15 April 2015, Washington DC

Project for the Study of the 21st Century event:

Crime and Counterterrorism in Karachi

Omar Hamid: former Karachi police officer, former Pakistani

government official and head of Asia-Pacific risk at HIS
Moderator: Negar Razavi: PS21 Global Fellow, anthropologist,
University of Pennsylvania

Moderator: Thank you all for coming today and thanks to Elyse and Chris and other for organizing as
usual. And Peter Apps who, if you dont know, is the founder of PS21. Hes an incredible force who
brings very disconnected people together, which is very remarkable, even the fact that were all sitting
here today.

Omar: The Godfather of PS21.

Moderator: Yes, the Godfather of PS21, and hes in London. Of course we want to thank our speaker,
Omar Hamid, whos going to talk to us about crime and counterterrorism in Karachi and if youre
following along on Twitter were doing #KarachiCrime and if you could do a shout out to PS21, were still
young and we can always benefit from social media buzz.
So, before I turn to Omar, I want to put out the question: Why Karachi? Of all the cities in South Asia,
why are we talking about it? Its a huge metropolis. I think its one of the most populous cities in the
world. It is the largest city, by population, in Pakistan. Its the economic center. Historically, its
incredibly important in terms of being a trade hub for various communities. And its very ethnically
diverse and religiously diverse. Thats also important. But its also one of the deadliest cities in the
world and I wanted to back myself with this. According to the U.S. government, 2700 people were killed
in Karachi in 2013. Just as a comparison, 240 people were killed in New York City the same year. So
were talking about ten times. Its an incredible number, a very staggering number. You have groups
like the Pakistani Taliban there operating, and in addition to that, sectarian and ethnic and all types of
strife going on, in addition to just everyday crime.
Im going to take the prerogative as the moderator since Im an anthropologist. I love to talk about
complex social phenomenon through the stories of the people whove lived them on the ground. I think
thats very rare in Washington, to really hear the grounded story and so I asked Omar to really start with
his own story today. Give us a brief background on why it is that he is such an eminent expert on this
issue.

Omar: Thank you so much Negar and thank you to PS21 and its chief of staff Elyse and all the rest of the
team members for putting together this event. Why am I an eminent expert? I dont know if Im and
eminent expert on Karachi. I just seem to have had the fortune or misfortune of being in the wrong
place at the wrong time. Ive served as a police officer in Karachi for 12-13 years. Being a police officer
in Karachi means that you really get to see the whole gamut of issues in Karachi. As you pointed out,
there are issues of sectarian violence. There are issues that any megacity has, but in addition to
sectarian violence, there are issues of political parties with their own militias. There are issues of the
increasing presence of the Pakistani Taliban. And, of course, you have all of the regular crime that you
would expect in a city that size as well. Being in the police kind of puts you in the vantage point to see
an entire cross-section of society. One of the things that is often put up as a criticism of people in
Karachi, especially by those who are living abroad or move abroad, is that they tend to look at the city as
a bubble or cocoon of a certain social strata or class. In the police, you dont have the luxury of doing
that. You are going to come across all segments of society and that what makes it interesting.
On top of being in the police, Ive again had the fortune or misfortune, depending on how you view it, to
have a number of very interesting assignments, to say the least. I have been posted as the town police
officer of one of the central districts in Karachi, which has been plagued by gang wars between rival
gangs. I was there for 18 months heading the local police unit there. I spent four years in
counterterrorism which meant that my focus was sectarian and religious groups like the Pakistani
Taliban. It also seemed like part of the job was getting your office blown up on a regular basis. That
kind of adds to the insight that I think you would find even from other police officers: I feel like Ive
really been stuck in the center of things. At times, tragically so. But, it gives the insight that I have on
the subject.

Moderator: One of the issues we talked about earlier was the issue of corruption. Its suddenly become
a buzzword in Washington again to talk about corruption again. Corruption is normally talked about in
the context of development here in Washington, especially with the World Bank and IMF. Now its
increasingly coming into the security debate. For those of us sitting this far away, we dont really have a
sense of what is corruption in the Karachi context. What does that mean for ordinary people and what
is the correlation to crime and insecurity?

Omar: Thats a very good question and youre right. I think at times we tend to look at corruption from
a very distant viewpoint. If you look at a city like Karachi, you really get an understanding of why
restricting the flow of corruption is integral to issues of governance and how it impacts things such as
security. Karachi is a city of, what, 20 million people. Its a city where, increasingly, the pressure placed
on municipal services by its citizens is tremendous. And yet, as you said, because of its role as being the
financial hub of Pakistan, it is always being considered by all parties, whether its secular political parties
based in the city, whether its the Pakistani Taliban, or anybody else, as a very lucrative cake or pie to be
looked at, from which they would like to extort resources. That is where the issue of corruption really
comes in to the story of Karachi because, in effect, the story of the past 25-30 of the city has been this

struggle between various groups to squeeze that pie as much as possible. To get out what they want for
their communities and the people that they represent, at the expense of everyone else.
As a result of the citys complex political climate, it remains a divided city, it remains a city in which, as
you said, represents of has large representations of all the ethnicities and nationalities in Pakistan. For
instance, Karachi has something like, at last count, 4-5 million Pashtuns, which actually makes it a bigger
city for Pashtuns than either Kabul or Peshawar. All of these various groups feel that they have a vested
interest in the city. All of them have competed for that. The complex political environment that also
comes in is the fact that, over the past 25 years, Karachis ethnicities have been essentially pitted against
each other. Weve seen, over that period, the rise of the MQM, which is the largest political party in the
city in terms of number of seats that it wins. Their point of view has been representing one section or
segment of Karachi citizens which are the immigrants from India at the time of the partition of India and
Pakistan. In rival to that, youve seen the emergence of the Peoples Party who, again, who represented
itself, not just through its political representatives, but also through criminal militias. Thats where we
see the nexus of crime and corruption and politics, which is really at the core of the problem in Karachi,
because, in order to safeguard and to capture their interests, all of the political players in the city feel
that political dialogue is not enough on its own to ensure that. Hence, all the citys players have actively
and for a long period of time maintained armed militias. Those militias come at the forefront of
organized crime, come at the forefront of corruption.
The other impact that the corruption angle has had on Karachi is that it has retarded the ability of
government to actually produce the sort of services that are required for its citizens. Its become a
governance problem because, as these parties fight for control of the city, the infrastructure of
government, whether it is the municipal operation of the city, whether it is the police force, has become
almost hopelessly politicized. You have the phenomenon of civil servants and police officers going to
one party or another to vie for lucrative postings. The objective of that is to get in the good books of a
certain political party, to get a good posting, and hence, also to be able to recoup your expenses from
your posting by making that post a revenue generating tool. That really at the center of corruption as
far as Karachi goes.

Moderator: So how does that filter down to the population? Is it that an ex-police officer needs to be
paid off in order to ensure that you get the permit for your business? What does that mean for the
average person?

Omar: We say, those of us who come from Karachi, that everything is for sale in Karachi. The way that it
filters down to the micro level is, for instance, illegal land grabbing. Political parties and religious
groups, like the Taliban in fact, often indulge in illegally occupying or squatting on pieces of land on the
suburban ends of the city. They take possession of these. They carve slices of land up to create new
squatter colonies and then they subsequently sell it off. Because there is a shortage of water in the city,
control of the citys water hydrants is also a very key tool of corruption. At one point last year, it was
funny because as the Pakistani Taliban was splintering into various groups, it was actually two factions of
the Taliban who were fighting against each other, essentially for control of Karachis water hydrants.

That was their end objective. It had nothing to do with religious ideology. It had to do with the cash
they gained through the water.
Its reelected in the police because, obviously, in order to conduct any kind of illegal activity in an area,
you need the connivance of the local police. The best way to secure that is either to pay them off or to
ensure that your political patrons control the police and hence, control the officers who are manning
those stations or those districts.

Moderator: As much as I hate asking this question, because we are in Washington, I want to ask a U.S.
centric question. The United States has poured billions of dollars into Pakistan to counter terrorism
ostensibly, but also a lot of that went into development projects, again with the goal of bolstering
moderate forces and to counter extremist groups. Within this landscape of corruption, however, what
does that mean in terms of the U.S.? Are we going about this the wrong way?

Omar: Id say one of the problems that has been there with the U.S. approach, specifically to Pakistan
and Karachi in particular, and there are many other problems which would probably be faced in any
developing country that retard the provision of aid and the insurance that the aid is used for the right
purposes, but I think more so in Pakistan and even more so in Karachi, is the fact that the premise used
over the past 15 years or so, since 9/11, has been that it was important to back groups who were
opposed to religious extremists. On paper that makes a lot of sense, but the problem in Karachi is that a
lot of those groups are also equally involved in criminal activities. In fact, one of the primary examples
of this is the party I mentioned earlier, the MQM, which is the largest party in the city. An extremely
secular party. Totally opposed to the spread of religious extremism and the Taliban and all these sorts
of things. And yet, the MQM operates the largest criminal-political mafia nexus in the city. Running part
of the city as virtually a parallel state with an extensive armed wing that has regularly taken part in
politically-targeted killings, murders of police officers and government officials, all these sorts of things.
And yet, there has been, over time, and again, remember that perception is equally important in a place
like Pakistan.
For some time now there has been, it seems certainly to people in Pakistan, kind of understanding that
the West, primarily the U.S. and, to a lesser degree, the U.K., was all right with the excesses of political
parties as long as they were secular and, you know, sort of talking the talk according to what
Washington or London were looking at. For instance, to use the example of the MQM, the MQMs
leader is based in London and has faced various criminal charges in the U.K., but certainly, and I wont
presume to say what the dynamics are, the perception has been that the response of the local
authorities in pursuing those allegations has been, perhaps, slower than it would have been had it been
a normal expatriate Pakistani living in the U.K. And certainly slower than if there had been, say, an
expatriate Pakistani who had received training in a jihadist camp in Afghanistan and who had a beard.
This is a criticism that has been labeled. Various examples have been quoted by people saying people
like Altaf Hussain have often made hate-inciting speeches or speeches in which hes incited his followers
to violence.

Had those speeches come from a mosque or a madrasa, or someone who had come from that
background, they would almost certainly have faced a much stricture level of prosecution. Similarly,
coming to the point of Western, I wouldnt call it acquiescence, but the perception of acquiescence,
weve seen various representatives of the U.S. and U.K. governments often pat homage to parties like
the MQM by going over to their headquarters and very publicized packages. Again, the impression that
that gives is that there seems to be a deeper relationship and that the sins of one party can be forgiven
simply because they have chosen to back the Western position in Pakistan.

Moderator: So, if Im understanding your argument, these are deep governance issues that extend
beyond the ideology of any single group?

Omar: Absolutely. These are governance issues, and again, especially in Karachi, that have to do with
the establishment of the rule of law. That has to be equal whether a party is secular or whether it is a
religious extremist group. In pursuing a policy where it seems as if there was a degree of cherry picking
in terms of who was to be pursued and, to be honest, I dont think that the fault or the blame can be laid
at the door of policymakers in Washington or London, part of that, in fact the larger part of it, had to do
with decisions made by the military and political leadership in Pakistan. Certainly under General
Musharraf and in subsequent governments, such as the Peoples party government that followed
General Musharraf, there was certainly an element of, thugs are breaking the law, but if its our thugs,
thats fine. And it seems like it was simpler to cover up these issues because it was politically
expeditious to do so rather than to confront the issues of governance and rule of law, which essentially
allowed these parties to grow, to further expand their militias, and for the writ of the state to further
reduce in a place like Karachi.

Moderator: One of the hopeful stories you get out of Pakistan is the courage of the members of the civil
society. What role do you think they play in bolstering the rule of law in a city like Karachi?

Omar: I think this is another which has really turned around over the past 5-6 years, the growth of civil
society. At times, when youre sitting in Pakistan or when youre observing these things very closely, it
almost feels like civil society does not necessarily have a direction. Its putting its head everywhere, but
its growth, and the fact that it found its voice is very important. The other thing thats aided this is the
expansion of the media in Pakistan, and again, the media too, at times, seems as if it is a lot of talking
heads shouting at each other nonsensically, but it has meant that, unlike the past, the media is no longer
a creature that can be controlled by any particular political party or by the countrys political or military
establishment. Weve seen examples like this more recently in the time of General Musharraf and it
was essentially a media inspired campaign that forced him, ultimately, to call an election and to
subsequently resign. Weve seen, in the past, in the early 90s when you had the specter of political
violence in Karachi when you had various political parties fighting each other. You had times where,
because you only had the media and one state-run TV channel, it was very easy to control those. They
are examples when the MQM and other parties sent out their militias to burn or intimidate newspapers

or shops selling newspapers and magazines in order to take those off the stacks. You cant do that
anymore. Of course, there remains a level of intimidation. Pakistan remains a very violent place for
journalists and in Karachi there have been a number of case of journalists being murdered by political
parties. But overall, and I promised that Id give you something hopeful, if there is hope, it is in this.
These things are no longer controllable. The crimes or misdeeds of various groups become very public
and the growth of civil society, the growth of social media, for instance, means that the contrarian view
gets out much more often.

Moderator: I have many many questions, but I want to turn it to you. Do any of you have questions for
Omar?

Audience Question: I have a question about the role of the military in the city. In many the
relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan is about military operations. Part of the U.S. aid goes
directly to investing in the Pakistani military. How are they performing in terms of dealing with the
crime situation? What have they done with the corruption issue?

Omar: Thats a very good question. If you look at the role of the military more widely and in Karachi, I
think there have been mistakes made. I mentioned the fact that when General Musharraf was power,
for instance, he made decisions to ally himself with any and all political parties that essentially bolstered
hid regime and that represented, broadly speaking, the same secular vision that he had irrespective of
the sins or lack thereof of those parties. The military was definitely a part of that. Because it was a
military government back then, the military has often been accused of having fostered various political
groups and non-state groups in Pakistan that subsequently became Frankenstein monsters for them
because, at the time, it served their short-term agendas to do so. So their role has, over the past 30-40
years, not a great one. What we see now is, more recently with the Pakistani army having, for the past
year or so, having been engaged in operations in the tribal areas, and, in fact, expanding the limit of this
operation against militancy to the cities, about 3-4 months ago or perhaps less than that even, they
began an operation against all militant groups in Karachi, whether religious or secular. You see that
operation catching a lot of steam. If you speak to various officials they say, Yes, we made mistakes in
the past, and were trying to amend them. Thats great, but I think that still doesnt address the
fundamental issue, which is that what weve seen is the shrinking of the writ of the state and of the rule
of law.
A military operation in the city will have a short-term benefit, certainly, but fundamentally, you need a
restoration of the rule of law and to do that you need the civic bodies, whether its the municipalities or
the police to play their role again, to provide impartial services to citizens. That is really where the
challenge lies and it remains to be seen whether that will go ahead. Well have to see. Obviously the
language at the moment is very positive, but then weve seen a lot of regimes, not just in Pakistan, but
around world talk a good fight and not really deliver.

Audience Question: How do they handle their share of the economy? There were questions about how
much control and corruption they have with industry. Has this changed?

Omar: I think there has been a change over the past 5-6 years. In the time of General Musharraf, this
was an issue about the military-industrial complex in Pakistan the militarys very very extensive
commercial activities. That really came to the fore for the first time. My perception was that it really
dented of the military because the military always liked to promote itself as a unifying factor in Pakistan,
generally speaking. If you speak to common people across the country, you will always find that they
have a positive image of the military. But the various corruption scandals and the overwhelming impact
of this military-industrial complex that came about towards the end of General Musharrafs reign hurt
them. I think there was rethinking on their part to withdraw from a lot of those activities that they had
been tagged with and they had been flagged with and that had caused them to lose public confidence.
What you saw since Musharrafs resignation in 2008 to date has been a retrenchment of sorts. I wont
say that that retrenchment has pulled the military out of all spheres of commercial life, no, but I think,
certainly, that there has been a significant reduction. Whats more, I think there was a time when it
became very in your face. I think that was really what hurt in terms of public perception. What youve
seen is a scaling down of that and a scaling down in real terms of those activities as well, to a much
smaller level than they were previously.

Audience Question: I have a whole bunch of questions. The first question is: does the Beluch insurgency
have much effect in Karachi? And two, about the port of Karachi: can you talk about if its corrupted?
Is there a warlord in charge of it? Is it sort of like a separate area? It has a huge port and everything in
Karachi comes through the port and your opinion on whether the port is a moderating effect on some of
the chaos. Does the necessity to be a world class port moderate things a little bit in Karachi?

Omar: To take your last question first: I dont think that it acts as a moderating influence in terms of
corruption. I think it has a multiplier effect. Having a port, in fact, two ports technically, in the vicinity
of the city means that, like any port city, the presence of a port brings certain dynamics of its own.
Those dynamics exist and get co-opted as part of the wider political firmament of the city. When we
speak of corruption, it has often been the case that the cabinet portfolio that covers ports, which is the
Ministry of Ports and Shipping, is often considered a lucrative posting or a lucrative cabinet position
simply because all of the potential revenue generation, illicit and non-illicit that the port brings. A
warlord? You dont have that kind of phenomenon in Karachi, which you perhaps have in the tribal
areas in Afghanistan. Its more to do with warring or rival political parties or factions who are always
trying to wrestle control of the resources of the city. The port, and all that it symbolizes, is one of the
resources that these parties fight over. I gave the example of the MQM. The MQM, for instance,
whenever it is a partner in the federal government, or indeed, in the provincial government, is very keen
to have the portfolio of ports and shipping as a ministry in the slot of cabinet post that is assigned to
them. Other parties, like the Peoples Party when theyre in power, equally contest this and are equally
eager to have portfolio.

Audience Member: Its a plum.

Omar: Its a very big plum, absolutely. With regard to the insurgency in Beluchistan, yes. It represents,
because of Karachis multiethnic nature and because of the fact that every nationally is represented in
Karachi, you see the impact of all the various conflicts going on in other parts of the country reflected
and mirrored in Karachi. When the Taliban started splintering in the tribal areas, you saw that
splintering in Karachi with different factions of the Taliban fighting over turf essentially and operating as
gangs would. The Beluch insurgency is the same. In fact, its very closely linked to the criminal activities
of the organized crime gangs in Lyari, one of the oldest parts of Karachi. Its really the Old City as far as
Karachi is concerned. The population of Lyari has a large Beluch population and often what the gangs
and the criminal dons do, or have done, in Lyari is used their ethnic identity, being Beluch, to form
relationships with lots of the tribal leaders in Beluchistan that facilitated their smuggling activities. The
road running across the border from Iranian Beluchistan, across Pakistan Beluchistan, all the way to
Karachi, is a very lucrative route for the smuggling of illegal diesels. Diesel that is smuggled out of Iran
comes all the way to Karachi and is sold for under sticker price at gas stations around the city. That is
one of the key rackets that is often contested.
The other one is weapons. The other border that runs across from Beluchistan to near Kandahar on the
Iran side, runs through Beluchistan and you have a road that comes to Karachi and is a fantastic route
for weapons smuggling. I remember when I was working in the CID, which is the counterterrorism unit
of the Karachi police, we were looking at how to stop the proliferation of weapons in Karachi. We found
that it was very difficult to do so because you had smuggles essentially picking up the latest weapons.
American M-4 rifles and things like that, that had been left on the battlefield in Afghanistan, bringing
them across to Qatar, where market price was a very reasonable 80,000 rupees, which is around $800.
Theres a bit of a markup by the time they get to Karachi. All of a sudden we found, when we were
looking at the gangs in Lyari, they had these sniper rifles and night vision googles, where the hell did
they get these from because the cops didnt have them. It was essentially all this American battlefield
paraphernalia that had been mislaid on the battlefields of Afghanistan.

Audience Member: How much of that came through the port? Did they fall of the truck?

Omar: There have been some allegations about that as well. That over the course of the past 10-15
years, in fact, this has been an accusation that has recently been laid at the doors of the MQM, where
its alleged that 1500 NATO containers went missing on the journey from Karachi port to Afghanistan.
The uncomfortable aspect of it for the Americans is that these containers had weapons in them and
other sorts of equipment. In theory, the agreement, on paper, with Pakistan about transiting cargo was
that it was nonlethal. In fact, all of us have known for a while that all sorts of cargo, not just nonlethal
cargo, went through the port. The Pakistani authorities, with a wink and nod, look the other way. It has
been an extremely lucrative trade because youve had a lot of people becoming very rich in a short
period of time by get NATO sub-contracts. Someone is running the trucks that is taking the containers

out of Afghanistan. Someone else is running the stuff. Someone is supplying bottled water for U.S.
forces or whatever. Often times, incidentally, the people involved in gaining those contracts were either
ex-Pakistan military officials or the wider network of friends and family. It was a gravy train that no one
really wanted to touch. It is a bit inconvenient, now, to have these allegations of weapons going
through because that would obviously mean that there was a violations of the terms of agreements of
NATO cargo going through.

Audience Question: What are some ways that the state could gain a monopoly on the legitimate use of
force away from the different armed militias?

Omar: I think its very challenging now because youve seen the state giving ground again and again. In
fact, the starkest example of this is that, in Karachi, you have an extraordinary high number of killings of
police officers. Of course, there are killings of police officers which happen regularly in the line of duty
so, a suicide bomber blows himself up and five police officers are killed, which is in the line of duty.
Apart from that, there have been about 500 officers who have been killed in the past 10 years,
especially as targeted killings, especially by political parties, because those officers had, at various points
in time, either taken action against the militant wings of those parties or arrested suspects who had the
patronage of those parties. What this does, apart from being just an astounding number, and Ive
argued this in many other forums, if this happened anywhere else in the world, wed have a police
strike. But what it has done in Karachi is that it has essentially sent a message to law enforcement
agencies, especially the local police that if you cross certain lines, then these political parties, whether
its the MQM or the Peoples Party or whomever, will come after you. So, there is a reluctance to do
their job, essentially, which is enforcing law. That is one of the biggest reasons why we spoke about
military intervention in Karachi, and even now, the operation conducted there is being conducted by
paramilitary forces, not the police, because the police has either become too riddled with people who
are on one side of the fence or another so it has become politicized, or police officers dont want to go
after this, because they feel that it will bring them into the spotlight and into the sights of various
groups. But, they have to be the ones to take back the streets. It cant be done by putting the army on
the streets. Putting a paramilitary force on the streets is not a solution to it. Like with counterterrorism,
it remains a law enforcement issue. The police are the one, like everywhere else the world, have
knowledge of the streets and the ability to work with local communities to improve governance issues.
If they dont take a step forward, then there is no long-term solution for this.

Audience Question: What would be the most effective way for outside partners to support Karachi and
stabilization in the area?

Omar: I think one of the things thats not really addressed when we talk about outside partners advising
various governments in Pakistan is, apart from the issues of aid and the numbers, really, its an issue of
governance and the fact that, if I were that position, I would say that political interference in governance
issues has to be eradicated or at least minimized because I certainly understand every political party

having a agenda, as political parties do across the world. But, you dont have political parties influencing
the police, you dont have political parties influencing the provision of municipal services. Its these
issues. Its the restoration of merit in governance, really which is the key point there. If you have merit
in governance, if you have civil servants and police officers picked on the basis of their qualifications to
do a job and treat all citizens equally, as they should, then you will find that the delivery of public
services, the delivery of governance improves radically anywhere in the world. I think that is something
that really should be stressed.

Audience Question: Could you talk a little bit about Yemen and whether or not the disagreements
about whether or not to be involved in Yemen could bring about some of this tension between the
military and the civil government again that could possibly lead to a coup in the long term if, for
example, Saudi territorial sovereignty is violated?

Omar: I think Yemen is going to be a very interesting test case for Pakistan. The situation, as it stands
in the Pakistan, at least my appraisal of it, is that, and you may know that 4 or 5 days ago, the
parliament in Pakistan passed a resolution that said they were going to stay out of the Yemen conflict.
This resolution would not have come out without the agreement of the army in Pakistan. It pretty clear,
from individuals that I was speaking to before, who were in the military, they were not keen to go into
Yemen is going to be the definition of a quagmire. In any case, from my sources, it seems as if the
demands being made by the Saudi government, which were in the region of asking for 30,000 Pakistani
troops to be sent to Saudi Arabia were exorbitant in Pakistan, where you have an insurgency in the tribal
areas where you have two volatile borders with Afghanistan and with India. That was just not going to
be possible any which way.
Another part of that issue is that there seems to be an apprehension, and I suspect in my personal
opinion that its correct, that this demand for troops is not just for Yemen. It will also be linked to
internal stability within Saudi Arabia, following a very contentious succession. We already have rumors
about King Salman being in advanced stages of Alzheimers or whatever. Its not clear that his
succession will be, you know, it will likely be messier than the last one. There is a very strong body of
opinion in Pakistan which believes that these Pakistani troops will be used almost as a Praetorian Guard.
You have a very Game of Thrones type of situation in Saudi Arabia. The reluctance of the state in
Pakistan, both the civil and military, is understandable. I dont think there is the issue of a coup there
because the civilian government and the military is on the same page. The problem is, of course, that
Pakistan has very deep and emotional ties with Saudi Arabia. Obviously, there is always an emotional tie
with Saudi Arabia being the homeland of the two sacred places, Mecca and Medina. Apart from that,
the Pakistani establishment, political and military, has very close personal ties. Prime Minister Sharif
spent a number of years in Saudi Arabia in exile. He set up a steel mill there, reportedly in partnership
with the sons of King Abdullah. A host of military leaders in Pakistan have always had close ties. There
has always been close cooperation on military activity. It has been a long standing, and probably correct
rumor, that Saudi Arabia had to fund large parts of Pakistans nuclear program, with the understanding
that, if the need ever arose, that technology would be transferred across.

It becomes very difficult, and I think the reaction from Saudi Arabia and some of the other GCC countries
has been one of almost shock. I dont think that Pakistan said, Were sorry. We cant. They were
almost banking on Pakistan to go into Yemen and to provide troops. The real challenge here for
Pakistan is that this has led to a very large degree of acrimony and resentment by the Saudis and the
other Gulf countries like the UAE and Kuwait or Qatar. They have leverage over Pakistan in the sense
that there are over a million Pakistani expatriate workers who work in these countries, who contribute a
very large amount of foreign exchange in the form of remittances back to Pakistan that helps to keep
the countrys foreign exchange reserve stable. Its very easy for these countries to turn around and
immediately cancel all the work permits of these workers and essentially cast out a large population and
that would be a very big economic blow. Saudi Arabia, last year, pledged Pakistan $1.5 million as a gift
with no strings attached, but the real question is: where there any actually strings with that $1.5 million.
I think its going to be a complex issue, and on top of that, there is the issue of right-wing religious
groups who have Saudi funding, whether its government funding or its the funding from private
individuals who are not accepting the Parliaments decision. A couple of days ago, a group calling itself
the Defense of Pakistan Council, which included various right-wing political parties as well as militant
groups and some of the other Sunni extremist groups, came together and said that they did not
recognize Parliaments resolution. These groups have militant wings. They can cause problems in
Pakistan. In the past, the perception has been that these groups were close to the Pakistani
establishment, but now, they find themselves opposed to that establishment because they get money
from the Saudis or the Arab world as well.
How does that play out? I think thats going to be a very very interesting point to look at over the next
5-6 months.

Moderator: Im going to ask the last question, if you dont mind, and its going to be very mean because
its a complex question. But Im going to ask for a very short response from you. We talked about
expanding this beyond Karachi to talk about cities in general and the future. According to the U.N., 72%
of the world is going to be living in cities by 2050 and there is a lot of talk, especially in developing
countries, that central governments are becoming less and less important in terms of the governance of
cities. Do you think thats true and what can we learn from Karachis example?

Omar: I think what you can learn from Karachis example is exactly what not to do in a megacity. Your
point is absolutely correct, that with the expansion of cities, with the phenomenon of megacities, you
have a situation where the central government, and many times even the local government has very
little control because, as these cities grow organically, control over scarce resources, which is the
fundamental point in Karachi, often ends up in the hands of non-state groups, whether its political
parties or whether its organized criminal syndicates. The challenge of urban governance will be how
the state is able to impose itself or how it can prevent its resources from being taken over by these nonstate groups. That will be the measure of success in urban governance in this century.

Moderator: Join me in thanking Omar and I also want to plug. Hes written an amazing novel called The
Prisoner, which is about a Christian police officer, correct, whos going after and American journalist
whos been taken by an extremist group. Please pick up a book.

Omar: Thank you, once again, to everyone at PS21.