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,
92d congress
Congress }
92d
d Session
Session
2d
COMlI'lITTEE PRINT
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COMMITTEE
U.S. INVOLVEMENT
INVOLVEMENT IN
IN THE
THE OVERTHROW
OVERTHROW
U.S.
OF DIEM,
DIEM, ,1963
1963
OF
A STAFF STUDY
BASED ON THE PENTAGON PAPERS
FOR THE USE
USE OF T
THE
PREPARED FOR
HE
COMMITTEE
'OMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES'
STATER SENA;
UNITED
SENA
,
I
',,
. ,., '(.
No. 3
NO.'
\\
i,
JULY
JULY 20,
20, 1972
1972
I
1' ,
'I
Printedfor
forthe
theus.
useof
of the
theCommittee
Committeeon
onForeign
ForeimRelAtions
Relations
Printed
i
,
OOMMITTlllIIl ON FOREISN
FOREI\}N RELATIONS
COMMITTEPJ
J. W. BULBRIGHT,
FULBRIGHT, Arlc~nsas,
Arkansas, Cluah'man
OhtUNlHW
GEORUD
GOnGE D. AIKDN,
AIKEN, Vermont
CLIFBORD
CLIFFORl) P.
P. CASRI,
CASEI New
New Jersey
Jersey
JOHN
JOHN SHERMAN
SHERMAN COOPDR.
COOPER. Kentu
Kent"
JACOB K.
I(.JAVITS,
JAVITS, New
YOrk
JACOB
New YOrk
nuan SCOTT,
SCOTT, Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania
aUGH
JAMES D,
B. PEARSON,
PDARSON, KansM
Kansas
CHARLBS H.
H. PERCY,
PDRCY, Illinois
IlllnOiS
CHARLES
Alabama.
JOHN SPARKMAN,
SPARKMAN, Alabama
l\lonmna
MIKE MANSFIRILD,
MANSFIELD, Montana
MIKD
FRANK CHURCa, ldaho
S',rUART SYMINGTON, Wasourl
CLAIBORNE FELL, :abode Island
GALE W. MoG:mlD, Wyoming
EDMUND
EDMUND S.
s. MUSXIE,
MU SKI^, Maine
W1LLIAM
WILLIAM B.
B.~)?ONq.1R,.
s p o n a , ~ aVIrginia
vtrglnia
,
~""
(11)
I,
.
..
.,
CONTENTS
Preface ____________________________________________________________ _
Coup planning, August 28-31 ________________________________________ _
Ihterregnum: Search for a policy, September 1-0ctober 1 _____________ _
Coup. planning resumes, October 2-81-________________________________ _
Overthrow of Diem and aftermath, November 1-8_____________________ _
Appendices ________________________________________________________ _
(nl)
PaA'(\"
V
2
7
11
21
27
'
9 ,
'
'
PREFACE BY
BY SENATOR
SENATOR JJ.
W. FULBRIGHT,
FULBRIGHT, CHAIRMAN,
CHAIRMAN,
PREFACE
. W.
COMMITTEE
ON
FOREIGN
RELATIONS
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
In 1968
1968 the
th~ Department
Department of
of Defense
Defense completed
completed an
an eighteen
eighteen month
month
In
study of
of US.-Vietnam
"U.s.-Vietnam Relation&
Relations, 1945-1967,
1945-1967." popularly
popularly known
known as
as
study
the Pentagon
"Pen.tagon Papers.
Papers." The
The existence
exiarence of
of this
this classified
classified 47
47 volume
volume
the
study kbeeame
known to
to the
the public
public through
through newspaper
newspaper reports
reports in
in June
June
study
a m e known
September the
the Defense
Defense Department
Department declassified
declassified large
large portions
portions
1971. IIn
n September
of the
the first
first 43
43 volumes.
volumes. The
The other
other four
four volumes
volumes remained
remained classified
classified on
on
of
t.he grounds
g~ou!lds that
that disclosure
disclosure of
01 the
the materials
materials tthey
cover-the history
history of
of
the
h y cover-the
negotiatIOns-would be
be detrimental
detrimental to
to the
the national
natIOnal interest.
interest.
newtiations-would
.IIn
1971 the Committee on Foreign
Foreign Relations began
be~an a den September 1971
taile~ study
~t!,dy of
of the Pentagon
Pentagon history
history and related
related materials. The study
tailed
was initiated
Imtlated under
under the
the. authority
aut~o.rity. of
of S. Res. 140, agreed to July 24,
24,
1971, .for
purp?se of
of inquiring
mqUlr1~ into
mto the
tbe origins and evolution of
of the
1971.
for the purpose
mvoJvemen~ in
IZi Vietnam,
Vle~nam. with
wlth particular
particular reference to lessons for
U.S. involvement
S . foreign policy making
makmg that might be drawn from the Pentagon
U.S.
history. Three
Thre~ staff researchers, Robert E. Biles, Robert M. Blum,
Blum. and
of the 7,000
7000
Ann L. Hollick, have been engaged in a careful review of
~ages" of documents and analvsis
a~al~sis included in US.-Vietnam
"U.~.- Vietnam RelaR~la
pages
hons. They
T~ey have had a
att their disposal both the classified
claSSified and unclassitions.
fied versions
verSIOns of
of .the
P~ntagou Papers. IIn
fied
the Pentagon
n addition, they have drawn
!lpon corroborative
cor~oborahve printed
prmted materials and interviews with individuals
upon
mvnlve,d in
m the
the events
events under
under study.
study.
involved
"l.:,S.
~nvolve'!1ent in the Overthrow of Diem, 1963"
ITS. Involvement
1963 by Ann L.
L.
Hollick. 1S
is the t~lrd
third of the staff studies to be released. It examines
examines the
role of the AmerICan
American ~ovemment
Government in the planning and execution of the
coup
Diem. In the period
coup that ended the mne-year
nine-year rule of Ngop Dinh Diem.
from
1,the United States Government approved
approved
from August to November 1,
and encourage~
encouraged the plot to overthrow
overthrow the South Vietnamese
Vietnamese GovernGovernm~ut.
series of public actions,
actions, rebuffed
rebuffed the
ment. Th~
The Umted
United States.
States, in a series
Diem reglme
regime and.
and, t~rough
through the suspension
suspension of aid.
aid, encouraged the coup
coup
leaders
leaders to move
move !l~amst
against the ~overnment.
government. The United States
States maintained
maintained
secret
secret ~ontact
contact With
with the
the plottmg
plotting IC'lnerals
generals throu~hout
throughout the
the planning and
and
executlOn
execution of
of ~he
the coup
coup and
and sou~ht
sought to
to advi.e
advise them
them on
on alternate
alternate coup
coup
plaps.
plans. Immediately
Immediately after
after the
the coup,
coup, the
the United
United States
States advised
advised the
the vicvic!orlous
new government
government and
and accorded
accorded
torious generals
generals ?'\
on the
the formation
formation of
of aa new
It
it prompt
prompt recogmtlOn.
recognition.
The
The stor~
storv of
of the
the active
active U.S.
U.S. role
role in
in the
the overthrow
overthrow of
of Diem
Diem raises
raises aa
number
number of
of Iss.nes
issues that
that have
have !ta cO'\tinning
continniug relevance
relevance to
to ongoing
ongoing polic,'Y'
A,t
this ep.,sode
episode reveals
reveals aa great
great deal
deal abOut the
At an
an operatlO,!al
operational I.ev:el,
level, th1S
ddli?ulty
difficulty of
of mamtit.mmg
maintaining aa forelgll
foreign policy
policy responsible
responsible to
to central
central didirectlOn
rection f~om
from vVashmgton.
Washington. In
I n the
the not
not uncommon
uncommon situation
situation of
of interinteragenc?,
agency dlsagreem~nts,
disagreements,aa country
country Ambassador
Ambassador has
has enormous
enormous latitude
latitude
to
U.S. pO!ICY
policy free
free from
from the
the constraints
constraints of
of Washington.
Washington. That
That
to gllide
guide U.S.
f~edom
freedom may
may easdy
easily Yield
yield to
to an
an active
activeintervention
intervention in
in the
the domestic
domesticafaffairs
fairs of
of the
the natIOn
nation to
to which
which he
he isis accredited.
accredited. Depending
Depending on
on the
the situsitu-
U.S. INVOLVEMENT
INVOLVEMENT IN
IN THE
THE OVERTHR~W
OVERTHROW OF
OF D
DIEM,
1963
U.S.
m , 1963
For the
the military
military coup
coup detat
d'etat against
agalnBt Ngo
Ngo Dinh
Dinh Diem,
Diem, the
the U.9.
U.S. must
must aeeept
accept it
it:
For
full share
share of
of responsibility.
responsibility. Begluntng
Beginningin
tn August
August of
Of 11968
we varioasls
variously authorized
authorized
full
- we
sanctioned and
and eneonraged
encouraged the
the coup
coup efforts
efforts of
of the
the Vietnamese
Vietnamese generala
generals an<
sanctioned
offered full
full support
support for
for aa 8uceR88or
successor government.
government. In
In October
October we
we cut
cut oft
off aid
aid tlt(
offered
Diem i
in
direct rebuff,
rebuff, giving
giving aa green
green liplht
light to
to the
the generals.
generals. We
We maintafnec.
maintainec:
Diem
n aa direct
clandestine contact
contact with
with them
them throughout
throughout the
the planning
planning Bnd
and execution
execution of
ot the
the COUK
COUI
clandestine
and sought
sought tto
review their
their operational
operationalpbns
plans and
and proposed
proposed new
new governmeut.
government. Thus
Thus
and
o review
as the
the nine-year
nine-year rule
rule of
of Diem
Diem came
came to
to aa bloody
bloody end,
end, our
our complidty
compliclty in
in his
his over
over
as
throw
throw heiahtened
heightened our
our rea~ousibtlltlea
reaponslbUities and
and ow
ou! commitment
Commitment in
tn an
an mentiam
eesentiallJ
leaderless
leaderless iTietnam.l
Vietnam. 1
The story of
of the
the U.S.
U.S. role
role in
in the
the Diem
Diem coup and of
of the
the events
events prepre
ceding it begins, according to the Pentagon
Pentagon Papers,
Papers, on May 8,1963.
8, 1963. On
this date South Vietnamese Government troops fired upon a Buddhist
protest
protest gathering in Hue, killino
killing fourteen and initiating
initiatin,g what has
haE
since become known as the
"the Buddxist
Buddhist crisis.
crisis." 2 The significance of
of the
rotest movement
Hue incident and the resulting protest
movement la
lay in
in what
what it
it rerevealed to the American public an
S . government oofficials.
clals. A
arent
and U
U.S.
Apparent
to all was the extent of
of Vietnamese disaffectlon
disaffection from the U%-supU.S.-supportedgovernment
Diem.&
ported ,government of
of N
Ngoo Dinh
DinhDiem.'
rotest proved
President
PreSident Diems
Diem's han%ling
handling of
of the growing Buddhist protest
i e f that Diem
equal1
equally revealing to U.S. officials. It undermined
undermmed their dbelief
could handle
andle the political stru
gle against the Vietcong and shattered
struggle
er tactics, inany illusion that the United &tes
States could, with the pro
proper
fluence the difficult N
course of
o :he
summer,
fluence
Ngoo brothers. During the course
the summer,
officials alternately
alternate y tried threats and inducements
inducements in a vain atU.S. officials
plaFate the growing Buddhist protests,
protests. For a
tempt to compel
compel Diem to placate
success
moment, the policy of inducement
inducement appeared to meet with success
brief moment,
US. Ambassador:
Ambassador, Frederick E.
departin% U.S.
when Diem promised the departing
Nolting, that he would make a public
pu lic statement conCIliatory
conciliatory to the
Noltin~,
promise, however,
however, typified the
Buddhists. Diem's
Diems fulfillment
fulfillment of this promise,
BuddhiSts.
Vietnamese leader's
leaders pro forma
forma responses
responses to American
American pressure.
ressure. In an
Vietnamese
interview on August 15,
15, President Diem
Diem merely stated
state that concilia
conciliainterview
it was
was "irreversible."
irreversible. 44
tion had
had been
been his
his policy
policy all
all along
along and
and that it
tion
u:.
(Vl
&.
11
The Pentagon
Pmtogon Pal!.ers~
P o em The
The Defense
D s m d e Department
Depwtment History
H h t o oj
01 United
Un4ted States
States Decision
Decieion
The
ranimg on
om VletMm
m e t w m.., The
FheBsnator
&vet
ad(tion, Vol.
voi. II
II (Boston:
cXoston: Beacon
Beacon Press,
press, 1912)
i972),
Making
Senator iJravel
1!Jditlon,
p. 207,
207. Hereafter
Hereaiter cited
cited as
lls Plmtagon
Peatapom Papers.
Popera.
p,
'
2Qeneral
M
s
~
w
e
l
l
Taylor
argues
that
the
facts
ore
In
dispute,
ztltliouph
there
1s no
no
II General Maxwell Taylor argues that "the facts are In dispute, although there is
doubt that
that there
there was
w88 aB clash
elash inVOlving
InviMvItng Buddhists
Buddhlsts in
In which
whleh some
8ome Uves
lives were
were lost."
lost. .8U;t'It"d8
8uOrd8
doubt
289.
end Plowshares
PloZOahweI)(New
(New York:
Pork :W.
W. W.
W. Norton
Norton && Co.,
Co.. 1912),
1072), p. 289.
an.d.
olilcials and
and reporters
reporters alike
allke have
have since
Slnee acknowledged
aeknowridged their
thelr ignorance
Igno~aIICeof
Of the
the Viet.
Vlet11U.S.
U.S. officials
Dnmese poUtical
poiltlcal situation
sitaption before
before the
the Buddhist
BUddhlst crlsis.
erlsis. As
A s John
John MeekUn.
Meeklln. Chief
Chlef of
of the
the
namese
U.S.i.8. confessed,
CODfeSBed " . . . there
there was
was little
Iktle eft'ective
effectl-ie etl'ort
effort to
to keep
keep tabs
tab8 on
00 the
t h e Political
PolltleRl
U.S.I.S.
attitudes of
of the
t h e Vietnamese
$leth&se
people, despite
desplte the
t h e known
known fact
fact that
that our
Our adversary
sdver88ry gave
gave first
first
attitudes
people,
And David
David
prlorle to
to this."
thls, Mission",
Xieaian (n Torment
TOo(.e(lt (New
(New York:
Tork: Doubleday.
Doubleday. 1965),
1985). p.
P. 102.
102. And
priority
Halberstam of
of tbe
the New
New York
York Time8
Times points
paints out,
out, "At
At the
t h e time.
tlme. few
few of
of us
UB knew
knew much
much about
shout
Halberstam
Buddhlsm in
In general,
general or
or its
Its Vietnamese
Vletnamese particulars
partlCuIBrS.
Llke other
other Americans
Americans in
In Viet
YletBuddhism
. . . . Like
m m we
we wet'e.
we?* eoneel:ned
eonee&xd with
Vith the
the war.
w w . After
After eight
elght months
month8 there,
there. II knew
knew no
no BUddhist
Buddhlst
nam,
rlekts,
knew
little
about
Vietnamese
Buddhism
and
had
never
been
In
a
pagodn.
The
priests, knew little about Vietnamese Buddhism and had never been in a pagodtl." The
&(ahingof o Quagmire
Quagmire (New
(NewYork:
York: Random
Random House,
House,1964),
1064),P.196.
D. 190.
MakingQ!a
Pemtwom Papen.
Popen, pp.
pp. 210,
210,230.
230.
4,4 Pentagon-
...
(1)
Less than a w.ek later, shortly after midnight on AU!!'1lst 21, military forces loyal to Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu raided pagodas
th~ou~hou~,the country, injuring and arresting monk~ and sacking the
bUlI~hn~; For better or worse, the August 21 pagoda raids decided
~,he Iss~e for t~e United ~tates, accordin!!, to the Pentagon account.
In the}r brutalIty and t~elr blunt repudiation of Diem's solemn word
to ~oltmg, they were a dlr~t, impudent slap in the face for the U.S.'"
It IS not known whether Dle,\Il ,knew of or approvell his brother's plans
for the,Pago<;la raid~. Diem.did not ho~ev<\l', ~pu<l;ia~them.
Nhu ~ I14'par~~ mtent m conductlllg these ".ids was to crush the
BuddhIst. 0J?'posI~IOn and to.present the new Ambassador, J.len Cabot
Lodf,e" w~t,!l,a ,faIt a,CCO\Ilp!I when he arrived. Not only were ge raids
ca~~ 1lI1y ti.J;I),ed" they Were carefllUy ,eJtecuted ,to implicllte the army
ra",.er ~han NhU s own forces. In the confused aftermath of the raids,
the Umt~ Sta~ Government denounced the attacks and held the
Sout,h Vletnam~~ Army (ARVN) responsible. When evidence of
:hu s .responsibllIty eventulllly became overwhelming the United
tates OSBued a strong statement denouncing the raids an'd attributing
them toNhu.
In.addition to alienating the Americans, Nhu's actions resulted in
maSSIve s,tudent p~te ,throughout the country and most importantly, eventllated 1Il thebeginnlllg of military plotting to overthrow
th.e Gove,rnm~nt. On Augnst 23 General Tran Van Don, Chief of South
Vletna,!, ~ {omt General Staff, contacted a CIA officer to deny ARVN
responsIbIlIty fo! t!,e raids and asked if the United States would sup&ort the Army If }t acted against Nhu and Diem. On the same day,
enRer'fl Le V!\n. KIm, General Don's deputy, made a similar approach
!o u us P~I1hps of UI'lIA. According- to the Pentagon account,
Thes,e .two dI.rect. and obVIOusly reinforcmg requeste for U.S. support
for mllIt,,:ry aId aImed.at Nhu's ouster marked the formal beginning of
t~e t;;~. mvolvement I~ the. protracted plottin~a~ainst the Diem r.eglme. 'rhe pagoda. raIds, m effect, threw the VIetnamese Army to~t~er WIth the Umted Sta~ Embassy in oppositiou to the Diem
regIme.
COUP PLANNING: AUGUST 23-31
l!.S. participation in plotting for the coup occurred in two separate
perIOds-from August 23 to 31 and from October 2 to the November 1
On August 24, the da:y after .the G~nerals' feeler, Ambassador
o ge sent a cabIe to '\yashmgton m whIch he advised against U.S.
support for a coup agamst Nhu. He took this stance not because he
was co'.'cerned that the U.S. would become involved in a Vietnamese
domes~lC matter, but because he believed that the balance of forces in
~~: ~;~!~:rea was unclear and that a coup then would be a "shot in
L':f'
3
Harriman, George Ball, and Michael Forrestal, the cable Was approved by the President, the Secretary of State, Roswell Gilpatrick,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and General Maxwell Taylor for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.' The subsequently controversial Augnst 24 cable
signalled a new political approach to the Diem regime. Recognizing
the leading role of Nhu in the pagoda raids, the calile stated:
U.S. Government cannot tolerate situation in which power lies in Nhu's hands.
Diem must be given chance to rid himself of Nhu and his coterie and replace
them with best military and political personalities available.
If, in spite of all your efforts, Diem remains obdurate and refuses, then we tuust
face the possibility that Diem himself cannot be preserved.1I
The third ste~ mentioned in the cable was to publicly exonerate the
military from mvolvement in the pagoda raids. Fourth, the cable
went on to say, "Concurrently, with above, Ambassador aud country
team should urgently examiue all possible alternative leadership and
make detailed plans as to how we might bring about Diem's replacement if this should become necessary."
Because there are some !!,aps in the cable traffic after August 24,
the Pentagon analyst relied heavily at this point on the accounts of
Hilsman and others. One important cable that was available to the
"nalyst was Lodge's prompt response to the August 24 instructions.
In that messa~e Lodge staked out a new position by strongly supporting a coup polIcy.
BeUeve that chances of Diem's meeting our demands are virtually nil. At same
time, by making them we give Nhu chan('e to forestall or block actton by military.
IUsk, we believe, is not worth taking, with Nhu in control combat forces Saigon.
Therefore, propose we go ~traight to Generals with our demands, without
informing Diem. Would tell them we prepared have Diem without Nhus but It Is
in effect up to them whether to keep him . ...
Request modUication instructions.ll
According to the Hilsman account, Washington officials, on receiving Lodge's response, agreed to "defer a direct approach to Diem" until more was known about the situation." While the Pentagon analyst
adds nothing to the Hilsman version," the New York Times claims
For accounts of the drafting and approval of this cable t (lee Roger HIIMman, To M(Jve
a NatiGn (New York: Doubl",day, 1967), p, 4S:S tl'. and Arthur M. SchleMinger, Jr., A
ThGuH1WJDQ.1I8 (BOlton: Houghton Mltll.ln, 196:S) , p. 991.
"PentagGn Paper., p. 734.
~ 5t~: ~: ~~1:
11:
13
tha~
them . . . . We w1ll provide direct support during any interim period of break
down central gOY meC'hanism . . . . We cannot he of any hf'lp durinlot initial action
ot assuming power
at state. Entirely their own action win or lose. Dont expect
lII
to be bailed out.
. While officials?> Saigon were moving ahead, policy makers in Washmgton w~re haVIng second thoughts about supporting a coup I?olicy.
At a NatIOnal Security.Council (NSC) meeting on the mormng of
A!,gust 2~L misgivin~ were aired by Secretary McNamara and CIA
Director McCone l neither of whom had personally approved the August 24 cable, ana General Taylor, whose approval had been secured
after the cable was dispatched." In the course of numerous NSC meetinp' during that week, a disagreement emerged between those who
Wished 0 con~inue a policy of support for Diem and those who favored
proceedmg With plans for a coup. Ambassador Nolting sided with
McNamara and Taylor in the view that the outcome of a coup would
b~ very do~btful. and that it w.as better .to continue our support for
Diem. N oltmg did, however, disagree With the U.S. military's hope
that Diem could belersuaded to remove Nhu from the Government.
On the other side 0 the argument, Hilsman, Harriman, and Ball of
the State Department agreed with Nolting that it was unlikely Diem
would remove his brother; unlike Nolting, however, they concluded
that the war could not be won if Nhu remained in power and that the
U.S. should therefore throw its weight behind the coup plotters.
In this situation of disagreement among his Washington advisors,
Pres!dent Kennedy cabled Saigon asking for more details on the coup
and Its prospects for success. Kennedy also asked what effect delaying t!>e ~ouI? would have. S.e~a!ate responses sent. by Lodge and
Harkms mdlcated that the divIsion among the PreSident's advisors
existed in S~igon as well, The President's enquiry arrived after CIA
agents Cone~ and S~ra had conveyed the agreed U.S. position to
Generals Khlem and Khanh, members of the coup committee. The
generals in turn supplied details regarding other members of the coup
group. On th~ baSIS of this informa~ion, Ambassador Lodge sent a
reply to Presldent Kemledy expressmg confidence in the identified
coup leaders and in the coup's prospects of success. In Lodge's assessment, "the chances of success would be diminished by delay.""
U Nell Sheehan and others, The Pentagon Paper., Ne1v York Times edition (NeW York'
Bantam BooksL-lOU), p. 169.
.
111 Pentagon .r(JfJer. p. 78lt
18 General Taylor denIes havIng approved the cable at all Sword. and Plow8hares pp
292-94.
. , .
1'1' Pentagon Paper p. 238.
The cbance of bringing off a Generals' coup depends on them to some extent;
but it depends at least as much on us.
We should proceed to make all-out eJrort to get Generals to move promptly.
We must press on for many reasons. Some of these are: (a) Explosiveness of
the present situation which may well lead to riots and violence if issue of discontent with regime is not met. Out of this could come a pro-Communist or at
18 These cables arp not included among the documentation and are described only in tn
analysiS. I'bkl., p. 238.
lfl Ibid., p. 239
"'0 :Nell Sheehan and others, The Pentagon Papers, p. 171.
7
6
best a neutralist set of politicians. (b) Tbe tact that war cannot be won with the
present regime. (c) Our own reputation for steadfastness and our unwillingness
to stultify ourselves. (d) It proposed action is suspended, I believe a body blow
will be dealt to respect for US by VNese Generals. Also, all those who expect
U.S. to straighten out this situation will feel let down. Our help to the regime in
past years inescapably gives a responsibility which we cannot avoid.!1
'ng; the plotters there was still a chance to approach Diem with an
. .
...
...
...
...
You are hereby authorized to announce suspension of aid through Diem gov~
ernment at a time and under conditions of your choice. In deciding upon the
use of this authority, you should consider importance of timing and managing
announcement so as to minimize appearance of collusion with Generals and
also. to minimize danger of unpredictable and disruptive reaction by existing
government. We also assume that you will not in fact use this authority unless
you think it essential. . . .'" ,
This State Department cable in effect turned over U.S. policy toward the Diem government to Ambassador Lodge. Accordmg to the
Pentagon analyst, the Vretnamese Generals had clearly s,r.;cified that
"they would regard an aid suspension as a coup signal. .. By dele/(Rting- to Lodge the authority to suspend aid to the Diem reg-ime, the
State Department was thereby bestowing on the Ambassador the power
to initiate the coup. And, as was by then abundantly clear, Lodge was
firmly convinced that a coup was the only feasible course of action. He
nlbid.,
Ibid.,
I8Ibid.,
U Ibid.,
15 Ibid.,
P.
p.
p.
p.
239, 738-39.
239.
737-38.
736-37.
p. 251.
Then, as later, he ,,:as reluctant to use aid suspension as a lever on
DIem. He preferred mstead to follow a policy of aloofness in the hope
that Diem would be forced to come to him.
'
On September. 3. a Sta!,,/AID cable informed Lodge that all ap~roval for non-mIlItary aId wo~d be temporarily held up. No suspenSIOn was announced, however, smce a policy decision was still pending. 28 Lod~e used ~his. opport~nity. to worry .rather than to overtly
pressure. D,em. MaI'?-tammg his polIcy of making Diem come to hinI,
::odge dlr~cted that m response to al.l enquiries about the status of U.S.
aId, the V,etnamese Government be mformed that Diem would have to
talk directly to Lodge about it.
In a series of cables on September 11 and 12, Ambassador Lodge
m:g~ tha~ detailed ~nsideration be given to ways to suspend nonmilItary aId as a san~tlOn to topple tjI<: Gover~ent. The Lodge cable
an~ a proposa~ by Hilsman for ~ombmmgpublIc and private pressure
to ""fluence Diem, w~re the. subject of. II: September 11 meeting in the
vy-Illte Hous,;.29 At this meetmg the deCISIon was taken to hold economic
aId renewal m abeyance pending a complete reexamination of how it
might be used to pressure Diem. On September 14, Lodge was told that
approval of the r<;maining ~18.5 million commerc~al import program
wa~ ?-eferred untIl the Umted States could arrIve at basic policy
decISIOns.
These basic decisions were made, at least for the time being, at the
September 17 meeting of the National Security Council. HIlsman's
"pressure and persuasion track" was apparently adopted. In the
guidance cable resulting from the meeting, it is evident that Washington officials were no longer considering a coup in the near future although they did not rule it out at a later time. The cable to Lodge r~ad :
We see no good opportunity for action to remove present government in 1m
mediate future; therefore, as your most recent messages suggest, we must for
the present apply such pressures as are available to secure Whatever modest
improvements on the scene may be possible. We think it likely that such Im!Jrovements can make a dlft'erence, at least in the short run. Such a course, moreover, is consistent with more drastic eftort as and when means become available
and we will be in touch on other channels on this problem..
This exchange of cables indicates the difficulties involved in carrying out a policy through an Ambassador who does not respond affirmatively to directives from 'Vashington. In Lodge's behalf, it must be
noted that it was particularly easy in this instance to ignore Washington's directives, since they were inconclusive. By holding out the
long-range possibility of more drastic action, Washington was still
hoping to keep open the option of supporting a coup.
The extent of Government confusion during this September of hurried meetings and conflicting cables was further apparent in the dispatch of fact-finding missions to Veitnam. Designed to bring back
more information on the political and military SItuation, such trips
were the most visible sign of disorientation within the Government.
The first of these trips during the policy interregnum lasted from September 6 to 10.
n was he.aded by Major General Victor H. Krulak, the Defense
Department's top expert in counter guerrilla warfare. He was accompanied by .Joseph Mendenhall, a senior Foreign Service Officer
with experience in Vietnam. During their hectic four day visit, til('
two men undertook very different kinds of tours. While Krulak visited
ten different locations in the four corps area, Mendenhall sl?oke with
old friends in Saigon and several provincial cities and capItals. The
two officials returned to Washington with very different estinIates of
the situation. 'Thereas Krulak discounted the effect of the political
crisis on the Army and its prosecution of the war, Mendenhall predicted a possible breakdown of civil government and even a religious
war resulting from disaffection with the regime." Each of these views
found its supporters in 'Vashington and as usual, no decisions were
forthcoming from the September 10 National Security Council meeting that heard these varying accounts.
The second and more important fact-finding mission during tho
September interregnum was headed by Secretary of Defense, Robert
11
&I
all
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 741.
Ibid., p. 243-45.
10
11
In his memorandum to McNamara, the President understandably described the purpose of the mission in different terms.
I am asking you to go because of my desire to have the best possible on-the-spot
appraisal of the m1litary and paramilitary effort to defeat the Viet Congo ..
The events in South Vietnam since May have DOW raised serious questions both
about the present prospects for success against the Viet Cong and sUll more about
the tuture efl'ecttveness of this effort unless there can be important political improvement in the country. It Is in this context that I now need your appraisal of
the situation. If the prognosis in your judgment is not hopeful, I would like your
views on what action must be taken by the South Vietnamese Government and
what steps our Government should take to lead the Vietnamese to that action....
It is obvious that the overall political situation and the military and param1lltary e1l'ort are closely Interconnected in all sorts of ways, and in executing
your responsibility tor appraisal of the mUitary and paramilitary problem I expect that you will consult fully with Ambassador Lodge on related political and
social questions. I will also expect you to examine with Ambassador Lodge ways
and means ot fashioning all forms of our assistance to South Vietnam so that
It will support our foreign policy objectives more preclsely.-
The party left Washington on September 23 and returned on October 2. While in Saigon, McNamara and Taylor met separately with
the country team, President Diem, and Vice President Tho. In evaluating the socio-political situation in Vietnam, McNamara and Taylor
were, according to Taylor's account, anxious to "assess coup attitudes." They therefore arranged a meeting with General Minh "under
the guise of a ~ame of tennis." Despite their hints, Minh declined to
broach the subject and the two Americans came away with the view
that no coup attempt was iu the offing." In their report to the President, they stated that "The prospects of an early spontaneous replacement of the Diem regime are not high." Although the United States
should not actively promote a coup, the Report urged "an intensive
clandestine effort, under the Ambassador's direction, to establish necessary contacts to allow U.S. to continuously appraise coup prospects."
Not rUlinlf. out future U.S. involvement m a coup, they went on to
note that 'whether or not it proves to be wise to promote a coup at
a later time, we must be ready for the possibility of a spontaneous
coup." 81
On the military situation in Vietnam, the October 2 McNamaraTaylor Report was generally o]?timistic." The report did, however,
acknowledge that "There are serIOus political tensions in Saigon (and
perha]?s elsewhere in Vietnam) where the Diem-Nhu government is
becommg increasingly unpopular."" Moreover, the report stated,
5. Further repressive actions by Diem and Nhu could change the present
favorable,military trends. On the other hand, a return to more moderate methods
National Broadcasting Company, "The Death
Pentagon Poper" p. '148.
Taylor, Sword, and Plowa1uJrea. pp. 297-98.
aT Pen.tagon. Poper" pp. 76S-65.
llJid.~ pp. 754-57.
all IWd . p. '151.
II
811
ot Diem," IX-pp/G-6.
'
88
Ibid., p. 752.
Ibid., pp. 769-70.
Nlltional Broadcasting Company, "The Death of Diem," IX-p/10.
411 Pfmtagon Paper" p. 767.
40
4l
.u!
13
12
chart U.S. policy toward the present and alternative Saigon regimes.
This guidance came in the form of an ambiguous October 6 cable transmitted to Lodge through CIA channels. The ambiguity of the cable
was ultimately to result in differing interpretations of U.S. policy
within the Saigon mission_ The cable said:
:f.~h:'~re~f:~::~t ~~n=~~:l~hit:oC
~Illable to~~mm~nt
of )Jeing
MIllh to discuss the s ecific Ian of oneI.n a~~m me~t, wIth Gen.
was again non-committal. p
operatIOns. Conem s response
Colonel Conein's own a ccount 0 f thoIS and other contacts is as
follows:
While we do not wish to stimulate coup, we also do not wish to leave impression
that U.S. would thwart change of government or deny economic and military
assistance to a Dew regime if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness of
mnitary effort, ensuring popular support to win war and improving working relatiODS with U.S. We would like to be informed on what is being contemplated but
we should avoid being drawn into reviewing or advising on operational plans o~
any other act which might tend to identify U.S. too closely with change in;.
government.'"
The cable went on to llrge that )linh be pressed for more detailed in-
formation and reiterated the importance of maintaining the possibility of denying U.S. involvement in the planning. These instructions
were conveyed to Minh by a CIA officer some time before midOctober."
While U.S. rehttions with the plotting generals were developing
t.hrough the first half of October, relations with the Diem regime were
deteriorating rapidly. The U.S. policy of selective sanctions seemed to
have a negative effect on Diem and his brother. Continuing his policy of
personal aloofness, Lodge allowed the suspension of the commodity
import program to go without comment. Diem responded to the suspensiori, however, with a vigorous attack on the U.S. Government
launched through the Vietnamese press. By mid-October the rising
level of the anti-American campaigIl indicated that Diem and Nhu
were going to fight rather than submit to U.S. policy directives.
Acting for Ambassador Lodge, General Joseph Stilwell of the Military Assistance Command for Vietnam applied a further sanction on
Oct<>ber 17. Stilwell privately informed the Diem Government that
the U.S. would cut off CIA funds to Colonel Tung's Special Forces,
which had been used by Nhu in the August pagoda raids, unless the
three companies were placed under Joint General Staff control and
transferred to the field. Although the South Vietnamese undertook a
few of the minor military measures recommended by the McN amaraTaylor Report, the combat situation grew steadily worse.
Then toward the end of October, U.S. relations wit.h Saigon suddenly seemed to take a turn for the better. Diem sent an indirect inquiry to Lodge regarding further U.S. decisions on commercial imports. Lodge apparently sensed that Diem waS also bein~ far more
careful about his repressive actions. And on October 24, D,em invited
Lodge to spend Sunday, October 27, with him at Dalat. Lodge was
pleaSed. that Diem had made the first move, and he used the occasion
to determine the effect of U.S. sanctions on Diem's willingIless to make
concessions. Lodge'S report of the meeting, however, described it as
disappointing and revealing no movement on the part of Diem. Whether or not the, October 27 meeting could have marked the beginning of
a greater effort by Diem to meet the U.S. demand for reforms will
never be known. The coup that was to end Diem's life was only five
days away.
Re
me
we~~h~:f;~:nb:~~n
inst;u:Jo~~
daAmy
at.ssrathdeosreLoms.dgte'stJO"port of the Minh-Conein meeting arrived the
ruc IOns were sent It as
. d .
fO':
ton that Conein should:
an Conem, Lodge suggested to Washing-
d.:rh,~;i~'Mi~.al:lh~
Communists.'1
st
Th~ news of
p e an
44
-ill
48
~ Ib
" p. 796.
..
At..w18
potnt in the story. there is a gap in the Pentagon papers' record of the
cable traffic and exact dates are Dot known.
14
15
Originally scheduled for October 26, the coup was delayed on October 22 as a result of what the South Vietnamese Generals mistakenly
took to be U.S. opposition. On October 22, General Harkins informed
General Don that one of his officers had been told about plans for a
coup. Harkins insisted that U.S. officers should not be approached
about such matters as it merely distracted them from their job of fighting the Vietcong. Don interpreted his conversation with Harkins as
official U.S. discouragement of the coul21 and he contacted Colonel
Conein in a state of agitation. Don told vonein that the generals had
called off the scheduled coup, and he requested clarification of U.S.
policy toward It coup. Acting for Lodge, Conein reiterated Washington's guidance and asked for proof of the existence of the coup group
and its plan. Don then promised to give him the political organization
plan if they could meet the next day. At this meeting on the 24th, Don
did not bring the promised plans due. he said. to the coup committee's
anxiety about possible breaches of security. He did promise, however,
to turn over to Conein for Lodge's review detailed plans of the operation and the proposed successor government. This he promised to do
two days before the coup which he said would occur before November 2.
Then to reassure himself further regarding American support, General Don approached Lodge directly at Dalat on October 28. In response to h,S query as to whether Conein spoke for the Ambassador,
Lodge assured Don that he did.
This episode between Harkins and Don and the subsequent differing
interpretations of it by Lodge and Harkins reveal a number of interesting aspects of U.S. involvement in the coup plotting. It indicates
first that Ambassador Lodge and General Harkins had very different
interpretations of Washington's guidance and that they supported
very differentj)olicies toward a coup. In carrying out his own interpretation of Washington's instructions, Lodge kept Harkins totslly
uninformed.an In the second placebthe incident reveals that Washington's guidance was sufficiently am iguous that it could be interpreted
in different ways. And, as Ambassador Lodge chose to interpret the
guidance as calling for close continuing and even encouragmg contact with the plotters, this effectively became the official U.S. policy.
No matter how anxious Washington officials were to become in the
days immediately preceding the coup, responsibility for the conduct of
U.S. policy was never taken out of the Ambassador's hands. A third
and perhaps the most revealing aspect of this incident was the importance of U.S. support to the coup plan. Given what the plotting
generals perceiv~d to be U.S. oppoBltio';1, they. were prepared to c,,:ll
off their plan ~th only a moment's notIce. T,his fact must. be kept m
mind when readmg Lodge's subsequent assertIOns to Washmgton that
the United States lacked the power to forestall a coup.
Given the evidence that U.S. support was a prerequisite for a coup
and the fact that Washington OffiCIalS never instructed Lodge to op-
pose the coup, ultimate responsibility for the coup that was to remove
Diem comes to rest with the U.S. Government.
Due to the Lodge-Harkins difference of opinion an~ to Harkin~'
negative assessment of the prospects for a coup, the WhIte House attItude toward a coup became progressively more negative. The cables
from Washington record increasing concern over the outcome of It
coup. As McGeorge Bundy cabled Lodge on October 25:
110 Harkins describes Lodge'. behavior as follows: I'He Itked to settle things and do
things on his own aceount without too much consultation with bls own staft' or with
those others tn the country, This came to me and most apparently when SecretarY
McNamara and General Taylor visited In late September, early October of 1903 and
they uked me It I'd seen two or three or four cables that came through tbe State Department Involving some of the mlUtarr. 9peratlon8. I saId I hadn't. Well they hadn't
been shown to me by the Ambassador.' National Broadcasting Company, "The Death
of Diem," IX-p/7.
We are particularly concerned about hazard that an unsuccessful coup, however carefully we avoid direct engagement, will be laid at our door by pubUc
opinion almost everywhere. Therefore, while sharing your view that we should
not be in position of thwarting coup, we would like to have option of judging and
warning on any plan with poor prospects of success.1I1
1
\
At a meeting of the National Security Council on October 29, concern was expressed over the differing Ha~kins and ~odge views toward a coup. Of special concern to Washington offiCIals was the apparent breakdown of communication and coordination between
MACV and the Ambassador. It was decided at the meeting that General Harkins should take command of the U.S. mission in Vietnam
if a coup began during the Ambassador's trip to "\y"ashington, scheduled to beg!.'n on October 31. Lodge. was, therefore, I';1structed to show
.
General Harkins all the cables relatmg to. coup planm.ng.
The revelation of these cables to Harkins caught hilll by surprIse.
I thought the thing was dead as far as an overthrow of DIem was concerned
and I went on with my business of fighting the war and training the military.
And unbeknownst to me, although I was the senior military man1i2there, the CIA
was working with the Ambassaor and contacting the Generals.
-~
Harkins' bleak appraisal of coup prospects brought Who
as mgton's anxieties to a head. White House concern was forcefully expressed in an October 30 cable to Lodge from Mcq'e<;>r.ge Bundy. :r~e
cable repeatedly insisted that the coup should be Imtmted only If It
enjoyed a large probability of succeeding. Lodge was t? kee~ W~sh
ington fully informed about all plans for a coup, enablmg Washmgton to then decide whether or not the Generals should proceed.
Believe our attitude to coup group can still have decisive effect on its decisions.
We believe that what we say to coup group can produce delay of coup and beuayal of coup plans to Diem is not repeat not our' only way of stopping coup.
We therefore need urgently your combined assessment with Harkins and OAS.
We concerned that our line-up of forces in Saigon (being cabled in next message)
indicates approximately equal balance of forces, with substantial possibllit;y
serious and prolonged fighting or even defeat. Either of these could be serious or
51
9
"
National Broadcasting ClOmpany, "The Death of Diem, X-p/3.
17
16
nOI?ic ways but to gain victory we must also bring them into the 20th Century
pohtically and that can only be done by either a thoroughgoing change in the
behavior of the present government or by another government. The Viet Cong
problem is partly military but it is also partly psychological and political. 5EI
~ven
loyal to Diem and raise serious issue as to what means coup group has to deal
with them.-
jn~ message, time has Dot yet permitted substantive examination of this matter
Although expressing the view that the U.S. had the power to delay a
(lOUP, it is significant that the Washington cable did not go so far as
to order the Ambassador to halt the plotting. Instead, it left responsibility for determining the prospeets for a successful coup entirely in
Lodge's hands.
While White House officials were obviously under the impression
that a coup could somehow be managed from Washington, Ambassador Lodge was not. Responding to Bundy on the same day, Lodge implied an involvement in the coup that was far deeper than Washington
was willing to recognize. Lodge argued vigorously that the United
States did not "have the power to discourage or delay a coup. Don
has made it clear many times that this is a Vietnamese affair.""
Lodge's motives in this cable are far from clear. It is doubtful that
Lodge had forgotten that only a week earlier the generals called off a
(lOUP due to imagined U.S. opposition. It is conceivable that Lodge
wished to keep ' the management of the coup in his own hands in the
face of a reluctant Harkins and an uncertain Washington. There is
(lertainly no evidence that he ever conveyed Bundy's directive to
Conein. Alternatively the Ambassador may already have been given
notice that the coup was imminent and may in fact have believed that
it was too late to call it off. If Lodge had received such information,
however, he did not pass it on to Washington. Whatever Lodge's motives, his message to Washington dated October 30, two days before
the coul;>, was unequivocally in favor of moving ahead with a coup.
He contmued to insist that the only way of forestalling a coup would
be to reveal the plan to Diem.
It Is theoretically possible for us to turn over the information which has been
given to us in confidence to Diem and this would undoubtedly stop the coup and
would make traitors out of us, For practical purposes therefore I would say that
we have very little influence on what is essentially a Vietnamese affair. In addition, tbis would place the heads of the Generals, their civilian supporters, and
lower mllitary officers on the spot. thereby sacrificing a significant portion of the
civilian and m1l1tary leadership needed to carry the war against the VC to its
successful conclusion. After our e:lrorts not to discourage a coup and this change
of, beart, we would foreclose any possib1llty of change of the GYN for the better.
DIE'm/Nhu have displayed no Intentions to date of a desire to change the traditional methods of control through police action or to take any repeat any actions
which would undermine the power position or solidarity of the Ngo family.1iII'
A,!,ong the. iro!,ies ~f this. statement was .Lodge's appeal for U.S.
non-mterventlOn m an all-VIetnamese" affaIr. This appeal was belied
by his very next paragraph.
'My general view is that the U.S. is trying to bring this medieval country into
20th Century and that we have made considerable progress In military and ecolIa
II!
!IIi
Ibid .. p. 789.
Ibid., pp. 789-90.
J. .
f
,
118
III
Jhid., p. 790.
Ibid.
Ibid... p. 791.
Ibid., p. 790.
18
19
cut predicating our position on the President's stated desire to continue tbe war
against the VO to final victory. Should the coup fail, we will have to pick up the
pieces as best we can at that time. We have a commitment to the Generals from
the August episode to attempt to help in the evacuation ot their dependents. We
should try to live up to this if conditions will permit.eo
On the difficult problem of who would be in charge ,?f the U.S. mission if a coup started during Lodge's trip to the Umted States, the
Bundy cable was firm in designating Harkins.
When yOU leave Saigon and before there is a coup, Truehart will be Chief of
the Country Team. Our only modification of existing procedures i~ llI;at in this
circumstance we wish all instruction to Conein to be conducted. In lm~edi:~te
consultation with Harkins and Smith so that all three know wh.at IS sold m (8$0)
Conein. Any disagreement among the three on such instrucbon should be reported to Washington and held for our resolution, when time perm1~s. .
If you have left and a coup occurs, we believe that emergency sltua~on requires, pending your return, that ~i~ection o~ ~ountry team be ves~ed m most
senior officer with experience of Inlhtary decISIons, and the offic~~ m our view
is Harkins. We do not intend that this switch in final responsiblli.ty should be
publicized in any way, and Harkins will of course be guided in baSIC posture by
our instructions.~5
Having elaborated U.S. policy in the event of, a successful or an unsuccessful coup, Lodge also described his view of the U.S. role if the
outcome were indecisive.
Should the coup prove indecisive and a protracted struggle is in progress, we
lIbould pl'obably .offer our good offices to help resolve the issue in the interest of
the war against the- VC. This might hold some benefit in terms of concessions by
G'VN. WewUI natuJ;'ally incur some opprobrium from both sides in our role as
mediator. However, this opprobrium would probably be less distasteful than a
deadlock wbteh would open the door to the VC. We consider such a deadlock
the least llkely possibility of the three. fl2
::
Ibid., p. 792.
65 Ibid., p. 793.
es
r. Ibid.
Sbaplen, "The Cult 0 , Dlem, " p. 54 .
20
At that
as~umed .would be loyal troops led by Genera l Ton That Dinh.
operaan
in
acclaim
r
popula
~Olnt, D,em and Nhu would return by
l
Colone
to
ing
accord
d,
planne
then
Nhu
Two."
tIon ~alled" "B~avo
which
Conem, to g? mto ~he progra m that he had origina lly planne d,ans
O'At
Americ
the
that
insist
and
North
the
WIth
was to negotIate
I!-~
out." 68
rAlthou~h in touch with or aware of these other coups and counte ls
Umted S~ates suppo~ went to the group of plottin g genera
coups,
led ~ Don, Kh,em and Mmh. U.S. contac ts with this group were
partIcu larly freque nt as November 1, the day of the coup, approa ched.
g genera ls
On Octobe r 28 two separ~te U.S. contacts with the plottin the
mornDuring
f.
himsel
Lodge
d
rnvolve
WhICh
of
one
d,
~re recorde
ched
approa
Don
l
Genera
mg of Lodge 's vi~it with Diem at Dalat,
for
spoke
Conein
agent
CIA
if
ed
enquir
and
y
dIrectl
the Ambas sador
Geng
evenin
That
did.
the Ambassador: Lodge ~ssured Don that he
~tion
eral Don met wIth. Conem and discussed details of the organiz
the
of the coup commIttee. In response to Conein's statem ent that Ochis
before
plans
coup
the
review
t'?
abl~
Ambas sador should be
made
tob~r 31 depart ure, Don mdICated that the plans might be
rather
coup
the
before
hours
four
as
late
as
avaIlable to Lodge
than two days be:!'ore the coup as earlier promised. Don urged that
r 31,
Lo~e not alte,: hls.pla ns to depart for Washi ngton on Octobe
AlfearIng that thIS mIght a~ert the palace to the imyen ding coup. the
in
place
take
would
g
nothin
that
ed.
though Gen~ral Don speCIfi
imUI'.xt ~orty-elght hours, accord rng to the Pentag on analys t, "the
ure.""
depart
's
Lodge
pt
pre-em
would
plica? on v.;as that the cou~
of
WIth. thIS advance warnm g, Admir al Harry Felt, Comm ander
a
have
to
29
r
Octobe
on
ted
instruc
was
the PacIfic ~Ieet (CINP AC),
alert
This
coast.
mese
Vietna
the
off
stand
force
task
aIr
and
naval
t plot.
,,;as a reenact.ment of an ale~ called at tbe ~ime of the Augus
s
civilian
can
Ameri
of
tIOn
evacua
for
e
prOVId
to
ed
mt!,nd
tlllj! and was
ry.
necessa
If
and depend ents
On the same day, October 29, the first prepar atory move of the coupl
took place. Gene~al Dinh ordere d Colonel Tung to move his Specia
apForces out of SaJgon for maneuvers. In issuing this order Dinh
biding
l,
gene;a
the
and
p~a~ to hav~ been cooper ating ~ith ?oth Nhu
h,S t!me untIl he could see WhICh SIde would prevail. General Dinh
the
was m. c)large of III Corps while Genera l Cao headed IV Corps
for
pla~
his
With
.
Saigon
of
y
v,icinit
~he
in
areas
two cl'ltICal corps
Bravo <;lne and Bravo Two m mmd and assumi ng the loyalty of Genals Dmh. and Cao, Nhu felt safe in sendin g Colonel Tung's forces
am the CIty. Unbeknownst,. however, to Nhu and Diem, the plottin
un~
gererbilsDhinhad taken grea~ pams to ,neutralize Cao .and to keep the
out ?f the pICture untIl he was needed
re Ia e
On Octobe r 31m a firial approa ch to Diem Genera l Don paid a visit
is not mentio ned in
~h th; t';o bro~ers at the palace. This visit, ';"hich
Shaple n "at the
Robert
to
ing
accord
. e. en. agon apers, was made
Nhu and Diem
both
warned
Don
70
ans."
Americ
.the.
of
OJ?mstJgatI
what they
them
asked
and
bad
was
y
that the SItuatIOn m the countr
of Diem" X- /4
National Broadcastio2,' Company ' "The Death
,p .
.
eg Pmtagofl , PB(J6r8, p. 260.
54.
p.
Diem,"
of
Cult
"The
'10 Shaplen,
88
21
rewere going to do about their promis ed reform s. Nhu and Diem
no
was
there
that
and
l
norma
to
d
returne
had
on
plied that the situati
regime
Diem
the
of
fate
The
left.
Don
this
With
ng.
anythi
do
to
need
was sealed and the coup began.
71
Seemin gly the U.S. policy of pressu re and persua sion had finally
imborne fruit on the very day of the coup. Lodge 's response to Diem's had
Lodge
if
Even
t.
accoun
on
Pentag
the
in
ed
tiative is not describ
wanted to save the Diem government, it was too late. Coup units were
alread y beginn ing to deploy in and around Saigon.72
Joint
At noon nearly all the genera ls and top officers convened at senior
only
The
Nhut.
Son
Tan
at
arters
headqu
Genera l Staff (JGS)
ls
officers not inform ed of and presen t at the meetin g were Genera
shot
been
had
who
officer
Naval
Senior
the
Dinh and Cao as well as
enroute. There the coup committee inform ed the aesembled officers
ual
that the coup had begun, asked their suppor t and recorded individ
group
hao
Mau-T
The
radio.
the
over
use
later
for
t
suppor
of
s
pledge
ted
of colonels had no choice but to go along. Severa l officers snspecthe
of
nders
comma
the
Tung,
l
Colone
as
such
Diem,
to
of being loyal
into
Air Force, Marines, Civil Guard and police force, were taken
trusted
more
of
hip
leaders
the
under
placed
were
units
Their
custody.
junior officers.
where
Colonel Conein wa.s invited to come to .JGS headqu arters during
sy
Embas
U.S.
the
he was author ized to mainta in contac t with
that
the coup. Accord ing to Conein, "I had a radio, a special radio with
had
I
plus
sy,
Embas
cut me into a special net ... directl y to the
line
the junta Or the plotter s agreem ent that I had a speCIal telephone
directl y to the U.S. Embas sy." 72
With regard to Genera l Taylor 's conten tion that the United States
was not aware of the momen t of the coup, Conein has said:
during the whole
My persona l opinion is this is quite inconce ivable becauseby cable everyo ne
reportin g period through my own Channels, I was reportin g
of the coup. Every
of the develop ments leading up to and includin g the timing
on HUsman, To MOtl6 a Nation. p. lS18.
Mecklin
of the coup by U.S. observers In Saigon see
'fl,I For vivid and varying accounts
22
one of the meetings, every one of the negotiations, the discussions that were held
with General Big Minh, with' General Don, and General Kim and any other
military leader who were participating in the coup was completely reported to
Washington, D.O. and I received many times guidance exactly of what I was to
discuss with these individuals and the limits of which I could discuss these
problems with them."
Jngton o:tll.clal. According to Roger mlsman, he was wakened at 2 :00 a.m. Washington
time (two and one half hours befOre Diem's Conversation With Lodge) by the State De
partment duty o:tll.cer and given word of the coup. He spent the rest ot the nIght at the
State Department "operations center." HUsman, To Move a NaUon, p. lS19.
\,
23
I
j
Diem: No. (And then after a pause) You have my telephone number.
Lodge: Yes. If I can do anything for your physical safety, please call me.
DieM: I am trying to reestablish order.7'1
At 4 :45 p.m., the Generals reached Diem and Nhu on the phone
again. They put Colonel Tung on the line to say that he and the Special
Forces had surrendered. Tung was then taken outside and shot. At
5 :15 p.m. General Minh made a personal call to Diem urging him to
surrender before the palace was put under ground and air attack. Diem
hun~ Up.81
DIem and Nhu then began frantically phoning troop commanders
throughout the country ,seeking their support. In the instances where
they were able to get through, the brothers were advised to surrender
by officers who now supported the coup. Unable to get the support of
the regular military, they vainly sought the support of their Republic
Youth grou.l.'s and paramilitary units.
Still unWIlling to surrender, Diem and Nhu escaped from the palace
at around 8 :00 "{l.m. and lied to the home of a friend in Cholon, a Saigon
suburb. An artIllery barrage of the palace began at 9 :00 p.m. joined
by a tank shelling at 3 :30 a.m .. November 2. At 6 :30 a.m. tile palace
surrendered when Diem, who had been long gone, issued a ceasefire
order to his palace guard. Colonel Thao was the first of the plotters
into the palace. He was told by a captured officer of Diem's escape and
whereabouts.
According to all accounts, Diem and Nhu's lIight from the palace
sealed their fate. In the course of meetings throughout the day, the decision to kill Diem had been discussed. MIlitary officers who might have
voted to spare Diem were assassinated. Then, when it was learned that
Pentagon Paper'l p. 268.
Mecklln M,,,lon. fn. TOnn-6notl p. 268.
80 Natlonai Broadcasting Company, "Tbe Death of Diem," X-pill.
One wonders what became of the U.S. military aircraft that had. been dispatched to
stand by for Lodge's departure, seheduled for the previous day.
Bl HUsman, To Move a Natton, p. 520.
'l"l'
25
24
Diem and his brothe r had escaped from the palace, the decision began
to go agains t Diem.82
the
Between 6 :00 a.m. and 9 :00 a.m., Diem made three phone calls tofirst
the
In
ay.
hide-aw
Cholon
his
from
Genera l Staff headqu arters
honors
eall, Diem refused to speak with Genera l Minh, requested full
y.
countr
r
anothe
to
t
conduc
safe
and
",nd a gracef ul exit from power
d
insiste
again
and
Minh
l
Genera
with
spoke
Diem
call,
second
the
ln
,
Finally
u~.
hung
angry,
ingly
increas
on full honors. Minh, becoming
and
t
aIrpor
the
to
t
conduc
safe
for
only
asked
Diem
call,
third
the
in
depart ure from Vietna m."
Recent accounts of the assassination of Diem implic ate all the coup
disgenerals. While an armore d persounel carrier and jeeps were
their
on
d
reache
was
sus
consen
a
Nhu,
and
Diem
up
pick
to
d
patche
Van Nhung ,
assassination. Genera l Minh dispatc hed Captai n Nguye n rs
were to be
brothe
The
.
assassm
ional
profess
a
and
aide
al
person
his
the
Xuan,
Huu
Mai
l
Genera
arters.
killed before returni ng to headqu
Hieu
Duong
n
Captai
r.
murde
the
ted
permit
t,
presen
nder
comma
senior
with their
N ghia assisted Nhung who shot the two brothe rs as they sat
nine-y ear
the
Thus
car."
d
armore
the
in
backs
theIr
behind
tied
hands
end.
bloody
a
rule of Ngo Dinh Diem came to
Accord ing to many accounts, the news of Diem's and Nhu's deaths
parwas deeply disturb ing to Presid ent Kennedy.8' His dismay wasaging
encour
in
ement
involv
U.S.
heavy
"the
of
e
hecaus
acute
ly
ticular
the coup leaders." The Pentag on analys t goes on to note:
offers of safe
Apparently.. we bad put full confidence in the coup committee's
of Diem and Nhu
conduct to the brothers, and, reluctant to intercede on behalfg on our pledges of
for fear of appearing to offer support to them or of renegin degree of hatred of
non-interference to the generals, we had not appreciated the
brothers survived
the Ngo family among the generals, nor their fear that if the
8Il
k.
comebac
a
stage
somehow
would
they
coup
the
the
ment." 88 The genera ls explain ed the structu re and composition of
govern ment they had decided on. They also covered a range of immethe
diate problems such as the disposition of the Nhu childre nls and
t
rest of the Ngo family , curfew, press ceusorship, and reprisa agains
were
ms
progra
aid
certaiu
that
see
to
ed
former officials. Lodge promis
restore d immediately aud that others were resumed when the uew
ogic~l
government was in place. ~'T~e generals con~rmed the psychol
thmr
of
success
the
to
IOn
suspenS
lillport
dity
commo
the
of
import ance
plans."
89
l
On November 4, the next day, Ambas sador Lodge and Lt. Colone
Washfrom
tious
iustruc
on
Conein met with Generals Minh and Don
ned
ington . Despit e Lodge 's elation, the State Depart ment was concer
and
n
opinio
public
on
with the negativ e effect of the assassinations
of cou!"e,
with the appear ance o.f U:S. complicity. The generals had,responS
Ive,
denied that the assassmatIOn had been ordere d and were ing stateclarify
a
issue
they
that
t
reques
his
to
according to Lodge,
memmeut about the deaths of the brothe rs and that they treat other
for
ment
Depart
State
the
d
rebuke
Lodge
ely.
bers of the family human
probns
relatio
l?ublic
e
negativ
the
with
upatiou
preocc
ive
"excess
its
lems of the coup" and for the Depart ment's "faIlur e to note the brilliance with which the coup was planne d and executed." 90
The uew govern ment with Minh as Presid ent was anuouuced on
's
November 5. On November 6, the State Depart ment approv ed Lodge
me",t,
Depart
State
the
7,
ber
Novem
On
)?roposed reply of recoguition.
under the pressu re of other governments and the press, announced Its
intenti on to recognize." 91
er,
Lod!!e delivered the note of recognition to the new Foreig n Minist
uacies
inadeq
his
sized
empha
Lam
8.
Pham' Dang Lam on November
for his new position and asked for the Ambassador's advice "which
" It
Lodge waS appare ntly not relucta nt to give on a variety of topics.
govnew
the
"that
t,
analys
on
Pentag
the
to
ing
accord
t,
was eviden
t, not
ernme ut would be heavily depeud ent ou U.S. advice and suppor
g
runnin
of
s
problem
al
practic
the
in
also
but
effort,
war
ouly for the
the countr y.""
coup.
This is the central message of events surrou nding the Diem of
the
row
overth
the
in
pation
The United States, throug h its partici
became
ment,
govern
or
success
a
of
t
shmen
establi
the
and
Diem regime
milimore directl y involved in manag ing the political, economic and came
ement
involv
U.S.
iu
e
increas
the
With
m.
Vietna
tary problems of
South
an increase in the commitment of U.S. prestig e to victory in
Asia
ast
Southe
from
awal
withdr
U.S.
a
made
turn
Vietna m. This in
more unlikely.
Official accounts of the coup denyin g a significant U$. involvement
are not uncommon. Arthu r Schlesinger has noted:
1, 1963, was entirely
It is important to state clearly that the coup of November
nor
carried out by the Vietnamese. Neither the American Embassy
planned and
lay behind the coup
the CIA were involved in instigat ion or execution . ... Whatlong
history of Vietthe
but
ugly,
or
quiet
ns,
America
of
was not the meddling
: g~~:, p. 271.
IbM.
Ibid., p. 272.
921bid.
00
91
26
naInese mlUtary resentment against Diem.... As Lodge later put it, the coup
was Uke a rock rOlling downhill. It could have been stopped only by an aggressive American intervention against the army on behalf of Diem and the Nhus. $a
Lodge himself offered the following description of U.S. participation in the coup in an interview with the New YOTk Timea on June 30,
1964.
APPENDICES
. Well, the United States was not involved in the overthrow of the Diem regime.
The United States was trying to change-bring about a change in the behavior of
the Diem regime. It was trying to bring about a change in the personnel of the
Diem regime
....
POlitical
means
... ..We were trying to bring about this by thoroughly legitimate
APPENDIX 1
DEPARTMENT OF STATE-MEMOBANDUM OF CONVERSATION-FOB THE RECORD
Mr. HUsman,
The
PresidentMr.
wasForrestal.
briefed on ~evelopmen t s in Indonesia, Laos and Viet-Nam.
The portion on Viet-Nam f0!l0ws. 0 June 16 in which the Government met the
A joint agreement was Slgne~ d~ists and the Government then worked to.
Buddhists' five demands. The ~ from the bonze who burned himself to death
ether on the funeral arrangemen
f
ral Came off without trOUble.
:0 that incidents could be avoided. The
in Saigon that the Government
Since then there have been rumors c e t These rUmors were given credence
does not intend to live up ~ th~ aft:.e~n~~age "Times" of Vlet.Nam, which is
It.
ir~~rating
~~X:l~a~~~c~;
~~~~~:. ~e :rti~l~ c~nta::~ ~h:ell~~:t~~~ ~~!~~ ~~m~:~ ~~
the Buddhists. There was a SUggt~S~ O~allenge to the Buddhists that, if I!-0 furdeath was drugged and a provocaJ ~ 2 thi8 would amount to an admiSSIon br
ther demonstrations occurred o~. :J w'ith the Government's action. (The.~res
the Buddhists that they were sa IS "bility ot drugging, to which Mr. HI man
dent injected questions on the POSS1 d nate explanation.)
replied that religious fervor :~~U:i:n it the possibility of getting r1di~l the
A~ ~s~~~t ::~O:~~:d judgment was t~~tt itth:C:~~~i!tsb~tn~':ine: an
Nh~ontinUing
the briefing, Mr. HUSIllaf!v~~~ increasing demands as well as
activist element which undoubtedly i its feet There was thus an element of
charging
the Government
truth in Diem's
view thatWthithe
,:a:~h~ts
might push their demands so far as
u
~1=1~
:e~mit
~ :r::n:fr~:Ons
29
. I to affect that effort. Tbe primary purpo~
tary and political factors most h?,-e Yth implications of recent development~ In
of the present SNIE is to .e:-:am1;~h eountry the viability of the Diem regIme,
South Vietnam f~r th~ stabIlIty 0
ec
,
and its relationshIP With the U.S.
28
The timing of Ambassador Nolting's return and Ambassador Lodge's assumption of duty was then discussed. The President's initial view was that Ambassador Nolting shoUld return immediately and that Ambassador Lodge should
assume his duties as soon thereafter as possible. The President volWlteered that
Ambassador Nolting had done an outstanding job, that it was almost miracu-
CONCLUSIONS
.
has highlighted and intensified a
A. The Buddhist crisis. in South. V1etr~~ with the Diem regime and its style
widespread and longst~ding dissab:c~;IS to carry out truly and promptly ~e
of government. If-as IS likelyth D~~ddhists, disorders will probably ~are agalll
commitments he has made to e
tnation attempts against him wIll become
and the chances of a coup or assass
.
better than even. (Paras. 4,14).
asiness about the extent of the U.S. lll~
B. The Diem regime's underlymg uns~a ened by the Buddhist. affair and the
volvement in South Vietnam has ~~~de wIN almost certainly perSIst and further
firm line taken by the U.S. This at 1 ~ the country is likely. (Paras. 10-12)
pressure to reduce the U.~. presenc~ III ot been effectively exploited by the Come Thus far, the BuddhIst issue a~ nd y appreciable effect on the conntermrutists, nor does it appear to~a;e Di~m ~~ likely to be overthrown ~y a Cominsurgency effort. We do ~ot IIIC munists 'would necessarily profit If he were
munist coup. Nor do we th:nk ~he o~iS non-Communist opponents. A nonComoverthrown by some .combl~atlon o.f iUally less effective against the Viet Cong,
munist successor regune mIght be ~h U S could provide reasonably effective
but, giv~n contlhnUed SUnmP~~ !~~U:he -!ar effort. (Paras. 7, 15-17)
leadershIp for t e gover
lous the way he had succeeded in turning the war around from the disastrously
low point in relations between Diem and ourselves that existed when Ambassador Nolting took over. Mr. Hilsman pointed out the personal sacrifices that
Ambassador N oIting had been forced to make during this period, and the President said that he hoped a way could be found to commend Ambassador Nolting publicly so as to make clear the :fine job he had done and that he hoped an
appropriate position could be found for him in Washington so that he could
give his children a suitable home in the years immediately ahead.
The President's decision was to delegate the .authority to decide oli the timing
of Ambassador Nolting'S return to the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs; that Ambassador Lodge should report to Washington no later than July 15
so that he could take the Counterinsurgency Course simultaneously with the
normal briefings for an ambassador j and that Ambassador ~dge should arrive
in Saigon as soon as possible following completion of the CI Course on August 14.
Arrangements were made for Ambassador Nolting to see the President at
4:00 p.m. on Monday, July 8.
Prepared by R. Hil&man.
APPENDIX 2
JULY 5, 1963,
DISCUSSION
MEMORANDUM OF CoNSERVATION
53-2--63
NIE 53-63. "Prospects in South Vietnam," dated 17 April 1963 was particularly
I. Introduction
. ha e faeed the Government of South Viet1. The two chief. pro~lem~ wh: hav~ been: (a) to forge the ~stitut1ons and
nam (GVN) since ItS bl~h III ~9 rvival as an independent natIOn, and (b~ to
loyalties necessary to Vletn~,m s ~u rsive and aggressive designs-pUrsued SIllce
counter the menac.e of Han?~ s su v~ guerrilla warfare. In attempting to cOJ?e
1960 by a campaIgn of WI esprea
hampered by its lack of confidence III
with these problems, the G VN h~ b~~r;;.ding and support of a considerable porn
and its inability to engage ~e 11: ~r~ing large segments of the educated classes
tion of the Vietnamese peop e-1~C ~ese inadequacies and tensions in the South
and the peasantry. Il!'ti.rehc:~! ~~ ;urther revealed and intensified.
Vietnamese body po I c
ri::
30
4. For the moment, the Buddhist movement remains under the effective COD~
trol ot moderate bonzes who have refused to accept support from or countenance
cooperation with any of Diem's political opponents, Communist or non-Communist, and appear to be trying to insure that the Buddhists live up to their
part of the bargain. This leadership gave the GVN a period of grace (which
expired about the end of June) tn which to show that it was moving in good
faith to carry out its undertakings, failing which protests would resume. So far
there have been no further demonstrations, but the Buddhist leadership is clearly
restive.
5. Despite Buddhist restraint in the political exploitation of the affair it has
obvions political overtones. It has apparently aroused widespread poP~lar indignation and could well become a focal point of general disaffection with the
Diem government. It provides an issue on which most of Diem's non-Commu
nist opponents (even including some Catholics) can find common ground of
agreement. There is considerable evidence that the issue itself and even more
the Diem family's handling of it to date has occasioned restiveness' at virtually
all levels of the GVN's military and civil establishments, both of whose lower
and middle echelons are largely staffed by Buddhists. In some cases, civil serv.
ants seem to have ignored or tempered GVN instructions, superiors have on
occasion evaded their assigned task of propounding the official GVN line to
their subordinates, and information on impending government actions has obviously leaked to Buddhist leaders. In any case, recent developments are causing
many GVN officials to reexamine their relations with and the limits of their loyalty to the Diem regime; there is accumulating evidence of serious disa.1fection
and coup plotting in high military and civilian circles.
6. The BUddhist affair appears to have given considerable heart to the various
non-Communist political opposition splinter groups in and out of South Vietnam. There also appears to be a growing feeling among former supporters of the
regime that Diem's position may have been permanently and dangerously impaired. Thus far, however, we have no evidence that the diverse opposition
groups have been able to form new or dective alliances with one another.
7. The Buddhist issue would appear to be an obvious windfall for the Communists, but so far there is no evidence that they have been able to exploit it effectively. They may have penetrated the Buddhist clergy to some extent, but
are not presently exerting any discernible influence, despite the suggestions to
the contrary in GVN pronouncements. To date the Buddhist crisis does not appear to have had any appreciable e1fect on the continuing counterinsurgency
effort, though the morale and efficiency of the GVN's military and civil forces
are likely to be impaired if the issue is prolonged.
8. The Buddhist crisis has also hurt the GVN internationally, with potentially
important e:trects upon the future success of U.S. polley towards southeast .Asia.
Protests are growing in other predominantly Buddhist countries, with the im
plication that U.S. action could help resolve the crisis. Cambodia and Ceylon have
made representations to the U.N. and more may be forthcoming. In other countries, including the U.S., the crisis has given new stimulus to criticism of U.S.
pollcy on the grounds that the U.S. is supporting an oppressive and unrepresentative regime.
9. The future course of the Buddhist affair will be largely determined by the
GVN's actions in the near term. It is likely that the issues recently raised can be
resolved if the GVN executes its portion of the negotiated bargain. However,
politically sophisticated segments of South Vietnamese society, Buddhists included, are mindful of Diem's past practice of often using negotiations as a stall
for time and of making promises in order to weather an immediate crisis. The
real danger in the present situation is that Diem may be tempted to employ such
tactics which have served him well in the past but could prove disastrous if
essayed this time. If demonstrations should be resumed, they would probably
assume an increasingly political cast, and less moderate Buddhist leadership
would be likely to come to the fore. Public order would be threatened. In particular, we cannot be sure how various army or police units would react if ordered
to flre on demonstrations headed by Buddhist bonzes.
Ill. The effoot 01 recent devel<ipment. on U.S.-GVN .e/atw...
10. The GVN has always shown some concern over the implications of U.S.
involvement in South Vietnamese affairs and from time to time has felt moved
to restrict U.S. activities and presence in South Vietnam. This attitude springs
partly from legitimate, if hypersensitive, concern for the appearance as well as
the fact of Vietnam's recently acquired sovereignty. To a considerable degree,
31
t
I
,
,
\
however it springs from the Diem government's suspicion of U.S. intentions toward it' and from its belief that the extensive U.S. presence is setting in motion
politicai forces which could eventually threaten Diem's. political primac~.
11 The Buddhist afl'airs erupted at one of these per10ds of GVN senSItivity,
and 'the strain has been aggravated by subsequent events. The GVN's initial
handling of the issue gave the U.S. ground for serious embarrassment and c:on cern which, in turn, produced a succession of forceful U.S. demarches. The DIem
family has bitterly resented these U.S. actions and may well feel that the Buddhist protests were at least indirectly due to the U.S. presence. Under the circumstances further pressure to reduce that presence is likely.
12. A key role in this regard will be played by Diem's brother, Ngo d.inh Nhu,
He has always been Diem's chief political lieutenant, but the years SInce 19M
have witnessed a steady accretion of Nhu's personal power and authority-an
accretion due partly to circumstance and primarily to deliberate effo~t on Nh~'8
part. Nhu has political ambitions of his own and almost certainly enVlsages h1mself as his brother's successor. For a variety of reasons, Nhu has long privately
viewed the U.S. with some hostility and suspicion. American .crit~cism of the
GVN has especially irritated Nhu, for he is aware that he and h1S w1fe are often
its primary targets. Above all, Nhu almost certainly doubts whether the support
which the U.S. has given to his brother would be transferred to him.
13. In the negotiations with the Buddhists, Nhu urged his broth~r to take a
firm line and is by his own statement, wholly out of sympathy WIth the con
cessions made. On the basis of past performance, we think it unlikely ~at he
will help to implement the settlement; his influence oli Diem will be rat~er III the
direction of delaying and hedging on commitments, a tendency to WhICh Diem
himself is already disposed. This will be the more likely since not only the Nbus
and Diem, but also his brothers Archbishop Thuc and Ngo dinh Can, ~e political boss of the central provinces, obviously ~ntinu? to doubt t:h~ legitImacy
of Buddhist complaints and to underestimate the mtens1ty of the CrISlS.
IV. The IJ'Utl<iok
14 If the Diem government moves effectively to fulfill its 16 June commit
ments, much of the resentment aroused by the Buddhist controversy c~)Uld be
allayed. However, even if relations between the GVN and the Buddh1sts a~
smoothed over the general discontent with the Diem regime which the crts~s
has exacerbat~ and brought to the fore is likely to persist. Further, if-as 1S
probable-the regime is dilatory, inept, and insincere in handlin~ Buddhist
matters there will probably be renewed demonstrations, and South VIetna~ will
probabrY remain in a s~te of domestic political tension. Under these CIrcumstances, the chances of a non-Communist assassination or couP. a.t~empt against
Diem will be better than even. We cannot exclude the poss1b1hty ?f an attempted Communist coup, but a Communist attempt will have appreCIably less
likelihood of success so long as the majority of the goyemm~nt's opponents and
critics remain-as they are now-alert to the CommuDlst perd.
15 The chances of a non-Communist coup-and of its success-would becom~ greater In the event renewed GVN/Buddhist confrontation should lead to
large-scale demonstrations in Saigon. More or less prolonged riot and gene~al
disorder would probably result-with the security forces confused over wh~ch
side to support. Under such circumstances, a small group, particularly one w1th
prior contingency plans for such an eventuality, might prove able to topple the
government Conversely, a continued or resumed truce between the GVN and
the Buddhi~ts would serve to reduce the likelihood of such a overthrow.
16. Any attempt to remove Diem will almost certaInly be directed against Nhu
as well, but should Nbu survive Diem, we are virtually ce~tain t;hat he would
attempt to gaIn power-in the first instance probably by mampulatmg the ~onst1tutional machlnery. We do not believe that Nhu's bid would succeed, desp1te the
personal poUtical base he has sought to build throug~ the Republican Youth (of
which he is the overt, uniformed head), the strategIc. hamlet program (whose
directing Interministerlal Committee he chairs), and m the army: He and hIs
wife have become too much the living symbols of all that is disliked m the pre~nt
regime for Nhu's personal political power to long outUve his brother. There mIght
be a struggle with no little violence, but enough of the army would almost ~r.
tainly move to take charge of the situation, either rallying behind the constitutional successor to install Vice President Tho or backing another non-Communist
dvilleader or a military 3unta.
17 A non-Communist successor regime might prove no more effective than
Die~ in fighting the Viet Cong; indeed at least initially it might well prove con
33
32
APPEN DIX 6
APPEN DIX 4
STATE 243-STA TE TO LODGE
APPEN DIX 5
AUGUSl' 25, 1968.
time, by making them we give Nhu ebance to forestal l .or block action
by military .
Risk, we believe, is nQt WQrth taking, with Nhu in contrQI combat
fQrces Saigon.
Therefo re, propose , We go straight to -Genera ls with our demand
s, without
informi ng Diem. Would tell them we prepare d have Diem without
Nhus but it Is
in effect up to them whethe r to ;keep him. Would also insist
to release Buddhi st leaders and carry out June 16 agreeme nt. general s take steps
AUGUST
26, 1963.
i
!
,
1. Highest level meeting nQon today review YQur 375 and reaffirm
ed basic
course. Specific decision s fQllQW:
34
35
279-BTA TE TO LODGE
Deeply appreci ate your 375 which was a most helpful claritlca tion.
We fully
underst and enormo us stakes at issue and the heavy respons
ibilities which you
and Harkins wUl be carryin g in the days ahead and we want
to do everyth Ing
possible from our end to help.
Purpose of this message is to explore further question at possible
attempt to
separat e Diem and the Nhus. In your telegram you appear to
treat Diem and
the Nhus as a singie package whereas we had indicate d earUer
that if the Nhus were removed the question of retainin g Diem to the General s
would be up to
them. My own persona l assessm ent is (and this is not an
instruct ion) that the
Nhus are by all odds the greater part of the problem in Vietnam
, internal ly, internatio nallyan d tor Americ an public opinion. Perhaps it is inconce
ivable that
the Nhus could be removed without taking Diem with them
or without Diem's
abandon ing his post. In any event, I would apprecl ate your commen
t on whethe r
any distinct ion can or should be drawn as between Diem and
Counsel lor and
Madam e Nhu.
The only point on which you and General Harkf.ns have dltreren
t views is
whethe r an attempt should be made with Diem to elimina
te the Nhus and presumably take other steps to consolid ate the country behind
a winning etrort
against the Viet Congo My own hunch, based in part on the report
of Kattenburg's convers ation with Diem is that such ftn approac h could
not succeed It it
were cast purely in terms ot persuas ion. Unless such a talk included
tion such as a threaten ed withdra wal of our support , it is unlikely a real sancthat it would
be taken completely seriousl y by a man who may teel
that
are inescap ably
commit ted to an anti-Co mmunis t Vietnam . But it a sanctionwe
were used in such
a convers ation, there would be a high risk that this would be
taken by Diem
as a sign that action against him and the Nhus was immine
nt and he might as
a minimu m move against the General s or even take some quite
such as calUng on North Vietnam tor assistall ce In expellin g the tantasti c action
It occurs to me, theretor e. that it such an approac were to beAmericans.
made it might
properlY await the time when others were ready tohmove
Immedi ately to constitute a new governm ent It this be 80, the question then arises
as to whethe r an
approac h to insist upon the expulsio n of the Nhus should
from Americ ans
rather than from the General s themselves. This might become
the means by which
APpEN DIX 10
Oablegram trom AmbaB8
ail
or
hich there is no respecta ble. turning back:
We are launche d on a course :tram w t. There is no turning back
in part bethe overthro w of the Diem gove: :n: comDlltted to thiS end in
large measurecause U.S. prestige Is alrMdy pu c
eak out. In a more tundaDl ental sense,
and will become more so, as the facts 1
ossibilit y in my view, that the war
there is no turni.ng back because there is n~ less th~t
Diem or any member ot
can be won under a Diem administr~iO~y to gain the
support at the peopl&
th family can govern the country
a
t
rnment service, civil and
wtio count, I.e., the educate d class In and :-\eO I~';ie last few
months (and
militar y-not to mention the Americ an
:lle~ated these people to an Incalcuespecially days) they have in fact f~l:edll agreement with the poll""
which
lable degree. So that I am persona
'tel
In.
was Instruct ed to carry out by laSfl!t sun~y ~als'~uP depends on
them to some
2 The chance of bringin g 0 a
n
extoot; but It depends at least as much
t
to
get
General
s to mOve promptl y.
8 We should proceed to make all-ou e or
.
To do so we should have authori ty to do ~1l0wn:: 'personallY message
previou sly
(a) That Gen. Harkin s Trehpel ~ot~d e:~~~sh their
authent icity. Gen. Harkins transmi tted by CAS officers.
s
u
should have order on this.
.
ublic stateme nt that all U.S. aid to
(b) If neverth eless General s inSlS~ on
we would agree,
VN through Diem regime has been s oppe 't same time (Weon express understandin g that General s will have st~[t:dtoa h~ld this ca'rd for would seek persuade General s that. it would be be e sar to do this at all.) use in event of
stalema te. We hope It w~ll ~o~hb~ ~~e~av: the will power, courage
, and detei~i
(c) VNese General s dou
a
e haunted by the idea that we w
minatio n to see thiS thing thrOUg~ The~ld r them
pursuan t to instructiOns, that
run out on them even though we ave
the game had started.
S me of these are:
5. We must press on for many rtea~~nstio~
which may well lead to riots and
(a) Explosi veness of the presen SI ~la .
ot Dlet Qut of this could come a
.
of
disconte
nt
with
reglDle
IS
n
.
violence If lssue
politicians.
pro_Communist or a t Iea st a neutrali st set of
ith
the
present
regime>.
(b) The fact that war cannot be ;on w
nd our unwillin gness to stultity
(c) Our own reputati on for stea as t ness a
ourselves.
I b 11 ve a body blow wUl be dealt to'
(d) If propose d action is suspend ed, II ~h~se who
expect U.S. to straight en
respect for us by VNese Generals Also, 8ur help to' the regime
in past years'
out this situatio n will feel let down. we cannot avoid.
inescap ably gives a responsibilit,Y wr iCh
ery substan tial risk
6. I realize that this C<;)l~rse IlllTokv~~ 1n:eric an lives. I would of losing VN.
never propose
It also involves some additlOna { ~hance of holding VN with
Diem.
it if I felt there was a reasona b e
[Point 7 unavaila ble.]
t I sh uld ask Diem to get rid ot the Nhug:
8 . . . Gen. Harkins think~ tha
B~t I believe
such a step has nO
before starting the General s action. nd would have that
the very serioUS effect of
chance ot getting the desired result a i
f Americ an indecisi on and delay. I
being regarde d by the General s as a s gn 0 un The General s
distrust us too
believe this is a risk which e ~h~ub~e;;"o~~uld certainl y ask
much already . Anothe r point s a i would give the ball to for time to conNhu.
sider such a far-reac hing requesst. ~ s G n Harkins conCUrs in
this telegram .
9. With the exceptio n of par. a ove e.
0; 0;'
36
37
APPENDIX 11
AUGUST
30, 1963.
APPENDIX 12
APPENDIX 18
OFFICE
ACTIVITIES
AUGUST 31, 1968.
MEMORANDUM FOB THE BECORD
6. Mr. HUsman commented that, in his view, the generals are not now going
to move unless they are pressed by a revolt from below. In this connection Am
bassador Nolting warned that in the uncoordinated Vietnamese structure any
thing can happen, and that while an organized successful coup is out, there
might be small flurries by irresponsible dissidents at any time.
7. Mr. Hilsman undertook to present four basic factors which bear directly
.on the pr.oblem confronting the U.S. now. They are, in his view:
a. The mood of the people, particularly the middle level officers, noncom
missioned officers and middle level bureaucrats, who are most restive. Mr. McNamara interrupted to state that he had seen no evidence of this and General
'Taylor commented that he had seen none either, but would like to see such evi
dence as HUsman could produce. Mr. Kattenburg commented that the middle level
.officers and bureaucrats are uniformly critical of the government, to which Mr.
McNamara commented that if this is indeed the fact we should know about it.
39
38
b. The second basic :factor as outlined b H'I
telt on our programs elsewher'e in As' if
Y I, sman, was what effect will begovernment. In this connection he: ,,;et~Ulesce to ~ strong Nhu-dominated
underway on just how much r~
.por e
a~ there IS a Korean study DOW
pulling out her aid. Mr. MCN~~~~~~ ~lliU:~ed States will tol,erate beforeWOuld be anxious to have it.
e
a e had not seen thIS study and
C. The third basic :factor Is Mr. Nhu his r
.
called that Nhu has once already lau~che dpe nsonality and hIS policy. Hilsman reprovince advisors and stated that he is sur : .e~ort aimed at withdrawal of ourBe gave, as supporting evidence the con~en~ l~/~ co~~ersation with the French.
,Mr. Bundy asked to see. Ambassa'dor Noltin
n
ercept.e<! message, which
not make a deal with Ho Chi Minh on Ho' t g expressed the oplmon that Nhu will
.
.
s erms.
d The"'o rth
-\- U
pomt IS the matter of U Sand
ld
'.
that this prOblem was moving to a politic~l a d w~r 1 OPl~IOn, HUsman stated'
problem, he said, is the press which conclud inn
p omatlc plane. Part of theto change the things in Viet~am of which te.: correc~l that we have the ability
added that this problem of press condemn t' ey !ire crItical. To this Mr. Murrow
8. Mr. Kattenburg stated that
a Ion IS now worldwide.
of Ambassador Lodge that, if
as ~ecently as last Thursday it Was the belietwith its bayonets at ever str~e un ertake to live with this repressive regime,
transparent negotiations with
puPPet bonzes, we are gOi~g to b~ ~~~~er and
stated that at this juncture it would be~t~U t
the country in six months. He
out honorably. He went on to say that h er or Us to make the decIsion to get
ten years, he was deeply disapPOinted in ~ytng b~n acquainted with Diem for
from his brother. It was Kattenburg's view ~:~ts:.~mg t~t he will not separate
from the military and as time
em WIll get very little support
country will gO steadiiy down h~nes on, he will get less and less Support and the
9. General Taylor asked what Kattenb
be forced out of Vietnam within'
u~ meant when he said that we would'
six months to a year as the people S::e ::~n s. K.attenburg replied that In from
go to the other side' and we will be obll a~ ~OSlfg the war, they ~ill gradually
pressed general disagreement with M K ge a eave. Ambassador Nolting exactivity which motivated Kattenb r., attenburg. He said that th(> unfavorable.
while citY support of DIem is doub~rg s remarks ~as confined to the city and,
it is improper to overlook the fact
~ow, it IS not greatly so. He said that
winning the Vietnam war, working withw~iSa!: donie a trfremendous ~Ob toward
ment.
me mpe ect, annoymg govern10, Mr. Kattenburg added that th
I
was in high hopes of expelling the ~euss a~~e n~w ~~~r-the population, which
cessation ot aid; now under the heel f er, e..
announcement regarding
quickly lose heart.
'
0 Nhu s mIlItary repressIon, they would
1L Secretary Rusk commented that Ka
'
lative; that it Would be far better for us to t~~urg~ recital was largely specu.:.
\that we will not pull out of Vietnam until
on e tirm basis of two thingsrun a coup. Mr. McNamara expressed agree e twar is "!on,. and that we will not
12. Mr. Rusk then said that
men with thIS View.
within these parameters. He a:: should Present questions to Lodge which faIt
we have been winning the war ed that he believes we have good proof that
months ot 1962 and the tirst m..-; :r~la~IY the contrast between the tirst sir
dent if he had any contribution to m~~e.S 0 1968. He then asked the Vice Presi18. The Vice President stated that h
completely; that he had great reserva~:tt:it~ S~etary Rusk's conclusionS"
ticularly so because he had never r lly
se WI h respect to a coup, parstated that from both a practical an:a seen a ~nnlne alternative to Diem. Be
to pull out; that we should stop PlaYi~o-!tical v~ewpo1nt, it would be a disaster'
1ng straight to the GVN and that we sh J~ an robbers and get back to talkwar. He stated that atte~ our communica~o' :.:. again go about winning theUshed, it may be necessary for 80m
ns
them are genuinely reestaberal Taylor. He said further that he ~:: bOO talk rough to them-perhaps Gen-dor Nolting's views and agreed with M M;!n g~tly impressed with AmbasS8.14. General 'Faylor raised th
r. camara s conclUsions.
diSPOsition of the forces which :a:u:!~o:e;~ whe~her we should change theIt was ~ that there shOUld be no change ~nm~ On lastla result ~f. the crisis.
time bemg.
e ex s ng dispOSItIon tor the-
APPENDIX 14
SEPTEMBER 17, 1968.
CAP 63516-WHITE HOUSE TO LODGE
it;
::less
tr
V. H. KBULAK,
Major
Genera~
USMC,
1. Highest level meeting today has approved broad outline of an action propos.:als program designed to obtain from GVN, if poSSible, reforms and changes in
personnel necessary to maintain support of Vietnamese and U.~. opinion in war
against Viet Congo This cable reports this program and our thinking for your
comment before a tinal decision. Your comment requested soonest.
2. We see no good opportunity for action to remove present government in
immediate future; therefore, as your most recent messages suggest, we must
for the present apply such pressures as are available to secure whatever modest
improvements on the scene may be possible. We think it likely that such improvements can make a difference, at least in the short run. Such a course,
moreover, is consistent with more drastic effort as and when means become
,available, and we will be in touch on other channels on this problem.
S. We share view in your 52S that best available reinforcement to your bargaining position in this interim period is clear evidence that all U.S. assistance is
granted only on your say-so. Separate telegram discusses details of this program, but in this message we specifically authorize you to apply any controls
you think helpful for this purpose. You are authorized to delay any delivery of
supplies or transfer of funds by any agency until you are satisfied that delivery is
in U.S. interest, bearing in mind that it is not our current policy to cut off aid,
entirely. In other words, we share your view that it will be helpful for GVN to
understand that your personal approval is a necessary part of all U.S. assistance.
We think it may be particularly desirable for you to use this authority in limiting or rerouting any and all forms of assistance and support which now go to or
through Nhu or individUals like Tung who are associated with him. This authorization speci:tically includes aid actions currently held in abeyance and you
are authorized to set those in train or hold them up further in your discretion.
We leave entirely in your hands decisions on the degree of pl""ivacy or publicity
you wish to give to this process.
4. Subject to your comment and amendment our own list of possible helpful
action by government runs as follows in approximate order of importance:
A. Clear the air.-Diem should get everyone back to work and get them to foem
on winning the war. He should be broadminded and compassionate in his attitude
toward those who have, for understandable reasons, found it difficult undel
recent cIrcumstances fully to support him. A real spirit of reconciliation coul(l
work wonders on the people he leads; a punitive, harsh or autocratic attitudE
could only lead to further resistance.
,
B. Buddhists and students.-Let them out and leave them unmolested. ThiJ
more than anything else would demonstrate the return of a better day and thE
refocusing on the main job at hand, the war.
C. Press.-The press should be allowed full latitude of expression. DielI
will be criticized, but leniency and cooperation with the domestic and foreigI
press at this time would bring praise for his leadership in due course. Whilt
tendentious reporting is irritating, suppression of news leads to much man
serious trouble.
D. Secret and combat police.--Confine its role to operations against the V(
and abandon operations against non-Communist opposition groups thereby indi
cating clearly that a period of reconciliation and political stability has returned
E. Cabinet changes to inject new untainted blood, remove targets of popula]
discontent.
F. Elections.-These should be held, should be free, and should be widel~
observed.
G. Assembly.-Assembly should be convoked soon after the elections. The gOY
ernment should submit its policies to it and should receive its confidence. A.l
assembly resolution would be most useful for external image purposes.
H. Party.-Can Lao party should not be covert or semi-covert but a broal
association of supporters engaged in a common, winning cause. This could perhap
be best accomplished by [words missing] starting afresh.
I. Repeal or suitable amendment Decree 10.
J. Rehabilitation by ARVN of pagodas.
K. Establishment of Ministry of Religious Affairs.
41
40
L. LIberation of passport issuances and currency restrictions enabling all tOo
leave who wish to.
M. Acceptance of Buddhist Inquiry Mission from World Federation to report true facts of situation to world.
5. You may wish to add or substract from the above list, but need to set psychological tone and image is paramount. Diem has taken positive actions in past
of greater or less scope than those listed, but they have had little practical po_
litical effect since they were carried out in such a way as to- make them hollow
or, even if real, unbelievable (e.g., martial law already nominally lifted, Assembly elections scheduled, and puppet bronzes established).
6. Specific "reforms" are apt to have little impact without dramatic, symbolic
move which convinces Vietnamese that reforms are real. As practical matterwe share your view that this can best be achieved by some visible reduction in
iniluence of Nhus, who are symbol to disaffected of all that they dislike in GVN.
This we think would require Nhus departure from Saigon and preferably Vietnam at least for extended vacation. We recognize the strong possibility that
these and other. pressures may not produce this result, but we are convinced
that it is necessary to try.
7. In Washington, in this phase, we would plan to maintain a posture of disapproval of recent GVN actions, but we would not expect to make public our
specific requests of Diem. Your comment on public aspects of this phase is particolarly needed.
8. We note your reluctance to contInue dialogue with DIem until you have
more to say, but we continue to believe that discussions with him are at a minimum an important source of intelligence and may conceivably be a means of
exerting some persuasive effect even in his present state of mind. If you believe
that full control of U.S. aSSistance provides you with means of resuming dialogue, we hope you will do so, We ourselves can see much virtue in effort to reason even with an unreasonable man when he is on a COlliSion course. We repeat,
however, that this is a matter for your judgment.
9, Meanwhile, there is increasing concern here with strictly military aspects of
the problem, both in terms of actual progress of operations and of need to make
effective case with Congress for continued prosecution of the effort, To meet
these needs, President bas decided to send Secretary of Defense and General
Taylor to Vietnam, arriVing early next week. It will be emphasized here that it
iii; a military mission and that all pOlitical decisions are being handled through
you as President's Senior Representative.
10. We repeat that political program outlined above awaits your comment before final decision. President particularly emphasizes that it is fully open to your
critiCism and amendment. It is obviously an interim plan and further decisionsmay become necessary very soon.
APPENDIX 15
SEPTEMBER 18, 1963.
STATE 431-FROM THE PRESIDENT TO LODGE
I appreciate your prompt comment and I quite understand the problem you
see in visit of McNamara and Taylor. At the same time my need for this visit
is very great indeed, and I believe we can work out an arrangement which takes
care of your basic concerns. W1ll you let me have your comment on the following as soon as possIble:
1. We can make it clear here, and McNamara and Taylor can make it clear
in Saigon to the GVN, that this visit is not designed to bring comfort to Diem.
My own thought is that any visit MeNamara makes to Diem he will want to
speak some home truths on the military consequences of the current difficulties,
and also to make it clear that the United States Government is not open to
oriental divisive tactics.
2. We can readily set up this visit as one which you and I have decided on
together, or even one which is sent in response to your own concern about
wbming the war in the current situation. For example, we could announce that
the purpose of the mission Is to consider with you the practical ways and means
of carrying out my announced pOlicy that we w1U support activities which wlll
further the war effort in South Vietnam and avoid supporting activities which
do not. The whole cast o-f the visit will be that of military consultation with you
on the execution of the policy which you and I have determined,
3 As our last message said my own central concern in sending this mission
is to make sure that my seni~r military advisors. are equipped ~ith a ~olid onthe-spot understanding of the situation, as a baSIS both for theIr parbcipation
in our councils here, and for the Administrations ~ccounting to the COD?ress
on this critically important contest with. the C~mmull1sts. Having gr?wn up m an
Ambassador's house, I am well trained m the Importance ?f prot~cting t~~ e~ec
tiveness of the man on-the-spot, and I want to handle thIS particular v~s~t ,m a
way which contributes to and does not detract from your own respon~Iblht1es,
But in the tough weeks which I see ahead, I just do not see any s,!bSbt~t~ for
the .ammunition I will get from an on-the-spot and authoritabve milItary
ap~~~is:~ not
think I can delay announcement of the McNamara miss~on bed Saturday and I will be grateful for a further prompt comment on thIS mes~~;e so that V:e can be firmly together on the best possible handling of the announcement and of the mission itself,
APPENDIX 16
SEPTEMBER 19, 1963.
SAIGON 544-FROM LODGE TO STATE-FOR PRESIDENT ONLY
I.
co~n~!'regardS
,
, .
d' t t and should not be applied WIthout sue a coup
tied to a promlsmg coup eat'
I believe that we should pursue contact with
~~i~~~o~r:;g!~~!:~fg:~ ~~niOOkS like acting. I particularly think ~ha:dtte
idI:a o~ supporting a Vietnamese Army independent of the government s ou
e
energetically studied.
43
42
APPENDIX 18
7.1 will, of course, give instructions that programs which one can he effectively
held up should be held up and not released without my approval provided that
this can be done without serious harmful effect to the people and to the war
.effort. Technical assistance and (omission) support to communications support
programs may be one way. Tbis would be a fly-speck in- the present situation aod
would have no immediate effect, but I hope that U.S. (omission) may get Vietnamese officials into the habit of asking me to release items which are held up
and that, over a long period of time, it might create opportunities for us to get
little things done.
8. But it is not even within the realm of possibility that such a techniqoe could
lead them to do anything which causes loss of face or weakening of their political
.organization. In fact, to threaten them with suppression of aid might well defeat
our purposes and might make a bad situation very much worse,
9, There should in any event be no publicity whatever about this procedure,
It it is possible (omission) a program, I intend to (omission),
10. As regards your paragraph 6 and "dramatic symbolic moves," I really do
not think they could understand this even if Thao wanted to, although I have
talked about it to Diem, and to Nhu last night (See my 541), They have scant
comprehension of what it is to appeal to public opinion al!! they have really no
interest in any other opinion than their own, I ,have repeatedly brought up the
question of Nhu's departure and have ,stressed that if he would just stay away
until after Christmas, it might help get the Appropriation Bill through, This
seems like a small thing to us but to them it seems tremendous as they.are quite
sure that the Army would take over if he even stepped out of the country.
11. Your paragraph 8. I have, of course, no objection to seeing Diem at any
time that it would be helpful. But I would rather let him sweat for awhile and
not go to see him unless I have something really new to bring up. I would much
prefer to wait until I find some part of the AID program to hold up in which he
Is interested and then have him ask me to come and .see him. For example, last
night's dinner wbich I suspect Nbu of stimulating is infinitely better than for me
to take the initiative for an appointment and to call at the office. Perhaps my
silence had something to do with it.
APPENDIX 17
SEPTEMBER 21, 1968.
MEMORANDUM FOB THE SECBETA,BY OF DEFENSE
It may be useful to put on paper our understanding of the purpose of your visit
to South Vietnam. I am asking you to go because of my desire to have the best
possible on-the-spot appraisal of the military and paramilitary effort to defeat
the Viet Congo The program developed after General Taylor's mission and carried forward under your close supervision has brought heartening results, at
least until recently. The events in South Vietnam since May have now raised
serious questions both about the present prospects for success against the Viet
Cong and still more about the future effectiveness of this effort unless there can
be important political improvement in the country. It is in this context that I
now need- your appraisal of the situation, If the prognosis in your judgment is
not hopeful, I would like your views on what action must be taken by the South
Vietnamese Government and what steps our Government should take to lead the
Vietnamese to that action. , ..
Ambassador Lodge has joined heartily in supporting this mission and I will
rely on you both for the closest exchange of views. It is obvious that the overall
political situation and the military and paramilitary etfort are closely interconnected in all sorts of ways, and i. executing your responsibility for appraisal of
the military and paramilitary problem I expect that you will consult fully with
Ambassador Lodge on related political and social questions, I will also expect
you to examine with Ambassador Lodge ways and means of fashioning all forms
of our assistance to South Vietnam so that it will support our foreign policy
objectives more preeisely.
I am providing you separately with a letter from me to President Diem which
Ambassador Lodge and you should discuss and which the Ambassador should
deliver on the occasion of a call on President Diem if after discussion and reference to me I conclude that such a letter is desirable.
In my judgment the question of the progress of the contest in South Vietnam
is of the first importance and in executing this mission you should take as much
time as is necessary for a thorough examination both in Saigon and in the field.
JOHN
F, KENNEDY.
SEPTEMBER
22, 1963.
;:\0
APPENDIX 19
SEPTEMBER
29, 1963.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
45
44
safer for peopl~ to vote than in past years, and he was touched at the interest
that even the simplest peasants in exercising their Bufrrage and participating
in the democratic process. In spite of the improved security situation at least
two people were killed by VO because they voted, and he showed this loss
deeply and personally. The discussion groups in the strategic hamlets had
further increased people's interest in government and voting. (Ambassador's
comment: This contrasts with well-founded observations. The truck loads of
soldiers were carted around in trucks so that they could vote several times in
one day,) ... Diem noted that while the total number of va bad declined
in the past year, the number of relatively large units, companies and battalions
engaged had risen. He explained this was because of the success of the strategic
hamlets' program. In the past the VC could get what they wanted from the
village-food and recruits-with a mere handful of men. Now they were in-creasingly forced to mount a company scale attack to get into the village.
-Furthermore, since the whole rural environment had become much more
actively hostile to the VC, they were forced to group in larger units to survive.
These larger units, of course, offered better targets to the government forces.
The fact-that there was a greater use of large units by the VC is one more indication of how well the war was going for the government. It was one more indication that the VC found themselves more and more in a position of being like
a foreign expeditionary corps rather than as a force that could exist and move
in the population like a fish in the sea. . . .
Secretary McNamara said he was concerned over a number of things: that
while the progress of the war was reasonably satisfactory, he was concerned
over a number of things. There was the political unrest in Saigon and the evident
inability of the government to provide itself with a broad political base. There
was the disturbing probability that the -war eft'ort would then be damaged by
the government's pollttcal deficiencies and the attendant loss ot. popularity. The
Tecent wave of repressions have alarmed pubUc opinion both in Vietnam and
in the United States. . . . The Secretary warned Diem that public opinion in
the U.S. seriously questioned the wisdom or necessity of the U.S. government's
aiding a government that was so unpopular at home, and it seemed increasingly
unlikely to forge the kind of national union or purpose that could bring the war
to an early and victorious conclusion.
(Comment: Diem otrered absolutely no assurances that he would take any
steps in responses to the representations made to American visitors. In t.act, he
said nothing to indicate or acknowledge that he had received even friendly
advice. ms manner was one of at least outward serenity and of a man who had
patiently explained a great deal and who hoped he had thus corrected a number
of misapprehensions.)
APPENDIX 20
THm SEOBETABY OF DEFENSE, W ASHINGTQ-N,
D.C.
OOTOBEB 2, 1968.
A. OoncZu8ion8
1 The m111tary campaign bas made great progress and continues to progress.
n
2' There are sedous political tensions in Saigon (and perhaps elsewhefe
So~th Vietnam) where the Diem-Nhu government is becoming ncreas ng y
. becomin hostile to the government, they are more hostile to .the Viet ong
WIll continue to
perform their military duties.
ld ch
th
esent
. 5 Further repressive actions by Diem and Nhu cou
ange
e pr
~:n to the ggovernment and at least for the near future they
_~~v~~~~:~lmi~icf~!~:~~~:O~~~~~~~:~~~u~{ei~~a;o :~r;:yge:~::~~
mitigate the political crisis.
t d b the U S will move Diem and Nhu
6 It Is not clear that pressures exer e
y
. .
Btl s
f~~~~O::lm~~~J~t
~view
with Diem the military changes nec(eIssaIr y tOdc~~i
.
..
.
in the Northern and Central areas , I ,an
_plete th)e m~ltar~ ~~~fi~~nd in the Delta (IV Corps) by the end of 1965. This
Corps by e en
,
f
ch changes as'
re::e~ ~~~~~rc~:;lt~~ :riifa~e: e~~hs~iS and strength to the Dethltat(IV11 Corp~~t
.
i th
Hitary tempo in all corps areas, so a a com
._,tr:~;na:1~e~:: ~eldea : average of 20 days out ot 80 and static missions are
...en:'~mphasis on "clear and hold operations" instead ot. terrain sweeps which
.have little permanent falue.
so
.,Z::
that time.
Ith th
gram to train progressively Vietnamese to takE
S. In accordance w
e pro
De artment should announce in the ver,
.over military functions, the Det~:: to ~ithdraw 1,000 U.S. m111tary personnel
.near future presently prepat~ Phould be explained in low key as an initial steI
by the end of 1968. Thistac onI ~e U S personnel with trained Vietnamese with
_In a long-term program 0 rep a
..
.out impairment of the WIar effor:aken to impress upon Diem our disapproval 0:
b
4. The following act ons e
.his political progra~ ld ommitment of funds in the commodity import pro
G. Continue to WI
0
c
t The significance of the withholding 0
gram, but avo~d ~ t~or~:J4a~~~~:~;mbe:dget should be brought home to the ~
.commitments or. e .
I contacts between USOM and MACV and
military officers 10 workmg levewe have stated $95 million may be used by th
.Joint General Stat!; up to now or the commodity import program for 19B<:
Vietnamese as a plann~g leve\:at this is uncertain both because of lack of fins
Henceforth we could ma e c ea~ ess and because of executive policy.
appropriation action by th~Co ':dlng AID loans for the Saigon-Cholon Watel
t pe ~~r Project. We should state clearly that we aI
b. Suspend approEval1 trl
works aud Saigon , ec c 0
.dolng so as a matter of policy.
47
46
c. Advise Diem that MAP and CIA support for designa ted units, now
under
Colonel Tung's control (mostly held in or near the Saigon
area for politica l
reasons ) will be cut ott unless these units are promptl y assigned
to the full a u-
thority of the Joint General 8m:!! and transfer red to the field.
d. Maintai n the present purely "correc t" relation with the top
GVN. and
specifically between the Ambass ador and Diem. Contacts between
General Harkin s
and Diem and Defense Secreta ry Thuan on military matters should
not, however,
be suspend ed, as this re-mains an importa nt channel of adviee.
sbould also seek to maintai n contact s where these are neededUSOM and USIA
to push forward
program s in sUPPQrt at the eft'ort in the field, whUe taking care not
to cut across
the basic picture of U.S. disappr oval and uncerta inty of U.S.
and intentio ns. We
should work with the Diem governm ent but not support iP
As we pursue these courses of action, the situatio n must
be closely watched
to see what,stepS! Diem is taking to reduce repressi ve practice
the effeetive ness of the military effort. We should set no fixed s and to improve
ognlze that we would hAve to decide in 2-4 months whethe r criteria, but re<'drastic action or try to carryon with Diem even If he had not to move to more
taken signific ant
stel"<
5. At this time, no initiativ e should be taken to encoura ge actively
a change
in governm ent. Our policy should be to seek urgently to identify
and build con
tacts with an alternat ive leadersh ip if and when it appeanl
.
6. The followin g stateme nt be approve d as current U.S. policy
toward South
Vietnam and constitu te the substan ce of the governm ent position
to be present ed
both in Oongreuioll8.1 testimo ny and In publlc stateme nts.
a. The security of South Vietnam remains vital
States Mecurity.
For this reasOBt we ..adhere to the overridi ng oDjectivetoof United
denying this country to
Commu nism and of suppres sing the Viet Oong Insurgen cy as promptl
y as possible .
(By suppr9s llng the lnsurgen ey we mean reduein g it to proport
by the nationa l aecurlty forces ot the GVN, unasBls ted by the ions manage able
mllftary forceR.) 'We believe the TJ.S. part of the task can be presenc e of U.S.
end of 1965, the termina l. date which we are taking as the timecomplet ed by the
objectiv e of our
('ounter insurgen oy program s.
b. The mllftary program in Vietnam has made progres
s and is sound In
princinJe.
. o. The poUtlea l situatio n In Vietnam remains deeply serious.
It has not yet
Flignificantly aft:'ected the mU1tary effort, but could do M at
some time in the
futUre. If the result Is a GVN ine1feetive in the conduct of the
war, the U.S. wHI
rE'view itA attitude toward Ruoport for the governm ent. Althoug
('oncerned by repressi ve practice s, effective perform ance In theh we are deeplv
war should be the determi ning factor in our relation s with the GVN.eonduct of the
d. The U.S. haR express ed its disappr oval of certain
of the Dlem.N hu
re-glme and will do so again if required . Our poBcy is toactions
Reek
abandon ment of repressi on because of its eft'ect on the popular to bring about the
will to resist. Our
meRns consist of express ions of disappro val and the w:lthholdjn~
of support from
GVN activitie s that are not clearlY contribu ting to the war effort.
We will use
these means as required to assure an effectiv e mfUtary program .
II.
A. The standard"
Mn.ITA~Y
B. Overall progress
With allowan ce for all uncerta inties, it is our firm conclusi
military program has made great progres s in the last year on that the GVN
that this progres s has continu ed at a fairly steady rate In the and a half, and
even through the period of greates t pOlitical unrest in Saigon. past six months
The tactl~ and
techniqu es employe d by the Vietnam ese under U.S. monitor
ship are sound and
give promise of ultimate Victory.
Specifically, progres s is most clear in the norther n areas (I
and II Corps) ;
especia lly notewo rthy work has been done in key coastal provinc
strength once threaten ed to cut the country in half but has now es where VO
tially reduced . In the central area and the highlan ds (III Corps),been substan progres s has
been steady though slower, and the situatio n remains difficult
in the provinc es
to the west and north of Saigon itself.
Throug hout the norther n twothlr ds of the country the strategi[Materi al Missing ]
c hamlet program
has matured effective ly and freedom of rural moveme nt
has grown steadily .
The Delta remains the toughes t area of all, and now requires
in both GVN and U.S. efforts. Approx imately 40% of the people top priority
live there;
the area is rich and has traditio nally resisted central authori
of Viet Cong strengt h-over one third of the "haTd core" ty; it Is the center
are found there;
and the maritim e nature of the terrain renders it much the most
difficult region
to pacify.
A first step has just been taken by the move of a third division
to the Delta,
but further major actions are needed. They include priority
GVN in the use of its resource s, the consolid ation rather than decision s by the
strategi c hamlets in many areas, the elimina tion of many fixedfurther spread of
outposts , better
hamlet defense s and more trained hamlet militia. Regular army
units should be
reserved for use in mobile actions and for clear and hold operatio
ns in support
of the strategi c hamlet program . Though there are unresolved.
problem s In several key provinc es close to Saigon, as well as in the 'Souther
nmost parts where
the VO are strongly esta'bUshed, it Is clear that the Delta situatio
improve d over the past year, even with the limited resource n has general ly
s allocate d to it.
Despite recent evidenc es or greater VO eft'ort and better 'Weapon
s, the Delta
campaig n can continu e to go forward t:e the essentia
l priority is assigned to
Delta requirem ents.
O. MiUtary indicato r,
toughne ss
()'1 tHeaBtI::r
at the fight.
June
Number of government initiated:
Small operations ___________ . _______________ .
large operations __ ________________________
Vietcoll'l killed ________ . ____ ._ . ________________
GVN killed ___________ ._. ___ .. ____ ___
~~~:ae::sn~~~:~red===:=::::=::
+ ___ . _ . _
::::::::::
:=::::
Vietcong military defectors ___ . __ ....
__ __ __ _.
Vietconl-inltilted incidents aU types_ _ _ :
Vietconl attacks ___ _______of ___
. ___ __ . _ _.
Estimated Vietcong strength:
851
125
1,896
413
590
390
420
1,310
410
2\. 000
85, 000
Jury
781
163
1,918
521
780
375
310
1,3110
410
21. 000
82.000
9{)6
1,685
2,0;14
166
41n
720
''"
220
1, 375
385
21. noo
76, 000
141
525
802
400
519
..'
490
71
2,000
431
390
450
90
1.675
1. ""
410
21.000
70,000
22,onn
98,000
48
40
eff.:Cl
1:
. m
Acknow ledging the progres s achieve d to ~te, there still remains the question of when the final military v' t
.attaine d. If, by victory, we mean
IC ory can
the reductio n of the insu en
~ore than sporadi c banditry
httl~
ng
S~methi
c;t:~
~e
in outlying districts , it is
commanders:
consulte d that SUCCess rna be acb 0 the vast maJont y of miUtary
and III Corps area by the
end of CY 1964. Victory fn the l~~eg in the I, II
t-: ke ]on?er~t le~st wen into
1~5. These estimat es necessa rily assumrr: t~~l
e poUbca l SItUation does not
a
SIgnificantly impede the e:ffort
SITUATION AND TRENDS
.
The current economic situatio n in South Vi etn
stable cam is, I? t~ main, ~atisfactory.
The inu:rna l Price level is reasona bly
. ommerc ml Illvento nes are high
and natIOnal bank reserves of fo .
mately $160
million ~hich equals approximate~I~ ~~c~ge stand at apprOxi
months. Imports at CUrrent rate
($240 mIllion imports less $75 to $80 'lJ'
etxhPorts). The effective rate of exchange of the piastre to the dollar is m~.;~.n
e range of reasona ble economic
1 III
value.
m.
ECONOM IC
i,
I
I
was optimist ic beTrends are difficult to discuss but the bUsiness commun ityr year
are projecte d
fore the present crises. Rice exports for the current calendayear.
Total exports
last
at approxi mately $80 million against $8.75 million last
year. Banking circles
are anticipa ted at $70 million as against $55 million
which represe nts
point to one bearish factor in the export picture. Rubber,
n of declinin g world marmore than half in value of all exports, faces a situations
in the next year.
ket prices and some plantati ons may curtail operatio icient
cotton textiles
On the domesti c side South Vietnam is almost self-suffcement inrequirem ents by
and is on its way to satisfyi ng its own fertilize r and
noted a healthy
1966. At the beginni ng of the current year banking circles
reflects, in their judgincrease in local investm ents in small enterpri ses which
for recent years.
ment an increase of confidence in the future that is unusualappear
reasona bly
The prospec ts for next year, under normal circums tances,
ure, exports of
good. If the Governm ent encoura ges diversif ication in ofagricult
rice should offset thesuch prOducts togethe r with the increasi ng availab ility
decline in foreign exchang e earning s from rubber.
revenue s areThe projecte d GVN budget for CY 1964 totals P27 billion: tax
P16 billion. Exestimat ed at I'll billion, leaving an internal budget deficit ofg also use of forternal resource s (resulti ng from U.S. operatio ns but requirin
an addition al P9.5 billion,.
eign exchang e reserves ) are estimat ed to generat emight
be somewh at reduced
leaving a P6.S billion estimat ed deficit. This deficit
borrowi ngs from the'
deficit,
ng
remaini
the
meet
To
s.
revenue
tax
al
addition
by
in the money
increase
g
resultin
a
with
required
be
still
would
Bank
l
Nationa
supply.
the last nine months,
The money supply has been increasi ng rather sharply in the
recent arrival of"
by
ed
dampen
been
has
e11'ect
nary
inflatio
the
althoug h
has been acThis
.
program
import
ity
commod
USOM's
under
ts
large shipmen
lly by
prinCipa
about
brought
g
licensin
import
in
increase
an
by
compan ied
licensing
general
open
an
of
year
this
of
g
beginnin
the
at
n
the GVN's adoptio
ed'
fabricat
iles,
automob
trucks,
as
such
goods
ctured
manufa
system for certain
the open gensteel and some industri al raw materia ls. The banks estimat e that
nanced imeral licensin g system will result in a $10 million increase in GVN-fL
ports In CY 1063.
the prospec ts for
In short, while the general economic Situatio n is good,
do not appear-holding the line on inflation and the balance of paymen tssevere restrain ts;.
bright for CY 1964 unless the GVN can be persuad ed to impose
n
EfJect of the Politica l Ori81.8 on- the Econom ic Situatio
SITUATION
AND TRENDS
rily less exAlthoug h our observa tions of the poUtical situatio n were necessa
the existthat
confirm
to
ample
were
they
picture,
military
the
of
tensive than
with the
y
carefull
n
situatio
the
d
reviewe
We
tension.
high
of
one
is
1n2" situatio n
51
50
relevan t U.S. officials and w.ere also impress ed by frank intervie
ws with GVN
.officials and with third country represen tatives.
In essence, disconte nt With the Diem/N hn regime, which had
spread just below the surface during recent years, has now become been widea seething
problem. The Buddhi st and student crises have precipit
these disconte nts
and given them specific issues. But the problem goes deeplyated
into
-objectives, and method s of operatio n of Diem and Nhu over a the persona lities,
period.
The evidenc e appears overwhe lming that Diem and Nhu long
operate in close
-collaboration, and that each needs the other. They undoub
regard them
selves as carrying out a social and politica l revoluti on fortedly
the good of their
.country. using all means- includi ng the strategi c hamlet
progra m-to build
up a secure base of politica l strength in the rural areas.
At the same time, the positive and educativ e sides of their actions,
marily at the country side, but with extensiv e country wide educatio aimed prinal efforts as
well, have been increasi ngly matched by negativ e and
repressi ve measure s of
-control against the urban populati on. The urban elite or "Establ
ishmen t"-whic h
includes lAtellectuals, civilian officials at all levels, and a high proport
ion of military o:tHcers--has never been trusted by Diem and Nhu.
sensitiv e to
signs of -opposi tion-wi th some justifica tion from events Always
in 1954---55 and the
attempt ed coups of 1960 and 1962-th e regime has turned increasi
ngly to police
methods , particul arly secret arrests, that have 'almost all the
bad effects of outright totalitar ianism even though a good deal of freedom to criticize
still remains .
Concurr ently, the palace has always manipu lated
controll ed the government structur e to ensure its own control. The degreeand
to which centrali zed control and interven tion have been carried, and the
quixotic nature of its
use, have had a steadily growing adverse etrect on often
efficienc and morale.
Both of these adverse charact eristics of the regime, andy the
them, focus more and more on Nhu. Not merely is he the hatchetresentm ent of
man, -but his
stateme nts on "personalism'~ and his building up with
Madame
persona l apparat us have smacked more and more of outrigh t Nhu of a wide
A further disturbi ng feature of Nhu is his flirtatio n with the ideatotalitar ianism.
of negotia ting
with North Vietnam, -whether or not he is serious in this at present.
This deeply
-disturbs respons ible Vietnam ese and, more basicallY, suggest
s a possible basic
incompa tibility with U.S. objectives.
Nhu's role and scope of action haVe increase d, and he may
well have the
designs imputed to him of succeed ing his brother in due
course. Diem is still
quite a long way from being a figurehead, and his persona
l prestige in the
country has survived remarka bly well. But Diem does
heavily on Nhu,
their central ideas are very close if not identica l, and it depend
would be remarka ble if
Diem dropped Nhu from a comman ding position .
Until the Buddhi st and student crises, it was probabl y true that
the alienati on
between Diem and the elite was more a matter of basicall
diverge nt views
of the right social structur e and of Diem and Nhu's handlin g ofyindividu
governm ent than it was a matter of reaction to repressi ons. Howeve als in the
r, the crises
nave now brought the repressi ons so directly into the lives of
many of the elite
that more orderly methods , which might previou sly have kept the
needed amount of talent, now probabl y cannot do so without loyalty of the
a convincing
degree of restorat ion of persona l security . Yet both
more
methods and
a restorat ion of persona l security cut diametr ically across theorderly
grain of Diem's and
especial ly Nhu's view of what is necessa ry to maintai n their
power and move
toward their idea of social revoluti on.
Thus, the disconte nt of the elite-re 1lected chiefly in the progres
respons ible men-ha s now reached the point where it is uncerta sive loss of
can keep or enlist talent to run the war. The loss of such men in that Diem
as Mau and
"Tuyen, and the deeply disturbe d attitude of such a cruical
the stronge st evidences of the seriousn ess of the situatio n. figure as Thuan, are
This is not to_ discoun t groups other than the eUte.
r, the Buddhi sts
-and student s cannot in themselves, either threaten the Howeve
regime or do more than
focus isstres-- although " of course they seriousl y damage
the regime's standin g
'in the U.S. and elsewhe re, with uninhib ited press reaction
further to the persecu tion complex that drives Diem and Nhus that contribu te
into repressi on.
The busines s commun ity is a passive factor only. Urban
i~ simply trying
-to hold its position, being anti-reg ime but not to the poIntlabor
of being an independent source of trouble. The rural peasant ry appear little affected
even by the
Buddhi st issue. If these groups can be kept even in an acquies
cent state the war
--could go forward .
v.
52
53
rate of progress would surely have a serious effect on U.S. popular support for
ro. u.s.
u.s. Repre.""lallv68
U.S. personnel in Saigon m1gh~ adopt an attitude of coolness toward their
A. Ooll4uol Of
Together, USOM's Commodity Import Program (eIP) and the prJ 480 program
account tor between 60 and 70 pereent of imports into Vietnam. The commitment of funds under the OIP has already been suspended. CIP deliveries result
in the generation of piastres, most of which go to the support of the defense
4rodget. It is estimated that CIP pipelines will remain relatively large for some
five or six months, and within this period there would not be a serious material
-effect Even within this period, however, the flow of piastres to support the
<lefense budget will gradually begin to decline and the GVN will be forced to
draw down its foreign exchange reserves or curtail its military ~diture8.
Within the domestie economy the existing large pipelines would mean that
there would be no material reason for inflation to begin in the short term period.
However, the psychological effect of growing realization that the CIP program
has been suspended might 'be substantial in 2-4 months. Saigon has a large num:ber of speculative traders, and although there i8 considerable police ettort to control prices, this might not be able to contaln.a general tren<l ot speculation and
boarding. Once in:fl.atlon did develop, it could have a serious effect on the GVN
budget and the conduct of the war.
Apart from CIP two major AID projects are up for ftp.sl approval-the SaigonCholon Waterworks ($9 million) and the Saigon Electric Power Project ($4
million). Suspension of these projects would be a possible means of demonstrating to Congress ,and the world that we disapprove of GVN policies and are not
providing additional aid not directly essential to the war etrort.
O. P-'Ill.." ....a 01"... a88l8lance
(1) USOM assistance to the Combat Police and USOM and USIS assIstance
to the DIrector General of Information and the ARVN PsyWar Program could
be suspended. These projects irivolve a relatively small amount of local currency
but their suspension, particularly in the case of USIS, might adversely atf'ect
programs which the U.S. wishes to see progress.
(2) However, there would be merit in a gesture aimed at Colonel Tung, the
Special Forces Commander, whose forces in or near Saigon played a conspicuous part, in the pagoda affair and are a continuing support for ,Diem.
Colonel Tung commands a mixed complex of forces, some of which are supported by MAP and others presently through CIA. All of those now in or
near Saigon were trained either for combat missions or for specIal operations
into North Vietnam and Laos. Purely on grounds of their not being used for
theIr proper missions, the U.S. could inform Diem that we would cut off MAP
and CIA support unless they were placed directly under Join"t General Staff and
were committed to field operations.
The :practical effect of the cut-oft' would probably be small. The equipment
cannot be taken out of the hands of the units, and the pay provided to some units
could be made up from the GVN budget. Psychologically, however, the significance of the gesture might be greater. At the least it would remove one target of
press criticism of the U.S., and would probably also be welcomed by the hIgh
military officers in Vietnam. Rnd certainly by the disaffected groups in Saigon.
At the same time, supnort should continue, but through General Harkins rather
than "cIA, for border surveillance and other simllar field operations that are
contributing to the war effort.
We h!"~'1>, weighed this cnt-otT action carefully. It runs,s risk that Colonel Tung
would refuse to carry out externAl operations against the Lao corridor and North
Vietnam. It might also limit CIA's access to the mmtary. However, U.S. 11aison
with bigll milltary officers could probably be fully maintained through the U.S.
I!
,
I
Coupled with all the above there Is the implicit leverage embodied in our
constantly making it plain to Diem and others that the long term continuation
of military aid is conditioned upon the Vietnamese Government demonstrating
a satisfactory level of progress toward defeat of the insurgency.
F. ConcZusions
A program of limited pressures, such as the CIP suspension, will not have
large material effects on the GVN or the war 'tfort, at leAl'4t for 2-4 months.
The psychological effects <could be greater, and there is, some evidence that
the suspension is already causing concern to Diem. However, the etrect of preasures that can be carried out over an extended period without detriment to the
war effort is probably limited with respect to the possibility of Diem making
necessary changes.
We have not analyzed with care what the etfect might be of a far more intensive level of pressure such as 'Cessation of MAP deliveries or long continued
suspension of the commodity import program. If the Diem government should
fail to make major improvements, serious consideration would have to be given
to this possible course of action, but we believe its effect on the war etTort would
be so serious-in psychologIcal if not in immediate material terms-that it
Should not be unuertaken at the present time.
VIII. COUP POSSIBILITIES
55
54
that these actions may reduce effiei
It::~~~rs~~~~hJbftl~:fS~~:~:::::V:;li~:~~t~f:~~l~~~~~~~~di~~~iDespite tb
e rmy and the EstabCOuld, quicklyese l}nfavorable prosPects for action in
irrationaL atta~~l~lu:~~a~ the. de~tb of Diem Or ~:
:~r;~Tgfbrew factors
J:stWOUld& ~l a:~~~~
~H:ri:~~t~ff~~~~~!~:;~2~;f~~~~:~i~~g *~:!~lr~~
~~~;!~~:;:;:eC:S?:n
s:~~:pSi~n
by ~u, ~~~~r~~~~n~~~~~~~~~le results of grow~
.
'
p ness and unrest.
even magnify the
..ffP
th~nU.S. has a
f:
St:m3
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.
APPENDIX 21
OCTOBER 5, 1963.
TO: LODGE-VIA CAS CHANNEL, CAP 63560
56
57
order to provide plausibility to denial suggest you and no one else in Embassy
Is8ue these instructions orally to Acting Station Chief and hold him responsible
to you aloDe tor making appropriate contacts and reporting to you alone.
AU reports to Washington on this subject should be on this channel.
his reply. Gen. Minh once again indicated his understanding and stated that he
would arrange to contact Conein in the near future aDd hoped that Conein would
be able to meet with him and give the assurance outlined above.
OOTOBER 5, 1963.
APPENDIX 22
OOTOBEB 5, 1963.
TO STATE FROM LODGE--CAS 1446
1. Lt. Col. Conein met with Gen. Duong Van Minh at Gen. Minh's Head~
quarters on Le Van Duyet for one hour and ten minutes morning of 5 Oct. 63.
This meeting was at the lnitiative ot Qen. Minh and has been specifically cleared
1n advance by Ambassador Lodge. No other persons were present. The converBaa
tlon was conducted in French.
2. Gen. Minh stated that be must know American Government's position with
respect; to a change in the Government of Vietnam within the very near future.
Gen. Minh added the Generals were aware of the situation is deteriorating
rapidly and that action to change the Government must be taken or the war will
be lost to the Viet Cong because the Government no longer has the support of
the ~p1~. Gen. Minh identified among the other Generals participating with
him m thIS plan:
Maj. Gen. Tran Van Don; Brig. Gen. Tran Thien Khiem' and Maj. Gen.
Tran Van Kim.
'
S. Gen. Minh made it clear that he did not expect any specific American support for an e1fort on the part of himself and his colleagues to change the Government but he stated he does need American assurances that the USG wUl
not attempt to thwart this plan.
4. Gen. Minh also stated that he himself has no pOlitical ambitions nor do any
ot the other General Omcers except perhaps, he said laughingly, Gen. Ton That
Dinh. OeD. Minh insisted that his only purpose is to win the war. He added
emphatically that to do this continuation of American Military and Economic
Aid at the present level (He said one and one haIt mUlion dollars per day) is
necessary.
5. Gen. Minh outlined three possible plans for the accomplishment of the
change of Government:
a. Assassination of Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can keeping President Diem
in Office. Gen. Minh said this was the easiest plan to accomplish
b. The encirclement ot Saigon by various m1l1tary units particularly the unit at
Ben Cat. (Comment: Fifth DiviSion elements commanded by Gen. Dinh).
c. Direct confrontation between military units involved in the coup and loyalist
mUitary units in Saigon. In effect, dividing the city of Balgon into sectors and
cleaning it out pocket by pocket. Gen. Minh claims under the circumstances Diem
and Nhu could count on the loyalty of 5,500 troops within the city of Saigon.
6. Conein replied to Gen. Minh that he could not answer specific questions as to
USG non-Interference nor could he give any advice with respect to tactical planning. He added that he could not advise concerning the best of the three plans
7. Gen. Minh went on to explain that the most dangerous men in South Viet:
Nam are Ngo Dinh Kau, Nao Dinh Oan and Ngo Trong Bieu, Minh stated that
Bieu was formerly a communist and still has Communist sympathies. When Col.
Conein remarked that he had considered 001. Tung as one of the more dangerous
individuals, Gen. Minh stated "if I get rid of Nhu, Can and Bieu Col. Tung will
be OD his knees before me."
'
8. Gen. Minh also stated that he was Worried as to the role of Gen. Tran Thien
Khiem since Khiem may have played a double role in August. Gen. Minh asked
that copies of the documents previously passed to Gen. Khiem (plan of Camp
Long Thanh and munitions inventory at that camp) be passed to Gen. Minh personally for comparison with papers passed by Khiem to Minh purportedly from
OAS.
9. Minh further stated that one of the reasons they are having to act quickly
was the fact that many regimental, battalion and company commanders are
working on coup plans of their own which could be abortive and a <Ica tastrophe".
10. Minh appeared. to understand Conein's position of being unable to comment
at the present moment but asked that Oonem again meet with. Gen. Minh to discuss the specUlc plan ot operations which Gen. Minh hopes to put into action. No
specific date was given for this next meeting. Coneln was again noncommittal in
SAIGON CAS 34026, TO STATE FROM LODGE (REF: CAS SAIGON 1445) EYES ONLY FO&:
SECRETARY RUSX FROM LODGE
Reference Big Minh-Conein meeting (Cas Saigon 1445). 'Vhile ~either G~eral
Harkins nor I have great faith in Big Minh, we need instructions on his approach. My recommendation, in which General Harkins concurs, is that Conein
when ne::,:t approached by Minh shoUld:
1. Assure him that U.S. will not attempt to thwart his plans.
2. Offer to review his plans, other than assassination plans.
3. Assure Minh that U.S. aid will be continued to Vietnam under Government
which gives promise of gaining support of people and winning the war against
the Communists. Point out that it is our view that this is most likely to be the
cuse if Government includes good proportion of well qualified civilian leaders
in key positions. (Conein should press Minh for details his thinking Re composition future Government). I suggest the above be discussed with Secretary
McNamara and General Taylor who contacted Minh in recent visit.
APPENDIX 23
FROM
OCTOBER
6, 1963.
59
58
'Copy fUrnished:
OCTOB~
m SfJ'rtth-
22, 1963.
Trends.
This report reviews the more significant statistics on the Communist insur-gency in South Vietnam as indicators of trends in the military situation since
July 1963.
ABSTRACT
Statistics, in general, are only partial and not entirely satisfactory indicators
of progress in the total counterinsurgency eitort in South Vietnam.1 First, some
statistics are incomplete, as for example, those relating to Viet Cong attacks
against strategic hamlets and desertions within the South Vietnamese military
and security services. Second, all statistics are acquired largely if not entirely
from oflicial South Vietnamese sources. As 'such, their validity must, to some
degree at least: remain questionable, even though the efforts of the United States
military and CIvilian advisers have improved the quality of this data during the
past year or [words missing]
Third there Bre several other important indicators which are extremely dim
cult it 'not impossibie to handle statistically. These include: morale and efficien'cy within the bureaucracy And the armed services, the degree of locally acquired or volunteered intelligence, popular attitudes toward the Viet Cong and
the government, and the status and impact of the government's political, social,
and economic activities in support of the strategic hamlet program. Nonetheless,
statistics touch on some significant aspects of the military situation and provide
a guide at least to trends In the fighting.
1 The statistics used In this paper were complied by the Defense Intelligence A~ncy
(DIA) and by the Office of the Special Ailsistant for Counterinsurgency and Special
Activities (SACSA) tn the Department of Defense and are based on field reports sub
mitted by tke Military Assistance Command VIetnam (l\1ACV).
Statistics show that the Viet Cong have accelerated their military and subversive ettort since July 1963. From January 1962 until July 1963, the total number of Viet Cong armed attacks, as well as all other incidents (sabotage, terrorism, an'd propaganda), dropped consistently. However, since July of this year,
total incidents and armed. attacks have increased appreciably. If the present
trend continues through the end of this year, total incidents will exceed by more
than 10% the level for the period July-December 1962. Large Viet Cong attacks
(company-size or larger) have also increased appreciably since July of this
year, and, if the trend continues, could exceed by almost 30% the level for JulyDecember 1962.
In addition, the Viet Cong during the last half of 1963 have shown increased
daring, planning, and coordination in their attacks. This has been evIdenced by
an attack against a United States helicopter base, and by simultaneous actions
against two or more strategic hamlets and even against two district capitals.
Until this period, towns had not been attacked since September 1961, when the
capital of Phuoc Thanh province was raided by a large Viet Cong force.
Oasualtie8
Although the" Viet Cong have incurred relatively heavy losses during some of
their more daring recent attacks, their overall casualties since July of this year
have not been correspondingly high. If the accelerated Viet Cong effort and
losses su:ffered are maintained at present levelS during the rest of this year,
casualties will remain about 10% below the level in July-December 1962, the
peak period in Viet Cong casualties last year.
In contrast, casualties among the South Vietnamese military and security
forces since July of this year are increasing and, at the present rate, could exceed by about 20% the level for the preceding six-month period. This vrould
raise the total casualties for 1963 by some 30% above the 1961 and 1962 levels.
Indeed, the ratio of Viet Cong to South Vietnamese forces killed and captured
dropped trom :Ove-to-one tor the last half of 1962 to three-to-one for the period
July~September 18, 1968. This ratio would be still less favorable to the government if casualties among such paramilitary groups as the village militia and
MontagnOlrd scouts were taken into account. Casualty statistics on the groupij
are not complete and are not shown in this report. During the period AugustSeptember 18, 1963, however, their casualties exceeded 500 as compared with
the combined total of more than 2,300 casualties among the Army, Civil Guard,
and Self Defense Corps for the same period.
Weapon8 losses
During 1962, weapons losses am"ong both the Viet Cong and government forces
increased progressively, although government losses were somewhat greater than
those of the Viet Congo The increase continued during January-April 1968, but
losses on both sides were about even. However, during May-August, Viet Cong
weapons losses dropped by more than 10%, while losses among government forces
increased by about 15%. If the trend noted during the last three weeks of September should continue throughout the year, the Viet Cong will lose almost 70%
fewer weapons than the government. Moreover. a large number of the Viet Cong
weapons lost are of the home-made variety while the great bulk of government
weapons losses are of standard or modern-type pieces.
60
61
2. CASUALTIES
1962
10,481
3,024
156
13, 755
6,036
GVN
c.hange)
8,595
2,441
63
17,338
6,846
(-18)
(-19)
(-40)
(+26)
<+13)
percent of
change)
6,847
1,941
72
13,944
8,056
(-20)
(-20)
<+14)
(-20)
<+18)
July 1-
Sept. 18,
1963!
MayAugust
1962
September-De- Januarycamber
April
1962
1963
period
3,777
1. 067
34
""
46
47
6,425
4,220
52
MayThrough
August Sept. 18, 1963
1963 (and percent of
(and percent
previous
of change)
period)
- - - - 1,526
---------------------5_ Vietcong weapons losses ____ . ______ _ - -1,202
1,806
1,917 1,703 (-11)
GVN weapons losses _________________ _
335 (20)
1,777
1,884
1,914 2,260 <+15)
1.534
6_ Vietcong defections 2 (1962 total: 1,956)_.
644 (28)
1,178 1,307 (+10)
107 ( 8)
Although only 42 percent of this period has elapsed, the statistics in this column are already 46-55 percent of the total
figures for the previous 6-month period, as shown in the last column_
2 This ex-eludes "Chieu Hoi" returnees which have totaled 13,664 through August 1963 but which have declined sharply
since July 1963.
1
If_ CONDENSED FIGURES ON MILITARY ACTIVITY FROM JAN. 1, 1OO2-VIET CONG-INITIATED INCIDENTS
1962:1
January ___ . _______ _
February ____ . _____ _
March _________ __ _
AprlL __________ ._
May ______________ _
June ______________ _
July_. ______ . _____ _
AUIUSL. _________ _
September ________ .
OciobeL _____ . ___'__
November _________ .
OecembeL ________ _
large-scale
attacks
(company-size
Total attacks
and larger)
Terrorism
Sabotage
Prop
21
20
27
27
38
23
12
10
10
14
8
9
839
613
660
1,024
892
736
735
885
624
583
614
670
180
137
290
220
257
210
423
192
251
222
223
233
182
166
132
185
Total
incidents
500
588
497
528
362
448
378
391
419
421
384
154
157
158
146
178
189
144
107
1,825
1,460
1,961
1,933
1,825
1,477
1,564
1,642
1,375
1,357
1,311
1,346
~~
~1
:~
1~
1,~~
131
ApriL __ ._________
383
12
688
105
155
1,331
May ________ .______
357
13
608
93
ISO
1,208
June_______________
410
12
652
107
142
1,311
July _______ ._______
407
9
698
80'3
183
1,368
AIIJusL___________
319
12
569
186
1,167
September 18------_ _-;:-:34::1:-_ _-;:::13_ _~;-;;:61:;3---__;;:11::5--_,:_::17_:3--_,:_'':,2=42
TotaL__________
3,008
106
5,361
842
1,413
10,624
1
WIA
January 1962:
.
ARVN-ArmyofVletnam_
1~~
fo~
Total ________________
February 1962:
ARVN_________________
299
72
68
475
118
76
Vietcong
Capture
Missing
Total
KIA
WIA
Captured
Total
_________________________________ _
43 ~~=---
ggc~V!lf~8:f:riie-corp$__~I~07~-~I;46~-__;6~5~..~.c.::~~c::,~..~.~.~~~~~.~.~..~.~..~.~.~..~.~-.~.~..~.i..~.i9i..
116
7 ___
42 ___
890
1,294
212
390
1,896
_________________________________ _
___________________________________ _
~gc::=::=~::=:::=::::=.__~10~4--~I;,06~--,~;~:..:.~..~..~.~~~~;~~~~;._~;~~~~~-:3iil'6---,~~5i;~---II:...~;,,;
TotaL ______________.~~~244,!O~~3~OO~~~~~~~~~~~~;;;~~;;;;~~~~
March 1962:
ARVN_________________
97
219
28 ________________________________________________ _
CG___ __ ____ ___ ______ __
160
223
27 _________________________________________________ _
94
108
185
164
146
222
1 _________________________________________________ _
66 _______________________
________________ _
84 ___ _
----~--~~-..,,~5~,..:.:.:~I~,~07~O..:.:.::..:,c,.~5;;96;==:c2~';2==.41"5~-22.,33o'03
Junel~:_________________
549
~e:r~~a_~=~::~=:::::
KIA
Percent of
previous
--------------------JanuaryApril
1962
84
133
13
230 _______________________________________ _
SOC___________________
150 _ _~18~6~-...;19~_,:_2~96:;..:.~
294
45
489 ___
__..____________
CG ______________________-.::'~'
..~.~
..~.;.
..~.~
..~..~.~
..~.~
....:.~
..~..~.~
~.~..-..:.. ;0._
;:.5:..
613
77
1,015
1,666
413
441
2,520
TotaL _____ . __ ._ .. __.~~3~2~5~~!;'~~~~~~~~~~~~;;;;~~,;;;~~;;;;;
July llt~l~
86
165
SDC
_____ .______________
235
372
CG ____________________
. __~
.."'2~_.:'';:
..~_
13
264 _______________________________________ _
153
761 __ ..____________________________________
_.;:46':..-~25~7-.:.:.~
~.~
..~..~.~
..:.:.~
..:.:.~.-~.~
..~..:.:.~-.~.~
..~.::
....:..~.2..5.ii-._
~~~~---~~=:::::::::::::
67
149
l~~
218 _______________________________________ _
U ~~~ :---:-::--:-:::-::::::::::::::::::::::::
103
SOC -----.---.----------2:'O".7--.:'.:'~-....::~-Cc::~=2~.~2~71;c---..,3;;6:;-7--.66"'~-33:.'300i7
Total ___________ . ____.=~~37~7~~~6~26~~~6:;3~~'.:o"0:'66~~~~~~~~~;;;;,~~;;;;;
September 1962:
~~~_N_~~~:=:==:==:===:=
125
2:~
231
lrl
= __-;;
5~
358 ________________
____ . ___ .... __ _
150 _______
._ .. ___ . _______ _
616 __ . _____ . ____ . __ . ____ . ___ . ____________ _
1,124
2.218
365
446
3,029
77
238
142
239
2
3
59
317 __________
____ ._._._.
208
_ _. __ ._ ... __ .. __________ ..
523 _ ______ . ___ . ___ . _______ . __
SDC _____________________
1,048
1,967
286
373
2,626
Total. ______ __ _____~=~36~5~~~6~19~~~6~4~~;:::::~~:;;;;~~~;;;,~~~~=~
63
225
= __-:;-:;-_-;:
November Hl62:
ARVN _________ ._______
~gC:::=:===::=::::::::
66
72
272
233
156
445
IS
6
71
TotaL ______________.=~!41~O~~~8~34~~~'~2~~I,O:,33~6~~';;.98:::;;2~~;;36;;:8~~~5;61~~~2.~'~1l
63
62
Percent of
combined strentth
2. CASUALTIES I-Continued
of RVNAF,
Civil Guard.
Vietcong
.VN
Total Self-def1mseCorps S
Date
2,016
~ig =-:: ::~:- -- -.-- ---- -.. ----- -.-- ---. ----681 ________
:~:~::
::=: :::
From January 1962 through May 1963. the above statistics include, in addition, to deserters all other pefSO':lS who have
been ab,!ent without official leave (a.w.oJ.) for any length of time or for any reason. The statistics have not been adjusted
to take Into account those persons who returned to duty. From June Ihrouah August 1963, the statistics consist entirely of
deserters and exclude a.w.oJ.s. but still have not been adjusted to account for returnees.
2S Army,
Navy, Marines,
Air Force.
From January
through and
December
1962, the combined strenilh of these services increased from 315,454 to 390,220
From January throulh AUlust 1963, the increase was from 392,460 to 404,799.
, Averale.
3. WEAPON lOSSESl
Vietconl
GVN
~.~~:,~'i~;;i:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::___\~:._~_2___ tffi
1962:
~:~1y~::::::::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
~:~~::::::::::::
::::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :::: :::::::::
May_. ____________ ____ _____________ . _______________ ---------------- -----.
1963:
4,534
5,195
457
253
r~
~
MI
335
467
797
46'
580
564
.63
554
644
4,878
3,955
4. VIETCONG DEFECTIONS I
1962. _ _________ ___ ___ . ____________________________ ___ ______ ---- ---- ----- --- ---- --- 1963:
-- 1,956
'
~~~~~::~::H:~~\:H~~-\~-E:HH~:\\::\\~:~:~\-:\-E:--:-~~-H:~\2:~n:::::
:~:t~8::.:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
168
Z4S
394
371
41.
394
308
191
107
TotaL _____ ___ ____________________ ________ . ____ ---------------- ----- -'-- -.-- - -- -- -- 2,592
Ma.ny Vieteonc weapons lost are of the .hon:'emade variety. .
IThlS does not Include "defectors" comlnl m under the "Chleu Hoi" or amnesty pmlram.
64
Many of them, ho~~r., ~lh~~ ~~~>,a~~~
t:&:
voluntarily Or tmder dureSs. The, number of" "Chien Hoi" returnees increased
progressively from April I!) to June 1963, when a high of about 3,200 was
reached. By August, returnees dropped to a low of about 1,600. Complete statistics are not yet available for September.
Until
Jun~
tary and security _,personneL who... had_.been_absent __ fro.m __ duty without. official
leave for any reason or for any length of time. Moreover. there was apparently
nQ attempt to adjust these all-inclusive statistics to acconnt for persons who had
returned to duty. Including "awols," the 1962 monthly average of deserters was
.7% of the combined strength of the military and security seivices. On this basis,
there was no clumge in the monthly average during the first five months of 1963.
Beginning in -June, however, statistics on deserters excluded "awols" although
they were still not adjusted to cover returnees. Even so, on the new basis, the
monthly average 0+ deserters increased from .6% in June 1963 to .8% in August
1963. Complete. statistics are not yet available for September.
Oon.c~u8ions _
On the basis of available statistical trends, there appear to ha.e been a number
of significant and unfavorable changes in the military situation in South Vietnam since July of this year. Indeed. virtually all of the indicators noted in this
:report suggest _that the military position of the Vietnam Government may have
reverted to- the point it had reached six months to a year ago. While it is difficult
to relate precisely cause and effect o.f adverse changes in the military situation
in South Vietnam, their occurrence at a time when the political_ situation has
deteriorated must be considered as more than coincidental. At the same time,
even without the Buddhist crisis and the, more serious political difficulties following in its wake, it is possible that the Diem government Wo.uld have been unable to maintain the favorable- trends- of preceding periods in -the face of the
accelerated Vi~t Cong effo.rt since JWy" 1963.
. APPENDIX 26
OCTOBEZ,25, 1963.
SAIGON 1964-FROM LOQGE TO M'GEORGE BUNDY
doubts.
2. CAS has been punctilious in carrying out my instructio.ns. I have personally approved each meeting between Gen. Don and Conein who has carried out
my orders In each instance explicitly. 'While I share your concern about the continued involvement of Conein in this matter, a suitable substitute for Conein
as; the principal contact is not presently available. Conein, as you know, is a
friend of some eighteen years' standing _with Gen. Don, and General Don bas
e~pressed ~I'eme reluctance to deal with anyone else.- -I do not believe the
inyolvement- of another American in close contact with the generals would be
productive. We are, however, considering the feasibility ora plan for the introduction of an additional officer. as a cut.:out between Conein _and a designee of
Gen. Don for communication pnrposes only~ This officer is .completely unwittin~
of. any details of past or present coup aetlvities and will remain so.
3. With reference to Gen. Harkins' comment to Gen. Don which -Don reports
to have referred to a presidential directive and the proposal for a meeting with
me, this may have served the uSeful purpose of allaying the General's fears as
to our interest. If this were a provocation, the GVN could have assumed and
manufactured any variations of the same theme. As- a precautionary measure.
however. I of course refused to see Gen. Don. As to the_lack of information a~
to General Don~s real backing, and the lack of evidence that any real capabilities
for action have been developed. ref. b provides only part of the answer. I feel
sure that the reluctance of the generals to provide the U.S. with full details of
their plans at this time, is a reflection of their own sense of security and a lack
of canfidence that in the large American community present in Saigon their
plans will not be prematurely revealed.
. 4. The best evidence available to. the Embassy, which I grant you is not as
complete as we would like it, is that Gen. Don and the other generals involved
65
aprov_ti~l1d,y,Ngo
"baIT_
thenationalintereBt.
'
5: I w~come yoy.r reaffirmm.g insttuctions'
contained. in CAS Washington
74228. It is
that we_ neither. thwart a coup nor that we are even in a posiwe do not
not; know
what
is going
;"tion
6.- where
We should
thwart
a coup
for on.
two reasons. First, it seems at least an
even bet that the next government would not bungle and stumble as much as the
present one has_ seeondly, it is extrenlely .unwise in the long range for us to pour
cold water on attempts at a coup, particularly when they are just in their beginning stages. We should remember that this is the only waY in which the people
in Vietnam can
get a change of government. Whenever we thwart "tat a c-o-up, as we have done in,Ule past, we are incurring very long lasting resentments,. we are assuming. an, undue. responsibility for keeping the incumbents in office, and in general are setting ourselves in judgment over the
affairs of Vietnam. Merely to keep in-touch with this situation and a policy merely
limited to "not thwarting" are courses both of which entail some risks but these
are lesser. risks than either thwarting all coups while they are stillborn or our
not 'being Informed of what is .happeniIlg. All the abOve is totally distinct from
not wanting U.S. military adviSOrs to be distracted by matters which are not in
their domain, with which I heartily agree.. Eut obviouslY this does not confiict
with. a jx;licy of not thwarting, In judging, propOsed coups,. we must consider
the "ffeeL oiL the ",ar effort: certainlY a succession of fights for control of the
Government of Vietnam would interfere with the war effort. It must also be
said tha,t. the war effort has been- interfereq1With already, by the incompetence
of_the present goveri:lill~nt:and the uproar which:this has caused.
7.. Gen._Don'S intention;w have no.:religiOus.disCrimination in a future government is cOmlnendable an(I .I. _applaud .his -_deSire not to be ""a vassal" of the
U.S. Eut I do not think his promise of a democratic election is realistic. This
cQuntrY siIllply is not ready for that procedure. I would add two other requirements.- First" that there be no whole!!!ale. purges of personnel in the government.
llldiViduals who were particularly reprehensible could be dealt with later by the
regu~ legal proceSS., Then I would be impractical, but I am thinking- of a government which might illclude Tri (juangand which eertainly should include
men. of, the sta,ture of Mr. B-g.U, the labo.r leader.
8. CODY to .Gen. Barkins.
APPENDIX 27
OCTOBER 25, 1963.
~tal
temp~s,
possibl~
CAP 63590.
rmation giving increased
Yourwill.continue
1964 roost helpfnl.
We
to be grateful for,aU additiouaU.nfo
clarity to prospects of action by Donor others, and we look forward to discussing
with you the whole qnestion of control and eutout on your return, always assuming that one of these D-Days does not turn out to be real. We are particularly
concern"d abOut hazard that.an unsuccessful coup, however carefully we avoid
direCt engagement will be laid at our door by public opinion alroost everywhere.
Therefore, while sharing your view that we shonld not be in position of thwarting coup, we would like to have <>ption of judging and warning on any plan with
poor prospects of success. We recognize that this is a large order, but president
bi
66
that we should urcentlJ' conllder our attitude and contingency plans. We note
particularly Don'. curiosity your departure and his Insistence Coneln be available tram Wedneoclay night aD, which suggests date might be as early as Thurs
day.
2. BeUeve our attitude to coup group can still have decisive effect on
its decisioDS. We believe that what we say to coup group can produce delay of
coup and that betrayal of coup plans to Diem is Dot repeat not our only way of
stopping coup. We therefore need urgently your combined assessment with
Harkins and CAS (including their separate comments it they desire). We CODcerned that our line-.up of forces in Saigon (being cabled in next message) indicates approximately equal balance of forces, with substantial possibility serious
and prolonged fighting or even defeat. Either ot these could be serious or even
disastrous for U.S. interests. so that we must have assurance balance of forces
clearly favorable.
3. With your assessment in hand, we might feel that we should convey
message to Don, whether or not he gives 4 or 48 hours notice that would (A)
continue OJ[pllcit hands-otf policy, (B) positively encourage coup, or (0) dis
courqe.
. 4. In any case, believe Coneln should :Hnd earliest opportunity express to
Don that we do not :Hnd presently revealed plans give clear prospect of quick
results. This conversation should call attention important Saigon units atUl apparently loyal to Diem and raise serious issue as to what means coup group has
to deal with them.
5. From operational standpOint, we also deeply concerned Don only spokesman for group and possibility cannot be discounted he may not be In good taith.
We badly need some corroborative evidence whether Minh and others dkectly
and completely involved. In view Don'. clatm be doesn't handle tlmWtary planning" could not Conein tell Don that we need better mllltsry picture and that
Big Minh could communicate this moot naturelly and eallly to Stillwell? We
recognize desirability Involving MAOV to minimum, but believe Stillwell far
more desirable this purpose than ulllng Ooneln both wayl.
6. Complexity above actions raises question whether you should adhere to
present Thursday schedule. Concur you and other U.S. elements shOUld take no
action that could indicate U.S. awareness coup posslblUty. However, DOD is
sending berth-equipped mlUtary aircraft that will arrive Saigon Thursday and
could take you out thereafter as late as Saturday afternoon in time to meet your
presently proposed arrival Washington Sunday. You could explain this being
done as conve~ience and that your Washington arrival is same. A further advantage such aircraft is that it would permit ;your prompt return from any point
en route if necessary. To reduce time in transit, you should use this plane, but
we recognize delaying your departure may involve greater risk that you per.
sonally would appear involved if any action took place. However, advantages
your having extra two days in Saigon may outweigh this and we leave timing of
fUght to your judgment.
7. Whether you leave Thursday or later, beUeve it essential that prior your
departure therp be fullest consultation Harkins and CAS and that there be clear
arrangements for handling (A) normal activity, (B) continued coup contacts,
(C) action in event a coup starts. We assume you wiU wish Truehart as charge
to be head of country team in normal Situation. but highef1lt authority d(>stres it
clearly understood that after your departure Harkins should participate in supervision of aU coup contacts and that In event a coup begins, he become head ot
C01l.ntry team Rnd direct representative of President, with Truehart in eftect
acting as POLAD. On coop contacts we will maintain continuous guidance and
will expect equally continuous reporting with. prompt account of any important
dIvergences in assessments of Harkins and Smith.
R If coup ~hould start, question of protecting U.S. nationals at once arise!'!.
We can move Marine Battalion into Saigon by air trom Okinawa within 24
hours-It available. We are sending instructions to CINCPAC to arrange orderly movement of seaborne Marine Battalion to waters adjacent to South
Vietnam in position to close Saigon within approximately 24 hours.
9. We are now examining post-coup contingencies here and request your
immediate r~ommendations on position to be adopted after coup begins,
E"sppciaUy with respect to requests for assistance ot different sorts from one side
or the other also request you forward t"ORtbJ.-ency recommendations tor action it
coup (A) succeeds, (B) tails. (C) IslndeclslTe.
10. We reiterate burden of proof must be on coup group to show a substantial possibility of quick success; otherwise, we should discourage them from
proceeding since a miscalculation could result in jeopardizing U.S. position in
Southeast Asia.
APPENDIX 29
OCTOBER 30, 1963.
From: Harkins, Saigon.
To: Taylor, Washington, D.C.
NR 2028.
Your JCS 4188-63 arriVed as I was in the process of drafting one for you along
the same lines. I share your concern. I have not as yet seen SAIGON 768. I sent
to the Embassy for a copy at 0830 this morning-as of now llOO-the Embassy
has not released it. Also CINCPAC 0-300040Z infor JCS came as a surprise to
me as I am unaware of any change in local situation which indicates necessity
for actions directed. Perhaps I'll find the answer in SAIGON 768. Or perhaps
actions directed in CINCPAC 3OOO4OZ are precautionary in light of Gen. Don's
statement reported in CAS 192:) that a coup would take place in any case not
later than November 2. It might be noted Don also Is supposed to have said
CAS SAIGON 1956--that though the coup committee would not release the
details, the Ambassador would receive the complete plan for study two days
prior to the scheduled times tor the coup.
I have not been informed by the Ambassador that he has received any such
plan. I talked to him yesterday on my return from Bangkok and he offered no
additional Information. He has agreed to keep me completely informed if anything new turns up.
Incidentally he leaves for Washington tomorrow (31st) afternoon. If the coup
is to happen before the second he's hardly going to get two days notice.
One thing I have found out, Don is either lying or playing both ends against
the middle. What he told me is diametrically opposed to what he told Col.
Coneln. He told Coneln the coup will be before November 2nd. He told me he
was not planning a coup. I sat with Don and Big Minh for 2 hours during the
parade last Saturday. No one mentioned coups. '1'0 go on:
Both CAS SAIGON 1896 and 19'25 were ,sent tlrst and delivered to me aftE'r
dispatch. My 1991 was discussed with the Ambassador prior to dispatch. My
1993 was not, basically because I had not seen CAS SAIGON 1925 before dispatch and I just wanted to get the record straight from my side and where my
name was involved.
The Ambassador and I are certainly in touch with each other but whether
the communications between us are effective is something else. I will say Cahot's
methods of operations are entirely different from Amb Noltings as far as reporting in the military is concerned.
Fritz would always clear messages concerning the military with me or my
staff prior to dispateh. So would John Richardson if MACV was conc~rned. 'l'hi~
is not so today. Cite CAS 1896 and 1925 for examples. Also you will r~cull I waH
not the r~ipient of several messages you held when you were here.
CINCPAC brought tbis matter up again wben I saw bim in Bangkok. this past
weekend. He Is gOing to make a check when he returns to see if he holds messages I have not received. Have just received SAIGON 768. I will have to report
you are correct in believing that the Ambassador is forwarding military rpport",
and evaluations without consulting me. For his weekly report to the President,
at bis request, I furnish him a short military statement. }"or preparation of
76S I made no m"ntion of the Delta. I will answer 768 separately today.
There is a basic difference apparently between the Ambassadors thinking and
mine on the interpretation of the guidance contained in CAP 68560 dated 6
October and the additional thoughts, I I't"peat, thoughts expressed in CAS Washington 74228 dated 9 October. I Interpret CAP 63560 as our basic guidance and
that CAS 74228 being additional thoughts did not change tbe basic guidance
in that no initiative should now be taken to give any adive covert enronrngE"lJlpnt
to a coup. The Ambassador teels that 74228 does ebange 63060 and that a change
ot government is desired and feels as stated in CAS SAIGON 1964 that the only
way to bring about sucb a change is by a coup.
I'm not opposed to a change In government, no indeed, but I'm in('linf:'d to
feel that at this time the change should be in mf:'thods of governing rather than
complete change of personnel. I have seen no batting order proposed hy any
of the <,oup groups. 1 think we should take a hard look at any proposed list
69
. .
befo re we mak e any de CIsI,
ons. In my cont acts here I h
e no one with the
stre ngth of char acte
, at,le ast in figh ting comm~V:i SSteeD
~lem
s. lear ly ther e are
no Gen eral s qualifie{t~~ e over
ion.
opin
my
In
man
I am not a Diem
.
I cert ainl y see the faul t
~ere to back 140 mill i per S;. ~OPle in thei r fight aga~n~~ hIS Char~cter. I am
Die;~s ~~ eade r at this time M t
com mun Ism and it
~u~t happ ens that
a ked to agre e the can gO elr
aU ~ O:t' of the Gen eral s I have
Diem
With
g
alon
y
nre opposed to
, y s the Nhu fam ily they
hPerh aps the' pres sure s we h ave begu n to appl y 'II
to
c ange thei r way S Th"IS,18 appa rent ly Dot evid ent aWl ca~se Diem and Nhu
s
sure
pres
the
we have begu n to ~
Sure
ill
etil
d will affe ct the ':ay
Dot. I am watc hing t1f~Y cont inuewill repo rt whe n I th~n\ ~~t to date they have
I do Dot agre e with t~gs1lY:nd dors asse ssm ent in 768 ey aVe.
ing Ollr own. The GV N' m assa
d
t::s Ih II and ::tt s
in
::e
_Ch a::
ra m?J:n:f~e~n Oct~be~ .to here
ama
McN
y
etar
YO:Ur VISIt
I wou ld sUgge~~~:nn~tSecr to chan ge hors es to o'
try
a t'
to take pers uasi ve Th;~
eiUI~kIY. Tha t we contiu'ue
ns that will mak e thee:lfhors
c ~e thei r COUrse and
method.s of actio n
rt
tary
mili
the
win
we
let them mak e an .
0 as qUIckly as possible, then
t
wan
they
ges
chan
the
all
~
Afte r all, righJya~
wro ngly , we have back ed l)j
To me it seem f
hard year s.
~~:: :ioW to get him dOw:~ ~~~ e~Iht long
~~~
su.
The
him,
f!d of
~i~dhge~st
~~~r
yuperior and fath er :n~!
:o:::~tl'
has lean ed
.
~~ge:'?;f 'onthd erhe unde
d
I
v
r-de ope Countries will take a di
.
lew of Our assI stance it they too wer e led to b:U eve, the sam e-fa te lies in. torellifV
or them.
.
.
APP END IX 30
. Saig on
OCTOBER 30, 1963.
Gen eral Bar kins
FOr~mG:ener
'
al Tay l w
,
n.
ngto
aahi
or,
.
Nr: MAC 2033
:f
0:
.
ided
ee thIS messa~ but wiII be prov
copy upon his
768
initl all now hold copy oi SAIGON
2028 whi h
MAO
my
s
-63. and this amplifie
c
3. Sa1g~~)~~ded to YOUr JOS 4188 ge pers ona
Lod
onse
to DEP TEL 576was Amb assa dor
resp
in
nt
side
nPre
a~o
P~~
expl anat ion ~:;
Seen 'ttt.68 unti l one
;veek. afte r diSPa~tic:n~ ~~~sible
cg:y
8.when I requ este dtoa 768
~~:
Jbs
our
toy
Ond
resP
ntly
so at I mig ht
n~ellife
rred
refe
eh
wh:l
68
DEP TEL 576
,
Lodge
h' . b :pon rece ipt dofinp
dor
assa
Amb
f
ts
1m rIel sugg este
1: Adm iral Felt not add
na:e ~W~\~:~e~~
:~:~ in his pers onal nr~;~~~~
ts f
of bou
I
I
,
70
,
I
APPEN DIX 31
OCTOBER 30, 1963.
From: Lodge.
To: State;
CAS 2063.
1. We must, of course, get best possible estimat e at chance coup's
success and
We estimat e ,most color Our tht.nk:ing, but do not think weot.have
delay or discoura ge a coup. Don has made it clear many times that the power to
namese atlair. It 1s theoreti cally 'possible tor us to turn over thethis Is a VietInforma tion
which has been glvE'D to us in confidence to Diem and this would undoubt
edly stop
the coup and would make traitors out of us. For practica l purpose
s therefor e I
would say that we have very little influenc e on what Is essentia
affair. In addition , this would place the heads of the General s, lly a Vietnam'se
their civilian supporters, and lower military otIlcers on .the spot, thereby sacriflci
portion of the civ11lan and military leadersh ip needed to carry ng a Significant
the war agaiul'lt
the VC to its success ful conclusi on. Alter our eJforts Dot to discour
tbis change of heart, we would foreclos e any posstbUfty of change age a coup and
the better. Diem/N hu bave displaye d no intentio ns to date of a of the GV~ for
desire to change
the tracUtio nal method s of oontrol through poUee action
or take any repeat any
actlons which would underm ine the power position or solidari
fly. This, despite our heavy preuure s directed DEPTE L M4. ty of the Ngo famIt our attempt to
thwart this coop were success tul, ,Which we doubt,
Is Our flrm estimat e that
younger omeara, 8JD8l1 groups of mllltar7 , would then it
engage In an abortive action
creating ChaOB Ideally suited to va ob~t1 V.B.
2. While we will attempt a combine d a8Se8SDlent in a followin
g message , tim",
has not yet permitt ed substan tive examin ation of this matter with
General Harkins. My general view is that the U.S. Is trying to bring this
medieva l country
into the 20th Century and that we have made conside rable progres
and economic ways but to gain victory we must also bring them s in military
Century politica lly and that can only be done by either a thoroug Into the 20th
hgoing change
in the behavio r of the present governm ent or by another
governm ent. The Vif't
Cong problem is partly mllltary but it Is also partly psychol
8. With respect to paragra ph 3 Ret., I believe that we ogical and political .
continu e our
present position ot keeping bands off but continu e to monitorshould
and press for more
detailed intorma tion. CAS has been analyzin g potentia l coup forces
and it is theIr estimat e that the General s have probabl y :figured for some time
their chances
pretty closely and probabl y also expect that once they begin
to move, not only
planned units, but other units will Join them. We beUeve that
Vietnam 's best
General s are Involved In directin g this effort. It they can't
it 011', it Is doubtful other military leadersh ip could do so successf ully. It ispull
underst andable that
the General s would be reticent to reveal tull details ot their plan
for fear of leaks
to the GVN.
4. Re para. 4, Ret., we expect that Conein will meet Don on
Oct or early morning 81 Oct. We agree with Para. 4, Ret., that the night of 30
we should CODtinue to press tor details and question Don as to his estimat
strenrth s of opposin g forces. We do not believe, however , that e of the relative
any Bigns of attempt ing to direct this atralr ourselve s or of givingwe should show
the impress ion
ot second thought s on this Vietnam ese Initiatio n. In the
respond specifically to CAS Washin gton 79126. Please notemeantim e. we will
2059 corl'e('ts CAS Saigon 2023 and two regimen ts of the 7ththat CAS Saigon
DivisIon are included in the coup forces.
5. Apparen Uy Para. 5, Ref., overloo ks CAS 1445, 5 Oct 1963
which gave
an a<'count of the face to tace meeting of General "Big
and Conein at
Minh's instigat ion and through the speclflc arrange mentMlnh"of Gen Don. Minh
~peeiflcally identifie d Gen Don as particip ating
in a plan to change the government. Please note that MInh's remarks paralJel in every way
the later stateme nts
ot Gen. Don. We beUeve that the limitnti on of contact to Don
and Cein fs an
appropr iate security measure consona nt with our urging that
the smalles t number of p@rsons be aware of these detaillll.
71
6. We do not believe it wise to ask that "Big Minh" paijs
Stilwell . The VIetnam ese believe that there are member s ot his plans t<;> Gen.
the U.S. military
who leak to the Governm ent of Vietnam . I do not doubt
this is an unjust
suspicio n but it is a fact that this suspicio n exists and therethat
is no Ui:ie in pretend ing that it does not.
7. I much appreci ate your furnishi ng the berth-eq uipped
which I trust Is a jet. I intend to tell Pan America n that a jet military aircraft
has been diverted
for my use and therefor e I will no longer need their services
. This will
undoubt edlY leak to the newspa pers and the GVN may study
some suspicio n. I will answer any inquIrie s on this scor~ to this move with
the e11'ect that I
am most pleased by this attentio n and that this is obvious done
as a measure
to insure my comfort and save my time. To allay suspicio nslyfurther,
I will oirer
space on the aircraft to MACV for emergen cy leave cases, etc.,
in 8S routine fashion as possible. I wish to reserve commen t as and handle this
to
my actual time
of departu re unt11 I have some addition al informa tion, hopeful
ly tomorro w.
S. Your para. 7 somewh at perplex es me. It does not seem sensible
to have
the m1l1tary in charge of a matter whiCh is so protoun dly politica
l as a change
of governm ent. In tact, I would say to do this would probabl y
hope for a change of governm ent here. This is said imperso be the end of any
as a general
proposit ion, since Gen. Harkins is a splendid General and an nally
to whom I would gladly entrust anythin g I have. I assume old friend of mine
that the Embass y
and MACV are able to handle normal activitie s under A. that
tinue coup contacts under B, and as regards C, we must simply CAS can condo the very best
we can in the 11ght of events after the coup has started.
9. We appreci ate the steps taken as outlined In para. 8. Howeve
rememb er that the GVN is not totally inept fn Its foreign soundinr, we should
gs and that
these moves should be as discreet and security consciou
s as possible. I would,
()f course, call for these forces only In case of extreme necessit
coincide s with the General s that this will be an all-Viet namese y since my hope
10. We anticipa te that at the outset of the coup, unless it airair.
moves with Ughtning swiftnes s, the GVN will request me or Gen. Harkins
use our influenc e
to call it off. I believe our responS ibilities should be that ourtoinfluenc
e certainl y
could not be superio r to that of the Preside nt who is Comma
nder-in- Chlef and
that if he is unable to call it oft', we would certainl y be unable
would merely be risking America n lives attempt ing to interfer to do so and
e in this Vietnamese problem . The Governm ent might request aircraft . Helicop
ters, for the
evacuat ion of key persona lities that would have to be studied
closely, but we
would certainl y not commit our planes and pilots between the
battle lines of the
opposin g forces. We should, rather, state that we would be willing
fashion during a truce in which both sides agree to the removal to act in this
alitieR. I believe that there would be immedi ate politica l problem of key persons in attempt ing
to take these persona lities to another neighbo ring country
would be best served In depositi ng them in Saipan where the and probablY we
commun ications , etc., would allow us some leeway to make a absence of press,
fu~ther decision
as to their ultimat e disposit ion. If senior Vietnam ese
persona litIes ar;td their
famUies requeste d asylum in the Embass y or other Americ
an installa tions, we
would probabl y have to grant It in Ught of our previou s action
'j'rf fJuang. 'I'his will undoubt edly present later problp.lDs butwith respect to
hopeful ly the
new governm ent might teel disposed to help us solve this problem
. Natural ly,
asylum would be granted ()D the same basis as the Buddhis
ts, i.e., physica l presence at the Embass y or other location .
11. As to requests from the General s, they may well
need of funds at
the last moment with which to buy oft potentia l OPPOSithave
ion. To t!-e extent that
these funds can be passed discreet ly, I believe we should
furmsh them, ~>ro.
vided. we are convinc ed that the propose d coup is su1D.ciently
well orgamz ed
to have a good chance of success. If they are successf
they will undoubted~y
ask for prompt recognit ion and some assuran ce thatul,military
and economiC
aid will continu e at normal level. We should be prepare d to
ments if the issue is clear-cu t predica ting our position on the make the~ statePreside nt s stated.
desire to continu e the war against the VC to final victory. VOA
might be an
importa nt means of dissemi nating this message . Should
the coup fall, we will
have to pick up the pieces as best we can at that time. 'Ve
to the General s trom the August episode to attempt to helphave a commit ment
in the evacua Uon
ot their depende nts. We should trY to live up to this if conditio
ns will permit.
Americ an complic ity will undoubt edly be charged and there
might be some acts
72
73
taken against specific personalities which we should anticipate and make provision against as best we can. Should the coup prove indecisive and a protracted
struggle is in progress, we should probably ofter our good offices to help resolve
the issue in the interest of the war against the VO. This might hold some benefit
in terms of concessions by GVN. We will naturally incur some opprobrium
from both sides in our role as mediator. However, this opprobrium would probably be less distasteful than a deadlock which would open the door to the VO.
We consider such a deadlock as the least likely possibility of the three.
12. As regards your para. 10, I do not know what more proof can be offered than the tact these men are obviously prepared to risk their lives and
that they want nothing for themselves. It I am any judge of human nature,
Don's face expressed of sincerity and determination on the morning that I
spoke to him. Heartily agree that a miscalculation could jeopardize position in
Southeast Asia. We also run tremendous risks by dOing nothing.
If we were convinced that the coup was going to faU, we would, of course,
do everything we could to stop It.
13. Gen. Harkins has read this and does not concur.
APPENDIX 32
OCTOBER 30. 1963.
OAS 79407 FROM BUNDY TO LODGE
or instrument of coup.
er nstrument ot existing government
c. In the event of imminent or actUal f '1
~f1'ord asylum in their discretion to thOs!l t~re ~f coup, U.S. authorities may
Im~lied obligation of this sort. We bel1eve ho w om t~ere is any express or
be 10 our iI!terest and probably in interest :ever that 10. such a case it Would
seek protection of other Embassies in additionf t those seeking asylum that they
made strongly if need arises.
0 our own. This pOint should be
d. But once a coup under responsJbl I
restrictions, it is in the interest of thee Ue:d~shfp has begun, and within these
1. We have your message about retu~ t Overnment that it should SUCceed
all public comment be kept as low.key and 0 fashfngton and we suggest that
that if possible you keep open the exact ti q~ et as POSSible, and we also urge
sensitive to great dtsadvantage of han me 0 your departure. We are stron I
out to be a week of deCision, and if it c:: r;~u o~~ of Saigon it this should t:r~
you pinned to a fixed hour ot departure now. avo ed we would prefer, not to see