Military Technology Diffusion in The Ottoman Empir

Rethinking the Ottoman "Decline": Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire,
Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries

Author(s): Jonathan Grant
Source: Journal of World History, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring, 1999), pp. 179-201
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
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Rethinking the Ottoman "Decline77:

Military Technology Diffusion in
the Ottoman Empire, Fifteenth to
Eighteenth Centuries
JONATHAN
GRANT
Florida State University
an
scholars have often advanced
of Ottoman
history,
states
the
the
of
decline.
that
argument
Traditionally,
In interpretation
Ottoman
empire reached its peak in the sixteenth century under Suley
man
the Magnificent,
and thereafter began an inexorable
stagnation
the field
and decline
often point
century. Historians
lasting until the twentieth
or
to the Ottoman
at
in
naval defeat
the failure of the
1571
Lepanto
in 1683 as events marking
the waning
second siege of Vienna
fortunes
of Ottoman
of the "decline."1
power and the beginning
The use of the term decline as it has been applied by Middle
East
case presents several problems.
in
scholars to the Ottoman
any
Implicit
is some kind of comparison.
notion
of "decline"
After
all, an empire
1
Norman
Ottoman
of Chi
Empire and Islamic Tradition
(Chicago: University
pp. 67, 73; Paul Coles, The Ottoman
Impact on Europe (London: Thames
A Political
1968), p. 195; P. M. Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent
1516-1922:
Halil
Press,
(Ithaca: Cornell
Inalcik, The Ottoman
History
University
1966), pp. 61-70;
(New Rochelle:
Empire: The Classical Age,
1300-1600
1973), pp. 41
Orpheus
Publishing,
Ikinci Viyana Kusatmasi
52; A?ir Arkayin,
1683 (Ankara: Gnkur. Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik
Etiit Ba?kanligi
1983); Bernard Lewis, The Emergence
Yayinlari,
ofModern Turkey (London:
See also Halil
Inalcik and Donald
Oxford
Press,
1968), pp. 21-39.
University
Quataert,
and Social History
Cam
eds., An Economic
1300-1014
Empire,
of theOttoman
(Cambridge:
of the decline
thesis.
Press, 1994), for the most recent discussions
bridge University
cago Press,
and Hudson,
Itzkowitz,
1972),
Journal ofWorld History, Vol. io, No. i

of Hawai'i Press
?1999
by University
179
i8o
JOURNAL
OF WORLD
SPRING
HISTORY,
1999
can only be seen as declining

to some measure, whether
in comparison
it be other powers or its own imperial past. As historians
have em
measure
at
unit
the
of
the
mentioned
(if
all) is often
concept,
ployed
or
to
context.
In
its broadest
broad
the
Ottoman
inappropriate
overly
Ottoman
"decline" has served as a negative
application,
judgment on
to match
Islamic society as a whole
and its inability
of
the march
since
and
of
Western
the
seventeenth
progress
rising power
society
In this instance
is the civilization.2
the unit of comparison
century.
is ill-chosen
the notion
Such a basis for comparison
that the
because
of a civilization
success
in military
is an
be measured
as
the
of
Renaissance
proposition,
obviously
Italy or
examples
the thirteenth-century
make
clear.
Mongols
a vague
unit of measure,
Besides
of the
proponents
selecting
decline
thesis tend to be rather imprecise about the scale by which
they
measure
the Ottoman
"decline." For example,
they may posit an eco
strength
can
dubious
or cultural/social
to a military
decline
that contributed
decline,
was
in
relation to an economically
but invariably this so-called decline
the "West" nor "Islamic society"
neither
"West."3 However,
expanding
was a monolithic
each civilization
there existed
entity, and within
nomic
states with varying degrees of military

often scholars
capability. Most
have used the term theWest or Europe generically,
when
they actually
meant
The use of these western Euro
France, and Holland.
England,
has
Ottoman
decline
pean states as the basis for measuring
military
them in the wrong
obscured
the actual Ottoman
conditions
by placing
context. The Ottomans
in western Europe, but rather
did not operate
in eastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean.4
In fact decline is not
a useful term at all, because
it reflects more a moral
judgment passed by
convinced
of their own superiority
than an accurate assess
Europeans
ment of Ottoman
after 1571 or 1683.
capabilities
offer more
than a monocausal
sure, the "declinists"
expla
nation. Halil
the foremost
advocate
of the declinist
Inalcik, perhaps
pressure, fiscal crisis, and Europe's new
points to population
position,
as
to Ottoman
decline
by the early
technology
contributing
military
To be
2Reuben
to the Sociology of Islam (London: Harrison

and Sons,
Levy, An Introduction
in aWorld Civ
and History
The Venture of Islam: Conscience
G. S. Hodgson,
1933). Marshall
of Chicago
ilization, vol. 3: The Gunpowder
Empires and Modern Times (Chicago: University
assessment
of the decline
of Islamic civilization
after
Press, 1974), offers a more nuanced
Univer
1700. See also IraM. Lapidus, A History
Cambridge
of Islamic Societies (Cambridge:
sity Press,
3The
1988).
foremost
of such studies isH. A. R. Gibb

example
vol. 1, pt. 1 (London: Oxford University
theWest,
Press,
4A notable
is Virginia
H. Aksan,
An Ottoman
exception
Ahmed Resmi Efendi,
(Leiden: E. ]. Brill, 1995).
1700-1783
and
and H.
Bowen,
1950).
Statesman
Islamic Society
inWar
and Peace:
Grant: Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire
181
In his view, "the Ottoman

failure meant
that a
century.
even
war
it
when
borrowed
Asiatic
culture,
technology
The
from the West, was doomed before the rise of modern
Europe....
was as much
of Western
the outcome
Ottoman
decline
Europe's
economic
modern
system as of superior European military
technology."5
seventeenth
traditional
some aspects of Ottoman

economic
decline have been seri
Although
into
the
role
of
tech
called
superior European military
question,
ously
to
in
its
Ottoman
decline
has
and
contributing
nology
production
an
remained
operative
assumption.6
in terms of "decline,"
it ismore useful to recon
Instead of thinking
on
terms
in
of locating Ottoman
the problem
capabilities
ceptualize
arms
the scale of the international
includes
production
hierarchy, which
arms transfers, and technological
I shall
diffusion. Therefore,
production,
to compare Ottoman
and naval capabilities
attempt
against
military
own past accomplishments
in
and the achievements
the Ottomans'
war technology
rivals
and production made by the Ottomans'
European
it becomes
and neighbors. When
appar
placed in the proper context,
ent that up to the early nineteenth
century the "decline" was certainly
not inexorable.
Keith Krause has recently put forth a model
for the spread of mili
as a diffusion wave that settles into a hierarchy
of mili
tary technology
a wave begins as a period of rapid innovation,
tary producers. Typically
from the first-tier inno
followed by the diffusion of military
technology
vators to second-tier
and concludes with attempts by third
exporters,
arms industry through tech
tier states to create their own indigenous
in the first tier innovate at
imports. Accordingly,
nological
producers
at the
the technological
frontier, those in the second tier adapt weapons
frontier, and third-tier
copy and reproduce
technological
producers
not
but
do
the
process of
capture
existing
technologies
underlying
or adaptation.7
innovation
The first wave was triggered by the gun
in the early fifteenth century and had largely run its
powder revolution
course by the mid-seventeenth
century. By that time the centers of
were England,
first-tier production
the Low Countries,
and (ephemer
5 Inalcik
and Social History

and Quataert,
eds., An Economic
Empire,
of the Ottoman
1300-1914,
p.22.
6
in An Economic
"Crisis and Change,
and Social History
1590-1699,"
Suraiya Faroqhi,
ed. Inalcik and Quataert,
refuta
p. 468. For a thorough
1300-1914,
Empire,
of the Ottoman
tion of the interpretation
see
economic
in the period
of Ottoman
decline
1500-1800,
The Middle East in theWorld Economy,
(London: Methuen,
Roger Owen,
1800-1914
1981),
pp.
1-23.
7Keith
Krause,
bridge: Cambridge
Arms
University
and
the State:
Press,
1992),
Patterns
of Military
pp. 30-31.
Production
and Trade
(Cam
JOURNAL
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OF WORLD
HISTORY,
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I999
wave came a period of

the initial revolutionary
ally) Sweden.8 After
in the late seventeenth
that began
innovation
incremental
century
of
the innovations
and ended in the early nineteenth
century. Among
of boring cannon
this secondary wave were the development
(rather
fire
from matchlock
in a mold),
the conversion
than casting cannon
of field guns and carriages.9
arms to flintlocks,
and the lightening
a more fluid group. The
Italian
second-tier
The
producers were
and Brescia had been first-tier manu
states of Milan, Venice,
Genoa,
facturers in the first half of the fifteenth century, but gradually declined
was importing
and by
cannon,
into the second tier. By 1500 Milan
Italian pro
fleet was built abroad. Although
1606 half the Venetian
into the second tier, they remained
ducers had dropped
important arms
as the main mechanism
served
workers
of
skilled
exporters. Migration
into Sweden, Russia, France, Spain, and
diffusion
for the technological
these newcomers,
between
the Ottoman
1450 and 1650. Among
empire
the
reached
and
successfully
Spain
however,
only France, Russia,
an
source,
tier.
For
the
second
Ottomans,
important supply
Italy proved
in the early period of Ottoman
1450-1500.10
expansion,
especially
to reformulate
the ques
it is possible
By employing Krause's model
more
Ottomans
a
the
Did
in
decline
tion of Ottoman
precise way:
Based
in the production
from their initial position
decline
hierarchy?
a
remained
the
Ottomans
clear
that
it
on Krause's
becomes
schema,
to
fifteenth
the
from
the
century
third-tier producer
period
throughout
did not
the Ottomans
In other words,
the early nineteenth
century.
is
it
mislead
and
a
tier in their military
capabilities,
technological
drop
them to first-tier producers,
ing to view them as in decline by comparing
rivals in
their immediate
as
Holland.
and
such
Furthermore,
England
Balkans
the
and
capabilities,
comparable
Poland, Hungary,
possessed
the third tier and were
below
while
Egypt and Iran were actually
were
the Ottomans
this regional context,
Given
import-dependent.11
a
as
dominant
themselves
able to maintain
power.
regionally
In their
is instructive.
Iranian capabilities
with
The comparison
a
tech
distinct
held
forces initially
struggle with Safavid Iran, Ottoman
in
Ottoman
At
the battle of Chaldiran
1514
advantage.
nological
a Safavid
force that
troops armed with firearms and artillery crushed
over
the Ozbegs
lacked guns. In 1528 the Iranians were victorious
In
from the Portuguese.
because of their artillery, which
they obtained
8
Krause, Arms and
9
Krause, Arms and
10
Krause, Arms and
11
Krause, Arms and
the State, p. 38.

the State, p. 54.
the State, pp. 37~45
the State, pp. 43, 51-52.
183
general, the Iranians chose to avoid pitched battles with the Ottomans
in favor of defensive
tactics. Under Shah Abbas
scorched-earth
(1587
an
1629) Persian forces included
artillery corps of about 500 guns, and
a series of sieges and counter-sieges
of Baghdad resulted in a reassertion
in the region and an effective
of Ottoman
control
stalemate
of the
Ottoman-Iranian
border
the Safavid artillery force

by 1639. However,
II
under
Abbas
Safavid rule ended in
(1642-66).
rapidly
cannon, under
1722 when the Persian army, equipped with twenty-four
a French commander
but lacking unified command,
suffered defeat at
deteriorated
the hands of Afghan

forces without
artillery. Iranian artillery and fire
arms were imported throughout
the period rather than manufactured
Thus, the Ottomans'
capacity to produce their own arma
domestically.
ments
stood them in good stead in relation to their Safavid opponents.12
It has often been assumed that the decline
in the military
fortunes
of the empire after 1683 was continual
and irreversible. For example,
Bernard Lewis wrote, "The
to keep up with the rapidly
tions, and in the course
itself far ahead of
Empire,
behind Europe in virtually
the late eighteenth
found
armaments,
Ottomans
found
Western
itmore
and more
difficult
innova
advancing
technological
of the eighteenth
the Ottoman
century
the rest of the Islamic world, fell decisively
all arts of war."13 Later he remarks, "And by
in
for so long self-sufficient
century the Ottomans,
to
in
themselves
for
obliged
place orders for ships
eign shipyards."14
are less than accurate accounts
Such statements
of the Porte's war
a
true
is
It
that
industries.
the products of
growing disparity between
war industries and those of their neighbors
Ottoman
did occur over
was
the eighteenth
caused by the Porte's neigh
century, but this gap
bors borrowing
the incremental
such as galleons,
innovations,
frigates,
of
techniques
cannon-boring,
light field guns, new-formula
gunpowder,
12Rudi
"Unwalled
Cities
and Restless
Firearms
in
Nomads:
and Artillery
Matthee,
Safavid
I. B. Taurus,
Iran," in Safavid Persia, ed. Charles Melville
(London:
1996), pp. 391
Medieval
410; David Morgan,
Persia,
1040-1797
(London: Longman,
1994), pp. 116-17,
Palmira Brummett,
Ottoman
135, 147, 150-51;
125-26,
Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy
in the Age of Discovery
of New York Press, 1994), pp. 55, 64-87;
(Albany: State University
"Crisis and Change,
Louis Dupree, Afghanistan
pp. 420-22;
(Prince
Faroqhi,
1590-1699,"
ton: Princeton
Press, 1980), p. 325.
University
13
Bernard Lewis, The Muslim
(New York: W. W. Norton,
Discovery
of Europe
1982),
p. 226.
14
can be
Similar
Lewis, The Muslim
Discovery
of Europe, pp. 226-27.
interpretations
found in Gani Ozbaran,
"War Industry Plants of the Ottoman
Armed
Forces," Revue inter
nationale d'histoire militaire 67 (1988): 67-76; Wayne
S. Vucinich,
The Ottoman
Empire: Its
Record and Legacy (Princeton:
Van Nostrand,
lu. A. Petrosian,
Osmans
1965), pp. 78-87;
igibel' (Moscow: Nauka,
kaia imperiia mogushchestvo
1990), p. 134.
i84
JOURNAL
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HISTORY,
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1999
to the Otto
and flintlock
the effects became
firearms. Once
apparent
after the Russian
of the Crimea,
the Turks
mans,
conquest
especially
followed
of the nineteenth
suit, with the result that by the beginning
war technology
was again competitive
with
that of
century Ottoman
to
its rivals, especially Russia. Thus
main
the Ottomans
able
proved
at the third-tier
tain production
level where
they copied foreign tech
it is
the limited degree of foreign dependence,

nology. To appreciate
war industries during
to take a closer look at Ottoman
necessary
modern
early
period.
Naval
the
Production
Ottoman
increased dramatically
from the
ship-production
capabilities
to
sixteenth.
The
first
naval
Ottoman
the
arsenal
century
I (1389-1402).15
under Bayezid
this
At
had been built at Gallipoli
on
to
construct
Sea
Ottomans
also
the
the
ships
early stage
managed
and the Black Sea. From these limited facili
of Marmara,
the Aegean,
ties a small navy emerged,
II ( 1451-81)
and by the time of Mehmed
I (1512-20)
of thirty galleys. By the time of Selim
the navy consisted
were
in
had
There
naval
taken
tremendous
place.
growth
production
fifteenth
110 naval
among the Golden Horn, Galli

yards and arsenals distributed
Rhodes,
poli, Izmit, Gemlik,
Sinop, Varna, Selcuk, Bodrum, Antalya,
in 1565 some 250 war
Yalova, Birecik, and other locations. At Birecik
to the seventeenth-century
Otto
and according
ships were launched,
man writer Katip ?elebi,
in 1567 a fleet of 550 ships issued forth from
the port.16 The main naval yards in Istanbul were huge operations.
By
at the
the sixteenth
60,000
century
people worked
approximately
at Kasimpa?a.17
Golden
another
100,000 were employed
Horn, while
in 1585, after Lepanto,
described
the Ottoman
Writing
Morosini,
The naval forces which

vast
and
galleys
second
to none
the Venetian
naval
bailo, Gianfrancesco
capacity:
the Great Turk uses to defend his empire are

in the world.
He
has
an
enormous
in his dockyard and he can turn out more whenever
number
of
he wants,
10 vols., vol. i
in Encyclopaedia
151.H. Uzun?ar?ili,
of Islam: New Edition,
"Bahriyya,"
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, i960), p. 947.
16
Kibar Fi Esfari'
l-Bihar, trans. Orhan
(Istanbul:
Tuhfetul
?aik G?kyay
Katip ?elebi,
Milli
Sosyal ve Ekonomik Diizeni
1973), p. 123; Necdet
Sevin?, Osmanli
Egitim Basimevi,
(Istanbul: U?dal Ne?riyat,
1985), pp. 145-46.
17
p. 147.
Sosyal ve Ekonomik Diizeni,
Sevin?, Osmanli
185
because he has plenty of wood, iron parts, skilled workers, pitch, tal
low, and all the other things needed. True, at present they do not have
at hand all the armament they would need to outfit the as yet uncom
pleted galleys, much less those the Grand Signor has ordered made,
and they are short of cotton sailcloth and other things. But his re
sources are so great that ifhe wanted to he could quickly assemble what
he needs; he has already begun to attend to this.18
Placing
production,
in Ottoman
into the context

naval
of Ottoman
of Lepanto
clear that this seemingly profound
turning point
to be quite superficial. True, the
actually proved
the battle
it becomes
affairs
defeat for the Ottoman
itself was a decisive
navy. Out of 230
Ottoman
galleys, 80 vessels were sunk and 130 captured.19 Yet Otto
man naval production
capabilities were left unaffected. The huge naval
and together
arsenal at Kasimpa?a was still the largest in the world,
it could make good the losses quite
with the other Ottoman
dockyards
1572 that
Indeed, the French ambassador
reported on 8 May
quickly.
In terms of naval con
the Turks had built 150 galleys in five months.20
battle
for a substantial
the Porte seemed to possess ample materials
struction,
navy. Paul Rycaut, an English observer, appeared to be rather perplexed
a larger fleet in the
to maintain
about the inability of the Ottomans
"Their Ports are several of them con
seventeenth
century. He wrote,
of Constanti
venient
for building both ships and Gallies;
the Arsenal
a
or
no
Chambers
for
hundred
less
than
hath
Voltas,
thirty-seven
nople
same
so
at
be
the
vessels
stacks
the
and
may
upon
many
Building,
"At Sinopolis [Sinop] near Trapesond
time."21 He continued,
[Trebizond]
at Midia and Anchiale, Cities on the Black Sea, are
is another Arsenal:
since the
the like ... ; and yet the Turk for several years, especially
War with Cand?a, and their defeat at Sea, have not been able at most
to Equippe a Fleet of above 100 sail of Gallies."22 From his description
a more
to produce
it is obvious
had the facilities
that the Ottomans
formidable navy.
The observations
The
striking feature
teenth centuries was
and Rycaut
require some comment.
in the sixteenth
for these observers
and seven
the size of Ottoman
naval yards. We
should not
of Morosini
18
ed., Pursuit of Power: Venetian Ambassadors'
(New York:
Reports
James C. Davis,
and Row,
Harper
1970), p. 134.
19
Coles, The Ottoman
Impact on Europe, p. 91.
20
The Galleys at LePanto
(London: Hutchinson,
1982), p. 228.
Jack Beeching,
21Paul
The Present State of the Ottoman
Empire
reprint, Westmead,
Rycaut,
(1968;
International,
1972), p. 213.
England: Gregg
22
Empire, p. 213.
Rycaut, The Present State of theOttoman
i86
JOURNAL
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HISTORY,
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1999
size with
in Istanbul was
confuse
the arsenal
efficiency.
Although
as a permanent
maintained
facility, the size of the work force varied.
The majority
of workers were employed
only for the short term, and
the core of permanent
staff was relatively
small. Also,
coerced
labor
in meeting
the labor needs at the arsenal. Many of
figured prominently
the workers
without
pay for extended
languished
periods of time be
cause the treasury was insolvent. Meanwhile,
tax farmers,
the official
who were charged with paying the arsenal's bills, proved slow and un
reliable.23 The physical capacity of Ottoman
yards rightly impressed ob
remained
invisible to them.
servers, but the arsenal's fiscal weaknesses
were very slow
Much has been made of the fact that the Ottomans
in making
the transition
from galleys to galleons. After
all, it was not
until 1682 that the Grand Vezir Kara Mustafa
the prin
Pa?a accepted
a
on
of
fleet
based
than
rather
ciple
sailing galleons
galleys.24 But it
to bear in mind
is important
that the sailing galleon did not immedi
superiority over the oar-powered
ately demonstrate
galley in the mid
in the Medi
Into the seventeenth
century.
century galleys
could get the better of sailing ships. In consequence
Spain
as the premier galley power in the mid-seven
its position
maintained
teenth century until the French under Louis XIV revived their galley
it the largest one in Europe at the end of that century.
fleet to make
sixteenth
terranean
in the eighteenth
its effectiveness
for
century the galley proved
in
in the Baltic.25
the Russians
their operations
against the Swedes
to adopt
is that the Turkish
One possible
reluctance
explanation
Otto
stemmed
from
material
considerations?that
that
the
is,
galleons
man preference
for a galley fleet over sea-going galleons was linked to
as the
of the sancak of Kocaeli
reduced timber supplies.26 The decline
Even
main
source
the growing
of Ottoman
importation
timber
of hemp
in the mid-seventeenth
century, and
from Italy also at that time, indicate
23
"Crisis and Change,
pp. 461-63.
1590-1699,"
Faroqhi,
24
"Bahriyya," p. 948.
Uzun?ar?ili,
25
Innovation and
Revolution: Military
Parker, The Military
Geoffrey
Press, 1988), pp. 87-88;
1500-1800
(Cambridge:
Cambridge
University
martin
and Galleys
University
Jr., Gunpowder
(Cambridge:
Cambridge
the Rise of theWest,

John Francis GuiL
Press,
1974), pp.
of Chicago
Press,
C. Hess, The Forgotten Frontier

Andrew
1978), pp. 15, 90-91; Paul W Bamford,
Galleys
Fighting Ships and Prisons: The Mediterranean
in the Age of Louis XIV
of Minnesota
Press, 1973), pp.
University
(Minneapolis:
of France
11-24.
26Rhoads
of Western
"The Ottoman
Attitude
towards the Adoption
Tech
Murphey,
in Contri
in Civil
and Military
Applications,"
nology: The Role of the Efrenci Technicians
et sociale de l'empire Ottoman
butions ?'l'histoire ?conomique
Peeters,
(Leuven: Editions
1983),
p. 292.
252-73;
Grant:
Military
some kind
completely
had been
Technology
Diffusion
in the Ottoman
Empire
187
is not
shortfall.27 Nevertheless,
this argument
In the 1760s much of the accessible
coastal areas
satisfying.
and as a result the price of timber had
vastly deforested,
of domestic
to
tripled from the 1740s to the 1760s.28 Yet the Ottomans
managed
were
at
time.
that
The
still
provinces
produce
galleons
delivering
to the arsenal as part of their tax, and in fact the archipelago
wood
one or two ships called fricata in
islands were required to construct
or
to
size
their
revenue.29
Selim Ill's whole naval
Moreover,
proportion
in the 1790s was implemented
modernization
with the same
program
to see how reduced
in effect. So it is difficult
supply conditions
timber supplies could have been a determining
factor in the tardiness
of Ottoman
galleon construction.
can be found in the Porte's long
A more compelling
explanation
naval rivalry with
the Venetians.
Ottoman
naval developments
had
been
intertwined
with
of
in
its
Venice.
those
Back
always
closely
sea
in
the
Ottoman
its
had
first
battle
navy
1416,
infancy,
fought
timber
the Venetians.30
the
Also, many of the experts who supervised
war
as
in
of
sultan's
in
the
had
served
building
galleys
yards
shipwrights
were
the
and
Ottoman
methods
of
construction
therefore
Venice,
This rivalry had great sig
largely copied from those of the Venetians.31
were
nificance
for Ottoman
naval development
because the Venetians
to adopt galleons.
also reluctant
against
were latecomers
to the idea of
the Ottomans
and Venetians
and
for
the
both
for
the
of sailing
galleon fleets,
impetus
adoption
came
from
in
the
Atlantic
the
seventeenth
powers
galleons
century. In
the late 1640s and early 1650s the Ottomans
made considerable
efforts
to increase the number
to their
in response
of their sailing vessels
as auxiliaries
defeats by Atlantic
for the Vene
sailing vessels operating
tian fleet.32 Somewhat
to
Venetians
encounter
the
diffi
later,
began
in retaining
culties
the services of these foreign auxiliaries. Recogniz
ing the vital role of sailing warships by this time, the Venetians
began
the first half of the eighteenth
building their own in 1667.33 Throughout
Both
27C. H.
of Suleyman
the Magnificent,"
Archivum
6
Ottomanicum
Imber, "The Navy
(1980): 232.
28
sur l'?tat actuel de l'empire Ottoman
Observations
(Ann Arbor: Uni
Henry Grenville,
Press, 1965), p. 54.
versity of Michigan
29
Grenville,
Observations,
pp. 3-4.
30
Uzun?ar?ili,
"Bahriyya," p. 947.
31
The Galleys at LePanto,
p. 152.
Beeching,
32
Kibar Fi Esfari'
l-Bihar, pp. 185, 190, 225; R. C. Anderson,
Katip ?elebi,
Tuhfetul
in the Levant,
Naval Wars
Princeton
(Princeton:
Press, 1952), p. 142.
1559-1853
University
33
in the Levant, p. 194.
Naval Wars
Anderson,
i88
JOURNAL
OF WORLD
HISTORY,
SPRING
1999
a naval balance with the Venetian

maintained
century the Ottomans
forces. Henry Grenville
still considered
the Ottoman
fleet comparable
to that of Venice
in 1765.34 Unfortunately,
from what he observed
by
the Ottomans
fell behind
the
merely keeping pace with the Venetians,
maritime
Atlantic
of Mediterranean
naval
powers. The
inferiority
to
Atlantic
power
power only became clear when the main naval activ
in the
ity in the western Mediterranean
passed to Britain and France
second
half of the 1700s.35

in the first
programs
Judging by the sporadic naval construction
a lack of resolve
seems to have
decades
of the eighteenth
century,
the ener
played the major role in limiting the size of the navy. Under
of Mezamorto
getic leadership
Huseyin
Pa?a toward the end of the
the European
naval
switch from oar
followed
the Ottomans
i6oos,
to sail-powered
galleons, which had occurred at the beginning
into the reign of
Mezamorto's
reforms continued
century.36
and the number of new ships with large-caliber
Ahmet
III (1703-30),
cannons
the war against Peter the Great
the Turks
increased.37 During
were superior in number
In 1711 the
and size of ships on the Azov.
and fourteen galleys.38 Evi
Azov fleet comprised
eighteen men-of-war
were
Ottomans
of
the
quite capable
significant naval construc
dently
worried about rumors of the Porte
the vigilant Venetians
tion, because
powered
of that
a fleet of forty
forming
the Venetian
intelligence
fact that such an Ottoman
or not
to sixty vessels
in 1720.39 Whether
were
exact
is
the
less
than
reports
important
response was deemed credible by Venetian
authorities.
to Baron de Tott, a French aristocrat who
served as a
According
were
into
in
Ottoman
introduced
arsenals,
expert
only
frigates
foreign
War
when
the Russo-Turkish
fleet during
the Ottoman
(1768-77),
in the Ottoman
It is likely that
defeat at Chesme.40
they participated
Grenville
mentioned
earlier.
Henry
slightly
frigates actually appeared
34
Observations,
p. 29.
Grenville,
35
"Bahriyya," p. 948.
Uzun?ar?ili,
36Stanford
Shaw, Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline
Empire 1280
of theOttoman
1808, vol. 1 of History
Cambridge
Empire and Modern
Turkey
(Cambridge:
of the Ottoman
Press, 1987), p. 226.
University
37
Shaw, Empire of the Gazis, p. 229.
38B. H.
Archon
Conn.:
and the Ottoman
Peter the Great
(Hamden,
Sumner,
Empire
Books,
1965), p. 25.
39
in Des
from 1720 to 1734 as Revealed
Empire
Shay, "The Ottoman
Mary Lucille
in the Social Sciences
of Illinois Studies
27, no.
Baili," University
patches of the Venetian
of Illinois Press, 1944), pp. 74-76.
3 (Urbana: University
40Baron Francis de
Press,
Tott, Memoirs
of Baron De Tott, vol. 2, pt. 3 (New York: Arno
1973),
p. 25.

each
frigates with forty to fifty cannons
not until after Selim
Ill's naval reforms
in 1765.41 In any case,

the Ottoman
fleet
that
with Atlantic
became competitive
Europe, although
at Chesme was not due to any technical deficiencies.
than the Russian
fleet,
actually had larger vessels
was
189
the Turkish
it was
again
defeat
The Turkish fleet

and their artillery
comparable.42
demonstrated
that the
reforms of Selim III (1789-1807)
was still capable of rising to the chal
domestic
production
of twenty-two
ships of the line and
lenge. In 1784 the navy consisted
In the period
fifteen frigates (of which nine were in poor condition).43
vessels carrying over sixty guns within
there were twenty-five
1784-88
of these, a seventy-four-gunner,
had been
the Ottoman
navy. One
Between
built by French engineers.44
1789 and 1798 some forty-five
modern
fighting ships were built and launched from the empire's ship
in
three of the largest ships ever present
these were
yards. Among
The
naval
empire's
the Ottoman
fleet: the Selimiye (122 cannons),
the BadiA Nusret
(82
and the Tavus-u Bahri (82 cannons).
cannons),
By 1806 the fleet con
sisted of twenty ships of the line and twenty-five
frigates, with a total
at
of 2,156 cannon.45 Additionally,
the
arsenal had been
shipbuilding
on
two
lines.
old
The
wooden
reorganized
European
drydocks were re
new
stone
five
forms
three
ones,
permanent
placed by
ship-building
were constructed,
on that of
and a new drydock was built, modeled
Toulon.46
center for Ottoman
Istanbul was clearly the dominant
naval con
struction. The Selimiye, Tavus-u Bahri, BadiA Nusret, AsarA Nusret,
Sedd
ul Bahir, and the BahrA Zafer were all launched from the naval yards in
Istanbul.47 These
of the complement
of
ships made up over one-third
the
of
III.
constructed
Selim
also
repre
reign
galleons
during
They
of the navy's firepower.
sented most
Besides
the Istanbul
galleons,
two
also
the
MerkenA
and
the
Gazi
yards
frigates,
produced
HumayA
Zafer, and six corvettes.48
While
Istanbul played
the most
important
role
in naval
41
Grenville,
p. 3.
Observations,
42
igibel', p. 164.
Petrosian, Osmanskaia
imperiia mogushchestvo
43
Shaw, Empire of the Gazis,
p. 154.
44Fernand
and Capitalism:
Braudel, Civilization
Century,
i5th-i8th
tive of theWorld
and Row,
(New York: Harper
1984), p. 477.
45
p. 158.
46
p. 158.
D?nden
(Istanbul: Kastas A.
47Nejat G?len,
B?gune Bahriyemiz
p. 118.
48
D?nden
G?len,
pp. 118-19.
B?gune Bahriyemiz,
vol.
construe
3: The Perspec
S. Yayinlari,
1988),
JOURNAL
190
OF WORLD
HISTORY,
SPRING
I999
In Bodrum
three
contributions.
tion, other ports made
significant
at Sinop also
1790 and 1796.49 Facilities
galleons were built between
in the years 1789-93. ?anakkale,
made three galleons
Gemlik, Midilli,
an additional
one galleon each to Selim's pro
contributed
and Rhodes
construction
site for frigates, and
served as the principal
gram. Rhodes
two corvettes were
four came out of there from 1793 to 1797? Also,
in 1799?
launched
from Rhodes,
the first in 1796 and the second
Other
naval yards at Eregli, Limni, Kemer, Kalas,
and Sinop were
for one frigate apiece.50
responsible
had relied on foreign expertise
The Ottomans
and had copied for
in their naval construction
from the very beginnings
eign technology
from the first-tier Atlantic
of their navy. As the innovations
producers
via Spain to Venice,
the Ottomans
diffused across the Mediterranean
of them and incorporated
these new types of ships
became
cognizant
their own fleet.
into
of Ottoman
borrowed
naval
First galleons
and then
service
after neighboring
frigates joined
powers had
the ranks
similarly
them.
Production
Military
cannon
The question
of when
the Ottomans
first employed
and fire
arms in their military
not
has
been
answered,
operations
definitively
cannon
centralized
but Ottoman
production
gradually became more
over the course of the fifteenth
century.51 In 1440, during the reign of
was
a
cannon
at Germe Hisar.52 After
Mur?t
established
the
II,
foundry
a
cannon
was
estab
of
permanent
conquest
Constantinople,
foundry
in the Galata
lished
49
Guien,
50
Guien,
51There
district.53
Bayezid
II (1481-1512)
extended
this
p. 118.
B?gune Bahriyemiz,
D?nden
pp. 118-19.
B?gune Bahriyemiz,
were present with Murat Han during
is evidence
the 1422
that cannoneers
in
and important
fortresses
used cannon?for
siege of Constantinople,
example, Antalya
must have made
the transition
from siege guns
1423. In the following
years the Ottomans
to field guns, because
II (1421-51)
the first clear usage of field
during the time of Murat
at the second battle of Kossovo
in 1448. Sevin?, Osmanli
guns occurred
Sosyal ve Ekonomik
D?nden
to the Use of Firearms by the

"The Earliest References
Paul Wittek,
141-42;
in Gunpowder
and Firearms in theMamluk Kingdom,
ed. David Ayalon
(London:
Vallentine,
of Islam: New Edition,
1956), pp. 142-43; V. ]. Parry, "Barud," in Encyclopaedia
1:1061; Mark C. Bartusis, The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society,
1204-1453
(Phila
of Pennsylvania
Press, 1992), pp. 336-41.
delphia: University
Osmanli Devleti
vol. 2 (Ankara: Turk
521. H. Uzun?ar?ili,
tesjdlatindan Kapukulu Ocaklari,
Tarih Kurumu Basimevi,
Sosyal ve Ekonomik D?zeni,
1944), p. 35. See also Sevin?, Osmanli
D?zeni,
pp.
Ottomans,"
p. 142.
53Tursun
i977)>
Bey,
Tarih-i
Eb?'1-Feth,
trans. A.
Mertol
Tulum
(Istanbul:
Baha
matbaasi,
P- 72.
Grant:
Diffusion
Technology
Military
in the Ottoman
191
Empire
I (1520-66)
had it renovated.
In addi
site, and Suleyman
production
tion to the central arsenal at Istanbul, the Ottomans
established
Bel
as
and
G?lamber
Buda,
grade,
I?kodra, Teme?var,
Pravi?te,
important
centers of cannon
Besides
these permanent
provincial
production.54
on the
other locations
served as foundries, depending
establishments,
needs of the moment.
Included in this category were Bilecik, Van, Kigi,
and Novobrdo.55
Rudnik,
Kamengrad,
cannons
The size and quality of Ottoman
in the fifteenth
and six
teenth centuries were quite impressive. Chemical
of
Ottoman
analysis
guns cast in 1464 reveals that the bronze was of excellent
quality.56
was the
the monstrously
Among
huge guns produced by the Ottomans
was
term
This
from
derived
Italian
the
word
balyemez.
pallamezza and
to
Ottoman
that
fired
the
shot.57
The use of an
guns
applied
biggest
Italian loanword
reveals the origins of the technology
copied by the
cannon
Ottomans.
the
of
Selim
of
this
I,
reign
During
type were 820
cm in length and weighed
to
tons.
Also
under
Selim
up
17
I, the Otto
mans developed
cannon
cm
cast
100
cm wide, a
and
425
grooved
long
feat not matched
the
Germans
until
the
nineteenth
by
century.58
for Ottoman
and tech
Unfortunately
military fortunes, the methods
so well in the sixteenth
niques that had served the Ottomans
century
in the seventeenth
began to be liabilities
century. The Ottoman
pref
erence for the production
of siege guns, which were too heavy for use
in a war of movement,
continued
through the seventeenth
century.59
at this time that European developments
It was precisely
in the manu
facture
of mobile
field artillery moved
ahead. Raimondo
Montecuc
the
commander
who defeated
at the
the Ottomans
coli,
Habsburg
in 1664, commented
on Ottoman
battle of St. Gothard
cannon:
This enormous artillery produces great damage when it hits, but it is
awkward to move and it requires too much time to reload and site.
Furthermore,
it consumes
and
the
breaking
which
and
here
wheels
it is placed
resides
our
a great
the
and
. . .our
artillery
advantage
over
amount
carriages
of powder,
and even
besides
the
cracking
ramparts
ismore handy
and more
cannon
the Turks.60
the
of
54
Parry, "Barud," p. 1063.
55
Midhat
Sertoglu, Osmanli Tarih Lugati (Istanbul: Enderun
56
57
Sertoglu, Osmanli Tarih Lugati, p. 33.
58
p. 143.
Sevin?, Osmanli
Sosyal ve Ekonomik D?zeni,
59
Coles, The Ottoman
60
Coles, The Ottoman
Kitabevi,
on
efficient
1986),
p. 341.
JOURNAL
192
OF WORLD
HISTORY,
SPRING
1999
cannons were still regarded highly

in
though, Ottoman
Generally,
are
the seventeenth
"The
Guns
the
and
wrote,
century. Rycaut
biggest
as well cast and moulded
as any in the world; for the last Expedition
in
were
new
cast
there
of
Cannon
and
40 pieces
Hungary
transported
by
unto Belgrade and
way of the black Sea, and thence by the Danube
cannon production
the
remained
Buda."61 Domestic
strong throughout
for big, heavy guns
century, but the Ottomans'
eighteenth
penchant
a
at
in
them
mobile
field
battles
against European
placed
disadvantage
forces armed with rapid-fire cannons. The Ottomans
remained partial
to the old balyemez and shaki cannons,
their artillery
and consequently
was no longer comparable
to that of European
powers.62 In effect, the
was
the
of
the Otto
wrong
type
empire
pieces. During
manufacturing
man campaign
in
Austrians
Ada
Kale
the
against
1738,
captured fifty
cannons
at Orsovo,
but they could only take forty of them due to the
of the pieces.63 It was not until 1774 that a train of light field
weight
service.64
artillery was cast for Ottoman
cannon
in the
had praised Ottoman
While
Rycaut
production
over
a
later Baron de Tott had no
seventeenth
century
century, barely
In Tott's assessment,
which
"the Founderies
similar inclination.
they
. .was not hot
. . . and the metal.
already had were useless;
enough
it reached
the improper make of which
added yet
the Moulds;
when
the baron
another defect to the Pieces they produced."65 Accordingly,
to bore the
and the use of machines
furnaces
suggested
improved
the new
with
cannon.66 After
twenty cannons
casting
successfully
was
to
He recorded
ordered
he
method,
prepare fifty four-pounders.
that, "The first work of the New Foundery was to be a Train of Field
with which
the Turks were entirely unprovided."67
Artillery,
to
Tott's chagrin,
the impact of his modern
Much
foundry was not
as great as he had hoped. After
the completion
of the pieces for the
were cast for the new forts on the
field train, some new cannons
Soon after
Dardanelles.68
Still, the new foundry remained underutilized.
cannons
to manufacture
at all. The
it ceased
the baron's departure,
to financial difficulties.
As the
failure of the facility was due primarily
61
Empire, p. 200.
Rycaut, The Present State of the Ottoman
62
63A. Z.
of Ada Kale
"The Ottoman
Hertz,
1738,"
Conquest
6 (1980):
64
Tott,
65
Tott,
66
Tott,
67
Tott,
68
Tott,
169.
Memoirs,
Memoirs,
Memoirs,
Memoirs,
Memoirs,
in Archivum
Ottomanicum
p. 155.
p. 114.
p. 97.
p. 155.
p. 197.
Grant: Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire 193

baron
himself
"We have
remarked,
already
seen
that
the Establish
ment of the new Foundery had not abolished the old. The Funds
were spent upon that; and it was with diffi
for the Artillery
for what was acknowl
that
the
necessary
culty
supplies were obtained
more
to
Baron
Tott's
useful."69
de
did yield
be
much
enterprise
edged
some results. In the 1780s each artillery regiment received ten cannons:
four of the new rapid-fire sweat, two smaller abus, and four older balye
for a total of 250 pieces.70 However,
this proved
mez and shahi cannons,
intended
to be inadequate. As reported to the French Foreign Ministry

in 1793,
"until today, the Turks have founded only bronze cannon
and their
foundries
and their forges are
army and navy have no other. Their
pitiful."71
Selim
in March
III must have agreed with
this opinion,
because
a
for
the
sultan
initiated
modernization
1793
program
artillery produc
tion. Selim's program relied on an infusion of foreign machinery
and
New
for
the
Cannon
expertise.
Foundry (Tophane)
machinery
Imperial
was imported from Britain
and France. At the same time a group of
cannon
founders
sent
by
the French
Directorate
occupied
the old
foundry buildings in Hask?y.72 These buildings had originally been

erected by Baron de Tott to manufacture
the rapid-fire cannon,
but
had been converted
for the assembly of old-style muskets
and bullets,
to modern
In addition
which were reintroduced
after Tott's departure.
new
to
create
the sultan sought
foundries. With
izing existing works,
a cannon
this goal in mind,
seventy master workers were to establish
foundry.73
With
the introduction
of cannon-boring
and the cast
techniques
ing of light artillery by Baron de Tott in the early 1770s, the Ottomans
the recipients
became
of two important
innovations,
technological
which
constituted
part of the second wave of Krause's model. To ap
one should note that Russia had adopted
the context
these
preciate
a
decade before the Ottomans,
and that the Russians
techniques
only
also had made use of a foreign expert to acquire
the knowledge
for
cannon-boring.74
When
viewed
from an eastern
European
perspective,
69
Tott, Memoirs,
p. 178.
70
p. 121.
71
p. 139.
72
p. 140
73
74 In the Russian
case the expert was a Dutch
in Berlin
in
of war captured
prisoner
H. McNeill,
The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since
1760. William
A.D. 1000 (Chicago: University
of Chicago
Press, 1982), p. 167; Krause, Arms and the State,
p. 56.
194
JOURNAL
OF WORLD
HISTORY,
SPRING
1999
were not significantly

com
the Ottomans
and the Russian
behind,
some
should
Tott's
of
of
characterizations
mitigate
parison
negative
Ottoman
before
the
Turks
and
the
capabilities.
faulting
Similarly,
of Islamic society" for their need to import technical
"backwardness
one needs to remember
in artillery production,
assistance
that Russia
was
not
under Catherine
the Great
in pro
self-sufficient
(1762-96)
either.75
ducing military
technology
so long for the Ottomans
to accept
it
take
did
Why
seemingly
was
to
The
field
Ottoman
connected
timing
lighter
artillery?
directly
were
in the eighteenth
Russian
tactical developments
century. Sieges
in eastern Europe, and therefore
the backbone
of military
operations
vital components.
The Turk
siege and fortress artillery were necessarily
ish fortresses
the northern
formidable
guarding
approaches
provided
set the conditions
for the Russo-Turkish
struggles. The
into their fortresses, thereby
Turks eschewed
field battles and withdrew
to engage
in siege operations.
In 1769 the Rus
forcing the Russians
defense
and
sians'
lack of large guns prevented

them from sustaining
the siege
a
as
at
the
fort
the
Turkish
and
result
Ottomans
scored a
Hotin,
against
were
as
to
retreat.
Russians
forced
The
the
Russian
tactical
victory
innovations
of aimed
field artillery,
the use of
infantry fire, mobile
infantry squares, and the overall stress on speed and shock grew out of
in the eighteenth
century.
challenges
posed by the Turkish campaigns
In effect, Russian
commanders
had changed
the rules of engagement
The heavy Ottoman
by the 1770s, and the Turks had to compensate.76
in defending
their strongholds,
but the greater
guns were still viable
in the field now required the adoption
Russian potency
of lighter field
guns.
The Ottoman
of gunpowder
followed
system for the production
the pattern of that used for cannon. The state created factories backed
commis
and directed
by government-appointed
by state resources
sioners. One such factory was the gunpowder
plant (baruthane) at Kagi
seventeen
tons of powder per month
in 1571.77
than?", which produced
there were large baruthanes at Belgrade, Konya, Birecik,
Additionally
Hama,
Aleppo,
Van,
Baghdad,
Rhodes,
Gallipoli,
Izmir, Selanik,
and
75For a broad overview

see Hans-Heinrich
of Russia's
technical
Nolte,
backwardness,
Ein halbes
'Russland und der Westen',"
des R?ckstands:
Jahrtausend
Vierteiljahr
Krause, Arms and the State,
78 (1991):
344-64;
schrift f?r Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte
P-55
76
C. Fuller, Strategy and Power in
Statesman,
pp. 145, 151; William
Aksan, An Ottoman
Russia,
(New York: Free Press, 1992), pp. 147-66.
1600-1914
77
Inalcik, The Ottoman
Empire: The Classical Age, p. 160.
"Tradition
Grant:
Military
Technology
Diffusion
in the Ottoman
195
Empire
to some sources, the first baruthane was estab

Teme?var.78 According
at
lished
of gun
during the time of Bayezid II.79 Production
Kagithane
was
and the whole process of
direction,
powder
subject to centralized
and using gunpowder was con
transporting,
manufacturing,
collecting,
The center was continu
stantly monitored
by the central government.
in
both
and
of gunpowder,
urging
improvements
quantity
ally
quality
and surplus powder was sent back to Istanbul for storage and redistri
bution to other munitions
locales. Provincial
powder works provided a
Besides Egypt, there were
significant portion of the empire's production.
fourteen powder factories in Baghdad, and ten in Buda. The Buda works
were supposed to provide 200-300
kantars (1 kantar =120
lb) to three
other fortresses in Hungary
and another 500 kantars to Belgrade annu
to supply 1,000 kantars
factories endeavored
ally. Meanwhile,
Baghdad
to
via
road.80
Istanbul
the
annually
Aleppo
to gauge to what extent
It is difficult
the Ottomans
relied on for
sources
for
their
of
Paul
noted
eign
supplies
gunpowder.
Rycaut
already
in the latter half of the seventeenth
is
century that "their Gunpowder
made
but in small quantities
about Constantinople,
but comes from
divers places of Europe but that from Damascus
ismost esteemed."81
In
a
was
near
new
Istanbul.
This
baruthane
built
1678
powder works, along
with an older works at Kagithane,
3,000 kantars of black
produced
powder each year. From Egypt, some 1,200 kantars of saltpeter were
for use in these baruthanes.82 After
received
the one baruthane was
a
a
new
was established
on the
in
fire
works
1697,
destroyed by
powder
in 1698. In addition,
outskirts of Istanbul
the Ottomans
maintained
in Salonika, Gallipoli,
provincial
powder works
Baghdad, Cairo, Bel
the second half of the eighteenth
grade, and Izmir.83 During
century a
was
to
meet
in
built
Damascus
the
of
needs
the janis
powder factory
centers did not provide
saries.84 Evidently,
these production
sufficient
quantities
78
Sertoglu,
p. 144.
79
Sertoglu,
of powder,
because
Osmanli
Tarih Lugati,
by the second half of the eighteenth
cen
ve Ekonomik
D?zeni,
p. 34; Sevin?,
Osmanli
Sosyal
Osmanli Tarih Lugati, p.34.

in Ottoman
of the Last Half of the 16th
Documents
80Turgut
I?iksal, "Gunpowder
International Journal of Turkish Studies 2 (winter
Century,"
1981-82):
81-91.
81
Rycaut, The Present State of theOttoman
Empire, p. 200.
82
Ismail Hakki Uzun?ar?ili,
Tarihi TV. Cilt.
Osmanli
2.Kisim XVIIII
(Ankara:
Y?zyil
Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi,
1959), p. 579.
83
Stanford
J. Shaw, Between Old and New: The Ottoman
Empire under Sultan Selim III,
Harvard University
Press, 1971), p. 142.
ij8g-i8oj
(Cambridge:
84Abdul Karim
in Syria in the Seventeenth
"The Local Forces
and Eighteenth
Rafeq,
in War, Technology
and Society in theMiddle East (London: Oxford University
Centuries,"
Press,
1975),
p. 301.
JOURNAL
196
OF WORLD
HISTORY,
tury the Porte was buying powder

Grenville
found Ottoman
powder
served rifle and pistol powder being
in 1765.86 The Ottomans
continued
SPRING
from Sweden
and Spain.85
to be of poor quality, and
and
imported from Holland
to produce powder using
Europe had been using a more
1999
Henry
he ob
Venice
the six
formula, while
stable,
quality powder since the early 1700s.87
in the last decade of the eighteenth
century the Ottomans
Finally,
to improve their powder production
in both quan
initiated measures
tity and quality. In the summer of 1794, under the leadership of Tevki'i
'Al Ratik Efendi, modernization
of the existing
powder works was
The Porte ordered European
for the baruthanes
equipment
attempted.
at Bakirk?y, Gallipoli,
and Salonika.
The goal was a production
level
teenth-century
higher
of 5,000
this first
kantars of European-type
powder per year. Although
was unsuccessful,
efforts the next year were more
rewarding.
1795 Mehmed
experts
?erif Efendi and some British gunpowder
at Bakirk?y
and added five new wheels.
remodeled
twenty old wheels
a year production
doubled from 1,500 kantars of old powder to
Within
were
similar modifications
3,000 kantars of European
powder. While
an entirely new powder factory
and Salonika,
carried out at Gallipoli
on the Sea of Marmara.
was constructed
at Azadli
This
factory em
attempt
InApril
ployed water power instead of animal power. Azadli was so successful

served only as a storage house and the works
that after 1797 Bakirk?y
at Gallipoli,
Izmir were closed entirely. After
and
Salonika,
1795 the
of
sufficient
Ottomans
could domestically
quantities
powder,
produce
free of imported powder.88
and they became completely
retained
their own distinc
With
regard to firearms, the Ottomans
tive forms until very late in the eighteenth
century. These Ottoman
varieties did not become
inferior to European
types until early in that
use
in
The
muskets
Turkish
forces
up to the time of the
among
century.
wars of the 1680s were by no means
inferior. In fact, they
Austrian
were capable of a longer range than those used by the Austrians.89
forces in Syria, the tabanja and the bawd tawil figured
in
the eighteenth
century. Both of these firearms were
prominently
the tawil was a
The tabanja was a pistollike weapon,
matchlocks.
while
in
of
match
second
half
the
While
introduced
the
1700s.90
long gun
local
Among
85
Osmanli Tarihi, p. 580.
Uzun?ar?ili,
86
p. 21.
Observations,
Grenville,
87
Shaw, Between Old and New,
pp. 142-43.
88
pp. 142-44.
89
Attitude
towards
"The Ottoman
Murphey,
p. 291.
90
Rafeq,
"The Local
Forces
in Syria,"
the Adoption
of Western
Technology,"
p. 295.
Grant:
Military
Technology
Diffusion
in the Ottoman
197
Empire
in Ottoman
service until the end of the cen
remained
lock muskets
armies.
become
standard in European
the
had
flintlock
tury,
already
A noticeable
increase in foreign firearms imports first became
ap
arms
century. At that time, besides receiving
parent in the eighteenth
in Syria began importing firearms
from Istanbul, authorities
shipments
with respect
from Europe, and especially
from Italy.91 The disadvantage
a large number
to Europe worsened,
of muskets
and by mid-century
from Holland
and Venice.92 The Italian guns
and pistols were coming
came mostly
in northern
from the factories of Brescia
Italy.93 These
to
transmission
of
the
of
from
belt
imports testify
military
technology
to
and
first- and second-tier
Venice,
(Holland
producers
respectively)
the third-tier Ottomans.
Some appreciation
of the growing disparity between
Europe and
can be gained from the
in the quality of arms production
the Ottomans
of Abdul Kerim Pa?a. In 1775-76
this diplomat was head
observations
to Moscow. On his journey, Adbul Kerim had
mission
of the Ottoman
to visit the Russian works at Tula. He observed:
the opportunity
In a large factory
situated
such as rifles, pistols,
on
of war
the
river,
pikes,
rapiers,
they manufacture
iron
and other
instruments
implements.
By using the water of the river in such services as working the water
wheels for forging iron, they ease their labors. They want to be supe
rior
to
their
fellow
craftsmen
and
artisans
in other
countries
in
that
industry. By paying attention to detail and by being careful, they get

more skilled and versed in the process day by day and produce very
pleasing and good firearms.94
into the condition
of Ottoman
This passage offers several
insights
arms production.
in Abdul
As Itzkowitz noted,
there is a strong hint
to shape up and improve the
Kerim's Sefaretname
for the Ottomans
it is revealing
that the author felt the
quality of their work.95 Also,
arms factories
need to mention
the use of water power. All Ottoman
at
time
On
animal
the
of
this
this point the
power
writing.
employed
not
take
the
authorities
did
because
animal
hint,
power
evidently
remained predominant
until the next century. Finally, Abdul Kerim's
praise
for the Russian
work
points
to the
increasing
importance
of
91
"The Local Forces in Syria," p. 297.
Rafeq,
92
Grenville,
Observations,
p. 21.
93V.
in the Ottoman
in Studies in the Economic His
J. Parry, "Materials of War
Empire,"
tory of theMiddle East, ed. M. A. Cook
Press, 1970), p. 227.
(London: Oxford University
94Norman
Mubadele?An
Itzkowitz
Ottoman-Russian
and Max Mote,
Exchange
of
Ambassadors
of Chicago
Press, 1970), p. 89.
95 Itzkowitz and
Mote, Mubadele,
p. 12.
JOURNAL
i98
OF WORLD
HISTORY,
SPRING
1999
Russia as the measure

for Ottoman
He presents
the Rus
performance.
as a model worthy
sian factory and workers
of emulation.
Russia was
arms
in
its
the first-tier European
powers
actually behind
production,
it was a firm second-tier
the Ottoman
power.96 Therefore,
although
indicates
that the Ottomans
praise for Russian
diplomat's
capabilities
were aware of their relative position
on the east European
scale.
After having
for years, Ottoman
of fire
lagged behind
production
arms dramatically
to the technological
in the
mainstream
returned
III
Selim
1790s. As he did in so many other areas of war production,
arms production
strove to revitalize
within
In 1794 the
the empire.
to be supplied with new, Euro
sultan issued orders for the janissaries
and ammunition,
and it was hoped
that entirely
weapons
pean-type
new
would be available by the end of the year.97 To accom

equipment
at Levend ?ift
plish this task, a new musket
factory was established
lik.98 As a result of Selim's program, Ottoman
firearms started to be
from foreign weapons
and now fit into the general
less distinguishable
advances
pattern of technical
taking place in Europe.99
of the arms facto
Selim's
the modernization
desire,
strong
Despite
ries was
not entirely
successful. The problem
lay in the want of sus
in
of the factories. The
forceful
the
administration
tained,
leadership
in
weakness
the foreign personnel
stemmed from the continual
changes
arms
in
In
all
the
the
factories with the
years 1795-98,
charge.
placed
one
were
in
of
the
under
the
exception
Hask?y
guidance of two French
and Cuny. After
the French
invaded Egypt, English
and
men, Aubert
Swedish
advisers assumed the duties. Besides
the rivalries of the vari
ous foreign advisers,
the low level of competence
of many
of them
their
effect.100
mitigated
Conclusion
For the declinists, Ottoman
military
technological
inferiority since the
as
an
has
been
taken
seventeenth
century
integral part of the Ottoman
96M. E.
Yapp, "The Modernization
in War,
View,"
tury: A Comparative
Oxford University
Press, 1975), p. 344;
and Nature
Origins
of Russian Military
Paul, 1981), pp. 37, 179.
97
p.
98
p.
99
100
p.
in the Nineteenth
Armies
Cen
in the Middle
and Society
East (London:
to theWest:
Duffy, Russia's Military Way
Christopher
and Kegan
Power,
(London: Routledge
1700-1800
of Middle
Eastern
Technologe
119.
131.
141.
199
a doubt the Turks

a position
is not warranted. Without
lost battles, wars, and territory after 1683. Nevertheless,
up to 1740
territory from the Vene
regained
they also defeated Peter the Great,
tians and Austrians,
and held off the Iranians on a second front.
decline.
Such
may have owed a share to luck, but no

victories
owed to misfortune.
The Russian
over the Turks beginning
in the 1770s should be attributed
less to
to
since
Russian
than
tactical
innovation,
superiority
technological
to the
the wonder weapon
turned out to be the bayonet. According
Russian
Turkish
rifles "are longer, stouter and of
general Golitsyn,
iron than those of the European
but they make use of them
better
are
to
and
saber in
always impatient
slowly
charge the enemy with
hand . . . infantry fire doesn't
them.
the
represses
stop
Only
bayonet
their ardor."101 Also,
those Russian
battles could easily have gone the
other way, and contemporary
did not rule out Russian defeat
opinion
in the first years of Catherine's
war.102 Finally,
the rousing Otto
man
over
in 1801 at the
the
forces
of
France
victory
revolutionary
These
more
battle
Ottoman
than
victories
their defeats
of El Honka
in Egypt
testified
to the renewed
vigor of the Turk
ish military.103
Ottoman
rolled back on track by the end
domestic war production
the
of the eighteenth
because
became more syste
century
government
to overhaul
matic
in recruiting
its pro
the foreign technical personnel
In the 1780s, even before Selim III, the employment
duction
facilities.
was becoming
more
in Ottoman
of foreign specialists
establishments
to
The
build up Ottoman
French
themselves
regular.
eagerly desired
and French engineers
and artisans super
of shells, bullets, ships, and artillery.104 As
to solicit
continues
the British embassy reported, the "French Mission
as
as
to
the Porte
hasten
much
and prepara
possible her armaments,
in
tions, by sea and land."105 Herein
improvement
lay the decisive
it
into
the technical
and integrating
Ottoman
acquiring
knowledge
naval and military

strength,
vised Ottoman
manufacture
101
Aksan, An Ottoman
Statesman,
p. 130.
102
Fuller, Strategy and Power in Russia, pp. 86-87.
103
to General
from Major Holloway
Field of Battle,
El Honka,
Hutchinson,
Dispatch
16 May
1801, in The Keith Papers, ed. Christopher
Lloyd, vol. 2 (London: Navy Records
Society,
1950), p. 303.
104Public Record Office
to Marquis
of Carmathen,
9 October
(Kew), FO 261/1, Ainslie
1784, No. 22, and 25 November
1784, No. 25.
105Public Record Office
to Marquis
10 Janu
of Carmathen,
(Kew), FO 261/1, Ainslie
1.
ary 1785, No.
200
JOURNAL
OF WORLD
HISTORY,
SPRING
I999
Instead of relying on the random

of
defection
into Ottoman
skilled Europeans
ranks, as they had done earlier in the
in the 1780s the Ottomans
century, beginning
arranged with foreign
states for formal missions
to transfer the necessary
As a
techniques.
recent plans and models
obtained
the most
for
result, the Ottomans
their arsenals and dockyards.
III was able to build on this base
Selim
domestic
industry.
he initiated his reforms in the 1790s, and this closed the widen
the Porte and its rivals over the century. Problems
ing gap between
the Ottoman
remained with
but production
establishment,
military
had been restored.
war production
From this examination
it is
of Ottoman
capabilities
no
evident
that the Ottoman
inexorable
decline
empire experienced
to remain
the Ottomans
after 1571 or 1683. Furthermore,
managed
when
on par technologically
with their main
and the
rivals, the Venetians
Russians. Although
Ottoman
did
behind
the
military
production
lag
western
the
European
military
technological
developments
during
this state of affairs was not irreversible,
and by
century,
eighteenth
in catching
the end of that century the Ottomans
had succeeded
the
wave
cannon
of innovations.
As we have
seen, galleons,
frigates,
and flint
gunpowder,
boring techniques,
light field guns, new-formula
lock firearms all found their way into Ottoman
domestic manufactur
ing and use.
man
to the eighteenth
centuries
From the fifteenth
the Ottomans
waves
to
two
catch
the
first
diffusion
of
and
aged
military
technology,
a domestic
each time they developed
derived
production
capability
from foreign expertise and copying foreign models. Although
the tech
over
to
the
of
the
Ottomans
time,
niques changed
adopt new
ability
a
consistent
remained
with
of
the
third-tier
pro
capacity
technologies
ducer throughout
the period.
In this light, the notion
of Ottoman
A case could be made, how
and misleading.
"decline" is inappropriate
a
for
after
Ottoman
discernible
decline
ever,
1850. At that time the
wave and actually began to
missed
the next technological
their
domestic
of
lose
entirely. A presentation
production
capabilities
war
erosion of Ottoman
in the period
the complete
industries
1854
Ottomans
and rapid
the scope of this essay. In brief, the dramatic
1914 exceeds
in war technology,
from repeater rifles to machine
guns and
changes
to dreadnoughts,
from ironclads
of
with
the development
combined
strain that Turkish resources could not
the mass army, caused a financial
support.
weapons
maintain
artillery
easier simply to restock with

the newest
imported
to
create
rather than lose time and money
and
attempting
a domestic
arms industry. German Mauser
rifles and Krupp
served as the standard issue for Ottoman
forces, and British war
It became
Grant: Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire 201

century the
ships made up the Turkish navy.106 By the late nineteenth
on
Porte was completely
imports and had
foreign weapons
dependent
fallen below
the third-tier
level. It seems an ironic inversion of the
were the most
decline thesis to note that the period when the Ottomans
to
to be the
out
Western
institutional
turned
receptive
borrowings
to import dependency
time when
the real decline
began.
106
"The Sword
of the Sultan: Ottoman
Arms
from
Grant,
Jonathan
Imports
toWorld War
at the 1997 annual meeting
Crimean War
I," unpublished
paper presented
the Society
for Military
Alabama.
History, Mongomery,
the
of

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Rethinking the Ottoman "Decline": Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire,

Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries

Rethinking the Ottoman "Decline77:

Florida State University

Journal ofWorld History, Vol. io, No. i

can only be seen as declining

states with varying degrees of military

to the Sociology of Islam (London: Harrison

of such studies isH. A. R. Gibb

Grant: Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire

In his view, "the Ottoman

some aspects of Ottoman

and Social History

wave came a period of

the State, p. 38.

Grant: Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire

the Safavid artillery force

the hands of Afghan

the limited degree of foreign dependence,

among the Golden Horn, Galli

The naval forces which

the Great Turk uses to defend his empire are

in his dockyard and he can turn out more whenever

Grant: Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire

into the context

the Rise of theWest,

C. Hess, The Forgotten Frontier

a naval balance with the Venetian

half of the 1700s.35

Grant: Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire

in 1765.41 In any case,

The Turkish fleet

to the Use of Firearms by the

cannons were still regarded highly

Grant: Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire 193

to be inadequate. As reported to the French Foreign Ministry

foundry buildings in Hask?y.72 These buildings had originally been

were not significantly

lack of large guns prevented

75For a broad overview

to some sources, the first baruthane was estab

by the second half of the eighteenth

Osmanli Tarih Lugati, p.34.

tury the Porte was buying powder

ployed water power instead of animal power. Azadli was so successful

industry. By paying attention to detail and by being careful, they get

for the Russian

Russia as the measure

would be available by the end of the year.97 To accom

Grant: Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire

a doubt the Turks

may have owed a share to luck, but no

vigor of the Turk

naval and military

Instead of relying on the random

easier simply to restock with

Grant: Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire 201

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