Bc.

Jaroslav Endrle
Charles University in Prague
Faculty of Arts
Institute of Philosophy and Religious studies
Course: Evolution and mind

Qualia, mysterianism and mechanisms of iracionality

Abstract
This essay is composed of closely tied critical reflexions on basic
assumptions and modus operandi of our thiking about consciousness and
its relation to physical world. As the struggle to make sense of mental
phenomena in nature boil down to so called problem of qualias, I treat them
at first. Then I expose the philosophical position called mysterianism as is
developed in article of Collin Mac Gin. At the end I attempt to uncover some
higher-level psychological mechanisms hidden behind perpetuation of mindblocking intuitions that proliferate in these debates.

But se nepouv na zatku vty

1 Phenomenal consciousness
The term phenomenal consciousness is supposed to mark something as qualitative
aspect of subjective experience or the way the content of this experience is given to us. The
basic units of phenomenal consciosness are so-called qualias. Of course, this definition tells us
nothing about entities in question, but it is not supposed to tell us anything since the qualias
are very intimely known to us. This is usually demonstrated by mental experiments or simple
enumeration. By the first way, qualias are for instance those things, which we will never known
about bats some what-it-is-to-be-like-batnesses 1 or those things which the all-knowing
colour scientis living in black-and-white room will never know about bananas and tomatos 2. By
the second way, qualias are things as redness of red or painess of pain. To really feel pain is to
have this qualia of painess, to see yelow banana as yelow is to have or know this qualia of
yelowness. Now, there are arising two sorts of problems here. At first, qualias are ireducible to
any physics and by virtue of this fact they are thought as somethnig over and above all science.
Essentially, the argumentation for this claim goes somehow like this Can you imagine the
reduction of phenomenal states to physical states?? No, it is utterlly impossible to imagine it.
And so it is impossible. Nevertheless, it is not only impossiblle to make sense of qualias, it is
also imposible to deny them. The reaction to such attempt works as hard-wired reflex, which
works as following algorithm: If somone try to deny your qualias, then look at your innerness,
imagine the redness of red and you have proof of the irreducible super-power of your
consciousness in action. End of discussion.
Of course it could be timidly objected to many aspects of this problematic. For example,
Dawkins objects against bat-case, that it is fundamentally incoherent. 3 Why should echolocation
make qualias of bat different then ours? Echolocation is just physical realization of input
relations that feeds data to bat's qualia translator. However, the kind of material realisation has
no bearing on supposed inner representativness of what is represented. The device, by which
you can send message, has also no bearing on content of message. The material realisation of
1Nagel, Thomas (1974). What is it like to be a bat? Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50
2J ackson, Frank (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
3DAWKINS, Richard. The blind watchmaker: why the evidence of evolution reveals a universe without design.
New York. ISBN 03-933-1570-3.

Turing machine doesn't have bearing on it's proper function and so on... Why should then
physical implemetation of organism's interfaces for interaction with eniviroment influence the
way of representatimg that enviroment? If you suppose, that qualias are irreducible to physics
and that they will left when all the other things will be explained, then you have to admit that
bats can hear collors and that they can have the similar visual field as we have. If you
suppose that qualias correlate with physical realisation of cognitive system in so closed way that
colors can be only seen, then your position is simply incoherent (how could you know this
without knowing what it is to be like a bat?)
However, this tactics will not work because it is contraintuitiv. Hearing colours?
Impossible. Where intuitions begin to rage, reason has no power. And anyway, even if all
systems perceive in the same way, the ireducibility of what-it-is-to-be-like knowledges stay
untouched. You can maybe reason from functional architecture of system to its inner states, but
you will never perceive this states as the system perceive them, so you will never know, what it
is to be like the system, as the system in question knows it. And of course, if your system will
not produce colours, you will never know, what the yelowness of yelow is. Now, this line of
reasoning, even if pretty intuitive, is again fallacious. Why should be yelowness of yelow taken
as knowledge? Only intuitions insinuate that. And we tend to accept it even as it iterferes with
everything that we ussually require from adepts for status of knowledge, such are for instance
possibility of thruth valuation, possibility of formulation and scrutinization in intersubjective
mode or informativness. If qualias were not knowledge-like, then would the whole problem
collaps into problem of inocuos subjectivity4, since the redness of red and painess of pain would
by just the way the organism attend its own inner processes. Phenomenal consciousness would
be just cognitive system realized and running in right way and qualias would be just handles
of processes controling and manipulating other processes. In this way, there would be no
problem of what-it-is-to-be-like knowledge, simply because there would by no such knowledge.
The only thing, which will be left after complete description of bats brain, will be, surprisingly,
bats brain. That thing, which Nagel and others desires, is not to know something, but to be
something. The problem reformuled after all possible things will be known about bats, the best
expert on bats will stay human. Now, he can be sad, that something stay out of reach of science
forever. However, no sane person really suppose that complete knowledge of some animal,
make him that animal, or does she?
Nevertheless, we still intuit that qualias are special knowledges which matter most of
4 Inocuos subjectivity is the ability of some cognitive system to attend its own states. It can be fully understood in
functional terms. For this reason Dennett use it in his work consciousness expleined.

all. Because what it would be like to be without them? And why this shouldn't be the case after
all? We can imagine something that has precisely the same functional and physical composition
as we, and we can imagine it without qualias! So it is obvious that qualias just have to be
something different, something more and above this boring natural processes that constitute us
physically. At this point, there is no point to argue further. If we can imagine something, then it
has to be true, that is clear, especially in cases where we have no serious knowledge about the
objects of our imagination. Maybe the last soft whisper of reason could try to object, that the
cause, which unchaines our imagination, lays preciselly in the fact that we doesn't know enough
about things we imagine, and so maybe the imagination which now support our ignorance stems
in interesting intelectual noose from this ignorance. However what difference make whispering
in the roar of intuiton thunder?
2) Mysterianism?
In previous section, I have tried to sheed light on background of debate concerning
prospects of naturalisation of consciousness. I think that this problem boils down to problem of
qualia. By criticcisng this concept, I wanted to demonstrate that qualias offer no solid base for
argumentation, since they have no rational support. They are pure intuitions only. The nonexistent rational support for qualias nevertheless present considerable obstacle for any critics.
Any attempt to criticise it has to inevitably collide with deeply entrenched sentiments supported
by overhelming atmosfer of misunderstanding. Thereof it might seems to us, that we have
arrived to the end of our way. As sentiments without arguments present no problem for the
course of science, and as there exist no other reason for taking qualias into account neither as
subject of scientific explanation nor as hinderance of it, we may feel free to close the case by
noting that qualias present problem of the same kind as angels once did. We are not obliged to
talk with supporters of qualias (or with friends of angels), until they establish their case in
something more substantial then their intuitions.
But we shouldn't be so quick. Not everyone feels to be obliged to get out of the way of
marching science. And there are even people, who actually think that at the face of this
deathlock, not the intuitions, but the science should resigned. We should examine the reasons
they have more closely. In this section, I will threat Collin McGinn and his position formulated
in article Can we solve the mind-body problem?5
5 McGinn, Colin (1989). Can we solve the mind-body problem? Mind 98 (July):349-66

Someone may think, that an attempt to build position based on slippery intuition of
qualitative consciousness is too bold idea. However, Collin McGinn evidently do not belong to
this category. His objective is to persuade us, that we will never understand relation between
consciosness and brain. To achieve this goal, he uses two tools. Firstly and mainly, our poor
stirred intuitions. Secondly, the so-called modularity theory of mind. According to this theory,
our mind is divided into modules, which prosses different kind of informations. As examples of
such modules may serve systems for perception as seeing, hearing or feeling. By use of this
theory, he wants to show, that our malfunctioning intuitions do not stem from simple ignorance,
but from our inborn incapacity to think properly some aspect of reality (some property or law)
that make it possible for brain to constitute our consciousness. To achieve this he introduces an
idea of cognitive closure, this states: A type of mind M is cognitively closed with respect to a
property P (or theory T) if and only if the concept-forming procedures at M's disposal cannot
extend to a grasp of P (or an understand- ing of T 6 For example, mind of mouse doesn't have
module or faculty for matemathic, so mice cannot grasp rational numbers. We can also be
cognitively closed to some kinds of natural properties, in the same way as are mice closed to
mats. After establishing this principle, he argues for three claims. (1) That there exist property of
brain which accounts for consciousness in naturalistic way. (2) That this property is cognitively
closed to us. (3) That there is no philosphical problem of consciousness (by which he mean, that
consciosness-brain relation is not mysterious objectively as relation between numbers and
world, but only for us)
Now, since claim (1) serves him to avoid mysticism and since I agree with this claim
(with only one exception, which will be mentioned further) I will skip it. For the same reason I
will skip analysis of (3) since I agree that there is no problem of this kind. However, I have to
deeply disagree with (2). Even so deeply, that it has no sense to analyze it larger extend. I will
mention only that there are according to McGinn three reasons supporting it. These are, our
insinuating intuitions, our long standing inability to solve mind-body problem and the absence
of means to solve it. Since the first two claims prove nothing, the whole weight of mysterian
conclusion lays at the last one. McGinn identifies two possible routes to grasp property (P)
mediating between brain and consciosness. These two routes corespond to two fundamental sets
of faculties we can use. The first faculty we have is introspection, the second one is perception.
He dismisses both of them. However this demarkacion of our problem is so deeply flawed that
we have to go back at begining in order to make sense of it.
6 McGinn, Colin (1989). Can we solve the mind-body problem? Mind 98 (July):349-66

The first problem consist, of course, in the use of intuitional pumps to make us feel more
ignorant then we actually are. This is rather interesting tactics with regard to autors claim that
we are naturaly cognitively closed to mind-body problem. If this thesis were true, then there
would be no need to formulate problem in a way that is either manipulative or simply silly. What
other kind of effect can have formulation of mind-body problem in sentence: How can
technicolour phenomenology arise from soggy grey matter7 then to stop the reader's proper
thinking and to fill him with feeling of resignation? Maybe the autor intention was to augment
our dictionary of new neurological term soggy grey matter. However, there are even more
insightfull questions we should consider befor we start, as for example: What makes brain so
different then kidneys? Yes, this is pretty puzzling, isn't it? Perhaps it is not so soggy? Or
more round? No one will ever know! But these two are not all mysteries by which the autor
feeds us. We should also consider, how could aggregation of millions insentient neurons create
consciousness? Impossible! If it could, then even the aggregation of grains of send could! And
in such case, we should maybe ask, what-it-is-to-be-like a desert...
This critic may be seen as pedantic, but short reflection on this mode of speach can be
revealing. I think that this is preciselly the way mysteries are born. They are born out of asking
stupid questions. Preacher of creationist doctrine may ask: Can you imagine that something so
complex as simple cell can be created by chance? Not possible! Impossibility of imaginig an
answer stems from putting the question in such a way that it hides some possibilities of its
answering. Collin McGinn's introductory questions are of the same kind. Posing of questions in
misleading way is simply dishonest and irresponsible. It is just demagogical trickery.
The second problem consist in his sloppy use of modular theory of mind. To begin with,
he doesn't tell us, in which sense the term modularity is used here. It is modularity of brain
mechanisms? Of faculties of mind? If it is modularity of brain circuitry or brain functions, then
he can deduce nothing from it, because this is simply unknown. If it is conceived as modularity
od minds function, then it is wrong. Since what should be faculty of mind? Counting? This is
faculty of human, not of mind. Human counts, thanks to his brain and thanks to society which
enables transmission of rules for counting from generation to generation. Human can counts in
his mind and this doesn't mean that the mind counts. For it doesn't, as it doesn't ride horse, drive
car or play piano. And human beings do not count or play piano, becaouse they have some
faculty for it. They do it, because they learn to do it.
However, the problem, that we doesn't know, what such faculty or module is, is not
only one. We also doesn't know how to use this terms. Our autor gives us no clear clue throught
7 McGinn, Colin (1989). Can we solve the mind-body problem? Mind 98 (July):349-66

witch we could individuate the supposed modules. If we try to find out, which cognitive
processes or abilities should count as parts of separate faculties, and which not, complete havoc
is the result. If faculties are brain dependent, as they have to be, then where lay dividing lines? Is
recognision of faces faculty? Or is faculty only vision? When recognision of faces is faculty, is
also the recognision of motion an separate faculty? Or of colors? Shapes? Of only one color? If
the vision is faculty, is it one faculty in all species? Or are different kinds of vision (as of fish
and owl) different faculties? How to differentiate it? It is totaly fuzzy. But even if it per
impossible were not be fuzzy, he would still be unable to infer from it anything. And he actually
doesn't infer anything. His only support for his main thesis lays in constant repeating, that it is
misguided to think that we can know everything. But why? Since the mind is facultative? If
mind is really facultative, then faculties can be added. And if his conception of faculties is so
fuzzy as it is, then faculties are added to mind all the time, by evolution, by development during
growing, by learning, by cultural evolution, by new technologies and so on. He uses words as
introspection and calls it faculty, even build in it one possible way to find his property P.
However, what is this introspection? How it differ of the other faculties? Actually, can be this
faculty through which we catch consciousness in all its vivid nakedness 8 some
different faculty then consciosness? What would it be like to have consciousness which doesn't
have this module? Can you imagine consciousness which canot catch itself in his vivid
nakedness? If we by introspection ascribe concepts of consciousness to ourselves; we thus
have 'immediate access' to the properties of consciousness, then how it differs from faculty of
language? Actually, if essence of introspection is the ability to ascribe concepts, then it has to be
the same faculty which ascribes concepts to outer things. Or does he thinks that we have to
concepts-ascribing faculties? I would be not surprised. And actually it probably doesn't matter at
all. For, how about faculty of languge? Is this one, or could be divided into faculties such as
grammar or semantic memory? Or do we have faculty for passive and active use of language?
People with damaged one part of brain (I think it is some specific part in brocas area, but I am
not sure) can understand talking and they can even read, but they are almost unable to remember
any word, when they are ask to name any thing. To which properies P are their minds M
closed and to which are open? Few years ago, I have learned russian, but I was to lazy to learn
writting. By virtue of this, I now recognize syllabs in words but not when stays alone, I can read
to some extend (I read dostoyevsky which is not very easy reading, so I really can read) but I am
utterly unable to write. And because I have learn myself at my parents garden and I have never
seriously listen to some talking, I ussualy do not recognize words when transmitted by sound
8 McGinn, Colin (1989). Can we solve the mind-body problem? Mind 98 (July):349-66

and not by ink. However, by some weird turn, I am able to put together enought words to
express simple sentences. I would like to know which faculties of mind, I have or i do not have
and I would like to know, to which I am closed in case of my russian faculty.
Now, this critique would be a little bit far-fetched, if I wanted to criticise facultative
theory of mind. I do not want to do this, since it is theory that is definitelly helpfull in many
areas for tasks such are catalogisation of brain processes or for creating new ways of learning.
And for this purpose, it can be and even have to be fuzzy, as our brain is. However, one thing is
to use some theory as heuristic for brain study, and the other thing is to base on some totaly
botched version of it some excessive metaphysical claim. It is even not possible to do this, since,
if you understand the mind as set of modules or faculties realised by brain, then you necessarily
can add up new faculties or change the old ones. You can do this to any extend imaginible, and
the mind will still be the human mind, due to the fact, that it will still be the mind of human
being. Human being is not defined by some type of mind. The opposite is true. Human mind is
human, because it belongs to human. And if the mind can be described as facultative, and if it is
ex-definitione not constant but modulable, then it never can follow from this, that it is
cognitively closed to anything, let alone for ever. On the contrary, it necessarily follows, that
the human mind is potentially open to everything. It is preposterous to use the facultative theory
of mind as the ground for apriory arguments for the impossibillity of cognition. The opposite is
consequence of this theory.
At this moment, it may still seems to us, that something on McGinn's position stay
untouched. Even if it is true, that human mind can't be cognitively closed to anything, then there
still stay the possibility, that as our minds are eqquiped now, they are closed to this property P
we are looking for. However, to prove that this is really the case, it is necessary to show
following things. At first, it is necessary to show by which faculties we are eqquiped, by which
faculties we are not eqquiped and why these faculties, by which we are not eqquiped, are not
gainable by learning. As we have seen, this McGinn has never done. Secondly, when we know
which faculties we have, it is neccessery to determinate cognitive scope of these faculties. This
is important because without establishing the scope of faculties we have, we obviously can't find
out, what we can't find out. It is also necessary to establish it, because we know that scope of
different faculties can overlap. The blind man can recognize to some extend the same objects as
everyone else by means of touch. For defense of McGinn here canot be objected, that blind man
is cognitively closed for example for colours, because colours are paradigmaticaly qualias and
by being qualias, they are not property to which could be anyone closed. Only to to real
properties can be mind closed. Even when we lack some faculty throught which we could
7

explore some property, we may explore this property by other faculties.

And further things are required. We have to also be able to confirm or falsify existence of
property in question. If we are not able to do this, then we are not able to say anything about
supposed cognitive closure with respect to it. However, if the property in question is really
natural, then we have to be able to detect it, even if we are closed to it, simply because it has to
have some causal influence. If it has no causal influence, then it do not exist and we are not
closed with respect to it. But if it exerts causal influence, we can establish its existence from
effect it has. And if we are able to establish existence of something throught effects it has, then it
seems to me, that we can't be cognitively closed with respect to it, in the same way the rat is
closed to theory of sets. Actually, we have to be fully cognitively open for discovering its
existence. Which of course doesn't mean, that all of our facoulties has to be open to it. We do not
need to see it, hear it, or to taste it. At this point, McGinns position is not only incoherent, it is
even in funny way contradictory. For he himself try to persuade us of existence of property (P)
that is causaly relevant and that is unknowable. In the same way, we could demonstrate
invisibility of some thing by creating visual images of it - holding it before our eyes and then
take the pleasure of watching its invisibility.
It is probablly not in dire need to mention that no of these three conditions for
establishing mysterian-case was satisfied by our autor. Thanks to this, we have here claim (C),
that we are cognitively closed to something, and we doen't know, which faculties we have and
which we doen't have, we do not know, how to find out, which faculties we have and which we
doen't have, we do not know, how to decide, if this dark (P) isn't really in scope of some of our
faculties (ahout whose we doen't know if we have them or not), and we still do not know, if isn't
(P) only fiction. Nevertheless, McGinn's claim (C) somehow emerges from this absolute
privation of reasons for any statement about our cognitive prospects.

And for me, this

emergence of claim (C) is the sole mysterious thing here.

Now, let us move to third point of my critique. Collin McGinn conceals in his inquiry
into humans cognitive psychology one faculty. And not any unimportent one. We could expect,
that when he explores even such obscure concepts as introspection (of which nobody seriously
expect anything), that he will dedicate proportionally large space to the traditional queen of all
faculties - to reason. However, this doesn't happen. He sees only two ways leading to
understanding of property (P). The first one is introspection, which is not very surprisingly
dismissed as useless. The second one is perception, and curiously, perception only. This is really
puzzling, because his main reason, for which we can't understand how brain gives rise to
consciousness, lays in that, that he doesn't see any property, as it is giving rise to consciousness,
8

when he is looking at the brain. It is not methaphor, he means it literally, we do not understand
mind-body problem, because we are trying to grasp it visualy. And consciousness isn't
something we could grasp visually and in spatial terms. Simply, the problem lays in that, that we
can't visualise it. Of course, to claim this at the face of modern science would be
ridiculous.Therefor, in order to avoid ridiculousness, he makes another step and he tells us, that
we can have theoretical concepts of properties, that are not perceptible, but we canot go to far by
creating them, because some principle of homoginity operates amid our concepts. This principle
is not stated explicitly and from claims as Suppose we try out a relatively clear theory
of how theoretical concepts are formed: we get them by a sort of analogical
extension of what we observe. Thus, for example, we arrive at the concept of a
molecule by taking our perceptual representations of macroscopic objects and
conceiving of smaller scale objects of the same general kin 9 it look like as if it would

be simple reformulation of autors maxim what do you can't visualise, you can't understand.I
am not expert in physic but I dare to say that this is still ridiculous. I think that the tool of (at
least teoretical) physicist is mathematics, and that the cognitive system, which stay behind it, is
far from being visual. Simply, I do not think that black holes are results of extension of our
perceptual representation of holes in billiard or that superstring theory was inspired by anything
macroscopic. Maybe, It is not the best way to tackle with mind-body problem by looking at
brain and trying visualise the solution. Actually, I think it is as good and usefull, as an attempt to
see voice. We can look at some audio system very long and we will see nothing. And we can say
look at the weird matter, how could something as this give rise to such a beautifull melody? It
just seem to be the wrong kind of thing! And you can stare at the radio in deep puzzlement
trying to imagine it forever. However, McGinn's principle of homogenity is supported by one
version of causal closure. It is formulated as :
If our data, arrived at by perception of the brain, do not include anything that brings in
conscious states, then the theoretical properties we need to explain these data will not include
conscious states either. Inference to the best explanation of purely physical data will never take
us outside the realm of the physical, forcing us to introduce concepts of consciousness.10
I think that this is simply not true. At first, he supposes that consciousness is something
non-physical. This only begs the question. The aim of his article is to persuade us, that
consciousness is something non-physical and so unexplainable. Here he argue for it by
supposing it. Secondly, every word on this page is something physical which force us to
9 McGinn, Colin (1989). Can we solve the mind-body problem? Mind 98 (July):349-66
10 McGinn, Colin (1989). Can we solve the mind-body problem? Mind 98 (July):349-66

introduce concept of cosciousness to explain its occurence. So also this is wrong.

However, there lay some deeper confusion here. He mixes together different cognitive or
epistemic modes. We can see it on his formulation of causal closure. When he says : a grasp
of P (or an understand- ing of T) in the same breath, he mixes together perceptive and
conceptualising abilities. Then he procceds with his argumentation and he tries to show us limits
of perceptive faculties. And then, by little sleight of hand, he extends the perceptual limits to
concept-forming abilities. In this manner, he doesn't see the importent differences between these
two faculties. At first, the process of concepts formation is not dependent on any perceptual
or material thing or ability. You can form your concepts as you want and as you need. The only
way to to decide among different modes of conceptualisation is their usefullness. You are not
methaphysically bound to anything. The success of modern science mirrors this unboundness.
Thanks to it, it can dispense with intuitions of all kind (all methapyhsical systems are only
rationalisations of some kind of intuitions or other feelings, so when you skip methaphysics,
you can skip intuitions). McGinn succesfully misses this point. But he misses not only this one.
For there is another difference between perceptual and concept-forming procedures. Perceptual
processes are bound to one mind. Concept forming procedures are social ones. This is reflected
by the simple fact that nobody learn to speak or to think by his own strenghts. It is something
which comes from our social enviroment. Of course, we have to have predisposition to be able
to get it succesfully, but these predisposion do not determine the kind of thinking and the kind
of conceptual system we get. Concepts evolves in intersubjective mode and they are not bound
to any concrete individual. By virtue of this, the understanding do not form concepts. Concepts
form our understanding.
These two points that we are not bound to any special set of concepts, and that sets of
concepts are not bound to any single mind with its limited forces, and that they form our
understanding, if taken seriously, make untenable any idea of fixed cognitive closure and I think
that it make also untanable every form of intuition-driven philosophy. Our understanding is
not dependent on our inherent abilities (but it is quantitavily constraint by them) but on artificial
conceptual systems we have created. It is great missunderstanding to say that our theories are
limited by our understanding. Indeed, in order to think this, you have to ignor whole modern
world and you have to go medieval, because our world, driven by contra-intuitiv sciences is
result of theories which have transcended our cognitive limits and have shaped our
understanding. The ability to imagine something play in argumentation no more decisive role.
How can you imagine curved space? It is not humanly possible, but it is quite well possible to
understand this idea throught conceptual items (by making sense of mats that underlays it). Our
10

theories are our prosthetic understanding. We create them to understand more then we would be
able to understand without them. And our understanding of theories is not marked by our ability
to imagine its items in terms of analogies from macroscopic world. It is rather the
missunderstanding of them which is marked by ball-like imagination, since it demonstrate that
the person who do it is actually unable to use his conceptual faculty.
Here lays the worst problem for mysterianism. It is impossible to formulate cognitive
closure with respect to theories. An attempt to do so is contradictory. Theory, which can't be
formulated is like word that can not be sad. And it is not important at all, who will formulate it.
Theory, which some species endowed with conceptualising systems con't understand, is as
language, that can't be translated to other languages. It is not theory at all. The sole constraint
with respect to possible teories which we can gat is the quantitative one. Some teories can be to
much complex at this moment of our conceptual development. Qualitative difference of
theories, e.g. differnence in principle, is just a nonsence, since all theories are conceptual
devices and as such, they are all of the same kind, no matter who create them or to which
purpose they are used. If god have served as theory T which explain property P, we would not
look at this explanation as on mirracle witch we are unable to comprehend. We would learn the
theory step by step, we would learn to test and use it and we would accomodate our own
theories to cooperate with it. And we would understandt it.
But even if we could not understand some theory on quantitative grounds, we would still
know thanks to it. You can imagine some mathematical proof (as was of four color theorem)
executed by special set of algoritms running on supecomptuter, which is nobody able to
comprehend. As the methods and devices are known as reliable, then we know that the results
have to be also right. Now we can imagine much more complicated theory, which we will be
utterlly unable to comprehend, but witch will gives us predictions of behavior of new kind of
objects, thanks to witch we will technologicaly proliferate as never before. Now it is clear as
heaven at sunny day, that we will know these things and that we will also know the theory in
question. And maybe, this great prostetic mind of ours, could one day gives us even the
understanding, be updating our outworn hardware. To achieve this, we have to at first update our
archaic software and stop to think in archaic ways.
It has been exposed, that our theories are artificial devices, that we are free from all
intuitions or Kantian anschauungen when we create them, that the understanding is function
of our conceptualising faculty, and that it is derrived of theories that can be created artificially
and freely in our intersubjective interactions11. In this light we can see, that McGinn's position,
11 This doesn't mean that we can create anything or that no rules exists here. Only that these rules are rules of

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and indeed whole qualia-problematic is even more misplaced then we could imagine. In an
misguided attempt to understand something, these people have created conceptual trash, and
now they run around showing that this intelectual death-body, which they created, can't live.
And they blame the evolution for it, as if the evolution were stubling here.
Diagnosis
Romeo wants Juliet as the filings want the magnet; and if no obstacles intervene he
moves towards her by as straight a line as they. But Romeo and Juliet, if a wall be built between
them, do not remain idiotically pressing their faces against its opposite sides like the magnet
and the filings with the card. Romeo soon finds a circuitous way, by scaling the wall or
otherwise, of touching Juliet's lips directly

William James12

This quote of William James very pregnantly elucidate behavioral difference between
inteligent and not so inteligent actions. It also shed some light on our problematic. A lot of
things depend on how we put some problem, which conceptual tools we choose for its solution
and by which criteria we want to meassure success of our enterprise. Collin McGinn tells us,
that we will never solve mind body problem. Reason for his claims are comic or non-existent.
However, this doesn't mean we can dismiss him as lunatic. He is symptom of something deeper.
Take how he pose the problem, how desperatelly he tries to show us, how hard the problem is. I
think he means it honestly. He really sees it in this way, and many people with him. Half of
troubles lies here. From the ventige of continental student of philosophy, it looks as if one
very bad habit have evovlved in some circles of anglophonic philosophers. These people
postulate some problem, in some terms, which they tought to be intuitiv, and then they beat their
hads against this conceptual wall. However conceptual walls are stronger with every punch they
get. This is the case, I think with mind-body problem. We got use to think about nature as
composed of small balls witch bump into each other and which create bigger balls, that also
bump into each other and so on until we emerge. Now we feel not to be result of bumps of small
balls. And so mind-body problem arises. But how we try to solve it? Do we do, what
philosophers should do at first? I mean, do we reflects fundaments of our thinking? It doesn't
natural selections or of capitalistic market or of functionality. Which means that survive only such theories,
that gives us what we need in the best, most cheap and and most effective way. These are rules witch, basicly,
lead all technlogical development.
12 James, William (1890). The Principles of Psychology.

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look so, from this ventige.Yes, many people create intricate teories. Some people try to show
that there are no problem, because everything is just storm of small balls . Physical sciences tells
us, they claim. Other people beat these people by intuitions. And so it goes in circles. All sides
device intricate tools and teories to cope with this problem. However, deadlock persists and I
think, it has to persist, since most of intelectual actions goes in wrong direction. It goes
forwards, but it should go of back to our basic assumptions.
The mechanism which drive it is easy. At begining, someone, as Descartes, get idea. It is
not the best idea ever, but it is easily concievable one. Then the idea spread itself. At first, it may
be used in some power-game. Some older form of knowledge do not satisfy new needs and so it
has to be overcome. New philosphical idea works then as weappon for missionaries of new
world. Then it expand and expand. And it habitualises itself in human minds. It digs still deeper.
In the end, if it is really successfull idea, it became dominant in some field of thinking. When
everone knows it, it become evident. When children are raised under its spell, it become
intuitiv for them. Now, for these children, something interesting happen. As they grow to
reason, and as they begin to formulate their views, out of their intuitions, they may find out, that
they are unable to give coherent form to expression of their intuitions. These children from our
metafor are in same position as we are, when we try to solve mind-body problem. Two
conceptual flowers grow from soil of their minds, trying to devour each other. Now they can
choose between two ways. Either everyone chose his favorite intuition and then he start to create
the best possible conceptual castle where he hiddes it while he is attacking intuition-castles of
others, or we can turn our eyes backward, reflect our intuitions and root them out. Collin
McGinn stay between this two reactions. If the magnet, pressed on wall between him and his so
badly desired filings, could be awaken, it would talk as Collin McGinn. He feels that his way
leads to nowhere. And he is right. Staring at soggy gray matter and trying to imagine how
colourfull phenomenology arise from it really leads to nowher. However this is not the only way
we have. Unlike magnet, we are inteligent, which means, we can find new ways, devise new
tools and so on. This is the main thing Collin McGinn forgets. He forgets, that even if our desire
to know may be so strong, that it push our intelect by the shortes way to his desired
understanding, our intelect is more like Romeo, then as magnet. It needn't remain idiotically
pressing against the wall of our intuitions, it can find its own way. Acctually, I think that this
second way, the way of Romeo, is ironically called also by the name mysterianism. I have in
mind the position of Noam Chomsky. Chomsky also don't want to beat his head against our own
bars, but he sees that the problem can roots in our conceptual practise and so he goes into history
in order to find where it stems. He tries to revise our concepts of matter and of thinking. He is
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mysterian, but not dogmatics mysterian as McGinn who follow the way of magnet witch lost its
power and fall down. He could be called revisionist mysterian, since he thinks, that althought
the mind-body problem is now insoluble, its insolubility is caused from deeply entrenched
intuitions that force us to repeatedly ill-pose it. That is the reason for which his way is more
similar to the way of Romeo, and for which reason it is the way of modern thinking. In this
manner, he stays in the same boat with thinkers such are Daniel Dennett or Terrence Deacon. He
stays here not because of similarity of positive claims, but because of the identity of modus
operandi of inteligent behavior. If the mysterianism is thought in revisionist manner, then it is
the most rational position witch can be espoused in our state of affairs.
References
DAWKINS, Richard. The blind watchmaker: why the evidence of evolution reveals a universe
without design. New York. ISBN 03-933-1570-3.
DENNETT, Daniel C. Consciousness explained. 1. pbk. ed. Boston [u.a.]: Little, Brown and Co,
1991. ISBN 978-031-6180-665
Dennett, Daniel C. (1988). Quining qualia. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), [Book
Chapter]. Oxford University Press.
Nagel, Thomas (1974). What is it like to be a bat? Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50
J ackson, Frank (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
McGinn, Colin (1989). Can we solve the mind-body problem? Mind 98 (July):349-66
James, William (1890). The Principles of Psychology.

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