G.R. No.

120420 April 21, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
RUFINO MIRANDILLA BERMAS
VITUG,
J.:
FACTS: Complainant Manuela Bermas, 15 years old, was raped by her own
father, appellant Rufino Bermas, while she was lying down on a wooden bed
inside their house armed with a knife and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously has
carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant against her. Hence,
complainant as assisted by her mother accuses Rufino Mirandilla Bermas,
filed a complaint against the accused of the crime of Rape before the RTC
of Paraaque. Accused Rufino Mirandilla Bermas pleaded not guilty. The
accused denied the allegation hence he even performed the dual role of a
father and a mother to his children since the time of hisseparation from
his wife and he thinks that the complainant might have been motivated by
ill-will or revenge in view of the numerous scoldings that she has
received from him on account of her frequent coming home late at night.
The trial court convicted the accused guilty of the offense charged
andsentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death.I SSUE: WON the
accused was denied his constitutional right to effective and vigilant
counsel. RULING:YES, SC remanded the case to the trial court. Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his
client with utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He must not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard
renders himadministratively liable.In the instant case, the aforenamed
defense lawyers did not protect, much less uphold, thefundamental rights
of the accused. Instead, they haphazardly performed their function as
counsel
de oficio
to the detriment and prejudice of the accused Sevilleno, however guilty
he might have been found to beafter trial. Inevitably, this Court must
advise Attys. Agravante, Pabalinas and Saldavia to adhere closelyand
faithfully to the tenets espoused in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, otherwise, commission of any similar act in the future
will be severely sanctioned. The Second Assistant Prosecutor issued

acertification to the effect that the accused had waived his right to a
preliminary investigation. On the dayof his arraignment, the accused was
brought
before
the
trial
court
without
counsel.
The
court
thereuponassigned Atty. Rosa Elmira C Villamin of the Public Attorney's
Office to be the counsel
de officio
.Accused forthwith pleaded not guilty. The pre-trial was waived.The
prosecution placed complainantManuela Bermas at the witness stand. The
counsel de oficio testified on direct examination with hardlyany
participation by defense counsel who, inexplicably, later waived the
cross-examination and thenasked the court to be relieved of her duty as
counsel
de officio
. Furthermore, Atty. Roberto Gomez wasappointed the new counsel
de officio and asked for a ten minute recess
before he began his crossexamination
which is far too inadequate On the day the defense will present their
evidence another lawyer Atty.Lonzame was appointed as counsel de oficio.
Therefore,
the accused has not properly andeffectively been accorded the right to
counsel. So important is the right to counsel that it has beenenshrined in
our fundamental law and its precursor laws.

A.C. No. 6155 March 14, 2006

MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO, JOSEPHINE S. TAN and CARLOS M. JOAQUIN
vs.
ATTY. JAIME JUANITO P. PORTUGAL
TINGA,
J.:
FACTS:SPO1 Ernesto C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M.
Joaquin were involved ina shooting incident which resulted in the death of
two individuals and the serious injury of another. As aresult,
Informations were filed against them before the Sandiganbayan for murder
and frustrated murder eventually they were convicted. Complainants engaged
the services of herein respondent for the accused.Respondent then filed a

Motion for Reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan but it was denied still
therespondent filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for
Reconsideration, with theattached Second Motion for Reconsideration and
filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari.Thereafter,
complainants never heard from respondent again despite the frequent
telephone callsthey made to his office. When respondent did not return
their phone inquiries, complainants went torespondents last known address
only to find out that he had moved out without any forwarding address.More
than a year after the petition was filed, complainants were constrained to
personally verify the statusof the petition and they were shocked that
their petition was denied due to late filing and non-payment of docket
fees and said resolution had attained finality and warrants of arrest had
already been issued againstthem.Complainants filed before the SC an
affidavit-complaint against Atty. Jaime Juanito P. Portugal(respondent)
for violation of the Lawyers Oath, gross misconduct, and gross negligence
for allegedmishandling of the petition which eventually led to its denial
with finality. Respondent contends that hewas not the original counsel of
the accused. He only met the accused during the promulgation of
theSandiganbayan decision convicting the accused of two counts of homicide
and one count of attemptedhomicide. He was merely requested by the
original counsel to be on hand, assist the accused, and be present at the
promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision and the petition was filed
within thereglementary period. Respondent sent a letter the PO3 Joaquin
for his formal withdrawal as counsel butthe latter did not reply. Upon the
investigation of the IBP, it ruled respondent guilty of violation of
theCode of Professional Responsibility and recommended the imposition of
penalty ranging from reprimandto suspension of six (6) months.ISSUE:
Whether respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in handling
G.R. No. 152621-23,which eventually led to the
ad cautelam
petitions dismissal with finality.
RULING:YES, SC ordered for the suspension of the respondent from
the practice of law for three (3)months. The SC agreed to the IBP
that the dismissal of the
ad cautelam
petition was primarily due to thegross negligence of respondent Once he
agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer owes fidelityto such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him. He must serve theclient with competence and diligence, and champion
the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care,and devotion. In a

criminal case like that handled by respondent in behalf of the accused,

respondent has ahigher duty to be circumspect in defending the accused for
it is not only the property of the accused whichstands to be lost but more
importantly, their right to their life and liberty. Thus, in the creation
of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties
that breathe life into it, among those, thefiduciary duty to his client
which is of very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring
a veryhigh degree of fidelity and good faith that is required by reason of
necessity and public interest.In this case, respondent ought to know that
he was the one who should have filed the Notice toWithdraw and not the
accused. His tale that he sent a registered letter to the accused and gave
theminstructions on how to go about respondents withdrawal from the case
defies credulity. It should have been respondent who undertook the
appropriate measures for the proper withdrawal of his representation.He
should not have relied on his client to do it for him if such was truly
the case. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute
right to terminate the attorney-client relation at anytime withor without
cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation
other than for sufficientcause is, however, considerably restricted. Among
the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that anattorney who
undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its
conclusion. He is not atliberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A
lawyers right to withdraw from a case before its finaladjudication arises
only from the clients written consent or from a good causeFurthermore,
after agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to
both causeand client, even if the client never paid any fee for the
attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a
profession in which duty of public service, not money, is the primary
consideration.

Ramos vs. Dajoyag - A.C. No. 5174

FACTS: This is a complaint filed by Ernesto M. Ramos against Atty. Mariano
A. Dajoyag Jr. for negligence in failing to appeal a ruling of the NLRC,
which affirmed the dismissal by the Labor Arbiter of a complaint for legal
dismissal.It appears that Ramos was terminated from work for failure of
his lawyer, Atty. Dajoyag, to file on timethe petition for certiorari,
when the Supreme Court dismissed it with finality.From the records, it can
be gleaned that Atty. Dajoyag moved for an extension to file which was
granted but the Resolution granting the 1st extension contained a warning

that no further extension would begiven. Atty. Dajoyag, on the other hand,
explained that he was not aware of this because when he filed hismotion
for last extension for only 20 days, he had not yet received the copy of
said resolution. He further explained that he relied on good faith that
his Motion for 1st Extension of 30 days would be grantedwithout the
warning as this was only a first extension; and also that he requested
for a second and lastextension of 20 days for which he complied with the
filing of the Petition for Certiorari on the last day of the supposed
extended period.ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ramos is guilty of
negligence.RULING: Yes. Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides: A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions
of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse
withoutsubmitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to
do so ". Motions for extension are notgranted as a matter of right but in
the sound discretion of the court, and lawyers should never presumethat
their motions for extension or postponement will be granted or that they
will be granted the length of time they pray for. Due diligence requires
that they should conduct a timely inquiry with the divisionclerks of court
of the action on their motions and, the lack of notice thereof will not
make them any lessaccountable for their omission.
REGALA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [1996]
y
Special Civil Action in the SC. Certiorari
y
RP instituted a Complaint before the Sandiganbayan (SB), through the
Presidential Commissionon Good Govt (PCGG) against Eduardo M. Cojuangco,
Jr., as one of the principal defendants,for the recovery of alleged illgotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corps.in PCGG
Case No. 33 (CC No. 0033) entitled "RP vs. Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."
y
Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners and herein
private respondentRaul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regalaand Cruz (ACCRA) Law Offices. ACCRA Law
Firm performed legal services for its clients andin the performance of
these services, the members of the law firm delivered to its
clientdocuments which substantiate the client's equity holdings.
y

In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law
firm acquire informationrelative to the assets of clients as well as their
personal and business circumstances. As membersof the ACCRA Law Firm,
petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assistedin
the organization and acquisition of the companies included in CC No. 0033,
and in keepingwith the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nomineesstockholders
of
the
said
corporationsinvolved
in
sequestration
proceedings.
y
PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit 3rd Amended Complaint"
Complaint" w/cexcluded Roco from the complaint in PCGG
party-defendant, Roco having promised hell reveal the
principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder
involved in PCGG Case # 33
y

& "3rd Amended

Case No. 33 as
identity of the
inthe companies

Petitioners were included in 3rd Amended Complaint for having plotted,

devised, schemed,conspired & confederated w/each other in setting up,
through the use of coconut levy funds, thefinancial & corporate framework
& structures that led to establishment of UCPB, UNICOM,COCOLIFE, COCOMARK,
CIC, & more than 20 other coconut levy funded corps, including
theacquisition of San Miguel Corp. shares & its institutionalization
through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly. Through insidious
means & machinations, ACCRA Investments Corp., became the holder of
roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital stock of UCPB.
y
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners alleged
that their participationin the acts w/ w/c their co-defendants are
charged, was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering.
y
Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a
separate answer denying the allegations in the complaint implicating him
in the alleged ill-gotten wealth.
y
Petitioners then filed their "Comment &/or Opposition" w/ Counter-Motion
that PCGG excludethem as parties-defendants like Roco.

y
PCGG set the ff. precedent for the exclusion of petitioners:(a)the
disclosure of the identity of its clients;(b)submission of documents
substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and(c)the submission of the
deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clientscovering
their respective shareholdings.
y
Consequently, PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by
Roco of the sameconditions precedent. However, during said proceedings,
Roco didnt refute petitioners'contention that he did actually not reveal
the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33,
nor had he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom he
acted as nominee-stockholder.
y
In a Resolution, SB denied the exclusion of petitioners, for their refusal
to comply w/ theconditions required by PCGG. It held, ACCRA lawyers
cannot excuse themselves from theconsequences of their acts until they
have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the
existence and identity of the client.
y
ACCRA lawyers filed MFR w/c was denied. Hence, ACCRA lawyers filed the
petition for certiorari. Petitioner Hayudini, likewise, filed his own MFR
w/c was also denied thus, he filed aseparate petition for certiorari,
assailing SBs resolution on essentially same grounds averred
by petitioners, namely:
o
SB gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners to the strict
application of thelaw of agency.
o
SB gravely abused its discretion in not considering petitioners & Roco
similarly situated&, thus, deserving equal treatment
o

SB gravely abused its discretion in not holding that, under the facts of
this case, theattorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners from
revealing the identity of their client(s)and the other information
requested by the PCGG.
o
SB gravely abused its discretion in not requiring that dropping of partydefendants be based on reasonable & just grounds, w/ due consideration to
constitutional rights of petitioners
y
PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that
the revelation of theidentity of the client is not w/in the ambit of the
lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor arethe documents it required
(deeds of assignment) protected, because they are evidence of
nomineestatus.WON attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners from
revealing the identity of their client(s) & theother information requested
by the PCGG
y
YES. Nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law
concepts of locatioconductio operarum (contract of lease of services)
where one person lets his services and another hires them without
reference to the object of which the services are to be performed,
whereinlawyers' services may be compensated by honorarium or for hire, and
mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be
placed makes a contract in his name, butgives up all that he gained by the
contract to the person who requested him. But the lawyerclientrelationship is more than that of the principal-agent and lessorlessee.
y
An attorney is more than a mere agent or servant, because he possesses
special powers of trustand confidence reposed on him by his client. An
attorney occupies a "quasi-judicial office" sincehe is in fact an officer
of the Court & exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action
to be taken favorable to his client.
y
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules,
ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the

fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate,exacting and

confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good
faith, that isrequired by reason of necessity and public interest based on
the hypothesis that abstinence fromseeking legal advice in a good cause is
an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.
y
Attorney-client privilege, is worded in Rules of Court, Rule 130:Sec. 24.
Disqualification byreason of privileged communication. The following
persons cannot testify as to matters learned inconfidence in the following
cases:xxx An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client,
beexamined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his
advice given thereon in thecourse of, or with a view to, professional
employment, can an attorney's secretary, stenographer,or clerk be
examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning
any fact theknowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.
y
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 20. It is the duty of
an attorney: (e) tomaintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril
to himself, to preserve the secrets of hisclient, and to accept no
compensation in connection with his client's business except from him
or with his knowledge and approval.
y
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17, CPR (A lawyer owes fidelity
to the cause of hisclient and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.) Canon 15, CPR alsodemands a lawyer's fidelity
to client.
y
An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the
degree of confidence whichexists between lawyer and client which in turn
requires a situation which encourages a dynamicand fruitful exchange and
flow of information.
y
Thus, the Court held that this duty may be asserted in refusing to
disclose the name of petitioners'client(s) in the case at bar.
y

The general rule is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse
to divulge the name or identity of his client.
y
Reasons advanced for the general rule:
o
Court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is
sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
o
Privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has
been established.
o
Privilege generally pertains to subject matter of relationship
o
Due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a
general rule,know his adversary.
y
Exceptions to the gen. rule:
o
Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that
revealing the client'sname would implicate that client in the very
activity for which he sought the lawyer'sadvice.

Ex-Parte Enzor and U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig: The subject matter of
therelationship was so closely related to the issue of the client's
identity that the privilege actually attached to both.
o
Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is
privileged.

Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corp.: couldnt reveal name of his client as this
wouldexpose the latter to civil litigation.

Matter of Shawmut Mining Company: We feel sure that under such

conditionsno case has ever gone to the length of compelling an attorney,
at the instance of ahostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer,
but the nature of the transactionsto w/c it related, when such information
could be made the basis of a suit againsthis client.
A

o
Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client
unless, byrevealing the client's name, the said name would furnish the
only link that would form thechain of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged.

Baird vs. Korner: a lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names of
clientswho employed him to pay sums of money to govt voluntarily in
settlementof undetermined income taxes, unsued on, & w/ no govt audit
or investigation into that client's income tax liability pending
y
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which
could qualify asexceptions to the general rule:
o
if the content of any client communication to a lawyer is relevant to the
subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal
assistance
o
where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously
disclosed & it isthe identity w/c is intended to be confidential, the
identity of the client has been held to be privileged, since such
revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entiretransaction.
y

Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a

client may fall within theambit of the privilege when the client's name
itself has an independent significance, such thatdisclosure would then
reveal client confidences.
y
Instant case falls under at least 2 exceptions to the general rule.
y
First, disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish
said client's connection withthe very fact in issue of the case, which is
privileged information, because the privilege, as statedearlier, protects
the subject matter or the substance (without which there would be no
attorney-client relationship).
y
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or
legal service sought wasduly established in the case at bar, by no less
than the PCGG itself as can be seen in the 3 specificconditions laid down
by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution
shouldthey accede thereto.
y
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that
the clients indeedconsulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers,
regarding the financial and corporatestructure, framework and set-up of
the
corporations
in
question.
In
turn,
petitioners
gave
their professional advice in the form of, among others, the
aforementioned deeds of assignmentcovering their client's shareholdings.
y
Petitioners have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would
implicate them in the veryactivity for which legal advice had been sought,
i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealthin the aforementioned
corporations.
y
Secondly, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name
would obviously providethe necessary link for the prosecution to build its
case, where none otherwise exists.

y
While the privilege may not be invoked for illegal purposes such as in a
case where a client takeson the services of an attorney, for illicit
purposes, it may be invoked in a case where a clientthinks he might have
previously committed something illegal and consults his attorney.
Whether or not the act for which the client sought advice turns out to be
illegal, his name cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads to
evidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which mightlead to
possible action against him.
y
The Baird exception, applicable to the instant case, is consonant with the
principal policy behindthe privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of
promoting freedom of consultation of legal advisors byclients,
apprehension of compelled disclosure from attorneys must be eliminated.
What is soughtto be avoided then is the exploitation of the general rule
in what may amount to a fishingexpedition by the prosecution.
y
In fine, the crux of petitioner's objections ultimately hinges on their
expectation that if the prosecution has a case against their clients, the
latter's case should be built upon evidence painstakingly gathered by them
from their own sources and not from compelled testimonyrequiring them to
reveal the name of their clients, information which unavoidably reveals
muchabout the nature of the transaction which may or may not be illegal.
y
The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilegeand lawyer's loyalty to his client is evident in
the duration of the protection, which exists not onlyduring the
relationship, but extends even after the termination of the relationship.
y
We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the
identity of their clients under pain of the breach of fiduciary duty
owing to their clients, as the facts of the instant case clearlyfall w/in
recognized exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not privileged
information.Otherwise, it would expose the lawyers themselves to possible

litigation by their clients in viewof the strict fiduciary responsibility

imposed on them in exercise of their duties.
HUMBERTO
C.
LIM,
JR.,
in
behalf
of
PENTA
RESORTS
CORPORATION/Attorney-in-Fact
of LUMOT
A.
JALANDONI,
Complainant,vs.ATTY. NICANOR V. VILLAROSA, Respondent.
Facts: In this case, respondent ATTY. NICANOR V. VILLAROSA is a practicing
lawyer and a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Lumot A.
Jalandoni who is the Chairman/President of PentaResorts Corporation (PRC)
and owns the biggest shares of stocks in the corporation, was sued
whichinvolved the possession of land where Alhambra hotel, the only
property owned by PRC, is situated. Thisis
Civil Case No. 97-9865.The latter engaged the legal services of herein
respondent.
Respondent
as
a
consequence
of
saidAttorney-Client
relationship represented Lumot A. Jalandoni et al in the entire
proceedings of said case.Utmost trust and confidence was reposed on said
counsel, hence delicate and confidential mattersinvolving all the personal
circumstances of his client were entrusted to the respondent.Later on,
respondent, without due notice prior to a scheduled hearing, surprisingly
filed a Motion towithdraw as counsel, one day before its scheduled
hearing. A careful perusal of said Motion to Withdrawas Counsel will
conclusively show that no copy thereof was furnished to Lumot A.
Jalandoni, neither does it bear her conformityThe grounds alleged by
respondent for his withdrawal as counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. was
that heis a retained counsel of Dennis G. Jalbuena. This is an estafa case
filed by the representatives of PRCitself against spouses Dennis and
Carmen Jalbuena It is worthy to note that from the outset,
respondentalready knew that Dennis G. Jalbuena is the son-in-law of Lumot
A. Jalandoni being married to her eldestdaughter, Carmen J.
Jalbuena.Petitioners alleged that as an offshoot of representing
conflicting interests, breach of attorney-clientconfidentiality and
deliberate withholding of records were committed by respondent. To
effectivelyunravel the alleged conflict of interest, we must look into the
cases involved.Petitioners alleged that as an offshoot of representing
conflicting interests, breach of attorney-clientconfidentiality was
committed by respondent.Issues: 1. Whether there existed a conflict of
interest in the cases represented and handled byrespondent, and2. Whether
respondent properly withdrew his services as counsel of record of
Jalandoni.Held: Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
highlights the need for

candor, fairness and loyalty in all the dealings of lawyers with their
clients
. Rule 15.03 of the CPR aptly provides:Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concernedgiven after a full disclosure of the facts.It is only upon strict
compliance with the condition of full disclosure of facts that a lawyer
may appear against his client; otherwise, his representation of
conflicting interests is reprehensible.
Conflict of interest may be determined in this manner:There is
representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new
retainer will require theattorney to do anything which will injuriously
affect his first client in any matter in which he representshim and also
whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his
first client anyknowledge acquired through their connection.The rule on
conflict of interests covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have beenconfided but also
those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.Another
test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent anattorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invitesuspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof, and also
whether he will becalled upon in his new relation to use against his first
client any knowledge acquire in the previousemployment. The first part of
the rule refers to cases in which the opposing parties are present
clientseither in the same action or in a totally unrelated case; the
second part pertains to those in which theadverse party against whom the
attorney appears is his former client in a matter which is related,
directlyor indirectly, to the present controversy.The rule prohibits a
lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a
former clientin any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same
action or in totally unrelated cases. The caseshere directly or indirectly
involved the parties connection to PRC, even if neither PRC nor Lumot
A.Jalandoni was specifically named as party-litigant in some of the cases
mentioned.An attorney owes to his client undivided allegiance. After being
retained and receiving the confidences of the client, he cannot, without
the free and intelligent consent of his client, act both for his client
and for one whose interest is adverse to, or conflicting with that of his
client in the same general matter The prohibition stands even if the
adverse interest is very slight; neither is it material that the intention

andmotive of the attorney may have been honest.The representation by a

lawyer of conflicting interests, in the absence of the written consent of
all partiesconcerned after a full disclosure of the facts, constitutes
professional misconduct which subjects thelawyer to disciplinary
action.Even respondents alleged effort to settle the existing controversy
among the family members
wasimproper because the written consent of all concerned was still
required. A lawyer who acts as such insettling a dispute cannot represent
any of the parties to it.The next bone of contention was the propriety of
respondents withdrawal as counsel for Lumot A.Jalandoni. In his comment,
respondent stated that it was he who was not notified of the hiring of
Atty.Alminaza as the new counsel in that case and that he withdrew from
the case with the knowledge of Lumot A. Jalandoni and with leave of
court.The rule on termination of attorney-client relations may be
summarized as follows:The relation of attorney and client may be
terminated by the client, by the lawyer or by the court, or byreason of
circumstances beyond the control of the client or the lawyer. The
termination of the attorney-client relationship entails certain duties on
the part of the client and his lawyer.
Accordingly, it has been held that the right of an attorney to withdraw or
terminate the relation other thanfor sufficient cause is considerably
restricted. Canon 22 of the CPR reads:Canon 22 A lawyer shall withdraw
his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in
thecircumstances.An attorney may only retire from a case either by written
consent of his client or by permission of thecourt after due notice and
hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the name of the
newlawyer is recorded in the case. A lawyer who desires to retire from an
action without the written consentof his client must file a petition for
withdrawal in court. He must serve a copy of his petition upon hisclient
and the adverse party at least three days before the date set for hearing,
otherwise the court maytreat the application as a "mere scrap of paper
."
Respondent made no such move. He admitted that hewithdrew as counsel on
April 26, 1999, which withdrawal was supposedly approved by the court on
April28, 1999. The conformity of Mrs. Jalandoni was only presumed by Atty.
Villarosa because of theappearance of Atty. Alminaza in court, supposedly
in his place.A client may discharge his attorney at any time with or
without cause and thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter his
appearance. Thus, it has been held that a client is free to change
hiscounsel in a pending case and thereafter retain another lawyer to

represent him. That manner of changinga lawyer does not need the consent
of the lawyer to be dismissed. Nor does it require approval of
thecourt.The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact was not even to
substitute for respondent but to act as additionalcounsel. Mrs.
Jalandonis conformity to having an additional lawyer did not necessarily
mean conformityto respondents desire to withdraw as counsel. Respondents
speculations on the professional relationshipof Atty. Alminaza and Mrs.
Jalandoni find no support in the records of this case.WHEREFORE, in view
of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa is hereby found
GUILTYof violating Canon 15 and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for one (1) year,
effective upon receipt of this decision, with a STERNWARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
NICANOR
GONZALES
and
SALUD
PANTANOSAS
vs.
ATTY.
MIGUEL
SABAJACANISSUE:
Whether or not it is justifiable for Atty. Sabajacan in holding
the certificates of title and its refusal to deliver the said
titles to the complainant despite a formalletter demand.
FACTS:
Sometime in October 1994 complainants were informed by the
Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City that the complainants
owners duplicate of titlecovering their lands were entrusted to
the office secretary of the respondentwho in torn entrusted the
same to respondent but when demanded to deliverthe said titles to
the complainant in formal demand letter refused and continuesto
refuse without any justification to give their titles and that in
spite of repeateddemands, requests and pleas towards respondent,
respondent still fail andstubbornly refused without justification
to surrender the said titles to the rightfulowners, the
complainants.The Court required commenting on the foregoing
complaint; the respondentadmitted having met Salud Panatanosas
but claims that, to his recollection,Nicanor Gonzales has never
been to his office. He further denies complainantsallegation
that he is arrogant, in contrast to the innocence, simplicity
andignorance of said complainants. The Court finds that
respondent admittedhaving taken possession of the certificate of
titles and that all he did was toinform the Court that his
obligation to deliver the certificates to Mr. Samto Uyexcludes
the delivery of said certificates to anyone else. Respondent
attachedsome certificates of title to his answer to support his

contention thatcomplainants are notorious characters. However,

the certifications indicate thatmost of the cases stated therein,
especially those involving fraud, have beendismissed. Respondent
likewise submitted Xerox copies of certain certificates of title
in an effort to explain why he kept the certificates of title of
complainantsthat is supposedly for the purpose of subdividing the
property. Unfortunately, anexamination of the same does not show
any connection thereof to respondentsclaim. In fact, two sets of
certificates of title appear to be entirely different fromeach
other.
H
ELD:
As a lawyer, respondent should know that there are lawful
remedies providedby law to protect the interests of his client.
The records do not show that he orhis client has availed of said
remedies. Also, he cannot be unaware of theimposable sanction on
a counsel who resorts to unlawful means that wouldcause injustice
to the adversaries of his client.The Court accordingly finds that
the respondent has not exercises the good faithand diligence
required of lawyers in handling the legal affairs of their
clients.Apparently, respondent has disregarded Canon 15, Rule
15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that a lawyer shall impress upon hisclient the need for
compliance with the laws and principles of fairness. Instead,he
unjustly refused to give to complainants their certificates of
titles supposedlyto enforce payment of their alleged financial
obligations to his client presumablyto impress the latter of his
power to do so.Canon 19, Rule 19.01 ordains that a lawyer shall
employ only fair and honestmeans to attain the lawful objectives
of his client and shall not present,participate in presenting, or
threaten to present unfounded charges to obtain animproper
advantage in any case or proceeding. Respondent has closely
skirtedthis proscription, if he has not in fact transgressed the
same.The Court desires and directs that respondent should
forthwith return thecertificates of title of complainants. To
ensure the same, he should be placedunder suspension until he
presents to the Court that the disputed certificates of title
have been returned to and receipt thereof duly acknowledged
bycomplainants, or can present a judicial order or appropriate
legal authority justifying the possession by him or his client of
said certificates. He is furtherWARNED that a repetition of the

same or similar or any other administrativemisconduct will be

punished more severely.
IN RE: Paas AM No. 01-12-02-SCISSUE:
Whether or not allegations of Judge Paas and Almarvez to each
other is meritorious.
FACTS:
Judge Paas administratively charges Court/Aide Utility Worker
Edgar E. Almarvez thathe is discourteous to his co-employees,
lawyers
and
party
litigants;
has
failed
to
maintain
thecleanliness in and around the court premises despite order to
do so, habitually absent fromwork or made it appear that he reported
for work by signing the log book in the morning, onlyto stay out of
office the whole day; asked from detention prisoners P100-P200
before hereleased to them their Release Orders and divulged
confidential information to litigants inadvance of its authorized
release
date
for
a
monetary
consideration,
thus
giving
undueadvantage or favour to the paying party. There were
attestations of the members of the courtwith regard to this
alleged complaint same attestation with the Jail Escort Officer
that hewitnessed Almarvez receive from detention prisoners P100P200
in
consideration
of
the
releaseof
their
Release
Orders.Almarvez filed an answer denying Judge Paas charges and
alleged that the real reasonwhy the latter filed the case against
him was because she suspected him of helping herhusband; Atty.
Renerio G. Paas conceal his marital indiscretions; since she
failed to elicit anyinformation from him, she resorted to calling
him names and other forms of harassment andinsisted him to sign
prepared resignation letter, a copy of which he was not able to
keep. Hefurther denied ever requesting for money in exchange for
the release of court orders andclaimed that Judge Paas ordered
him to undergo a drug test per Memorandum even if he hadno
history of drug abuse on a periodic or continuous basis as shown
by the test results of hisexamination.The administrative cases
were consolidated and referred for evaluation to the OCA wherein
a separate case for inhibition Judge Paas husband, private
practitioner Atty. Paas, was usinghis wifes office as his office
address in his law practice wherein they vehemently denied
thecharge that the latter was using Room 203 of the Pasay City
Hall of Justice as his address, theyclaiming that Atty. Paas
actually holds office at 410 Natividad Building, Escolta, Manila.

OnJanuary of 2002 Judge Paas admitted that her husband did use
her office as his return addressfor notices and orders in a
Criminal case but only to ensure and facilitate delivery of
thosenotices, but after the cases were terminated, all notices
were sent to his office address inEscolta.OCA laid its findings
and recommendations that Almarvez be dismissed of its sharges
of exacting money and be duly penalized for inefficiency in the
performance of his official duties.On charges against Judge Paas,
for lack of supporting evidence recommended the dismissal of
the charges of maltreatment, harassment and verbal abuse but
instead be found guilty of simple misconduct in office and be
penalized with reprimand and warning.
H
ELD:
A.
On charges against AlmarvezThe Court finds no sufficient evidence
to support the charge of violation of confidentiality of official
communication against Almarvez while the charges of neglect of
duty is too general to support a conviction and are contrary are
towhat is reflected in his performance rating that he cooperated
willingly. Theirclaims remains hearsay. On the charge of
inefficiency concurs with the findingsand recommendations of OCA.
The fact that respondent Almarvez neverdisputed the performance
ratings given him is tantamount to an impliedacceptance.B.
On charges against Judge PaasRegarding the charges of abuse of
authority and oppression against Judge Paas, Almarvez failedto
substantiate the same. Judge Paas order to undergo drug test is
not an unlawful order.However Judge Paas indeed allowed his
husband to ride on her prestige for purpose of advancing his
private interest, in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
On his part, Atty.Paas was guilty of using fraudulent, misleading
and deceptive address that had no purporseother than to try to
impress either the court in which his cases are lodged, or his
client, that hehas close ties to a member of the judiciary.
Therefore, violating Canons 3, Rule 3.01, Canon 10,Rule 10.01,
Canon 13, Canon 15, Rule 15.06 which states that A lawyer shall
not state or implythat he is able to influence any public
official, tribunal or legislative body.Wherefore, Almarvez is
pronounced GUILTY of inefficiency and is hereby suspende for

1month and Judge Paas GUILTY of conduct of unbecoming of a member

of the judiciary andhereby REPRIMANDED, with warning that
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealtwith
severely, she is further ordered to pay a FINe and that his
husband Atty. Renerio PaasGUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and hereby
SUSPENDED from practice of law for a period of three months with
warning.
RIZALINO FERNANDEZ v. ATTY. REYNALDO NOVERO, JR.Mendoza, J:
Facts:
Rizalino Fernandez and others filed a disbarment case against Atty.
Reynaldo Novero, Jr. for alleged patentand gross neglect in the handling
of their civil case against the Bacolod City Water District.The
complainant imputed that the respondent did not attend the scheduled
hearing nor seek apostponement, for which reason the trial court
considered respondent to have waived further presentation of hisevidence
and directed him to formally offer his exhibits. However, respondent
failed to formally offer his exhibits,prompting the trial court to order
the dismissal of the case. The respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of theorder of dismissal however he did not file his
motion within the reglementary period. He even tried to shift the blameon
complainant by claiming that the latter insisted on presenting his sister
from Manila as their last witness. The truthwas that complainants sister
had already testified.The respondent submitted his Answer and averred that
the complaint filed against him was baseless, purelymalicious and
speculative considering the fact that it was not made under oath. He
contended that complainantengaged his legal services after the first
counsel had withdrawn and he had no knowledge of what had happened inthe
case before he handled it because complainant did not furnish him with the
records and stenographic notes of theprevious proceedings despite his
repeated requests. He alleged that he failed to formally offer the
exhibits becausecomplainant tried to take over the handling of the case by
insisting on presenting more witnesses who failed toappear during
trial.The Office of the Bar Confidant submitted a report finding
respondent guilty of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and recommending his suspension.The Integrated Bar of the Philippines also
submitted a report and recommendation for the suspension of respondent
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross neglect in the handling of
the civil case?

Held:
The Supreme Court held that a counsel must constantly keep in mind that
his actions or omissions, evenmalfeasance or nonfeasance would be binding
on his client. A lawyer owes to the client the exercise of utmostprudence
and capability in that representation.The respondents attempt to evade
responsibility by shifting the blame on complainant due to the
lattersfailure to turn over to him records and stenographic notes of the
case only highlights his incompetence andinadequacy in handling the
complainants case.The respondent Atty. Novero is found guilty of neglect
of his clients case and is Suspended from thepractice of law for one (1)
month with Warning that repetition of the same negligent act will be dealt
with even moreseverely.
EDGAR O. PEREA vs. ATTY. RUBEN ALMADROAustria-Martinez, J:
Facts:
Edgar Perea filed a complaint for disbarment against his lawyer Atty.
Ruben Aladro for gross neglect of hisduties as a lawyer. The respondent
was his counsel before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City where he is
beingcharged with the crime of Frustrated Homicide. The RTC issued an
order granting Atty. Almadros motion for leave tofile demurrer to
evidence within ten days from February 26, 1996. Perea thought that his
counsel filed the saiddemurrer and the case against him was dismissed.
However, he learned sometime in 1999 that his counsel failed tofile any
demurrer, thus there was a warrant issued for his arrest and he is not
allowed to post bail. The respondenthas not attended any of his hearings
and such neglect of his responsibilities would result to the loss of
freedom andlivelihood of his client. Atty. Almadro submitted an Answer to
the complaint through the law firm Sua and Alambra, whichcontended that:
two days after the RTC granted the manifestation of defense to file motion
for leave to file demurrer to evidence, he had finished the draft of the
motion and the accompanying pleading which he stored in a magneticcomputer
diskette intended for editing prior to its submission in court; a few days
before the deadline, he tried toretrieve the draft from the diskette but
said drafts were nowhere to be found despite efforts to retrieve them;
this ledhim to believe that the drafts must have been finalized and the
edited versions accordingly filed. He becamepreoccupied with the
congressional elections in Biliran where he ran and subsequently lost,
then he was offered aposition in the Philippine Stock Exchange as head of
the Compliance and Surveillance Division which he accepted;his time and
attention was spent in the performance of his demanding job which led to
the neglect of his duties ascounsel.The case was referred to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and

recommendation.The IBP, through Commissioner Renato Cunanan submitted its
report and recommendation. They are convinced that Atty. Almadros
actuations reveal not only serious neglect or indifference to his duties
as a lawyer but more gravelyhis open disrespect for the court and the
authority it represents. The IBP strongly recommend that respondent
besuspended from the practice of law for two years and that he be fined
ten thousand pesos (PhP10,000.00). They alsorecommend that Atty. Sua and
Alambra be ordered to explain why they should not be held in contempt
for deliberately foisting a deliberate falsehood and misrepresentation.
Issue:
Whether or not the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for the suspension of Atty. Alambra for gross neglect of his duties as a
lawyer is meritorious?
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative, finding the respondent Atty.
Alambra guilty of serious neglect of his duties as a lawyer and of open
disrespect for the court and the authority it represents, as embodied in
Canon 18,Rules 18.03 and 18.04 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is Suspended fromthe practice of law for
one (1) year and Fined in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) pesos,
with a Warningthat any or similar acts of dishonesty would be dealt with
more severely.

LEGAL ETHICS CASES(Case Digest)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

# 1
: C a y e t a n o
v s .
M o n s o d 2 0 1
S C R A
2 1 0 S e p t e m b e r
1 9 9 1 Facts:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possesrequired qualification of having been engaged in the
practice
of
law
for
at
least
ten
years.
The
1987
constitutionprovides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a
Commission
on
Elections
composed
of
a
Chairman
and
sixCommissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, atleast
thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must
not have been candidates for any electiveposition in the
immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall bemembers of the Philippine Bar who
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Issue:
Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification
of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Held:
In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated:
The practice of law is not limited to theconduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident toactions and special proceeding, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them inmatters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services, contemplatingan appearance before judicial
body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditors
claim inbankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings
in
attachment,
and
in
matters
of
estateand
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice
of law means any activity, in or out court,which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the
required qualification of having engaged in the practiceof law
for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsods past
work experience as a lawyer-economist, alawyer-manager, a lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor verily more than
satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of
COMELECchairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years does In the view of theforegoing,
the petition is DISMISSED.*** The Supreme Court held that the
appointment of Monsod is in accordance with the requirement
of law as having been engaged in the practice of law for at least

ten years. Monsods past work experiences as alawyer-economist, a

lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer
negotiator of contracts and alawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement that hehas been engaged in the practice of law for at
least
ten
years.
Again,
in
the
case
of
Philippine
LawyersAssociation vs. Agrava, the practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases and litigation in court;
itembraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident
to actions and social proceedings and othersimilar work which
involves the determination by a legal mind the legal effects of
facts
and
conditions.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#2:
PHILIPPINE
LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION
VS.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA,in his capacity as Director of
the Philippines Patent OfficeFACTS:
A
petition
was
filed
by
the
petitioner
for
prohibition and injunction against CeledonioAgrava,
in
his
capacity
as
Director
of
the
Philippines
Patent Office. On May 27, 1957, respondentDirector
issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled
for June 27, 1957 an examination forthe purpose of
determining who are qualified to practice as patent
attorneys before thePhilippines Patent Office. The
petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar
examinationsand is licensed by the Supreme Court to
practice
law
in
the
Philippines
and
who
is
in
goodstanding, is duly qualified to practice before
the
Philippines
Patent
Office
and
that
the
respondentDirectors holding an examination for the
purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in
violationof
the
law. The
respondent,
in
reply,
maintains the prosecution of patent cases does
not involve entirely or purelythe practice of law
but
includes
the
application
of
scientific
and
technical
knowledge
and
training
as
amatter
of
actual
practice
so
as
to
include
engineers
and
other
individuals
who
passed
the
examinationcan
practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he
stressed that for the long time he is holdingtests,
this is the first time that his right has been
questioned formally.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the appearance before the patent

Office and the preparation and theprosecution of
patent
application,
etc.,
constitutes
or
is
included in the practice of law.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the practice of law
includes such appearance before thePatent Office,
the representation of applicants, oppositors, and
other
persons,
and
theprosecution
of
their
applications for patent, their opposition thereto,
or the enforcement of theirrights in patent cases.
Moreover,
the
practice
before
the
patent
Office
involves the interpretation andapplication of other
laws and legal principles, as well as the existence
of facts to be established inaccordance with the
law of evidence and procedure. The practice of law
is
not
limited
to
the
conduct
of cases
or
litigation in court but also embraces all other
matters
connected
with
the
law
and
any
workinvolving the determination by the legal mind
of
the
legal
effects
of
facts
and
conditions.
Furthermore,the
law
provides
that
any
party
may
appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or
decision of thedirector. Thus, if the transactions
of
business
in
the
Patent
Office
involved
exclusively
or
mostlytechnical
and
scientific
knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal
should be taken not to acourt or judicial body, but
rather
to
a
board
of scientists,
engineers
or
technical
men,
which
is
not
the
c a s e . ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#3: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-19450
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.Magno T.
Buese for defendant-appellant.
Paredes,
J.
:On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna,
charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief
before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said
accused was represented bycounsel
de officio
but later on replaced by counsel
de parte

. The complainant in the same case was representedby City

Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his
appearance as private prosecutor, aftersecuring the permission of
the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as
such, was that everytime he would appear at the trial of the
case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and
that hewould not receive any payment for his services. The
appearance
of
City
Attorney
Fule
as
private
prosecutor
wasquestioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case
of
Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al.
, L-1532, Nov.28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an
attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant
ProvincialFiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by
operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law
practice."Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining
the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is aviolation of
the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order
sustaining the legality of theappearance of City Attorney
Fule.Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused
presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting asPrivate
Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27,
now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain
attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule
falls under thislimitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by
upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that
he(Fule) was not actually engaged in private law practice. This
Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presidedby the Hon.
Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20,
1961, the pertinent portions of which read: The present case is
one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the
offended party of the civilliability, the civil action was deemed
impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The offended party
had,therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be
represented by a legal counsel because of her interest inthe
civil liability of the accused.Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of
Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a
party may conducthis litigation in person, with the aid of an
agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the
aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the
Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of theoffended
party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services
or that his appearance was in aprofessional capacity. As
Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or
intervention whatsoever inthe prosecution of crimes committed in
the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution
of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office

of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the CityAttornev of San

Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of
Assistant City Attorney Fule asAssistant City Attorney of San
Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the
other hand, asalready pointed out, the offended party in this
criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or
afriend to protect her rights in the civil action which was
impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.In view of
the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston
D. Fule may appear before the Justiceof the Peace Court of
Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as
an agent or a friend of theoffended party.WHEREFORE, the appeal
from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos,
Laguna, allowing theapprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private
prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.
The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding. The
appeal
should
be
dismissed,
for
patently
being
without
merits.Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned
trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which weconsider
plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in
his confused interpretation of Section 32of Rule 127 (now Sec.
35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or
other official or employeeof the superior courts or of the office
of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a
member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He
claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as privateprosecutor
in the case was engaging in private practice. We believe that the
isolated appearance of CityAttorney Fule did not constitute
private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the
Rules. Practice ismore than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts
of thesame kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise
(State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S.768).
Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habituallyholding one's self
out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such
services (State vs. Bryan,4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The
appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as
determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The
following
observation
of
the
Solicitor
General
is
noteworthy:Essentially, the word private practice of law implies
that one must have presented himself to be in the activeand
continued practice of the legal profession and that his
professional
services
are
available
to
the
public
for
acompensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration

of his said services.For one thing, it has never been refuted

that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediatesuperior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the
complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.CONFORMABLY
WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as
it is hereby affirmed, in allrespects, with costs against
appellant hqXv.
*** The Supreme Court held that the isolate appearance of City Attorney
Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and
contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance,
for it consists of frequents or customary actions, a succession
of facts of the same kind or frequent habitualexercise. Practice of
law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding ones self out to the public, as
customarily and demanding payment for such services. Themere appearance as
counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement
in the private practice of law. It is alsoworth noted that, it has
never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by
his immediatesuperior to represent the complainant in the case at
bar, who is a relative.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#4: JESUS MA. CUI vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI, ROMULO CUIG.R. NO. L-18727AUGUST 31, 1964FACTS:
Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses
Don Pedro Cui and DoaBenigna Cui, nowdeceased, "for the care and
support, free of charge, of indigentinvalids, and incapacitated
and
helplesspersons."
It
acquired
corporate
existence
bylegislation and endowed with extensive properties by the
saidspouses through a series of donations, principally the
deed of donation.-Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave t h e
initial management to the founders jointly and,
incase
of
their
incapacity
or
death,
to
" s u c h persons as they may nominate or designate, inthe
order prescribed to them."-Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, a n d
his
widow
continued
to
administer
the
Hospicio
u n t i l h e r d e a t h i n 1 9 2 9 . T h e r e u p o n t h e administration
passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem who both died. Dr.
Teodoro
Cui,
only
son
of M a u r i c i o
Cui,
became
theadministrator.-Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and
d e f e n d a n t A n t o n i o M a . C u i a r e brothers, being the
sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses
Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui.On 27 February 1960 the then

incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned infavor

of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between
them andembodied in a notarial document. Thenext day, 28
February, Antonio Ma. Cui took hisoath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui,
however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of
his brother's assumption of the position.-Dr. Teodoro Cui
died
on
August
27, 1 9 6 0 ;
on
Sept
5,
1960
the
plaintiff
wrote
a
letter
tothe
defendant
d e m a n d i n g t h a t t h e o f f i c e b e t u r n e d over to him; and
the demand nothaving been complied with the plaintiff filed the
complaint in this case. RomuloCui lateron intervened, claiming a
right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui,another
one of thenephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in
their deed of donation.- A s
between
Jesus
and
Antonio the main issue turns upon their
respective
qualifications
t o t h e position of
administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under
equalcircumstances would bepreferred pursuant to section 2 of the
deed of donation. However,before the test of age may be, applied
thedeed gives preference to the one, among thelegitimate
descendants of the nephews therein named, "queposea titulo de
abogado, omedico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de
estos
titulos
el
que
pague
alestadomayor
impuesto
o
contribucion."-The specific point in dispute is the meaning of
the term "titulo deabogado." Jesus Ma.Cui holds the degree of
Bachelor
of
Laws
from
the
University
of
Santo
Tomas
(Class1926)but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the
examinations to qualify himas one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other
hand, is a member of the Bar and althoughdisbarred by this Court,
he was reinstated by resolutionpromulgated on 10 February1960,
about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator
of theHospiciode Barili.C
o
u
r
t
a quo
- decided in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo
de abogado,"taken alone, means that of afull-fledged lawyer, but
that has used in the deed of donationand considering the function
or purpose of theadministrator, it should not be given astrict
interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law
degreeor diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as
erroneous both by the defendant and by theintervenor.
ISSUE:

WON the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to

the office of administrator. (YES)RATIO: Whether taken alone or
in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not merepossession
of theacademic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the
Bar after dueadmission thereto, qualifying one forthe practice of
law. A Bachelor's degree alone,conferredby a law school upon
completion of certain academicrequirements, does not entitle
itsholderto exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent
of "abogado" islawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed
and general signification, and has reference to that classof
personswho are by license officers of the courts, empowered to
appear, prosecute and defend, anduponwhom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence. In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the
practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme Court.
According to Rule138 such admission requires passing the Bar
examinations,
taking
the
lawyer's
oath
and
receiving
a
certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his
license to practice the profession. The academic degree
of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to
the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the requirements
that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed
all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university,
officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this
purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not
indispensable: completion of the prescribed courses may be shown
in some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly under
the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had not
gone through any formal legal education in college were allowed
to take the Bar examination and to qualify as lawyers. (Section
14 of that code required possession of "the necessary
qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be
incorrect to say that such persons do not possess the "titulo de
abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelorof Laws
from some law school or university. The founders of the Hospicio
de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing
testadvisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a
lawyer, the administrator shouldbea doctor or a civil engineer or
a pharmacist, in thatorder; or failing all these, should be
theonewho
pays
the
highest
taxes
among
those
otherwise
qualified.A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the
managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "makeregulations for
thegovernment
of
said
institution;
shall
"prescribe
the
conditions
subject
to
which
invalidsandincapacitated
and
destitute persons may be admitted to the institute"; shall see to
it thattherules andconditions promulgated for admission are not
in
conflict
with
the
provisions
of
theAct;
and
shall

administerproperties of considerable value for all of which

work, it is to bepresumed, a working knowledge of the lawand a
license to practice the profession would beadistinct asset.Under
this particular criterion we hold that theplaintiff is not
entitled,
as
against
thedefendant,
to
the
office
of
administrator.As far as moral character isconcerned, the standard
required of one seeking reinstatementtothe office of attorney
cannot be less exactingthan that implied in paragraph 3 of the
deed of donation as a requisite for the office which is disputed
in thiscase. When the defendant wasrestored to the roll of
lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from
hispreviousdisbarment were wiped out.For the claim of intervener
and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also alawyer, grandsonof
Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio
mentioned by them inthedeed of donation. He is further, in the
line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui,who is a son
of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews.Besides being a
nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma.Cui is older than
he andtherefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise
equal. The intervenorcontends that the intention of the founders
was
to
confer
the
administration
by
line
and
successivelytothedescendants of the nephews named in the deed, in
the
order
they
are
named.
Thus,
heargues,
since
the
lastadministrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the
Mauricio Cuiline, the next administrator must comefrom the line
of
Vicente
Cui,
to
whom
the
intervenorbelongs.
This
interpretation, however, is not justified by theterms of the deed
of
donation.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#5:
IN THE MATTER OF PREOCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST
ATTY. VINCENTE RAUL ALMACEN G.R.No. L-27654 February 18,
1970FACTS:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender
Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed onSeptember 25, 1967, in
protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice
committed against his clientby this Supreme Court." He indicts
this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who
arecalloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons
their own applicable decisions and commitculpable violations of
the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who
was deeply aggrieved bythis Court's "unjust judgment," has become
"one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy."

In thesame breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of

justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying
"that justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and
dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent
injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that werecommitted must never be
repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that... a
resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the
certificate of the undersigned attorney andcounsellor-at-law IN
TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the
event we regain our faithand confidence, we may retrieve our
title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen must surrender his Lawyers
Certificate of Title.
RULING:
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen be, as he ishereby, suspended from the practice of law
until
further
orders,
the
suspension
to
take
effect
immediately.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#6: IN RE: ATTY. FELIZARDO M. DE GUZMAN January 21, 1974FACTS:
Vicente Floro filed his Answer to the above-mentioned Petition
for relief and he alleged that the decisionof the City Court was
based on an admission made in open court by petitioner Lagrimas
Lapatha on the basis of which the words "Confession of judgment"
were written on the "expediente" of the case and underneath
wereaffixed the signature of said petitioner and that of Atty.
Felizardo deGuzman; that the alleged payments of Lagrimas Lapatha
were made after the rendition of the decision toforestall
immediate execution of the judgment; that when petitioner filed
with the City Court a motion forreconsideration of the decision
alleging fraud, the true circumstances attending the hearing of
November 2,1967, were brought out to the satisfaction of
petitioner's counsel, for which reason the City Court denied
themotion for reconsideration; that during the hearing on
petitioner's motion for reconsideration Atty. de Guzmanagreed not
to press for the execution of the judgment on the assurance of
petitioner that she would vacate thepremises by January 15, 1968,
however, petitioner did not comply with her promise and instead
filed thePetition for Relief.
ISSUE:

Whether the petition for relief against the respondent who

committed any deceit or misconduct in CivilCase No. 165187 of the
City Court of Manila be approved.
RULING:
We agree with the Solicitor General that in the instant case "the
evidence is wanting" to sustaina finding that respondent
committed any deceit or misconduct in Civil Case No. 165187 of
the City Court of Manila. In Go vs. Candoy, 19 this Court said:
"It is quite elementary that in disbarment proceedings, the
burdenof proof rests upon the complainant. To be made the basis
for suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the chargeagainst him
must be established by convincing proof. The record must disclose
as free from doubt a case whichcompels the exercise by this Court
of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act done
as
well
as
of the
motivation
thereof
must
be
clearly
demonstrated."WHEREFORE,
this
administrative
complaint
is
dismissed and respondent, Atty. Felizardo M. de Guzman,
isexonerated
of
the
charge.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#7: In the Matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo A.
Diao vs. Severino G. MartinezFacts:
Telesforo A. Diao took the law examinations in 1953 and was
admitted to the Bar. Two years later, Severino Martinez charged
Diao of falsifying the information in his application for such
BarExamination. Upon further investigation, it was found that
Diao did not finish his high school training, andneither did he
obtain his Associate in Arts (AA) degree from Quisumbing College
in 1941.Diao practically admits first charge, but claims that he
served the US army, and took the General Classification Test
which, according to Diao, is equivalent to a High School Diploma,
although he failed to submit certificationfor such claim from any
proper school officials. The claim was doubtlful, however, the
second charge was clearly meritorious, as Diao did not obtain his
AAdegree from Quisumbing College. Diao claims that he was
erroneously certified, and asserts that he obtainedhis AA from
Arellano University in 1949. This claim was still unacceptable, as
records would have shown that Diao graduated from the University
in April1949, but he started his Law studies in October 1948
(second semester, AY 1948-1949) and he would not havebeen
permitted to take the Bar, as it is provided in the Rules,
applicants under oath that
Previous

to the studyof law, he had successfully and satisfactorily

completed the required pre-legal education (AA) as required bythe
Department of Private Education
Issue:
Whether Telesforo A Diao should be Disbarred.
Ruling:
Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the Bar Exams, but
did by falsifying information. Admissionunder false pretenses
thus give grounds for revoking his admission in the Bar, as
passing the Bar Exam is notthe only requirement to become an
attorney at law.
manifestation clearly indicating that purpose is filed with the
court or tribunal, and a copy thereof served uponthe adverse
party, and until then, the lawyer continues to be counsel in the
case.Assuming that Atty. Ortiz was justified in terminating his
services, he, however, cannot just do so and leavecomplainant in
the cold unprotected. Indeed, Rule 22.02 requires that a lawyer
who withdraws or is dischargedshall, subject to a lien,
immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client
is entitled, and shallcooperate with his successor in the orderly
transfer of the matter. Atty. Ortiz claims that the reason why
hetook no further action on the case was that he was informed
that Canoy had acquired the services of anothercounsel. Assuming
that were true, there was no apparent coordination between Atty.
Ortiz and this newcounsel.There are no good reasons that would
justify a lawyer virtually abandoning the cause of the client in
the midstof litigation without even informing the client of the
fact or cause of desertion. That the lawyer forsook his
legalpractice on account of what might be perceived as a higher
calling, election to public office, does not mitigatethe
dereliction of professional duty. Suspension from the practice is
the usual penalty, and there is no reason todeviate from the norm
in
this
case. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#10:Borja, Sr. vs. Sulyap, Inc. 399 SCRA 601 (2003)
DOCTRINE: "Private practice" of a profession, specifically the law
profession does not pertain to anisolated court appearance; rather,
it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.
FACTS:
Basilio Borja, Sr. as lessor, and Sulyap, Inc., as lessee,
entered into a contract of lease involving a one-storey office
building owned by Borja located at New Manila,Quezon City.

Pursuant to the lease, Sulyap, Inc.paid, among others, advance

rentals,association dues and deposit for electrical and telephone
expenses. Uponthe expiration of their lease contract, Sulyap
demanded the return of the said advance rentals, dues anddeposit
but Borja refused to do so. Thus, Sulyap filed with the RTC of QC
a complaint for sum of money againstBorja. Subsequently, the
parties entered into and submitted to the trial court a
Compromise Agreementstating that Borja is bound to pay the
amounts P30,575 and P50,000 and in case any amount due is not
paidwithin the period stated in this agreement shall earn 2%
interest per month until fully paid plus 25% attorneysfees of
the amount collectible and that writ of execution shall be issued
as a matter of right.Petitioner, however, failed to pay the
amounts stated in the judicial compromise. Sulyapfiled a writ of
executionagainst Borja. The Trial Court granted the writ. Borja
motioned to quash the writ by stating that his failure topay the
amounts within the agreed period was due to Sulyaps fault;
therefore, the penalty clause should not beimposed.Borja filed
another motion praying for the quashal of the writ of execution
and modification of the decision. Thistime, he contended that
there was fraud in the execution of the compromise agreement. He
claimed that 3 setsof compromise agreement were submitted for his
approval. Among them, he allegedly chose and signed thecompromise
agreement which contained no stipulation as to the payment of 2%
monthly interest and 25%attorneys fees in case of default in
payment. He alleged that his former counsel, Atty. Leonardo Cruz,
whoassisted him in entering into the said agreement, removed the
page of the genuine compromise agreementwhere he affixed his
signature and fraudulently attached the same to the compromise
agreement submitted tothe court in order to make it appear that
he agreed to the penalty clause embodied therein.Sulyap presented
Atty. Cruz as witness, who declared that the petitioner gave his
consent to the inclusion of the penalty clause of 2% monthly
interest and 25% attorneys fees in the compromise agreement. He
addedthat the compromise agreement approved by the court was in
fact signed by the petitioner insidethe courtroom before the same
was submitted for approval. Atty. Cruz stressed that the penalty
clause of 2%interest per month until full payment of the amount
due, plus 25% thereof as attorneys fees, in case of defaultin
payment, was actually chosen by the petitioner. The trial court
ruled in favour of Sulyap because it gave credence to the
testimony of Atty. Cruz and even notedthat it was more than one
year from receipt of the judgment on compromise on October 25,
1995, when hequestioned the inclusion of the penalty clause in
the approved compromise agreement despite severalopportunities to
raise said objection.
ISSUE:

Whether Borja is bound by the penalty clause in the compromise

agreement.
HELD:
YES. While a judicial compromise may be annulled or modified on
the ground ofvitiated consent orforgery, we find that the
testimony of the petitioner failed to establish the attendance of
fraud in the instantcase. No evidence was presented by petitioner
other
than
his
bare
allegation
that
his
former
counselfraudulently attached the page of the genuine compromise
agreement where he affixed his signature tothe compromise
agreement submitted to the court.Petitioner cannot feign
ignorance of the existence of the penalty clause in the
compromise agreementapproved by the court. When he received the
judgment reproducing the full text of the compromise agreement,to
February 19, 1997, he never raised the issue of the fraudulent
inclusion of the penalty clause in theiragreement. We note that
petitioner is a doctor of medicine. He must have read and
understood the contents of
individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known
to possess good moral character. A lawyer isan oath-bound
servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by
inflexible norms of law and ethics,and whose primary duty is the
advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he has
sworn to be afearless crusader. By taking the lawyers oath, an
attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law,and an
indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration
of justice. Lawyers should act andcomport themselves with honesty
and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote
the publicsfaith in the legal profession. It is also glaringly
clear
that
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility
was
seriouslytransgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the
blank checks by indicating amounts that had not beenagreed upon
at all and despite respondents full knowledge that the loan
supposed to be secured by the checkshad already been paid. His
was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document,
resorted to for hismaterial gain.Deception and other fraudulent
acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful
anddishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of
the legal profession are not satisfied by conductthat merely
enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws. Considering
the depravity of the offensecommitted by respondent, we find the
penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for two years from
thepractice of law to be too mild. His propensity for employing
deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. Hismisuse of the

filled-up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is

loathsome. Thus, he is sentencedsuspended indefinitely from the
practice
of
law
effective
immediately.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#15:
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#16:
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#17:People vs de luna et al GR 10236-48
Oreste
Arellano
y
Rodriguez.Pedro
B.
Ayuda.Alawadin
I.
Bandon.Roque
J.
Briones.Abraham
C.
Calaguas.Balbino
P.
Fajardo.Claro C. Gofredo.Estela R. Gordo.Generoso H. Hubilla.Emilio
P. Jardinico, Jr.Angelo T. Lopez.Eustacio de Luna. Jaime P.
Marco.Santos L. Parina.Florencio P. Sugarol, andMaria Velez y
Estrellas-took an oath as a lawyer even though they did not pass
the bar exams. (sa notary public pa jud)
RULING:
It appearing that the persons mentioned, except Capitulo,
Gefredo, and Sugarol,have not passed the examinations, it was
resolved:A. To refer the matter to the Fiscal, City of Manila for
investigation and appropriateaction in connection with Section 3
(e), Rule 64;B. As Pedro Ayuda has assumed to be an attorney
without authority, he is given 10days from notice thereof, within
which to explain why he should not be dealt withfor contempt of
the Court;C. The notary public Anatolio A. Alcoba, member of the
Bar, who has illegallyadministered the oath to the said persons
in disregard of this Court's resolutiondenying them admission to
the Bar (except Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol), ishereby given
ten days to show cause why he should not be disbarred or
suspendedfrom the pratice of law;D. The clerk of Court is
directed to furnish copy of this resolution to the Court
of Appeals and to all courts of first instance, the Court of
Industrial Relations, thePublic Service Commission, and the
Department of Justice;E. As to Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol,
proper action will be taken later in theirrespective cases. (pp.
36-37, rec., G.R. No. L-10245.)It is clear, from the foregoing
resolution, that this Court did not intend to exercise
itsconcurrent jurisdiction over the acts of alleged contempt

committed by appelleesherein and that we preferred that the

corresponding action be taken by the CityFiscal of Manila in the
Court of First Instance of Manila. In fine, the latter had
no jurisdiction
over
the
cases
at
the
bar.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 1 8 : L e s l i e
U i
v s .
A t t y .
I r i s
B o n i f a c i o
A C # 3 3 1 9
J u n e
8 ,
2 0 0 0 Facts:
Leslie Ui and Carlos Ui were married on January 1971. On June
1988, Leslieconfronted the respondentAtty. Iris Bonifacio for the
illicit affair . Respondentadmitted the relationship and said
that she will cut off thesaid relationship. OnDecember 1988
Carlos
and
Iris
had
a
second
child.
On
March
1989
complainantpleaded
torespondent
to
stop
their
illicit
relationship.On Atty Iris side, she asserts that she had no
knowledge of Carlospreviousmarriage. Carlos Ui was the one who
represented himself as single during theircourtship. Shesubmitted
her Certificate of marriage dated Oct. 1985 to court. Uponthe
courts investigation it was found outthat the marriage was in
fact on Oct 1987.In the case at bar, it is the claim of
respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when shemet Carlos Ui, she knew
andbelieved him to be single. Respondent fell in love withhim and
they got married and as a result of suchmarriage, she gave birth
to two (2)children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status
of Carlos Ui, she lefthim
ISSUE
:Whether or not Atty Iris Bonifacio is guilty of gross immoral
conduct as aground for disbarment
RULING:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED,the Reportand Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part
of thisResolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the
recommendation fully supportedby the evidenceon record and the
applicable laws and rules, the complaint forGross Immorality
against Respondent isDISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty.
IrisBonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfullyattaching
to herAnswer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern
warning thata repetition of the same will merit a moresevere
penalty.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#19: Elmer Canoy,

complainant
v. Atty. Jose Max Ortiz,
respondent
A.C. No. 5485 March 16,2005Facts:
This is a case wherein complainant Elmer Canoy accused his
former
counsel,
Atty.
Jose
Max
Ortiz
of misconduct
and
malpractice. In 1998, Canoy filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against his former employer,Coca Cola Bottlers
Philippines, and was represented in said case by Atty. Ortiz.
Canoy, explained Ortiz, was oneof his indigent clients, in that
it was the latters practice since commencing his practice of law
to cater toindigent and law-income clients. In the labor case
against CCBP filed with the National Labor RelationsCommission,
the labor arbiter ordered the parties to submit their respective
petition papers. Canoy submittedall the necessary documents and
records to Atty. Ortiz for the preparation of the position paper.
Canoy madeseveral follow-ups with the office of his attorney,
said visits were unfruitful until it came to his knowledge
on2000, upon inquiring with the NLRC itself, that his complaint
was already dismissed way back in 1998 for failureto prosecute
because the parties did not submit their position papers. Atty.
Canoy further claimed that Atty.Ortiz never informed him about
the status of his case nor of the fact that he failed to submit
the position paper.In his
Comment
, Atty. Ortiz admitted to not being able to submit the position
paper because the period withinwhich to file it lapsed already,
with arbiter already dismissing the case, but reasoned out that
his election as aCouncilor of Bacolod City made him very
preoccupied with his functions. His duties as a public servant
and alawyer are beyond physical limitation, said Atty. Ortiz,
so he had to withdraw from his other cases. He alsoclaimed of not
being able to remember whether he immediately informed Canoy of
the dismissal of the case,but recalled of Canoy conveying that he
already has a lawyer to handle the case. Hence, his office did
not insiston refiling the case. Atty Ortiz also pointed out that
the dismissal of Canoys complaint was without prejudice.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Ortiz is guilty of misconduct and
malpractice
Ruling:
Upon investigation of the case, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippinesconcluded that clearly Atty. Ortizfailed to exercise
the degree of competence and diligence required of him in
prosecuting his client andrecommended that Atty. Ortiz be
reprimanded. The Supreme Court, however, finds the recommended
penaltyof the IBP too lenent and instead suspended Atty. Ortize

from the practice of law for one month, in lieu of theadmonition

or reprimand. According to the Court, Atty Ortiz several canons
and
rules
in
the
Code
of
ProfessionalResponsibility.
Specifically, Atty. Ortiz was guilty of violating Rule 18.03 of
the Code, which states, A lawyershall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render himliable, on account of his failure to file the
position paper on time, tantamount to neglecting a legal
materentrusted to him. That the case was dismissed without
prejudice does not mitigate his liability. Further, Ortizalso
violated Rule 22.02, which states,A laywer shall withdraw his
services only for good cause and uponnotice appropriate in the
circumstances. Therefore, even if Atty. Ortiz was justified in
terminating his servicesdue to his elective position, he should
have coordinated with the new council of Canoy and turned over to
thelatter all papers and property which the Client is entitled
and should have cooperated with his successor in theorderly
transfer of the matter, as per Rule 22.02.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 2 0 :
L a p u t
v s .
R e m o t i g u e
,
6
S C R A
4 5 ( A . M .
N o .
2 1 9 ,
2 9
S e p t e m b e r
1 9 6 2 ) L A B R A D O R , J. (En Banc)FACTS:
Petitioner
ATTY. CASIANO U. LAPUT
charge respondents
ATTY. FRANCISCO E.F.REMOTIGUE andATTY. FORTUNATO P. PATALINGHUG
with unprofessional and unethicalconduct in soliciting cases
andintriguing
against
a
brother
lawyer.
In
May
1952,
NievesR i l l a s V d a .
d e
B a r r e r a
r e t a i n e d
p e t i t i o n e r
A t t y .
L a p u t
t o
h a n d l e
h e r "Testate
Estate
of MacarioBarrera" case in CFI-Cebu. By Jan.
1 9 5 5 , p e t i t i o n e r h a d p r e p a r e d t w o pleadings:
(1)
closing of administration proceedings, and (2) rendering of final
accounting and partition of saide s t a t e . M r s .
Barrera
did
not
countersign
both
pleadings.
Petitioner
found
out
later
t h a t respondentAtty.
Patalinghug had filed on 11 Jan. 1955 a written appearance as the
new
counsel
forMrs.Barrera.
On
5
Feb.
1955,
petitioner
voluntarily
asked
the
court
to
be
relieved
as
Mrs.B a r r e r a s c o u n s e l . P e t i t i o n e r a l l e g e d t h a t :
(1)

respondents
appearances
were
unethical
and improper;
(2)
theymade Mrs. Barrera sign documents revoking the petitioners
Power of Attorney" purportedly todisauthorize him from further
collectingand receiving dividends of the estate from Mr.
MacarioBarreras corporations, and make him appear as adishonest
lawyer and no longer trusted byhis client; and
(3)
Atty. Patalinghug entered his appearance withoutnotice to
petitioner. Respondent Atty. Patalinghug answered that when he
entered his appearance on 11 Jan.1955Mrs. Barrera had already
lost confidence in her lawyer, and had already filed a pleading
discharging hiss e r v i c e s .
The
other
respondent
Atty.
Remotigue
answered
that
when
he
filedhis
appearance
on
7 Feb.
1955,
the
petitioner had already withdrawn as counsel. The SC
referred the case to the SolGen forinvestigation,
report
and
recommendation.
Thelatter
recommended
t h e c o m p l e t e e x o n e r a t i o n o f respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Remotigue and Atty Patalinghug are guilty of
unprofessional andunethicalconduct in soliciting cases.
RULING: No. The SC found no irregularity in the appearance of
Atty. Patalinghug as counselfor Mrs.
Barrera; and there was no actual grabbing of a case from
petitioner becauseAtty.Patalinghug's professional services were
contracted
by
the
widow.
Besides,
the
petitioner'svoluntarywithdrawal on 5 Feb. 1955, and his filing
almost simultaneously of a motion for thepayment of his
attorney'sfees, amounted to consent to the appearance of Atty.
Patalinghug ascounsel for the widow. T h e S C
a l s o
h e l d
t h a t
r e s p o n d e n t
A t t y .
R e m o t i g u e
w a s
a l s o
n o t
g u i l t y
o f
u n p r o f e s s i o n a l c o n d uct in as much as
he entered his appearance, dated 5 Feb. 1955, only on 7
February 1955,after Mrs. Barrera h a d d i s p e n s e d w i t h
petitioner's
professional
services,
and
after
petitionerhad
voluntarily
w i t h d r a w n his
appearance.As
to
Atty.
Patalinghugs
preparation of documents revoking the petitioners power
of attorney,the SolGen found that the same does not appear to be
prompted by malice or intended tohurtpetitioner's feelings, but
purely to safeguard the interest of the administratrix.Case
dismissed and closedfor no sufficient evidence submitted to
sustain
the

charges.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Legal EthicsCode of Professional ResponsibilityCanon 1People of

the Philippines vs Atty. Fe T. Tuanda(A.M. No. 3360 January 30,
1990)Facts: On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one
Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a total
stated value of P36,000.00, for saleon a commission basis, with
the condition that the respondent would turn over the sales
proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before
14February 1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead
of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to
approximately P26,250.00,issued three checks: (a) a check dated
16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated
23 February 1984 also for the amount of P5,400.00;and (c) a check
dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon
presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their
issuance, all three(3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank,
Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding
receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondentmade no arrangements
with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced
and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez. The
RTC convicted her in violation of B.P. 22, in which the Court
considered it as a crime involving moral turpitude as this
mischief creates not only a wrong tothe payee or holder, but also
an injury to the public Respondent was suspended by the Court of
Appeals. She went to the Supreme Court asking for the liftingof
the Order of suspension arguing that the issuance of bouncing
checks
does
not
relate
to
the
exercise
of
her
legal
profession. Issue: WON the suspension of Atty. Fe Tuanda be
lifted. Held: The Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order
of Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the
practice of law. We should add thatthe crime of which respondent
was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorneys
oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both
of which she was bound to obey the laws of the land. Conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude might not ( as in the
instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22does not) relate to the
exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however it certainly
relates to and affects the good moral character of a person
convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, this Court
stressed that: the nature of the office of an attorney at law
requires that she shall be a person of goodmoral character. This
qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission
to the practice of law; its continued possession is also
essential forremaining in the practice of law. SUSPENSION
AFFIRMEDCanon
2Pedro
L.
Linsangan
vs
Atty.
Nicomedes

Tolentino(A.C. No. 6672, September 4, 2009) Facts: This is a

complaint for disbarment filed by Pedro Linsangan of the
Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty.
Nicomedes Tolentino forsolicitation of clients and encroachment
of professional services. Complainant alleged that respondent,
with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his
clients to transfer legal representation. Respondentpromised them
financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims.
To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them
and sent themtext messages. To support his allegations,
complainant presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio
attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his
lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondents
services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant
also attached respondentscalling card:Based on testimonial and
documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation,
found that respondent had encroached on the professionalpractice
of complainant, violating XXX Rule 2.03 of the CPR which
provides: RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE
ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.Hence,
lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such
actuation constitutesmalpractice, a ground for disbarment. Rule
2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which
provides:RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR
INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS
CAUSE. This
rule
proscribes
ambulance
chasing
(the
solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney,
personally or through an agent in order to gainemployment) as a
measure
to
protect
the
community
from
barratry
and
champerty. Complainant presented substantial evidence (consisting
of the sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by
Labiano and referred to respondentsoffice) to prove that
respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited
from referrals suits. Although respondent initially denied
knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the
mandatory hearing. Through Labianos actions, respondents law
practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer
representation on the strength of Labianosword that respondent
could produce a more favorable result. WHEREFORE, respondent
Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, XXX of
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility
XXX
is
hereby
SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of one year
effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same orsimilar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely. Adelino H. Ledesma
vs Hon. Rafael C. Climaco(GR No. L-23815, June 28, 1974) Facts:

Petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrar

for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental.
Then and there, hecommenced to discharge its duties. As he was
counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the
sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion towithdraw as such.
Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also
appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants.
Subsequently, onNovember 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent
motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised
on the policy of the Commission on Elections torequire full time
service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of
petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the
defense.Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6,
1964, denied said motion. A motion for reconsideration having
proved futile, he instituted thiscertiorari proceeding. The SC
found the petition without merit. As stated in the assailed order
of the respondent judge, even before the petitioner accepted the
appointment to theComelec, he knew that the case was going to
resume on that day, that the case has been delayed eight times at
the instance of the petitioner, and that hiswork as an election
registrar will not be in conflict with his serving as counsel de
oficio for the said accused. The high court described the
petitioner as unmindful of his work as counsel de oficio and
reminded him that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdenedwith conditions including that of being appointed counsel
de oficio which makes even more manifest that law is indeed a
profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere
trade. In the end, the Court challenged the petitioner to exert
himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with
competence, if not with zeal, if only toerase doubts as to his
fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing
and added that the admonition is ever timely for those enrolled
in theranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this
is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence
over the promptings of self-interest.
1
Canon 3Khan, Jr., vs SimbilloAugust 19, 2003 Facts: Atty.
Rizalino Simbillo publicized his legal services in the July 5,
2000 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer via a paid
advertisement which read:Annulment of Marriage Specialist 5324333/521-2667. A staff member of the Public Information Office
of the Supreme Court took notice and called thenumber posing as
an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who said that
her husband was an expert in handling annulment cases and can
guarantee acourt decree within four to six months, and that the
fee was P48,000. Further research by the Office of the Court
Administrator and the Public InformationOffice revealed that

similar ads were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of

the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of the Philippine
Star. Atty.Ismael Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office filed an
administrative complaint against Atty.Simbillo for improper
advertising and solicitation in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule
3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court. The case was referred to the
IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. IBP found
respondent
guilty.
Respondent
filed
an
UrgentMotion
for
Reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, this petition for
certiorari Issue: WON Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is guilty of
violating Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of theRules of
Court Held: Yes, petitioner was suspended from the practice of
law for one year and was sternly warned that a repetition of the
same or similar offense will be dealtwith more severely. Ratio:
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in
which duty to public service, not money is the primary
consideration. Reasoning- Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or
permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.- Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use
of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified,
self-laudatory or unfair statement orclaim regarding his
qualifications or legal services.- Rule 138, Sec 27 of the Rules
of Court states: Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefore. A member of the bar may
bedisbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grosslyimmoral conduct or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before
theadmission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing
as attorney for a party without authority to do so.- The
following elements distinguish legal profession from business:1.
A duty of public service2. A relation as an officer of the
court to the administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity and reliability3. A relation to clients in
the highest degree of fiduciary4. A relation to colleagues at the
bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to
resort to current business methods of advertising andencroachment
on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.Respondent advertised himself as an Annulment Specialist, and
by this he undermined the stability and sanctity of marriage
encouraging people whomight have otherwise been disinclined and
would have refrained form dissolving their marriage bonds, to do
so.- Solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed,

however, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible

with
the
dignity
of
the
legalprofession. Ulep
vs
Legal
Clinic June 17, 1993 Facts: Petitioner prays that respondent
cease and desist from issuing ads similar to annexes A and B and
to prohibit them from making ads pertaining to theexercise of the
law professions other than those allowed by law- Annex ASECRET
MARRIAGE?P560 for a valid marriageInfo on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.Pls call: 5210767,
5217232, 52220418:30am-6pm7F Victoria Bldg, UN Ave, Mla- Annex
BGUAM DIVORCEDON PARKINSONAn Atty in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS
on Guam Divorce thru theLeg Clinic beg Mon-Fri during office
hours Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Probs,
Visaext.
Quota/Non-quota
Res
and
Special
Retirees
Visa.Declaration
of
Absence.
Remarriage
to
Filipina
Fiancees.Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for
FilipinaSp/Shil. Call Marivic THE LEGAL CLINIC, etc Petitioners
Claim:-Ads are unethical and demeaning of the law profession and
destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity
of the members of the bar.-As a member of the legal profession,
he is ashamed and offended by the ads Respondents Comment:-They
are not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of
leg support services thru paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronicmachines- Even if they are leg services,
the act of advertising them should be allowed under Bates v.
State bar of Arizona Issues:1. WON the services offered by The
Legal Clinic constitutes practice of law?2. WON their services
can be advertised? Held:1. Yes. The Practice of law involves any
activity, in or out of the court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training andexpertise- To
engage in the practice is to perform those acts which are
characteristic of the profession; to give advice or render any
kind of service that involves legalknowledge/skill- Not limited
to the conduct of cases in court; includes legal advice and
counsel and preparation of legal instruments and contracts by
which legal rights aresecured regardless of WON theyre pending
in court3 types of legal profession activity:1. legal advice and
instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations2. preparation for clients of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman3.
appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess
power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty and
property according to law, in orderto assist in proper inter and
enforcement of law
2

Respondents description of its services shows it falls within

the practice of law:Giving info by paralegals to laymen and
lawyers thru the use of comps and modern info tech- computerized
legal research, document search, evidence gathering, locating
parties/witnesses to a case, fact finding investigations,
assistance to laymen inneed of services from agencies like birth,
marriage, prop, bus registrations, etc.*even if some of the
services offered merely involve mechanical and technical know how
like installing computer system for law offices, this doesnt
make itan exception to the general rule- gives out leg info to
laymen and lawyersnot non-advisory and non-diagnosticex. foreign
laws on marriage, divorce and adoption have to explain to
client the intricacies of the law and advise him on the proper
course of action- what its ads represent and what it will be paid
for- It doesnt matter that they dont represent clients in court
since practice of law isnt limited to ct appearances but also
leg research, leg advice and draftingcontracts Phil Star Art Rx
for Leg Probs, int by proprietor Atty Nogales:- Takes care of
probs as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic sitlawyers, who like drs, are specialists in various fields and can
take care of it (taxation, crim law, medico-leg probs, labor,
litigation, fam law)- backed up by paralegals, counselors and
attys- caters to clients who cant afford big firms- can prepare
a simple deed of sale or affidavit of loss and also those w/ more
extensive treatment-The fact that they employ paralegals to carry
out its services doesnt matter; whats important is that its
engaged in thepractice of law cause of the nature of the
services it renders, which brings it within the statutory
prohibitions against ads only a person duly admitted as amember
of the bar and whos in good and regular standing is entitled to
the practice of law- public policy requires that the practice of
law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character to protect the public, court,client and
bar from incompetence/dishonesty of those unlicensed to the
practice and not subject to the discipline of court 2.No. The
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer, in
making known his legal services, shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified andobjective info/statement of facts- not
supposed to use any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified,
self-laudatory
or
unfair
statement
re
his
qualifications/legal
servicesnot
supposed
to
pay
representatives of the mass media in return for publicity to
attract legal businessCanons of professional Ethics (before CPR)
provides that lawyers shouldnt resort to indirect ads for
professional
employment
like
furnishing
newspapercomments,
publishing his pictures with causes the lawyers been engaged in,
importance of his position and other self-laudationStands of

legal profession condemn lawyers advertisement of his talents

like a merchant does of his goods because of the fact that law is
a profession. The canons of profession tell us that the best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust whichmust be
earned as the outcome of character and conductGood and efficient
service to a client and the community has a way of publicizing
itself and catching public attention; this shouldnt be done thru
propaganda EXCEPTIONS:1. expressly allowed publication in
reputable law lists of informative data thats not misleading and
may include only: name, professional assoc, adds, nos,branches of
law practiced, date and place of birth and admission to the bar,
schools attended w/ dates of grad, degrees , public offices,
posts of honor, legalauthorships, legal teaching positions,
membership and offices in bar association, legal and scientific
societies and legal fraternities, listings in other reputablelaw
lists, names and adds of references with written consent and
clients regularly represented- cant be mere supplemental feature
of paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical thats published
for other purposes- never in a law list that are calculated or
likely to deceive/injure the public/the bar or lower the
dignity/standing of the profession- ordinary simple professional
card allowed name, law firm, add, no and special branch of law
practiced- publication of simple announcement of the opening of a
law firm or change in partnership, assoc, firm name or office
add, for the convenience of theprofession- have name listed in
phone directory but not under designation of special branch of
law2. necessarily implied from the restrictionsBates v. State Bar
of Arizona: allowed lawyer to publish a statement of leg fees for
an initial consultation or give, uponrequest, a written schedule
of fees or estimate for spec services as an exception to the
prohibition against advertisements by lawyersCanon 4In the Matter
of Attorney Lope E. Adriano, Member of the Philippine Bar.People
of the Philippines vs Remigio Estebia(February 27, 1969, G.R. No.
L-26868)Facts: Remigio Estebia was convicted of rape by the Court
of First Instance of Samar and was sentenced to suffer the
capital punishment. On December,Lope Adriano was appointed as
Estebias counsel de oficio when his case came up before the
Supreme Court on review. Adriano was required to prepare andfile
his brief within 30 days from notice. On January 19,1967, Adriano
sought a 30-day extention to file appellants brief in mimeograph
form. On February 18,Adriano again moved for a 20-day extension.
A third extension was filed on March 8 for 15 days. On March 27
Adriano filed for another 15-day extension andon April 11 he
moved for a last extension of ten days. However, on April 21 he
sought a special extension of five days. All of these motions for
extensionwere granted by the Court and the brief was due on April

26, 1967. However, no brief was filed. For failing to comply, the
Supreme Court resolved to imposeupon Adriano a fine of P500 with
a warning that a more drastic disciplinary action will be taken
against him upon further non-compliance. On December 5,1968,
Adriano was ordered to show cause why he should not be suspended
from the practice of law for gross misconduct and violation of
his oath of office asattorney. A resolution was personally served
upon him on December 18, 1968 however Adriano ignored the said
resolution. Issue: Whether or not the conduct of Atty Lope E.
Adriano as member of the bar deserve disciplinary action. Held:
Yes, by specific authority, this Court may assign an attorney to
render professional aid to a destitute appellant in a criminal
case who is unable toemploy an attorney. Correspondingly, a duty
is imposed upon the lawyer so assigned "to render the required
service." A lawyer so appointed "as counsel foran indigent
prisoner", our Canons of Professional Ethics demand, "should
always exert his best efforts" in the indigent's behalf.No excuse
at all has been offered for non-presentation of appellant's
brief. And yet, between December 20, 1966, when he received
notice of hisappointment, and December 5, 1968, when the last
show cause order was issued by this Court, more than sufficient
time was afforded counsel to prepareand file his brief de
oficio. In the face of the fact that no brief has ever been
filed, counsel's statements in his motions for extension have
gone down to the level of empty andmeaningless words; at best,
have dubious claim to veracity.Adrianos pattern of conduct
reveals a propensity to benumb appreciation of his obligation as
counsel de oficio and of the courtesy and respect that should
beaccorded this Court. For the reasons given Attorney Lope E.
Adriano was suspended from the practice of law throughout the
Philippines for a period of one (1) year. People of the
Philippines vs Roscoe Daban y Ganzon, Sixto P. Demaisip(G.R. No.
L-31429, January 31, 1972)Facts: Respondent, Attorney Sixto P.
Demaisip, started as counsel de parte of appellant. On October
24, 1970, he filed a motion for extension of time of 30days
within which to file appellant's brief. It was granted. So were
subsequent motions for extension. On May 25, 1971, after having
obtained 13 extensions inall, he filed a motion asking that in
view of the father of appellant being unable to raise money for
printing expenses, he be allowed to retire as counsel departe and
be appointed as counsel de oficio instead to enable him to file a
typewritten brief, a draft of which, according to him, he had by
then finished. ThisCourt, in a resolution of June 2, 1971,
granted his prayer to be appointed counsel de oficio, but
required
him
to
file
a
mimeographed
rather
than
a
typewrittenbrief. In the light of his own representation, there
was reason to expect that such a brief would be duly forthcoming.

It did not turn out to be the case at all,for respondent

Demaisip, this time as counsel de oficio, kept on filing motions
for postponement, four in number, likewise granted by this
Tribunal in a spiritof generosity. All in all, he had seventeen
extensions. Still there was no appellant's brief.It was only then
that on October 11, 1971 this Court issued a resolution requiring
Atty. Sixto P. Demaisip to explain, within ten (10) days why
disciplinary
3
action should not be taken against him. What passed for an
explanation
for
appellant's
persistent
failure
to
file
appellant's brief was submitted on November25, 1971, worded thus:
"[Comes now] the accused-appellant, by and thru the undersigned
counsel
de
oficio,
unto
this
Honorable
Supreme
Court
mostrespectfully manifests and explains that, in the opinion of
the undersigned lawyer, grounded on settled jurisprudence, the
escape of the prisonerautomatically makes the appeal useless and
unnecessary because it is considered abandoned." It is his
prayer, therefore, that the above be considered asatisfactory
explanation.Held: Doctrine: There is need anew in this
disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental
postulate
that
membership
in
the
bar
carries
with
it
aresponsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a
profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks
are called upon to aid in theperformance of one of the basic
purposes of the State, the administration of justice. To avoid
any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an
indigentdefendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de
oficio. The fact that his services are rendered without
remuneration should not occasion adiminution in his zeal. Rather
the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that other
pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has
hispractice to attend to. That circumstance possesses a high
degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he
cannot afford either to neglect hispaying cases. Nonetheless,
what is incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must be
fulfilledNothing can be clearer, therefore, than that respondent
Demaisip, by such gross neglect of duty, notwithstanding the many
extensions granted him, wasrecreant to the trust reposed in him
as counsel de oficio.Respondent Demaisip ought to have known
better. His explanation disregards the facts and betrays
ignorance of the law. It is true there was a notice on June23,
1971 from the then Acting Director Vicente R. Raval of the Bureau
of Prisons that on June 15 of that year appellant Roscoe Daban y
Ganzon did escape. Asfar back as May 13, 1971, however,
respondent Demaisip, according to his motion of that date filed

on May 25, 1971, wherein he prayed that he be appointedcounsel de

oficio and permitted to submit a mimeographed brief, had assured
this Court that he had already prepared a draft. If he were not
careless of thetruth, then there was no excuse why prior to June
15, 1971 he was unable to submit such a brief to this Court. It
is not to be ignored either that as of that datehe had already
secured thirteen extensions, ordinarily many more than any
counsel is entitled to but nonetheless granted him, because the
sentenceimposed was one of death. The liability incurred by
respondent Demaisip is thus unavoidable. He had failed to fulfill
his responsibility as defense counsel. Whether as counsel de
parte ora counsel de oficio, he was indeed truly remiss in the
discharge of a responsibility which, as a member of the Bar, he
cannot evade. It is by such notoriousconduct of neglect and
indifference on the part of counsel that a court's docket becomes
unnecessarily
clogged.
His
transgression
is
indisputable;
whatremains
is
the
imposition
of
an
appropriate
penalty.WHEREFORE, until further orders of this Court, respondent
Sixto P. Demaisip is hereby suspended from the practice of the
law in all courts of the Philippines,except for the sole purpose
of filing the brief for appellant Roscoe Daban y Ganzon with this
Court within a period of twenty days from receipt of
thisresolution. Let a copy of this resolution be spread upon his
record.Canon 5 Juan Dulalia, Jr., vs Atty. Pablo C. Cruz(A.C. No,
6854, April 25, 2007 [Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1380])Facts: Atty.
Pablo C. Cruz, Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan
(respondent), is charged by Juan Dulalia, Jr. (complainant) of
violation
of
the
Codeof
Professional
Responsibility. Complainants wife Susan Soriano Dulalia filed an
application for building permit for the construction of a
warehouse. Despite compliance with all therequirements for the
purpose, she failed to secure a permit, she attributing the same
to the opposition of respondents who wrote a September 13, 2004
letterto Carlos J. Abacan, Municipal Engineer and concurrent
Building Official of Meycauayan saying that unbearable nuisances
that the construction creates and itsadverse effects particularly
the imminent danger and damage to their properties, health and
safety of the neighbours adjoining the site. By complainants
claim, respondent opposed the application for building permit
because of a personal grudge against his wife Susan who objected
torespondents marrying her first cousin Imelda Soriano on
September 17, 1989 while respondents marriage with Carolina
Agaton which was solemnized onDecember 17, 1967, is still
subsisting. Respondent married Imelda Soriano on September 17,
1989 at the Clark County, Nevada, USA,21 when the Family Code of
the Philippines had already takeneffect.22 He invokes good faith,
however, he claiming to have had the impression that the

applicable provision at the time was Article 83 of the Civil

Code.23For while Article 256 of the Family Code provides that the
Code shall have retroactive application, there is a qualification
thereunder that it should notprejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws.In respondents case, he being out of the country since
1986, he can be given the benefit of the doubt on his claim that
Article 83 of the Civil Code was theapplicable provision when he
contracted the second marriage abroad. From 1985 when allegedly
his first wife abandoned him, an allegation which was notrefuted,
until his marriage in 1989 with Imelda Soriano, there is no
showing that he was romantically involved with any woman. And, it
is undisputed that hisfirst wife has remained an absentee even
during the pendency of this case. Respondents misimpression that
it was the Civil Code provisions which applied at the time he
contracted
his
second
marriage
and
the
seemingly
unmindfulattitude of his residential community towards his second
marriage notwithstanding, respondent may not go scotfree. Held:
Respondent violated Canon 5 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep
abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal
education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards
inlaw schools as well as in the practical training of law
students and assist in disseminating information regarding the
law and jurisprudence.Respondents claim that he was not aware
that the Family Code already took effect on August 3, 1988 as he
was in the United States from 1986 and stayedthere until he came
back to the Philippines together with his second wife on October
9, 1990 does not lie, as "ignorance of the law excuses no one
fromcompliance therewith." It must be emphasized that the primary
duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes. They areexpected to be
in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of
law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed
of theexisting laws and to keep abreast with legal developments,
recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they
be conversant with basic legalprinciples. Unless they faithfully
comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge
competently and diligently their obligations as members of
thebar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing
mistakes. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of
violating Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year. He is WARNED
that a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. Jonar
Santiago vs Atty. Edison V. Rafanan(A.C. No. 6252, October 5,
2004)Facts: Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology (BJMP), filed a complaint for the

disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafananwith the Commission on Bar

Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
on
January
16,
2001.
It
charged
Atty.
Rafanan
with
deceit;malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under
Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and violation of
Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03, Canon 5, andCanons 12.07 and 12.08 of
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility
(CPR).Complainant
alleged, among others, that Respondent in notarizing several
documents on different dates failed and/or refused to: a)make the
proper notationregarding the cedula or community tax certificate
of the affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized documents
in
the
notarial
register;
and
c)
make
andexecute
the
certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents
he had notarized, all in violation of the notarial provisions of
the RevisedAdministrative Code.Complainant likewise alleged that
Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and
offered the same as evidence in the case wherein he wasactively
representing his client. Finally, Complainant alleges that on a
certain date, Respondent accompanied by several persons waited
for Complainant afterthe hearing and after confronting the latter
disarmed him of his sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting
words and veiled threats.On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the
January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD, Atty. Rafanan filed his
verified Answer. He admitted having administered the oath tothe
affiants whose Affidavits were attached to the verified
Complaint. He believed, however, that the non-notation of their
Residence Certificates in theAffidavits and the Counteraffidavits was allowed.He opined that the notation of residence
certificates applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary
public and was not mandatory for affidavits relatedto cases
pending before courts and other government offices. He pointed
out that in the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to
before governmentprosecutors, did not have to indicate the
residence certificates of the affiants. Neither did other
notaries public in Nueva Ecija -- some of whom were older
4

practitioners -- indicate the affiants residence certificates on

the documents they notarized, or have entries in their notarial
register for these documents.As to his alleged failure to comply
with the certification required by Section 3 of Rule 112 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, respondent explained that ascounsel
of the affiants, he had the option to comply or not with the
certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it was complainant who
was duty-bound to bring thesaid noncompliance to the attention of
the prosecutor conducting the preliminary investigation.On

September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution

No. XVI-2003-172 approving and adopting the Investigating
Commissioners
Report
thatrespondent
had
violated
specific
requirements of the Notarial Law on the execution of a
certification, the entry of such certification in the notarial
register,and
the
indication
of
the
affiants
residence
certificate. The IBP Board of Governors found his excuse for the
violations unacceptable.Held: Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure expressly requires respondent as notary -in the absence of any fiscal, state prosecutor orgovernment
official authorized to administer the oath -- to certify that he
has personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied
that they voluntarilyexecuted and understood their affidavits.
Respondent failed to do so with respect to the subject Affidavits
and Counter-Affidavits in the belief that -- ascounsel for the
affiants -- he was not required to comply with the certification
requirement.It must be emphasized that the primary duty of
lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the
forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law.
This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed
of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments,
recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they
be conversant with basic legalprinciples. Unless they faithfully
comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge
competently and diligently their obligations as members of
thebar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing
mistakes.Having
undertaken
the
defense
of
the
accused,
respondent, as defense counsel, was thus expected to spare no
effort to save his clients from a wrongconviction. He had the
duty to present -- by all fair and honorable means -- every
defense and mitigating circumstance that the law permitted, to
the end thathis clients would not be deprived of life, liberty or
property, except by due process of law. The Affidavit executed by
Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his
clients, since it pointed out the fact that on the alleged date
and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence and
could not have possibly committed the crime charged against them.
Notably, in his Affidavit, complainantdoes not dispute the
statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its
contents.WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of
violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby FINEDP3,000 with a
warning that similar infractions in the future will be dealt with
more severely.Canon 6Huyssen vs. Guttierez(A.C. No. 6707, March
24, 2006) Facts: In 1995, the complainant and her three sons, all
American citizens, applied for Philippine Visas. The respondent

who was then connected with theBureau of Immigration and

Deportation (BID) informed them that they needed to deposit a
certain amount of money in order that their visa applications
willbe approved. Complainant then deposited with respondent on
six different occasions from April 1995 to April 1996 the total
amount of US $20,000. However,the respondent refused to issue
copies of official receipts despite the demand of the
complainant.
After
one
year,
complainant
demanded
from
respondentthe return of US $20,000 who assured her that said
amount would be returned. Instead of returning the money, the
respondent issued postdated checkswhich were dishonored. After
respondent made several unfulfilled promises to return the said
amount, a complaint for disbarment was filed in theCommission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Guttierez should be disbarred for the act
complained of in the case Held: The respondent was DISBARRED from
the practice of law and ordered to return the amount he received
from the complainant with legal interest fromhis receipt of the
money until payment. Respondents acts of asking money from
complainant in consideration of the latters pending application
for visas isviolative of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging
or participating in any unlawful, dishonest,or deceitful acts.
Moreover, said acts also constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 of the
Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting
their privateinterests. Promotion of private interests includes
soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction
requiring the approval of his office or whichmay be affected by
the functions of his office. As a lawyer, who was also a public
officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with strict demands
and
highstandards
of
the
legal
profession. Vitriolo
vs.
Dasig(A.C. No. 4984, April 1, 2003) Facts: The complainants, all
high ranking officials of the Commission on Higher Education
(CHED), filed an administrative case for disbarment against
Atty.Felina S. Dasig, also an official of the CHED. The charge
involves gross misconduct of respondent in violation of the
Attorneys Oath for having used her publicoffice to secure
financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation
of the CHED. The complainants allege that during her tenure as
OIC of the LegalAffairs Service of the CHED, she attempted to
extort from four different people sums of money as consideration
for her favorable action on their pendingapplications or requests
before her office. Issue: Whether or not respondent should be
disbarred for the acts she committed during her tenure Held: The
respondent was DISBARRED for violation of the Attorneys Oath as
well as of Rule 1.01 and 1.03 of Canon 1 and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6
of the Code of Professional Responsibility for acts of dishonesty

and gross misconduct as OIC of Legal Services. Respondents

attempts to extort money from persons withapplications or
requests pending before her office are violative of Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members
of the Barfrom engaging or participating in any unlawful,
dishonest, or deceitful acts. Said acts also constitute a breach
of Rule 6.02 of the Code which bars lawyers ingovernment service
from promoting their private interests. Promotion of private
interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value
in anytransaction requiring the approval of his office or which
may be affected by the functions of his office. Canon 7 Atty.
Bonifacio Barandon, Jr vs Atty. Edwin Ferrer, Sr(A.C. No. 5768,
March 26, 2010) Facts: Atty. Barandon filed a complaint-affidavit
with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment,suspension from the
practice of law, or imposition of appropriate disciplinary
actions against Atty. Ferrer. One of the grounds for the prayer
for disbarment orother disciplinary actions against Ferrer was
his conduct and the words he uttered at the courtroom of
Municipal Trial Court Daet before the start of hearing.Such
conduct of Atty. Ferrer was confirmed by disinterested persons
who witnessed the incident. In the said incident, Atty. Ferrer
was drunk when he utteredthe words: Laban kung laban, patayan
kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang
magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogadona rito ay mga
taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo
taga-rito. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Ferrer violated Canon 7
of the Code of Professional Responsibility? Held: Yes, Atty.
Ferrer violated Canon 7, particularly rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Ferrer uttered the invectives
against Barandon withintent to annoy, humiliate, incriminate, and
discredit the former. A lawyers language should always be
dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of thelegal
profession.
The
use
of
intemperate
language
and
unkind
ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. Atty.
Ferrer ought to have realized thatsuch kind of public behavior
can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation
and erode public respect for it. The Supreme Court affirmed
thesuspension of Atty. Ferrer for one year as ordered by the IBPCBD. Wilfredo Catu vs Atty. Vicente Rellosa(A.C. No. 5738,
February 19, 2008) Facts: Respondent was the Punong Barangay of
Barangay 723, Manila. Respondent, as punong barangay, presided
over the conciliation proceedings between
5
petitioner and Antonio Pastor as regards a contested property.
The parties to the conciliation proceedings failed to arrive at

an amicable settlement.Respondent issued a certification for the

filing of the appropriate action in court. Regina Catu and
Antonio Catu, the mother and brother of the complainant,filed a
complaint for ejectment against Pastor before the Metropolitan
Trial Court. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the
defendant in thatcase. Issue: Whether or not respondent acted in
contravention
of
Canon
7
of
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility? Held: Yes, respondent acted in contravention of
the rules established by Canon 7, particularly rule 7.03, of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.Respondent violated the
provision stated in Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules which prohibits public officer or employee from
engagingdirectly in any private business, vocation or profession
unless such public officer or employee is granted permission to
engage in such activities by the headof the Department in which
they belong. As punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to
practice his profession. However, respondent should haveobtained
the prior written permission of the Secretary of Interior and
Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for
Elizabeth and Pastor.A lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects
it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the
dignity of the legal profession. Public confidence in thelaw and
in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the bar. Every lawyer should act and
comport himself in amanner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession. Respondent was suspended from
the practice of law for a period of sixmonths.Canon 8Camacho vs.
Pangulayan(328 SCRA 631, March 22, 2000)Facts: Atty. Manuel N.
Camacho, the hired counsel of some expelled students from the AMA
Computer College, filed a complaint against the lawyers
of Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices (Atty. Pangulayan, et
al.) for having procured and effected on separate occasions,
without
his
knowledge,
compromiseagreements
("Re-Admission
Agreements") with four of his clients which, in effect, required
them to waive all kinds of claims they might have had
againstAMACC, the principal defendant, and to terminate all
civil, criminal and administrative proceedings filed against it.
Complainant averred that such an act of respondents was
unbecoming of any member of the legal profession warranting
either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. The
students, members of the Editorial Board of the school paper,
were expelled by the school as recommended by the Student
Disciplinary tribunal forpublishing some objectionable features
or articles. They were found guilty of using indecent language
and
unauthorized
use
of
student
publication
funds.Atty.
Pangulayan admits that he only participated in the formulation
and execution of the various Re-Admission agreements complained

of and alleges thatthe agreements had nothing to do with the

civil case but were purely administrative. Issue: WON Atty.
Pagulayan act in accordance with ethical standards for procuring
said agreements. Held: No, the IBP found that Atty. Pangulayan
was aware that when the letters of apology and Re-Admission
agreements were formalized, the complainantwas already the
counsel for the students in the civil case. However, he still
proceeded to negotiate with the students and their parents
withoutcommunicating the matter to their lawyer. His failure is
an
inexcusable
violation
of
the
canons
of
professional
responsibility and an utter disregard of theduty he owes to his
colleague.
His
defense
that
the
agreements
were
purely
administrative does not hold because the manifestation stated
that
the
studentsshall
drop
all
civil,
criminal
and
administrative proceedings against AMA. The IBP recommended a 6month suspension but the SC found it too harsh andruled only a 3month suspension. Laput vs. Remotigue(6 SCRA 45 September 29,
1962) Facts: Atty. Casiano U. Laput was the former counsel of one
Nieves vda. De Barrera, the administrator of the estate of
Macario Barrera, regarding the testateof the latter. He charged
respondents
Atty.
Remotigue
and
Atty.
Patalinghug
with
unprofessional and unethical conduct in soliciting cases and
intriguingagainst another lawyer. Complainant alleges that weeks
after his client refused to countersign several pleadings that he
prepared, he found out thatrespondent Atty. Patalinghug was the
new counsel of Mrs. Barrera so he voluntarily asked the court to
be relieved as counsel for Mrs. Barrera. After that, theother
respondent Atty. Remotigue entered his appearance. Complainant
says that the respondents nursed the desire of his former client
to replace him andalso made Mrs. Barrera sign documents sent to
corporations which have stocks owned by Macario Barrera revoking
his power of attorney. He further allegesthat the motive of the
respondents was to embarrass him to the officials, lawyers and
employees of those companies picturing him as a dishonest lawyer
andno longer trusted by his client. Issue: WON respondents were
guilty of unethical and unprofessional conduct Held: No, the
solicitor-general found that before respondents filed their
appearance, Mrs. Barrera had already filed with the court, a
pleading discharging thecomplainant. The fact that complainant
was not able to get a copy was not the fault of the respondents.
Also, it was found that Mrs. Barrera dismissed Atty.Laput because
she no longer trusted him after finding out that some checks were
sent to the complainant instead of her and that several
withdrawals weremade by complainant in her account without her
permission. There is no irregularity in the appearance of
respondents as counsel. The revocation of powerof attorney
prepared by respondent was done without malice and was made only

to safeguard his client. Charges DISMISSED. Canon 9Office of the

Court Administrator vs Atty. Misael M. Ladaga(A.M. No. P-99-1287
January 26, 2001)Facts: Atty. Misael Ladaga, Branch Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, appeared as counsel
for and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa NaldozaLadaga, an
accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for Falsification of Public
Documents before the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that
the appearanceof said respondent in said case was without the
previous permission of the Court. During the occasions that the
respondent appeared as such counsel before the METC of Quezon
City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, hisPresiding
Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was
handling. Respondent appeared as pro bono counsel for his cousinclient NarcisaLadaga. Respondent did not receive a single centavo
from her. Helpless as she was and respondent being the only
lawyer in the family, he agreed torepresent her out of his
compassion and high regard for her. This is the first time that
respondent ever handled a case for a member of his family who is
like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the
purposeof settling the case amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding
Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for his cousin. On
top of this, during all the years thathe has been in government
service, he has maintained his integrity and independence. He
failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the
Department. The presiding judge of the court to which respondent
is assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated by
law. Issue: WON Atty. Ladaga, upon such several appearances, was
engages into private practice? NO Held: Respondent is charged
under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil
servantsfrom
engaging
in
the
private
practice
of
their
profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallowscertain
attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their
profession. THERE WAS NO PRIVATE PRACTICE: In People vs.
Villanueva: Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of
the same kind.In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise
(State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768).
Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding ones self
out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services (State vs.
6

Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel

on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement
in the private practiceof law. Based on the foregoing, it is
evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as
pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 doesnot
constitute the private practice of the law profession
contemplated by law. DECISION: Reprimanded. Donna Marie S.
Aguirre vs. Edwin L. Rana(B.M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003) Facts:
Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who
passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. On 21 May 2001, one day before
the scheduledmass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as
members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre
("complainant") filed against respondent aPetition for Denial of
Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law,
and gravemisrepresentation. The Court allowed respondent to take
his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking
on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine InternationalConvention Center.
However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll
of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him.
Thus,respondent took the lawyer's oath on the scheduled date but
has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now. Complainant
charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave
misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a
lawyer,appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001
elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers
("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate.Complainant further alleges that
respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001
entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing
of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this
pleading, respondent represented himself as "counsel for and in
behalf of Vice MayoraltyCandidate, George Bunan," and signed the
pleading as counsel for George Bunan ("Bunan"). In his Comment,
respondent admits that Bunan sought his "specific assistance" to
represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that "he decided
toassist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who
knows the law." Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001
pleading that objected to theinclusion of certain votes in the
canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the
pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an "attorney" in
thepleading. Issue: Whether respondent is engaged in unauthorized
practice of law. Held: Yes, We agree with the findings and
conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserveadmission
to the Philippine Bar. Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22
May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as
counsel forBunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the

lawyer's oath. Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of

law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed
various pleadings, without license todo so. Evidence clearly
supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent
called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was not a
memberof the Bar. Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing
that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown
moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. The right
to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a
privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with
special
qualificationsduly
ascertained
and
certified.
The
exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity,
legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even publictrust
since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does
not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practiceof law is a privilege that can be
withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if
the
person
seeking
admission
had
practiced
law
without
alicense. True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations
and took the lawyer's oath. However, it is the signing in the
Roll of Attorneys that finally makes onea full-fledged lawyer.
The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two
essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be
performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administeredby this
Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys