Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Foundations of speech
act theory
Philosophical and linguistic perspectives
o
London and New York
Contents
List of contributors
Ways of doing things with words: an introduction
Savas L. Tsohatzidis
vii
1
29
50
80
99
132
156
7 O n being truth-valued
Charles Travis
167
187
208
220
vi
Contents
234
267
292
312
323
335
350
365
374
393
407
460
Bibliography
Index
478
491
List of contributors
Purdue University,
West
and
Linguistics,
University of California,
viii
List of contributors
Suppose all you know about John is that, in uttering a certain sentence
yesterday at 5 p.m., he either gave permission to Mary to marry a linguist,
or wished Mary to marry a linguist, or asked whether Mary is going to
marry a linguist, or predicted that Mary will marry a linguist, or objected to
Mary's marrying a linguist. Could you validly infer, from this piece of
disjunctive knowledge, that, no matter which one of these five things John
might have done in uttering the sentence, what he would have meant in
uttering it would be the same? Y o u certainly could not. A n d this suggests
that, in order to identify what a speaker means in uttering a sentence of his
language, it is not enough that you should know which individual he
thereby purports to identify (for example, Mary) and which property he
thereby purports to, truly or falsely, ascribe to that individual (for example,
the property of getting married to a linguist at some point in the future) to put it more generally, it is not enough that you should know which proposition he purports to be expressing in uttering the sentence he utters.
What is required, in addition, is that you should know what is the meaningdetermining act in the context of which he expresses that proposition whether, for example, he expresses it in the context of an act of giving
permission, or in the context of an act of giving a wish, or in the context of
an act of asking a question, or in the context of an act of making a prediction, or in the context of an act of raising an objection, and so on.
These are some of the acts that, under the generic name of illocutionary
acts that was given them by Austin (1962), constitute the primary subject
matter of speech act theory. W h y should they be deemed worthy of
linguistic or philosophical interest? The main reason derives from what has
just been said of them - namely, that they appear to be meaningdetermining acts, in the sense that the identification of what a speaker
means in uttering a sentence of his language is not possible, even after the
proposition he thereby purports to express has been identified, unless it is
further determined which one among the various types of acts of this kind
he is engaged in performing by means of his utterance. If this is so, and if
the study of what speakers of a natural language mean: by uttering
sentences of that language is, as it is generally acknowledged to be, a
itself would standardly be used to mean in that language: just as the fact
that a person can, on a particular occasion, use a hammer in order to open
a locked door does not invalidate the definition of hammers as tools that, in
the population of tool users in which that person belongs, are standardly
used for nailing rather than for opening locked doors, so the fact that a
speaker can, on a particular occasion, use a sentence of his language in
order to mean something different from what that sentence would be taken
as meaning in that language, does not invalidate the characterization of that
sentence's linguistic meaning in terms of what its utterances would standardly be used to mean by the members of the sentence-using population
in which that speaker belongs. In short, sentence meaning and speaker
meaning must be connected, unless the power of natural language
sentences to regularly mean things that ate also meant by speakers of those
natural languages was to be counted as a miraculous coincidence; and the
fact that standard procedures are occasionally put to non-standard employments should be no more surprising in the case of the linguistic behaviour
of a population than h. would be i n the case in the non-linguistic behaviour
of that population.
It is a logical possibility, of course, that, among the various components
that presumably conspire in determining what speakers of natural
languages mean, the illocutionary component should turn out to be relevant in specifying only what these speakers occasionally mean rather than
what they standardly mean. However, there do not appear to be natural
languages where this possibility is realized, since reference to illocutionary
acts appears to be necessary i n specifying not only what speakers of those
languages occasionally mean, but also what they standardly mean (and so,
what the sentences they utter themselves mean) - to give just one, obvious,
example, no one would be counted as a speaker of English if he was
unaware of the fact that the sentences Ts Mary going to marry a linguist?'
and 'Mary is going to marry a linguist' mean different things, and no
account of that difference would be believable unless it specified that the
knowledge in question is, in part, knowledge of the fact that the former, but
not the latter, sentence wonld be standardly usable by a speaker of English
in order to ask whether (rather than to state that) a certain individual called
M a r y is going to marry a linguist, whereas the latter, but not the former,
sentence would be standardly usable by a speaker of English in order to
state that (rather than to ask whether) a certain individual called M a r y is
going to marry a linguist. Reference to illocutionary acts that speakers of
natural languages perform, then, seems necessary in specifying not only
what they occasionally mean, but also what they standardly mean. A n d
since one cannot decide on a priori grounds that, in all languages, only
certain types of illocutionary act will be relevant in characterizing standard
speaker meanings (and hence, sentence meanings), whereas certain other
types of illocutionary act will only be relevant in characterizing occasional
speaker meanings, it seems advisable to approach the various issues
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explicates that aspect of a sentence's meaning by reference to its truth conditions (which may be assumed to be world-relative, but, except when the
sentence contains indexical elements, are assumed not to be contextrelative), this means that one may study the illocutionary aspect of sentence
meaning with or without the further aim of using one's results in order to
revise, if necessary, the various formulations of truth-conditional accounts
of the propositional aspects of sentence meaning. Now, there are linguists
and philosophers who, while acknowledging that the study of illocutionary
acts is a necessary component of the study of sentence meaning, appear to
take it to be impossible that such a study might lead to an account of the
propositional aspect of Sentence meaning that would he revisionary in the
above sense. But this is certainly not a logically impossible outcome, and
one of the most interesting features of the first part of the volume is that it
makes it clear that it is in fact possible. For, although some of the papers in
that part develop accounts of illocutionary aspects of sentence menning
that do not raise (and, given their objectives, do not have to raise) the
question whether a proper treatment of these aspects would necessitate
revisions in truth-conditional conceptions of the propositional aspects of
sentence meaning, many others develop arguments that are specifically
designed to show that a proper understanding of illocutionary acts provides
both the opportunity to nealize serious limitations and the means of overcoming certain difficulties of standard truth-conditional accounts of the
propositional content of natural language sentences.
Given the prominence of the truth-conditional paradigm in recent
linguistic and philosophical discussions of the semantics of natural
languages, the distinction between accounts of illocutionary acts that are
revisionary or nonrrevisionary with respect to their presumed implications
on the proper treatment of propositional content is probably the most
significant distinction to draw when one considers speech act theory from
the viewpoint of what might be called its 'external' relations. But there may
be equally significant distinctions to make from an 'internal' viewpoint as
well - that is, distinctions reflecting fundamental differences in the aims
and methods of proposed analyses of the notion of an illocutionary act,
independently of how these analyses are situated with respect to the
distinction between revisionary and non-revisionary attitudes towards
truth-conditional accounts of propositional content. Probably the most
basic distinction in this regard has to do with the difference between
imposing extensional and intensional criteria of adequacy on one's answer
to the question of what an illocutionary act is - or, to put the matter in a
way that abstracts away from possible differences on the issue of propositional content, between imposing extensional and intensional criteria of
adequacy on one's answer to the question of what it is for a proposition,
however characterized, to be expressed in the context of a performance of
an illocutionary act. A n extensionally correct answer to that question
would, for example, be a system that would characterize the set of all and
only those possible act-kinds that would intuitively be regarded as illocutionary act-kinds, by taking some among them as primitive and by
specifying operations by means of which all the others could be derived
from those taken as primitive. A n d such an answer might well be all that
one would want to be given by way of an analysis of the notion of an illocutionary act. But there is a real sense in which someone in possession of
such an answer, although knowing which act-kinds are illocutionary actkinds, and what are the logical relationships between the primitive and the
non-primitive ones, might not know what it is in virtue of which they all are
illocutionary act-kinds - might not know, that is, what is the (nondisjunctive) property that they all share and that accounts for their
recognition as members of a natural class. A n d it is precisely when one
would have succeeded in specifying such a unifying property that one
would have provided an intensionally correct answer to the question as to
what an illocutionary act is. O f course, providing either an extensionally or
an intensionally adequate answer is no easy matter, and it is not to be
expected either that all the proposed answers will be (or will be intended to
be) complete, or that they will all use the same conceptual resources in
order to reach their common goals. But there can be little doubt about the
value of goals themselves, and several papers in the first part of the volume
make significant attempts towards reaching them, either completely or
partially, both on the extensional and on the intensional side. Consequently, using this 'internal' dimension of variation alongside the 'external'
one mentioned earlier seems to be a safe guide in situating some of the
theoretically crueial proposals that this part of the volume is offering.
The papers by John Kearns and David Shwayder are clear examples of
how far-reaching the proposed revisions of standard truth-conditional
accounts of propositional content can be when taking place in a speech act
theoretic framework. Both papers are mainly concerned with the content of
acts of asserting, which, of all kinds of illocutionary acts, might appear to
be the least likely to disturb standard assumptions about the representation;
of propositional content; they both argue, however, that this appearance is
merely the result of the failure to appreciate that propositional contents,
when properly understood, are no less action-theoretic objects than the
illocutionary acts they support (though, of course, action-theoretic objects
with their own distinctive characters). In 'Meaning, structure and speech
acts', Kearns begins by characterizing certain fundamental relations holding
between elements of complex intentional acts (in particular, the relation
between a component act and an act of which it is a component, the relation between a character-giving and a character-receiving act, and the relation between an enabling and an enabled act), as well as two linguistically
fundamental kinds of acts that may stand in one or more of these relations
to each other - namely, acts of identifying and nets of representing. H e
then shows how the propositional content of an assertion can be perspicuously analysed by reference to these two acts in their various possible
10
11
12
13
them. He then shows that an influential argument that has been taken to be
fatal to that thesis - the argument that the semantic analysis of the words in
question in terms of certain non-fact-stating uses of sentences in which they
occur is unacceptable because it gives no account of the role of these same
words in other sentences with recognizably different uses - is in fact unsuccessful, since a principled account can be provided of the ways in which
the occurrence of these words in sentences whose uses do not have to be
mentioned i n their analysis systematically depends on their occurrence in
sentences whose uses do have to be mentioned in their analysis. He finally
suggests that the broader claim concerning the non-fact-stating nature of
apparently fact-stating utterances could be fruitfully reformulated in terms
of a notion of minimal statementhood (itself modelled on recent proposals
of minimalist definitions of truth), and that, thus reformnlated - that is, as
the claim that not all of the sentences that perform minimal acts of stating
are sentences Derfonnine acts of Dhvsical sianalline - it would make
possible a clearer understanding both of the importance of the speech
act theoretic contribution to the study of sense and of the directions in
which that contribution could be furthered. In 'Contextualism and antir n n t P Y t n a l k m in the nhilosonhv of language' Recanati identifies as another
oneofthe main theses characteristic of the intellectual climate within which
speech act theory was initially conceived the thesis that what the utterance
of a sentence expresses is, even when the sentence does not contain
inHpYiral pvnressions in nart determined bv the context of its utterance H e
heTshow^ that the main argument that has been directed (and has been
u/iHelv a r r e n t e d as valid"* against semantic analvses nronosed in the snirit nf
That Lsis - the argument that these analyses oueht to be rejected because
hev
Itinlv senses beyond necZ^
Z m fact umuccessful s i n it
S
^Hec w n n M
he agreed to
Retaken
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14
P A R T II
The distinction between what the utterance of a natural language sentence
would standardly mean and what it might occasionally mean (which is not,
of course, intended to suggest that 'standard' meanings do not manifest
themselves on all occasions, but rather that 'occasional' meanings only
manifest themselves on a subset of those occasions) is indispntable in
certain central cases, and it is the existence of such cases that has given rise
to the greater part of pragmatic, as distinct from semantic, investigations.
The problems that such investigations must try to solve are of two broad
kinds. First - and obviously, given the existence of a large number of
unclear cases - they must try to formulate principles by reference to which
it could legitimately be decided whecher an interpretation that a sentence
receives is or is not dictated by its standard meaning (and also principles by
reference to which one might distinguish between different kinds of nonstandard meanings, since, just as there are pretheoretically obvious differences between meanings that are standardly conveyed and meanings that
are non-standardly conveyed, there are also pretheoretically obvious differences between various sorts of non-standardly conveyed meanings).
15
16
17
the
doctrine nf 'dirertlv' and 'indirectlv' nerformahle illnrntinnarv arts at least
in its standard Searlian version is of Questionable validitv Rertnlet's hasir
claim in ' A r e there indirect speech acts?' is that, in central cases where the
notion of indirect performance has been invoked, no illocutionary act other
18
than the so-called 'direct' one can legitimately be supposed to have been
performed: the postulation of a further 'indirect' act, Bertolet argues, is
both open to the conceptual objection that it confuses the notion of something's having a certain property with the notion of something's being
treated as if it had that property, and to the methodological objection that
it is not necessary in order to explain the relevant facts (these facts can all
be explained, on Bertolet's proposal, just by supposing that the result of a
hearer's employing the Gricean inferential mechanism in the kinds of
circumstances considered by Searle is merely the conclusion that the
speaker gives oblique information about certain of his mental states, and
not the furthen conclusion than that he actually performs 'indirectly' the
acts that would be normally associated with those states). Holdcroft's basic
claim in 'Indirect speech acts and propositional content' is, on the other
hand, that, in central cases where the notion of an 'indirect' performance of
an illocutionary act has been invoked, no illocutienary act other than this
allegedly 'indirect' one can legitimately be supposed to have been
performed: the postulation of a background 'direct' act, he argues, often
depends on empirically questionable assumptions concerning the extent to
which formal indicators of illocutionary potential are available, leads to
conceptually untenable results when the allegedly co-present 'direct' and
'indirect' acts happen to have conflicting conditions of satisfaction, and is
methodologically suspect since it unnecessarily complicates the account of
the inferential mechanisms that, in the absence of clear formal indications
of illocutionary potential, a hearer can plausibly be supposed to employ in
order to determine what illocutionary act the speaker has performed. The
arguments that these two papers offer against Searle's doctrine of 'direct'
and 'indirect' illocutionary acts might be supposed to proceed from diametrically opposed premises. But they do not have to be supposed to so
proceed, especially if one is prepared to agree that the cases of alleged
'indirectness' that justify the criticisms of the first are not of the same sort
as the cases of alleged 'indirectness' that justify the criticisms of the second,
and conversely. A n d if this is so, one further consideration that the papers
might invite is that the Searlian account of 'direct' and 'indirect' performances of illocutionary acts is problematic not only because it misanalyses
several cases of 'indirectness' that it takes to be central, but also because it
unjustifiably assumes that the phenomena that the label of 'indirectness'
collects are in fact homogeneous. The issue of heterogeneity is also the
main theme of Tsohatzidis's 'Speaker meaning, sentence meaning and
metaphor', though the heterogeneity under discussion there is one that
Searle clearly acknowledges and attempts to account for, since it does not
concern the phenomenon of illocutionary 'indirectness' as such, but rather
the relation between that phenomenon and the phenomenon of figurativity
- a relation that it is important for Searle to be able to elucidate, since both
of these phenomena, though intuitively quite different, are, according to
him, cases of occasional speaker meaning and analysable in terms of the
19
20
act type in terms of certain constitutive rules and a pragmatic characterization of the same type in terms of certain defeasible presumptions - and
points out that an early (and generally neglected) indication of the possibility of such a split can be detected in the different ways in which Searle
and Grice were trying to formulate their common opposition to certain
ways of appealing to linguistic evidence in offering solutions to philosophical problems. The papers by Graham Bird and A s a Kasher, on the
other hand, review, the one negatively and the other positively, detailed
recent proposals as to how the split should be motivated and systematically
represented. In 'Relevance theory and speech acts', Bird begins by
surveying Sperber and Wilson's (1986) arguments to the effect that only
three illocutionary act types should be regarded as associated with standard
sentence meanings, and that all the rest, to the extent that may be allowed
to have a place in an account of linguistic communication, should be
characterized pragmatically using the resources offered by their theory of
relevance. He then suggests that none of the arguments Sperber and
Wilson use in order to motivate either the distinction between setnantically
encoded and non-semantically encoded illocutionary act types, or the
distinction between communicatively significant and communicatively nonsignificant illocutionary act types, rests on secure premises, and that some
of them would not in fact support their purported conclusions, even if their
premises were secure. He finally claims that the principles on which the
theory of relevance is constructed do not ensure that its applications will
not be explanatorily empty, both in general and in connection with the
speech act theoretic issues to which Sperber and Wilson have attempted to
apply them. His conclusion is, then, that at least one way of motivating the
distinction between semantically and pragmatically characterizable illocutionary act types should probably be abandoned. This conclusion does
not, of course, entail that there might not be other ways of motivating that
distinction, and one of Kasher's aims in 'Modular speech act theory:
programme and results' is precisely to defend a different way. Kasher
begins by outlining the general requirements that, on now standard conceptions of cognitive science, should be fulfilled by a theoretical representation of any human competence (linguistic or otherwise) as a property of
the mind. H e then adopts a particular set of independently confirmed
criteria for answering, within that general framework, the question of the
extent to which the organization of any particular human competence is
modular or non-modular (that is, depends for its exercise on specialpurpose or on general-purpose information-processing capacities of the
mind). A n d he finally argues, basing himself both on theoretical considerations and on experimental evidence, that the human competence that is
exercised in the performance of illocutionary acts is organized partly in a
modular and partly in a non-modular way (its modular component being
manifested in the ability to perform illocutionary acts of certain basic types
that have close coimections with standard sentence meanings and appear to
21
Aeor7miE^
applied but also a domain that provides excellent
o p p o r t u ^ i e s for sharpeningmany of these analytical tools.
22
P A R T III
The capacity of a sentence to be standardly used in the performance of
illocutionary acts of a certain kind need not be structurally signalled, in the
sense that sentences structurally similar to it are not logically compelled to
have similar capacities. Nevertheless, the hypothesis that some significant
correlation might be found to exist between the illocutionary capacities of
sentences and their grammatical characteristics is an interesting empirical
hypothesis, and the fact that a particular formulation of that hypothesis generally known as the 'performative hypothesis' - had to be abandoned in
the course of the early history of transformational grammar does not show
that every formulation of it would be similarly indefensible. There are two
distinct types of interest that research aimed at confirming appropriate
formulations of such an hypothesis might serve. First, and less radically,
one might be interested in finding correlations between grammatical
characteristics and illocutionary capacities simply because, once found,
these correlations would make possible a simple and predictively powerful
formulation of that part of the semantics of natural language sentences that
concerns their illocutionary act potential. Second, and more radically, one
might be interested in establishing such correlations in order to extract, by
considering the relations between them, certain conclusions about the
nature of illocutionary acts that would not be available to theoretical
analyses of them that ignore the question of their grammatical manifestation, and that might therefore have to be revised in view of sufficiently
powerful grammatical evidence. (Someone following the less radical way,
for example, might be interested to find that there are correlations between
indicative sentences and acts of asserting, imperative sentences and acts of
requesting, and interrogative sentences and acts of questioning, but might
not envisage that these correlations, important though they are in systematizing the semantic description of the relevant sentence types, are of any
relevance to the analvsis of the concepts of asserting of reauestine or Of
questioning Someone following the more radical way however might
apart from ascertaining these same correlations observe that interrogative
sentences are, in many languages, much more similar, structurally speaking,
to indicatives than they are similar to imperatives, and use this observation
as a basis for claiming that a theoretical analysis of questions as a kind of
heavily hedged assertions would be preferable to the standard analysis of
them as a kind of reauests "1 O f course these two approaches are not in
principle incompatible but they are usually pursued separately and they
are certainly distinct in respect of the range of data that each one would
oblige its follower to take into account: sufficiently rich data from a single
language at a time would be enough for the less radical approach but such
data would obviously be insufficient to give credibility to the kinds of
claims that would be characteristic of the more radical approach, and
appeal to cross-linguistic evidence would accordingly be necessary to
23
support them. The three papers comprising the third part of the volume
offer examples of both approaches, and of the insights that may be gained
by systematically pursuing either one of them.
Robert Harnish's paper on ' M o o d , meaning and speech acts' is a
monograph-length contribution proposing a full theory of sentential moods
(that is, of standard sentence-type/illocutionary act-type correlations) for a
particular language. Harnish prefaces the statement of his theory with an
extensive critical review of major linguistic and philosophical proposals
concerning the analysis of sentential mood, leading to the formulation of
certain criteria that any such analysis must satisfy in order to be both
theoretically illuminating and capable of being integrated with the analysis
of other facets of sentence meaning. H e then formulates a theory of the
major sentential monds of English which meets the previously formulated
criteria of adequacy, and in which each major sentence type is associated,
on the one hand, with a condition controlling its compatibility with some,
but not with other, types of illocutionary act and, on the other hand, with a
condition controlling its compatibility with some, but not with other, types
of satisfaction of propositional content. H e finally notes certain descriptive
and methodological problems that the further development of this theory
would have to solve, and outlines the general character of his proposed
solutions to these problems.
Harnish's approach does not require that the analysis of illocutionary
acts must be checked for its adequacy by reference to, among other things,
the grammatical characteristics of their manifestations, and indeed assumes
that an appropriate analysis of them is available prior to the investigation of
the grammatical make-up of the utterances tokening them. The papers by
Jerrold Sadock and William Croft, on the other hand, argue, each in its
own way, that a proper understanding of the nature of illocutionary acts
must be sensitive to, among other things, known regularities about the
details of their grammatical manifestations, and they naturally seek to
support their claims by appealing to cross-linguistic evidence. In 'Toward a
grammatically realistic typology of speech acts', Sadock begins by
reviewing the best-known taxonomies of illocutionary acts in the philosophical literature, and emphasizes both the arbitrary character of many of
the criteria that they choose as basic, and the unprincipled way in which
they often employ their chosen criteria. H e then develops the thesis that the
most important of the features that, in these taxonomies, are supposed to
establish separate categories of illocutionary acts are in fact only rarely
manifested separately, and that the vast majority of commonly occurring
types of illocutionary acts can and must be analysed as combinations of
three of these features in varying degrees of comparative prominence. H e
finally argues that these three features have characteristic, and crosslinguistically regular, grammatical correlates both in their (rare) isolated
and in their (common) combined occurrences, and that this typological
evidence in their favour makes categorizations of illocutionary acts based
24
25
Parti
Speech acts and semantic
theory
30
31
Illocutionary acts
N o w for the concept of an illocutionary act. This term, due originally to
J . L . Austin (1962), is often seriously underexplained for a technical term.
The usual practice is to give a list of examples and leave it up to the reader
to form an intuitive concept on that basis. That is pretty much what I will
do here, though with some supplementary indications. For a pretheoretical
demarcation of illocutionary act concepts I rely on our familiar indirect
discourse form. W e have a large assortment of devices for making explicit
what someone said (where this is distinguished from what sentence he
uttered), the 'content' of the utterance, what 'message' it conveyed. Here is
a small sample.
32
33
C O M M U N I C A T I O N THEORIES
The I A P theory belongs to a large group of theories of meaning that we
may call 'communication theories'. They fall into a single family by virtue
of identifying the meaning of a linguistic expression with what enables it to
perform a distinctive role in communication, with its 'communicative
potential'. This is, in a way, the obverse of ( A l ) . Since a sentence's
meaning what it does is what makes it usable for a certain communicative
job, why not just identify its meaning with that usability? That is the basic
idea of communication theories.
It may be helpful to mention some theses that are often erroneously
thought to follow from the claims that language is essentially a device for
communication and that the communicative function of language is crucial
for understanding language and, in particular, for understanding the
semantic aspect of language.
1
2
3
34
is the articulation of thought. (2) may be true, but it does not follow from
the communicative approach to the understanding of meaning. A s for
(3) whether it is true depends on how we draw boundaries around
'language'. In any event, that fate of all these views is independent of the
basic commitments of communication theory and of the I A P thesis in
particular.
Communication theories differ as to the feature of communication they
pick as crucial for meaning. Historically the emphasis has been on the fact
that communication involves an attempt to produce psychological effects
on an addressee - get the latter to believe or know something, to act in a
certain way, to adopt or modify attitudes, and so on. Indeed, prior to my
paper 'Meaning and use' (1963) the illocutionary aspect of communication
was almost completely ignored in theories of meaning. Thus John Locke
(1690: B k II, ch. 2, sect, i ff.) held that communication is a matter of trying
to get someone else to realize what ideas the speaker currently has in his or
her mind. One achieves this by producing words that are signs of the
presence of those ideas, the words having acquired this capacity by virtue
of having been regularly used to convey those ideas to a hearer. The
meaning of a word is then identified with the ideas of which it is a sign.
Mid-twentieth-century updates of Locke are found in the writings of
Charles L . Stevenson (1944: ch. 3) and H . P . Grice (1957, 1968, 1969).
Neither of these thinkers deal in Lockean ideas, but the emphasis is still on
the fact that communication involves impacts on the psyches of hearers.
Stevenson identifies the meaning of a linguistic expression with its disposition to produce psychological effects in hearers, the precise effect
varying with circumstances. Grice's more complicated view is that what a
speaker means by his utterance is a function of what effects the speaker
intends to produce in the hearer by means of the hearer's recognition of
that intention. The meaning of a sentence is, roughly, a function of what
effects utterances of it are regularly used to produce.
Borrowing another term from Austin, we may term the Locke,
Stevenson and Grice accounts perlocutionary-act-potential theories. A
'perlocutionary act' is one the application of which to a speaker entails that
the speaker's utterance had an effect of a certain sort. Here are a few
examples.
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
U
U
U
U
U
35
36
37
38
39
O n this approach to the problem our next job is to bring out what it is to
assert, presuppose or imply that something is the case. Since this kind of
activity is more overt and explicit in the case of assertion, that will be a
good place to start. What is it to assert that it is raining outside, by uttering
'It is raining outside'? What is added when I move from using that sentence
to practise pronunciation or to give an example to using it to make that
assertion?
Obviously, what is added must somehow involve the proposition that it
is raining outside. Otherwise, how could it make my utterance an assertion
of that proposition rather than some other? But it does not involve that
proposition in any of the ways that might initially strike one. The truth or
falsity of that proposition is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of
my asserting it. I can assert that p whether it is true or false. More generally, the crucial condition cannot be something that obtains independently
of the speaker. Whatever turns my utterance into an assertion that p must
connect me with pj it must be some 'stance' I have or take vis-a-vis p. But
here too the most obvious suggestions do not work. M y believing that p is
neither necessary nor sufficient. Not necessary, for I may be lying. Not
sufficient, for if it were I would constantly be asserting everything I believe!
There are two further reasons for rejecting my belief that p as the crucial
addition here; and a consideration of these reasons will further our
endeavour to understand the situation.
(a) The condition must he something within U ' s control.
It must be 'up to me' whether, in uttering the sentence S, I am asserting
that p, rather than, say, practising pronunciation. Surely I can move from
one to the other at w i l l .
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hence that there is just ground for complaint, in case the conditions in
question are not satisfied. Thus we may take the following as explaining 'In
uttering S U took responsibility for its being the case that p'.
( R l ) In uttering S, U knowingly takes on a liability to (lays himself open
to) censure, reproach, being taken to task, being called to account
. . . in case of not-p.
O n this account, performing an illocutionary act goes beyond mere
sentence utterance by virtue of the speaker's engendering what we might
call a 'normative' state of affairs - the speaker's being subject to just
complaint or censure, in case certain conditions are not satisfied. It is the
shift in normative status that is crucial here; it is not that U does something
that makes a respondent psychologically able to blame h i m . What U does
is to render such negative reactions appropriate or relevant. Moreover, as
in other cases this appropriateness is only prima facie. Whether an overt
objection or complaint is justified on the whole depends on other factors. If
the transgression is minor, and if being upbraided for it would upset me in
such a way as to endanger my health or my life, one would not be justified
on the whole in censuring me. A n d even if censure would be justified, the
matter may not be important enough to warrant anyone's taking the
trouble. Considerations of decoinm or social rank may preclude anyone's
actually calling me to account. A n d so on.
Since it is a matter of U ' s taking on this liability, rather than a matter of
U ' s being subject to the liability, willy-nilly, this suggestion satisfies our first
constraint (a) that it be up to U whether the crucial condition holds. A n d it
satisfies the second constraint (b), since U takes on the liability in issuing
the utterance, not just at the same time thereof.
Needless to say, when I speak of U ' s knowingly taking on the liability, I
do not imply that this is something U has before his mind at the moment,
something he is consciously envisaging. It can be like other things we
'knowingly', deliberately, intentionally do, while our mind is wholly
engaged with other concerns. That it is 'knowing' is shown by how U
responds to reactions that presuppose that liability. If he readily acknowledges their pertinence, that satisfies my condition.
This account needs sharpening in at least two respects before it is ready
to be sent out into the world.
(i) With respect to each of the conditions, c, for which U takes responsibility, we have to recognize that whether U is blameworthy depends not
so much on whether it is actually the case that c, but on U's epistemic position vis-a-vis c. If c is not the case but U has every reason to suppose it to
obtain, then he cannot be rightly called to account, though there is still
something defective about his utterance. Contrariwise, if c does obtain, but
U has every reason for thinking it does not, he could still be properly
upbraided. T o illustrate these points, suppose that, as your superior officer
in the military I order you to report to my room. Say you are physically
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unable to do so, though I have ample reason to think you are able. Then I
could hardly be called to account for the issuance of the order (provided I
withdraw it when I realize the situation). If, on the other hand, you are able
to report but I have ample reason to suppose you are not, but issue the
order anyway, perhaps in order to cause confusion, then I could properly
be taken to task (by someone who knows all the facts), even though all of
the conditions for which I take responsibility are satisfied. There are further
complexities here into which I will not be able to go in this paper. F o r
present purposes, let's modify each of the conditions in the above iists by
prefacing it with ' U has sufficient reason to suppose t h a t . . . ' .
(ii) I have been using a scatter-shot technique to give an idea of the
reactions to which U renders herself rightfully liable (given certain conditions) in her utterance. I have used a variety of terms - 'complain',
'object', 'blame', 'censure', 'upbraid', 'correct', 'reproach', 'take to task',
'call to account'. It would be desirable to have a more unified account, to
say what all these have in common. M y suggestion is that they are all
appropriate reactions to something impermissible, something the agent
ought not to have done, something that was in violation of a rule. There is a
variety of such reactions just because what specific behaviour is appropriate
on the whole depends, as we have seen, on further features of the situation.
The only thing that binds all these together is the realization or 'perception'
on the part of the reactor that the first party has violated some rule. Thus
the only way to get a non-disjunctive formulation of the crucial condition is
to do it in terms of rule violation.
(R2) U uttered S as subject to a rule that implies that a necessary condition of U ' s uttering S (in circumstances like these) is that U
have sufficient reason to suppose that:
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What follows is then a list of conditions like those given above. (Since we
have put the qualifier 'have sufficient reason to suppose that' in the coverall
prologue, we need not attach it to each condition.) W e may take this as an
alternative explication of ' U took responsibility for the obtaining of the
following conditions', i.e., an alternative to ( R l ) . I take it to be a deeper
explication in that it brings out what is behind the phenomenon of 'taking
responsibility', namely, recognizing that a sentence is governed by a rule
that lays down conditions of permissible utterance. We wiU see that this
notion is what is crucial to the I A P account of sentence meaning.
I hope it is clear that what is said to be necessary for the performance of
the illocutionary act of, for example, promising A to take him to the
meeting that evening is not that the conditions listed earlier under that
rubric actually obtain, but rather that U take responsibility for their
obtaining , i.e. (using the (R2) explication), that U utter the sentence as
subject to a rule that makes her having sufficient reason to suppose those
conditions to obtain a necessary condition of permissible utterance of the
sentence. This leaves open the possibility that one does perform that illo-