their memorandum.
Eduardo B. Olaguer vs. Judge Alfredo D. Ampuan,
Judge; various

A.M. No. MTJ-10-1769, October 6, 2010

Five administrative cases were filed with the Office of the

offenses

Court Administrator
(OCA) against Judge Alberto L. Lerma (respondent judge)
for violating Supreme Court rules, directives,
and circulars, for making untruthful statements in his
certificates of service, for gross ignorance of the
law and/or gross negligence, for delay in rendering an
order, for abusing judicial authority and
discretion, and for serious irregularity. He was found
guilty of all of the charges. The totality of all these

findings underscore the fact that respondent judges

actions served to erode the peoples faith and
confidence in the judiciary. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Judge Alberto L. Lerma/Atty. Lourdes A.
Ona
vs. Judge Alberto L. Lerma/Jose Mari L. Duarte vs. Judge
Alberto L. Lerma/ Ret. General Meliton D. Goyena vs.
Judge Alberto L. Lerma/Office of the Court Administrator
Vs. Judge Alberto L. Lerma, A.M. No. RTJ-072076/A.M. No. RTJ-07-2077/A.M. No. RTJ-2078/A.M. No.
RTJ-07-2079/A.M. No. RTJ-07-2080, October 12,
Judges; violation of

2010
That the assailed Resolutions issued by

Anti-Graft and Corrupt

respondents favored Northern Islands Co., Inc. and the

Practices Act

Guy family does not necessarily render

respondents guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, absent proven particular acts of manifest,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, good
faith and regularity being generally presumed in
the performance of official duties by public officers. In
order for this administrative offense to prosper,
the subject order or actuation of the judge in the
performance of his official duties must not only be
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, more
importantly, must be attended by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption. 3-D Industries, Inc. and Smartel
Phil., Inc. vs. Justices Vicente Q. Roxas and Juan Q.

Judge; making

Enriquez, A.M. No. CA-10-50-J, October 5, 2010

Respondent Judge failed to indicate in his Certificates of

untruthful statements

Service
for May and June 2005 his absences. Canon 3 generally
mandates that a judge should perform official
duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence. Rule
3.01 requires that a judge be faithful to the law
and maintain professional competence, while Rule 3.09
commands a judge to observe high standards of
public service and fidelity at all times. A judges
submission of false certificates of service seriously

undermines and reflects on the honesty and integrity

expected of an officer of the court. This is so
because a certificate of service is not merely a means to
ones paycheck but is an instrument by which the
Court can fulfill the constitutional mandate of the people
s right to a speedy disposition of cases.
Respondent Judge is guilty of making untruthful
statements in his Certificates of Service. Atty. Norlinda
R. Amante-Descallar vs. Judge Reinerio [Abraham] B.
Judge; misconduct

Ramas, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2015. December 15, 2010

Judge Maceda was accused of mishandling the courts
training fund obtained from
the local government because of lack of liquidation report.
Judge cannot be held liable. Nevertheless, in
view of the nature of the fund, which required no
liquidation and is not an accountable judicial fund),
the Court believed that the Judge should have taken steps
such as informing the court staff or filing of
a report with the Office of Court Administratoron how
the fund was handled. This precautionary
move would have placed the Judge above any suspicion of
impropriety. Judges shall avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities.
Atty. Jonna M. Escabarte, et al. vs. Ms. Loida
Marcelina J. Genabe / Ms. Loida Marcelina J. Genabe vs.
Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, et al., A.M. No. P-092602, December 1, 2010
Office of the Court Administrator uncovered the
mismanagement of the records of
Urdaneta RTC Branch 45 presided by respondent judge.
An orderly and efficient case management
system is no doubt essential in the expeditious disposition
of judicial caseloads, because only thereby can
the judges, branch clerks of courts, and the clerks-incharge of the civil and criminal dockets ensure that
the court records, which will be the bases for rendering
the judgments and dispositions, and the review

of the judgments and dispositions on appeal, if any, are

intact, complete, updated, and current. Such a
system necessarily includes the regular and continuing
physical inventory of cases to enable the judge to
keep abreast of the status of the pending cases and to be
informed that everything in the court is in
proper order. In contrast, mismanaged or incomplete
records, and the lack of periodic inventory
definitely cause unwanted delays in litigations and inflict
unnecessary expenses on the parties and the
State. Although the presiding judge and his or her staff
share the duty of taking a continuing and regular
inventory of cases, the responsibility primarily resides in
the presiding judge. The judge should not
forget that he or she is duty-bound to perform efficiently,
fairly, and with reasonable promptness all his
or her judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions. Respondent judge is of simple
misconduct. In re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted
in the Regional Trial Court, Br. 45, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, and Report on the Incident at Br. 49, Same
Court, A.M. No. 08-4-253-RTC, January 12, 2011
We pass upon the unsigned letter complaint for
administrative action and
disbarment against Justice Inting for gross neglect of
judicial duties in deciding a case. In administrative
proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving
the allegations in the complaint with substantial
evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion. We set the applicable standard in
deciding cases involving accusations of
misconduct leveled at judges in Concerned Lawyers of
Bulacan v. Villalon-Pornillos, where we said: The
burden of substantiating the charges in an administrative
proceeding against court officials and
employees falls on the complainant, who must be able to

prove the allegations in the complaint with

substantial evidence. In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, the presumption that respondent
regularly performed her duties will prevail. Moreover, in
the absence of cogent proof, bare allegations of
misconduct cannot prevail over the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions. In
fact, an administrative complaint leveled against a judge
must always be examined with a discriminating
eye, for its consequential effects are, by their nature,
highly penal, such that the respondent stands to face
the sanction of dismissal and/or disbarment. The Court
does not thus give credence to charges based on
mere suspicion and speculation. Given the lack of any
evidence to prove that Justice Inting acted with
any bad faith or ill-motive, we dismiss the complaint
against her. Re: Complaint of Concerned Members of
Chinese Grocers Association Against Justice Socorro B.
Inting of the Court of Appeals, A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-177Judges; administrative

CA-J, April 12, 2011.

Section 1, Rule 140 provides three

Proceedings against

ways by which administrative proceedings against judges

judges; how instituted

may be instituted: (1) motu proprio by the

Supreme Court; (2) upon verified complaint with affidavits
of persons having personal knowledge of the
facts alleged therein or by documents which may
substantiate said allegations; or (3) upon an
anonymous complaint supported by public records of
indubitable integrity. An unverified complaint
against a judge, where the facts alleged are disputed or are
not easily verifiable from public records, will
generally be dismissible for being unsubstantiated. Re:
Letter-complaint of Atty. Ariel Samson C. Cayetuna,
et al., all employees of Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias
against Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias, CA
Mindanao Station, A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-127-CA-J. January

Judge; burden of proof

11, 2011.
It is well-settled that in administrative proceedings, the

burden of proof that

respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the
complainant. Re: Letter-complaint of Atty. Ariel
Samson C. Cayetuna, et al., all employees of Associate
Justice Michael P. Elbinias against Associate Justice
Michael
P. Elbinias, CA Mindanao Station, A.M. OCA IPI No. 08127-CA-J. January 11, 2011
The respondent Justice and court employee were charged
of corruption. Where
one seeks the imposition of a penalty upon a judicial
officer or magistrate on the ground of corruption, it
behooves him/her to establish the charge beyond
reasonable doubt, for the general rules with regard to
admissibility of evidence in criminal cases apply. The
Court ruled that the corruption charges were not
proved by sufficient evidence. It emphasized that while the
Court will never tolerate or condone any act,
conduct or omission that would violate the norms of
public accountability or diminish the peoples faith
in the judiciary, neither will it hesitate to reject suits that
only serve to disrupt rather than promote the
orderly administration of justice. Re: Anonymous Letter
Relative to the Alleged Corruption in the Court of
Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City, A.M. No. 07-6-14-CA,
Judge; gross

January 18, 2011.

Respondent judge failed to decide 102 criminal cases and

incompetence and

43

inefficiency

civil cases within the reglementary period. As a general

principle, rules prescribing the time within
which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings
taken, are considered absolutely indispensable
to the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly
and speedy discharge of judicial business. By
their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.
In the same vein, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct is emphatic in enjoining judges

to administer justice without delay by

disposing of the courts business promptly and deciding
cases within the period prescribed by law.
Corollary to this, Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated
January 15, 1999, requires all judges to
scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the
Constitution for deciding cases, because failure to
comply therewith violates the constitutional right of the
parties to speedy disposition of the cases. Only
in certain meritorious cases, that is, those involving
difficult questions of law or complex issues, may a
longer period to decide the case be allowed but only upon
proper application for extension of the period
has been made by the concerned judge. Respondent judge
is guilty of gross incompetence and gross
inefficiency. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Former
Judge Leonardo L. Leonida of the RTC, Br. 27, Sta.
Judge; impropriety

Cruz, Laguna, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2198. January 18, 2011.

Respondent judge sent a letter, in his official letterhead, to
one of the parties in a case
pending before his own court, inviting the latter to a
conference to discuss the case. The Court found the
respondent guilty of impropriety. Employees of the court
have no business meeting with litigants or
their representatives under any circumstance. This
prohibition is more compelling when it involves a
judge who, because of his position, must strictly adhere to
the highest tenets of judicial conduct; a judge
must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence. Mansueta Rubin vs. Judge Jose
Aguirre, Jr., RTC, Br. 55, Himamaylan, Negros Occidental,

Judge; gross

A.M. No. RTJ-11-2267, January 19, 2011

Respondent judge obtained commodity and cash loans

misconduct

from the complainant

for the construction of his home. Respondent judge
pleaded innocence reasoning that the loans were
obtained when there was no case pending in his sala
where the complainant is a party. The above

disclaimer notwithstanding, the Court held that

respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct.
Respondent judge violated the New Code of Judicial
Conduct. Although at the time he and his family
had business dealings with complainant there was no
pending case involving the businessman, he
should have been more circumspect in securing the
construction materials. The sphere of complainants
business operations was within his territorial jurisdiction.
As the OCA aptly noted, it is neither
impossible nor remote that a case might be filed in his
court with complainant as a party. In such a case,
his (respondent) business and financial dealings with
complainant would create a doubt about his
fairness and impartiality in deciding the case and would
tend to corrode the respect and dignity of the
court. In addition, the Court found that Judge respondent
committed impropriety in talking with
litigants outside court proceedings. His improper conduct
was further aggravated by the fact that these
conversations took place in the absence of the opposing
litigants and/or the opposing counsel. Time and
again, the Court have emphasized that judges are expected
to conduct themselves in a manner that
would enhance respect and confidence of the people in the
judicial system. The New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges
must not only maintain their independence,
integrity and impartiality; they must also avoid any
appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may
erode the peoples faith in the Judiciary. These standards
apply not only to the decision itself, but also to
the process by which the decision is made. Victoriano Sy
vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-092189, January 18, 2011.
Respondent committed acts unbecoming of a judge, in
particular, talking to a

prospective litigant in his court, recommending a lawyer to

the litigant, and preparing a motion for the
litigant, which pleading was filed in his court and was
acted upon by him. The conduct of a judge
should be beyond reproach and reflective of the integrity of
his office. Indeed, as stated by the OCA, the
said acts of respondent violate Section 1 of Canon 2
(Integrity), Section 2 of Canon 3 (Impartiality), and
Section 1 of Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. The
aforementioned acts of respondent constitute gross
misconduct. Misconduct means a transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, wilful in
character, improper or wrong behavior. Gross
has been defined as out of all measure, beyond allowance;
flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to
be excused. Florenda V. Tobias vs. Judge Manuel Q.
Limsiaco, Jr., MCTC, Valladolid, Negros Occidental, A.M.
No. MTJ-09-1734, January 19, 2011
Respondent judge made or allowed many unreasonable
postponements that
inevitably delayed the proceedings and prevented the
prompt disposition of the case out of manifest bias
in favor of the accused. Thus, he flagrantly violated the
letter and spirit both of Rule 1.02 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, which enjoined all judges to administer
justice impartially and without delay; and of
Canon 6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which required
him as a trial judge to be prompt in disposing of
all matters submitted to him, remembering that justice
delayed is often justice denied. That his conduct
proceeded from his bias towards the accused rendered his
acts and omissions as gross misconduct. It is
settled that the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the
additional elements of corruption, willful
intent to violate the law, or disregard of long-standing
rules, which must be established by substantial

evidence; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Daniel

G. Sevilla v. Judge Francisco S. Lindo,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 55, Malabon City, A.M. No.
MTJ-08-1714. February 9, 2011
Judge Rabang, a judge of the MTCC in Cotabato City, left
the Philippines in
May 2007 without an approved leave and has remained
abroad and absent from his court for more than
four years. Such attitude betrays his lack of concern for
his office. He has abandoned his office and
committed gross misconduct. The Code of Judicial
Conduct decrees that a judge should administer
justice impartially and without delay. A judge should
likewise be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly
administer justice. The trial court judges
being the paradigms of justice in the first instance have
been exhorted to dispose of the courts business
promptly and to decide cases within the required period
because delay results in undermining the
peoples faith in the judiciary from whom the prompt
hearing of their supplications is anticipated and
expected, and reinforces in the minds of the litigants the
impression that the wheels of justice grind ever
so slowly. Re: Application for indefinite leave and travel
abroad of Pres. Judge Francisco P. Rabang III, MTCC,
Judge; gross

Cotabato City. A.M. No. 07-9-214-MTCC. July 26, 2011

Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross

misconduct; penalty

misconduct
constituting a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct as
a serious charge. Under Section 11 of the
same Rule, the respondent found guilty of a serious charge
may be meted any of the following sanctions:
(1) Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of
the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or reappointment to
any public office; (2) Suspension from office

without salary and other benefits for more than three

months but not exceeding six months; or (3) A fine
of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Victoriano Sy vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Br. 24,
Judge;

Koronadal City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2189, January 18, 2011.

Some court personnels bundy cards were punched-in

insubordination;

even

simple misconduct

though they were in fact absent. Respondent judge failed

to investigate the bundy cards incident from
the time the leader of the judicial audit team had reported
it to him in his capacity as the Acting
Executive Judge and despite an order from the OCA for
him to do so. Section 3, Canon 2 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
directs a judge to take or initiate appropriate
disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel
for unprofessional conduct of which the judge
may have become aware. This imperative duty becomes the
more urgent when the act or omission the
court personnel has supposedly committed is in the
nature of a grave offense, like the bundy-cards
incident involved herein. For disobeying or ignoring the
directive to investigate the bundy-cards
incident, respondent judge is guilty of insubordination, an
omission that constitutes simple misconduct.
In re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the
Regional Trial Court, Br. 45, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and
Report on the Incident at Br. 49, Same Court, A.M. No. 08-4-

Judge; undue delay in

253-RTC, January 12, 2011.

The respondent judge failed to resolve the case within the

the disposition of

90-day reglementary period. No less than the Constitution

cases

sets the limits on this all-important aspect in

the administration of justice. It mandates that lower
courts have three (3) months or ninety (90) days
within which to decide cases or matters submitted to them
for resolution. Also, the Code of Judicial
Conduct requires judges to dispose of the Courts business
promptly and decide cases within the

prescribed period. It cannot be over emphasized that

judges need to decide cases promptly and
expeditiously. Delay in the disposition of cases is a major
cause in the erosion of public faith and
confidence in the justice system. For this fundamental and
compelling reason, judges are required to
decide cases and resolve motions with dispatch within the
reglementary period. Failure to comply
constitutes gross inefficiency, a lapse that warrants the
imposition of administrative sanctions against the
erring magistrate. Prosecutor Hilario Ronson H. Tilan vs.
Judge Ester Piscoso-Flor, RTC, Br. 34, Banaue, Ifugao,
Judge; delay in

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2188, January 10, 2011

Complainant is the private complainant in a BP 22 case

disposition of cases

before the
sala of respondent judge. Even as the case was covered by
the Rules on Summary Procedure,
Respondent judge constantly postponed hearings without
valid cause. Respondent judge is liable for
delay in the disposition of cases tantamount to inefficiency
and incompetence in the performance of his
official duties. Although the postponement of a hearing in
a civil or criminal case may at times be
unavoidable, the Court disallows undue or unnecessary
postponements of court hearings, simply
because they cause unreasonable delays in the
administration of justice and, thus, undermine the
peoples faith in the Judiciary, aside from aggravating the
financial and emotional burdens of the
litigants. For this reason, the Court has enjoined that
postponements and resettings should be allowed
only upon meritorious grounds, and has consistently
reminded all trial judges to adopt a firm policy
against improvident postponements. Yet, respondent judge
postponed five hearings for lack of material
time without bothering to state the specific causes why his
court lacked material time. He also reset four
hearings supposedly upon the agreement of the parties,

which the complainant credibly denied because

that was prejudicial to his interest. Respondent judge cited
the absence of the public prosecutor in one
hearing and of the PAO lawyer in two hearings as
justifications for the cancellation of the hearings. Such
excuses for delay were not credible, however, for he could
have summoned a relief prosecutor and a
relief PAO attorney, or made arrangements for their
attendance pursuant to the Courts Circular 1-89
(dated January 19, 1989) to avoid unnecessary
postponements. Daniel G. Sevilla v. Judge Francisco S.
Lindo,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 55, Malabon City, A.M. No.
MTJ-08-1714. February 9, 2011
Respondent judge failed to resolve a motion within the
prescribed
period. Respondent judge insisted that the delay was not
intentional but simply brought about by sheer
volume of work in his sala. Respondent judge is guilty of
undue delay in resolving a motion. The Court
has consistently held that failure to decide cases and other
matters within the reglementary period
constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition
of administrative sanction against the erring
magistrate. Delay in resolving motions and incidents
pending before a judge within the reglementary
period of ninety (90) days fixed by the Constitution and the
law is not excusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency. The Court finds no merit in Respondent
judges explanation that the reason for the delay in
resolving the motion was the pressure from equally urgent
matters in connection with the 800 pending
cases before his sala. Firstly, he is duty-bound to comply
with the above-cited rules under the Canons in
the Code of Judicial Conduct, and the administrative
guidelines laid down by this Court. Secondly, the
Court is not unmindful of the circumstances that may

delay the speedy disposition of cases assigned to

judges, Respondent judge should have seasonably filed a
request for an extension to resolve the subject
motion. For failing to do so, he cannot evade
administrative liability. Pio Angelia v. Judge Jesus L.
Grageda,
RTC, Branch 4, Panabo City, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2220.
Judge; failure to

February 7, 2011
Respondent judge failed to file the required

comply with SC

comment as required by the Supreme Courts show cause

directives and
circulars

resolution in a pending administrative case

against him despite several opportunities given to him.
Compliance with the rules, directives and
circulars issued by the Court is one of the foremost duties
that a judge accepts upon assumption to office.
The obligation to uphold the dignity of his office and the
institution which he belongs to is also found in
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 2.01
which mandates a judge to behave at all times
as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. Under the
circumstances, the conduct exhibited by respondent judge
constitutes no less than clear acts of defiance
against the Courts authority. His conduct also reveals his
deliberate disrespect and indifference to the
authority of the Court, shown by his failure to heed our
warnings and directives. Respondent judges
actions further disclose his inability to accept the Courts
instructions. Moreover, his conduct failed to
provide a good example for other court personnel, and the
public as well, in placing significance to the
Courts directives and the importance of complying with
them. Respondent judge was held
administratively liable. Judge Napoleon E. Inoturan, RTC,
Branch 133, Makati City v. Judge Manuel Q.
Limsiaco, Jr., MCTC, Valladolid, San Enrique-Pulupandan,
Negros Occidental/Sancho E. Guinanao v. Judge
Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., MCTC, Valladolid, San Enrique-

Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, A.M. No. MTJ-01Judge; gross

1362/A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785. February 22, 2011

It took respondent judge more than two years to decide an

inefficiency

ejectment case after

it was declared submitted for resolution. The delay in
deciding a case within the reglementary period
constitutes a violation of Section 5, Canon 6 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates
judges to perform all judicial duties, including the delivery
of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and
with promptness. In line with jurisprudence, respondent
judge is liable for gross inefficiency for his
failure to decide a case within the reglementary period.
Judge Napoleon E. Inoturan, RTC, Branch 133,
Makati City v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., MCTC,
Valladolid, San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental/Sancho E. Guinanao v. Judge Manuel Q.
Limsiaco, Jr., MCTC, Valladolid, San Enrique-Pulupandan,
Negros Occidental, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362/A.M. No. MTJ-111785. February 22, 2011
Respondent judge is liable for gross inefficiency for failing
to adopt a system of
record management in her court. Furthermore,
respondent judge resolved a motion for reconsideration
which was filed way beyond the required period. There was
also a delay in sending the records of the
appealed case to the CA. Respondent judge violated Rule
3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
which provides that A judge shall dispose of the courts
business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods. Bareng vs. Daguna, A.M. No. RTJ-10-

Judges; plagiarism

2246. June 1, 2011

SC Associate Justice Castillo was accused of plagiarism in
connection with the
decision he wrote for the Court in the case entitled
Vinuya v. Romulo (G.R. No. 162230). The Court
dismissed the charges against Justice Castillo. Plagiarism,

a term not defined by statute, has a popular or

common definition. To plagiarize, says Webster, is to steal
and pass off as ones own the ideas or
words of another. Stealing implies malicious taking.
Blacks Law Dictionary, the worlds leading
English law dictionary quoted by the Court in its decision,
defines plagiarism as the deliberate and
knowing presentation of another persons original ideas or
creative expressions as ones own. The
presentation of another persons ideas as ones own must
be deliberate or premeditateda taking with
ill intent. While the academic publishing model is based
on the originality of the writers thesis, the
judicial system is based on the doctrine of stare decisis,
which encourages courts to cite historical legal
data, precedents, and related studies in their decisions.
The judge is not expected to produce original
scholarship in every respect. Citing published articles or
work of a number of legal writers, the Court
ruled that a judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether
trial or appellate, is exempted from a charge of
plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from a law
review article, novel thoughts published in a legal
periodical or language from a partys brief are used
without giving attribution. Judges are free to use
whatever sources they deem appropriate to resolve the
matter before them, without fear of reprisal. This
exemption applies to judicial writings intended to decide
cases for two reasons: the judge is not writing a
literary work and, more importantly, the purpose of the
writing is to resolve a dispute. As a result,
judges adjudicating cases are not subject to a claim of
legal plagiarism. In matter of the charges of
plagiarism, etc. against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del
Judge; propriety

Castillo, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC. February 8, 2011

Respondent judge issued a warrant of arrest of the
complainant for direct assault. Upon
learning about the warrant, complainant alleged that she

called respondent judges wife, who said she

would help in having the bail reduced to P6,000.00 and
would have the case for direct assault against
herein complainant dismissed provided herein
complainant cancel the wifes debt of P35,000.00 and
provided that complainant loan the wife an additional
amount of P50,000.00. Respondent judge denied
any knowledge of the loan. Though the Court ruled that
the complainant failed to substantiate her claim,
nevertheless, the Court notes that although respondent
judge denies knowledge of such transaction
between his wife and complainant, respondent judge did
not categorically deny his wifes debt to
complainant. Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct stresses the importance of propriety and the
appearance of propriety to the performance of all the
activities of a judge. Respondent judge should bear
in mind that judges should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
Furthermore, judges and members of their families are
prohibited from asking for or accepting any gift,
bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be
done or omitted to be done by him in
connection with the performance of judicial duties. Lydelle
L. Conquilla v. Judge Lauro G. Bernardo, MTC,
Judge; violation of SC

Bocaue, Bulacan, A.M. No. MTJ-09-1737. February 9, 2011

Respondent judge granted bail even in the absence

rules, directives, and

of any written application. Respondent judge invokes the

circulars

constitutional right of the accused to bail and

Section 17(c), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which does not require that a person
be charged in court before he or she may apply for bail. To
his mind, there was already a constructive
bail given that only the papers were needed to formalize
it. The Court held that respondent judge is
guilty of a less serious charge of violation of Supreme
Court rules, directives and circulars under Sec. 9,
Rule 140. Sec. 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on

Criminal Procedure allows that any person in custody

who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with
any court in the province, city or municipality
where he is held. However, in the case at bar, despite the
absence of any written application, respondent
judge verbally granted bail to the accused. Moreover, in
clear departure from Sec. 14 of Rule 114,
respondent judge verbally ordered the clerk of court to
accept the cash deposit as bail, to earmark an
official receipt for the cash deposit, and to date it the
following day. The bail should be deposited in the
nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city or
municipal treasurer. Worse, respondent judge
did not require the accused to sign a written undertaking
containing the conditions of the bail under Sec.
2, Rule 114 to be complied with by the accused.
Immediately upon receipt by the clerk of court of the
cash deposit of PhP 30,000 from the accused, respondent
judge ordered the police escorts to release the
accused without any written order of release. In sum,
there was no written application for bail, no
certificate of deposit from the BIR collector or provincial,
city or municipal treasurer, no written
undertaking signed by the accused, and no written release
order. As regards the insistence of respondent
judge that such may be considered as constructive bail,
there is no such species of bail under the Rules.
Despite the noblest of reasons, the Rules of Court may not
be ignored at will and at random to the
prejudice of the rights of another. Procedural rules have
their own wholesome rationale in the orderly
administration of justice. Justice has to be administered
according to the Rules in order to obviate
arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality. In this case, the
reason of respondent judge is hardly persuasive
enough to disregard the Rules. Gaudencio B. Pantilo III v.
Judge Victor A. Canoy, A.M. No. RTJ-112262. February 9, 2011

Judges; administrative

An administrative complaint for

complaint not a

gross ignorance of the law was filed against Judge De Vera

substitute for judicial

remedy

for denying admission of a position paper

due to her mistaken belief that the same was filed out of
time. Upon a showing of the judges good faith
and efforts to rectify her mistake, the complaint was
dismissed. An administrative complaint is not the
appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order
or decision issued by a judge where a judicial
remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration,
an appeal, or a petition for certiorari.
Disciplinary proceedings against a judge are not
complementary or suppletory to, nor a substitute for
these judicial remedies whether ordinary or extraordinary.
For, obviously, if subsequent developments
prove the judges challenged act to be correct, there would
be no occasion to proceed against her at all.
Besides, to hold a judge administratively accountable for
every erroneous ruling or decision rendered,
assuming she has erred, would be nothing short of
harassment and would make her position doubly
unbearable. Atty. Rafael T. Martinez and Spouses Dan and
Edna Reyes v. Judge Grace Gliceria F. De Vera,
Presiding Judge, MTCC, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, A.M.
No. MTJ-08-1718, March 9, 2011.
As to the allegation of grave
misconduct against Judge Pao in holding a hearing
notwithstanding the fact that defendants counsel
already rested his case, the same has no leg to stand on.
Time and again, the Supreme Court has ruled
that the acts of a judge, pertaining to his judicial
functions, are not subject to disciplinary action, unless
they are tainted with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad
faith. If the complainant felt aggrieved, his
recourse is through judicial remedies, i.e., to elevate the
assailed decision or order to the higher court for
review and correction. Indeed, disciplinary proceedings

and criminal actions against magistrates do not

complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies,
whether ordinary or extraordinary. An inquiry
into their civil, criminal and/or administrative liability
may be made only after the available remedies
have been exhausted and decided with finality. Ferdinand
C. Bacolot v. Hon. Francisco D. Pao, Presiding
Judge, RTC, Br. 93, San Pedro, Laguna, A.M. No. RTJ-10Judges; conduct

2241, March 9, 2011.

In his Comment on an administrative complaint filed

unbecoming of a judge

against
him, respondent judge used derogatory and irreverent
language in relation to the complainant. Verily,
we hold that Judge Amila should be more circumspect in
his language. It is reprehensible for a judge to
humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays lack
of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a
judge must at all times be temperate in his language. He
must choose his words, written or spoken, with
utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man
is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing
speech increases his persuasiveness. Accordingly,
respondent Judge Venancio J. Amila is hereby found
guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. Lydia A.
Benancillo v. Judge Venancio J. Amila, A.M. No. RTJ-08-

Judges; impropriety

2149, March 9, 2011.

Respondent judge acted inappropriately in calling the
complainant and the
intervenors to a meeting inside his chamber and using
derogatory and irreverent language in relation to
a complainant. Accordingly, he was found guilty of
conduct unbecoming of a judge. The New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary exhorts
members of the judiciary, in the discharge of their
duties, to be models of propriety at all times. Sections 1
and 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct clearly enjoin judges not only from committing
acts of impropriety but even acts which have

the appearance of impropriety. The Code recognizes that

even acts that are not per se improper can
nevertheless be perceived by the larger community as
such. Be it stressed that judges are held to higher
standards of integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys
and other persons not [vested] with public
trust. Lydia A. Benancillo v. Judge Venancio J. Amila, A.M.
Judges; undue delay in

No. RTJ-08-2149, March 9, 2011.

It took respondent judge six (6) years to resolve,

rendering a decision or

on technicality, a case governed by the rule on summary

order

procedure. When confronted with

administrative charges of delay, the Court shall be guided
by the period allowed by law. Reglementary
periods fixed by law and the various issuances of the
Court are designed not only to protect the rights of
all the parties to due process but also to achieve efficiency
and order in the conduct of official business.
The Court has time and again admonished judges to be
prompt in the performance of their solemn duty
as dispenser of justice, since undue delays erode the
peoples faith in the judicial system. Delay not only
reinforces the belief of the people that the wheels of justice
grind ever so slowly, but invites suspicion,
however unfair, of ulterior motives on the part of the judge.
The raison dtre of courts lies not only in
properly dispensing justice but also in being able to do so
seasonably. Josefina Naguiat v. Judge Mario B.
Capellan, Presiding Judge, MTCC, Br. 1, Malolos City,

Judge; disciplinary

Bulacan, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1782, March 23, 2011.

Assuming for the sake of argument that respondent judge

action

erred in issuing the

questioned order, he cannot be held liable for his official
acts, no matter how erroneous, for as long as he
acted in good faith. A judge is not required to be faultless
because to demand otherwise would make the
judicial office untenable for no one called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the administration
of justice can be infallible. As a matter of policy, a judge

cannot be subject to disciplinary action for his

erroneous actions, unless it can be shown that they were
accompanied by bad faith, malice, corrupt
motives, or improper considerations. In the absence of
such proof, the decision or order in question is
presumed to have been issued in good faith by respondent
judge. This was emphasized in the case of
Balsamo v. Judge Suan, where the Court explained: The
Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the
judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before
the latter can be branded the stigma of being
biased and partial. Thus, not every error or mistake that a
judge commits in the performance of his
duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have
acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an
injustice. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt
motives or improper considerations are sufficient
defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the
law can find refuge. Antonio Monticalbo v.
Judge Cresente F. Maraya, Jr., RTC, Br. 11, Calubian,
Judge; gross ignorance

Leyte, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2197, April 13, 2011.

Complainant insists that respondent judge erred in ruling

of law

that his
counterclaim for attorneys fees and litigation expenses
was covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure and points out that his claim exceeds the
P10,000.00 limit set in the Rule on Summary
Procedure. Complainant is mistaken. The rule now has
placed the ceiling at P100,000.00. A judge can be
held liable for gross ignorance of the law if it can be shown
that he committed an error so gross and
patent as to produce an inference of bad faith. In addition
to this, the acts complained of must not only
be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but should
also be motivated by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty, and corruption. Antonio Monticalbo v. Judge
Cresente F. Maraya, Jr., RTC, Br. 11, Calubian, Leyte,
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2197, April 13, 2011.

Judge; presumption of

In cases where a judge is charged with bribery or grave

good faith

misconduct,
bias or partiality cannot be presumed. Neither can bad
faith or malice be inferred just because the
judgment or order rendered by respondent is adverse to
complainant. In order to merit disciplinary
action, it must be established that respondents actions
were motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or
hatred or were attended by fraud, dishonesty or
corruption. In the absence of such proof, the decision or
order in question is presumed to have been issued in good
faith by respondent judge. This was
emphasized in the case of Balsamo v. Judge Suan, where
the Court explained: The Court has to be shown
acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be
branded the stigma of being biased and partial. Thus, not
every error or mistake that a judge commits in
the performance of his duties renders him liable, unless
he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with
deliberate intent to do an injustice. Good faith and
absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper
considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge
charged with ignorance of the law can find
refuge. Antonio Monticalbo v. Judge Cresente F. Maraya,
Jr., RTC, Br. 11, Calubian, Leyte, A.M. No. RTJ-09-

Justice; conduct

2197, April 13, 2011.

We point out that publicizing professional qualifications or

unbecoming

boasting of
having studied in and graduated from certain law schools,
no matter how prestigious, might have even
revealed, on the part of Justice Ong and Justice
Hernandez, their bias for or against some lawyers. Their
conduct was impermissible, consequently, for Section 3,
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary, demands that judges avoid
situations that may reasonably give rise to the
suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality in their

personal relations with individual members of

the legal profession who practice regularly in their courts.
Judges should be dignified in demeanor, and
refined in speech. In performing their judicial duties, they
should not manifest bias or prejudice by word
or conduct towards any person or group on irrelevant
grounds. Their language must be guarded and
measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. In
this regard, Section 3, Canon 5 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, mandates
judges to carry out judicial duties with
appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the
parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, and judicial
colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant
ground, immaterial to the proper performance of
such duties. In view of the foregoing, Justice Ong and
Justice Hernandez were guilty of unbecoming
conduct, which is defined as improper performance.
Unbecoming conduct applies to a broader range of
transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of
ethical practice or logical procedure or
prescribed method. Assistant Special Prosecutor III
Rohermina J. Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S.
Justice; simple

Ong, et al., A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J, April 12, 2011.

The procedure adopted by respondent Justices for their

misconduct

provincial hearings
was in blatant disregard of PD 1606, as amended, the
Rules of Court, and the Revised Internal Rules of
the Sandiganbayan. Even worse, their adoption of the
procedure arbitrarily denied the benefit of a
hearing before a duly constituted Division of the
Sandiganbayan to all the affected litigants, including
the State, thereby rendering the integrity and efficacy of
their proceedings open to serious challenge.
Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors
men forgive and time forgets. They are expected
to have more than just a modicum acquaintance with the
statutes and procedural rules. For this reason

alone, respondent Justices adoption of the irregular

procedure cannot be dismissed as a mere deficiency
in prudence or as a lapse in judgment on their part, but
should be treated as simple misconduct, which is
to be distinguished from either gross misconduct or gross
ignorance of the law. The respondent Justices
were not liable for gross misconduct defined as the
transgression of some established or definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence, or the corrupt or persistent violation of
the law or disregard of well-known legal rules
considering that the explanations they have offered
herein, which the complainant did not refute, revealed that
they strove to maintain their collegiality by
holding their separate hearings within sight and hearing
distance of one another. Neither were they
liable for gross ignorance of the law, which must be based
on reliable evidence to show that the act
complained of was ill-motivated, corrupt, or inspired by an
intention to violate the law, or in persistent
disregard of well-known legal rules; on the contrary, none
of these circumstances was attendant herein,
for the respondent Justices have convincingly shown that
they had not been ill-motivated or inspired by
an intention to violate any law or legal rule in adopting the
erroneous procedure, but had been seeking,
instead, to thereby expedite their disposition of cases in
the provinces. Assistant Special Prosecutor III
Rohermina J. Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S.
Judge; dishonesty

Ong, et al., A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J, April 12, 2011.

The accomplishment of the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) is a
requirement under the
Civil Service Rules and Regulations for employment in the
government. Judge Aguilar was guilty of
dishonesty in filling out her PDS when she answered that
she had no pending administrative case
against her and that she had not been formally charged
nor found guilty of any administrative

charge. Her failure to disclose such facts in her PDS filed

upon her assumption of office when she
already had notice of the adverse decision therein
constitutes dishonesty, considered a grave offense
under the Administrative Code of 1987, as well as the Civil
Service Rules, with the corresponding
penalty of dismissal from service even for the first offense.
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Aguilar,
Judge; undue delay in

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2087, June 7, 2011

With respect to Judge Ayco, the Court stresses that the

rendering a decision

propriety or impropriety of the motion for reconsideration

is judicial in nature and therefore, beyond the
scope of this administrative proceedings. He however,
cannot be excused for the delay in resolving
complainants motion for reconsideration. Failure to decide
a case or resolve a motion within the
reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and
warrants the imposition of administrative
sanction against the erring judge. Spouses Sur and Rita
Villa, et al. v. Presiding Judge Roberto L. Ayco, et al.

Judge; failure to file

A.M. No. RTJ-11-2284. July 13, 2011

Respondent clearly violated the Anti-Graft and

statement of assets

Corrupt Practices Act and the Code of Conduct and

and liabilities

Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees

when he failed to file his Statement of Assets, Liabilities
and Net Worth (SALN) for the years 2004-2008.
He gave no explanation why he failed to file his SALN for
five consecutive years. While every office in
the government service is a public trust, no position
exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and
uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary.
Hence, judges are strictly mandated to abide
with the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and with
existing administrative policies in order to maintain
the faith of our people in the administration of justice.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Uyag P.
Usman, Presiding Judge, Sharia Circuit Court, Pagadian
City. A.M. No. SCC-08-12. October 19, 2011.

Judges; administrative

Disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions brought

liability.

against any judge

in relation to the performance of his official functions are
neither complementary to nor suppletory of
appropriate judicial remedies, nor a substitute for such
remedies. Any party who may feel aggrieved
should resort to these remedies, and exhaust them,
instead of resorting to disciplinary proceedings and
criminal actions. A judges failure to correctly interpret the
law or to properly appreciate the evidence
presented does not necessarily incur administrative
liability, for to hold him administratively
accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he
renders, assuming he has erred, will be nothing
short of harassment and will make his position doubly
unbearable. His judicial office will then be
rendered untenable, because no one called upon to try the
facts or to interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.
Administrative sanction and criminal liability
should be imposed only when the error is so gross,
deliberate and malicious, or is committed with
evident bad faith, or only in clear cases of violations by
him of the standards and norms of propriety and
good behavior prescribed by law and the rules of
procedure, or fixed and defined by pertinent
jurisprudence. Re: Verified complaint of Engr. Oscar L.
Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO etc. against Hon.
Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., et al. A.M. No. 11-184-CA-J.

Judges; court

January 31, 2012

Respondent Judge failed to exert due

personnel; gross

diligence required of him to ascertain the facts of the case

misconduct; neglect of
duty

before he came out with the Order. He should

be reminded of his personal responsibility in the making of
his decisions and orders. He should not rely
on anybody else for the examination and study of the
records to properly ascertain the facts of each case
that he handles. He cannot simply pass the blame on his

staff and hide behind the incompetence of his

subordinates. Moreover, respondent Judge should have
been more cautious since the case involved was
an old inherited case with voluminous records and what
was sought to be executed was an order issued
almost twenty (20) years ago. It is incumbent upon him to
devise an efficient court management system
since he is the one directly responsible for the proper
discharge of his functions. Although judges cannot
be held to account for erroneous judgments rendered in
good faith, good faith in situations of infallible
discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable
judgment and does not apply where the issues
are so simple and the applicable legal principle evident
and basic as to be beyond permissible margins of
error.
The records and pleadings filed have established the
administrative liability of the clerk of court. First,
respondent Clerk of Court failed to inform respondent
Judge of the existence of the Court of Appeals
and Supreme Court decisions. Second, he failed to inform
and send the parties their respective notices
and court orders. Third, he issued the Certificate of
Finality without verifying if indeed a motion for
reconsideration was filed in connection with the case. As
custodian of judicial records, it is incumbent
upon the clerk of court to ensure an orderly and efficient
court management system, and to supervise the
personnel under his office to function effectively. They
must be assiduous in performing official duty and
in supervising and managing court dockets and records. It
is also incumbent upon him to see to it that
court orders were sent with dispatch to the parties
concerned. Thus, respondent Clerk of Court should
ensure an orderly and efficient record management system
to assist all personnel, including respondent
Judge, in the performance of their respective duties.
Espina and Madarang Company, et al. vs. Judge Cader P.

Indar, Al Haj and Abie M. Amilil, Officer-in-charge, branch

Clerk of Court, both of theRegional Trial Court, Br. 14,
Cotabato City. A.M. No. RTJ-07-2069. December 14, 2011
Judge; gross ignorance

Well- settled is the rule that an injunction cannot be

of law and undue delay

issued to transfer possession or control of a property to

another when the legal title is in dispute between
the parties and the legal title has not been clearly
established. In this case, respondent judge evidently
disregarded this established doctrine when he granted the
preliminary injunction in favor of Pagels
whose legal title is disputed. When the law involved is
simple and elementary, lack of conversance with
it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Gross ignorance
of the law is the disregard of basic rules and
settled jurisprudence. When the inefficiency springs from
a failure to consider so basic and elemental a
rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his functions,
a judge is either too incompetent and
undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too
vicious that the oversight or omission was
deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of
judicial authority. A judge may also be
administratively liable if shown to have been motivated by
bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in
ignoring, contradicting or failing to apply settled law and
jurisprudence. Atty. Rene Medina, et al. vs. Judge
Victor Canoy, et al. A.M. RTJ-11-2298, February 22, 2012.
Civil Case No. 632, a case for ejectment, is covered by the
Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. It is equally undisputed that in
summary procedure, a preliminary conference
should be held not later than 30 days after the last answer
has been filed. Considering that no
preliminary conference at all was held in Civil Case No.
632, Judge Literato evidently failed to comply
with a basic rule of procedure for which he should

accordingly be held accountable. Judge Literatos

inaction in Civil Case No. 632 for 322 days constitutes
utter disregard for the summary nature of an
ejectment case.
Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge
displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules,
he erodes the publics confidence in the competence of our
courts. It is highly imperative that judges be
conversant with the law and basic legal principles. Basic
legal procedures must be at the palm of a
judges hands. In sum, Judge Literato is administratively
guilty of gross ignorance of the Rule on
Summary Procedure and undue delay in rendering a
decision. Dr. Ramie G. Hipe vs. Judge Rolando T.
Literato, Municipal Trial Court, Mainit, Surigao Del Norte.
Judges; delay in

A.M. No. MTJ-11-1781, April 25, 2012

udges are not administratively responsible

conducting summary

for what they may do in the exercise of their judicial

hearing to extend the

72-hr TRO; gross
ignorance of law;
requirement of bad
faith, fraud,
dishonesty, or
corruption.

functions when acting within their legal powers and

jurisdiction. Not every error or mistake that a judge
commits in the performance of his duties renders
him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or
with deliberate intent to do an injustice. To
hold otherwise would be to render judicial office
untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or
interpret the law in the process of administering justice
can be infallible in his judgment. To constitute
gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the
subject decision, order or actuation of the respondent
judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary
to existing law and jurisprudence but, most
importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption. Complainants failed to
adduce proof to show that respondent judge was motivated
by bad faith, ill will or malicious motive
when he granted the TRO and preliminary injunction. In
addition, respondent judge should not be
penalized for failing to conduct the required summary

hearing within 72 hours from the issuance of the

original TRO. Though the Rules require the presiding
judge to conduct a summary hearing before the
expiration of the 72 hours, it could not be complied with
because of the remoteness and inaccessibility of
the trial court from the parties addresses. Sps. Democrito
and Olivia Lago vs. Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr.
RTC, Br. 43, Gingoog City. A.M. No. RTJ-10-2255, February
Judges; immorality vs.

8, 2012
The New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary

simple misconduct

provides that, as a subject of constant public scrutiny,

judges must accept personal restrictions that might
be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. In
particular, judges must conduct themselves in a
way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial
office. Occupying as he does an exalted position in
the administration of justice, a judge must pay a high
price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, the
judge must comport himself at all times in such a manner
that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear
the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to
him as the epitome of integrity and justice.
There was no evidence that respondent judge engaged in
scandalous conduct that would warrant the
imposition of disciplinary action against him. His
admission of homosexuality does not make him
automatically immoral. However, respondent judge is
guilty of simple misconduct in causing the
registration of title in his sons name with the intention of
defrauding a possible judgment-obligee.
Simple misconduct is a transgression of some established
rule of action, an unlawful behavior, or
negligence committed by a public officer. Aida R. Campos,
et al. vs. Judge Eliseo M. Campos, MTC, Bayugan,

Judges; undue delay in

Agusan del Sur. A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761, February 8, 2012

Judges must resolve matters pending before them

rendering a decision

promptly
and expeditiously within the constitutionally mandated

three-month period. If they cannot comply with

the same, they should ask for an extension from the
Supreme Court upon meritorious grounds. The rule
is that the reglementary period for deciding cases should
be observed by all judges, unless they have
been granted additional time. Judges must dispose of the
courts business promptly. Delay in the
disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our
people in the judiciary, lowers its standards,
and brings it to disrepute. Hence, judges are enjoined to
decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so
constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition
of administrative sanctions on them.
Although there are no promulgated rules on the conduct
of judicial audit, the absence of such rules
should not serve as license to recommend the imposition
of penalties to retired judges who, during their
incumbency, were never given a chance to explain the
circumstances behind the results of the judicial
audit. Judicial audit reports and the memoranda which
follow them should state not only recommended
penalties and plans of action for the violations of audited
courts, but also give commendations when
they are due. To avoid similar scenarios, manual judicial
audits may be conducted at least six months
before a judges compulsory retirement. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Judge Celso L. Mantua, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 17, Palompon, Leyte. A.M. No. RTJ-11Judges; judicial

2291. February 8, 2012

In A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC (Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C.

clemency

Diaz, Metropolitan Trial

Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency),
the Court laid down the following guidelines in
resolving requests for judicial clemency, thus:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These
shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s)
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,

judges or judges associations and prominent members of

the community with proven integrity and
probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative
case for the same or similar misconduct
will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of
the penalty to ensure a period of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show
that he still has productive years ahead of
him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to
redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as
intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development of
the legal system or administrative and other
relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances
that may justify clemency.
Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court
finds merit in petitioners request. A review of
the records reveals that petitioner has exhibited remorse
for her past misdeeds, which occurred more
than ten (10) years ago. While she was found to have
belatedly filed her motions for additional time to
resolve the cases then pending in her sala, the Court
noted that she had disposed of the same within the
extended period sought, except in A.M. No. 99-2-79-RTC
where she submitted her compliance beyond
the approved 45-day extended period. Nevertheless,
petitioner has subsequently shown diligence in the
performance of her duties and has not committed any
similar act or omission. In the Memorandum of
the Office of the Court Administrator, her prompt
compliance with the judicial audit requirements of
pending cases was acknowledged and she was even
commended for her good performance in the
effective management of her court and in the handling of
court records.

Moreover, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Bohol

Chapter has shown its high regard for
petitioner per the letter of support signed by a number of
its members addressed to the IBP dated
October 15, 1999 during the pendency of her
administrative cases and the IBP Resolution No. 11, Series
of 2009 endorsing her application for lateral transfer to the
RTC of Tagbilaran City. Re: Petition for judicial
clemency of Judge Irma Zita V. Masamayor. A.M. No. 12-2Judge; gross

6-SC, March 6, 2012.

In Guerrero vs. Judge Deray, the Court held that a judge

misconduct

who deliberately and

continuously fails and refuses to comply with the
resolution of [the Supreme] Court is guilty of gross
misconduct and insubordination.
In the present case, the Court found that Judge Go failed
to heed the Courts pronouncements. He did
not file the required comment to the Courts show-cause
resolutions despite several opportunities
granted him. His willful disobedience and disregard to the
show-cause resolutions constitutes grave and
serious misconduct affecting his fitness and worthiness of
the honor and integrity attached to his office.
It is noteworthy that Judge Go was afforded several
opportunities to explain his failure to decide the
subject cases long pending before his court and to comply
with the directives of this Court, but he has
failed, and continuously refuses to heed the same. This
continued refusal to abide by lawful directives
issued by this Court is glaring proof that he has become
disinterested to remain with the judicial system
to which he purports to belong. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Judge Go, et al. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1667,
April 10, 2012.
In Kaw v. Osorio, the Court held that while the respondent
judge, in that case,
may not be held liable for extortion and corruption as it

was not substantially proven, he should be made

accountable for gross misconduct. The acts of the Judge
in meeting a litigant in a case pending before his
sala, and telling her, Sige, kay ako na bahala gamuson
nato ni sila (Okay, leave it all to me, we shall
crush them) constitute gross misconduct. Misconduct
means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate
violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior in
connection with ones performance of official
functions and duties. For grave or gross misconduct to
exist, the judicial act complained of should be
corrupt or inspired by the intention to violate the law, or a
persistent disregard of well-known rules. The
misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere
error of judgment. The arbitrary actions of
respondent judge, taken together, give doubt as to his
impartiality, integrity and propriety. His acts
amount to gross misconduct constituting violations of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly
Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 2 and Sections 2 and 4 of
Canon 3 and Section 1 of Canon 4
It is an ironclad principle that a judge must not only be
impartial; he must also appear to be impartial at
all times. Being in constant scrutiny by the public, his
language, both written and spoken, must be
guarded and measured lest the best of intentions be
misconstrued. Needless to state, any gross
misconduct seriously undermines the faith and confidence
of the people in the judiciary. Criselda C.
Gacad vs. Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr., RTC, Br. 3,
Nabunturan, Compostela Valley A.M. No. RJ-10-2257. July
17,
Judge; gross

2012
In this case, Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous

misconduct and

annulment of marriage cases which do not exist in the

dishonesty

records of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or the

Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court,
Cotabato City. There is nothing to show that (1)

proceedings were had on the questioned cases; (2) docket

fees had been paid; (3) the parties were
notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared; (4) hearings
had been conducted; or (5) the cases were
submitted for decision. Judge Indar, who had sworn to
faithfully uphold the law, issued decisions on the
questioned annulment of marriage cases, without any
showing that such cases underwent trial and
complied with the statutory and jurisprudential requisites
for voiding marriages. Such act undoubtedly
constitutes gross misconduct.
Among the questioned annulment decrees is Judge Indars
Decision dated 23 May 2007, in Spec. Proc.
No. 06-581, entitled Chona Chanco Aguiling v. Alan V.
Aguiling. Despite the fact that no proceedings
were conducted in the case, Judge Indar declared
categorically, in response to the Australian Embassy
letter, that the Decision annulling the marriage is valid
and that petitioner is free to marry. In effect,
Judge Indar confirms the truthfulness of the contents of
the annulment decree, highlighting Judge
Indars appalling dishonesty. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Judge Indar. A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232, April
Judge; performing or

10, 2012
Judge

agreeing to perform

Molato is to be reprimanded for agreeing to serve as one of

functions or services
outside of their official
functions.

Lucky Corporations alternate bank

signatories even if he may not have performed such service
for the corporation. He has no business
agreeing to the performance of such service. His offense
constitutes a violation of Administrative
Circular 5 which in essence prohibits public officials from
performing or agreeing to perform functions
or services outside of their official functions for the reason
that the entire time of the officials and
employees of the judiciary shall be devoted to their official
work to ensure the efficient and speedy
administration of justice. Ramoncito and Juliana Luarca

vs. Judge Ireneo B. Molato, MTC, Bongabong, Oriental

Mindoro/ Jeny Agbay vs. Judge Ireneo B. Molato, MTC,
Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. A.M. No. MTJ-08Notary public; duty to

1711/A.M. No. MTJ-08-1716, April 23, 2012.

A notary public is

ascertain the

empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most

identities of the
parties executing the
document

common of which are the acknowledgement and

affirmation of documents or instruments. In the
performance of these notarial acts, the notary public
must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal
affixed on documents. The notarial seal converts
a document from a private to a public instrument, after
which it may be presented as evidence without
need for proof of its genuineness and due execution. Thus,
notarization should not be treated as an
empty, meaningless or routinary act.
A notary publics function should not be trivialized and a
notary public must discharge his powers and
duties which are impressed with public interest, with
accuracy and fidelity. A notary public exercises
duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries
must inform themselves of the facts they certify
to; most importantly, they should not take part or allow
themselves to be part of illegal transactions.
The Court cautioned all notaries public to be very careful
and diligent in ascertaining the true identities
of the parties executing the document before them,
especially when it involves disposition of a property,
as this Court will deal with such cases more severely in
the future. Maria vs. Cortez. A.C. No. 7880, April

Judge; delay in

11, 2012.
Judges are continuously reminded to resolve cases with

rendering decisions

dispatch to
avoid any delay in the administration of justice. Thus,
under Section 9 (1), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
undue delay in rendering a decision or order is considered
a less serious charge.
The Supreme Court ruled that the prudent course of

action would have been for Judge Asis to request an

extension for acting on Civil Case No. 05-35013 instead of
disposing the case only after being prompted
to file a comment on the present Complaint. The Court
nevertheless deemed it proper to reduce the fine,
considering the existence of factors that mitigated the
commission of the offense, namely: (a) this is his
first infraction, and (b) his delay in the disposition of the
case resulted from his serious medical
conditions. Leticia Jacinto vs. Judge Josephus Joannes H.
Asis, MeTC, Br. 40, Quezon City A.M. No. MTJ-121811, June 13, 2012
Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, mandates
that cases or
matters filed with the lower courts must be decided or
resolved withinthree months from the date they
are submitted for decision or resolution. With respect to
cases falling under the Rule on Summary
Procedure, first level courts are only allowed 30 days
following the receipt of the last affidavit and
position paper, or the expiration of the period for filing the
same, within which to render judgment. As a
general principle, rules prescribing the time within which
certain acts must be done, or certain
proceedings taken, are considered absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the
orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their
very nature, these rules are regarded as
mandatory.
Judges are oft-reminded of their duty to promptly act upon
cases and matters pending before their
courts. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, directs judges to dispose of the courts
business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods. Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics further exhort judges to be prompt and
punctual in the disposition and resolution of cases

and matters pending before their courts.

In addition, Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January
28, 1988 once more reminds all magistrates to
observe scrupulously the periods prescribed in Section 15,
Article VIII of the Constitution, and to act
promptly on all motions and interlocutory matters pending
before their courts. Prompt disposition of
cases is attained basically through the efficiency and
dedication to duty of judges. If they do not possess
those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable
to the prejudice of litigants. Accordingly, judges
should be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of their obligation to
promptly administer justice.
Unfortunately, respondent failed to live up to the exacting
standards of duty and responsibility that her
position requires. The case was submitted for resolution
on July 19, 2006, yet it was still pending when
complainant filed the present administrative complaint on
June 4, 2010, and remained unresolved per
complainants manifestation filed on September 8, 2010.
More than four years after being submitted for
resolution, the case was still awaiting decision by
respondent. Respondent irrefragably failed to decide
the case within the 30-day period prescribed by the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. This action is
contrary to the rationale behind the Rule on Summary
Procedure, which was precisely adopted to
promote a more expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional
rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases.
Indeed, respondent even failed to decide the case
within the three-month period mandated in general by the
Constitution for lower courts to decide or
resolve cases. Records do not show that respondent made
any previous attempt to report and request
for extension of time to resolve the case.
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by

A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, classifies undue delay in

rendering a decision as a less serious charge for which the
penalty is suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for one month to three months,
or a fine of P10,000.00 to P20,000.00. Given that
respondent had been previously dismissed from the
service, the penalty of suspension is already
inapplicable. Instead, the Court imposed upon respondent,
for her undue delay in resolving the case, a
fine in the maximum amount of P20,000.00, to be
deducted from her accrued leave credits Fe Valdez vs.
Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 60, Mandaluyong City. A.M. No. MTJ-11Judge; gross abuse of

1796, June 13, 2012

In this case, the contempt charge was commenced

authority and gross

not through a verified petition, but by Judge Belen motu

ignorance

proprio through the issuance of an order

requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to show cause why he
should not be cited for indirect contempt. As
such, the requirements of the rules that the verified
petition for contempt be docketed, heard and
decided separately or consolidated with the principal
action find no application. Consequently, Judge
Belen was justified in not directing the contempt charge
against State Prosecutor Comilang to be
docketed separately or consolidated with the principal
action. However, Judge Belen blatantly violated
the injunctive writ issued by the CA enjoining the
implementation of his May 30, 2005 Order and
December 12, 2005 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 94069.
As pointed out by the OCA, the CAs disquisition is clear
and categorical. In complete disobedience to
the said Resolution, however, Judge Belen proceeded to
issue (1) the Order requiring State Prosecutor
Comilang to explain his refusal to file the supersedeas
bond and to require his presence in court on
September 26, 2007, as well as to explain why he should
not be cited for indirect contempt; (2) the

September 26, 2007 Order seeking State Prosecutor

Comilangs explanation for his defiance of the
subpoena requiring his presence at the hearing of even
date, and directing, once again, his attendance at
the next hearing on October 1, 2007 and to explain once
more why he should not be cited for indirect
contempt; and (3) the October 1, 2007 Order finding State
Prosecutor Comilang guilty of indirect
contempt and sentencing him to pay a fine of P30,000.00
and to suffer two days imprisonment. In
requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his nonfiling of a supersedeas bond, in issuing subpoenas
to compel his attendance before court hearings relative to
the contempt proceedings, and finally, in
finding him guilty of indirect contempt for his noncompliance with the issued subpoenas, Judge Belen
effectively defeated the status quo which the writ of
preliminary injunction aimed to preserve. State
Prosecutors II Josef Albert T.
Judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws.
They must know the laws and apply them properly in good
faith as judicial competence requires
no less. Moreover, refusal to honor an injunctive order of a
higher court constitutes contempt, as in this
case, where Judge Belen, in contumaciously defying the
injunctive order issued by the CA, was found
guilty of indirect contempt. Judge Belens actuations
cannot be considered as mere errors of judgment
that can be easily brushed aside. Obstinate disregard of
basic and established rule of law or procedure
amounts to inexcusable abuse of authority and gross
ignorance of the law. Likewise, citing State
Prosecutor Comilang for indirect contempt
notwithstanding the effectivity of the CA-issued writ of
injunction demonstrated his vexatious attitude and bad
faith towards the former, for which he must be
held accountable and subjected to disciplinary action. Our

conception of good judges has been, and is, of

men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who
discharge their duties in accordance with law.
Hence considering the foregoing disquisitions and Judge
Belens previous infractions, which are all of
serious nature and for which he had been severely
warned, the Court adopted the recommendation of
the OCA to mete the ultimate penalty of dismissal against
Judge Belen for grave abuse of authority and
gross ignorance of the law. The Court can no longer afford
to be lenient in this case, lest it give the public
the impression that incompetence and repeated offenders
are tolerated in the judiciary. State Prosecutors
II Josef Albert T. Comilang and Ms. Victoria Sunega-Lagman
vs. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, RTC, Branch 36,
Judge; gross ignorance

Calamba City. A.M. No. RTJ-10-2216, June 26, 2012

Not all administrative complaints against judges merit a

of the law

corresponding penalty. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty

or corruption, the acts of a judge in his
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. The
remedy of the complainants in this case is
judicial in nature. Hence, the denial of their motion for
reconsideration of the Supreme Courts
Resolution dismissing the administrative case against
Judge Lubao is in order.
The records would show that Judge Lubao had been very
careful in his actions on the case, as his branch
clerk of court even wrote the Post Office of General Santos
City asking for certification as to when the
Order, sent under Registry Receipt, was received by the
defendants. There was no evidence that Judge
Lubao acted arbitrarily or in bad faith. Further, Judge
Lubao could not be faulted for trying to give all the
parties an opportunity to be heard considering that the
records of the case would show that the court a
quo summarily dismissed the case without issuing
summons to the defendants. Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, et al.,
vs. Judge Antonio C. Lubao, RTC Br. 22, General Santos

City, A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3210-RTJ, June 20, 2012

The respondent deserves to be sanctioned for gross
ignorance of the
law. With her inaction on the petition for contempt, she
betrayed her unbecoming lack of familiarity with
basic procedural rules such as what was involved in the
contempt proceedings before her court. She
should have known that while the petitioners have the
responsibility to move ex parte to have the case
scheduled for preliminary conference, the court (through
the branch clerk of court) has the duty to
schedule the case for pre-trial in the event that the
petitioners fail to file the motion. The respondent
cannot pass the blame for the lack of movement in the
case to her staff who, she claims, were monitoring
the case. As presiding judge, she should account for the
anomaly that since the respondents filed their
answer, the petition for contempt had been gathering dust
or had not moved in the respondents court.
Clearly, the respondent fell short of the standards of
competence and legal proficiency expected of
magistrates of the law in her handling of the petition for
contempt. As in Magpali v. Pardo, she should be
fined P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. It bears
stressing that when the law is so elementary, not
to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. Eladio D.Perfecto vs.
Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esideria, A.M. No. RTJ-112258, June 20, 2012
Judge Clapis is also liable for gross ignorance of the law
for
conducting bail hearings without a petition for bail being
filed by the accused and without affording
the prosecution an opportunity to prove that the guilt of
the accused is strong. His Order granting bail
indicates that he merely used as basis the affidavit of one

prosecution witness that was submitted

earlier. Clearly, he failed to observe the proper procedure
in granting bail. His act is not a mere
deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment but a
patent disregard of well-known rules. When an
error is so gross and patent, such error produces an
inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for
gross ignorance of the law.
If judges are allowed to wantonly misuse the powers vested
in them by the law, there will not only be
confusion in the administration of justice but also
oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due
process. Judges are reminded that having accepted the
exalted position of a judge, they owe it to the
public to uphold the exacting standard of conduct
demanded from them. Criselda C. Gacad vs. Judge
Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr., RTC, Br. 3, Nabunturan, Compostela
Judges; inhibition

Valley A.M. No. RJ-10-2257. July 17, 2012

Judicial remedies were available to complainant in the
main cases. The allegations in
the instant complaint are a mere rehash of the allegations
in complainants Urgent Omnibus Motion to
Expunge Motion for Clarification and Recall the Resolution
dated November 13, 2002 and the Urgent
Motion to Inhibit and the Resolve Respondents Urgent
Omnibus Motion filed in the main cases. These
were in fact decided already on October 19, 2011. The
Complainant charges Justice Sereno of unfairly
refusing to inhibit herself from taking part in the
deliberation in the main cases notwithstanding that
Justice Carpios former law office supposedly worked for
her appointment in the Supreme Court. The
charge is purely conjectural and the Court, in its April 17,
2012 per curiam decision in A.C. No. 6332 has
already ruled that the charge has no extrinsic factual
evidence to support it. Re: Letter-Complaint
Against Hon. Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Maria Loudes
P.A Sereno dated September 16, 2011 filed by Atty.

Judges; undue delay in

Magdaleno M. Pena, A.M. No. 12-6-11-SC. June 13, 2012

Delay in case disposition is a major culprit in the

rendering a decision or

erosion of public faith and confidence in the judiciary and

order

the lowering of its standards. Failure to decide

cases within the reglementary period, without strong and
justifiable reasons, constitutes gross
inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative
sanction on the defaulting judge.
In this case, the decision was purportedly issued on 7
April 2011, or more than four months since the last
submission of the parties position paper. The pretrial
Order was purportedly issued on 26 January 2010,
or more than three months since the pretrial. Section 8 of
the Rules on Summary Procedure provides that
within five days after the termination of the preliminary
conference, the court shall issue an order stating
the matters taken up therein.
Further, paragraph 8, Title I(A) of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC,
entitled Guidelines to be Observed by Trial
Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of PreTrial and Use of Deposition-Discovery
Measures, mandates that a judge must issue a pretrial
order within 10 days after the termination of the
pretrial. Since the ejectment case fell under the Rules on
Summary Procedure, respondent judge should
have handled it with promptness and haste. The reason for
the adoption of those Rules is precisely to
prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases, an
offense for which respondent judge may be held
administratively liable. Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court classifies undue delay in rendering a
decision or order as a less serious charge, which under
Section 1(b) of the same Rule is punishable with
suspension from office, without salary and other benefits,
for not less than one (1) nor more than three
(3) months; or a fine of more than 10,000, but not
exceeding 20,000. Considering that the instant
administrative charge is only the third against respondent

judge (the first has been dismissed, while the

second is still pending), and considering his relatively long
tenure in the judiciary starting in 1997, he
may be reasonably meted out a penalty of 5,000 for being
administratively liable for undue delay in
rendering a decision. Pilar S. Tanoco vs. Judge Inocencio B.
Saguin, Jr. MTCC Br. 3, Cabanatuan City. A.M.
Judge; unreasonable

No. MTJ-12-1812. June 20, 2012

Judges have the sworn duty to administer justice

delay in the

without undue delay, for justice delayed is justice denied.

disposition of cases

They have always been exhorted to observe

strict adherence to the rule on speedy disposition of cases,
as delay in case disposition is a major culprit
in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judicial
system. Under the 1987 Constitution, trial
judges are mandated to decide and resolve cases within 90
days from submission. Corollary to this
constitutional mandate, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary requires judges to perform all judicial duties
efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Javellana, the Court
held that a judge cannot choose his deadline for
deciding cases pending before him. Without an extension
granted by the Court, the failure to decide
even a single case within the required period constitutes
gross inefficiency that merits administrative
sanction. If a judge is unable to comply with the period for
deciding cases or matters, he can, for good
reasons, ask for an extension.
An inexcusable failure to decide a case within the
prescribed 90-day period constitutes gross inefficiency,
warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions
such as suspension from office without pay or fine
on the defaulting judge. The fines imposed vary in each
case, depending chiefly on the number of cases
not decided within the reglementary period and other
factors, such as the presence of aggravating or

mitigating circumstances, the damage suffered by the

parties as a result of the delay, the health and age
of the judge, and other analogous circumstances.
In this case, records are bereft of showing that Judge
Buenavista sought for an extension of time to
decide and resolve most of the cases pending before him,
save only for one instance. Having therefore
failed to decide cases and resolve incidents within the
required period constituted gross inefficiency,
warranting the imposition of a fine of P10,000.00 which
the Court finds reasonable under the
circumstances. Re: Report of the Judicial Audit Conducted
in the Regional trial Court, Branches 72 and 22,
Narvacan Ilocos Sur. A.M. No. 06-9-525-RTC, June 13,
Judge; undue delay

2012
The Revised Rules on Summary Procedure was
promulgated to achieve an
expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases
that it covers. The respondent failed to abide by
this purpose in the way that he handled and acted on the
subject unlawful detainer case. Under Section 7
of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, a
preliminary conference should be held not later
than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed. The
respondent set the case for preliminary conference
at a time way beyond the required thirty (30)-day period.
Another of the respondents procedural
lapses relates to the frequent resetting of the date of the
preliminary conference. Clearly, the respondent
failed to exert his authority in expediting the proceedings
of the unlawful detainer case. Sound practice
requires a judge to remain, at all times, in full control of
the proceedings in his court and to adopt a firm
policy against unnecessary postponements.
In numerous occasions, the Court admonished judges to
be prompt in the performance of their solemn
duty as dispensers of justice because undue delay in the
administration of justice erodes the peoples

faith in the judicial system. Delay not only reinforces the

belief of the people that the wheels of justice in
this country grind slowly, it also invites suspicion, however
unfair, of ulterior motives on the part of the
Judge. Judges should always be mindful of their duty to
render justice within the periods prescribed by
law. Murphy Chu, et al. vs. Hon. Mario B. Capellan,
Assisting Judge, MeTC, Br. 40, Quezon City. A.M. No.
Judge; disciplinary

MTJ-11-1779, July 16, 2012.

Jurisprudence is replete with

proceedings against

cases holding that errors, if any, committed by a judge in

judges; presumption of
regularity

the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot

be corrected through administrative proceedings, but
should instead be assailed through available
judicial remedies. Disciplinary proceedings against judges
do not complement, supplement or substitute
judicial remedies and, thus, cannot be pursued
simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to
parties aggrieved by their erroneous orders or judgments.
Even if the CA decision or portions thereof turn out to be
erroneous, administrative liability will only
attach upon proof that the actions of the respondent CA
Justices were motivated by bad faith, dishonesty
or hatred, or attended by fraud or corruption, which were
not sufficiently shown to exist in this case.
Neither was bias as well as partiality established. Acts or
conduct of the judge clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice must be clearly shown before he
can be branded the stigma of being biased and
partial. In the same vein, bad faith or malice cannot be
inferred simply because the judgment or order is
adverse to a party. Here, other than AMALIs bare and selfserving claim, no act clearly indicative of bias
and partiality was alleged except for the claim that
respondent CA Justices misapplied the law and
jurisprudence. Thus, the presumption that the respondent
judge has regularly performed his duties shall
prevail. Re: Verified complaint of AMA Land, Inc. against

Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, et al. A.M. No. OCA IPI No.

Judge; gross ignorance

12-202-CA-J. January 15, 2013

Judge Sarmiento, Jr. was charged with gross ignorance of

of law

the law, manifest

partiality and dereliction and neglect of duty. The court
held that the judge did not commit gross
ignorance of the law. Gross ignorance of the law on the
part of a judge presupposes an appalling lack of
familiarity with simple rules of law or procedures and wellestablished jurisprudence which tends to
erode the public trust in the competence and fairness of
the court which he personifies. The complaint
states that respondent judge, in arbitrary defiance of his
own September 25, 2006 Decision which
constitutes res judicata or a bar to him to pass upon the
issue of Geoffrey, Jrs. custody, granted, via his
March 15, 2011 Order, provisional custody over Geoffrey,
Jr. to Eltesa. The Decision adverted to refers to
the judgment on compromise agreement.
Respondent judge cannot be held guilty of the charges
hurled by the complainant against him since there
is no finding of strong reasons to rule otherwise. The
preference of a child over 7 years of age as to whom
he desired to live with shall be respected. Moreover,
custody, even if previously granted by a competent
court in favor of a parent, is not permanent. Geoffrey
Beckett vs. Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., RTC,
Branch 24, Cebu City. A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326. January 30,

Judge; misconduct

2013
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate
violation of a rule of law or
a standard of behavior. To constitute an administrative
offense, misconduct should relate to or be
connected with the performance of the official functions of
a public officer. In grave misconduct, as
distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or
flagrant disregard of an established rule must be

established.
In this case, the actions of the Sandiganbayan Justices
respecting the execution of the final judgment
against accused Velasco were shown to be in respectful
deference to the Courts action on the various
petitions filed by the former. Records are bereft of evidence
showing any trace of corruption, clear intent
to violate the law or flagrant disregard of the rules as to
hold the Sandiganbayan Justices
administratively liable for grave misconduct. Re: Complaint
of Leonardo A. Velasco against Associate Justices
Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr., et al. A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 10-25Judge; no abuse of

SB-J. January 15, 2013

Complainant, a

authority when judge

former Court Stenographer III at the RTC, failed to show

did not renew a

temporary
appointment

any proof that she was entitled to a permanent

position. Other than her allegation that she was given two
very satisfactory and one satisfactory
rating, there was no evidence presented that she has met
the prescribed qualification standard for the
position. Such standard is a mix of the formal education,
experience, training, civil service eligibility,
physical health and attitude that the job requires.
Respondent judge, who is the immediate supervisor
of complainant, is in the best position to observe the
fitness, propriety and efficiency of the employee for
the position. It should be impressed upon complainant
that her appointment in the Judiciary is not a
vested right. It is not an entitlement that she can claim
simply for the reason that she had been in the
service for almost two years.
The subsequent filing of complaint against Atty. Borja
(officer-in-charge of the PAO-Virac) manifests
complainants propensity to file complaints whenever she
does not get what she wants. Such attitude
should not be tolerated. Otherwise, judges will be placed
in hostage situations by employees who will
threaten to file complaints whenever they do not get their

way with their judges.

Since there is no proof that respondent judge abused her
position, the case against her should be
dismissed. Respondent judge should, however, be
reminded to be circumspect in her actuations so as not
to give the impression that she is guilty of favoritism.
Kareen P. Magtagob vs. Judge Genie G. GapasJudge; anonymous

Agbada. OCA IPI No. 11-3631-RTJ. January 16, 2013

Under Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,

complaints against

anonymous

judges must be
supported by public
records of indubitable
integrity; unbecoming
conduct

complaints may be filed against judges, but they must be

supported by public records of indubitable
integrity. Courts have acted in such instances needing no
corroboration by evidence to be offered by the
complainant.
Thus, for anonymous complaints, the burden of proof in
administrative proceedings which usually rests
with the complainant, must be buttressed by indubitable
public records and by what is sufficiently
proven during the investigation. If the burden of proof is
not overcome, the respondent is under no
obligation to prove his defense.
In this case, no evidence was attached to the lettercomplaint. The complainant never appeared, and no
public records were brought forth during the investigation.
Judge Achas denied all the charges made
against him, only admitting that he was separated de facto
from his wife and that he reared fighting
cocks.
For going out in public with a woman not his wife, Judge
Achas has clearly failed to abide by Canons of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for Philippine Judiciary.
Regarding his involvement in cockfighting,
however, there is no clear evidence. Although Judge Achas
denied engaging in cockfighting and betting,
he admitted rearing fighting cocks for leisure. While
rearing fighting cocks is not illegal, Judge Achas
should avoid mingling with a crowd of cockfighting

enthusiasts and bettors as it undoubtedly impairs

the respect due him. As a judge, he must impose upon
himself personal restrictions that might be viewed
as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so
freely and willingly.
No position demands greater moral righteousness and
uprightness from its occupant than does the
judicial office. Judges in particular must be individuals of
competence, honesty and probity, charged as
they are with safeguarding the integrity of the court and
its proceedings. He should behave at all times
so as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his
activities. His personal behavior outside the
court, and not only while in the performance of his official
duties, must be beyond reproach, for he is
perceived to be the personification of law and justice.
Thus, any demeaning act of a judge degrades the
institution he represents. Anonymous vs. Judge Rio C.
Achas, MTCC Branch 2, Ozamiz City, Misamis
Occidental, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801. February 27, 2013

Judge; definition of

There is nothing in the Internal Rules of the CA (IRCA)

ponencia; ponente if

which would have required the

present can act upon

an urgent motion
alone or with another
member present

Division Clerk of Court to transmit the urgent motion for

action only to the two present regular
members of the 14th Division, as the complainants seem
to believe. The complainants would have been
correct if the absent member of the Division was not the
ponente herself but either of the other members.
This implies that the ponente if present can act upon the
urgent motion alone or with another member
present, provided that the action or resolution is
submitted on the next working day to the absent
member or members of the Division for ratification,
modification or recall.

A preliminary injunction is not a ponencia but an order

granted at any stage of an action prior to final
judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a particular
act. It is settled that as an ancillary or
preventive remedy, a writ of preliminary injunction may be
resorted to by a party to protect or preserve
his rights and for no other purpose during the pendency of
the principal action. Its object is to preserve
the status quo until the merits of the case are passed
upon. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a
provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. On the
other hand, ponencia refers to the rendition of a
decision in a case on the merits, which disposes of the
main controversy. The writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the 14th Division in CA-G.R. SP No.
122784 did not settle the controversy therein,
but is a mere interlocutory order to restore the status quo
ante, that is, the state of things prior to the
RTCs Order of December 21, 2011. Ethelwoldo E.
Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson & Angel S. Ong vs. Court of
Appeals Asso. Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P.
Judge; government

Dicdican, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J. February 19, 2013

In a letter, former Chief Justice Panganiban requested that

employee vis--vis

the government service

government officer;
liberal treatment upon
retirement claims of
judges and justices

which he rendered from January 1962 to December 1965

in the Department of Education, its Secretary,
and the Board of National Education, be creditable so that
he can meet the present service requirement of
fifteen (15) years for entitlement to retirement benefits.
Under the old Administrative Code (Act No. 2657), a
government employee includes any person in
the service of the Government or any branch thereof of
whatever grade or class. A government officer,
on the other hand, refers to officials whose duties involve
the exercise of discretion in the performance of
the functions of government, whether such duties are
precisely defined or not. Clearly, the law, then and
now, did not require a specific job description and job

specification. Thus, the absence of a specific

position in a governmental structure is not a hindrance for
the Court to give weight to CJ Panganibans
government service as legal counsel and consultant.
The Supreme Court has unquestionably followed the
practice of liberal treatment in passing upon
retirement claims of judges and justices, thus: (1) waiving
the lack of required length of service in cases
of disability or death while in actual service19 or
distinctive service; (2) adding accumulated leave
credits to the actual length of government service in order
to qualify one for retirement; (3) tacking postretirement
service in order to complete the years of government
service required; (4) extending the full
benefits of retirement upon compassionate and
humanitarian considerations; and (5) considering legal
counseling work for a government body or institution as
creditable government service. Re: Request of
(Ret.) Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban for ReComputation of his Creditable Service for the Purpose of ReComputing his Retirement Benefits, A.M. No. 10-9-15-SC.
Judge; gross ignorance

February 12, 2013

The court held that Judge Dinopol is guilty of gross

of the law; mandatory

ignorance of the law. To be held

inhibition; no liability
for damages in the
exercise of
judicial functions.

administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, the

acts complained of must not only be contrary
to existing law and jurisprudence, but must have also
been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty,
and corruption. Gross ignorance of the law is considered
as a serious offense under Rule 140, Section 8,
and is punishable under Section 11.
Moreover, one of the plaintiffs in the Civil Case assigned to
the judge, is a relative by affinity within the
sixth degree, Judge Dinopol should have inhibited himself
from taking cognizance of the case as
mandated by Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.
However, Judge Dinopol is not liable for damages. In Alzua
v. Johnson, the court explained that in civil

actions for damages, judges of superior and general

jurisdiction are not liable to answer for what they do
in the exercise of their judicial functions, provided they are
acting within their legal powers and
jurisdiction. Eduardo Panes, Jr. et al. vs. Judge Oscar E.
Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Joewe Palad
vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal
City/Roque C. Facura, et al. vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol,
RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Eden V. Castro vs. Judge
Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal
City/Rosalinda G. Farofaldane vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol,
RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Engr. Roque C.
Facura, et al. vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24,
Koronadal City, A.M. OCA-IPI No. 07-2618RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2619-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI
No. 07-2652-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2720RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2721-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI
Judge; instituting

No. 08-2808-RTJ. February 12, 2013

Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,

administrative

there are three ways by which administrative proceedings

proceedings against
justices

may be instituted against justices of the CA

and the Sandiganbayan and judges of regular and special
courts: (1) motu proprio by the Supreme Court;
(2) upon verified complaint (as in this complaint) with
affidavits of persons having personal knowledge
of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may
substantiate said allegations; or (3) upon an
anonymous complaint supported by public records of
indubitable integrity.
In this case, complainants have no personality to assail
the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
CAs former Special 14th Division since they were not
parties in the lower court. Thus, they are not
permitted to harass the CA Justices who issued the same.
For even granting that the issuance of the writ
was erroneous, as a matter of public policy a magistrate
cannot be held administratively liable for every
discretionary but erroneous order he issues. The settled

rule is that a Judge cannot be held to account

civilly, criminally or administratively for an erroneous
decision rendered by him in good faith. The
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in the
consolidated CA petitions was discretionary,
interlocutory and preservative in nature, and equally
importantly, it was a collective and deliberated
action of the former Special 14th Division. Moreover, as an
established rule, an administrative, civil or
criminal action against a judge cannot be a substitute for
an appeal. Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A.
Henson & Angel S. Ong vs. Court of Appeals Asso. Justices
Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. OCA
IPI No. 12-201-CA-J. February 19, 2013

Judge; judicial

Manlapaz charged Judge Sabillo with serious and gross

conduct; definition of

misconduct

just debts; willful

failure to pay a just
debt is a ground for
disciplinary action
against judges

for failure to return an amount arising from a transaction.

The Court has repeatedly stressed that it is not a
collection agency for the unpaid debts of its officials and
employees, but has nevertheless provided for Section 8,
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court that holds its
officials and employees administratively liable in unpaid
debt situations. This Section provides that
willful failure to pay a just debt is a ground for disciplinary
action against judges and justices. Just debts,
as defined in Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, refer to
(1) claims adjudicated by a court of law; or (2) claims, the
existence and justness of which are admitted
by the debtor. Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court
classifies willful failure to pay a just debt as a
serious charge.
While reference to a debt necessarily implies a transaction
that is private and outside of official
transactions, the rules do not thereby intrude into public
officials private lives; they simply look at their

actions from the prism of public service and consider

these acts unbecoming of a public official. These
rules take into account that these are actions of officials
who are entrusted with public duties and who,
even in their private capacities, should continually act to
reflect their status as public servants.
Employees of the judiciary should be living examples of
uprightness not only in the performance of
official duties but also in their personal and private
dealings with others so as to preserve at all times the
good name and standing of the courts in the community.
Here, the complainants claim is a just debt.
The willfulness of Judge Sabillo in not paying is shown by
his continuous failure to settle despite
demand letters sent to him. Thus, the court imposed the
penalty of fine. Victoriano G. Manlapaz vs. Judge
Manuel T. Sabillo, MCTC, Lamitan, Basilan, A.M. No. MTJ10-1771. February 13, 2013

Judge; judicial audit;

The

courts jurisdiction

OCA submitted its memorandum to then Acting Chief

over an administrative
case; presumption of
regularity

Justice Antonio T. Carpio on 10 July 2012 more

than two years and seven months after Judge Grageda
compulsorily retired. During his incumbency, Judge
Grageda was never given the chance to explain the alleged
violation of Supreme Court rules,
directives and circulars. Up to the present, the OCA has
not commenced any formal investigation or
asked Judge Grageda to comment on the matter. Thus, the
complaint against Judge Grageda must be
dismissed.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Mantua, the court
held that this Court concedes that there are no
promulgated rules on the conduct of judicial audit.
However, the absence of such rules should not serve
as license to recommend the imposition of penalties to
retired judges who, during their incumbency,

were never given a chance to explain the circumstances

behind the results of the judicial audit. Judicial
audit reports and the memoranda which follow them
should state not only recommended penalties and
plans of action for the violations of audited courts, but
also give commendations when they are due. To
avoid similar scenarios, manual judicial audits may be
conducted at least six months before a judges
compulsory retirement. We recognize that effective
monitoring of a judges observance of the time limits
required in the disposition of cases is hampered by limited
resources.
These limitations, however, should not be used to violate
Judge Mantuas right to due process.
For the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an
administrative case, the complaint must be filed during
the
incumbency of the respondent. Once jurisdiction is
acquired, it is not lost by reason of respondents
cessation from office. In this case, Judge Gragedas
compulsory retirement divested the OCA of its right
to institute a new administrative case against him after his
compulsory retirement. The Court can no
longer acquire administrative jurisdiction over him by
filing a new administrative case against him after
he has ceased to be a public official. The remedy is to file
the appropriate civil or criminal case against
him for the alleged transgression.
Moreover, to hold Judge Grageda liable, there must be
substantial evidence that he committed an
offense. Otherwise, the presumption is that he regularly
performed his duties. In Go v. Judge Achas, the
Court held that, In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, the presumption that the respondent has
regularly performed his duties will prevail. Even in
administrative cases, if a court employee or
magistrate is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the
evidence against him should be competent.

Missing Exhibits and Court Properties in Regional Trial

Court, Br. 4, Panabo City, Davao del Norte, A.M. No. 10Judge; undue delay

2-41-RTC. February 27, 2013

The court held that Judge Amdengan committed undue
delay in rendering a
Decision in the ejectment case. An action for ejectment is
governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure,
Section 10 which provides that within thirty (30) days
after receipt of the last affidavits and position
papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same,
the court shall render judgment. This
provision is mandatory, considering the nature of an
ejectment case.
Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue
delay in rendering a decision or an order is
classified as a less serious charge, punishable by either
suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3)
months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not
exceeding P20,000. The court considered his candid
admission and acceptance of his infraction as factors
in imposing only a fine. Atty. Manuel J. Jimenez, Jr. vs.
Presiding Judge Michael M. Amdengan, Municipal Trail
Court, Angono Rizal, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. February 13,

Judges; duty to adopt

2013
The OCA found that the court

an efficient system to

failed to maintain a general docket book to keep track of

monitor the status of

cases

the cases under it. Although the duty is vested

with Mr. Teves as the Branch Clerk of Court, it is the duty
of Judge Tormis to make sure that the
members of her staff perform their duties. The OCA also
found that Mr. Teves repeatedly submitted
inaccurate reports as to the actual number of cases
pending with their court. This is brought about by
their failure to adopt an efficient system of monitoring
their cases. Again, this is the primary
responsibility of Judge Tormis. Finally, the OCA noted that
Judge Tormis failed to conduct an actual

physical inventory of cases to keep abreast of the status of

the pending cases and to be informed that
every case is in proper order.
Judge Tormis is guilty of violating Supreme Court rules,
directives, and circulars for her failure to
comply with her duty to provide an efficient court
management system in her court which includes the
preparation and use of docket inventory and monthly
report of cases as tools thereof. Office of the Court
Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4,
Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of
Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12,
2013
Judges; gross

Judge Tormis issued the warrant of arrest in violation of

ignorance of the law;

the Rule on

when the law is

sufficiently basic, not
to be aware of it
constitutes
gross ignorance of the
law

Summary Procedure that the accused should first be

notified of the charges against him and given the
opportunity to file his counter-affidavits and other
countervailing evidence. The Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure has been in effect since November 15,
1991. It finds application in a substantial
number of civil and criminal cases. Judge Tormis cannot
claim to be unfamiliar with the same. Every
judge is required to observe the law. When the law is
sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to
simply apply it; and anything less than that would be
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In short,
when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Office of the
Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing
Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch
Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-121818. March 12, 2013

Judges; gross

Under Rule 140 of the Rules

inefficiency; gross

of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC dated

ignorance of the law;

September 11, 2001, violation of Supreme Court

imposable penalties

rules, directives and circulars, and gross inefficiency are

categorized as less serious charges with the
following sanctions: (a) suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for not less than one nor
more than three months; or (b) a fine of more than
P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
Moreover, gross ignorance of the law is classified as
serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140 of the
Revised Rules of Court, and penalized under Section 11
(a), Rule 140 of the same Rules by: (1) Dismissal
from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as
the Court may determine, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of
benefits shall, in no case, include accrued leave
credits; (2) Suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for more than three (3), but not
exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of more than
P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00.
In determining the proper imposable penalty, we also
consider Judge Tormis work history which reflects
how she performed her judicial functions. We find that
there are several administrative cases already
filed against her, with most of these cases being decided
against her. These cases show her inability to
properly discharge her judicial duties. Considering her
past infractions and taking into account the
number of irregularities she committed in this present
case, Judge Tormis was meted with the penalty of
dismissal from service with forfeiture of all benefits and
privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any,
with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Office of the
Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M.

Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities

(MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S.
Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12Judges; motion to

1818. March 12, 2013

As held in Sps. Hizon v. Sps. dela Fuente, an inhibition

inhibit; grounds

must be for
just and valid reason. Complainants mere imputation
that the case was decided by the magistrates of
the Court with extreme bias and prejudice is baseless and
clearly unfounded. Jasper Junno F. Rodica v.
Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro, et al.; A.C. No. 9259. March 12,

Judges; undue delay in

2013
The honor and integrity of the judicial system is measured

deciding cases

not
only by the fairness and correctness of decisions rendered,
but also by the efficiency with which disputes
are resolved. Under the 1987 Constitution, trial judges are
mandated to decide and resolve cases within
90 days from submission for decision or resolution.
Corollary to this constitutional mandate, Section 5,
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary requires judges to perform all
judicial duties efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable
promptness. The mandate to promptly dispose of
cases or matters also applies to motions or interlocutory
matters or incidents pending before the
magistrate. Unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a
pending incident is a violation of the norms of
judicial conduct and constitutes gross inefficiency that
warrants the imposition of an administrative
sanction against the defaulting magistrate. Office of the
Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis,
Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves,
Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818.
March 12, 2013
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/march20
13/MTJ-12-1818.pdf); Office of the Court

Administrator v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49,

Tagbilaran City / Paulino Bural, Sr. v. Judge Fernando
G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City; A.M. No. RTJ-132342 / A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6, 2013
Judge Fuentes III concedes that there is no valid
justification for the delay in resolving the cases pending
in his court. Indeed, his frequent travels to his residence
in Ozamis City, which led to travel fatigue and
poor health, will not absolve him from liability. If a judge is
unable to comply with the period for
deciding cases or matters, he can, for good reasons, ask
for an extension. Without an extension granted
by the Court, the failure to decide even a single case
within the required period constitutes gross
inefficiency that merits administrative sanction. Office of
the Court Administrator v. Judge Fernando G.
Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City / Paulino Bural, Sr. v.
Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran
City; A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342 / A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March
Judges; undue delay in

6, 2013
An inexcusable failure to decide a case

deciding cases;

within the prescribed 90-day period constitutes gross

administrative
sanctions.

inefficiency, warranting the imposition of

administrative sanctions such as suspension from office
without pay or fine on the defaulting judge. The
fines imposed vary in each case, depending on the
following factors: (1) the number of cases not decided
within the reglamentary period; (2) the presence of
aggravating or mitigating circumstances; (3) the
damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay; (4)
the health and age of the judge; and (5) other
analogous circumstances.
In this case, the fine was reduced considering that this
was the first infraction of Judge Fuentes III in his
more than 15 years in the service. The Court likewise took
into consideration the fact that the respondent
judge exerted earnest efforts to fully comply with the

Courts directives as contained in the resolution.

Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Fernando G.
Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City / Paulino Bural, Sr.
v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City;
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342 / A.M. No. RTJ-12Judges; undue delay in

2318. March 6, 2013

Respondent judge claimed that the delay was the

deciding cases;

consequence of the three suspension orders issued

suspension from office

is not a justification
for the delay.

against her as she was suspended for an aggregate period

of almost one year and six months. Records
reveal, however, that Judge Tormis was repeatedly
suspended in cases wherein she committed a breach
of her duty as a member of the Bench. She cannot,
therefore, be allowed to use the same to justify
another violation of her solemn oath to dispense justice.
Even if she was allowed to avail of this excuse,
as aptly observed by the OCA, several of the cases that she
failed to dispose of had been overdue for
decision or resolution even prior to said suspensions.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M.
Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S.
Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-

Judge; Court

1818. March 12, 2013

In Obaana, Jr. v. Ricafort, the court held that: Any

Personnel; Grave

impression of

misconduct; Gross
neglect of duty; Gross
inefficiency

impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of

official functions must
be avoided. This Court shall not countenance any conduct,
act or omission on the
part of all those involved in the administration of justice
which would violate the
norm of public accountability and diminish the faith of the
people in the Judiciary.
First, the judges involved solemnized marriages even if the
requirements
submitted by the couples were incomplete and
questionable. Their actions

constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v. Asdala, the Court

held that inefficiency
implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance, and
carelessness.
Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of
duty regarding the payment
of solemnization fees. The Court, in Rodrigo-Ebron v.
Adolfo, defined neglect of duty
as the failure to give ones attention to a task expected of
him and it is gross when,
from the gravity of the offense or the frequency of
instances, the offense is so
serious in its character as to endanger or threaten public
welfare. The marriage
documents show that official receipts for the solemnization
fee were missing or
payment by batches was made for marriages performed on
different dates.
Third, the judges also solemnized marriages where a
contracting party is a
foreigner who did not submit a certificate of legal capacity
to marry from his or her
embassy. This irregularity displayed the gross neglect of
duty of the judges.
Fourth, the judges are also guilty of gross ignorance of the
law under Article 34 of
the Family Code with respect to the marriages they
solemnized where legal
impediments existed during cohabitation such as the
minority status of one party.
On the other hand, the court interpreter is guilty of grave
misconduct when she
said she can facilitate the marriage and the requirements
on the same day. She
proposed an open-dated marriage in exchange for a fee of
P3,000. Section 2,
Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
prohibits court personnel

from soliciting or accepting gifts, favor or benefit based on

any explicit or implicit
understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall
influence their official actions.
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service defines grave
misconduct as a grave
offense that carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from
the service even on a
first offense. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge
Anatalio S. Necessario, et al.
Judge; Gross ignorance

A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691. April 2, 2013

The respondent judges violated Canons 21 and

of the law

6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which exact

competence, integrity and probity in
the performance of their duties. Ignorance of the law is a
mark of incompetence,
and where the law involved is elementary, ignorance
thereof is considered as an
indication of lack of integrity. In connection with this, the
administration of justice
is considered a sacred task and upon assumption to office,
a judge ceases to be an
ordinary mortal. He or she becomes the visible
representation of the law and more
importantly of justice. Office of the Court Administrator vs.
Judge Anatalio S.
Necessario, et al. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691. April 2, 2013
Judge Clemens was charged for gross ignorance of the law
and
violation of the Child Witness Examination Rule. The
Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit since the acts of Judge Clemens were far from being
ill-motivated and in bad faith as to justify any
administrative liability on his part. A complete reading of
the TSN reveals that he was vigilant in his
conduct of the proceedings. In the instances mentioned in
the Complaint-Affidavit, he had been attentive

to the manifestations made by Atty. Tacorda and had acted

accordingly and with dispatch. Further,
contrary to the allegations of Atty. Tacorda, the TSN
showed that the respondent Judge was very much
concerned with following the proper conduct of trial and
ensuring that the One-Day Examination of
Witness Rule was followed; but at the same time, he was
sensitive to the fact that the witness was
already exhausted, having testified for almost three (3)
hours. Atty. Jerome Norman L. Tacorda for: Odel L.
Gedraga v. Judge Reynaldo B. Clemens, presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Br. 31, Calbayog City, Western
Samar, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2359, October 23, 2013
Complainant filed a case against Judge Patricio accusing
him of gross
ignorance of the law, manifest bias and partiality for
refusing to execute a judgment which was already
final and executory. The rule is that once a judgment
attains finality, it thereby becomes immutable and
unalterable. Thus, the Supreme Court held that Judge
Patricio demonstrated ignorance of such rule by
repeatedly refusing to execute the final and executory
judgment of conviction against the accused. The
rules on execution are comprehensive enough for a judge
not to know how to apply them or to be
confused by any auxiliary incidents. The issuance of a writ
of execution for a final and executory
judgment is ministerial. In other words, a judge is not
given the discretion whether or not to implement
the judgment. He is to effect execution without delay and
supervise implementation strictly in
accordance with the judgment. Judge Patricios acts
unmistakably exhibit gross ignorance of the law.
Jesus D. Carbajosa v. Judge Hannibal R. Patricio, Presiding
Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, President
Roxas, Capiz, A.M. No. MTJ-13-1834, October 2, 2013.

Complainant claimed that since Judge Cajigals

appointment as
presiding judge of RTC, Branch 96, Quezon City, the latter
has displayed gross inefficiency by failing to
resolve within the prescribed period a number of
incidents. Moreover, complainant questions the
propriety of the Judges decision in a case he is involved
in. The Supreme Court held that the charges of
ignorance of the law are bereft of merit. Judge Cajigals
order was issued in the proper exercise of his
judicial functions, and as such, is not subject to
administrative disciplinary action; especially considering
that the complainant failed to establish bad faith on the
part of the judge. Well entrenched is the rule that
a judge may not be administratively sanctioned for mere
errors of judgment in the absence of showing
of any bad faith, fraud, malice, gross ignorance, corrupt
purpose, or a deliberate intent to do an injustice
on his or her part. Moreover, as a matter of public policy, a
judge cannot be subjected to liability for any
of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he
acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be
to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon
to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment. Narciso G. Dulalia v. Judge Afable E.
Cajigal, RTC, Br. 96, Quezon City, A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 10Judge; Prohibition

3492-RTJ, December 4, 2013

Section 35 of Rule 138 of the

against private

Rules of Court expressly prohibits sitting judges like Judge

practice of law

Malanyaon from
engaging in the private practice of law or giving
professional advice to clients.
Section 11 Canon 4 (Propriety), of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct and Rule 5.07
of the Code of Judicial Conduct reiterate the prohibition
from engaging in the
private practice of law or giving professional advice to

clients. The prohibition is

based on sound reasons of public policy, considering that
the rights, duties,
privileges and functions of the office of an attorney are
inherently incompatible
with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion
and privileges of a sitting
judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full
time and attention to their
judicial duties, prevent them from extending favors to their
own private interests,
and assure the public of their impartiality in the
performance of their functions.
These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency
and desire to promote
the public interest.
Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the
Bench must accept that his
right to practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar is
thereby suspended, and
it shall continue to be so suspended for the entire period
of his incumbency as a
judge. The term practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases in court or to
participation in court proceedings, but extends to the
preparation of pleadings or
papers in anticipation of a litigation, the giving of legal
advice to clients or persons
needing the same, the preparation of legal instruments
and contracts by which
legal rights are secured, and the preparation of papers
incident to actions and
special proceedings.
In this case, Judge Malanyaon engaged in the private
practice of law by assisting his
daughter at his wifes administrative case, coaching his
daughter in making
manifestations or posing motions to the hearing officer,

and preparing the

questions that he prompted to his daughter. Sonia C.
Decena and Rey C. Decena vs.
Judge Nilo A. Malanyaon, RTC, Br. 32, Pili, Camarines Sur.
A.M. RTJ-10-2217. April 8,
Judge; Delay in

2013
Judge Lazaro was accused of undue delay in the

deciding cases

resolution of the Motion

to Dismiss a civil case considering that she had resolved
the Motion to Dismiss beyond the 90-day period
prescribed for the purpose without filing any request for
the extension of the period. The Supreme Court
held that the 90-day period within which a sitting trial
Judge should decide a case or resolve a pending
matter is mandatory. If the Judge cannot decide or resolve
within the period, she can be allowed
additional time to do so, provided she files a written
request for the extension of her time to decide the
case or resolve the pending matter. The rule, albeit
mandatory, is to be implemented with an awareness
of the limitations that may prevent a Judge from being
efficient. Under the circumstances specific to this
case, it would be unkind and inconsiderate on the part of
the Court to disregard Judge Lazaros
limitations and exact a rigid and literal compliance with
the rule. With her undeniably heavy inherited
docket and the large volume of her official workload, she
most probably failed to note the need for her to
apply for the extension of the 90-day period to resolve the
Motion to Dismiss. Danilo E. Lubaton v. Judge
Mary Josephine P. Lazaro, Regional Trial Court, Br. 74,
Antipolo, Rizal, A.M. RTJ-12-2320, September 2, 2013
Judge Baluma was asked to explain his failure to act on
the twenty-three
(23) cases submitted for decision/resolution. The Supreme
Court held that it has consistently impressed
upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and

expeditiously under the time-honored precept that

justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge should decide
cases with dispatch and should be careful,
punctual, and observant in the performance of his
functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes
the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary,
lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute.
Failure to decide a case within the reglementary period is
not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency
warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on
the defaulting judge. Judge Balumas gross
inefficiency, evident in his undue delay in deciding 23
cases within the reglementary period, merits the
imposition of administrative sanctions. Re: Cases
Submitted for Decision before Hon. Teofilo D. Baluma,
Former Judge, Branch 1, Regional Trial Court, Tagbilaran
Judge; Gross

City, Bohol, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2355, September 2, 2013.

Judge Soriano failed to decide thirty-six (36) cases

Inefficiency

submitted for decision in

MTC and MTCC, which were all due for decision at the
time he compulsorily retired. The Supreme
Court held that Judge Soriano has been remiss in the
performance of his judicial duties. Judge Sorianos
unreasonable delay in deciding cases and resolving
incidents and motions, and his failure to decide the
remaining cases before his compulsory retirement
constitutes gross inefficiency which cannot be
tolerated. Inexcusable failure to decide cases within the
reglementary period constitutes gross
inefficiency, warranting the imposition of an
administrative sanction on the defaulting judge. Judge
Sorianos inefficiency in managing his caseload was
compounded by gross negligence as evinced by the
loss of the records of at least four (4) cases which could no
longer be located or reconstituted despite
diligent efforts by his successor. Judge Soriano was
responsible for managing his court efficiently to
ensure the prompt delivery of court services, especially the

speedy disposition of cases. Thus, Judge

Soriano was found guilty of gross inefficiency and gross
ignorance of the law, and fined P40,000 to be
taken from the amount withheld from his retirement
benefits. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon.
Santiago E. Soriano, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1683, September 11,
Judge; Gross

2013.
Judge Pardo was accused of corruption. Judge Pardo did

Misconduct

not deny that

Rosendo, a litigant who had a pending application for
probation in his sala, went to his house, had a
drinking spree with him and stayed there for more than
two hours. The Supreme Court held Judge
Pardo liable for gross misconduct. Citing jurisprudence,
the Court held that a judges acts of meeting
with litigants outside the office premises beyond office
hours and sending a member of his staff to talk
with complainant constitute gross misconduct. Moreover, a
judge was held liable for misconduct when
he entertained a litigant in his home and received benefits
given by the litigant. Atty. Jessie Tuldague and
Atty. Alfredo Baldajo, Jr. v. Judge Moises Pardo and Jaime
Calpatura, etc. / Atty. Jessie Tuldague and Atty. Alfredo
Baldajo, Jr. v. Jaime Calpatura, etc. / Re: Report on the
Judicial Audit and Investigation Conducted in the RTC,
Cabarroguis, Quirino, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1962/ A.M. OCA IPI
No. 05-2243-P/ A.M. No. 05-10-661-RTC, October

Judge; Grave

25, 2013.
Grave misconduct, gross

Misconduct; Gross

neglect of duty and gross dishonesty of which Judge

Neglect of Duty; Gross

Dishonesty; Penalty

Salubre, Edig, Palero and Aventurado are found

guilty, even if committed for the first time, are punishable
by dismissal and carries with it the forfeiture
of retirement benefits, except accrued leave benefits, and
the perpetual disqualification for
reemployment in the government service. As to Judge
Salubre and Edig, however, in view of their
deaths, the supreme penalty of dismissal cannot be

imposed on them anymore. It is only the penalty of

dismissal that is rendered futile by their passing since
they are not in the service anymore, but it is still
within the Courts power to forfeit their retirement
benefits. Report on the financial audit conducted in the
MTCC, Tagum City, Davao del Norte / Office of the Court
Administrator v. Judge Ismael L. Salubre, et al., A.M.
OCA IPI No. 09-3138-P/A.M. No. MTJ-05-1618, October 22,
Judge; Remedy for

2013
A complaint for gross ignorance of the law, grave

Correcting Actions of

misconduct, oppression, bias and partiality was filed

Judge

against Judge Omelio. The Supreme Court

reiterated the rule that the filing of an administrative
complaint is not the proper remedy for correcting
the actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the
norms of propriety, where a sufficient remedy
exists. The actions against judges should not be
considered as complementary or suppletory to, or
substitute for, the judicial remedies which can be availed
of by a party in a case. Moreover, the grant or
denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case
rests on the sound discretion of the court
taking cognizance of the case, since the assessment and
evaluation of evidence towards that end involves
findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive
determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial
discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be
interfered with, except when there is grave abuse
of discretion. Ma. Regina S. Peralta v. Judge George E.
Omelio / Romualdo G. Mendoza v. Judge George E.
Omelio / Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra v. Judge George E.
Omelio, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2259/A.M. No. RTJ-11-

Judge; Voluntary

2264/A.M. No. RTJ-11-2273, October 22, 2013

Rallos charges Justice Hernando with bias because he

inhibition

voluntarily inhibited
himself in CA-G.R. CEB SP. No. 06676 only after the
promulgation of the March 28, 2012 and April 13,
2012 resolutions. The Supreme Court held that the fact

that Justice Hernando voluntarily inhibited

himself after writing the assailed resolutions did not
establish his bias against Rallos and her co-heirs
considering that the inhibition was for the precise
objective of eliminating suspicions of undue influence.
The justification of Justice Hernando was commendable,
and should be viewed as a truly just and valid
ground for his self-disqualification as a judicial officer in a
specific case. Further, Rallos insists that she
was entitled to be informed about the inhibitions of the
Justices and about their reasons for the
inhibitions. The Court held that there is nothing in Rule V
or in any other part of the Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals that specifically requires that the partylitigants be informed of the mandatory or
voluntary inhibition of a Justice. Nevertheless, a partylitigant who desires to be informed of the
inhibition of a Justice and of the reason for the inhibition
must file a motion for inhibition in the manner
provided under Section 3, Rule V of the Internal Rules of
the Court of Appeals.
However, the Court held that henceforth all the parties in
any action or proceedings should be
immediately notified of any mandatory disqualification or
voluntary inhibition of the Justice who has
participated in any action of the court, stating the reason
for the mandatory disqualification or voluntary
inhibition. The requirement of notice is a measure to
ensure that the disqualification or inhibition has not
been resorted to in order to cause injustice to or to
prejudice any party or cause. Re: Letters of Lucena B.
Rallos, for alleged acts/incidents/occurences relative to the
resolutions(s) issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 06676 by
Court of Appeals Executive Justice Pampio Abarintos and
Associate Justices Ramol Paul Hernando and Victoria
Isabel Paredes/Re: Complaint filed by Lucena B. Rallos
against Justices Gabriel T. Ingles, Pamela Ann Maxino, and
Carmelita S. Manahan, IPI No. 12-203-CA-J/A.M. No. 12-

9-08-CA, December 10, 2013

Administrative

The Court dismissed the complaint filed by Inter-Petal

Complaint; moot and

Recreational Corporation against Chief Justice Renato

academic

Corona for being moot and academic after

considering the judgment of the Senate sitting as an
Impeachment Court, which found the Chief Justice
guilty of the charge under Article II of the Articles of
Impeachment, with the penalty of removal from
office and disqualification to hold any office under the
Republic of the Philippines as provided in Section
3(7), Article XI of the Constitution. Re: Complaint Against
the Honorable Chief Justice Renato C. Corona dated
September 14, 2011 filed by Inter-Petal Recreational
Corporation, A.M. No. 12-6-10-SC. June 13, 2012

Public Officials; SALNs

While no prohibition could stand against access to official

records, such as the
SALN, the same is undoubtedly subject to regulation.
Section 8 (c) and (d) of R.A. No. 6713 provides for
the limitation and prohibition on the regulated access to
SALNs of government officials and employees
as well as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A.
No. 6713. The power to regulate the access by
the public to these documents stems from the inherent
power of the Court, as custodian of these personal
documents, to control its very office to the end that
damage to, or loss of, the records may be avoided;
that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of
the books and documents and other
employees may be prevented; and that the right of other
persons entitled to make inspection may be
insured. In this connection, Section 11 of the R.A 6173
provides for the penalties in case there should be a
misuse of the SALN and the information contained
therein. The Court found no reason to deny the

public access to the SALN, PDS and CV of the Justices of

the Court and other magistrates of the Judiciary
subject, of course, to the limitations and prohibitions
provided in R.A. No. 6713, its implementing rules
and regulations, and in the guidelines set forth in the
decretal portion.
The Court noted the valid concerns of the other
magistrates regarding the possible illicit motives of some
individuals in their requests for access to such personal
information and their publication. However,
custodians of public documents must not concern
themselves with the motives, reasons and objects of
the persons seeking access to the records. The moral or
material injury which their misuse might inflict
on others is the requestors responsibility and lookout. Any
publication is made subject to the
consequences of the law. While public officers in the
custody or control of public records have the
discretion to regulate the manner in which records may be
inspected, examined or copied by interested
persons, such discretion does not carry with it the
authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination,
or copying of the records. After all, public office is a public
trust. Public officers and employees must, at
all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.
The Supreme Court also provided the following guidelines:
1. All requests shall be filed with the Office of the Clerk of
Court of the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals; for
the lower courts, with the Office of the Court
Administrator; and for attached agencies, with their
respective heads of offices.
2. Requests shall cover only copies of the latest SALN, PDS
and CV of the members, officials and
employees of the Judiciary, and may cover only previous

records if so specifically requested and

considered as justified, as determined by the officials
mentioned in par. 1 above, under the terms of these
guidelines and the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
R.A. No. 6713.
3. In the case of requests for copies of SALN of the
Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals,
the authority to disclose shall be made by the
Court En Banc.
4. Every request shall explain the requesting partys
specific purpose and their individual interests
sought to be served; shall state the commitment that the
request shall only be for the stated purpose; and
shall be submitted in a duly accomplished request form
secured from the SC website. The use of the
information secured shall only be for the stated purpose.
5. In the case of requesting individuals other than
members of the media, their interests should go
beyond pure or mere curiosity.
6. In the case of the members of the media, the request
shall additionally be supported by proof under
oath of their media affiliation and by a similar certification
of the accreditation of their respective
organizations as legitimate media practitioners.
7. The requesting party, whether as individuals or as
members of the media, must have no derogatory
record of having misused any requested information
previously furnished to them. Re: Request for copy of
2008 Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth [SALN]
and Personal Data Sheet or Curriculum Vitae of the
Justices of the Supreme Court and Officers and Employees
of the Judiciary/ Re; Request of the Philippine Center for
Investigative Journalism [PCIJ] for the 2008 Statement of
Assets, Liabilities and Networth [SALN] and Personal
Data Sheets of the Court of Appeals Justices, A.M. No. 098-6-SC/A.M. No. 09-8-07-CA. June 13, 2012
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/june2012

/09-8-6-SC.htm).
Retirement under R.A 910; Retirement vs. Resignation.
Resignation and retirement are two distinct
concepts carrying different meanings and legal
consequences in our jurisdiction. While an employee can
resign at any time, retirement entails the compliance with
certain age and service requirements specified
by law and jurisprudence. Resignation stems from the
employees own intent and volition to resign and
relinquish his/her post. Retirement takes effect by
operation of law. In terms of severance to ones
employment, resignation absolutely cuts-off the
employment relationship in general; in retirement, the
employment relationship endures for the purpose of the
grant of retirement benefits. RA No. 910, as
amended allows the grant of retirement benefits to a
justice or judge who has either retired from judicial
service or resigned from judicial office. In case of
retirement, a justice or judge must show compliance
with the age and service requirements as provided in RA
No. 910, as amended. The second sentence of
Section 1 imposes the following minimum requirements for
optional retirement:
(a) must have attained the age of sixty (60) years old; and
(b) must have rendered at least fifteen (15) years service in
the Government, the last three (3) of which
shall have been continuously rendered in the Judiciary.
Strict compliance with the age and service requirements
under the law is the rule and the grant of
exception remains to be on a case to case basis. The Court
allows seeming exceptions to these fixed rules
for certain judges and justices only and whenever there
are ample reasons to grant such exception.
On the other hand, resignation under RA No. 910, as
amended must be by reason of incapacity to
discharge the duties of the office. In Britanico, it was held
that the resignation contemplated under RA
No. 910, as amended must have the element of

involuntariness on the part of the justice or judge. More

than physical or mental disability to discharge the judicial
office, the involuntariness must spring from
the intent of the justice or judge who would not have
parted with his/her judicial employment were it
not for the presence of circumstances and/or factors
beyond his/her control.
In either of the two instances above-mentioned, Judge
Macarambons case does not render him eligible
to retire under RA No. 910,as amended. First, Judge
Macarambon failed to satisfy the age requirement
since he was less than 60 years of age when he resigned
from his judicial office before transferring to the
COMELEC. Likewise, he failed to satisfy the service
requirement not having been in continuous service
with the Judiciary for three (3) years prior to his
retirement. Second, Judge Macarambons resignation
was not by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of
the office. His separation from judicial
employment was of his own accord and volition. Thus, the
ruling in Britanico cannot be properly applied
to his case since his resignation was voluntary. Third,
there are no exceptional reasons to justify Judge
Macarambons request. Judge Macarambon failed to
present similar circumstances, i.e., the presence of
available and sufficient accumulated leave credits which
we may tack in to comply with the age
requirement. A verification from the Leave Division, OCA
shows that at the time he left the Court Judge
Macarambon only had 514 vacation leaves and 79 sick
leaves which are insufficient to cover the gap in
the age of retirement. Moreover, these accumulated leave
credits were all forwarded to the COMELEC
upon his transfer. Finally, unlike in Britanico, the nature of
his separation from his judicial office was
voluntary.
However, although Judge Macarambon is not qualified to
retire under RA No. 910, as amended, he may

retire under RA No. 1616 based on the documents he had

presented before the Court which meets the
age and service requirements under the said law. Re:
Application for Retirement of Judge Moslemen
Macarambon under Republic Act No. 910, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9946, A.M. No. 14061-RET, June 19,
Administrative Cases

2012
Respondent law professors asked for

Initiated by Supreme

alternative reliefs should the Court find their Compliance

Court; procedure

unsatisfactory, that is, that the Show Cause

Resolution be set for hearing and for that purpose, they be
allowed to require the production or
presentation of witnesses and evidence bearing on the
plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the
Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the plagiarism case
against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC)
and to have access to the records of, and evidence that
were presented or may be presented in the ethics
case against Justice Del Castillo. It should be clarified that
this is not an indirect contempt proceeding
and Rule 71 (which requires a hearing) has no application
to this case. As explicitly ordered in the Show
Cause Resolution this case was docketed as an
administrative matter. The rule that is relevant to this
controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on disciplinary
proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme
Court, to wit:
SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.In proceedings
initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court
or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so
requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case
for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of
the Supreme Court or judge of a lower
court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the
same manner provided in sections 6 to 11
hereof, save that the review of the report of investigation
shall be conducted directly by the Supreme
Court.

From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a

formal investigation, through a referral to the
specified officers, is merely discretionary, not mandatory
on the Court. Furthermore, it is only if the
Court deems such an investigation necessary that the
procedure in Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-A will be
followed. As respondent professors are fully aware, in
general, administrative proceedings do not
require a trial type hearing. Re: Letter of the UP Law
Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A statement by the
Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law
on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation
Administrative

in the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011.

A complaint charging Judge Kapili with Conduct

Proceedings; burden of

Unbecoming of a Member of the Judiciary, and Gross

proof

Misconduct amounting to Violation of the Code of

Judicial Conduct was dismissed because of the failure of
the complainant to meet the burden of proof
required in administrative proceedings. Administrative
charges against judges have been viewed by this
Court with utmost care, as the respondent stands to face
the penalty of dismissal or disbarment. Thus,
proceedings of this character are in their nature highly
penal in character and are to be governed by the
rules of law applicable to criminal cases. The charges in
such case must, therefore, be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Jocelyn Datoon v. Judge Bethany G.
Kapili, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch
24, Maasin City, Southern Leyte, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2247,

Plagiarism

March 2, 2011.
The passing off of the work of another as ones own is an
indispensable element of
plagiarism. Whether or not the footnote is sufficiently
detailed, so as to satisfy the footnoting standards
of counsel for petitioners is not an ethical matter but one
concerning clarity of writing. The statement
See Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in
International Law (2005) in the Vinuya decision is an

attribution no matter if Tams thought that it gave him

somewhat less credit than he deserved. Such
attribution altogether negates the idea that Justice Del
Castillo passed off the challenged passages as his
own.
The Vinuya decision lifted passages from Criddle-Descents
article. Criddle-Descents footnotes were
carried into the Vinuya decisions own footnotes but no
attributions were made to the two authors. One
of Justice Del Castillos researchers, a court-employed
attorney, explained how she accidentally deleted
the attributions, originally planted in the beginning drafts
of her report to him. She said that she did her
research electronically. In the course of editing and
cleaning up her draft, the researcher accidentally
deleted the attributions. Given the operational properties
of the Microsoft program in use by the Court,
the accidental decapitation of attributions to sources of
research materials is not remote. The Microsoft
Word program does not have a function that raises an
alarm when original materials are cut up or
pruned.
Petitioners theory that intent is not material in
committing plagiarism since all that a writer has to do, to
avoid the charge, is to enclose lifted portions with
quotation marks and acknowledge the sources from
which these were taken, ignores the fact that plagiarism is
essentially a form of fraud where intent to
deceive is inherent. Plagiarism presupposes intent and a
deliberate, conscious effort to steal anothers
work and pass it off as ones own.
The subject passages were reproduced in the Vinuya
decision without placing them in quotation marks.
But such passages consisted of common definitions and
terms, abridged history of certain principles of
law, and similar frequently repeated phrases that, in the
world of legal literature, already belong to the
public realm. The judge is not expected to produce original

scholarship in every respect.

Since the attributions to Criddle-Descent and Ellis were
accidentally deleted, it is impossible for any
person reading the decision to connect the same to the
works of those authors as to conclude that in
writing the decision Justice Del Castillo twisted their
intended messages. And the lifted passages
provided mere background facts that established the state
of international law at various stages of its
development. These are neutral data that could support
conflicting theories regarding whether or not
the judiciary has the power today to order the Executive
Department to sue another country or whether
the duty to prosecute violators of international crimes has
attained the status of jus cogens.
On occasions judges and justices have mistakenly cited
the wrong sources, failed to use quotation marks,
inadvertently omitted necessary information from
footnotes or endnotes. But these do not, in every case,
amount to misconduct. Only errors that are tainted with
fraud, corruption, or malice are subject of
disciplinary action.
The Justices researcher was competent in the field of
assignment given her. She finished law from a
leading law school, graduated third in her class, served as
Editor-in Chief of her schools Law Journal,
and placed fourth in the bar examinations when she took
it. She earned a masters degree in
International Law and Human Rights from a prestigious
university in the United States under the
Global-Hauser program. Justice Del Castillo did not
exercise bad judgment in assigning the research
work in the Vinuya case to her. In the matter of the charge
of plagiarism, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, October 12,
Statement of UP

2010
While the statement was meant to reflect the educators

Professors

opinion on the
allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they

treated such allegation not only as an

established fact, but a truth. They expressed
dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillos explanation on
how he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions
and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those
of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized. The
statement bore certain remarks which raise
concern for the Court. The first paragraph concludes with
a reference to the decision in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty
and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the
land. The authors also not only assumed that Justice Del
Castillo committed plagiarism, they went
further by directly accusing the Court of perpetrating
extraordinary injustice by dismissing the petition
of the comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary.
They further attempt to educate this Court on
how to go about the review of the case. The insult to the
members of the Court was aggravated by
imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the
said case, its dismissal on the basis of polluted
sources, the Courts alleged indifference to the cause of
petitioners, as well as the supposed alarming
lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the
most basic values of decency and respect.
The publication of a statement by the faculty of the UP
College of Law regarding the allegations of
plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
was totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash
act of misplaced vigilance. Of public knowledge is the
ongoing investigation precisely to determine the
truth of such allegations. More importantly, the motion for
reconsideration of the decision alleged to
contain plagiarized materials is still pending before the
Court. We made it clear in the case of In re Kelly
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/october2
010/10-10-4-SC.htm#_ftn4) that any
publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the

jury, the parties, the officers of the court, the

counsel with reference to the suit, or tending to influence
the decision of the controversy, is contempt of
court and is punishable.
The UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite
resentment against a resolution that would not
reverse the Vinuya decision. This runs contrary to their
obligation as law professors and officers of the
Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court, to which they owe fidelity
according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and
not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice.
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/october2
010/10-10-4-SC.htm#_ftn7) Re: Letter of
the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A
Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4Administrative

SC. October 19, 2010

The fact that the complainant

proceeding; settlement

manifested that he is no longer interested to pursue the

does not render case

moot

administrative case against the respondent since

he and the latter have already agreed to settle their
dispute amicably would not render the case moot.
The withdrawal of complaints cannot divest the Court of
its jurisdiction nor strip it of its power to
determine the veracity of the charges made and to
discipline, such as the results of its investigation may
warrant, an erring respondent. Administrative actions
cannot depend on the will or pleasure of the
complainant who may, for reasons of his own, condone
what may be destestable. Neither can the Court
be bound by the unilateral act of the complainant in a
matter relating to its disciplinary power. The
Courts interest in the affairs of the judiciary is of
paramount concern. For sure, public interest is at stake
in the conduct and actuations of officials and employees of

the judiciary, inasmuch as the various

programs and efforts of this Court in improving the
delivery of justice to the people should not be
frustrated and put to naught by private arrangements
between the parties. Fernando P. Chan vs. Joven T.
Olegario, Process Server, Regional Trial Court, Branch 6,
Iligan City, A.M. No. P-09-27
Administrative

As correctly pointed out by the

proceedings;

Investigating Judge, to sustain a finding of administrative

substantial evidence
required.

culpability, only substantial evidence is

required. The present case is an administrative case, not a
criminal case, against respondent. Therefore,
the quantum of proof required is only substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Evidence to support a conviction in
a criminal case is not necessary, and the dismissal of the
criminal case against the respondent in an
administrative case is not a ground for the dismissalof the
administrative case. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Claudio M. Lopez, Process Server, MTC,
Sudipen. La Union, A.M. No. P-10-2788, January 18,

Administrative

2011.
The compromise agreement between complainant

proceedings;

and respondent, or the fact that complainant already

compromise
agreements

forgave respondent, does not necessarily warrant

the dismissal of the administrative case. Three reasons
justify the continuation of the administrative
matter despite the compromise agreement or the
forgiveness. One, the Courts disciplinary authority is
not dependent on or cannot be frustrated by the private
arrangements entered into by the parties;
otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice,
as well as the discipline of court personnel, will
be undermined. Two, public interest is at stake in the
conduct and actuations of the officials and
employees of the Judiciary. Accordingly, the efforts of the

Court in improving the delivery of justice to

the people should not be frustrated and put to naught by
any private arrangements between the parties.
And, three, the Courts interest in the affairs of the
Judiciary is a paramount concern that bows to no
limits. Benigno B. Reas v. Carlos M. Relacion, A.M. No. PAdministrative

05-2095. February 9, 2011

Bayani was charged with dishonesty for failure to

Proceedings;

disclose in her Personal Data Sheet that she was

substantial evidence

previously admonished in an administrative case.

Bayani invoked good faith as her defense. The Court ruled
that while her defense of good faith may be
difficult to prove as clearly it is a question of intention, a
state of mind, erroneous judgment on the part
of Bayani does not, however, necessarily connote the
existence of bad faith, malice, or an intention to
defraud. In administrative proceedings, only substantial
evidence is required to warrant disciplinary
sanctions. Substantial evidence is defined as relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Thus, after much
consideration of the facts and circumstances, while
the Court has not shied away in imposing the strictest
penalty to erring employees, neither can it think
and rule unreasonably in determining whether an
employee deserves disciplinary sanction. Bayani was
admonished and warned that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will warrant the imposition of a
mere severe penalty. Re: Anonymous Complaint against Ms.
Hermogena F. Bayani for Dishonesty, A.M. No.

Bad faith defined;

2007-22-SC. February 1, 2011

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or

absence of proof

negligence; it
imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of a
sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill-will; it
partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a
state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or

some motive or self-interest or ill-will for

ulterior purposes. Evident bad faith connotes a manifest
deliberate intent on the part of the accused to
do wrong or cause damage. In issuing, ex parte, an order
which was effectively a Temporary Restraining
Order with an indefinite term, the respondent judge was
found to have violated Rule 58, Section 5 of the
Rules of Court. However, the charge of bad faith and
manifest partiality was rejected by the Supreme
Court. No evidence was adduced to prove that the
issuance of the assailed order was motivated by bad
faith. Further, the Supreme Court found that in issuing
the assailed order, respondent judge was not at
all motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred and some
other motive; rather, he took into account the
circumstances obtaining between the parties. Mayor Hadji
Amer R. Sampiano, et al. v. Judge Cader P. Indar,
Sheriffs and process

A.M. RTJ-05-1953, December 21, 2009

In the implementation of writs

servers expenses for

or processes of the court for whic expenses are to be

service of writs and

processes

incurred, sheriffs are mandated to comply with

Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC to the effect that the
sheriff or process server must first prepare an estimate of
the expenses for approval by the court, and
that the interested party may then deposit the amount as
indicated in the approved estimate with the
clerk of court or ex oficio sheriff for disbursement to the
deputy sheriff assigned to effect the service of the
writ or process, subject to liquidation within the same
period for submitting a sheriffs return. In this
case, the respondent served the writ of execution without
presenting to the complainant a court
approved estimate of expenses and without the required
deposit from the complainant to the clerk of
court. While the record reveal the existence of an approved
Itemized Estimated Amount of Expenses, a
copy of that same itemized estimated expenses was only

given to the complainant almost four months

after the writ of execution was served on the losing party.
Likewise in contravention of Rule 141,
respondent sheriff directly received money from the
complainant. Respondent is found guilty of neglect
of duty. Emma B. Ramos v. Apollo R. Ragot, A.M. No. P-09Administrative

2600, December 23, 2009

It is a settled rule that in administrative proceedings

proceedings; quantum

that the complainant has the burden of proving the

of evidence

allegations in his or her complaint with substantial

evidence. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
presumption that the respondent has regularly
performed his duties will prevail. Illupa vs. Abdullah, A.M.
No. SCC-11-16-P. June 1, 2011

Administrative

In several jurisprudential precedents, the Court

proceedings;

has refrained from imposing the actual administrative

mitigating
circumstances.

penalties prescribed by law or regulation in the

presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the
respondents length of service, the respondents
acknowledgement of his or her infractions and feeling of
remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian
and equitable considerations, respondents advanced age,
among other things, have had varying
significance in the determination by the Court of the
imposable penalty. Office of the Court Administrator

Affidavit of Desistance;

vs. Aguilar, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2087, June 7, 2011

It bears to stress that a case of suspension

no effect on

or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief

disciplinary
proceeding

to a complainant in a civil case but is intended

to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession or its
undesirable members in order to protect the public and
the courts. It is not an investigation into the acts of
respondent as a husband but on his conduct as an
officer of the Court and his fitness to continue as a
member of the Bar. Hence, the Affidavit dated March
15, 1995, which is akin to an affidavit of desistance,
cannot have the effect of abating the instant

proceedings. Elpidio P. Tiong vs. Atty. George M. Florendo.

Presumption of

A.C. No. 4428. December 12, 2011

The Court has

innocence in

consistently held that in suspension or disbarment

disbarment
proceedings; burden of
proof; quantum of
proof

proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the

presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant to prove the allegations
in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or
disbarment proceedings is preponderance of
evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally
balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a
decision in favor of the respondent. Siao Aba, et al. vs.
Attys. Salvador De Guzman, Jr., et al. A.C. No. 7649.
December 14, 2011

Internal Rules of the

Section 4 of Rule VI of

CA (IRCA); preliminary

the 2009 IRCA provides that [T]he requirement of a

injunction;
requirement of a
hearing

hearing for preliminary injunction is satisfied with

the issuance of a resolution served upon the party sought
to be enjoined requiring him to comment on
the said application within the period of not more than ten
(10) days from notice.
In this case, the CA was justified in dispensing with the
requisite hearing on the application for
injunctive writ, since the so-called new and substantial
matters raised in the third urgent motion in
CA-G.R. SP No. 122784 and in the supplement thereto
were in fact not previously unknown to
respondents Ricafort, and they had already been
previously ordered to comment on the said application,
at the time when the said subsequent matters were
already obtaining. Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio
A. Henson & Angel S. Ong vs. Court of Appeals Asso.
Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. OCA

Jurisdiction of the

IPI No. 12-201-CA-J. February 19, 2013

An administrative matter was instituted

Court over

against Judge Grageda, based on the result of a judicial

administrative

audit conducted after his retirement. According

proceedings

to the Supreme Court, for it to acquire jurisdiction over an

administrative proceeding, the complaint
must be filed during the incumbency of the respondent
public official or employee. This is because the
filing of an administrative case is predicated on the
holding of a position or office in the government
service. However, once jurisdiction has attached, the same
is not lost by the mere fact that the public
official or employee was no longer in office during the
pendency of the case.
In present case, Judge Gragedas retirement effectively
barred the Court from pursuing the instant
administrative proceeding that was instituted after his
tenure in office, and divested the Court, much
less the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), of any
jurisdiction to still subject him to the rules and
regulations of the judiciary and/or to penalize him for the
infractions committed while he was still in the
service. Accordingly, the complaint against retired Judge
Grageda was dismissed. Office of the Court
Administrator v. Jesus L. Grageda; A.M. No. RTJ-10-2235.

Public officer;

March 11, 2013

In People v. Jansen, the Court held that the

Presumption of

solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate

regularity

whether or not a marriage

license has been duly and regularly issued by the local
civil registrar. All the
solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has
been issued by the
competent official, and it may be presumed from the
issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the
duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had
fulfilled the requirements of law. However, in Sevilla v.
Cardenas, the presumption
of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity
or failure to perform a duty. The visible superimpositions
on the marriage licenses

should have alerted the solemnizing judges to the

irregularity of the issuance.
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S.
Necessario, et al. A.M. No. MTJPublic Officers; public

07-1691. April 2, 2013

In this case, Gesultura, a Cashier II in the Office of the

office is a public trust;

Clerk of Court in the

public officers and

employees must at
all times be
accountable to the
people, serve them
with utmost
responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and

RTC, was dismissed for an anomaly involving the

Judiciary Development Fund and
the General Fund. The Court held that public office is a
public trust. Public officers
and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act
with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives. Those charged with the

efficiency, act with

dispensation of justice, from

patriotism and justice,

justices and judges to the lowliest clerks, should be

and lead modest

circumscribed with the heavy

lives.

burden of responsibility. Not only must their conduct at all

times be characterized
by propriety and decorum but, above all else, it must be
beyond suspicion.
No position demands greater moral righteousness and
uprightness from the
occupant than does the judicial office. The safekeeping of
funds and collections is
essential to the goal of an orderly administration of justice.
The act of
misappropriating judiciary funds constitutes dishonesty
and grave misconduct
which are grave offenses punishable by dismissal upon the
commission of even
the first offense. Time and again, we have reminded court
personnel tasked with
collections of court funds, such as Clerks of Courts and
cash clerks, to deposit
immediately with authorized government depositories the

various funds they have

collected, because they are not authorized to keep funds in
their custody. Office of
the Court Administrator vs. Develyn Gesultura. A.M. No. P04-1785. April 2, 2013
Judiciary;

Respondent Arnejo, a stenographer of the RTC, was

Accountability

accused of receiving
payment for the TSN on 22 July 2010 and remitting the
money to the cashier of the Clerk of Court only
on 19 and 23 December 2010. The Supreme Court held
that the respondent violated the Code of Conduct
of Court Personnel and Code of Ethics for Government
Officials and Employees. The Court will not
tolerate the practice of asking for advance payment from
litigants, much less the unauthorized
acceptance of judicial fees. Section 11, Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court, specifically provides that payment
for requests of copies of the TSN shall be made to the
Clerk of Court. Clearly, therefore, payment cannot
be made to respondent, as it is an official transaction,
and, as such, must be made to the Clerk of Court.
Respondent, being a stenographer, is not authorized to
accept payment for judicial fees, even if twoOctober
thirds of those fees would be paid to her. Moreover, the
issuance of an acknowledgment receipt cannot
be construed as having been done in good faith,
considering the fact that respondent only remitted the
payment for the TSN five (5) months after her receipt of the
supposed judicial fee, or only after the
instant Complaint had been filed against her. Her belated
remittance was tainted with bad faith. Joefil
Baguio v. Maria Fe Arnejo, Stenographer III, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 24, Cebu City, A.M. No. P-13-3155,

Judiciary;

October 21, 2013.

The issue presented in this case is

Applicability of Sec. 7,

whether or not Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing

Rule III, IRR of R.A.

Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. (RA)

No. 10154.

10154 applies to the employees of the Judiciary. The

Supreme Court ruled that the subject provision
which requires retiring government employees to secure a
prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of
administrative case/s from, among others, the CSC
should not be made to apply to employees of the
Judiciary. To deem it otherwise would disregard the
Courts constitutionally-enshrined power of
administrative supervision over its personnel. Besides,
retiring court personnel are already required to
secure a prior clearance of the pendency/non-pendency of
administrative case/s from the Court which
makes the CSC clearance a superfluous and nonexpeditious requirement contrary to the declared state
policy of RA 10154. The Court, however, noted that since
the Constitution only accords the Judiciary
administrative supervision over its personnel, a different
treatment of the clearance requirement obtains
with respect to criminal cases. As such, a clearance
requirement which pertains to criminal cases may be
imposed by the appropriate government agency, i.e., the
Office of the Ombudsman, on retiring court
personnel as it is a matter beyond the ambit of the
Judiciarys power of administrative supervision. Re:
Request for guidance/clarification on Section 7, Rule III of
Republic Act No. 10154 Requiring Retiring
Government Employees to Secure a Clearance of
Pendency/Non-Pendency of Case/s from the Civil Service

Judiciary; Duty of

Commission, A.M. No. 13-09-08-SC, October 1, 2013.

Sherriff Nery was accused of failing to serve

Sheriff to Promptly

summons to the defendant in a case where he asked for

Serve Summons

transportation expense, and despite being given

an amount. The Supreme Court found the respondent
guilty. Summons to the defendant in a case shall
forthwith be issued by the clerk of court upon the filing of
the complaint and the payment of the
requisite legal fees. Once issued by the clerk of court, it is
the duty of the sheriff, process server or any

other person serving court processes to serve the

summons to the defendant efficiently and
expeditiously. Failure to do so constitutes simple neglect of
duty, which is the failure of an employee to
give ones attention to a task expected of him, and signifies
a disregard of a duty resulting from
carelessness or indifference. Moreover, sheriffs are not
allowed to receive any payments from the parties
in the course of the performance of their duties. They
cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money
from the parties without observing the proper procedural
steps under Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court, as amended. Atty. Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao v.
Naeptali Angelo V. Nery, Sheriff III, Branch 30,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, A.M. No. P13-3153,
October 14, 2013.