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Was Marx a Dialetheist?

Author(s): Graham Priest
Source: Science & Society, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Winter, 1990/1991), pp. 468-475
Published by: Guilford Press
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COMMUNICATIONS

Vol. 54, No. 2, Winter 1990-1991, 468-475

Science& Society,

WAS MARX A DIALETHEIST?

1 Introduction
In "Dialectic and Dialetheic" (thisjournal, Vol. 53, 1989, 388-415;
hereafter, DD) I argued that a number of the more central contradictionsin the dialectics of Hegel and Marx are straightforward
logical contradictionsof the formA8c- A. In "A MaterialistCritique of
Hegel's Concept of Identityof Opposites" (thisjournal, Vol. 54, 1990,
147-166; hereafter,MC) Erwin Marquit takes issue withthe claim. He
agrees that this is so in Hegel (and even Engels). The crux of the
disagreementis whetherit is so in Marx, and more generally,in materialist dialectic. In this briefreply I will assess his arguments.These fall
into threecategories:i) general logical considerations;ii) the difference
between idealist and materialistdialectic; and iii) analyses of specific
examples. I will take these in turn.
2 General Logical Considerations
The firstargument concerns the nature of logic. Dialetheism is
ruled out by formal logic. Modern formallogic "retains the essential
contentof the [classical]law of non-contradiction"
(MC, 162); and (MC,
147) "logicianspoint out thatif one accepts a logical contradiction,any
statementcan be proved as true" (ex contradictione
quodlibet).
468

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WAS MARX A DIALETHEIST?

469

theseremarksignoreaspectsof modernlogic,to
Unfortunately,
to call attention.
The use of formalmethwhichmyarticlewas trying
ods providespowerfultechniquesin logic,butthesecan be appliedto
of formallogic.Consequently
thereis notjust
givenumeroussystems
one modernformallogic: thereare many.In some,the Principleof
Non-Contradiction
holds;in someitfails.Exactlythesameis trueof all
theotherprinciplesof traditional
logic,includingthe Principleof Exholds
cluded Middle and ex contradictione.
Logics where ex contradictione

are called "explosive";thosewhereit fails,"paraconsistent."

of explosive
It is onlysomelogicianswho endorsethe correctness
earlier
this
endorsed
the
most
century
logicians
logics. Certainly,
of explosiveformallogics.This was largelybecause they
correctness
knewonlyone or two,and thesewereexplosive.Butwe knowa lotmore
of thiskindof formallogicwhich
now,and itis exactlythecorrectness
is a topicof some contention
amongmodernlogicians.It is still,perwould
sidewithan explosivelogic.Butthe
most
that
true
logicians
haps,
of
cannot
dialecticians
remains:
appeal to the abstractauthority
point
of dialectics.
modernor formallogicin supportof an interpretation
of dialecticsis partof the debateabout
For the correctinterpretation
whichformallogicis correct.Engelsgot it exactlyrightwhenhe said
(1954, 43):
of
science.. . . The theory
The scienceoflogicis ... likeeveryother,an historical
onceand for
theLawsofThoughtis byno meansan "eternaltruth"established
all,as philistine
reasoningimaginesto be thecasewiththeword"logic."Formal
to
fromthetimeofAristotle
logicitselfhasbeenthearenaofviolentcontroversy
the presentday.

are notpermissible
whenMarquitsays"logicalcontradictions
Similarly,
in theoreticalinvestigations"
(MC, 165) thisbegs the question;and,
have been toleratedin
moreover,is quitefalse.Logicalcontradictions
of
in
For
theoretical
investigations. example, Dirac'sformulation
many
conwas
5-function
of
the
the
behavior
mechanics
quite
quantum
theearlycalculuswas
butthiswasallowedtostand.Similarly,
tradictory,
behaviorof infinitesimals
based on the explicitly
(see
contradictory
Priest,et ai, 1989, 369, 374-7, 494f). Of course,thesetheorieswere
eventuallyreplaced. But the replacementof the old calculus had
(see Lakatos,1978);and in anycase,
nothingtodo withitsinconsistency
and the periodforwhichthe old
all theoriesget replacedeventually,
of scientific
calculuswas acceptedwas muchlongerthanthe half-life
therefore
theories.These generallogicalarguments
carryno weight.

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470

SCIENCE f SOCIETY

3 Idealistvs. MaterialistDialectic
between
deals withthe difference
The nextsortof consideration
dialectic.The generalidea is thatidealistdialectic
idealistand materialist
is committedto dialetheismbecause of its idealism,ratherthan its
version.Marquitsumsup
dialectics.This thenlapsesin thematerialist
as follows(MC, 165):
the considerations
wasrootedin hisdialecticalidealism,in
Hegel'sneed forlogicalcontradictions
in a processof
in thought
whichtheworldunfoldsfromtheIdea as movements
dialecticalnegationfromone oppositeto another,ratherthanin thehistorical
developmentof matter,in whichthe processof diprocessof evolutionary
inessence,being
alecticalnegationunfoldsintime.Hegel'sdialectical
unfolding,
as
a
of
contradictions
the
ahistorical,
consequenceof
required acceptance logical
in every
of oppositesas an absoluteidentity
the need to regardthe identity
dialecticshas no suchneed.
respect.Materialist

isa crucialand idealistdialectics

betweenmaterialist
Nowthedifference
in
a stateof
it
to
Idea
that
was
held
be
the
one.
ly important
Hegel
And the
was
social
institutions.
believed
that
it
Marx
development.
natureof a substanceis clearlyrelevantto someof itsproperties.For
as such
example,theIdea is notmaterial;societyis. But thisdifference
bears no relevanceto whetherthe substanceinvolvedhas (can have,
musthave) logicallycontradictory
properties.It is no more (or less)
a materialobjectcouldbe
difficult
to see howstatesof affairsinvolving
it
how
ofaffairs
than
is
to
see
states
say,
involving,
literally
contradictory
between
theAbsolutecould be. (And as a matterof fact,theantithesis
ofsocietyis notas clear
theimmateriality
oftheIdea and themateriality
as mightbe suggestedeither.For,as Hegelis oftenat painsto pointout,
dualtheIdea is essentially
embodied.Neitherside of thespirit/nature
ismcould existwithoutthe other.)
These preliminary
points aside, Marquit'sargument,if I unis as follows.
Contradictions
ariseinthedialecticdue to
derstanditright,
one state(thatA) beingreplacedbyitsnegation(that~A). If thedialectic
is non-temporal,
as itis in Hegel,we haveA8c~A"atthesametime";but
ifitis temporal,
as itis in Marx,we merelyhaveA at one timeand ~A at
is neverrealized.This argumentdoes not
another,so a contradiction
standup. Fora start,thisis nottheonlywaythatcontradictions
arisein
dialectic(eitherforHegel or forMarx;see, e.g.,thenextsection).But
moreimportant,
thereare temporaland non-temporal
in
developments
bothHegel's and Marx'sdialectics.Hegel'slogicaldialecticis not temdialectic(DD, 401) is; Marx'shistorical
dialecticis
poral; his historical
temporal,but his equivalentof the logicaldialectic,the deductionof

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WAS MARX A DIALETHEIST?

471

economiccategoriesin Capital,is not.(Anditdoes no good to pointout

forexactly
thatthisdeductionis embodiedin a historical
development,
the same is trueof Hegel'slogicaldialectic.)
too,especiallycomThus, I findtheseconsiderations
unpersuasive
what
we
call
from
historical
with
the
might
continuity.
pared
argument
Marx,as he himselfsays,tookoverhisdialecticfromHegel. Of course,
those
he was criticalof aspectsof it; but he is nevercoy in criticizing
whoseideashaveinfluenced
him,and he tellsus exactlywhathe takesto
and
be wrongwithHegel's dialectic,for example,in the Economical
nowhere
does
he
Yet
explicitly
rejectHegel's
Philosophical
Manuscripts.
betweenthe twodialecticsit
Yet if thiswerea difference
dialetheism.
wouldbe botha crucialand an obviousone. It is implausiblethathe
wouldnot have mentionedit.
4 Analyisof SpecificExamples
In DD, I gavethreetextualexamplesof Marx'sapparentdialetheofthese,butdoes takeissue
on thefirst
ism.Marquitdoes notcomment
withtheothertwo.Let us lookat hisanalyses.In bothofthesehe triesto
enforcethewell-known
ploythatwehavealreadyseenatworkinthelast
inwhichweappeartohavebothA and
section.Ifeverthereisa situation
different
between
Ri andR2 (inthelastsection
~A, distinguish
respects,
thesewere times),such thatA holds in respectRi and -A holds in
it is to makethisstrategy
respect/?2-I noted(DD, 404) how difficult
workall the time.Let us see if Marquitsucceedswithit here.
it is
concernsthe notionof a commodity:
The firstcontradiction
but not both.Marquitnotes
botha use-valueand an exchange-value,
in the firstand mostsimpleformof
is manifest
thatthecontradiction
calls
the
Marx
what
value,
"Simple,Isolatedor AccidentalForm."In
the
one
this,
commodity, exchangor(20 yardsof linenin Marx'sexis
ample), exchangedforanother,theexchangee(a coat).The tworoles,
exchangorand exchangee,provideforMarquitthemeanswithwhichto
it is the exthe respectswithwhichto enforceconsistency:
construct
that
is
a use-value.
the
and
an
that
is
exchangee
exchange-value,
changor
In thisanalysisofthesimpleformofvalue,Marquitseemsto me to
be right.The quotationhe producesto supportit (MC, 160) does not
seemto me to makethepoint,butthereare clearerpassagesin Capital
(e.g. 1976, 143):
ofthelinen,
theform
of
inwhich
thecoatistheequivalent
inthevaluerelation,
thecoatcountsas theformof value.The valueof thecommodity
linen,is
therefore
coat,thevalueofone
bodyofthecommodity
bythephysical
expressed
other.
of
the
the
use-value
by

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472

SCIENCE f SOCIETY

But this does not show that there is no contradiction.For the simple
form of value is only a moment,the simplestabstraction,of the exchange process. Marx goes on to analyze others. Moreover, in reality,
thismomentnever occurs on its own. Clearly,it is alwaysaccompanied
by itsopposite. If A is exchanged forB, thenB is exchanged forA. Thus,
in reality,as opposed to a simple abstractionfromit,both commodities
are exchangorsand exchangees,and so use-valuesand exchange-values.
(This, I take it, is Ilyenkov'spoint; MC, 163.)
Nor willit help to evade contradictionby sayingthatqua exchangor
the commodityis a value, whilstqua exchangee the commodityis a
and the roles of exchangor
use-value. For real exchange is symmetrical,
and exchangee are exactlythe same role. Exchangingx fory is exactly
the same as x being exchanged fory. Thus, in the process of exchange a
commodityis a use-value and an exchange-value,as the quotation from
Marx that I gave (DD, 407) states.
It is interestingto compare the treatmentin Capitalwiththe correto theCritiqueofPoliticalEconomy.
sponding treatmentin A Contribution
Here Marx says (1971, 40; all italicsoriginal): "The commodityis a use
value, wheat, linen, diamond, machinery,etc. but as a commodityit is
simultaneouslynota use value." This is as clear a statementof a contradictionas one could get. But the nextsentencegoes on: "It would not
be a commodity,ifit were a use-value forthe owner. . . . For itsowner it
is on the contrarya non-use-value..." This might appear to imply
Marquit's distinction,except that Marx continues:
inthefirst
. . . hasstilltobecome
a use-value,
The commodity
placea use-valuefor
others.. . . The commodity
must,on theotherhand,becomea use-valueforits
sincehis meansof existenceexistoutsideit,in the use-valueof other
owner,
. . . Thus theuse-values
ofcommodities
become
use-values
people'scommodities.
of
a
mutual
by
exchange places.
Thus, Marx is clear that as exchangor it is simultaneouslya use-value
and an exchange-value. Indeed, it becomes a use-value by being an
exchange-value.
The second example concernsthe nature of bound labor. I argued
that it is both free and not-free,and thisfor a number of reasons (any
one of whichis sufficientto make the point). Let us see whetherMarquit
has any more success in applyingthe difference-in-respect
policyhere.
One considerationwhichgrounds the contradictorynatureof wage
labor, in particular,is thatthe laborersare freeto sell theirlabor-power
as theychoose; yettheyare hardlyfree,since the alternativeis starvation
and death. In what I take to be his commenton this,Marquit says (MC,
162):

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WAS MARX A DIALETHEIST?

473

or notentering
into
theworkers
are freeonlyinrespecttothechoiceofentering
of
oflabor,butare notfreewithrespecttothechoiceoftheconditions
a contract
laboras longas theydo nothave themeansof productionat theirdisposal.
But thisis to missthe point. It is notjust thattheyare not freeto choose
the conditionsof labor; theyare not free not to labor; because not to
labor is to die. The situation is exactly the same as that of Sartre's
occupied peoples (DD, 404), whichI have already discussed,and so will
say no more.
The situationwithrespectto the otherconsiderationwhichgrounds
the contradictioninvolved in any bound labor is more complex. The
considerationis simplythatsuch labor isforced,and thereforenot free.
However, it is labor nonetheless,and as such it is autonomous selfproduction.As Marx puts it (in partof the quotationthatMarquitomits;
DD, 408): "thisovercomingof obstaclesis in itselfa liberatingactivity."
In what I take to be his commenton this,Marquit says (MC, 161-2):
of
conditionforthecontinuation
in consciouslaboris a necessary
Participation
ofboundlabor. . . the
. . . Underconditions
humanexistence(self-realization).
discussed
one of theirmanyneeds,the self-realization
laborersare satisfying
ofotherneeds- adequatediet,housing,
above.Butwithrespecttothemeeting
rest,education,etc.- thelaborersare notfreeand cannotbe freewithoutthe
of
thedetermination
theproductoftheirlabor,including
powerto appropriate
theconditionsunderwhichtheirlaboris beingperformed.
Thus, the bound laborers are free in respect of realizing themselves,
but not free in respect of how theyeat, shelter,learn and, quite generally,labor. But this is a strange distinction.What is self-realization
(continued existence) other than eating,sleeping, learning,and all the
other material practices that make up human life? It seems to me
that unless one mystifiesself-realization,these two are exactly the
same thing.There is no differencein respect at all! So this contradiction stands too.

5 Motion
The final example that Marquit discusses is of rather a different
kind: motion. This comes fromthe dialecticsof nature ratherthan the
dialecticsof humanity.Thus considerationsfromnatural science enter.
The subject is too complex to discuss properlyhere, involvinghighly
technicalissues such as the correctinterpretationof the formalismof
quantum mechanics; so I will say only a few words.
The problem is posed by Zeno's paradox of the arrow. Both Marquit and I agree thatthe orthodox,Russellean,solutionto the problem

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474

SCIENCE f SOCIETY

does not work.I prefera solutionaccordingto whichmotiondoes

it incorporates
the view
(because,incidentally,
generatecontradictions
thatthevaluesof a determinable
are spreadovera range,ratherthan
himcorrectly,
a solutionthat
localized).Marquit,ifI understand
prefers
to
mechanics.
or
(See Priest,1985, 1987,ch. 12; Marappeals quantum
quit, 1979,416f.)
It is not clear to me thatone can solvemacroscopicproblemsby
illicitreductionist
appealingto a microscopic
theorywithoutimporting
in
principles.(Even
quantum theory,macroscopicobjects,such as
in a different
behave
devices,
measuring
wayfrommicroscopic
objects,
suchas thesystems
But
even
theymeasure.)
settingthataside,it is not
clearthatquantummechanics
does succeedingivinga consistent
viewof
the world.
For a start,as Marquitnotes(MC, 158f),in quantummechanicsa
statedescription
does notassigna singlevaluetoa determinable,
suchas
position,but a range of values. If one takesthisspread merelyas a
measureofour uncertainly
as to thevalue,thennothingontological
has
and
so
on
the
the
remains.
If,
changed,
paradox
problempresentedby
theotherhand,one takesit thatthespreadis ontological,
and thatthe
states,it is notclear
systemdetermined
reallyis in all theincompatible
thatthe situationis consistent.
Or again,considerthe two-slit
thatMarquitdescribes
experiment
theprobability
thata
(MC, 158).Byclassicallogicand probability
theory,
thatithits
photonhitsthescreenin a certainplace(5) is theprobability
thescreenat thatplaceand goesthrougheitherone slit(A) or theother
(~A): Pr(S) = Pr(S8c(A'~A)). But thisis equal to Pr(S&A)+Pr(S&~A)thelasttermis 0. But
Pr(S&A&~A).Assumingtheworldtobe consistent
thenPr(S) is thesumof theprobabilities
of theparticlegoingthrough
one slit or the other. And this is exactlywhat is not found exOne (butbyno meanstheonly)wayoutofthisproblemis
perimentally.
just to acceptthatthe lasttermis notzero,thatthe particlerealizesa
contradiction
and goes throughbothslits.(For a slightly
less simplemindeddiscussion,see Priest,etai, 1989,377f.)
I am not,fora moment,suggesting
thatquantummechanicaldeare
of
an
inconsistent
scriptions descriptions
reality.
Mypointisjustthat
it is ratherprematureto claimquantummechanicsas an allyagainst
dialetheism.
So Marquit'sfinalargumentis inconclusive.
GRAHAM PRIEST

The University
of Queensland
Queensland,Australia

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WAS MARX A DIALETHEIST?

475

REFERENCES
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Engels,Frederick.1954.Dialectics
Lakatos,Imre. 1978. "Cauchyand the Continuum."In Vol. II of Lakatos'
Collected
Papers,eds.J. Worralland G. Currie.NewYork:CambridgeUniPress.
versity
ofMotioninContinuous
and DiscreteSpaces."
Marquit,Erwin.1979."Dialectics
Science&fSociety,42, 410-425.
to the Critiqueof PoliticalEconomy.London:
Marx, Karl. 1971. A Contribution

Lawrenceand Wishart.
. 1976. Capital,Vol. I. New York:Penguin.
in Motion."American
Priest,Graham.1985."Inconsistencies
QuarPhilosophical
339-46.
22,
terly,
. 1987.In Contradiction.
The Hague: Nijhoff.
, R. Routleyand J. Norman.1989.Paraconsistent
Logics.Munich:PhilosophiaVerlag.

475-480
Vol.54,No.4, Winter
Science
& Society,
1990-1991,

IN DEFENSE OF MARXISM: A REPLY

Several points need to be clarifiedin Thomas F. Mayer's (1989) contributionto the debate over AnalyticalMarxism.
DefinitionalPolitics or Political Definitions
Mayeris correctin drawingattentionto the politicaluses of defining
a fieldor approach or school of inquiry.However,the problemof who is
to claim Marxismand how it is to be defineddoes not simplyinvolve,as
Mayerargues, the choice betweenan exclusive,ossified,doctrinalMarxism incapable of change, and an eclecticMarxismcapable of encompassing any and all theoreticaland methodologicalpositions.The point is
not whetherthistheoryor thatis "really"Marxist,but what counts as a
theoreticallyand methodologicallyadequate understanding of social
reality,an adequacy determinedby the relationshipbetweentheoryand
concrete political practice.

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