Mozg Armii

ocers to have had formal military training. As early

as May 1918, he seems to have had an important role in
the Soviet Operations Branch, then in its infancy.[3] He
was a member of the Red Army General Sta from 1921
to 1925, and also had a role as Joseph Stalin's military
mentor.[3]

2 Main theories in Mozg Armii

2.1 Mobilization is the opium of war

Boris Shaposhnikov, author of Mozg Armii, in 1929, year of the

publication of the books last volume.

A mobilization scene in Germany on August 1, 1914, the day of

the German declaration of war on Russia and two days before
Germany declared war on France (August 3).

Mozg Armii (Russian: ), in English The

Brain of the Army, is a three-volume military theory
book published between 1927 and 1929.[1] It is the most
important work of Boris Shaposhnikov, a Soviet military
commander then in command of the Moscow military region. Mozg Armii gained a wide popularity throughout the
Red Army, and Shaposhnikov himself was held in high
regard by Joseph Stalin.[2]

"Mobilization is the opium of war is the title of one of

the books chapters. In it, Shaposhnikov draws mainly
from the experience of World War I and the eorts all
belligerents made to mobilize as quickly as possible in
order rst to try and crush the enemy before he himself
had been able to mobilize, then to sustain a prolonged war
eort. According to Shaposhnikov, the next war would be
as long and intense as World War I had been, and would
require several mobilizations throughout.[1]

The author

Shaposhnikov also presented mobilization as being a dangerous yet essential measure. On the one hand, he afrmed that governments had to be mindful of the fact that
to mobilize was in itself a step towards a full-blown conict: he underlined the fact that, just before World War
I began, mobilization by a country had been tantamount
to a declaration of war, as neighbouring countries reacted
to such a threat with mobilizations of their own. On the
other hand, an early mobilization allowed for reinforcing the lines of defense, whereas delays in mobilization

Main article: Boris Shaposhnikov

Boris Shaposhnikov had been, before the Russian Revolution, a graduate of the Imperial Nicholas Military
Academy (1910) and then a colonel. Unusually for someone with such a background, he supported the revolution
and rejoined the Red Army in 1918. As such, when the
Red Army was in its early years, he was one of the few
1

2 MAIN THEORIES IN MOZG ARMII

heightened the risk of having to face a fully mobilized ected any kind of reality. For Svechin, the conduct of
enemy army with understrength forces.[1]
a war had to be assumed by the entire state.[1]
In Shaposhnikovs eyes, this and the eort required to
sustain a total war, as demonstrated during World War
I, pointed to the importance of pre-mobilization measures. The drafting of millions of servicemen, and especially, according to Shaposhnikov, the conversion of
a countrys economy to a war economy, took time and
should not be improvised on the go. But, so as not to raise
the alarm in neighbouring countries, pre-mobilization
should, according to Shaposhnikov, consist of as much
measures as could be taken to prepare for the actual mobilization, but all the while keeping them secret.[1]

2.2

The integral military leader: Franz

Conrad von Htzendorf as a model

For Shaposhnikov, who approved of this and quoted

Svechin heavily,[1] the main and ideal model for such an
integral General Sta was that of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire during World War I,[1] and specically, the sta
of Count Franz Conrad von Htzendorf (the AustroHungarian Army's Chief of the General Sta from 1914
to 1916).[4]
According to Shaposhnikov, the cardinal virtue of Conrad was that under him, there was a real teamwork among
the General Sta. Shaposhnikov praised Conrads close
relations with his operations chief; he also commended
Conrad on his encouraging his subordinates to show initiative, his view of strategy as being subordined to politics (see below), and his lack of reluctance in delegating
authority.[4]
Shaposhnikov also attributed a range of personal virtues
to Conrad, among which boldness and strength of character, energy and initiative, independence, and his
workaholism (virtues Shaposhnikov compared to these of
Napoleon Bonaparte). However, in line with the Marxist
view of history, Shaposhnikov rejected any kind of Great
Man theory in warfare and stressed the importance of
collective work. For him, this view was supported by
Carl von Clausewitz's (see above quote) and Conrads own
writings.[4] Ironically, Conrad had been badly defeated in
1916 by Russian General Alexei Brusilov, who, like Shaposhnikov, joined the Red Army after the Revolution.

2.3 Subordination of strategy to politics

Another central reference to Clausewitz in Mozg Armii is
to the famous clausewitzian idea that war is a continuation of politics by other means. Shaposhnikov approved
of this, and stressed that military planning in general, and
mobilization in particular (see above), had to be made according to political imperatives.[5]

Count Conrad von Htzendorf, Shaposhnikovs model of a good

Chief of the General Sta.

While he was not at the time a member of the Communist

Party of the Soviet Union, Shaposhnikov was, in Mozg
Armii, in favour of a politically engaged General Sta,
acting as directed by the Party. In his denition of politics as pertaining to the conduct of war, Shaposhnikov
included the idea of class struggle both at a worldwide
and at a national scale (within each belligerent country).[5]

Regarding military command, Shaposhnikov supported

the ideas that one of his colleagues, Alexander Andreyevich Svechin, had already formulated in a book entitled
Strategy (rst published in 1926). The main idea here was
that leadership had to be integral": it could not be wholly
entrusted to any single individual, because, in Svechins
words, the commander in chief does not have all power
over the entire state and giving full power to a chosen
military leader is an obsolete formula which never re-

Conrad von Htzendorf, the main role model in Mozg

Armii (see above), was also described as a politically
savvy general by Shaposhnikov, and specically, as one
whose ideas were quite in accordance with these of
Marxism. For instance, he noted that Conrad favoured
the equality of all nationalities within the armed forces,
without discriminations. Shaposhnikov even went so far
as to say that Conrad was in favour of a mass Peoples
Army, which was in contradiction with Conrads own
writings.[4]

[4] Sondhaus, Lawrence (2000). Franz Conrad von Htzendorf: architect of the apocalypse. Studies in Central European Histories. Boston: Humanities Press (Brill Academic Publishers).
[5] Frank, Willard C.; Gillette, Philip S. (1992). Soviet military doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev, 19151991. Westport: Greenwood Press.

First edition of Clausewitzs On War (1832), an important reference in Mozg Armii.

Reception and inuence

In contrast with Alexander Andreyevich Svechin's Strategy, one of Shaposhnikovs inspirations and references
(see above), Mozg Armii was very well received and had
a lasting inuence. Mozg Armii was quoted as an important text by nearly all Soviet military theorists and military
historians; as late as the 1990s, it was still included as a
textbook in the curriculum of the General Sta Academy.
Thus, Mozg Armii can be seen as a landmark in Soviet
military theory and doctrine on the organization of the
Red Army's General Sta.[1]

References

[1] Kokoshin, Andrei Afansevich (1998, 1999). Soviet

strategic thought, 191791. Cambridge, Mass.: Belfer
Center for Science and International Aairs. Check date
values in: |date= (help)
[2] Corvisier, Andr; Childs, John (1994) [1988]. Shaposhnikov, Boris Mikhailovich. A dictionary of military history and the art of war. Neilson, Keith. Oxford (UK),
Cambridge (Mass.): Blackwell Publishing.
[3] Erickson, John (1984) [1962]. The Soviet high command:
a military-political history, 19181941 (Third ed.). London, Portland (Oregon): Frank Class Publishers.

5 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

5.1

Text

Mozg Armii Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mozg%20Armii?oldid=635720299 Contributors: Pavel Vozenilek, Koavf, JHMM13,

Hmains, Chris the speller, Yasst8, Alykkr, Ohconfucius, Ser Amantio di Nicolao, Iridescent, Aldis90, Nick Number, Hydro, Addbot,
Yobot, AustralianRupert, BG19bot, BattyBot, Monkbot and Anonymous: 2

5.2

Images

File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-25684-0004,_I._Weltkrieg,_Mobilmachung.jpg Source:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/
commons/a/a2/Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-25684-0004%2C_I._Weltkrieg%2C_Mobilmachung.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation
project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals (negative and/or positive), resp. the
digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Unknown
File:Hoetzendorf_Franz_Graf_conrad.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a9/Hoetzendorf_Franz_Graf_
conrad.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: http://crowland.uw.hu/images/csata/caporetto.html
http://www.thefullwiki.org/Count_Franz_Conrad_von_H%C3%B6tzendorf
http://www.qwiki.com/q/#!/Count_Franz_Conrad_von_H%C3%B6tzendorf
http://oc.encydia.com/ca/Franz_Conrad_von_H%C3%B6tzendorf
http://degroteoorlog.blogspot.com/2011/03/broesilov-offensief.html
http://www.iltasanomat.fi/kotimaa/Mannerheimin%206%20vihollista/art-1288363475002.html Original artist: Unknown
File:Shaposhnikov1929.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/55/Shaposhnikov1929.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Transferred from ru.wikipedia
Original artist: Unknown Original uploader was Just at ru.wikipedia
File:Vomkriege.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a6/Vomkriege.jpg License: Public domain Contributors:
? Original artist: ?

5.3

Content license

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