Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Kordela
/ GOD
THEORY
IN GLOBAL
/ December
CAPITALISM
1999
POLITICAL METAPHYSICS
God in Global Capitalism (the Slave,
the Masters, Lacan, and the Surplus)
A. KIARINA KORDELA
Macalester College
In truth, however, value is here the active factor in a process, in which, while constantly
assuming the form in turn of money and commodities, it at the same time changes in
magnitude, differentiates itself by throwing off surplus-value from itself; the original
value, in other words, expands spontaneously. For the movement . . . is its own movement . . . is automatic expansion . . . able to add value to itself . . . living offsprings . . . golden eggs . . . an independent substance. . . . It differentiates itself as original
value from itself as surplus value; as the father differentiates himself from himself qua
the son, yet both are one and of one age: for only by the surplus value of 10 does the 100
originally advanced become capital, and so soon as this takes place, so soon as the son,
and by the son, the father, is begotten, so soon does their difference vanish, and they again
become one, 110.3.
Marx (1967, 1:171-73)
The future must no longer be determined by the past. . . . Anticipation is imperative . . . in
order to be more than herself . . . impossible subject, untenable in a real social framework. . . . But secretly, silently, deep down inside, she grows and multiplies . . . she goes
and passes into infinity. . . . Heterogeneous, yes . . . she does not cling to herself; she is dispersible, prodigious, stunning, desirous and capable of others, of the other woman that
she will be, of the other woman she isnt, of him, of you . . . she is everywhere, she exchanges . . . in the exchange that multiplies. . . . She does not know what shes giving,
she doesnt measure it . . . she finds not her sum but her differences. . . . In one another we
will never be lacking.
Cixous (1986, 309-20)
If God is dead, everything is permitted, then the conclusion imposing itself within the text
of our experience is that the response to God is dead, is nothing is any longer permitted.
Lacan (1991, 139)
It is therefore absolutely impossible to control capitalism from the metalevel, because
capitalism itself is deconstructive.
Karatani (1995, 71)
POLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 27 No. 6, December 1999 789-839
1999 Sage Publications, Inc.
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DIVINE TAUTOLOGY
(LACANS RETURN TO SPINOZA)
The failure of reason to ground its own discourse is by definition a secular
issue, since within theocratic discourses any gap or insufficiency of the
human ability to reason is always legitimately filled in by divine omniscience
or its cognates and surrogates. In other words, theocratic is that discursive
paradigm that does not impose on human reason the task of grounding its own
discourse and, consequently, of giving word for any discursive contradictions
and inconsistencies. If not the first, God remains the more or less surreptitious last recourse always invoked to fill in the ultimate gap that a system of
reasoning structurally produces as the question of the last origin or cause.
In theocracy, God is legitimately and consciously representable. A limit case
is Descartess articulation of the cogito, oftenrightly and notreferred to
as the philosophical grounding of modern subjectivity. Here, reason claims to
ground itself even as it eventually takes last recourse in its being grounded by
God. The first conscious philosophical attempt to comprehend the structural
gap involved in any system of secular reasoning, that is to say, to acknowledge and represent the logical inevitability of a transcendent recourse, is
offered by the introduction of the Spinozian distinction between tautology
and syllogism.
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the myth has to do with the inability, for a culture which holds the belief that mankind is
autochthonous . . . to find a satisfactory transition between this theory and the knowledge
that human beings are actually born from the union of man and woman. Although the
problem obviously cannot be solved, the Oedipus myth provides a kind of logical tool
which relates the original problemborn from one or from two?to the derivative
problem: born from different or born from same? (p. 216)
To be sure, even on this level the myth does not succeed in solving the problem logically. Instead, it allows a theoretically infinite number of slates [to]
be generated, each one slightly different from the others (p. 229). LviStrauss articulates the fact that there is no Other of the Other (i.e., no logical
solution that could ground the text meant to guarantee social cohesion) by
pointing out that the myth solves the problem precisely by not solving it
(logically). Instead, it produces the possibility of theoretically infinite displacements and substitutions.
We need only assume that two opposite terms [e.g., life and death] with no intermediary
always tend to be replaced by two equivalent terms [e.g., food and warfare] which admit
of a third one as a mediator [e.g., animal-hunting]; then one of the polar terms and the
mediator become replaced by a new triad, and so on. (p. 224)2
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tence and signifier. The mirror stage represents the split in terms of sensation
versus form; the introduction of the symbolic order represents it in terms of
existence versus signifier. And we will see why this split has to be introduced
twice.
On the prelinguistic and prereflective (literally mirrorless) level of the
drive, the subject is assumed to live within the absolute harmony of the one
that does not distinguish between the subjects pure (extrasemantic) existence as an animal and itself as a thinking being. This is logically possible not
because the infant (be it human or other animal) is assumed not to think, but
because it is assumed to think in a radically uncompromised way that does
not force the thought to fit into any pregiven signifier. The Lacanian infant
does not speak any language because it itself is languagespecifically, a literally bodily language that signifies needs transparently and without any
loss. Lacan conceives of any bodily function on the level of the drive not as a
biological function but as a signifying act. Eating, for instance, is a signifying
bodily act that means that what is eaten has become for the subject a nothing
something for which the subject no longer cares, something from which the
subject is now weaned. At the oral level, Lacan (1981) says, the object is
the nothing, in so far as that from which the subject was weaned is no longer
anything for him (pp. 103-4). This is a rearticulation of the fundamentally
Hegelian thought that the subject eats only that with which it does not care to
develop or sustain a relation. As long as you eat the bone, you are a doga
slave, as Hegel would say; when you stop consuming it and start relating to it
somehow, you cease to be the slave and ascend to the level of the master
whether the Kubrickian ape-master, who discovers that the bone can be an
effective killing weapon; the capitalist master, who sells bones to be eaten
only by others; or the artistic master, who paints the bone to be seen also by
others. In this sense, whatever it eats, the Lacanian infant always eats the
nothing. The pathological case of anorexia nervosa, in which what the
child eats is [literally] the nothing (pp. 103-4), is, in properly psychoanalytic
fashion, only the symptom that shows the truth about the normal case. On the
level of the drive, existence and signification do not relate antinomically to
each other because the subject does not consist of a body that eats and a mind
8
that thinks, but rather of a body that thinks by eating or eats by thinking.
The next stage, known as the mirror stage, consists of the separation of
thought from the body and its attachment to the image. It is, then, also an
account of the Western fixation on vision as the primary cognitive sense. Qua
separation, this stage introduces the two into the economy of subjectivity,
thereby substituting the harmony of the level of the drive with an antinomic
conflict. The reason for this transition is, in empirical terms, the discrepancy
between, on one hand, the infants experience of its body as an infinity of sen-
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sations and uncoordinated movements and, on the other, its image in the mirror as a finite and uniform whole. In logical terms, we encounter yet again the
old conflict between one and two or infinity and finitude. The harmony of the
one, which characterizes the infant on the level of the drive, is disrupted as the
infant is offered a mirror image that represents to it the prematurely whole,
uniform, and limited total form of the body (Lacan 1977, 2)a body that
nonetheless continues to be experienced fragmentarily. This anticipation of
the self as one distinct and whole form is given to him only as a Gestalt, that
is to say, in an exteriority in which this form is certainly more constituent than
constituted, and which stands in contrast with the turbulent movements that
the subject feels are animating him (p. 2). This is the first identification in
the life of the subject in the full sense that analysis gives to the term,
namely, as an external arbitrary introduction of an other that the subject
(mis)recognizes for itself so that its I is precipitated in a primordial form
(p. 2). Thus, the moment of the subjects first self-identification coincides
with the subjects self-alienation and, hence, cognition with miscognition
(mconnaissance).
But, this imaginary, specular misrecognition notwithstanding, the subjects antinomy lies precisely in the fact that it cannot fully identify either
with the image in the mirror (finitude) or with the movements animating the
body (infinity). In the first case, it would lose its body (fragmentarity); in the
second, it would lose its total form (unity). Like Marxs capital, the Lacanian I emerges in the no-mans-land, the void, between (the) insufficiency (of
the fragmented body) and (the) anticipation (of the total bodily form). The
mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation (Lacan 1977, 4). And like Kants world in his mathematic antinomy, the Lacanian I can form a cognitive object neither in the thesis (I am these movements/I am infinite) nor in the antithesis (I am this
image/I am finite)for either statement begs the question and presupposes the knowledge of the Is limits that it purportedly asks. The mirror stage
represents the entrapment of the I within the mathematic antinomy and its circular or tautological logic, just as it represents the implicit Lacanian argument that it is the structure of capitala societys means of exchange, rather
than its means of production or its superstructurethat determines the constitution of the subject.
So it is that, contrary to common wisdom, the mirror stage involves much
more than the identification of the subject with its mirror image and, hence,
much more than the introduction of the imaginary register within which such
identification can take place. The imaginary register cannot constitute itself
without the parallel constitution of the symbolic register. The mirror stage is
the stage that produces both registers in their antinomic relation. In the first
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place, the mirror stage is a mathematic antinomy that consists of the thesis I
am these infinite movements and the antithesis I am this finite image. Neither statement can be truesince both beg the question of the limits of the I
by presupposing them as knownand, consequently, neither of them can
become this with which the I can identify. This means that the mirror stage is
a state in which the I at once produces itself in anticipation by misrecognizing
itself as something other than itself (mirror image) and excludes identification as a possibility for the I. In other words, castration and the law of the
father, which are assumed to be the agency that breaks down the imaginary
identification of the mirror stage and to force the subject to recognize difference, are in a sense redundant myths. The myth of the mirror stage suffices to
represent misrecognition and imaginary identification as well as the logical
impossibility of this identification. The registers of the imaginary and the
symbolic are antinomic, which is also to say, they supplement each other and
are the inseparable effects of the originary single real.
Now, the impossibility of the Is identification is tantamount to the introduction of the death drive and the symbolic order. That the I cannot identify
with either of the statements of the mathematic antinomy means that the I is
compelled to repeat ceaselessly its oscillation between these two alternatives.
The death drive manifests itself as repetition compulsion insofar as the subject, trapped as it is in its no-mans-land between body and mirror image,
compulsively repeats the gesture of the comparison between the two poles
that sustain its logical nonexistence in any positive space. Here, Lacan (1988)
diverges from Freud in that he equates repetition compulsion not only with
the death drive but also with the symbolic order: The death instinct is only
the mask of the symbolic order (p. 326). If the mirror stage enthralls the subject within repetition, then it is already the subjects introduction to the signifier and its symbolic order.
The primary characteristic of the signifier is its radical ambiguity, that is,
the fact that it throws the subject into the endless search for unambiguous
meaning, since the formalism of the signifier guarantees the production of
ambiguous, mutually exclusive, meaningsas Kant, de Man, and Karatani,
among others, have shown. It seems, then, that the mathematic antinomy with
its radical ambiguity and undecidability suffices to provide the matrix for
both the imaginary and the symbolic registers. Except for one crucial thing:
the mathematic antinomy articulates radical undecidability with regard only
to untrue statements, that is, statements that are not possible representations
of reality. This means that, even if the ambiguity of the signifier were somehow resolved and a decision in favor of one of the two statements of the antinomy were made, the statement could still not represent reality because it is
inherently untrue, an impossible representation of reality. What is yet lacking
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ics, Part I, app.). In other words, I can judge as bad, say, an earthquake that
may cause my death only if I think teleologically, my supreme end thereby
being my own survival. But in a nonteleological and nonevaluative monism,
both life and death are parts of life and hence neither should be valued more
than the other. If this is the case, I cannot, then, even justify that my death
would be something badnot in the moral sense of evil but bad in the
sense of an eternal truth. My interest is in itself a fictional teleology, and outside any teleology and fiction, there is no reason why my death should be
worse than my life. In other words, no metalanguage is possible, or, in Zizeks
(1993) words, in terms of speech-acts-theory, [no reduction] of performative to constative is possible (p. 217). Every statement always entails a certain fictional teleology and system of values. In Lacanian terms, it entails the
paternal metaphor, the signifier of a prohibition, the Master Signifier,
which, as Zizek puts it, brings about the closure of an ideological field by
way of designating the Supreme Good (God, Truth, Nation, etc.) (p. 217).
It is the introduction of this moral prohibition to see all ends as equally
goodallowed by the imaginary identification with the paternal metaphor
that enables the subject to cease its repetitive search for meaning. We cannot
avoid teleologyHegel is the underside of Spinoza. What we can avoid,
however, is to forget that Spinoza is the underside of Hegel, that is, that teleology is an ideological fiction, albeit necessary. Albeit an ideological fiction,
teleology is necessary, for only it can extricate us from the logically irresolvable dilemma between antinomic meanings and hence from repetition compulsion, which is why the imaginary register (the field of teleological fictions) is that which sustains the symbolic order (the field of repetition
compulsion) and gives it the sense of reality. The interpellation by an ideological prohibition is required for the subject to abandon the undecidability
between untrue statements and to enter the realm of antinomic, yet true, statements. Having identified with the prohibition, however, the subject does not
encounter in this realm an antinomy but only one true statementthe other is
prohibited (excluded) by the introductory prohibition itself. In this way the
subject passes from the repetition compulsion of its death drive to the pleasure principle of its restitutive tendency: the imposition of the law, the fixation
on one determining metaphor that provides the possibility of unambiguous
meaning, extricates the subject from the exhausting loop of repetition and its
excessive expenditure of energy. Now Adam has no irresolvable dilemma to
resolve but simply to choose between sinning and not sinning. In the event,
Adam has only one choice: to sin. Eve makes sure that the other alternative be
prohibited, if Adam is to become what he is destined to become: a (sinful)
man.
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the subject to the interpellation of the social Other. If I effectively like and am
interpellated by the Roman frescoes, it is not merely because of my having
been ideologically brainwashed by a certain cultural canon. The ideology of
this canon would leave me entirely indifferent, if there were not something
that exceeds the canons rational aesthetic and historical justifications and
that is required in the first place in order for these justifications to appear convincing to me despite their inconsistency. This something is enjoyment of
meaning.
Thus, the frescoes cannot be directly reduced to surplus enjoyment (plusde-jouir), a concept synonymous to real insofar as it indicates that any
enjoyment (jouir) is always, by structural necessity, a surplus enjoyment
just as the real is always, by structural necessity, a surplus (beyond representation). Surplus enjoyment is precisely the real and enjoyment is something
whose ontological status cannot be anything else but that of surplus. Being
pure surplus, the real and enjoyment have no ontological consistency: they do
not manifest themselves as ontologically positive categories. However, they
manifest themselves in their effects or symptoms, the two ontologically positive categories of enjoyment (jouissance) and enjoyment of meaning (jouissense). In Fellinis Roma, these positive categories are represented by the
blank walls and the frescoes, respectively, whereas the ontologically inconsistent surplus enjoyment in itself is something that can only be inferred from
them, not represented by anything.
To articulate Lacanian enjoyment qua surplus, all three concepts
enjoyment, enjoyment of meaning, and surplus enjoymentare required.
And although many would tend to see enjoyment (jouissance), that which is
unrepresentable, as the sign meant to stand in for the real, I now argue that this
sign is surplus enjoyment (plus-de-jouir). By contrast, enjoyment (jouissance) and enjoyment of meaning (jouis-sense) are the two modes in which
the real (plus-de-jouir) erupts within ontologically positive reality. The real
qua surplus enjoyment is not the unrepresentable (this which cannot be legitimately represented), but the surplus effect of representation, which is of a
different ontological status than representation, including its two entailed
alternatives, the representable and the unrepresentable. This ontological differentiation of surplus enjoyment, as we shall see, is determined by the model
on which Lacan draws in order to articulate the paradoxes of enjoyment:
Marxs conceptualization of the paradoxes of capital.
Although in his reading of Fellinis frescoes Zizek reduces these three
concepts to two (as if both plus-de-jouir and jouissance were positive manifestations: frescoes and walls), it is he who has both stressed the ontological
inconsistency of surplus enjoyment and made largely known that it derives
from Marxs concept of surplus value. Lacan (1991) states explicitly the
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Most Marxist readings of surplus value identify it as something whose ontological status is inconsistent only insofar as it is heterogeneous to the ontological status of jouissance, the vulgar reality of the conditions of production. Thus, Marxists have always capitalized on the injustice involved in the
excess or surplus of unpaid labor and its underside, the excessive profit of
those who can appropriate this labor because they possess the means of production. Although Marx defined surplus value in terms of its structural function in the constitution of capital itself, the emphasis in Marxism is displaced
onto surplus as surplus labor and profit. Without doubting the truth of this
reading, Lacan wants to foreground the unnoticed or neglected fact that Marx
defined surplus as the structural precondition of the transformation of money
into capital and of the latters circulation and proliferation. The precondition
of the chain of the circulation of capital is not only its ontological other, the
system of production with its exploitation of labor. There is also another precondition within the chain of circulation of capital, which nonetheless is
ontologically heterogeneous from both capital and production. This is surplus value: neither labor or means of production nor capital. For surplus is
simultaneously within capital, and yet, without it.
In simple circulation, C-M-C [Commodity-Money-Commodity], the value of commodities attained at the most a form independent of their use-values, i.e., the form of money;
but that same value now in the circulation M-C-M, or the circulation of capital, suddenly
presents itself as an independent substance, endowed with a motion of its own, passing
through a life-process of its own, in which money and commodities are mere forms
which it assumes and casts off in turn. Nay, more: instead of simply representing the relations of commodities, it enters now, so to say, into private relations with itself. It differentiates itself as original value from itself as surplus-value; as the father differentiates
811
himself from himself qu the son, yet both are one and of one age: for only by the
surplus-value of 10 does the 100 originally advanced become capital, and so soon as
this takes place, so soon as the son, and by the son, the father, is begotten, so soon does
their difference vanish, and they again become one, 110. (Marx 1977, 154)
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relation between Booz and his sheaf. Thus, although it is the sheaf that is
characterized as neither miserly nor spiteful, there is no question of the
sheafs having either the merit or demerit of these attributes, since the attributes, like the sheaf, belong to Booz, who, once his sheaf has thus usurped
his place, . . . can no longer return there, and he himself has been swept
away by the sheaf, and hurled into the outer darkness where greed and spite
harbor him in the hollow of their negation (Lacan 1977, 157). The law (and
vulgar reality) of property is negated by the displacement of the attribution
of munificence from Booz to His sheaf, which, coming from nature,
knows neither our reserve nor our rejections, and even in its accumulation
remains prodigal by our standards (p. 157). In the free play of the chain of
signification, the old man, Booz (like Fellinis blank walls) can in his
invisible harbor slide unhindered from metaphor to metaphor, up to his
accession to paternity (p. 157). One word for another: that is the formula
for the metaphor (p. 157).
The crucial point that Lacan, after Roman Jakobson, makes is that metonymy, the articulation of the relation of possession, and hence of power relations, is only the one side of the effective field constituted by the signifier, so
that meaning can emerge there (Lacan 1977, 156). In the other side, he goes
on to say, is metaphor, namely, the enjoyment of meaning derived from the
poetic license, provided to us by the so-called free playof the signifiers. The
play is freeprecisely insofar as it is incomprehensible, insofar, that is, as the
reason for any metaphorical substitution exceeds our understanding or
rational justification of these metaphorical substitutions. Yielding not only
meaning of a certain use value (the function of the signifier to convey certain
information), but also surplus enjoyment qua enjoyment of meaning, the
chain of signification is guaranteed to be free. This free play has, initially
due to the rationale provided by the metonymic relation between Booz and
his sheaf, placed the sheaf belonging to Booz in the position of Booz. It then
permits attributes that cannot logically pertain to the sheaf to appear next to it.
This permission, this license, and the beauty it produces, is surplus value in
the field of language, surplus enjoyment. Thus, the sheaf is no longer Boozs
possession, it becomes autonomous, and acquires a natural airthat is further
transferred to the Booz to whom the attributes, miserly and spiteful,
belonged in the first place. Now, Booz, in his natural air, can be endowed
with any attributes, including the opposite of his original: neither miserly
nor spiteful. And all this without the poem ever claiming explicitly that
Booz is neither miserly nor spiteful. It is because of the function of enjoyment of meaning that the well-known phenomenon of the naturalization of
ideological construals can take place as a primary mode of ideological
mythologization.
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Es
Boozs
moi
representable self
Surplus enjoyment
Master signifier:
neither miserly nor spiteful
(fecundity)
Hegelian dialectic between
master and slave
a
A
Enjoyment
Antinomy (answer):
Miserly and spiteful
or
neither miserly nor spiteful?
(fecundity or property?)
Real opposition between
master and slave
Once one is within a system of symbolic rather than real property (capital
rather than land), the spite and greed pertaining to him who has real power
(Spinozas potentia; French puissance; German Vermgen), and effecting
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him who does not have any, become invisible under the mirage of thinking or
imagining that one has power (Spinozas potestas; French pouvoir; German
Macht).13 The master has puissance (real power), whereas, Lacan argues, the
slave has jouissance (enjoyment). Specifically, the slave derives enjoyment
from the sacrifices he has to make in order to produce ever more enjoyment of
meaning, that is, in order to sustain and intensify his illusion that it is he who
has the power (e.g., I am poor not because I am exploited but because I am
honest; it is, in other words, my choice to be poor, and hence I am my own
master). Because this kind of enjoyment stands in direct opposition to the
healthy, self-interested pleasure of the pleasure principle, it is deemed to be
always a perverse enjoyment in the precise sense that it disempowers the subject who derives it.
The initial signifier, the master (Booz), like Marxs initially advanced
capital, has no specific original semantic value. Rather, it is a question: What
is a master? The surplus enjoyment, like Marxs surplus value, adds itself to
this unspecified original value, thereby specifying it. Characterized as neither miserly nor spiteful, the master is now unambiguously the embodiment
of fecundity. Like Marxs capital, the signifier acquires an equivalent value
(signified) in the paradoxical temporal mode that, through surplus value,
leaps from insufficiency (the traumatic gap in the chain of positive meaning,
manifest as a logically unanswerable question) to anticipation (the logically
ungrounded certainty of an answer). The sheaf qua paternity is double-sided:
both Being, free circulation of capital, potestas; and Dasein, being as the
commodity at the disposal of a possessor and his pontentia. The effacement
of the possessive or metonymic relation constitutes the precondition of the
possibility of the chain of the enjoyment of meaning (metaphors) in the first
place. In Heideggerian terms, ontology (the organization of metaphors) has
to be blind to the ontic (the metonymic system) in order to be a properly decisionistic ontology. Or, inversely, ontology would be something that remains
blind and perverted from its own most aim [decisionism], if it has not first
adequately clarified the meaning of Being [beyond any ontic determinations], and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task (Heidegger
1962, 31; emphasis in the original, brackets mine). The metonymic determination of the metaphorical substitutions has to be preceded, predetermined,
by an absolute metaphor that determines the possibilities of metonymic
determination itself. Surplus enjoyment (the Master Signifier) not only presupposes and, hence, guarantees a Master (a real power, and consequently a
slave and his enjoyment), but is also the precondition of the effacement of this
real power from representation by means of the enjoyment of meaning. The
advent of the latter opens up the dialectics that allows not only the sheaf to
substitute his master, but also the master to substitute the slave. For,
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Worse
(pire)
Es
moi
that which (the hand)
(ce qui)
817
Dad
(pre)
a
A
dross
(perte)
This passage reveals the connection between enjoyment (jouissance) and the
notorious Hegelian fear of death as that which defines the slave. Both belong
exclusively to the slave. The slave fears mortality and has exclusive access to
enjoyment, whereas the master has puissance (real power) and disregards
mortality, as if he were immortal. The immortality of the theocratic and precapitalist master was guaranteed by his status as the earthly representative of
God (the king). By contrast, the democratized immortality of the capitalist
master is guaranteed by the immortality of capital itself. Immortality is the
eternal deferment not only of biological death but also of the last instance
known as the Final Judgment. Capital is immortal precisely because the judgment about its value is eternally deferred. One hundred pounds are always
already 110, and they are, in turn, always already more poundsand this ad
infinitum. In one word, capital is immortal because it essentially is credit.
And so is the signifier, a fortiori the differential, postlinguistic, deconstructed
signifier, the semantic value of which is eternally deferred, since it is always
relegated to the value of ever more signifiers that come to frame or graft (in
the Derridian sense) its value.
Being the subject of the signifier and of capital, the secular subject is also
the subject of value, surplus, and hence immortality. This is the catch of both
capital and secular meaning (i.e., meaning not fixed by the scripture but subject to free interpretation and hence originator of enjoyment of meaning).
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The other side of the paradox is articulated by the joke: What is the lightest
object on earth?The phallus, because it is the only one that can be elevated
by mere thought. As Zizek concludes,
to obtain the true meaning of phallus, we have to read both examples together: phallus
designates the juncture at which the radical externality of the body as independent of our
will, as resisting our will, joins the pure interiority of our thought. . . . To use the traditional Hegelian terms, phallus is the point of the unity of opposites: not a dialectical
synthesis (in the sense of a kind of mutual completion) but the immediate passage of one
extreme into its opposite. (p. 223)
The moral deriving from the correlation of the two stories, Zizek continues,
is that EVERYTHING depends on methe point of the riddlebut for all
that I can do NOTHINGthe point of St. Augustines theory (p. 223). In
other words, the moral of the two stories can be expressed only by means of
two antinomic statements, that is, a thesis and an antithesis, which cannot
both be possible representations of one and the same world: Either the world
is one in which everything depends on me or one in which I can do nothing.
Now, you may be tempted to see both theses as extremes and to opt instead for
the wisdom of the middle: Some things depend on me, while I can do nothing about others. But this moderate reasoning, far from constituting a third
alternative, is already represented by the one of our two alternatives, St.
Augustines phallic and phallocratic position: I can control some things,
including my body and its physical needs, while I can do nothing about one
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bodily part, my penis. Inversely, my will and the field it controls are the
exception to the phallus absolute and autonomous will and power. As Zizek
(1994) puts it, phallic function is the very splitting between the domain of
[uncontrollable] phallic enjoyment and the desexualized public field that
eludes it [and is controlled by my will]that is to say, phallic is this selflimitation of the Phallus, this positing of an Exception (p. 153).
Each of Zizeks stories offers us a version of the same phallic and phallocratic position: that of the St. Augustinian middle and that of idealism, if
not solipsism: I am in control of everything, including my penis. One and
the same world, a phallocratic world, can consider both statements as true,
exclude or repress one of them, and thus become either a moderate or an
extreme idealist world. The phallocratic world is structured according to the
dynamic antinomy. The real alternative to this world, a nonphallic, nonphallocratic world, can emerge only by considering both statements to be false.
This would be a world structured according to the logic of the mathematic
antinomy. This is the case when I and my will are considered to be not totalizable cognitive objects and hence not objects that can be clearly distinguished
from everything else. In other words, in the case of the mathematic antinomy, I and my will cannot control everything not because I have no will but
because this will is always already controlled by everything, just as everything is always already controlled by me and my will. This is no harmonic
synthesis between human will and everything in the world but the recognition
that either is impure and supplemented by its other. It is the recognition of
both a gap in me and my will (the gap of the unconscious) and a gap in the
autonomous contingency of everything in the world (the gap of the intervention in the world by the subject qua real). In other words, I control everything,
with no exception, but there is always an exception, a gap, in my controlling
power itself. I control everything but I cannot control how (to what end) I control it.
The exception of phallic enjoyment (jouissance), posited by the dynamic
antinomy, allows for the constitution of the public field as a system of absolute human control (and, consequently, in the case of democracy, as a system
of equality and universal exchangeability), which is however possible only
on the ground of an exception: the private field of sexual enjoyment (and,
consequently, the exception of those who even in a democracy do not make it
to the public field). A notorious such world split in two is the Hegelian world
of the male public field and the female private domaincriticized by Hanna
Arendt among others. The public field of this world represents itself as the
world of the harmony of the one, where everything is exchangeable or substitutable for everything else (all citizens are equal, and so on). It is the field of
the free circulation of metaphor, the field of the enjoyment of meaning
822
823
mount to gendering the real, or, more precisely, to articulating the real as a
coincidentia oppositorum, where maleness and femaleness meet not in the
sense of a harmonizing sublation of their difference but, on the contrary, in
their antagonism. The fact that it is specifically the signifier phallus that is
employed within psychoanalysis as the marker of this locus of antagonistic
coincidence of the two sexes that I seein opposition to much of feminist
criticismas a consequence, and an indication, of the specifically political
character of psychoanalysis. That is, the site of the sexual antagonism is
notand should not berepresented by a neutral sign (and its entailed
metalanguage) if it is to represent both its phallic, patriarchal negation of
femaleness (its exclusion from representation) and its nonphallic capitalist
appropriation.
By this last statement, I hint to the fact that a nonphallic world is not necessarily a world of sexual or other equality, as I will argue more extensively in
the next section.
824
dence or its quasisecular versions of the Hegelian Spirit of History and Adam
Smiths Invisible Hand of the Marketor as a process that, albeit infallible
and almighty, does not know its own end, does not have any predetermined
goal. We could call the latter the post-Marxist and postmodernist version of
the invisible hand of the market, which moves the strings with absolute certainty, regardless of whether its destination is the perpetuation of the market
or its miraculous self-collapse (represented by contemporary theorists as
diverse as Deleuze and Baudrillard).
The political advantage of the latter version of the as-if logic is precisely
that it allows the social system to include any possible development as always
already part of itself. It is a system organized according to what Spinoza
called immanent causality, as opposed to transitive (teleological) causality.
The characteristic of this causality, as we have seen, is that in it Truth is the
standard both of itself and of the false (Spinoza 1985, 479; Ethics, II, prop.
43, schol.). Nothing can be a disqualifying error in a system that incorporates
error as a legitimate part of itself, a system that does not hide its ungroundedness or inconsistency and that does not fix itself to any meaning or identity.
Far from acknowledging its belief in a God (and hence a telos), this system
justifies itself by invoking the very argument that there is no Other of the
Other. Which is why God is unconscious (consciously assumed to be
dead) only when everything (true and false) appears to be permitted.
In both versions of the as-if logic, obedience to the Law is due precisely
to the fact that there is no Other of the Other, that the ideology of the state
apparatus that interpellates us is inconsistent, and that, consequently, epistemologically it does not exist. If this traumatic tautology, on which the
lawand the irrational belief in the almightiness of the system, which
induces obedience to the lawrests, is suddenly lost, Zizek (1989) argues,
then the very texture of the social field disintegrates (p. 36). But this belief
can be lost only in the first, teleological version of the as-if logic. This is
the moment of disillusionment, historically caused by the conspicuous discrepancy between actual and promised reality. By contrast, the logic of
immanent causality, in which everything (truth and error) reconfirms and
reinforces the truth of its system, the belief in it cannot ever be lost because no
actual reality can falsify a system whose promised reality is one that does not
differentiate between truth and falseness and whose future, consequently,
permits everything.
To show how the difference between these two versions of the as-iflogic
manifests itself historically, I now turn to Zizeks representation of three
actual social phenomena: (1) multiculturalism, (2) gender difference, and (3)
class difference. To describe the logic of multiculturalism, Zizek (1994)
invokes the King in absolute monarchy:
825
beyond those who are indifferent to laws, those who break laws while remaining integrated into the system of law and order, and those who stick strictly to the letter of the law,
there are those at the very top whose acts are always in accordance with the law, not
because they obediently follow the law but because their activity determines what is law
in a performative waywhat (ever) they do simply is the law (the King in an absolute
monarchy, for example). This point of inversion is the exception that founds the Universal. (p. 158)
826
827
828
829
830
within current readings of psychoanalysis and beyond, as Zizek, unbeknownst to himself, testifies. His statement that phallic is the positing of an
Exception, is possible only if we conceive the male, desexualized, social
public field as an initially undifferentiated female space in which sexuality
permeated everything, until an exception was posed effecting the distinction
between public and private spheres. The same is true of the individual male
subject, who is also assumed to emerge out of the undifferentiated female
subject through castration, as the latter is understood within the postmodern
discourse: the fear of the loss of the phallus in the face of its female
absencean absence that, as such, posits the phallus as presence in the first
place. Man and public space, just as everything that in contemporary theory is
conceived as constituted by means of the addition of the phallus to an originary lack, are therefore woman with phallus. In contrast to modernism,
postmodernism naturalizes woman as the genus and defines any species as
woman with phallus. Not least among the embodiments of the genus of
natural woman is multiculturalism, which, lacking any essentialist identity,
produces species by adding to itself phallic essentialist identities. Like
Marxs surplus value, the genus obtains its own movement . . . [its own]
automatic expansion, being able to add value to itself, to change in magnitude . . . [and to] differentiate itself by throwing off surplus-value from
itself.
This is possible insofar as the genus-species logic allowsor rather
coerces, albeit often in an ostensibly noncoercive wayone of the empirical
manifestations of the genus-surplus, namely, the species of female surplus
enjoyment, to appropriate the status of surplus and thus to reduce the other
species, namely, male phallic enjoyment, to its radical other. This means that,
although the mathematic antinomy is the mode of the failure of reason that
allows one to experience ones own gender or ethnic identity as a contingent
ingredient to be, as Zizek put it, methodologically bracketed in the pursuit of truth, nothing prevents the female logic of the enjoyment of meaning
from seeing the male logic and its noncontingent sexuality as radically
otherthat is, as no logic at all. Hence, both the male (essentialist) and the
female (deconstructionist) versions of the genus-species logic can lead to
the appropriation and exploitation of the other. Publicly open secrets do not
necessarily lead to a more egalitarian world than do hidden secrets. They do
not even lead to a more subvertible world, since essentialist formations
appropriate the other by means of infringeable prohibitions, while nonessentialist, cynical or concensual formations do it by means of considerably more
intractable impossibilities.
Having become radically other, enjoyment (just as its economical equivalent: the process of production, the labor it requires, and the commodities it
831
This passage from The Laugh of the Medusa, although originally published in 1975, remains remarkably symptomatic of a dominant strand of
feministand not onlydiscourse in the 1990s. This discourse celebrates
the free flow of feminine jouissance, a term vaguely comprehending both
plus-de-jouir and jouis-sense. Perhaps both to this contemporary discourse
and to Cixous, just like to Marxand for that matter, to any articulation of the
transcendental preconditions of any system, mine not excludedapplies the
same set of antinomic judgments: on one hand, we are gravely deluded in seeing ourselves as opposing the whole history of men and . . . [the] biblicocapitalist society (Cixous 1986, 316). For we do no less than showing (a verb
that has not only constative but performative function), occasionally even
celebrating (e.g., Cixous), the very precondition of patriarchal capitalism, the
832
surplus, with which in this century we have come to identify woman. On the
other hand, by doing so, welike Descartesbring this otherwise dead (but
nonetheless effective) mechanism to the level of the statement and the unconscious. Thus, it can be brought to the level of the enunciation and consciousnessjust like Descartess gap (God), repressed in his syllogism, becomes
conscious in Spinozas definition of tautology, which is why the surplus is
also politically double-sided. It is that which sustains the system that produces it (e.g., Descartess theocratic discourse) and that which, for better or
worse, opens up the possibility of its subversion (Spinozas secular, capitalist
discourse).
The tormenting question, however, remains: what does it mean to say
thatwhen we participate in and foster the representation of the species qua
genus, the appropriation of a specific empirical body by the transcendental
precondition of the societal organization (i.e., the structure of its means of
exchange)we serve both sides of the surplus? This response may be nothing more than an evasion, a way to beg, yet again, the question about the
meaning of our action, as long as we do not know what this both means: the
one and the other side, or, either the one or the other side?
As long as we do not know the answer to this question we also do not know
how to be effectively critical of the galloping uncontrollability of the contemporary capitalist secular discourse without at the same time opposing womens
and for that matter, any othersdemand for rights within a society and a discourse that succeeds in producing the rhetorical coincidence between body,
writing, woman, love, and excess (surplus). How can the hegemonic
discourse be challenged when it has established the rhetorical coincidence of
the precondition of its own possibility (surplus) with nothing other than her
who would have reasons to challenge it, namely, the slave?
NOTES
1. Published in Lacan 1975, 73-82; for an English translation see Lacan 1998, 78-89.
2. Brackets within citations, unless otherwise indicated, are mine. Here, they are inserted by
me but they introduce the examples Lvi-Strauss himself uses in other passages in order to illustrate this point.
3. Brackets belong to the original.
4. Note that this recapitulates one central problematic within Freudian theory, namely, that
of the mutual relation and function within psychoanalytic theory of the pleasure principle and the
death drive. Gilles Deleuze (1994), in his Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty, rearticulated the
Freudian problem in favor of the inclusive meaning, according to which the death drive is not an
umbrella term for the exceptions to the [pleasure] principle but . . . its foundation (p. 113). This
articulation of the relation between death drive and pleasure principle accounts for the
833
transcendental or metaphysical precondition for the pleasure principle to constitute the empirical principle, according to which everything in life can (phenomenologically) be explained on
the grounds of the striving for pleasure. For there must be something which falls outside it [the
pleasure principle] and is not homogeneous with itsomething, in short, beyond, namely, the
death drive, which accounts for the necessary compliance of the field with the empirical principle [the pleasure principle] (p. 112). Thus, Deleuze offers a reading of Freud compatible with its
rearticulation in the late Lacan, insofar as he opts for a monistic (inclusive) conceptualization of
the psychoanalytic theoretical inventory. In the late Lacan, this is manifest in his derivation of all
registers from one, the real, which simultaneously is their effect. See also Marie-Hlne Brousse
(1995a, 1995b) The Drive (I) and The Drive (II).
5. I am paraphrasing Kants (1990) second example of the dynamic antinomy in his Critique of Pure Reason (B472/A444B473/A445).
6. I am paraphrasing Kants (1990) first example of the mathematic antinomy in his Critique of Pure Reason (B452/A424B455/A427).
7. See also note 8, below.
8. One of the most interesting rearticulations of certain aspects of Lacanian theory is
Marie-Hlne Brousses account of the concept of the drive. Nonetheless, although she places
all due emphasis on the fact that the drive is assumed to pertain to the register of the signifier, her
articulation misses the fact that, on the level of the drive, the signifier is further assumed to coincide with the body. Brousse (1995b) rightly identifies the shift from the early to the late Lacan
with the articulation of the real as an effect (and cause) of the symbolic and the imaginary, but
then she proceeds to infer that, therefore, the drive is the pure symbolic: But what changes in
Lacans work after Seminar XI is the definition of the drive, which is purely symbolic
here. . . . Thus there is no room for the real in this presentation (p. 114). What evades Brousse in
Lacans articulation of the drive is that faeces and phallus are objects, as a matter of fact,
bodily parts. The body per se does not exist in Lacan, as they say, in the sense that the commodity per se does not exist in Marx. The body and its exclusion form the very precondition of
the possibility of the symbolic and the imaginary, just as in Marx commodity and its exclusion
are the very preconditions of the circulation of capital. On the level of the drive, there is no space
for the real only in the sense that the real cannot be distinguished from the symbolic, something
that could be possible only through the mediation of the imaginary. The level of the drive is precisely the level of the absolute coincidence or indistinguishability between real and symbolic.
Brousses statement can be accepted only insofar as its contrary statement (the antithesis)
there is no place for the symbolic, for all there is here is realis also accepted. The hypothesis of
a being structured as the coincidence of the dynamic and the mathematic antinomies articulates
the level of the drive or of the full signifier. Here, meaning and bodily pleasure (the pleasure principle) do not stand in a conflictual relation, for the body is assumed to derive its very pleasure
from its functioning as a signifier. In eating nothing, the infant or the anorexic finds pleasure in
signifying his or her weaning from that which no longer counts for him or her, namely, survival
(guaranteed by means of eating), since the question of the survival of the bodyas a purely
extrasemantic existentis excluded together with the exclusion of the question about existence,
imposed by the negative judgment. On the other hand, however, the body is omnipresent in this
mode of deriving pleasure, not only because it is its ultimate recipient, but also because it constitutes the very means to this derivation of pleasure. It is the body itself that functions as a signifier,
thereby allowing for the derivation of pleasure out of the act of exchange that constitutes the phenomenon of signification (faeces in place of the phallus).
9. Note the not-all logic of the triad enjoymentsurplus enjoymentenjoyment of meaning
as the three constituents of one concept enjoyment, which is nonetheless repeated in its constituents. This is a further analogy between Lacanian theory and Marx, in whose articulation of
834
capitalism production is at once the set of all stages of production and one of its members: production, exchange, circulation, consumption.
10. Lacan, as he himself notes, uses the same line in his seminar on the psychoses in order to
exemplify the concept of metaphor (see Lacan 1993, 228).
11. Surplus enjoyment is that which at once joins and allows for the distinction between, in
Heideggerian terms, being-there (Dasein) and Being (Sein), ontic and ontological, metonymy
and metaphor. And, as Heidegger has also emphatically pointed out, the function of the ontological Being (metaphor) is to predetermine what the ontic Dasein (metonymy) can produce as its
own (ontological) Being (metaphor). It is the ontic (metonymy) that determines what is its Being
(metaphor), but not in a deductive way (see Heidegger 1962, 31). For a proper ontology (organization of metaphors) will always already have determined what the ontic (metonymy) can determine as its Being (metaphor). The task of ontology is purely decisionistic. It is to produce a
genealogy of the different possible ways of Being (which is not to be constructed deductively)
(Heidegger 1962, 31). The ontological (metaphor) allows for the occlusion of the ontic (metonymy), so that ontology is not blinded by it. Not everything is reversible. Only the ontic is
occluded; only the ontological occluds; and only ontology is, in the first and last analysis, not
blind.
12. The double function of the plus-de-jouir as the precondition of the compossibility of the
one and the two within the Lacanian theory requires by logical necessity the revision of the
Hegelian master-slave dialectic, thereby leading to Lacans critique of its readings by both JeanPaul Sartre and Alexandre Kojve, encapsulated in Lacans distinction between the desire of
the other and the desire of the Other, whereby mans desire is the desire of the Other.
The desire of the Other is the very element Kojves reading of the Hegelian dialectic does
not take into account, according to Lacan, precisely because it articulates desire as the effect of
an intersubjective interaction between two conscious subjects, two others, without the mediation
of the unconscious (read: surplus), a second degree Otherness within each subject. This is clear,
for example, in the following argument by Kojve (1980):
Desire is humanor, more exactly, humanizing, anthropogeneticonly provided
that it is directed toward another Desire and an other Desire. To be human, man must act
not for the sake of subjugating a thing, but for the sake of subjugating another Desire (for
the thing). The man who desires a thing humanly acts not so much to possess the thing as
to make another recognize his right . . . to that thing, to make another recognize him as the
owner of the thing. (p. 40)
Kojve does not account here for the generation of the desire for the thing in the first place, that is,
he does not answer the question what is it that, first, makes the subject believe that possession of a
thing is tantamount to subjugation, and, second, that the possession of this thing as opposed to
another will lead to the subjugation of the other human. The Lacanian answer to the question presupposes the unconscious belief that this is what the other desires. That this belief is unconscious
means that it is not rationally grounded, that there is no rational evidence manifest in the intersubjective interaction between the one and the other subject, that this is indeed what the other
desires. This belief is produced by a radical Otherness, an effect of the ambivalence inherent in
any intersubjective interaction insofar as the latter takes place in, and by means of, the signifier.
Hence, for Lacan (1981), mans desire is the desire of the Other (p. 235).
It is this subjugation of oneself to the (barred) Other, the determination of ones desire by the
Other, and the fact that the subject is an effect of the unconscious (surplus, that is, gap in the
barred Other), which requires the further introduction of the logic of the scopic field in the
835
Lacanian theoretical edifice. The scopic field articulates the intertwining of the retroactive logic
of desire, or the gaze (that which escapes the subjects cognition in the intersubjective interaction), with the linearity of seeing (that which constitutes the subjects field of cognition in the
intersubjective interaction), in the theoretical articulation of the subject. In other words, the
scopic field, the field in which desire emerges via both the retroactivity of the gaze and the linearity of the cogito, allows us to understand that intersubjectivity is not a relation merely between
two Cartesian cogitos, but also between two subjects that are the effect of a collective unconscious in the sense of an absolutely ambiguous linguistic system. However, this is far from
implying that the dialectics of desire should be read as the direct dialogue between two unconsciousnesses, either. The narrativization of the dynamics of desire, either only in the terms of the
cogito and seeingness or of the gaze, is partial (both quantitatively and qualitatively, that is, ideologically) and cannot account for the overall situation, for each is voiced only from one side.
Both narratives have to be taken into account, not in and by a third neutral metanarrative
(which does not exist), but within their transferential relation. Lacans conceptualization of the
scopic field, which includes both modes of causality and/or desire (i.e., linear vision and retroactive gaze), could serve as a useful scheme toward the attempt to articulate the two modes of
causality.
Furthermore, the Lacanian conceptualization of the gaze in terms of a second-degree Otherness leads to the critique of the Sartrean account of the Hegelian dialectic in terms of mutually
gazed subjects. A gaze, Lacan objects, cannot possibly produce shame or, for that matter, any
feeling whatsoever, in me unless I already have the desire to be seen in a certain way by the gazing subject, which means that it is my desire that renders the others gaze a subject and thus
allows the gazing subject to objectify me. Moreover, this further means that my desire within
the intersubjective interaction always ultimately involves the desire to be objectified. Consequently, to resist the others look is tantamount to resisting ones own desire. For, if to be objectified is the elementary kernel of the desireas my shame, or any other feeling under the gaze of
the other, testifiesthen the avoidance of this desire is nothing other than the desires underside,
namely, the law that prohibits the fulfillment of this desire. Hence, to avoid any objectification
tout court is tantamount to total submission to the law, to ones own superego, to being totally
preoccupied by a single desire, namely, not to desire, or, as Sartre would say, not to be
objectified. In other words, Sartres definition of freedom coincides with the Lacanian definition of psychosis insofar as the latter is identified as a psychic economy marked by the absence of
desire, that is, by the absence of any fantasmatic relation within the economy of subjectivity. This
is the very economy of the master, identified within the Lacanian logic with the psychotic par
excellence (S) insofar as the master is the only one who renders impossible that articulation that
we indicated elsewhere as the fantasm, insofar as it is the relation of the a with the division of the
subject($ a) [est le seul rendre impossible cette articulation que nous avons pointe ailleurs comme le fantasme, en tant quil est relation du a avec la division du sujet($ a)]
(Lacan 1991, 124).
13. For Spinozas distinction between potentia and potestas, see Michael Hardts (1991)
Translators Foreword: The Anatomy of Power (pp. xi-xvi) in Negris The Savage Anomaly.
Lacans two registers, the symbolic and the imaginary, are rearticulations of Spinozas potentia
and potestas.
14. The problematic that I am trying to articulate in this essay is already visible in this passage in its rhetorical articulation of perspectives with regard to truth. When the passage
states that the commodity is the disguised mode of representing value, the perspective of the
narrative voice is that of the free circulation of capital. It is the same perspective that in the next
sentence continues to state that In truth it is only value, and not money or the commodity, that
836
is the active factor in the process in question. But, when the passage reaches the statement, But
the money itself is only one of the two forms of value. Unless it takes the form of some commodity, it does not become capital, the perspective no longer lies within the realm of the free circulation of capitalwhich knows nothing of the commoditybut within the realm of the commodity itself, in its ontological opposition to capital. After this leap into the outside of the chain of
circulation of capital, the narrative voice returns into the interior of the chain to continue the
articulation of the impossibility to differentiate between capital and surplus valuethereby,
moreover, already employing the rhetorics that would become common in nineteenth-century
Romanticism (compare Wordsworths The child is father of the man, in My Heart Leaps Up)
and twentieth-century psychoanalysis.
Moreover, as far as truth is concerned, from the identification of jouissance with what
Lvi-Strauss identifies as the real conflict or the factual binary opposition that the human mind
cannot bear (life versus death, or possessor versus commodity), and from the identification of jouis-sense with what he calls the myth, or with what Zizek describes as the narrative
marked by an inconsistent, nonsensical gap, it follows that truth lies on the side of jouissance.
This is indeed so, but only partially. Truth is indeed jouissance insofar as it is a flat fact that one is,
say, either dead or alive, either a possessor of commodities or commodified labor, either master
or slave, to use the Hegelian terminology, and so on. As Lacan (1991) put it,
Ce qui est masqu au niveau de Marx, cest que le matre qui est d ce plus-de-jouir a
renonc tout, et la jouissance dabord, puisquil sest expos la mort, et quil reste
bien fix dans cette position dont larticulation hglienne est claire. Sans doute a-t-il
priv lesclave de la disposition de son corps, mais, cest un rien, il lui a laiss la jouissance. (p. 123)
But in addition to the factual truth, the fancies of the myth, of jouis-sense, the imaginary mirage
of desire is also constitutive of truth and, as such, addresses also the slave. What Lacan, drawing
on Wittgenstein (see Lacan 1991, 61-77), practically says here, to the detriment of Nietzsche, de
Man, and others, is that the fact is not so much that there are no facts but only interpretations, but
rather that interpretations are also facts. The factual truth is jouissance, but the so-called factual
truth is not all the truth because the nonsensical, tautological, and arbitrary statements of the
myth, the jouis-sense, are also facts by dint of the mere fact that they are posited. This is precisely
the function of tautology: to posit facts. And the worst trap with regard to truth is precisely to
assume that either jouissance or jouis-sense in isolation can make up for the entirety of truth,
even as this entirety remains arguably not representable.
15. Ce qui est masqu au niveau de Marx, cest que le matre qui est d ce plus-de-jouir a
renonc tout, et la jouissance dabord, puispuil sest expos la mort. . . . Sans doute a-t-il
priv lesclave de la disposition de son corps, mais, cest un rien, il lui a laiss la jouissance.
16. For the Lacanian formulas of sexuation, see Lacan, 1975, particularly the chapter Une
Lettre dmour, (pp. 73-82). For an English translation, see Lacan 1998 (pp. 78-89). Rearticulations of the Lacanian formulas of sexuation, which, one way or another, have informed my
reading are: Badiou, 1996; Copjec, 1994, particularly the chapter Sex and the Euthanasia of
Reason (pp. 201-36); and Zizek, 1994, particularly the chapter Otto Weininger, or Woman
Doesnt Exist (pp. 137-64).
17. The as-if principle draws on the so-called Philosophy of the As If, first articulated by
the neo-Kantian philosopher Hans Vaihinger (see Vaihinger 1924). Vaihinger acknowledged
Jeremy Bentham as the predecessor of the Philosophy of the As If. Lacan frequently refers to
Benthams The Theory of Fictions and the therein developed concept of fictitious as that which
articulates the fact that every truth has the structure of fiction (Lacan 1992, 12). Lacan
837
compares Benthams epistemological contribution to that of Freud insofar as both showed that
pleasure lies on the side of the real, which, however, is nothing but the effect of the fictitious. In
other words, pleasure lies on the side of the real only insofar as it lies on the side of the fictitious. This conceptualization of pleasure presupposes that the fictitious is not understood as
the imaginary but as the symbolic (language), which is grounded as a system of truth on the
a s - i f moment of an a priori, logically inconsistent, assumption.
Benthams effort is located in the dialectic of the relationship of language to the real so as
to situate the good-pleasure in this case, which . . . he articulates in a manner that is very
different from Aristotleon the side of the real. And it is within this opposition between
fiction and reality that is to be found the rocking motion of Freudian experience. Once the
separation between the fictitious and the real has been effected, things are no longer situated where one might expect. In Freud the characteristic of pleasure, as that dimension
which binds man, is to be found on the side of the fictitious. The fictitious is not, in
effect, in its essence that which deceives, but is precisely what I call the symbolic.
(Lacan 1992, 12)
On Lacans reading of Benthams concept of the fictitious, see also Lacan 1981 (p. 163).
Octave Mannoni has further developed the concept of the as if as the logical structure of the je
sais bien, mais quand mme . . . (see the chapter Je sais bien, mais quand mme . . . in Mannoni 1968). Of course, it is Blaise Pascal who first developed the idea of acting as if one believed
so that belief ultimately comes to the subject; see The Wager, in his Penses (Pascal 1966,
121). The Pascalian conception of the as-if structure has become largely known by Louis
Althussers reelaboration of the concept as the elementary function of ideological interpellation
(see Ideology and Ideological State Aparatuses, in Althusser 1971, pp. 127-86). Slavoj Zizek
reelaborates the relation between the as-if structure and ideological interpellation drawing on
all, Pascal, Lacan, Mannoni, and Althusser, whom he thereby critiques (see, e.g., Zizek 1989, the
chapters Law is Law and Kafka, Critic of Althusser, pp. 36-47).
18. Compare the third chapter in Freud, 1985, titled Die Umgestaltungen der Pubertt
(pp. 78-113). This is a point in Freud that has obviously attracted a lot of attention within feminist
criticism.
REFERENCES
Althusser, Louis. 1971. Lenin and Philosophy and other essays. Translated by Ben Brewster.
New York: Monthly Review.
Althusser, Louis, and tienne Balibar. 1970. Reading Capital. Translated by Ben Brewster. London: NLB.
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A. Kiarina Kordela received her Ph.D. from the Department of German Studies at Cornell University and is currently teaching in the Department of German Studies and Russian at Macalester College in St. Paul, Minnesota. Her work focuses on the relations
between philosophy, psychoanalysis, literature, and popular culture and includes the
articles Trauma on Credit forthcoming in New German Critique and Exteriority to
Metaphor in Japanese translation in Hihuo kukan (Critical Space).