Indian Political System: Centre-State Relation

Indian Political System: Centre-State Relation
Centre- State Relation
Hidayatullah National Law University

Raipur, Chhattisgarh
Submitted To: Dr. Avinash Samal.
Assistant Professor, Political Science.
Submitted By: ABHINAV K SHUKLA
Roll: 03, Semester- 3.
Subject: Political Science (Major)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Thanks to the Almighty who gave me the strength to accomplish the project with sheer hard
work and honesty. This research venture has been made possible due to the generous cooperation of various persons. To list them all is not practicable, even to repay them in words
is beyond the domain of my lexicon.
This project wouldnt have been possible without the help of my teacher Dr. Avinash Samal,
Faculty of Political science at HNLU, who had always been there at my side whenever I
needed some help regarding any information. He has been my mentor in the truest sense of
the term. The administration has also been kind enough to let me use their facilities for
research work. I thank them for this would be grateful to receive comments and suggestions
for further improvement of this project report.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements.................2
Introduction.............4
Research Methodology, Objectives and Scope and Limitations.5
Nature of Centre -State Relations ...6-10
Present sitiuation of the Centre-State Realtions ..11-13
Need for restructuring Centre-State Relations.14-16
Conclusion.............17
References.........................................................................................18
1. INTRODUCTION
States in India are plagued by recurrent and severe fiscal crisis from the middle of the
eighties. Mismanagement of the finances by the State governments is the reason for the
3

crisis, most often highlighted during the current discussions on the issue. The role of the
Central government, pivotal under the existing Centre-State financial relationship, is seldom
mentioned as a possible reason. It requires reiteration in this context that India is a semi
federal polity and the existing constitutional allocation of financial powers between the
Centre and the States is heavily skewed in favour of the former.
The Indian Constitution places considerable constraints on the States capacity for resource
mobilisation while saddling them with enormous expenditure responsibilities. The
Constitution of India however envisaged a fiscal transfer mechanism to transfer adequate
funds from the Central government to the States, taking into account the disproportion
between the financial powers and responsibilities of the two tiers of the government.
The
Finance Commission to be appointed every five years under Article 280 of the Constitution is
the main agency for affecting such transfers. It is a semi-judicial body and is entrusted with
the twin responsibilities of apportioning Central Government revenues between the Centre
and the States on the one hand and among the individual States on the other.1
The Indian Constitution is federal in form but tends to be unitary in character. The federal
principle gets circumscribed by the dominant powers vested with the Centre in the political,
legislative, administrative and financial spheres. Strengthening the federal principle is
necessary for meeting the aspirations of the people who are governed through state
governments and for strengthening the unity of India. Theunity in diversity requires a
federal system which can accommodate the rich diversity and weld the variegated social
structure into a strong Union.
The Constitution has formally divided the legislative, administrative and financial powers
between the Centre and the States.2 The legislative powers are distributed in three lists, viz.
the Union list, the State list and the Concurrent list. The Union list gives the Centre the
authority to act in matters of national importance which include defence, foreign affairs,
currency and other areas of strategic importance related with the security of the country.
1 D.D.Basu, Constitution of India, 21st edition.

2 http://lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/finalreport/v1ch8.htm
4

1.1 OBJECTIVES- The specific objectives of this project being the following:
(a) To analyze the nature of Centre- State relations in political and financial matters in regard
to the Constitutional Provisions.
(b) To evaluate the Present Scenario of Centre- State relations in political and financial
matters.
(c) To discuss the need of restructuring Centre- State relations in political and financial
matters.
1.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research is analytical and descriptive in nature. Secondary sources of information
have been used while making this project. Such as, articles from books, journals and the
internet.
1.3 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

This project is based on the Centre-State relations in context of only legislative and
political powers conferred by the Constitution of India.
2. NATURE OF CENTRE-STATE RELATIONS

5

a. FINANCIAL RELATIONS
2.1.1. Formulation and Implementation of Plans
In the sphere of planning, the balance of decision making process tilted more towards the
Centre during the early years of planning. This was probably inevitable as there was lack of
adequate experience in the formulation and the implementation of Plan programmes at the
State level. No doubt, planning from the grass-roots level has been emphasised from the very
beginning, but its implementation has been sporadic and tardy. Even so, the Planning
Commission encouraged District Planning Committees (DPCs) and taluk level planning
process from the Fourth Plan. Subsequently, a significant step was taken through the
enactment of the 73rd and the 74th Amendments to the Constitution in 1993, which conferred
a Constitutional status not only on the PRIs and the ULBs but also on the DPCs. 3 It is now
fully realised that the spirit of co-operative federalism should get reflected in the strong
encouragement given to participative planning processes. In other words, the Central
Government, the State Governments, the PRIs, the ULBs, and the non-Governmental
organisations, the voluntary action groups and most of all, the people at the grass-roots have
to be involved in the process of formulation and implementation of the Plans. It is realised
that the process of democratic decentralisation can have true meaning only when sufficient
autonomy and freedom is available to the States as well as to the PRIs and the ULBs in the
formulation and the implementation of the Plans. At the same time, autonomy pre-supposes
maturity in decision making and responsibility in the use of national resources. 4
Decentralisation of the process of formulation and implementation should, therefore, ensure
accountability.
2.1.2. Share of States in Public Sector Plan Outlay
An important area of concern in the sphere of planning is the decreasing share of the States
in the overall public sector Plan outlay. The share of the States in the actual public sector
expenditure is going down continuously from the Fifth Plan onwards, so much so that while
the share of the States was about 50% in the Fifth Plan it came down to almost 37% in the
Eighth Plan. Further, the share of the States in terms of total public sector expenditure has
3 G. AUSTIN, WORKING OF A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, (1st ed., 1999).
4 http://polityinindia.wordpress.com/tag/federalism-and-centre-state-relations/
6

been lower than the originally envisaged outlay in successive Five Year Plans since the Sixth
Plan. In the Eighth Plan, while the share of the States in the total public sector outlay was
envisaged to be 41.46%, in actual realisation it is likely to be of the order of 37 percent. The
main reason for the declining share of the States has been the shortfall in the mobilisation of
resources by the State Governments. Besides others, the non achievement of the States'
envisaged outlays has adverse implications for sectors like Agriculture, Education, Health
and other Social and Basic Minimum Services.
The States' own resources (SOR) for their Eighth Plan were projected at Rs.1,01,485 crore.
As against this, the expected realisation would be only Rs.70,335 crore, i.e., 69.3 percent of
the projected SOR. The major shortfall was in respect of the Balance from Current Revenue
(BCR) and internal contributions of public enterprises of the States. The BCR was projected
at Rs.12,985 crore, while the expected realisation is (-) Rs.2,009 crore only, showing a
shortfall of Rs.14,994 crore. An important reason for such a severe shortfall was the failure of
many State Governments to raise the budgetary resources through additional revenue raising
measures, increase in the non-Plan revenue expenditure on the target group oriented
programmes, effect of the adoption of Central Pay scales and Central Dearness Allowances
by many State Governments. The financially unviable operations of the State Electricity
Boards, the State Road Transport Corporations and other State enterprises in most of the
States had an adverse impact on the BCR of the State Governments, as these resulted in
higher subsidies and grants to these enterprises, in addition to substantial loss of revenue in
terms of interest and dividends, while States were forced to pay interest on their loans. The
unwillingness of most of the States to revise the irrigation rates at least to meet the O&M
expenditure was another reason for the shortfall in the States own resources. The most
worrisome aspect was the increasing number of States providing free electricity to the
farmers at a time when the country is facing a severe power shortage.5
2.1.3 Transfer of Centrally Sponsored Schemes
Another issue which has been cropping up from time to time in the relations between the
Centre and the States pertains to the Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS). The CSS are being
implemented right from the beginning of the First Plan. When they were conceived, they
were welcomed as they were intended to serve certain specific national goals. One classic
5 http://www.jstor.org/stable/
7

example of CSS, which has made a far reaching impact, has been the introduction of HYV
seed. This ushered in the Green Revolution in the country. But the number of CSS has grown
over the years and they have made deep inroads even into the spheres falling within the
domain of the States. There have been efforts from time to time for transferring the CSS to
the States along with the corresponding funds, but not to much avail. A review undertaken by
the Planning Commission showed that in 1995-96 there were 182 CSS under implementation
with the Central funding of the order of Rs.16,000 crore. This level of Central funding is even
more than the normal Plan assistance given to the States for the State Plans. In principle, the
CSS should be confined to schemes of an inter-State character, matters impinging on national
security, selected national priorities where Central supervision is essential for effective
implementation and multi-State externally financed projects where the Central coordination is
necessary for operational reasons. Except for such schemes, all other schemes should be
transferred to the States along with the corresponding funds. A detailed exercise has been
done by the Planning Commission to identify the schemes which could be transferred to the
States in the light of the above approach.
A final decision in the matter would be taken after ascertaining the views of the State
Governments/Central Ministries with the approval of the NDC.6
2.1.4 Inter-se Allocation of Plan Assistance
Since 1969, the Central assistance for the State Plans has been distributed to the States as per
the Gadgil Formula. Some marginal changes have been made in this formula from time to
time, but the emphasis has always been on channelising larger Central assistance to the
backward States. The formula was last amended in 1991-92. As per the existing formula, after
setting apart the funds required for Externally Aided Projects (EAPs) and reasonable amounts
for Special Area Programmes, 30% of the balance is earmarked for ten Special Category
States. The balance amount is distributed among Non-Special Category States on the basis of
following criteria and weightage :
6 http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Visakhapatnam/trends-in-centrestaterelations-discussed/article
8

------------------------------Criteria
Weightage
------------------------------Population (1971)
Per Capita Income
- 60%
- 25%
Performance Criteria - 7.5%

Special Problems
- 7.5%
------------------------------During the Plan discussions, various Chief Ministers have asked for a revision of this
formula for allocation of Central assistance to the State Plans so as to change both the criteria
and the relative weights. While the backward States have argued for higher weightage to be
given to backwardness, (equity), the better-off States have argued that they should be
rewarded for maintaining financial discipline and achieving better productivity, (efficiency).
No formula can satisfy the demands of all the States. The formula for the allocation of
Central assistance has to be such that it helps in a balanced regional development on the one
hand and encourages financial discipline and better economic performance on the other. The
solution to this contentious problem has to be found by a consensus. The views of the State
Governments have been sought regarding the revision of the formula. The NDC will have to
take a final view on this matter.7
2.1.5 Nature of Central Assistance
Besides the issue of inter-se distribution of Central assistance among the States, the nature of
Central assistance, that is, the grant-loan component, has also been raised from time to time.
The States argue that when 30% of the grant component was introduced in 1969, the revenue
component of the States' Plans was around 30 percent. Subsequently, it has gone on
increasing, reaching upto 45 percent. They maintain that this justifies the increase in the grant
component of Central assistance for State Plans under Gadgil Formula. Further, the States
argue that among other reasons, the 70% loan component in the Central assistance for the
States Plans has been a major reason for their increasing debt burden. They argue that their
debt burden has been increasing so much so that in some cases there is net reverse flow of
funds. They have, therefore, been asking for an increase in the proportion of the grant
7 http://www.epw.in/special-articles/centre-state-relations-india.html
9

component in the Central assistance. The Special Category States have demanded Central
assistance to be given as 100 per cent grant. The Sarkaria Commission had examined this
issue and recommended different patterns of loan-grant assistance, depending upon the
paying capacity of the States. The Finance Commissions in the past had also looked into the
debt position of the States and recommended a scheme for general debt relief for all States,
linked to fiscal performance and specific relief for States with high fiscal stress, the Special
Category States and the States with debt problems warranting special attention. It has to be
recognised that any change in the grant-loan component of the Central assistance has
implications for the resource position of the Central Government. The NDC may have to
decide on the issue of grant-loan proportion in the Central assistance while considering the
question of inter-se distribution of the Central assistance among the States.8
b. POLITICAL RELATIONS
There are provisions whereby a State or a part thereof could be brought under the emergency
powers of the Union. This can be done even without any constitutional breakdown and has
been made possible as per Amendment in Article 352. However, bringing a State under the
Presidents rule always triggers several controversies and brings criticism from political
experts especially if the dissolved Assembly belonged to some other party than the one ruling
at the Centre. 9
The legislative powers are vested in the Union and the States, but the Union wields dominant
power over the States. Article 249 empowers the Rajya Sabha or the Upper House to assume
legislative powers and make laws for a two-third majority for a temporary period on any
matter in the State List, which it feels necessary or expedient. Article 252 empowers the
legislatures of two or more States to authorise the Parliament to make a law on any matter in
the State List. Under Article 360, during financial emergency, all financial bills must be sent
to the President for his assent, or he may direct the Governor to place the financial bills of the
State before him for consideration. Under Article 256, the Constitution provides that the
executive power of the States should be so exercised as to ensure compliance with the laws
made by the Parliament as well as the existing laws.
8 http://www.enableall.org/competitivequest/GK/IndianFederalismCenterStateRelations.html
9 HM SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, (4th ed., vol. 3, 1996).
10

A face-off between the Centre and the States can lead to the use of Article 356 in the State. It
empowers the President to dissolve the State legislature on the recommendation of the
cabinet, if there is a breakdown of the constitutional machinery at the State level, and
proclaim Presidents rule in the State. Such an imposition can lead to the deployment of
central forces in the State to maintain law and order.
Since the maintenance of law and order is a State subject, the role of the Centre in violating
the authority has been questioned. The 42nd Amendment to Article 257 empowered the
Union to deploy a central force, for dealing with any grave situation of law and order in any
State. It has, however, been clarified that a grave situation of law and order is different
from the internal disturbance as envisaged in Article 356.10
3. PRESENT SCENARIO OF THE CENTRE-STATE RELATIONS

3.1 FAILED PLEDGES
It is well known that the constitution of India was framed within about three years of
independence, and it made some pledges through the Directive Principles of State Policy --to secure, among other things, for the people of India the right to an adequate means of
livelihood, the right to employment, education and health. These pledges, however, have been
grossly under-achieved. The number of the unemployed, according to the latest National
Sample Survey data, has soared from 2.65 crore in 1999-2000 by 87 lakh to reach a staggered
figure of 3.52 crore in 2004-05. About 30 percent of the population is still below or around
the poverty line, one-third of population is illiterate and under-five mortality rate is
unfortunately at 85 per 1,000 live births.
There was another related, important pledge made in terms of the constitutional provisions. It
is known that in the constitution, major responsibilities in the spheres of development
expenditure (for instance, on education, health, irrigation, roads, power etc) as well as
10 V.N. SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, (11th ed., 2008).
11

administrative expenditure (on general administration, law and order etc) were given to the
states. But in the distribution of powers of revenue-raising in the same constitution, major
sources of revenue (such as income and corporate tax, production excise, customs duties etc)
were all given to the centre. It is in view of this imbalance --- the major revenue-raising
powers being heavily tilted in favour of the central government and major responsibilities in
the sphere of developmental and administrative expenditure given to the states --- that the
constitution made an important pledge in its article 280: of setting up a Finance Commission
with a periodicity of five years, to recommend a just share of receipts of central taxes as well
as a compensating flow of deficit grants to the states. Article 275, then, made the provision of
further augmentation of the states revenue through grants for promotion of welfare of the
scheduled tribes.
However, regarding these pledges about the much-needed decentralisation of financial
resources to the states, there has unfortunately been a gross failure over the years at the
national level. This failure is not an isolated event. It is connected with the adoption at the
national level of a capitalist path of development which required India to be a unified
homogeneous market. This path reflected the needs of the big capitalists, allied with
landlords, who have always considered democracy and more powers for the states and the
people as obstacles to their view of economic growth and political power.
3.2 PREVAILING IMBALANCE
The basic problem of imbalance in the financial aspect of centre-state relations, as mentioned
above, is actually seen from the following fact. In 2004-05, according to the estimates of
expenditure compiled by the Reserve Bank of India, the burden of annual developmental
expenditure borne by the states (taken together, Rs 3.62 lakh crore) was more than one and a
half times higher than what was borne by the centre (Rs 2.33 lakh crore). These figures relate
to the expenditure that the states could made under financial constraints. The really needed
developmental expenditure of the states would have been much higher, at least twice this
figure. On the other hand, in the sphere of revenue-raising, of the total revenue collected in
the country in 2005-06, nearly 62 percent went to the hands of the central government and
only 38 percent to all the states taken together.11
11 http://polityinindia.wordpress.com/tag/federalism-and-centre-state-relations/
12
Given this greater burden of the states responsibilities of developmental expenditure on the
one hand, and more powers of revenue mobilisation at the centre on the other, the pledge has
been, as mentioned earlier, for a matching transfer of resources from the centre to the states in
terms of devolution of central taxes and grants in terms of article 280 and article 275 of the
constitution. In fact, however, the share of net central transfer in terms of devolution of
central taxes and grants (net of interest payment by the states on central loans), as a
proportion of the centres total revenue receipts, has unfortunately fallen from 32.7 percent in
1990-91 to a very low figure of 29.5 percent in 2004-05, showing a gross failure of the
pledge in terms of constitutional provisions to help the states for carrying out the needed
developmental activities. Confronted with this situation, it has been worked out by the Leftled state governments (and supported by other states as well) that, given the available data on
the need of development expenditure, the state's share of central tax revenue should be at
least 50 percent.
Moreover, the states have also correctly demanded transfer of at least residuary powers in the
constitution, particularly the residuary powers of taxation of services, to the states. But, of
late, through a constitutional amendment, the centre has unjustly acquired for itself the entire
power of levy of service taxation. Fairness requires that the states may now at least be given
the concurrent powers of taxation of all services, albeit at a lower rate than that levied by the
centre.
It may also be noted that the share of total market borrowing to which the states may be
entitled is also dictated by the centre. In the 1950s, shares of market borrowing of the states
and the centre in the total governmental market borrowings were in the proportion of 50:50.
But this share of market borrowing of the states has now fallen sharply to around 15 percent,
with more than 85 percent of the market borrowing being cornered by the centre. Now,
consistent with development responsibilities of the states, the share of market borrowing of
the states should be steadily increased to 50 percent within a period of five years.
13
4. NEED FOR RESTRUCTURING CENTRE- STATE RELATIONS

4.1 Misuse of Articles 356 and 355
The repeated misuse by the Centre of the provisions of Article 356 of the Constitution to
dismiss State Governments and dissolve State Assemblies has been subverting the federal
principle and the rights of the States. The demand to restrict the use of Article 356 only to
cases where there is a serious threat to national unity or the secular fabric of the country has
been raised from various quarters in successive meetings of the Inter-State Council. In view
of the Supreme Court judgment on the S. R. Bommai case 12, there is an urgent need to build
in strong safeguards in Articles 356 and 365 through appropriate amendments of the
Constitution. However, no decision has been taken by the Union Government in this regard.
There is also a new and alarming proposal for Central deployment of paramilitary forces in
the States unilaterally in a situation which the Centre would consider as an internal
disturbance. The provenance of Article 355 needs to be clarified. As has been repeatedly
stressed by several constituents of the Inter-State Council, the term internal disturbance in
Article 355 is related to public order, which is the first entry in the State List. The proposal
for Central deployment of paramilitary forces in a State in a situation which the Centre would
consider as internal disturbance without the States concurrence is unacceptable. Article
355 should be amended on the lines suggested above for Article 356. Apart from external
aggression, only a serious threat to national unity or an assault on the secular principle can be
taken cognizance of.
4.2 Appointment and Role of Governors
The provision for centrally appointed Governors for the States has remained as an
anachronism, which is not in keeping with a federal democratic polity. If the post of
Governor has to be retained, then the Governor should be appointed by the President from a
list of three eminent persons suggested by the Chief Minister, satisfying the criteria
mentioned by the Sarkaria Commission. This has also been repeatedly discussed in the InterState Council. None of the major countries of the world with a federal constitution have any
12 M.P.JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, (6th ed., 2012).
14

provision for a post of the Governor in a State to be appointed by the Centre. There should
also be a time limit with regard to Governors assent to Bills passed by the State Assemblies.
Moreover, the requirement of an explicit norm debarring Governors from publicly expressing
disagreements or differences with the State Government, also need to be debated. There is
also a need to review whether Governors should continue to be ex-officio Chancellors of
State Universities.
4.3 Central Intrusion into the State List
Not only have the earlier transfer of State subjects, such as education, to the Concurrent List
been left unreversed, but further intrusions have also been made into the State List in terms of
proliferation of the so-called Centrally Sponsored Schemes. These Central schemes on the
State subjects, which contain rigid guidelines imposed by the Centre, besides having
implications in the financial sphere, also impair the autonomy of the States and affect their
development priorities.
There is an urgent need to review the impact of the transfer of legislative items from the State
to the Union/Concurrent List. The Union Government has so far ignored the demand of the
States to place at least the residuary powers of legislation in the State List. The residuary
power of taxation in the sphere of services is being pre-emptorily used by the Union
Government to the total exclusion of the States. Despite discussions in the Inter-State
Council, the proposal for a Constitutional amendment to set definite time-limits for receiving
the assent of Governors or the President in the case of bills passed by the State Assemblies
has so far been ignored. Moreover, there is no formal institutional structure that requires
mandatory consultation between the Centre and the States in areas of legislation under the
Concurrent List. 13
4.4 Treaty-making Powers
The present Constitutional scheme with regard to treaty making power being exclusively in
the domain of the Union Executive needs to be urgently reviewed. The Constitution should be
amended to make legislative sanction mandatory for any international treaty. Besides, several
international treaties like the WTO agreement have serious implications for the States,
13 H.R.KHANNA, LEGAL CLASSICS: MAKING
OF INDIAS
15
CONSTITUTION, (2nd ed. 2009).

especially with respect to State subjects like agriculture. In all such cases, consultation with
the States and concurrence of the Inter-State Council must also be made mandatory.
4.5 All-India Services
The All India Services are under the exclusive domain of the Centre. Some of the powers can
be shared with the States. The State Governments should especially have a greater role in the
administration of the Rules and Regulations of All India Services.
Several cases of disputes between the union and the state governments regarding the All India
Services Officers have been in the news.
The recent case was the suspension of the SDM of Greater Noida IAS Durga Shakti Nagpal.
This decision of the Akhilesh Yadav led Samajwadi party Govt. was criticized by the Union
Govt. When the Union Ministry said the state govt. to take back the suspension of Mrs.
Nagpal, then the UP Cheif Minister Akhilesh Yadav went to the extent of saying that The
Union Govt. may call all the IAS officers to the centre, we will run the administration with
the State Administrative Officers.
This became a controversy because IAS Mrs. Nagpal was suspended for the only reason that
she ordered to remove an illegally built wall of a Mosque which is no justified reason to
suspend the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of a District. Her suspension was taken back after 2-3
months.
16

5. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has at times upheld the decision of dismissing the State government. In
March 1994, the apex court upheld the dismissal of the BJP State Government in Madhya
Pradesh and Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh in 1992 because it considered that the
antisecular actions of these States were inconsistent with the secular character of the
Constitution. However, a large number of cases of dismissal have been held unconstitutional.
For example, the Article was used to impose Presidents Rule in Uttar Pradesh on the
recommendation of the Governor Romesh Bhandari-although the Kalyan Singhs BJP
government had proved its majority on the floor of the Assembly. The governors action
showed that being political appointees, the governors display partisan politics and are unable
to take a proper decision under their constitutional responsibilities.
The Sarkaria Commission called for a consensus and cooperation between the Centre and the
States for the smooth functioning of democracy. It favoured a strong Centre to safeguard the
national unity and integrity, but viewed the centralisation of power as dangerous. It
recommended that the Article 356 should be used sparingly and in the rarest of rare cases,
when all other alternatives fail. The Centre-State relations must be founded on fairness and
mutual respect. The responsibility devolves on politicians to rise above the parochial
considerations and uphold the true values of democracy.
To sum up, the reordering of centre-state relations for more justified devolution of powers to
the states is an important pledge intrinsically connected to the fulfilment of other pledges
regarding the common peoples greater access to employment, livelihood, education, health
care and other amenities. Such decentralisation of powers from the centre to the states,
moreover, must not stop at the state headquarters, but go down to the level of village
panchayats and urban municipalities in the districts, and through them to the vast majority of
people. It is only through the peoples involvement of people, through their struggles, that
these two kinds of pledges pledge of employment, livelihood, education and health for the
people and pledge for decentralisation of powers can be combined into a unified pledge for
realisation. The Independence Day is an occasion for the common working people to take up
this unified pledge as a part of their class struggle.
17

6. REFERENCES
Books:
V.N. SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, (11th ed., 2008).

D.D. BASU, SHORTER CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, (14th ed., vol. 2, 2009).
M.P.JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, (6th ed., 2012).
G. AUSTIN, WORKING OF A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, (1st ed., 1999).
H.R.KHANNA, LEGAL CLASSICS: MAKING OF INDIAS CONSTITUTION, (2nd ed. 2009).
D.D. BASU, SHORTER CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, (14th ed., vol. 1,2009).
HM SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, (4th ed., vol. 3, 1996).
Websites:
www.lawmin.nic.in
www.jstor.org
www.epw.in
www.thehindu.com
www.preservearticles.com
www.polityinindia.wordpress.com
18

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Centre- State Relation

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