North American Philosophical Publications

Aristotle on the Extension of Non-Contradiction

Author(s): Edward Halper
Source: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Oct., 1984), pp. 369-380
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications
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History of Philosophy
Quarterly
Volume 1,Number 4, October 1984

ARISTOTLE ON THE EXTENSION OF

NON-CONTRADICTION
Edward Halper
of Metaphysics
discussions
T4-8 focus their attention on
and
Aristotle's
MOST
presenting
evaluating
arguments forwhat he calls
the "firmest principle of all things" (1005bll-12),
and what we generally
call the "principle of non-contradiction."1 Aristotle surely is concerned to
show that those who deny the principle implicitly or explicitly are reduced
to incoherence. However,
the view that this is his only concern in T4-8
that this section is merely an island of logic in a sea of
presumes
metaphysics. On this usual view, T4-8 is consistent with Aristotle's other
concerns, but does not advance his metaphysical
investigation. Iwill take
a different approach here. It seems to me that Aristotle
is using the
can
discussion of non-contradiction
in T4-8 to explain how metaphysics
include all beings (t<x '?vtcO in its subject matter. More interesting than
the claim that non-contradiction
holds is the claim that all beings fall
its scope OaTracri -yap vrrapxei tols oixriv?1005a22-23).
under
What
the basis
grounds support this claim? I contend that we can understand
for the universal extension of non-contradiction by considering Aristotle's
use of "one"(T? ?v) and the closely related term for the unity possessed
If I am correct, Aristotle's
by a plurality, "same" (t? aW??1018a7-8).
some
more
recent
bears
with
connection
attempts to answer
analysis

metaphysical
questions by taking logical formulae like the principle of
non-contradiction and determining which kinds of entities would satisfy
such formulae. Aristotle's chief concern in T4-8 is to show what any being
is to extend to it. It is worth noting in
must be like ifnon-contradiction
are
his
that
conclusions
somewhat
different frommore current
advance
ones.

Before any consideration of how Aristotle justifies the universal exten

there is the question of what
sion of the principle of non-contradiction,
means
the
the
that
claim
he
principle "belongs to all beings." The
by
term "belongs" Orrapxei) regularly expresses the relation of attributes to
substances. Does Aristotle use this term in order to suggest that the
as out
principle is a kind of attribute? Such a suggestion would not be
rageous as itmight at first seem. However, there is no evidence that this
369

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370

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

iswhat Aristotle had inmind, and there is no need to pursue this question
further here. Let us simply assume that T3-8 uses "belongs" in a general,
non-technical way. The principle of non-contradiction
"belongs" to all
more
of
it
all
because
holds
modern
beings
beings. Using
terminology,
Aristotle might have spoken of the universal extension of the principle
of non-contradiction. Or he could have said that each being is "subject
to" or "falls under the scope of the principle, or that the principle "holds
of or "is true of each being.
the principle as extending
Just how, though, are we to understand
one
to
of
all
Aristotle's
formulations of the
Consider
universally
beings?
same
not
"the
cannot
and
belong to the same
belong
principle:
(being)
same
same
in
at
the
the
The
time
and
respect" (1005bl9-20).
(being)
In
refers
to
two
Of
which
does
the
hold?
other
principle
principle
beings.
words, does the principle of non-contradiction extend to all beings because
(1) no being can belong and not belong to a substrate, or because
(2) no
attribute can belong or not belong to any being? To allay any suspicions
that the problem arises from the abuse of the idea of the extension of the
principle letme pose the question in still a different way: is the principle
falsified by (1) an attribute that belongs and does
of non-contradiction
not belong or by (2) the substrate towhich itbelongs and does not belong?
It is easy to see that these formulations are equivalent and that neither
is adequate.
alternative
If, though, (1) the principle refers to the being
that belongs to the substrate or if the principle is falsified by the attribute,
then it cannot extend to substances because they are not predicated of
all beings. If, on the other hand, (2) the principle extends to the being
that is qualified by attributes or if the principle is falsified by a substrate,
then the principle extends only to substances; for attributes are not qual
ified by attributes (1007b2-3). Neither alternative is satisfactory.
In fact, though, this dichotomy is bogus. The principle is about both
substances and attributes, and any falsification must involve both: the
principle would be false if some substance were qualified by an attribute
in the same respects. Apparently,
non-contradiction
and its negation
extends to both substances and attributes but in different ways. Sub
stances fall under the principle because they cannot be qualified in con
tradictory ways; attributes fall under the principle because they cannot
qualify in contradictory ways.
Can this be the way that the principle of non-contradiction belongs to
all beings? Probably not. This interpretation makes the principle ambigu
ous; the principle would say different things about substances and attri
butes. Further, this interpretation places the force of the principle on
for it is the character of substances that does not allow of
substances;
and thus enables the principle to extend to all
contrary qualification,
This
interpretation begins to resemble alternative (2).While Aris
beings.
do away
totle does assert that philosophers who deny non-contradiction
he also speaks of attributes
with substance and essence (1007a20-21),

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ARISTOTLE ON NON-CONTRADICTION

371

such as "sweet" as if they had essences (1010b23-28), and his argument

that non-contradiction
extends to such attributes does not refer to the
in which they inhere. In short, non-contradiction
substances
extends to
attributes in a more significant way than this interpretation admits.
Some commentators have in fact construed the extension of the principle
along the lines I have just rejected and limited their discussions to sub
stance.2 However, Aristotle is quite clear about the universal extension
of the principle.
It is possible to develop the formulation of the principle that I gave
earlier in a way to explain how attributes fall under it:Aristotle accepts
attributes as having essences and as thereby capable of having their own
attributes (in a secondary sense). This will be clearer later. For the present
the easiest way to understand the universal extension of the principle is
to focus on another of Aristotle's formulations of the principle: "it is not
possible for the same (being) to be and not be at the same time" (B2,
996b30; also 1006bl8-19). Unlike the other formulations, this one involves
only a single being. There is no longer any difficulty in understanding
how it can extend to attributes: it is impossible for sweet to be and not
to be at the same time in the same respect, etc. And the formulation
applies in the same way to substances.
The reason that the importance of this formulation has been overlooked
may be that commentators have been distracted by a distinction between
an objective principle of non-contradiction
that applies to things and a
a
or
"law of thought."3 (1) "It is
is
that
subjective
psychological principle
same
not
the former while
to
be
and
to
be"
instances
for
the
impossible
(2) "it is impossible for someone to believe the same to be and not to be
at the same time" is an instance of the latter. This second appears in the
initial discussion of non-contradiction
(1) appears else
(r3, 1005b29-30);
and (2) placed among
where in T4-8. Since the two are distinguished
psychological principles, the significance of the formulation in T has been
missed.

that neither things nor thoughts can contradict

Aristotle does maintain
each other, but it is a mistake to divide this view into two distinct prin
is a principle of thought is that
ciples. The reason that non-contradiction
we
are
not
to
if
know them. Non-contradiction
cannot
be
and
be
both
things
is at once a claim about the nature of things and about our capacity to
know them. Accordingly, when Aristotle prefaces the principle with, "it
is impossible for someone to believe...," he is not expressing a psychological
belief here is clear later when he
principle. The reason he mentions

they
that, though people verbally deny non-contradiction,
acknowledges
cf. 1005b35-1006a2).
do not really believe what they say (1009al6-22;
Thus, the statement of the principle that includes belief is not different
from the one that omits it.With this conclusion we can see the formulation
the universal
that I have claimed allows us to most easily understand
other statements of
extension of the principle present with Aristotle's

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372

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

Since there is ample evidence of it

the principle in T3 (1006b26-27).
there is no reason to suppose
T4-8
(e.g. 1006a3-4; 1006bl8-19),
throughout
that it is not Aristotle's central formulation.
II
That non-contradiction extends to all beings is now clear. What, though,
is the basis for this universal extension? Philip Merlan has argued that
Hintikka's
analysis of the Greek view of knowledge answers this ques
tion.4According toHintikka, the objects ofknowledge must be unchanging
for the Greeks because their knowledge claims are temporally indefinite;
i.e., they include no references to time. Claims about an object that could
change would be falsified if the object did change. Lacking any reference
to time, a knowledge claim must be about something that does not change
if it is to be eternally true.

is
Now Aristotle maintains
that the principle of non-contradiction
clearest in regard to supersensibles and that those who deny the principle
do so because they fail to recognize a realm beyond the sensible (1009a36
the prin
1012b30-31). According to Merlan,
38; 1010al-3;
1010a25-35;
as
to
because,
ciple obviously applies
supersensibles
they
unchanging,
can be the object of knowledge claims that cannot be contradicted. Aris
totle extends the principle to sensible substances by recognizing that they
too are "permanent and exempt from the flux of time."5
This analysis has the advantage
of explaining Aristotle's
otherwise
in T4-8. However, it contains three
puzzling remarks about supersensibles
serious defects. First, the principle of non-contradiction
is not temporally
indefinite. It is Plato who probably sees a contradiction in Socrates' sitting
and not sitting. Aristotle denies a contradiction here by noting that the
sitting and the not sitting are not at the same time Octroi).While
'ct|xa
is surely
may be rendered "together" here, the temporal qualification
included in the principle (see 1005b27-28).
Even if the principle were temporally indefinite, there would be other
problems with Merlan's
interpretation. The least of these is that it extends
the principle only to substances. It is quite clear that Aristotle regards
the principle as extending to all beings. Can accidents too be "permanent
and exempt from the flux of time"?
A more important difficulty is that Merlan does not really explain why
the principle extends to sensible substances. On what ground does he
claim that they are unchanging? Quite the contrary, instead of justifying
the extension of non-contradiction, the Merlan-Hintikka
analysis rather
explains why Aristotle's philosophical predecessors would have asserted
that there are contradictions in the sensible world: temporally indefinite
claims about changing things will be contradictory. Plato in particular
supplies a similar analysis in the Timaeus in order to reject the possibility
forms can be objects of
of knowledge of sensibles. Only the unchanging

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ARISTOTLE ON NON-CONTRADICTION

373

knowledge. Sensibles are objects of belief (28a); they may not possess an
account (Xcryos) that is "at all points entirely consistent with itself and
exact" (29c, Cornford; cf. 51e). In short, Plato is claiming that sensibles
admit of contradictions,6 and the Merlan-Hintikka
analysis seems to lie
behind this conclusion. If, though, this is the case, and ifAristotle and
Plato express knowledge claims in temporally indefinite sentences, then
both of them are inmuch the same position in regard to non-contradiction.
In sum, ifMerlan's analysis is correct, it is hard to see how Aristotle has
to sensi
any basis for going beyond Plato in extending non-contradiction
bles. We must look elsewhere ifwe are to find a justification for extending
the principle universally.

Ill
The preceding analysis has not adequately explained the basis forAris
to all beings, but one point at least
totle's extension of non-contradiction
is effectively
the
of non-contradiction
of
extension
is clear: the question
of
of
of
to
Platonic
the
the
knowledge
problem
possibility
equivalent
sensibles. There can be no doubt that non-contradiction holds of Plato's
forms and Aristotle's
supersensibles. The crucial question is whether it
also extends to sensibles. If not, they cannot be known. If, though, the
principle does extend to sensibles, there is no reason to doubt that they
are knowable. In this light the assertion of the universal applicability of
claim.
the principle is a significant metaphysical
issue. In
There is no doubt that Aristotle is aware of the metaphysical
a
"it
that
is
is
T3 he asserts that non-contradiction
necessary
principle
If non-contradic
to know for anyone who knows anything" (1005bl6-17).
tion is a necessary prerequisite of knowledge, itmust extend just as far
as knowledge does.
The question remains, however, on what basis does Aristotle maintain
that non-contradiction, and thus knowability, extend to sensibles? Rather
than addressing this question, T4-8 seem to concentrate on establishing
the principle of non-contradiction by means of a series of "elenchic argu
Yet there
ments" that refute denials of the principle (cf. 1006all-13).
reasons for doubting this traditional picture. I am going
are, Imaintain,
tomaintain
that Aristotle's primary concern lies not somuch with estab
as with the twin issues of the principle's uni
non-contradiction
lishing
versal extension and the possibility of knowing sensibles.
As

first

acknowledges
The

starting

something
(cnqixatveiv)

is not for our opponent

point of all such arguments
seem to beg the question?but
is or is not?this
might
to himself
and to another
(1006al8-20).
something

if "man"

Further
mal."

that Aristotle
step, let us consider the assumption
as the first step in all of his elenchic arguments:

And

I mean

signifies

(something)

by "signifying

one,

(something)

let this be
one"

to say that
to signify

the "two-footed

thus:

if "man"

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ani

is some

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

374

thingwhich is a man, then this (something) is the being ofman (toavftpom <p
elvai) (1006a31-34).
contain a number of equations. Aristotle begins by
passages
assuming merely that there is significant speech. However, for a term to
signify something is for it to signify (something) one. And, as Aristotle
explains in the confusing last lines, the "one (thing)" signified in the case
of "man" is "two-footed animal," the "being of man." Since the latter
phrase surely indicates the essence ofman, Aristotle is pointing out that
significant speech requires the existence of essences. The term "man"
it
it designates Socrates or Cleinias,
but because
signifies not because

These

refers

to an

essence.

Continuing down a few lines from the last quotation, we see Aristotle
refer to "two-footed animal" as the definition (\070s) ofman. To signify
one thing is to have one definition. Since the definition of a term expresses
the essence of the thing designated by the term, the assumption that the
term signifies an essence is tantamount to the assertion of its definability.
later in T he speaks of
Indeed, when Aristotle refers to this assumption
the necessity of starting from definitions (1012a21-24; b5-8).
Assumption of the existence of significant speech seems innocuous; but
once we unpack all that Aristotle regards as necessary for significant
claims that a denier of non-con
speech, we are faced with metaphysical
tradiction could scarcely be expected to accept. Is Aristotle really asking
us to accept these metaphysical
claims in order to establish non-contradic
tion? This question is complicated by the fact that, in the wake of later
Wittgenstein, we at least recognize the force of positions that insist on
significant speech but dismiss definitions and essences. If non-contradic
tion rests upon an identification of significant speech with reference to
essences, Aristotle's analysis will surely seem ineffective.
It seems tome that a consistent Wittgensteinean
is unable tomaintain
the impossibility of something's both being and not being. The closest he
can come to this view is a claim about language: we do not in fact say
that something is and is not; it just is not done. However, my concern
but Aristotle.
here is not Wittgenstein
Let us, then, return to the question of how Aristotle can ask us to
assume that there are essences in order to refute denials of non-contradic
tion. The first step to resolving this difficulty is to see that the full
significance of the assumption does not become clear until the arguments
get under way. Aristotle's opponent accepts only that there is significant
speech and this occurs, Aristotle explains, when a term such as "man"
signifies something that is one. T4-8 begin only with this assumption;
but in the course of the analysis it becomes clear what it involves.
is obviously only partial. In order forAristotle to be
This explanation
unpacking the assumption of definability in T4-8, he must already accept
It is possible that T4-8 intend
the apparent conlusion, non-contradiction.

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ARISTOTLE ON NON-CONTRADICTION

375

only to show the close connection of definability, essences, significant

does do this?but Aristotle's constant
speech, and non-contradiction?it
method is to point out how the assumption of another character allows
us to refute denials of non-contradiction. He seems to be assuming that
non-contradiction
holds and using this to support the assumptions
of
definability and essences.
The conclusion that emerges from this discussion is that the real import
of T 4-8 is not in establishing non-contradiction
but in asserting the
in
claims
contained
what
is
metaphysical
presented as an assumption.
The apparent conclusion, non-contradiction,
is functioning as a premise
that supports the apparent premise but real conclusion, definability. In
is clear from the
short, as I see Aristotle's analysis, ?on-contradiction
to assume
start. The issue is, what is it necessary
in order to refute
denials of non-contradiction?
or, what are things to be like if non-con
tradiction is to hold? Aristotle's answer is that they must have essential
definitions. We know that things have essences because this assumption
allows us to infer non-contradiction. Of course, this argument provides
only probable support for the existence of essences.
The necessity of justifying what Aristotle calls the starting point of
the argument, definability, supports my claim that it is definability or
the existence of essences that is at issue in T4-8. Aristotle does mention
philosophers who seem to deny non-contradiction, but he never entertains
the definability
serious doubts about it. Instead, the text emphasizes
assumption. In addition to the long passage that I partially quoted above,
Aristotle carefully points out three more times that his arguments rest
on the "assumption" of definability (1006bll-13;
1012a21-24; b5-8). Why
does Aristotle emphasize a controversial "assumption"
that he does not
answer
that
he
is
intends
the
fact that the
The
only
justify?
plausible
assumption allows us to infer non-contradiction as a kind of justification
for the assumption.
Additional
support formy interpretation lies in T 3's claim, to which
is presupposed by all knowledge.
I earlier referred, that non-contradiction
if it is to be knowable.
A being must be subject to non-contradiction
T4-8
from
of
all
the
However,
definability in order to
arguments
begin
arrive at non-contradiction. Now if a being is definable, it possesses an
essence, and it is surely knowable. Hence, in assuming definability, Aris
what T3 claims requires non-con
totle is assuming knowability?exactly
tradiction. On the surface, Aristotle is going in a circle: he is assuming
(definability) in order to show knowability. However, once
knowability
we recognize that the real starting point is non-contradiction the difficulty
to support definability,
vanishes. Artistotle is using a non-contradiction
In sum, Aristotle's claim in T3 that
and thereby showing knowability.
non-contradiction is presupposed by all knowledge suggests that Aristotle
is using non-contradiction to support definability and thereby knowabil
ity.
If the foregoing analysis

is correct, the force of T 4-8 does not lie in

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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

376

establishing non-contradiction but in supporting definability,

that beings have essential definitions.

the claim

IV
interpretation of T 4-8 that I have been expounding puts us in a
position to tackle the central question of this paper, on what basis does
The
Aristotle
extend the principle of non-contradiction
universally?
answer, stated simply, is that all beings possess essential definitions.
However, Aristotle cannot support the universal extension by referring
to support his claim
to essences. As I see it, he uses non-contradiction
that sensibles have essences.
The

remainder of this paper, I am going to reconstruct the outlines

I take to be Aristotle's analysis in T4-8. As I have mentioned,
begins with a part of the assumption of definability, that terms
"man" signify something one, and then uses this along with
to delimit the rest of the definability claim.
non-contradiction

In the
of what
Aristotle
such as

Why must Aristotle assume that a term signifies a "one"? Consider

the variety of formulations of the principle: "It is impossible for the same
to be and not be at the same time" (1005b29-30).
"The same cannot be
qualified by contraries at the same time" (1005b26-27). "The same cannot
belong and not belong to the same at the same time" (1005bl9-20).
to all of these formulations is the assumption
Common
that what is
to
the
is
the
"same."
This
term
latter
subject
principle
signifies oneness
of substance (1012all,
1018a4-9). The assumption that "man" signifies
something that is one allows us to speak of "man" as "one and the same"
and thereby to substitute it into the statement of the principle of non-con
tradiction.
Obviously, it is no contradiction to assert "something is" and also "some
thing is not" unless the "something" in each case is one and the same.
That a term signifies a "one" is a precondition for even expressing it in
the formulation of the principle. Clearly, only things that are one can be
subject to non-contradiction.
claim seems thoroughly trivial, but its consequences
for Greek
are
It
shows
Plato
would
restrict
philosophy
profound.
immediately why
the principle of non-contradiction to forms. In the Phaedo he distinguishes
This

the

forms

as

"always

the

same"

(ctei

(ixroarrcos

Taina

exovTa)

from

the

sensibles which are "never the same" (80b). Lacking all sameness and
oneness, the sensibles are not in themselves subject to the principle of
non-contradiction.
It is not that Plato is claiming that they are necesarily
contradictory. They simply fall outside of the scope of the principle. It is
not clear how the principle could apply to them.
The same insight lies behind Cratylus' correction of Heraclitus.
The
reason that it is impossible to step into the same river even once is that,
in perpetual flux, the river is never properly the "same" (1010al2-15).

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ARISTOTLE ON NON-CONTRADICTION

377

That a term signifies something one and the same is a minimum pre
condition for even considering whether what the term signifies is subject
to the principle. Clearly, then, for a thing to be subject to non-contradiction
it is necessary that it be "one" and the "same". Furthermore, it is obvious
that it is sufficient for it to possess the eternal unchanging
unity and
sameness of the Platonic form to be subject to the principle. Thus Aristo
tle's references to the principle's being obvious for supersensibles. Aristo
tle's insight is that possessing a weaker kind of unity is also sufficient
for a thing to be subject to the principle. In particular, he claims that we
need only assume that a term signifies some one nature in order to infer
non-contradiction. The term or the nature is one in that it possesses an
essential definition (cf. T 6, 1016a32-35). His analysis has two parts. The
to deduce non-contradiction.
first, comprising T4, uses this assumption
In the second, beginning in T 5, Aristotle ismaintaining
that arguments
advanced to dispute the applicability of the principle to sensibles are not
compelling. Although Aristotle's analysis is quite lengthy, a brief sketch
will suffice for the present purposes.
Aristotle begins, as I have noted, with the assumption that a term such
as "man" signifies one thing. Then, the negation of this term must signify
something else. Were this not the case, then there would be no difference
in asserting "man" and "not-man." It follows that to claim that "man" is
"not-man" is tomake two things one, an absurdity. Hence, this denial of
non-contradiction must be false (cf. 1006bl8-32).
that to completely
Pursuing these considerations, Aristotle maintains
one
names to signify
to
and
all
non-contradiction
is
make
all
things
deny
one thing. The question ofwhether non-contradiction obtains then comes
down to the question whether a name signifies a particular essential
nature or whether all names signify one and the same thing. In the latter
Heraclitean world (cf.Phys. 185bl9-25) there can be no significant speech.
Thus, anyone who tries to assert the Heraclitean
position necessarily
contradicts himself.
that there are contradictions
Of course, anyone who seriously maintains
a
to
demonstration
that he too is contradicting
be
bothered
is unlikely
by
himself. However, Aristotle's analysis shows that anyone who maintains
the Heraclitean
position must also surrender significant speech.
T 4 goes on to argue that someone denying non-contradiction also gives
up "substances and essences" (1007a20ff.). The analysis is similar towhat
we have seen. If there is an essence ofman, then this essence will be
different from the essence of not-man. To claim that man is not-man is
tomake two things one.
In this way Aristotle uses the "assumption" that a term signifies some
has a single
thing one to dismiss denials of non-contradiction. Whatever
essential nature is subject to the principle. But the question remains,
claim
which terms signify such a nature? For the refutation ofHeraclitus'

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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

378

that non-contradiction never obtains, it suffices to prove that it holds in

at least a single instance. However, Aristotle's position ismuch stronger.
He maintains
that the principle always obtains. Thus, each name involved
in significant discourse must signify one essential nature.
to argue directly for this position, Aristotle confines his atten
Unable
tion to dismissing arguments that have supported contrary conclusions.
There are two sorts. First, physicists such as Anaxagoras
point to the
fact that sensibles change and take on contrary characters (1009a22-38;
1010a7-9). Aristotle's response is that sensible substances possess these
characters potentially but not actually; they are potentially two but actu
Further, despite these changes the form of the
ally one (1009a32-36).
sensible substance does not alter (1010a22-25). Hence, these arguments
are not grounds for denying non-contradiction
of sensible substances.
stems
The second kind of argument advanced to deny non-contradiction
the
fact
from Protagoras'
of
From
that
different
sensation.
interpretation
people sense the same thing as both sweet and non-sweet, Protagoras
seems to conclude that the same thing has these contrary characters.
in ascribing one of
says Aristotle, we are simply mistaken
Nonsense,
these qualities to the thing. In any case, though, the sweet itself of neces
sity has its own nature, and we are always right about it. "Sweet" cannot
be and not be (1010bl9-26). Thus, to avoid Protagorean denials ofnon-con
that sensible characters have their own
tradiction Aristotle assumes
essential nature. "Sweet" and other accidents must also signify one thing.
Hence, Protagoras' argument also fails to be a ground for denying non-con
tradiction of sensibles.
Both of these arguments address the question of the extension of non
contradicton, and both posit the existence of essences in order to dismiss
denials of non-contradiction. The only way tomake sense of these argu
ments is to acknowledge
that they are assuming that non-contradiction
does hold. Only ifAristotle is convinced that non-contradiction holds can
he advance the existence of essences of sensible substances and of acci
dents as a way of avoiding contradictions. Again, the force of this argu
ment lies not in asserting that non-contradiction holds but in justifying
the existence of essences on the ground that they allow us to dismiss
arguments

against

non-contradiction.

From Aristotle's perspective there is no doubt that what is subject to

non-contradiction must be "one" in some way. While Plato insists that
a variety of things said
only the forms are one, Aristotle distinguishes
to be "one" in A 6. In T4-8 he maintains
that something that is "one" in
is
virtue of possessing an indivisible essential formula (cf. 1016b32-35)
subject to the principle of non-contradiction. Aristotle disputes Plato by
showing that a weaker "one" suffices to dismiss denials of the principle
and that ifwe assume that all beings are "one" in this way we can dismiss
Since all beings will be one in
all arguments against non-contradiction.
the pertinent way only if they all possess essences, Aristotle is assuming

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ARISTOTLE ON NON-CONTRADICTION

379

in order to refute arguments against

that all beings possess essences
non-contradiction must hold, we ought to
non-contradiction.
Because
accept the claim that all beings possess essences. The reasoning is induc
tive but anyone challenging Aristotle bears the burden of finding an
alternative way of rejecting arguments against non-contradiction.
Several loose ends remain. First, ifmy analysis is correct, Aristotle is
to assert that all beings possess
using the discussion of non-contradiction
essences. Essence
(to tl i\v elvai), however, is often thought to belong
it is a mistake.
exclusively to substances. Though this view iswidespread,
in its primary and strict sense does belong to substance alone;
Essence
but Aristotle also recognizes a secondary sense inwhich all beings possess
an essence and a definition (Z 4, 1030a29-32,
17-23). It is this secondary
essence to which Aristotle refers when he claims that deniers of non-con
tradiction destroy essences (1007a20-21).7
Second, what are we now to say about the multiplicity of formulations
The problem we encountered earlier was how to
of non-contradiction?
apply them to accidents. However, once we recognize that accidents have
some sort of essence, this difficulty vanishes. If an accident possesses any
attributes. To be sure,
essence, it can also be said to have accidental
Aristotle
insists that an accident can only qualify another accident if
non
both belong to the same (proper) substrate (1007b2-5). Nevertheless,
contradiction can still be asserted of the attribute: it is impossible for a
white (thing) to be musical and not-musical at the same time in the same
respect, etc. This statement is equivalent to asserting that it is impossible
to be and not be at the same time. It follows, then, that
for the musical
to all beings. This conclusion
all of the formulations apply equivalently
depends on my analysis and stands in support of it.
Finally, I earlier promised to put T 4-8 in the context of Aristotle's
This task is now nearly complete.
larger concerns in the Metaphysics.
Let me only add that these chapters are an appropriate sequel to ri-2.
After arguing that there is a single science that knows all beings insofar
as they are beings, Aristotle is faced with the spectre of a Heraclitean
universe. In accordance with the Aristotelian notion of a science, to claim
that there is one science of all beings is to claim that there is one formula
of all beings. Thus, the result of ri-2 looks very much like the Heraclitean
universe where everything has a single formula (Aristotle even insists
that non-beings are-1003bl0).8

that we
The question Aristotle then faces is, is the only knowledge
as
Aristotle
of
them
have of all beings the knowledge
answers,
beings? No,
for then all would be one; there would be contradictions; and there would
each being must be known not
be no significant speech. Consequently,
own
a
essential formula; itmust be
as
its
but
also
through
being
merely
one nature. That this is the case is the real result of T4-8. It remains to
Z-H and especially to Z 4-5 forAristotle to explain how each being can
have its own formula.

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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

380

To conclude, in T 4-8 Aristotle is considering a logical principle, non-con

claim that each being
tradicton, in order to arrive at the metaphysical
possesses some sort of essence. Although this conclusion will surely be
disputed, many modern philosophers should feel sympathy with Aristo
tle's

procedure.

University

Received

of Georgia

1, 1983

August

NOTES
1. See,

e.g., Christopher

Clarendon

Press,

Aristotle

1971),

(Dordrecht,

Aristotle's

Kirwan,
pp. 85-121;

Holland:

R. M.

D. Reidel,

Dancy,
1975).

one of the "firmest principles;"

but Aristotle
here.
tion, and I shall focus on it exclusively

also

2. E.g.,

Merlan,

Philip

15 (1970),

Jan

"The Law

Lukasiewicz,

Review
4.

The

"law

of the excluded

devotes more

Aristotelian

attention

(Oxford:

A Study

and Contradiction:

middle"

in

(Tl)

is

to non-contradic

Doctrine,"

Phronesis,

vol.

p. 98.

3. W. D. Ross, Aristotle's
Barnes,

and a Strange

"Hintikka

Sense

T, A and

Books

Metaphysics:

Metaphysics,
of Contradiction,"
"On

ofMetaphysics,

I (Oxford: Clarendon

Press,

1924), p. 264. Jonathan

vol. 10 (1969), pp. 302-309.

Quarterly,
Philosophical
of Contradiction
in Aristotle,"
tr. Vernon Wedin,

the Principle
vol. 24 (1970-71),

p. 487.

and a Strange Aristotelian

Doctrine."
J. Hintikka,
"Time, Truth, and Knowl
in Ancient Greek Philosophy,"
American
vol. 4 (1967), pp.
Philosophical
Quarterly,

"Hintikka

edge
1-14.

5. Merlan,

p. 98.

6. At Republic
to sensibles
of non-contradiction
436b-3, Plato does apply the principle
like a top. However,
the application
of the principle here presupposes
the existence
of
of three fingers at
forms, a point that is brought out more fully later in the discussion
523b-e. In themselves
the sensibles would not be subject to the principle.
I will return to
this shortly.
7. So

too Dancy,

pp. 95-98.

8. Cf. G.E.M.

Anscombe

Press,

pp. 42-43.

1976),

and P.T.

Geach,

Three Philosophers

(Ithaca,

Cornell

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University