Previous research has demonstrated that exposure to news media increases viewers’ concerns

about national security, as well as their mistrust of politicians and government. However, the
contribution of entertainment media to security concerns and trust in government has received
only scant attention in previous research, conducted mainly in the American context. The current
investigation explores possible associations between exposure to news and political
entertainment and concern about security and political mistrust using survey data (n = 512)
collected in Israel in the aftermath of the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah conflict. Results demonstrate
that exposure to entertainment talk shows was related to greater concern about security and high
levels of political trust, while exposure to political comedy was related to reduced concerns about
security and lower levels of political trust. News exposure was not significantly related to
security concerns and political trust.

One of mass media's main social functions is to survey a society's environment in order to warn
of potential threats. As modern cultures have gained more control over natural threats, human
threats such as war and terrorism have become a central concern for the media's surveillance. In
dealing with these concerns, television programs look at the politics of security questions, and
issues such as war, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction often dominate the media agenda.
These issues are dealt with not only in the news. They are often presented in entertainment
programming as well: in entertainment talk shows, political comedy shows, and televised
dramas.

News and entertainment media report on such threats and track the political developments that
make them more imminent and grave. Furthermore, news coverage presents the elected officials
who are charged with keeping citizens safe in a critical and often cynical manner, as self-
motivated, dishonest, and even corrupt. As a result, exposure to news media increases viewers’
concerns about personal and national security (e.g., Slone, 2000; see also Scheufele, Nisbet, &
Ostman, 2005), as well as their cynicism and mistrust towards politicians and government (e.g.,
Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Moy, Pfau, & Kahlor, 1999).

While it is possible to argue that concern about security and political mistrust interact in
interesting manners in shaping political attitudes (Davis & Silver, 2004; Hetherington, 2006, Ch.
5; Uslaner, Canetti-Nissim, & Pedahzur, 2004), the potential contribution of media to the
combination of these two constructs is yet unexamined. The current investigation explores
possible associations between exposure to news and entertainment genres and the combination of
concern about security and political mistrust. It further advances prior research by examining the
association between exposure to televised entertainment genres (political comedy shows and talk
shows) and concern about national security. Finally, the current study advances the
generalizability of previous research by examining the abovementioned associations using data
collected in Israel in the aftermath of the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah conflict in Lebanon.

MEDIA EXPOSURE AND CONCERN ABOUT

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SECURITY
At certain times and in certain places, security dominates the media agenda. This seems to be the
case almost constantly in Israel, where national security is one of the most frequently and
prominently issues covered by media (e.g., Sheafer & Weimann, 2005). For example, content
analysis demonstrated that 19.3 percent of the items on commercial TV news dealt with security-
related issues, whereas only 4.9 percent dealt with economic issues, 7.8 percent focused on
crime, and 6.1 percent on foreign affairs (Weimann & Goren, 2001). Security issues were second
only to the Israeli elections (22.5 percent) in terms of the amount of attention they received, but
they were first in terms of prominence (p. 6).

Security issues not only receive ample news coverage, but this coverage also tends to be
sensationalized, dramatized, and scary (see Wolfsfeld, 2004). After terrorist attacks, virtually all
national television channels stop regular programming and devote long hours to emotional
coverage of the attacks, "exposing viewers to the horrors of dead and injured victims and to the
words of shocked witnesses, broken-hearted relatives and politicians ..." (Liebes & Kampf,
2007a, p. 109). Before the 2003 Gulf War, newspaper headlines predicted chemical and
biological attacks on Israel, a massive flight of Israelis to other countries, and enormous damages
to the Israeli economy as a result of the pending US offensive in Iraq (Kremnitzer, 2002). Even
in times of relative calm, the news media report regularly and very prominently on various
security related threats—including possible nuclear attacks, mega terrorist attacks, and new
weapons systems—acquired by Hezbollah or Syria (Benziman, 2002).

Constant exposure to such images might impact media consumers’ perception of the severity of
these threats. According to the literature about media agenda setting, the greater the attention that
media devote to a certain topic, the more this issue is perceived as important by the audience
(McCombs, Shaw, & Weaver, 1997). Thus, the prominence of news coverage of war and terror
makes these topics salient and thus, it subsequently promotes greater concerns. Furthermore,
according to cultivation theory, viewers that are frequently exposed to (predominantly violent)
televised presentations of reality tend to project this scary televised construction of reality onto
their real-life environment. Accordingly, greater television consumption leads to perceptions of
the world as a more scary and dangerous place (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, & Signorelli, 1994).
On the psychological level, this phenomenon can be explained by the fact that repeated exposure
to media makes media information more cognitively available to the viewer. Given the fact that
most viewers lack first-hand experience with topics covered by the media, they are more likely to
relay on media-generated heuristic perceptions of reality (Shrum, 1996). While the cultivation
effect was studied in various areas, such effects were especially noticeable in perception of
violence and risks (Shanahan & Morgan, 1999). For instance, cultivation findings link television
exposure to fear of crime and crime-related risk perceptions (e.g., Romer, Jamieson, & Aday,
2003). This is, probably, due to the fact that violent and scary media coverage is not only
frequent, but also dramatic and graphic. Vividness of media representations, in turn, increases the
cognitive availability of these messages and thereby increases the possibility that such media-
based information will be used as a mental shortcut when processing real-life information
(Shrum, 1996).

As described earlier, most research on media cultivation has examined the effects of exposure to
television on personal security, mainly in the context of crime, but not on perceptions related to
national security issues. However, processing information regarding threats and risks in the
context of national security can be similar to processing information about personal safety and
crime, given that, similarly to crime issues, security issues oftentimes receives massive and
dramatized news coverage. Indeed, several studies link news consumption and perceptions of the
threat associated with the topic covered by the media. For example, the perceived threat of
nuclear war was correlated with newspaper reading among Finnish adolescents prior to the 1991
Gulf War (Poikolainen, Kanerva, & Lonnqvist, 1998). In a US panel study, television use in t1
was associated with t2 negative emotional responses (fear, anger, uneasiness, and frustration) to
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, controlling for demographic and psychological variables (Cho et al.,
2003; but see Rubin et al., 2003, for different findings). The authors conclude that this type of
evidence supports a causal claim about the impact of TV on viewers’ responses. Such claims can
also be substantiated using an experimental design. Indeed, Israeli experimental subjects exposed
to news clips of terrorism were more anxious about terrorism, compared to a control group
(Slone, 2000). In line with this previous research, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that news
exposure will be positively associated with audience concerns about security (H1).

As cultivation theory argues, fear is not only a product of exposure to news, but may be related to
exposure to entertainment. Gerbner originally argued that cultivation effects result from all forms
of television exposure (Gerbner, 1998). However, since different genres may systematically vary
in the type of content they present, or use different media frames, later research demonstrated that
cultivation effects in fact differ by genre (Cohen & Weimann, 2000). In Israel, the news is not
the only type of television content to deal with national security and to present issues such as
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. As will be detailed later, these issues are also dealt
with very extensively in political comedy shows and entertainment talk shows. The most popular
comedy shows in Israel (described in the following paragraphs) treat politicians very negatively,
describing them as insincere, incompetent, and corrupt. Thus, it makes sense to investigate
whether exposure to such presentations of politics is associated with concern about national
security. Thus, given lack of prior research or theorizing, our first research question asks: Is
exposure to political comedy shows, and entertainment talk shows associated with concern about
national security? (RQ1).
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MEDIA EXPOSURE AND TRUST IN POLITICS

Political trust consists of citizens’ expectation that no party in the democratic exchange
(including politicians, parties, and other institutions) will exploit another's vulnerability (Tsfati &
Cohen, 2005). It is the expectation that political actors will act fairly—that is, in the interest of
the community at large rather than in their own personal interest—and that they are capable of
promoting the social good (Misztal, 2001, p. 383). This encompasses trust in political institutions
such as the government, Senate, or the Supreme Court (e.g., Orren, 1997). Trust in these
institutions underlies the effectiveness of the democratic process and promotes a healthy political
environment (e.g., Hetherington, 2006). Thus, scholars expressed concern from the continuous
decline of public's trust in the political institutions and attempted to identify the factors that
contributed to this process (cf. Orren, 1997).

Political trust and institutional trust are both part of what Uslaner (2002) calls "strategic trust",
which is targeted toward objects we are familiar with, and is to a large extent a function of our
past interactions with these objects (as opposed to "moralistic trust", which is the belief that
others in general share your fundamental values and therefore should be treated as you wish to be
treated by them). Since, as Uslaner argues, strategic trust is heavily based on prior experiences,
information about whether or not politicians have violated citizens’ trust in the past is crucial for
future political trust. The fact that most of this information is expected to originate from media
sources invites research on the contribution of mass media exposure to political trust.

The idea that exposure to a critical media presentation of politics results in decreased audience
trust in democratic institutions dates back to the 1970s. Part of Robinson's (1976) notion of
"video-malaise" was that greater exposure to television news, with its high degree of negativism,
conflict frames, and anti-institutional themes, generates mistrust in democratic institutions and
political disaffection (Norris, 2000). Using National Election Studies (NES) data, Miller,
Goldenberg, and Erbring (1979) reported that readers of highly critical newspapers were more
distrustful of the government. Later studies (e.g., Moy & Pfau, 2001) presented additional
evidence of the association between news exposure and reduced confidence in democratic
institutions and trust in politicians.

However, research has found that media promote different perceptions of political institutions.
Several studies have found that political trust (e.g., confidence in the local and federal
government) is by and large positively related to reliance on newspapers, while the opposite
association holds in case of reliance on television news (e.g., Becker & Whitney, 1980; O’keefe,
1980). Likewise, Internet use appears to be positively related to political trust. However, this
effect might be contingent to the specific uses of the medium. For instance, trust is greater among
surfers who browse the Internet in search for guidance rather than for entertainment (Kaye &
Johnson, 2002). Furthermore, using the Internet to voice one's own political opinions is positively
related to political trust (Wang, 2007).

Other studies have differentiated between the contributions of different types of media
consumption to trust in specific political institutions. For example, Moy et al. (1999) indicated
that exposure to television news relates to greater trust in public schools, whereas newspapers
reading relates to greater trust in the court systems. On the other hand, listening to political-talk
radio shows was found to be associated with lesser trust in public schools (Pfau, Moy, Radler, &
Bridgeman, 1998; Moy et al., 1999) but with greater trust in congress (Pfau et al., 1998).

A more detailed account of the mechanism underlying the association was presented by Cappella
and Jamieson (1997), using framing theory. They argued that media tend to frame political actors
and their activities strategically: politicians are presented as selfish actors, motivated solely by
their desire to get elected to office. Alternative interpretations of politicians' activities—as
motivated mainly by a passion to do good for society—are regularly downplayed (e.g., in one of
their analyses, 67 percent of television news was framed strategically; p. 111). This framing
activates political cynicism. Cappella and Jamieson also provide us with experimental evidence,
establishing that the direction of the association is from exposure to cynicism, and not the other
way around.

Given this past research, it is hypothesized that television news exposure will be negatively
associated with audience trust in democratic institutions (H2a) whereas newspaper and Internet
news exposure will be positively associated with audience trust in democratic institutions (H2b).

While video-malaise and framing theories relate only to news content, it is important to take into
account that viewers are exposed to current-affairs content not solely through news programs but
also through various entertainment genres. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that exposure to
entertainment will affect viewers’ perception of political institutions. Such potential effects can
be carried out through the same underlying mechanism as news content.

However, just as different types of television content cultivate different perceptions of reality
(Cohen & Weimann, 2000) they can have different contribution to political mistrust. Thus, the
direction of the expected effects of entertainment programs should vary based on the tone of the
coverage of political issues in these shows. While some entertainment genres may evoke
mistrust, due to their unfavorable presentation of politics, other programs may present politics in
a respectful light that, in turn, may strengthen viewers’ political trust.
One type of content that typically presents politics negatively, and thus may evoke mistrust in
politics, is political comedy. Political comedy shows are quick to turn any political mis-step by
candidates into entertaining punch lines (see Baumgartner & Morris, 2006), and thus their tone is
mostly unflattering and sarcastic towards politicians. Moreover, because of their use of humor,
which encourages more careful processing, political comedy shows are more persuasive and
more memorable than non-humorous presentations of politics (Nabi, Moyer-Guse, & Byrne,
2007). While the news provides viewers with factual information from which they draw
unfavorable conclusions regarding political institutions, political comedy programs present
unbalanced and comically extreme information, mock politicians, and interpret their actions
cynically. Thus, if news programs evoke political cynicism, it makes sense that to an even greater
extent, exposure to comedy shows will increase negative attitudes toward politicians. Previous
research shows that, indeed, exposure to political comedy in the United States is associated with
various indicators of political mistrust (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006), and also, when the
audience is relatively naive (Moy, Xenos, & Hess, 2005), it may lead to the adoption of the
caricaturized presentation of politicians (Young, 2006).

At the time of study, Israeli television featured several very popular political comedy shows, the
most prominent of which was Eretz Nehederet (roughly translated as "A Wonderful Country").
When data for the current investigation were collected, the show was broadcast in its fourth
season on Israel's most popular TV channel on Friday evenings. In January 2007, the show had
an average rating of 28.77 percent and was Israel's most watched TV show. The format of the
show is that of a parody newscast, with a group of actors imitating commentators and politicians,
discussing the events that took place in the past week. Eretz Nehederet could be described as
sharing many elements with the John Stewart Show and the political sketches on Saturday Night
Live, but with somewhat less sophisticated humor (compared to both), on the one hand, and a
more vulgar tone, on the other.

The main targets of the show's jokes are Israeli politicians. They are presented as self-serving,
incapable, dishonest, corrupt, and ignorant (for a content analysis see Balmas, 2008).

Like the television news shows it ridicules, Eretz Nehederet does not depict internal Israeli
politics only. The show devotes substantial time to security matters. In fact, the fourth "season
finale" episode of Eretz Nehederet in 2006–07 depicted the last hour in the life of the state of
Israel and its destruction by an Iranian nuclear missile, launched because Prime Minister Olmert
mistakenly pushed the red button and started a nuclear confrontation. Israel's enemies, including
Hezbollah leader Nasrallah, and Hamas leader Mohamed Abu Tir, are imitated on the show
frequently, and depicted as sophisticated Jew-haters, determined to kill as many Israelis as
possible. Abu Tir actually complained about a sketch presenting him as trying to seduce young
Israelis to come to "trance" dance parties in the Palestinian territories, while actually having other
plans for them there. Another, somewhat less popular, political comedy show—The Lior Shline
Show—is based on American late-night-show formats such as Jay Leno's and David Letterman's
shows. Like Jay Leno and other U.S. late-night shows, Shline's show begins with a long
monologue ridiculing politicians, and cynically interpreting the events of the day. In sum,
political comedy shows on Israeli television are similar on many aspects to political comedy
shows in the United States, and especially in their negative and cynical treatment of politicians.
While the lion's share of research on the effects of political comedy focused on the American
context, these programs and formats are often exported from the United States or imitated in
other countries, and as a result, dominate the television landscape around the globe (e.g., Varis,
1984). Since the Israeli shows resemble political comedy shows in the United States, and given
that research has documented negative associations between political comedy exposure and trust
in politics in the United States, it is hypothesized that exposure to political comedy shows will be
negatively associated with trust in democratic institutions (H3).

While political comedy presents politics negatively and is thus consequently assumed to have a
negative impact on viewers’ trust, the effect of political talk shows may be positive (Moy et al.,
1999). In recent years, political candidates in the United States have frequently appeared on
entertainment talk shows such as Oprah Winfrey's, or Regis Philbin's shows, which feature lower
levels of public affairs information and focus more on drama and human interest. Recently,
scholars have begun exploring the effects of such entertainment talk shows on citizens’ political
attitudes and knowledge (e.g., Baum, 2003, 2005).

As opposed to news and satire, that by definition aim to criticize and attack the political figures,
the entertainment format of talk shows is more sympathetic towards politics and politicians
(Schultz, 1995). Content analysis found that entertainment talk show interviews on U.S.
television include fewer references to political parties, partisan themes, or other divisive images
compared to traditional news reports, and that they are much more sympathetic to their interview
subjects compared to traditional news shows (Baum, 2005). The relative lack of reference to
divisive terms in entertainment talk shows may lead to a relative absence of strategic framing,
which is associated with greater cynicism (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997), and thus exposure to
these shows may be associated with greater trust in politics. In addition, it has been recently
demonstrated that incivility on televised segments adversely affects political trust (Mutz &
Reeves, 2005). Given that entertainment talk shows are more likely to be civil and non-
confrontational, they are likely to be associated with greater political trust.

The main entertainment talk shows on Israeli television are hosted by Yair Lapid and Dudu
Topaz, that at the time of study were broadcast on prime time on commercial channels, and these
entertainment talk shows resemble their U.S. counterparts (Oprah Winfrey's, or Regis Philbin's
shows) in their tone and format. Like the "soft news" shows described and analyzed by Baum
(2005), both regularly focus on entertainment and human-interest stories and less on current
affairs. The shows feature celebrities (among the guests in the past were Julia Roberts, the Dalai
Lama, and Bill Gates), army generals, and oftentimes politicians. While both shows differ in
many ways, the format of the political interviews on both is of intimate personal interviews.
While tough questions are sometimes asked, the atmosphere is always supportive and consensual.
Both shows enjoyed high ratings (14 percent to 25 percent) and both hosts enjoy the public
image of typical mainstream Israelis. While the content is often very political, it is hardly ever
confrontational.

In an interview before the eighth season of the program was aired, Yair Lapid described the show
as designed "to provide stability, not because of laziness, but out of consideration for the viewers
who want to know that there are things that do not change." The critics often describe his tone as
soft, "father-like", and sympathetic to his guests (Asheri, 2007). Ilana Dayan, a leading
investigative journalist who was among Lapid's guests, addressed the differences in audience
motivation for watching her show as opposed to Yair Lapid's: "They come to me to get the real
story. They come to you to have good time." (Asheri, 2007).

In sum, given the sympathetic presentation of politicians on entertainment talk shows, our fourth
hypothesis (H4) predicts that audience exposure to entertainment talk shows will be positively
associated with trust in democratic institutions.

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MEDIA EXPOSURE AND THE COMBINATION OF

SECURITY CONCERNS AND POLITICAL
MISTRUST
Thus far, it has been established that exposure to news and entertainment media may be related to
concern about security, and separately, that it is related to political trust. However, the
combination of concern about security and trust in politics may be of significance for political
attitudes and behavior. Two citizens who are similarly very concerned about national security—
one who is very mistrustful of the leadership and the other who is very trustful—should respond
differently to their concern about security. The first may feel as if he or she has no one to rely on
but himself/herself and thus builds a bomb shelter and stockpiles arms. The second may join the
military (if she or he is at an appropriate age), or support security-related government initiatives
such as The Patriot Act. In line with this logic, some research in political science shows that
perceptions of risk interact with trust in government when determining political outcomes (Davis
& Silver, 2004; see also Hetherington, 2006, Ch. 5). Technically, it may very well be that the
viewers who become concerned about security due to their media exposure are not the very same
people who become mistrustful, and thus it makes sense to explore the association between
exposure to news media and the combination of concern about security and political mistrust.
Thus, RQ2 asks: Is there an association between exposure to news, political comedy shows, and
entertainment talk shows and the combination of concern about security and political trust?

CONTROL VARIABLES
Trust in politics and concerns about national security are not only a function of media exposure.
Since prior research tells us these constructs are also influenced by a host of additional
demographic and psychological variables, the models reported in the following paragraphs
control for several covariates. Given that a negative personal mood is associated with a perceived
negative national mood (Arian, Shamir, & Ventura, 1992), and with a sense of danger and threat
(Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Wood, 1995), and given that political mistrust can result
from a projection of one's unhappiness with his/her life (e.g., Brehm & Rahn, 1997), personal
mood was controlled for in the models. Since national pride was found to be associated with
political trust in previous research (Newton, 2001), we controlled for this variable as well. Given
that personal involvement in the 2006 conflict is logically expected to relate to concern about the
possibility of future conflicts, as well as to political trust, indicators of involvement in the
conflict were also included in the analysis.

We also measured additional psychological variables—dispositional optimism and coping styles

(that are likely to affect one's reaction to stressful situations such as a security threat [for an
overview see: Scheier & Carver, 1992]) and value orientations (family values vs. materialism),
that previous studies have linked with satisfaction in the way the government runs the country,
and one's sense of safety and security (Tan, Tambyah & Kau, 2006). However, since none of
these variables had a significant contribution to any of the tested models, and since they were
uncorrelated at the bivariate level with the dependent variables, they were excluded from the
final models reported here for the sake of parsimony.

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NATIONAL MOOD IN ISRAEL AFTER THE 2006

ISRAEL–HEZBOLLAH CONFLICT
The data for this study were collected just months after the Israel–Hezbollah conflict of 2006 in
Lebanon, in which Israel failed to defeat Hezbollah despite a massive military offensive (Kalb,
2007). While the news media were relatively supportive of the government in the first days of the
conflict, the coverage gradually became more negative, stressing the fragility of the civilian
population (Liebes & Kampf, 2007b), the disorganization of the army, the inexperience of the
political leadership in military issues, and the attempts by politicians to avoid taking
responsibility for the failure in the conflict. The news media also dealt extensively with the
possibility of another confrontation with Hezbollah or Syria. These news were accompanied by
reports about the progress of the Iranian nuclear program and declarations by the Iranian
president that Israel should be liquidated.

In this atmosphere, it is no wonder that Israeli public opinion has become pessimistic about
Israel's security and critical of its leadership. Indeed, data published by the Tami Steinmintz
Institute revealed that 72 percent of respondents—a sample of the adult Israeli population—were
not confident that Israeli leaders could handle all the risks and challenges facing Israel. More than
half of the people surveyed—57 percent—believed that Israel's national security had
deteriorated, and 80 percent felt that Iran posed a real threat to Israel's existence. It is in this
context that this paper examines the associations between exposure to various news and
entertainment media and concerns about Israel's security and trust in politics.

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METHOD
SURVEY PROCEDURES
The data for this study were collected by the Cohen Institute for Public Opinion Research at Tel
Aviv University, using telephone surveys conducted during late February 2007, as part of the
Media Trust Index project (Tsfati & Peri, 2006). Out of 2331 randomly selected numbers called,
512 completed the interview. Within households, adults over 18 were selected. Response rate,
calculated according to AAPOR guidelines was RR1 = .30. Immigrants from Former Soviet
Union were included as they constitute an important sub-population in the Israeli context, both
because they make a substantial share of the Israeli Jewish population (about 18 percent), but also
because of the unique political attitudes towards political institutions that this group might
harbor, due to their unique experiences under the Soviet regime (Mishler & Rose, 2001).

SAMPLE
The sample consisted of 512 individuals, a representative sample of the adult Jewish Israeli
population. Arab Israelis (comprising about 18 percent of the Israeli population) were not
included in the current study for the following reasons. First, this study investigates the correlates
of exposure to media content targeted only at the Jewish population. Second, the crisis of
confidence in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon War took place primarily among Israeli Jews,
while the levels of trust in Israeli democracy and institutions are generally and consistently low
among Israeli Arabs. Third, past research demonstrates that security is a matter of concern
primarily for Israeli Jews, not for Arabs.

Given that survey response in Israel is much lower among ultra-orthodox Jews, stratified
sampling was used, with two strata, constructed using household residential areas: an ultra-
orthodox stratum, and another stratum for the rest of the adult Jewish Israeli population. Within
strata, households were randomly selected from the phone directory.

In the sample, 51.4 percent were female, in comparison to 52.1 percent of the adult Jewish-Israeli
population (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2008). In terms of religiosity, 7.8 percent were self-
described ultra-orthodox Jews, 10.5 percent were self-described as "religious," 33.6 percent
described themselves as "traditional" Jews, and 48.1 percent were self-described secular Jews.
The parallel distribution in the adult Jewish-Israeli population, according to the Central Bureau of
Statistics is 7.5 percent ultra-orthodox, 9.5 percent religious, 38.8 percent traditional, and 43.6
percent secular.

In terms of demographics, 10 percent of the respondents were new immigrants from the former
Soviet Union, 38.3 percent of the sample were of Mizrachi (i.e., of North African or Asian)
origin, 30.3 percent were of Ashkenazi (European or North American) origin, and 21.4 percent
were born to Israeli-born parents. In comparison, 41.7 percent of the adult Jewish-Israeli
population is Mizrachi, 31.1 percent born to Israeli-born parents, and the rest (27.2 percent) were
born to a father from European (including FSU) countries (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2008).
On average, respondents had 13.2 years of education (SD = 3.50), and the average age was 47.50
(SD = 16.20) similarly to 46.7 in the general population (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2008).

INDEPENDENT MEASURES
Media exposure
Respondents were asked about the frequency of their exposure to various media content. Items
included: "watch news and current affairs shows on television" (M = 3.82, SD = 1.61; on a six-
point scale ranging from "never" [coded as 1] to "more than once a day" [coded as 6]), "listen to
news and current affairs programs on the radio" (M = 3.45, SD = 1.85), "read daily newspapers"
(M = 1.75, SD = 1.20; on a four-point scale ranging from "never" [coded 1] to "more than four
times a week" [coded 4]), and "read current affairs information on the Internet" (M = 1.67, SD =
1.90; on a "never" [coded as 1] to "more than once a day" [coded as 6] scale). Since the study
reported here is part of a larger-scale longitudinal project, the measures used here replicate the
scales used in the past to allow cross-time comparison.
To measure exposure to televised entertainment, respondents were asked how frequently they
watch "political comedy shows, such as Eretz Nehederet or the Lior Shline late night show" (M =
2.27, SD = 1.13), and "talk shows such as the Yair Lapid Show or the Dudu Topaz Show" (M =
2.12, SD = 1.08). Response categories varied on a four-point scale from "never" (coded as 1) to
"always" (coded as 4). In addition to the fact that this study is intended to explore the unique
contribution of each of these media formats to the dependent variables, Exploratory Factor
Analysis did not reveal a coherent factor structure for these items, and they performed poorly in
reliability analysis (Cronbach's = .33). Hence they were entered separately into the statistical
models reported in the following paragraphs.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Trust in institutions
Respondents were asked about their amount of trust in political parties (M = 1.54, SD = .67), the
government (M = 1.72, SD = .72) and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF; M = 3.13, SD = .80).
Response categories varied between "no trust at all" (coded as 1) to a "very high level of trust"
(coded as 4). Reliability for the three items was rather poor (Cronbach's = .50), and although all
the items composed a single factor in an Exploratory Factor Analysis (Principal Axis, Oblique),
the loading of trust in the IDF fell below .30. Thus, the three items were used as three separate
dependent variables in the analyses that follow.

Concern about security

Respondents were asked about the degree of their concern about each of the following: "A
decline in Israel's deterrence" (M = 3.10, SD = .98), "the rocket threat of Hezbollah and the
Palestinians" (M = 3.06, SD = .99), "the Iranian nuclear threat" (M = 2.98, SD = 1.03), "terrorist
attacks" (M = 3.18, SD = .91), and "the possibility of war with Syria" (M = 2.58, SD = 1.12).
Response categories varied between "not worried at all" (coded as 1) to "very worried" (coded as
4). The five items loaded together in an Exploratory Factor Analysis (Principal Axis, Oblique),
and their reliability was Cronbach's = .80. Hence, the items were averaged to create a scale (M
= 2.98, SD = .76).

COVARIATES
Political leanings were measured using a single-item measure, worded "How would you rate
yourself on a scale representing the Israeli political map with ‘1’ representing ‘left’ and ‘7’
representing ‘right’?" The item had a mean of 4.49, and a standard deviation of 1.75.

Involvement in the war

To measure respondents’ experiences and involvement with the 2006 Lebanon war, they were
asked whether they "remained in areas that were under rocket attack," "had to evacuate from a
shelled area," "had someone close to you staying in shelled areas," or "served in the military in
shelled areas or in Lebanon during the war." Response categories ranged from "1" "for not at all"
to "5" for "throughout the war." These four items loaded on a single factor in an Exploratory
Factor Analysis (Principal Axis, Oblique) and hence were averaged to create a scale (M = 1.87,
SD = .86, Cronbach's = .50).

Personal negative consequences of the war

Respondents were asked whether they were physically hurt, someone close to them was
physically hurt, or whether their economic situation deteriorated, as a result of the war ("yes",
coded as 1 or "no", coded as 0). These four items loaded on a single factor in Exploratory Factor
Analysis (Principal Axis, Oblique) and hence were summed to create a scale (M = .21, SD =
.47), representing the longer-term personal costs of the war, experienced by respondents (KR-20
= .22).

National pride was measured using a single item, worded "I am proud to be Israeli." This
question had five response categories varying between "1" for "do not agree at all" and "5" for
"certainly agree" (M = 4.38, SD = 1.08).

Personal mood was measured using a single item, worded "How would you rate your personal
mood today?" This question had four response categories varying between "1" for "very bad" and
"4" for "very good" (M = 2.84, SD = .89). This question was asked at the beginning of the
survey (immediately following demographic questions that were used to examine the eligibility
of the respondent).

Demographic variables included were: gender, age, ethnic origin—Mizrachi origin (Jews of
Middle Eastern or African origin = 1) and immigrants from the former Soviet Union (= 1), years
of education and degree of religiosity (1—Orthodox, 5—totally secular).

TOP
ABSTRACT
MEDIA EXPOSURE AND CONCERN...
MEDIA EXPOSURE AND TRUST...
MEDIA EXPOSURE AND THE...
NATIONAL MOOD IN ISRAEL...
METHOD
RESULTS
DISCUSSION
NOTES
REFERENCES

RESULTS
H1 predicted an association between news exposure and viewers’ concerns about Israeli security.
The first research question addressed the possible associations between exposure to political
comedy and entertainment talk shows and such security concerns. To examine this hypothesis
and research question, an OLS regression model was run with concern about security as the
dependent variable. The first block of independent variables included demographic, political, and
psychological variables, whereas media exposure variables were entered in the second block.
Results are reported in Table 1, as Model 1. Females, immigrants from the Former Soviet Union,
secular, Mizrachi, and right-wing respondents were significantly more concerned about Israel's
security. Those reporting they were in a better personal mood were significantly less concerned
about Israel's security.

View this TABLE 1 Ordinary Least Squares Regression models predicting political trust
table: and concern about security (standardized coefficients)
[in this
window]
[in a new
window]

As evident from the table, the media exposure variables added 4 percent to the variance
explained by the model (p < .001). All other things being equal, and in contrast to H1, exposure
to news (either on TV, the radio, newspapers, or the Internet) was not significantly associated
with concerns about Israel's security, but exposure to televised entertainment was associated with
such concerns. However, each type of entertainment content was associated with exposure in a
different manner. Ceteris paribus, watching talk shows was associated with greater concerns (b =
.13, SE = .04, p < .05), while watching political comedy programs was borderline significantly
associated with reduced concerns (b = –.07, SE = .04, p < .10).

H2a, H2b, H3, and H4 looked at the relationship between media exposure and trust in political
parties, the government, and the IDF. Models 2, 3, and 4 in Table 1 report OLS standardized
coefficients in models predicting these constructs, respectively. Older respondents reported a
higher level of trust in the IDF, while higher education was associated with less trust in the IDF.
Those involved with the war reported greater trust in the IDF and in political parties, and national
pride was associated with trust in government and in the IDF. Personal mood was significantly
associated with all three trust variables.

Entering media exposure variables into the equation significantly increased the R2 (for trust in
parties: F(6392) = 1.94, p = .07; for trust in the government: F (6404) = 2.87, p < .01; and
F(6401) = 4.17, p < .001 for trust in the IDF) and added 3 percent to 4 percent to the variance
explained by the model. As in the models predicting concerns about security, and in contrast to
the predictions of H2a and H2b, exposure to news through various media did not contribute to
trust in any of the institutions, with the exception of radio news, which was found to be a
negative predictor of trust in the IDF (b = –.06, SE = .02, p < .01). In contrast to news,
entertainment programs were found to be consistently correlated with trust. As predicted earlier,
each type of entertainment content again affected trust differently. All else being equal, as
predicted by H3, watching political comedy shows was associated with less trust in these
institutions (b = –.18, SE = .04, p < .05; b = –.10, SE = .04, p < .05; b = –.07, SE = .04, p < .10,
respectively), whereas watching talk shows was found to be positively associated with trust in
political parties (b = .13, SE = .04, p < .01), government (b = .15, SE = .04, p < .001), and the
IDF (b = .11, SE = .04, p < .01), in accordance with H4.
Finally, RQ2 focused on the association between media exposure and the combination of concern
about security and political trust. To examine this question, a variable combining political trust
and concern about security was created. First, the three trust items were averaged. Then, a
categorical variable combining the trust and concern constructs was created, based upon the
average values of both constructs, with the resulting combinations of "high trust–high concern,"
"low trust–high concern," "low concern–low trust," and "low concern–high trust." A multinomial
logistic regression—the appropriate technique for treating an unordered categorical variable—
was utilized with this combination variable as the dependent variable. Results are presented in
Table 2.

View this TABLE 2 Multinomial logistic regression model predicting the combination
table: of concern about security and trust in politics
[in this
window]
[in a new
window]

As in the previous analyses, the news exposure variables were not significantly related to the
combination of concern about security and political trust. Over and above the effects of the
control variables, each one-unit increase on the political comedy exposure measure was
associated with a 59 percent increase in the odds of being in the "unconcerned-mistrusting"
category, relative to the "high concern–high trust" reference category (b = .46, p < .05). Each
one-unit increase on the entertainment talk show exposure measure was associated with a 56
percent decrease in the odds of being in the unconcerned-mistrusting category and a parallel
increase in the odds of being in the "high concern–high trust" group (b = –.82; p < .001).
Exposure to talk shows was also associated with reduced odds of being in the "high concern–low
trust" group, relative to the "high concern–high trust" group (b = –.33, p < .10).

DISCUSSION
 TOP
This paper focused on the association between exposure ABSTRACT
to various media genres and media consumers’ concern MEDIA EXPOSURE AND CONCERN...
about national security and trust in political institutions. MEDIA EXPOSURE AND TRUST...
Contrary to the predictions of H1 and H2a and H2b, MEDIA EXPOSURE AND THE...
NATIONAL MOOD IN ISRAEL...
news exposure was generally not significantly METHOD
associated with either outcome variable (with the RESULTS
exception of the negative association between radio DISCUSSION
news exposure and trust in the IDF). However, as NOTES
expected, exposure to televised entertainment REFERENCES
significantly related to both security concerns and
political trust, and their combination. Exposure to
political comedy shows was associated with lower levels of concern about national security, and
lower levels of trust in politics (the latter association was predicted by H3). Exposure to
entertainment talk shows was significantly related to higher levels of concern about security, on
the one hand, and a higher degree of trust in politics (as expected by H4), on the other. All in all,
this study joins others (Baum, 2003, 2005; Cao & Brewer, 2008; Moy et al., 2005) in stressing
the important role played by entertainment media in shaping political perceptions. While meant
first and foremost to entertain, rather than inform, exposure to these genres seems to not only
educate viewers about political candidates and realities (Hollander, 2005; Young, 2006), but also
helps them form deeper attitudes regarding the political world. In the current investigation, the
effects of these entertainment genres were generally stronger than that of any news media.1

Given the possibility of an indirect effect of news, it is worthwhile to note that even when the
news exposure variables were entered into the model without controlling for exposure to political
comedy or entertainment talk shows constructs, none of the news exposure variables was a
significant predictor of either the political trust indictors or the security concern construct (again,
with the exception of radio news exposure predicting mistrust in the IDF). This finding rules out
the possibility that news promotes exposure to other political genres, which in turn promote
mistrust or concern about security.

The fact that news exposure did not relate to security concerns may seem surprising, given the
dominance of Israel's security problems in Israeli media coverage, and the somewhat hysterical
tone of this coverage. The explanation for this null finding may be that, as opposed to the
entertainment talk shows, news coverage does not only present information regarding security-
related threats, but also, given the conflictual nature of news, information contradicting the sense
of threat and questioning its severity. For example, political actors arguing that the increased
attention to security is meant to increase the defense budget at the expense of other problems are
interviewed, analysis is presented, and additional interpretations of the threatening information
are offered. Yet another possibility is that, given the prominence accorded to security-related
issues, concern about security is not a function of the frequency of exposure. Since security-
related threats make it to the headlines, any encounter with the front page en route to work, may
promote concern, and thus, there is no difference between those exposed rarely and those
exposed regularly. In addition, if one views the associations between news exposure and concern
for security as emerging from agenda setting effects, then it is no surprise that such effects were
not evidenced as agenda-setting effects are contingent on low obtrusiveness of the issue (e.g.,
Weaver et al., 1981), and given its high relevance for almost everybody living in Israel, the issue
of security does not meet this criterion in the Israeli context.

The lack of association between news exposure and mistrust in politics in Israel is inconsistent
with some research, documenting such associations elsewhere (Moy & Pfau, 2001), but
consistent with other research reporting null main effects, but significant interaction effects (Moy
et al., 1999). More research will be needed in order to determine whether this null finding stems
from differences in media content (e.g., less critical news presentation of politicians), floor
effects (given the very low level of trust in politicians in Israel after the conflict), or simply
cultural differences between Israel and the US context.

The fact that, as expected by H3, exposure to political comedy shows was associated with lower
levels of political trust is consistent with previous research in the U.S. (Baumgartner & Morris,
2006). The presentation of politicians in shows such as Eretz Nehederet is very critical and
unflattering. They are presented as dishonest, selfish, stupid, and self-centered, and thus, it is only
logical that exposure to such presentations is associated with political mistrust. What may be
more surprising is the fact that exposure to political comedy was associated with reduced
concerns about Israel's security. After all, the shows deal with security threats to Israel, and
present Israeli leaders as incompetent and incapable of preventing the impending security-related
catastrophes. Perhaps the reason for the association between exposure to political comedy and
reduced security concerns has to do with the fact that Israel's enemies, not only Israeli politicians,
are ridiculed on the shows, and presented as unable to realize their goal of harming Israel.
Another possible interpretation is that, simply, exposure to the humor in the comedy shows
alleviates concerns and helps viewers cope with fear (this explanation is consistent with
Yovetich, Dale, & Hudak, 1990).

Thus far, research exploring the effects of media on concerns about security has focused on news
programming only. The current exploration demonstrated that in the Israeli context, exposure to
entertainment talk shows is associated with greater concern about security. Politicians and army
generals often resort to fear in their rhetoric (e.g., Murphy, 2003), but at the same time, they try
to convey the message that security threats can be dealt with successfully, and that the current
leadership is up to the challenge. It is possible that politicians appearing on entertainment talk
shows are simply successful in conveying this message, which includes both fear and trust; in the
same manner they are successful in conveying additional messages on such shows (Baum, 2005).
The dramatically-appealing "fear and trust" message may be effective in particular given the
intimate and sympathetic atmosphere on such shows. The civil discussion may cultivate a sense
of trust in the politicians appearing on them (Mutz & Reeves, 2005), and contribute to the
persuasiveness of their fear messages, which might be questioned in more hardball-style news
formats.

The unique contribution of this study is that it offers a look at the possible effects of media on a
combination of two variables that were hitherto viewed as unconnected—security concerns and
trust in politics. We argued earlier that it makes much sense to examine these two variables in
conjunction, given that a concerned citizen who trusts the government will react differently to the
sense of threat than a concerned citizen who is mistrustful of the government. The current
investigation demonstrated that Israelis watching entertainment talk shows were much more
likely to report a combination of concern and trust—a combination that was linked in previous
research to more mobilized attitudes and behaviors.

Political scientists have differentiated between perceived threat and anxiety, demonstrating that,
in the post 9/11 U.S. context, the former is related to a desire for retaliation and support for anti-
terrorist government initiatives, and the latter is associated with reduced support for such
initiatives (Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005). The conceptualization of concern about
security in the current investigation is very similar to that of a perceived threat, and thus, when
combined with trust in government and political institutions, our respondents watching Yair
Lapid and similar entertainment talk shows are probably likely to become mobilized and support
governmental military initiatives. On the other hand, respondents watching political comedy are
not expected to become particularly de-mobilized as a result of their exposure. They will
probably not emigrate from Israel, as they do not see the threats as particularly severe. They do
not trust the government, but this mistrust will not cause them to form independent militias,
given the relative absence of perceived threats.

This study is not free of limitations. The first has to do with the exposure measures. As Price and
Zaller (1993, p. 135) note, "In trying to estimate their typical rates of media use, respondents may
have trouble recalling the details of what may often be a set of low salience behaviors." This
problem is somewhat intensified in the context of the current project, given that respondents had
to confront survey items that referred to genres such as "talk shows" and "political comedy."
However, measurement error typically biases correlation estimates downward (Allison, 1999, pp.
55–57). If weak measures worked in the above analyses, then the associations reported above
could probably be replicated with more accurate measures.

Another limitation has to do with the question of causality, given the use of a cross-sectional
research design. When investigating the association between media exposure and concern about
security, on the one hand, and mistrust in politics, on the other, communication scholars have
argued, based on theoretical reasoning, that the direction of the association is from media
exposure to concern and mistrust, and not the other way around. Experimental research (e.g.,
Slone, 2001) provided further evidence supporting these theoretical claims, and longitudinal
evidence also helped substantiate the causal direction in the case of reactions to terrorism (Cho et
al., 2003).

The fact that in the current investigation, many alternative explanations (i.e., that some third
factor accounts for the association between exposure and trust or concern), were ruled out
through the use of statistical controls, further facilitates the refutation of the possibility of
selective exposure. However, the possibility that additional psychological variables, which were
not controlled for, are responsible for the exposure to the different entertainment genres, and
independently for the political mistrust or security concerns, cannot be fully negated.

Still, we believe that merely establishing that watching entertainment talk shows is associated
with greater concern about security and higher levels of trust in politics, while watching political
comedy is associated with reduced concern about security and lower levels of trust in politics, is
of importance, regardless of the causal mechanism underlying these associations. This
mechanism should be investigated further in future research.
 TOP
ABSTRACT
MEDIA EXPOSURE AND CONCERN...
MEDIA EXPOSURE AND TRUST...
MEDIA EXPOSURE AND THE...
NATIONAL MOOD IN ISRAEL...
METHOD
RESULTS
DISCUSSION
NOTES
REFERENCES

NOTES
Yariv Tsfati (Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania, 2002) is a senior lecturer at the Department of
Communication, University of Haifa, Israel. His research focuses on various facets of public
opinion, in particular on trust in media, the third person effect, and campaign effects.

Riva Tukachinsky (M.A., University of Haifa, Israel, 2006) is a Ph.D. student in the Department
of Communication at the University of Arizona. Her research interests include psychology of
entertainment and media effects.

Prof Yoram Peri is the Head of the Chaim Herzog Institute for Media, Politics and Society and
professor of Political Sociology and Communication in the Department of Communication, Tel
Aviv University, Israel. His recent books include Telepopulism: Media and politics in Israel
(Stanford University Press, 2004) and Generals in the Cabinet Rooms: How the Military Shapes
Israeli Policy (USIP Press, 2006).

Data collection for this study was funded by the Chaim Herzog Institute for Society and Politics
at Tel Aviv University. The authors are grateful to Jonathan Cohen and Oren Livio for their
comments.
1
We tested for the statistical significance of the differences between the coefficients for political
comedy and talk shows, on the one hand, and the coefficients for the rest of the media items (TV
news, newspapers, radio, and Internet) on the other. In 22 out of 32 such contrasts in Table 1, and
9 out of 16 contrasts in Table 2, the coefficients were significantly different. Almost in all cases
when the comparisons were not significant, the coefficients for political comedy and talk shows
were stronger in magnitude than the rest of the coefficients.
 TOP
ABSTRACT
MEDIA EXPOSURE AND CONCERN...
MEDIA EXPOSURE AND TRUST...
MEDIA EXPOSURE AND THE...
NATIONAL MOOD IN ISRAEL...
METHOD
RESULTS
DISCUSSION
NOTES
REFERENCES

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Received for publication March 17, 2009. Accepted for publication March 30, 2009.

 Oxford Journals
 Social Sciences
 Int. Journal of Public Opinion Research
 Volume 21, Number 4
 Pp. 399-423

International Journal of Public Opinion Research Advance Access originally published online on May 20,
2009
International Journal of Public Opinion Research 2009
21(4):399-423; doi:10.1093/ijpor/edp015
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© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on
behalf of The World Association for Public Opinion Research.
Articles by Tsfati, Y.
All rights reserved. Articles by Peri, Y.
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Exposure to News, Political
Comedy, and Entertainment Talk What's this?
Shows: Concern about Security
and Political Mistrust
Yariv Tsfati, Riva Tukachinsky and Yoram Peri

Address correspondence to Yariv Tsfati, Department of Communication, University of Haifa, 31905,

Israel,ytsfati@com.haifa.ac.il