Republic of the Philippines

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS ORIENTAL

7th Judicial Region
Branch 31
Dumaguete City
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,

CRIM CASE NO. 20225

FOR: INFANTICIDE

-versusGIRALYN ADALIA,
Accused.
X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -/

DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
ACCUSED

GIRALYN ADALIA, by counsel, to this Honorable Court, pursuant to the

leave of court granted to her, most respectfully moves for the dismissal of the instant case, by
way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that the evidences presented by the prosecution were
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
DISCUSSIONS
Accused is charged with INFANTICIDE which is defined under Article 255 of the
Revised Penal Code as the killing of any child less than three days of age, whether the killer is
the parent or grandparent, any other relative of the child, or a stranger. In fine, the elements for
this crime are:
a. That a child was killed;
b. That the deceased child was less than three days (72hrs) of age;
c. That the accused killed said child.
Moreover, in the case of U.S. vs. Vedra1 it was emphasized that in the crime of Infanticide, it is
necessary that the child be born alive and be viable, that is, capable of independent existence.
The prosecution therefore had the burden of proving that all of the foregoing elements are
present in the instant case, and that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable ground for its
commission.
In the instant case, the theory of the prosecution is that on July 17, 2010, the accused
gave birth to a baby, subsequently killed it, and threw it at a nearby creek. Accused however
1

12 Phil. 96

strongly holds that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. As a matter of fact, the evidences presented by the prosecution, both testimonial and
documentary were insufficient to remotely suggest that the accused had anything to do with the
crime charged.
At the outset, it should be noted that all the evidences presented by the prosecution were
all merely circumstantial. In Mangansay vs. Sandiganbayan 2 it was held that Under Sec. 4, Rule
133 of the Rules of Court on the Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence would be
sufficient to convict the offender if (1) there is more than one circumstance, (2) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The circumstantial evidences presented by the prosecution however, were not sufficient
to establish the corpus delicti, or the fact that the accused killed her newborn baby. The
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses only tend to prove that maybe the accused was
pregnant, maybe she gave birth because of the alleged presence of blood on her clothes , maybe
she killed her own baby, and maybe the baby they found at Arabe Creek on July 20, 2010 was
the child of the accused.
No evidence was presented to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was
actually pregnant. Even in the medical certificate issued by Dr. Delia Futalan, dated December
18, 2010 (Exhibit N for the prosecution), the doctor expressly ruled out pregnancy as her
diagnosis, and concluded that the accused had a uterine mass inside her. Even if the doctor
recanted this diagnosis and conveniently concluded that the accused was actually pregnant in
subsequent medical certificates, this does not change the fact that the testimony of the doctor has
now been tainted and its credibility rendered highly suspect. It is also noteworthy that the doctor
refuted her own diagnosis only after a dead baby was found, and only after the accused had been
considered by the police as the convenient suspect. Even the testimonies of the other
prosecution witness claiming that they observed the accused with a bulging belly is insufficient
to prove that she was pregnant as none of these witnesses are experts in the field of gynecology
or medicine. Furthermore, even if it is true that the accused was observed to have a bulging belly,
2

546 SCRA 51

this can be explained and is consistent with the original diagnosis of Dr. Futalan finding the
accused to have a uterine mass.
Secondly, no witness actually saw the accused giving birth, and subsequently killing her
own baby. Most of the prosecution witnesses were the neighbors of the accused who allegedly
saw her in bloody clothing two days before a dead baby was found at a creek, and claiming that
they saw a shanty full of blood. Regardless of whether these are true or not, these circumstances
are still insufficient to prove that the accused actually gave birth, and by no stretch of ones
imagination would these circumstances suggest that the accused killed her own baby.
Fourth, no evidence was presented to prove that the dead baby was indeed the child of the
accused. This is the missing link in the instant case, or the missing piece of the puzzle so to
speak. For the prosecution to prove that the accused killed her own baby, it is of utmost
importance that there be evidence linking the accused as the person who just delivered the dead
baby. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed in this regard.
Lastly, no evidence, direct or circumstantial was presented to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the dead baby was born alive and viable. Infanticide, as stated in the foregoing
involves the killing of a new born baby. Absent any proof that said newborn baby was in fact
born alive, one cannot logically conclude that said baby was killed. In fact, granting for the sake
of argument that the accused had just delivered a baby in a shanty somewhere in the mountains,
and away from capable medical assistance and sterile medical facilities and equipments, this
very circumstance itself casts a dark shadow of doubt that said baby ever survived a delivery in
such an environment.
The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the guilt of the accused cannot be
deduced from scrutinizing just one particular piece of evidence, it is more like a puzzle which,
when put together, reveals a remarkable picture pointing towards the conclusion that the accused
is the author of the crime.3 In the instant case, it is clear that the pieces of the puzzle just
simply do not fit together, and the prosecution failed to overthrow the burden of proof that lay
heavily on their shoulders. The Constitutionally enshrined presumption of innocence of the
accused Giralyn Adalia must therefore stand, and the instant case be dismissed.
3

Salvador vs. People, 559 SCRA 461

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable
Court that the above-entitled case as against the accused be dismissed.
Other reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.
Dumaguete City, Philippines, June 19, 2014.
PUBLIC ATTORNEYS OFFICE
Dumaguete City South District
Hall of Justice, E.J. Blanco Drive
Piapi, Dumaguete City

By:

NOTICE OF HEARING
PROS. ETHYL ELECCION-VIDAL/
PROS. JOAN ABADA-MUNOZ
Provincial Prosecution Office
Branch Clerk of Court
RTC Branch 31
Greetings! Please be notified that the foregoing DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE with prior
leave of court is submitted to the Honorable Court for its kind consideration without
further arguments.

Copy furnished:
Pros.Ethyl Eleccion-Vidal/
Pros. Joan Abada-Munoz
City Prosecution Office
Branch Clerk of Court
Branch 31