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and expanded to rule over ethnically and religiously diverse groups of people, often with the aid of a technological advantage. For a time, they would
appear unstoppable, like the Empire in Star Wars. For example, in the 13th century, in less than 100 years, the Mongols used lightning-fast archers on
horseback to expand their empire over 6,000 miles from northern China to Eastern Europe. But just when the empire was at its peak, it split up into four
smaller kingdoms. Other empires rose and fell even more quickly. In just three years (1939-1942), Nazi Germany used the speed of new modern aircraft
and tanks to conquer most of Europe before losing it all two years later. Both the Mongols and the Nazis used new lightning-quick military technology to
dominate areas around them. Both rapidly expanded their territories. Neither empire could sustain its prime area of conquest. No empire ever does.
Historians divide imperialism into two types, formal and informal. With formal imperialism, one country establishes direct political control over a territory,
often as a colony or protectorate. Good examples of this type of control include British rule of the colonies in America before 1776, India (1858 1947),
(123-131). Even though empires dont last forever, they often leave behind a lasting legacy of changes in the forms of political, economic, and cultural
influences. We study empires, then, to help us understand why the modern world is the way it is. For example, hundreds of millions of Latin Americans
today speak Spanish and Portuguese because, five hundred years ago, their ancestors were conquered by Spain and Portugal. The Islamic Empire spread
its religion from Arabia to Morroco to India. Even though this imperial expansion occurred over one thousand years ago, the empires religious influence
lives on. Despite Islams origins on the Arabian Peninsula 4,500 miles away, Indonesia, in Southeast Asia, has the largest Muslim population today. These
far-reaching and long-lasting influences make sense when we understand the history of empires. And, remarkably, in the modern era, England, a small
island nation on the periphery of Eurasia, came to rule over the most impressive empire of all. The fact that England became a dominant world power
through its rule of the British Empire, the largest empire in the history of the world, baffles us even today. How did a small island country (about the size of
Oregon) on the far edge of the Eurasian continent come to rule over one-quarter of the worlds land mass and population? It must have had some unusual
advantages over every other country. Certainly, the wealth and technological advances emerging from the Industrial Revolution contributed a great deal
to the success of the British Empire, especially in the nineteenth century, when England first industrialized. However, the first European colonial empires,
and their increasing control of global trade, began before the Industrial Revolution, so the answer must be more complex. When and why did European
imperial dominance take form? And why didnt powerful Asian countries such as China or India conquer Europe instead of the other way around?
In 2010,
Europe and the United Statesoften referred to as the Westmade up
only 15 percent of the worlds population yet controlled 53 percent of the
worlds wealth (Global distribution of Wealth). As we learned in the Industrial Revolution chapter, its no coincidence
that these same countries have been at the fore of technological revolutions
that occurred in the last two centuries. In 2010, English was the dominant language of the Internet and computer
Studying modern empires also helps us to learn about the origins of the uneven distribution of wealth and technology in the world today.
programming. Despite the relatively small number of native English speakers in the world compared to Chinese or other languages, there are more English
language websites than any other language (Internet World Users). Why are Europe and the United States today so wealthy in contrast to the rest of the
our-well being. On the other hand, the aspiration for quasitotal control over matter,
pushed to an extreme, leads individuals to create the death culture so justly
condemned by environmentalists. The death culture represents a discourse that was strongly
criticized-by a number of groups and scientific disciplines. It appears in the imperialist political
will, where oppression and exploitation, assimilation and cultural genocide, of
subjected people, constitute the golden rule of the powerful colonizing
ruler.But more than control over a territory, its subsoil of its wealth, it is a
form of cannibalism of values and works of art that devours a culture with all
its original creations (Moscovici 1993: 19). The death culture can therefore be
understood in terms of what some environmentalists call genocide and,
transported to the environmental scale, ecocide (ibid. 20), as a mode of
governmentality in which exploitation is the organizing principle of social life.
Ecocide, decried by environmentalists, is reflected in an absence of respect
for the environment, through the pollution of air and water and the
destruction of entire forests stemming form a fetishization of
concrete. Ecocide is the mutation of the environment by genetic
manipulation and cloning, by the nuclear experiment and its production of
radioactive waste. Many environmentalists claim that it is the rule of market
aesthetics (of ugliness), of waste and of stench.
To say this is not to suggest that we abandon the wilderness retreat or the nature journal as green practices. It is to acknowledge
how arduous and inconclusive even our best efforts at greening are. Why should this discourage us?
critique, far from being contrary modes, work together toward slow, authentic change. As Foucault argues,
a permanent reactivation of critique is, at present, our only procedure for determining what is not or is no longer indispensable for
the constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects (ibid. 423). Seen in the light of Foucaults work,
the self-cultivation
of the green subject is a long, difficult historical endeavour with an uncertain result. The
greening of the subject becomes a case of working on our limits ; it is a patient labor giving form to
our impatience for liberty (ibid. 50). To