Q6.

How the lessons learned from Vietnam War were applied in the Gulf
War?
1.

Introduction.
a.
Vietnam War.
Following the Japanese occupation in IndoChina the vietnamese resistance army was set up by Ho Chi Minh with
US aid. After Japanese were driven out it went under the French
colonial role. After a war of liberation the French were defeated and
Indo-China was divided into Laos, Combodia, North and South Vietnam
in 1954 by Geneva agreement. US efforts to support the noncommunism regime in South Vietnam increased gradually after 1954.
Initial involvement was limited to financial aid and mil advisors. The
communist North Vietnam was getting support from USSR and China
and Vietcong insurgency became obvious and South Vietnam could not
hold the line of communications. To get the accurate info regarding
the extent of Vietcong insurgency and supply sources on 31 Jul 64 US
destroyer Maddox equipped with special electronic intelligence gears
began patrolling the coast of North Vietnam. It came under fire on
02 Aug 64 by 3 NV torpedo boats. The attk was retaliated and again
on 04 Aug similar attacks were launched against US ships. On 07 Aug
64 US congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution empowering the
president to take all nec steps, including the use of armed forces.
b.
Gulf War. On 02 Aug 90 Iraqi troops along with armour,
helicopter and aircraft support, invaded the tiny Kingdom of Kuwait.
Following this invasion there were series of unsuccessful diplomatic
efforts initiated by different leaders of the world to mitigate the
crisis. US president Bush and other world leaders began working to
form an anti-Iriqi coalition. The leading members of the coalition
against Iraq included Egypt, France, Great Britain, Saudi Arabia, Syria
and United States. Fighting between Iraq and the Coalitiion toook
place for only 43 days from 17 Jan 91 including 100 hrs of grd attk.
It was first in the history of war where air power alone achieved the
overwhelming victory over the Iraq's sixth largest Air Force and
fourth largest Army in the world.

2.

Analysis.

a.

Vietnam War.
(1).
The main political aim of US was to stop spread of
communism in South-East Asia. However, this aim was not well
transmitted into a solid mil aim.
(2). Inadequate Strategy.
Once
they
had
engaged
American in the war, US political leaders owed to their people
and to the men they committed to battle an opportunity to
achieve the country's limited objective in Vietnam. This could
have been done through the use of air power, the 'major
unplayed turn card'. But the problem was not that air power
was absent, but that it was squandered and misapplied. The
political bureaucratic decision-makers in the DOD and NSC,
beginning with the president, were ambivalent about whether
they were engaged in a counter-insurgency or a sub-theatre
conventional war against a foreign invasion. Throughout , they
never sought even a limited victory- they tried only not to loseand produced an objectiveless strategy that never aimed for
more than a stalemate. Eventually they developed a plan to
outlast North Vietnam, ignoring the fact that they had a much
more compelling reason to preserve than did the United States.
This inadequate national strategy seriously hampered mil
planning, most notably the use of air power.
(3).

Air Strategy .
(a).
Confusion over the Nature of War.
It is
difficult to simplify the air strategy of the vietnam war.
The conflict went on too long. Too many players had
roles. The views of the players changed, and changed
again. Some policy and strategy formulators saw the war
as a counter insurgency and considered the defeat of the
vietcong in South Vietnam their major objective. Others
viewed the war as an effort by North Vietnam to conquer
South Vietnam. If the war was considered an insurgency ,
then it was necessary to shut off outside assistance to
the guerrillas to achieve victory. There have been no
successful
counter-insurgencies without effective

interdiction of outside assistance. If, on the other hand,

NV was considered the direct aggressor, then the war
needed to be taken to Hanoi in no uncertain terms. The
key in either case, was striking NV'S heart and major
logistic arteries and not squandering precision assets as
United States did on the capillaries in southern North
Vietnam, South Vietnam and elsewhere. Decision-makers
in the Johnson administration were concern about
Chinese or Soviet involvement in the war if bombing of
North Vietnam were to become intolerable to them.
They formulated an impotent air strategy that aimed only
at protracting the until Hanoi and Viet cong could stand
it no longer. In the end, the American people's tolerance
for pain without hope proved to be shorter lived than the
North Vietnamese leadership's ability to toilerate
destruction of superficial national assets in persuit of
their lifelong dream.
(b).

Demand for Unfettered

Use of Air Power.
Defense Secretary McNamara rejected the
strategy( planned by mil leaders) of sealing off NV and
ruled out interdicting major lines of comm close to Hanoi.
He would permit striking tgts in NV only near the DMZ
separating North from South Vietnam, but tgts further
north were reserved for strike only if the NV failed to
respond to the US pressure. The Air Force Chief of
Staff, Gen Curtis E. LeMay, argued forcefully for an
immediate attk against strategic tgts in the HanoiHaiphong area. He believed interdiction elsewhere was
not likely to be decisive. He was opposed by Army Chief
of Staff Gen Wheeler and Chairman of the Joint Chief
of Staff Maxwell Taylor, who preferred a more gradual
increase in air pressure on NV; they believed the war had
to be won in South Vietnam and that the Army should
carry the burden. Wheeler also believed an air campaign
should support the war in South Vietnam chiefly through
CAS. The Army view in 1964 was essentially that of
McNamara, who called for two main msn: CAS by the Air

Force of Army units and interdiction of en lines of comm

in and near South Vietnam.
(4)
Misapplication of Air Power in Rolling Thunder.
To
raise
South Vietnamese morale and to increase incrementally the pressure
after a series of attk by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, a
campaign called Flaming Dart was begun in Feb 65. The next month it
evolved into a more systematic air campaign called Rolling Thunder.
The latter involved strikes on lines of comm in NV below the 19 th
parellal(well south of Hanoi and Haiphong) and elsewhere. Gen LeMay
retired in Jan65, still calling for truly strategic air campaign; his
successor, Gen J. C McConnell, also argued that the US needed to
concentrate on destroying the centre of North's logistics network,
not its tertiary tributary aspects. But the Secretary of Defense
continued to maintain that the primary role of air power was to
support grd forces in South Vietnam because McNamara was only
interested in avoiding defeat.
(5). Throughout the campaign from 1964-18 December 1972 the use
of air power was severely limited by political restrictions. For
example, attacks on town targets which might have involved civilian
casualties were proscribed, as was the use of incendiary weapons
against northern towns. Some exceptions were made after the
introduction of the guided bomb, when it was considered that air
attack on a vital target would only involve very small numbers of
casualties. All targets in North Vietnam had to be agreed by
Washington. Finally, all bombing north of the 20th parallel was
Proscribed from 23 October 1972 in order to assist the peace
negotiations. Thus up to the 18 December 1972, air power was not
used in the classic sense against the enemy's ability and will to fight.
The air campaign, though on a large scale, had to be confined to
peripheral targets.
(6). The political restrictions were not the only difficulties facing
the Americans. The North Vietnamese had large stockpiles of
supplies hidden in the south, and in any event their requirements were
considerably lower than those of a western army. Moreover, they
showed considerable enterprise and energy in repairing damaged roads

and railways, and they were clever at improvisation and the harnessing
of their manpower resources. They also made full use of the jungle
for deception and camouflage and were aided by the poor weather
over North Vietnam from October onwards.
In all these
circumstances, it is not surprising that the US air forces failed to
achieve their major aim of blockading the North from the South.
(7). However, on 16 December 1972 Dr Kissinger announced that the
peace negotiations had reached deadlock, and that the emotive issue
of the return of prisoners could not be resolved. On 18 December
President Nixon ordered all-out unrestricted bombing of Hanoi. For
the first time air power in the classic sense was to be used correctly
in Linebacker II lasted for 10/12 days.

(8). Although the bombing of the area north of the DMZ continued
throughout the first half of January 1973, Hanoi had finally yielded
and peace talks were now in full swing. On 15 January it was
announced from the White House that negotiations with the North
Vietnamese had been completed to the extent that the bombing of
their country could be suspended. No further attacks took place and
the air war over North Vietnam was now over.
3.
Lessons.
The major lessons which may be drawn from the US air
offensive in North Vietnam are summarized below:
a.
Political resolution is necessary in order to allow the effective
use of air power.
b.
Strategic air power was a major factor responsible for the
North Vietnamese acceptance of the cease-fire.
c.
Electronic warfare is a most important protective factor in an
air offensive.
d.

The effect of conventional bombs can be overestimated.

e.
Small calibre LAA defences such as the multiple 23mm and
12.7mm guns are very effective.
f.

The helicopter is vulnerable to small arms and LAA defences.

g.

A true all-weather attack system is required.

h.
The air campaign to blockade North Vietnam was not a success
because of:
(1)
Political prescriptions on large areas of North Vietnam
and a veto on certain vital targets.
(2)
The multiplicity of routes available to the enemy and his
ability to manage without complete reliance on mechanized
methods of transport.
(3)

The effective use of camouflage.

(4)
North Vietnamese ingenuity, industriousness, and
manpower.
(5)
Bad weather which interrupted operations in the
Monsoon period.

4. Exploitation of the Lessons in Gulf.

Beside the lessons mentioned in
para 3, Vietnam War was the proving grd for United states USSR
technology and tactics. Even though Gulf War was faught between US
lead Coalition and Iraq , many of the technology and tactic evolved in the
vietnam war were also exploited by the Coalition. Few lessons which were
came in direct use in Gulf War are given below:
a. Aim. From the experience of Vietnam war, US learned the
requirement of clearcut political aim and mil objective. In the Gulf War,
political aim and mil objectives were clearly defined and well transmitted
to the all level of commanders.
b. Command and Control.
In the Vietnam war,there were lack of
coordination between the commanders regarding the use of air power in

the war. All the air efforts were not placed under single commander ,
Army ,Navy, Marine and Air Forces had been using air power
independently. Nobody knew who are supporting commanders who is
supported commander. In the Gulf all resources were placed under a
single commander, Gen Schwatzkof. All air efforts were well coordinated
and concentrated.
c. Targets.
In the Vietnam War there were lot of controversy
regarding the target which could be attk and which were not. In the
Gulf, tgts were well defined and there were no political restriction on
strategic tgts.
d. Underestimation. In the Vietnam War US underestimated her en,
but in the Gulf they gave due importance to the Iraqi capabilities. Even
when negotiation was going on they had been continuing their deployment
and had started trg.
e. Theatre of Operation.
In the Gulf War fighting was fought from
the theatre whereas in the Vietnam War fighting was fought, in fact,in
the Pentagon resulting lack of local resposiveness.

5.
Conclusion. There are controversy surrounding the contribution of
air power in Vietnam War. One argument alleges that political constraints
and interference from Washington inhibited air power so much that only
when it was fully applied by the Linebacker II campaign in Dec 72 was the
political objective achieved and the Hanoi regime forced to the conference
table. The other side points to the lack of a clearcut political objective; the
failure to identify the en centre of gravity; confused tactical priorities;
duplication and competitive command and control; inappropriate targeting;
prohibition of offensive counter air on North Vietnamese airfields; failure
to build up in theatre expertise; repetitive and inflexible routing;
unfavourable topography; and unfavourable climate. In the Gulf War all of
these considerations which probably contributed to US failure were
effectively exploited to the victory of the US lead Coalition.